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POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIII.

FROM JANUARY TO JUNE

1808.

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1808.

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Table of the Number of *Christenings* and *Burials* within the Bills of Mortality, from December 1807, to May 1808, inclusive.

Epochs.	Christened.		Buried.														Total Buried.	
	Male.	Female	Under 2 Years.	2 to 5.	5 to 10.	10 to 20.	20 to 30.	30 to 40.	40 to 50.	50 to 60.	60 to 70.	70 to 80.	80 to 90.	90 to 100, &c.	Males	Females		
December	973	943	629	324	110	60	132	195	205	191	164	144	59	9	1148	1084		
January	897	886	632	231	101	50	106	166	198	185	167	131	52	7	1061	965		
February	626	609	573	240	76	52	98	150	146	159	149	112	56	4	929	886		
March	798	748	538	228	71	56	124	171	164	173	152	138	64	3	986	896		
April	947	913	493	213	73	53	116	191	214	177	157	128	67	6	969	919		
May	736	739	409	174	67	51	79	136	133	125	126	81	33	0	725	695		
	4977	4838	3274	1410	498	322	655	1009	1060	1010	915	734	331	29	5818	5445		
Total Christenings. . 9815																Total Burials. . 11263		

Table of the Prices of *Meat, Sugar, Salt, and Coals*, in London, from December 1807, to May 1808, inclusive.

	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	April	May	
	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	per Stone of 8lb. to sink the Official.
Beef ..	5 0	5 0	5 4	5 4	5 8	5 6	
Mutton	4 4	4 0	4 4	4 8	4 8	5 0	
Pork ..	4 0	4 0	5 8	5 0	5 0	5 8	
Sugar ..	33 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	33 7	31 8	34 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	37 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	38 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	Cwt.
Salt. . .	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	Bushel
Coals ..	56 3	56 0	58 0	65 0	54 6	52 0	Chald.

Table of the Prices of the *Quartern Loaf* in London, from December 1807, to May 1808, inclusive

Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May
Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.
<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>
6 10 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 11 1	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 11 3	11 11	1 11
13 10 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 11 8	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 11 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 11 8	11 $\frac{1}{2}$
20 10 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 11 15	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 11 $\frac{1}{2}$	17 11 15	11 $\frac{1}{2}$
27 11 25	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 11 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 11 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 11 22	11 $\frac{1}{2}$

Table of the Prices of the English *Three per Cent. Consols*, from Dec. 1807, to May 1808, inclusive.

Day	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	April	May
1	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	63	64	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—
2	64	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	—	64	66 $\frac{1}{2}$
3	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	66 $\frac{1}{2}$
4	64	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	64	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	67 $\frac{1}{2}$
5	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	67 $\frac{1}{2}$
6	—	—	63	—	64	67 $\frac{1}{2}$
7	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	67 $\frac{1}{2}$
8	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	65	67 $\frac{1}{2}$
9	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	65	65	68
10	—	—	63	64	—	—
11	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	65	68
12	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	65	67
13	—	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	—	65	—
14	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	66	68
15	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	64	—	67
16	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	63	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	—
17	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	68
18	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	63	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	—
19	—	63	63	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	68
20	—	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	—	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	—
21	—	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	68 $\frac{1}{2}$
22	64	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	66	—
23	64	63	63	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	65	—
24	64	—	63	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	68 $\frac{1}{2}$
25	—	—	63	—	66	68 $\frac{1}{2}$
26	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	66	68
27	—	63	—	—	66	—
28	64	63	—	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	—
29	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	68 $\frac{1}{2}$
30	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	—
31	64 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	—	—	—

Table of the Prices of the French *Five per Cent. Consolidés*, from Dec. 1807, to May 1808, inclusive.

Day	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	M	April	May
1	—	—	—	85.50	—	—
2	—	86	—	—	—	—
3	—	—	—	—	—	86.0
4	—	—	—	—	85.50	—
5	85.50	—	86.25	—	—	86.50
6	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	—	86.50	—	—	—	—
8	—	—	—	—	85.75	—
9	—	—	—	—	—	—
10	—	—	—	—	—	—
11	—	—	—	—	85.75	86.75
12	86.0	—	—	83.75	—	—
13	—	—	—	—	—	—
14	—	—	—	—	—	—
15	—	—	86.50	—	—	—
16	—	—	—	—	—	87
17	—	—	—	83.90	86.10	—
18	—	86.50	—	—	—	—
19	—	—	—	—	—	—
20	—	—	—	—	—	—
21	—	—	—	—	86.50	—
22	86.50	—	—	—	—	87.30
23	—	—	—	—	—	—
24	—	—	—	—	—	—
25	—	—	84.10	86.75	—	—
26	—	—	—	—	—	—
27	—	—	—	—	—	—
28	—	—	86.0	—	—	—
29	—	—	—	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	—	—
30	—	—	—	—	—	—
31	—	—	—	—	—	—

Table of the Number of *Bankruptcies* in England, from December 1807, to May 1808, inclusive.

Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	April	May
87	95	106	87	88	122

It is the boast of the partizans of the late minister, William Pitt, that the Commerce of England was doubled during his administration.—When he became minister, the interest of the National Debt (paid annually out of the taxes) amounted to something more than nine millions of pounds sterling; and, at the close of his administration, it amounted to more than twenty four millions of pounds sterling.—During his administration, he added five-fold to the Assessed Taxes; he created the Income Tax; and, by what is called the Land Tax Redemption Act, he made that tax perpetual, and caused the alienation for ever of a considerable part of the property of the Church and of all charitable foundations.—During the year after he became minister (1785) the money paid on account of the Poor, in England and Wales, amounted to 2,004,238 pounds, the average price of the quartern loaf in that year, being sixpence three farthings; and, during the year 1803 (two years before the end of his career), the money paid on account of the Poor, in England and Wales, amounted to 4,267,965 pounds, the average price of the quartern loaf, in that year, being ninepence farthing.—During his administration, the act of “Habeas Corpus,” or personal-safety act, was suspended for several years together.—When he died, in January, 1806, the parliament came to an unanimous decision to cause his Debts, to the amount of 40,000 pounds, to be paid out of taxes raised upon the people; and, further, caused him to be buried at the public expense, and voted a monument in honour of his memory, in Westminster Abbey Church, also at the public expense, and that too, upon the ground of the services which he had rendered the country.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION.—I think, that enough was said, in my last Number, to dissipate all the bubbles, which the full grown babies of the London press had been, for several days, blowing out for the amusement of others like themselves; but, since the writing of the article here referred to, I have seen some instances of their frothy folly that I cannot forbear to notice. Upon this occasion, as well as upon all others, the two factions are opposed to each other; but, this is one of those events, which both represent as auspicious for the country, and, of course, the point in dispute is, which faction has the merit of it. If merit there be, however, it manifestly appears, that to neither of them does it belong; for, the letter of our envoy, Lord Strangford, as well as that of Sir Sidney Smith, our admiral, leave it clearly to be inferred, that, if the Prince Regent of Portugal could have remained upon the terms of joining Napoleon against England, he would have remained; and, indeed, to be satisfied of this, what have we to do but to refer to his hostile proclamation? But, Napoleon would not suffer him to remain upon those terms; so that, the merit of the emigration, for which the two factions are quarrelling, like two dogs for a bone, belongs to Napoleon, or, if it must be divided, the Prince Regent is the only one who has any fair pretensions to a share. And this being the case, Napoleon having been assured, that an emigration to the Brazils would be the consequence of his refusing to suffer the Prince to reign in Portugal, is there not some reason for us to hesitate, before we give way to such unbound-

ed joy at the event? Napoleon is not very much in the habit of doing that which he foresees will produce good to us. But, I agree, that his opinions are no rule whereby for us to judge of what is for our good. I agree, that the case must rest upon its own intrinsic merits; and, I think I have shown, in my former article upon the subject, that the emigration cannot, in all probability, tend to our good.—Of an opinion widely different, however, are the wisemen of the London press. The *Comier* says: “The escape of the royal family of Portugal from the grasp of the tyrant, and the prospects which that event opens to our view, have produced the greatest satisfaction. Already has commerce directed its attention to the Brazils, and several ships have been engaged to convey thither the produce of our industry.”—I doubt it not. There needs no assurance on the part of this writer to convince me, that the event has produced great satisfaction amongst the inhabitants of Finsbury Square and Thames Street: nor have I the least doubt, that the Brazils will soon become a grand out-let for the produce, or fruits, of the industry of the people of England, having, indeed, shown, in my former Number, that a good round sum out of our taxes will be wanted to support the new government of her most faithful majesty. But, I see, in this, nothing to give me satisfaction, and nothing that ought to give satisfaction to any man, who has the good of England at heart.—The *Morning Chronicle*, as if he were pitted for a wager against his “brainless brother,” says: “there is at this moment actually cut down in the Brazils,

“ timber sufficient for the construction of 20 sail of the line. Our West India islands can be amply supplied from the Brazils with provisions, lumber, and every article of necessity.”—Timber for twenty sail of the line! What was it cut down for? And who cut it down? The event, which has now taken place, could not have been anticipated in the Brazils; and, if it had, whence were to come the hands to cut down the timber? The whole of the population does not surpass half a million of souls, scattered over an immense territory. The Europeans do not work, and the African slaves are employed in raising them provisions and in working the mines. It would require, I should think, one half of the working population to be employed for a whole year to cut down and rough-hew timber sufficient for twenty ships of the line, supposing a sufficiency of the various sorts of timber to be found in the country, which is not the case. And, if one half of the working population were employed in this way, is it not evident, that one half of the people must cease to eat; or, that one half of the mines must cease to be worked? This assertion, therefore, respecting the timber cut down in the Brazils, is not less silly than false. Still, however, it is, as to both these qualities, far surpassed by the assertion respecting the capability of the Brazils to supply our West India colonies “ with provisions, lumber, and every article of necessity.” The *Morning Chronicle* will say it is unfair if I suppose him to include amongst articles of necessity, the clothing and hardware requisite in the West Indies; and, therefore, I will suppose him to mean only the wood necessary for buildings and for cooperage, and the food necessary for the people to live upon. First, as to the wood, the inhabited part of the Brazils is at a distance from the centre of our West India colonies, five times as great as that which divides those colonies from the centre ports of the United States of America, or from Nova Scotia; so that, supposing there to be a spare population in the Brazils sufficient for the preparation of the several sorts of lumber; supposing there to be a sufficiency of saw-mills and of other conveniences under the scorching suns of the Brazils; and supposing there to be iron and shipwrights in abundance in that country, the lumber must arrive in the West Indies at an expense which would soon cause the plantations to be deserted, English sugar necessarily being quite unable to bear a moment’s competition with that raised by the

colonists of other nations. But, supposing all this to be overbalanced by the advantage of getting the lumber from a country other than the American States. Yet, what good is this grand event to us in this respect? We have another of our own, Nova Scotia, covered with all sorts of wood, from the pine to the hazel, and we have, nevertheless, found, that it is impossible thence to draw the lumber necessary for our West India colonies. The reason is, that we have not there a sufficiency of spare population to prepare the lumber for the West Indies, and we never shall have as long as the banks of the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomack, the Ohio, and the Mississippi invite to the tilling of a climate more genial. By compelling the West India colonies to receive no lumber except from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, we should, doubtless, induce people to reside in the last countries; but, as their food would cost much more labour to raise it than it costs to raise food for the hewers of wood in the American States, the lumber would come at an increased price to the West India planters, English West India produce would be dearer than the produce of the West India colonies belonging to other nations, what we used of it in England we should be obliged to give more of the fruit of our labour for, and, as to foreign countries, there our planters would be undersold by the planters of every other nation. This is the reason why our West India islands have not been supplied with lumber from our own American colonies; and, leaving the difference in distance out of the question, the same reason exists with respect to the Brazils, where the population is short of half a million at the end of two hundred years; and, into which there have been imported from Africa, during that time, not less than two millions of negroes. The population of the Brazils is a forced population, a population kept up by importing men into the country, by purchasing men to live and work there; and I leave the reader to judge of the understanding (or learning) of the man who asserts, in the most unqualified manner, that our West India colonies can be supplied with lumber by a country, where each workman costs, upon an average, at the first purchase, two hundred guineas.—But, if it be so grossly absurd to assert that the Brazils are capable of supplying our West India colonies with lumber, what shall we say of the other proposition of this writer, namely, that they are capable of supplying those colonies with provisions?—First, what are the sorts of provisions, with which the West India

colonies require to be supplied? Flour, salt pork and beef, and butter. I will say nothing of the live-stock, which are carried thither from the American States, and which, if they could possibly be found in sufficient number in the Brazils, would, doubtless, greatly relish, and thrive exceedingly during, a voyage of from six to ten weeks, and sometimes of three months.—The flour, supposing the mills and all constructed ready, must, after such a voyage, come very cheap to our planters, especially when we consider that the agricultural labourers are brought from Africa at the price of two hundred guineas each. Besides these objections, which apply to corn and flour, there are others with regard to the salt meat and butter. I should suppose, that the very coolest days ever known in the Brazils, almost the whole territory of which lies between the tropics, exceed in heat the very hottest days ever known in England. Now, it is well known, that no sort of meat will take salt, unless the weather, speaking in our language, be cold; how then, is it possible to preserve meat in the Brazils, much less to put it up in a state fit to be kept for a twelvemonth? And, I should think, that even the smoke-dried tenants of the city, many of whom never saw the morning dew in their lives, would require but very little to convince them, that the potting down of butter under a vertical sun must be delightful sport, surpassing even that of eating hasty-pudding with an awl.—One would really suppose, that this writer of the *Morning Chronicle* never thought. That his words dropped out from his pen at random. And, yet, he sometimes sports a word or two of Latin at the close of a paragraph, in order, I suppose, to shew, that he is “a gentleman of education,” a man of “classical learning.” The truth is, he has no time for thinking about any thing but what will serve the purposes of his faction. Upon party squabbles it is admirable what dexterity he shows; how he stickles and quibbles and shuffles, and with what charming grace he unsays to day what he said yesterday; but, upon all matters, wherein the public look for, and need information, it is truly surprising to see what ignorance he discovers; though it must be confessed, that he is fully equalled, even in this respect, by a great majority of his brethren.—Nevertheless, I dare say, that it is, by this time, pretty generally believed, that the Brazils are capable of supplying our West India colonies with lumber and provisions; and that John Bull begins to hug himself in the idea, that he has found out a population of half a mil-

lion of people, who, with the surplus of their produce, are able to feed a million of people in another country. He will, too, I dare say, perceive, that, supposing the Brazilians to be able to send forth so much subsistence, it will be mightily advantageous to them to receive in exchange, sugar, coffee, indigo, and tobacco, all of which they grow abundantly in their own country. John can swallow a pretty good dose, and should not be so free with his jokes upon those who place reliance upon the virtues of holy-water. His priests (I mean the London news-editors) are much greater impostors than those who taught his forefathers to perform pilgrimages to the shrine of that famous scoundrel “Saint Thomas a Becket,” and who exhibited the blood of a duck for that of Jesus Christ. John may laugh, and shake his fat jowls, at being gravely told of the Virgin Mary’s house taking a flight from Palestine to Italy; but, in revenge, the Italians have nothing to do but to remind him of his building a monument in honour of the memory of Pitt, in consequence of the national services of that minister; or, of his rejoicing at the emigration of the Portuguese Government, as an event auspicious to England. John is an honest, industrious, unsuspicious fellow; but, it becomes not him, above all others, to laugh at those who suffer themselves to be amused and cheated by quacks and impostors.—The above examination into the abilities of the Brazils may serve to enable us to judge of the probability of the new government ever being capable of supporting itself, and maintaining the independence of the country. It appears to me quite impossible, that it should be able to keep up either a fleet, or an army, without recruits from England, and without grants of English money; and, then, what will the Brazils be, but another accursed colony, another mill-stone about our necks, another East Indies? I think, however, that the likely thing is, that, when we come to make peace, Napoleon will insist, that the Brazils shall belong to Portugal; and, in that case, what are we to do? Shall we continue the war, “eternal war,” rather than give up our hold upon the Brazils, especially when that important country, Hanover, which is “as dear to us as Hampshire,” may be offered to us in exchange? Ah, poor Prince Regent! dismal as you will find the Brazils, you will not, I am afraid, upon your landing there, have seen half the mortifications that are in store for you.—What we have to consider, at present, however, is the expence that this new government will be to us; the quantity of labour we shall have to

perform to raise the taxes that will be required of us for its support. But, if I am not greatly deceived, we shall not be left long in doubt upon this subject; that meeting of parliament, for which the Morning Chronicle is so anxious, will, I am pretty certain, enable the world to judge of the understandings of those, who bid us rejoice at this event.—In taking my leave of this subject, for the present, I cannot forbear pressing upon the memory of the reader, that it appears from the official dispatches published by the ministers, that the Prince Regent would not have emigrated, had he not been assured, that Napoleon would have shown him no quarter; that, while emigration was talked of in England, rather than the Prince would join the foes of England, the Prince was issuing a proclamation by which he joined the foes of England; and that, therefore, those persons were right, who, with me, laughed at the idea of an emigration to the Brazils, under the circumstances then represented to exist. I am desirous, that the reader should bear in mind, that the emigration, which has now taken place, is an event very different from that which was, at first, talked of, and expected; that the emigration talked of embraced a large number of the people, voluntarily leaving their country rather than live under French rule; that it was, in short, a dignified transfer of the seat of government that was then expected; that the emigration which has now taken place is to be considered as, indeed, the newspapers call it, “an escape;” and that none of us, who ridiculed the idea of an emigration of the state, ever supposed it unlikely, that many persons in Portugal, if implacably pursued by the French, would do their best to escape.—Just as I was laying by this article, the following paragraph caught my eye.—“Notice was yesterday given at the Post-Office, that bags of letters would be made up and forwarded to Rio de Janeiro; a circumstance which induces a belief, that a commercial negociation between that country and England will shortly be opened. Yesterday a few of our merchants waited on the Portuguese Ambassador. His excellency received them with much complaisance and affability, but informed them, that until the necessary arrangements were formed, he could not take upon him to hold out any encouragement to commercial enterprizes to the Brazils.”—Yes, they have been at him already. A commercial negociation! Before they knew whether the Prince Regent will ever arrive in Brazil. Greedy as

ravening wolves. The Ambassador must have thought them mad. Besides, what commerce do these gentlemen expect to carry on to Brazil? They may carry some of the port wine that we have in England; but I know not any thing else that they can carry more than we used to supply the Brazils with before. If, however, it be true, that post-office packets are to be sent to that country, our expenses, on account of this “glorious event,” have already actually commenced. We may prepare to sweat; for these expences will make no little figure in our annual disbursements from the treasury.—I cannot forbear taking one more paragraph from the Morning Chronicle. “While every one is justly overjoyed at the prospect of extended commerce which the Brazils hold out to this country, as well as the lucky escape which our ancient ally has made from destruction, by an accident equally unforeseen and extraordinary, it is natural for us to feel some degree of anxiety with respect to the policy which such ministers as the present may adopt in so delicate and important a juncture, towards our transplanted ally. Never was there an occasion upon which more depended on the judgment—the soundness of views which our rulers may possess. The first shaping of our connexions with the new empire will be infinitely important to the continuance of our intercourse with it, in all time coming; and when we consider what set of men are now at the head of affairs, it is impossible not to feel extreme apprehensions as to the plans they may adopt, and the persons they may depute to execute then. Lord Bathurst and his commercial board; Lord Mulgrave, Mr. Robert Ward, and their maritime views; the solid talent of Lord Hawkesbury; the weight of Lord Camden; the wit of Mr. Canning, and his deep knowledge of the ancients, who knew not that Brazil existed; the tolerant, liberal spirit of Mr. Perceval; the slave-trading views of Lord Westmoreland, and indeed of almost the whole junto—all this may do well enough in ordinary times—and the interest of the country may in any common juncture escape total ruin, in spite of it.”—The plain English of which, is, “pray, good people, do make a clamour that the no popery ministers may be put out of their places, and that I and my patrons may get into them.” But, the people will not clamour. They know, that those who are now in the places are just exactly as good as your patrons, with this difference

in their favour, that they have never promised the people to do them any good. But, the best of this paragraph, is, the sneer at Mr. Canning for his deep knowledge of the ancients, who knew not that Brazil existed. Not much more did the ancients know about the situation and motions of the sun, the earth, or the planets; not much more did they know about navigation; not much more did they know about chemistry or electricity; not much more did they know about many of the sciences now of the utmost importance in the affairs of mankind. This is a furious, though side-winded, blow at the “learned languages;” and, I would have the Morning Chronicle beware how he draws off the envenomed Doctors from me to himself; for, it is quite clear, either that the “learned languages” are useless to a statesman, or that Mr. Canning, who was “captain of Eton,” has one qualification, at least, which a statesman ought to possess; and, it is precisely this qualification, which the Morning Chronicle has thought proper to ridicule.

Russia.—It will be remembered, that, sometime ago, in speaking upon the consequences, to us, of the total conquest of the continent of Europe by Napoleon, I gave it as my opinion, that we ought now explicitly to proclaim, that we had, and would maintain, a complete sovereignty of the sea; and, that, when we came to make peace, we should as explicitly assert, and exercise in peace, that sovereignty. I then endeavoured to shew, that there were many countries, which we should be able greatly to embarrass by cutting off all maritime communication between them; or, at least, by causing them to purchase all the goods they received from without at a price augmented tenfold. This article has been commented upon by the editor of a foreign newspaper, entitled the “*Courier du Nord*,” a translation of whose comments, as given in the Times newspaper, I here insert, because, supposing the writer to be a man well-informed, that is to say, learned. upon the subject, I think his comments will go very far towards convincing the reader, that my opinion was correct, and that, as far as Russia could be injured by the loss of commerce with foreign nations, it is in the power of England to injure her.—“Without going to the bottom of the question, we think it becomes us, as Russians, to examine these points, viz. whether England has the power of raising the price of foreign merchandize tenfold; and how far the nations of the globe could communicate with each other if the paths of the ocean were forbidden

them. The solution of these two questions depends on some local knowledge, which is not very common.—The first and important thing is, that merchandize may be embarked at Brzesc on the Bug, and may, without touching land, or changing its vessel, arrive at Bremer-Forden, within three posts of Bremen, by means of the canals of Bromberg and Havel. This way may therefore be made use of even for the most bulky objects; and we doubt not that it would have been used, but for the toll-duties in Germany, which are a bar against all continental circulation.—But, let us suppose this obstacle removed, and considering Amsterdam as the emporium of continental merchandize, let us see what a Dutch merchant will do who is desirous of sending cloth into Asia Minor, and of receiving cotton in return. He will certainly be able to embark his cloths upon the Zuyder Zee, and, always protected by the Isles, will carry them into the Weser, where he will have to transport them three posts by land, which will bring him to Bremer-Forden, whence, in the way above-mentioned, he will carry his cloths to Brzesc, ever on streams as easy to ascend as to descend.—At Brzesc he will find a canal begun, and, for the present, a short passage by land, which will bring the wares into the Prypee, and from thence into the Dnieper. If the Dutch merchant wishes that his cargoes of cloth should avoid the passage of the cataracts, he will have a further land-carriage of some leagues: then the cloth will have only to traverse the Black Sea, and go to Trebisonde. The return of cotton may be made in the same way; or, should the Dutch merchant prefer it, he will find at Odessa waggons belonging to the peasants of the Ukraine, which return empty, which will perhaps cost less than the vessels, and which will carry his merchandize to Brzesc.—Should the same Dutch merchant be desirous to transport his cloth into Persia, and join to it the opium of Asia Minor, he will cause it to ascend the Don up to Zarizyn: there he will find a land-carriage much employed, which will cost his goods not more than at the rate of three kopeeks each pound. He will go into the Volga, and thence into the Caspian Sea.—Mr. Cobbett says, “We hold the keys of China;” but this expression is not true in respect to Russia. Russia not only has commerce with China, but this commerce would be susceptible of a great extension,

“ were Russia to transmit piastres, as other
 “ nations do. A thousand piastres would
 “ cost but six roubles to transport, and the
 “ returns would be made by water; for
 “ the Selenga is navigable even to the
 “ frontiers of China. It may be descend-
 “ ed as far as the lake Raykal, where
 “ the Argoun is entered, and thence in
 “ the Jenissey to Jenniseysk, where there is
 “ a land-carriage of 100 wersts to Ket; and
 “ by that river, the Irtysh and the Tobol, the
 “ frontiers of European Russia are reached.
 “ This road is much used. Thus among
 “ the nations of the globe, there are many
 “ communications altogether independent
 “ of the ocean.—Let us now enquire
 “ what are the articles of merchandize
 “ which might be made tenfold dearer at
 “ the good pleasure of the Lords of the
 “ Ocean. Let us begin with coffee. All
 “ who have been at Venice these ten years
 “ or more, know that nothing is drunk there
 “ but the coffee of Arabia; dearer, it is
 “ true, than the coffee of the Islands, but it
 “ also pays an enormous contribution to the
 “ Beys of Egypt. Passing by Aleppo, Or-
 “ fa, Erzerom, and taking the road of Suez
 “ to Trebizonde, it would amount to 1,200
 “ wersts. Besides, the coffee which is
 “ bought at St. Petersburg goes by land to
 “ the extremities of the empire without be-
 “ ing much dearer to the last consumer;
 “ and the carriage on the back of camels is
 “ not in general dear. It results, therefore,
 “ that in Russia, Arabian coffee might be
 “ had at the price for which it was had at
 “ Venice.—Sugar is unquestionably the
 “ article, in respect to which Mr. Cobbett
 “ is nearest being in the right; and in fact
 “ he is in the right altogether as things are
 “ now; but this state of things may very
 “ easily be changed, by a free and sure
 “ communication with the Indus, in order
 “ to attain which, nothing is wanting but
 “ the consent of the Persians and Afghans. In
 “ fact, the English have no establishment on
 “ the Indus, which belongs to the independ-
 “ ent Raja of Tatta. Our Tartars of Oren-
 “ bourg, who sometimes proceed so far,
 “ agree in saying that the price of sugar on
 “ the Indus is below what would be im-
 “ agined. There is a distance of 1500 wersts
 “ from the Indus to the Caspian Sea. Su-
 “ gar, carried over the manner used in
 “ China and Egypt, might be sent these
 “ 1500 wersts without having its price dou-
 “ bled, I mean, the original price, which is
 “ exceedingly low. The camel costs abso-
 “ lutely nothing to maintain, and hence it
 “ happens that transports may be made in
 “ Asia very cheap.—Finally, spices ex-

“ cepted, there are few Asiatic articles
 “ which cannot in time be brought into Eu-
 “ rope through Russia, and this Russia itself
 “ is, during half the year, an ocean, being
 “ covered with water in the form of snow.
 “ All the horses which cannot then be em-
 “ ployed in the labours of husbandry, may
 “ be used in the transport of goods, and that
 “ at a very cheap rate. In summer, num-
 “ berless rivers, bearing their waters into
 “ the Volga and the Caspian Sea, shew Rus-
 “ sians the direction they ought to give to
 “ their activity.—It is beyond a doubt,
 “ that England consumes for its marine a
 “ great mass of products, and has hitherto
 “ given Russia advantages which she can
 “ expect from no other commercial nation;
 “ but if the menace of Mr. Cobbeit were
 “ put into execution, Russia, though she
 “ might lose at first, would perhaps be a
 “ gainer in the end.”—Now (addressing
 “ myself to this foreign editor), first of all you
 “ suppose, Sir, the toll duties of Germany re-
 “ moved, in order that Russia may receive her
 “ cloth from Holland; but, how are they to
 “ be removed? By the power of Napoleon, I
 “ suppose; for the Emperor of Russia will
 “ not be permitted to meddle in the affairs of
 “ Germany; and, for whatever good Napo-
 “ leon does Russia in this way, it is not to be
 “ doubted, that, in some way or other, he will
 “ receive an equivalent; so that, upon the sup-
 “ position that it is possible for Russia to re-
 “ ceive her clothing through Amsterdam, this
 “ equivalent will have been something forced
 “ from her by the maritime power of England.
 “ But, have you really considered the cost of
 “ transporting heavy and bulky goods two
 “ thousand miles by canals, and, in part, land
 “ carriage? I can know nothing of the prices
 “ of carriage of this sort upon the continent of
 “ Europe; but, I am able to come at a pretty
 “ correct judgment by comparing the canal and
 “ land charges here with the charge of sea
 “ freight. The expence of conveying goods
 “ by the canal from Liverpool to London, a
 “ distance of 200 miles, is more than half as
 “ much as that of conveying the same goods
 “ from Philadelphia to Liverpool; and, a land
 “ carriage of 60 miles, in England, is equal in
 “ expence to this canal carriage of 200 miles.
 “ Now, Sir, I am not easily to be made be-
 “ lieve, that either the canals or the roads be-
 “ tween Amsterdam and Petersburg are bet-
 “ ter than they are in England; I am satisfied,
 “ that the risk, including damage in lading and
 “ unloading, is as great, if not greater, inland
 “ than by sea; and though labour may posi-
 “ tively be cheaper upon the continent than it
 “ is here, relatively it cannot be cheaper, for
 “ labour, in all its branches, will bear an exact

proportion in price; if canal carriage be cheap at Amsterdam, so will sea carriage; and, therefore, my comparison is quite a sufficient guide for my judgment. Supposing, then, your canal at Brzesc finished instead of begun, and allowing that those "streams," of which you speak, have the extraordinary quality of ascent as easy as the descent, you will find, I believe, that only one hundred miles of your inland carriage will amount to more than sea freight from Amsterdam to Petersburg; I leave you to calculate what will be the relative amount of two (perhaps I should say three) thousand miles of inland land carriage. Besides, Sir, where are the people to come from to carry on this traffic; it would, I should suppose, require one half of the labouring population of the places, through which the goods would pass, to work the barges and waggons.—As to the empty waggons, which the Dutch merchant would find at Odessa, the owners of them must be of a very singular taste, a taste quite peculiar to the farmers of the Ukraine, if they will carry his goods for less than fifty times as much as it would cost to transport them the same distance in a ship. Of this trade between Holland and Asia Minor, however, it is not necessary to our purpose to say much; but I think there can be little doubt, that, if Russia were shut out from the ocean, which we have it in our power to accomplish, her supply of woollen cloth would soon become such as to reduce her to the use of her furs, in which state her millions of subjects might, perhaps, be as happy as they now are; but, the change would, I am fully persuaded, give an entire new cast to her character as one of the great nations of Europe.—We do not, according to your opinion, hold the keys of China against Russia. Why, to be sure, China and Russia are joined by intervening lands. They are upon the same continent; and, if the lands join, as some contend, at the northern extremity of the world, and there be but one continent, we do not, in this sense, hold the keys of the passage between Russia and Cape Horn; but, if we are able to prevent Russia from receiving any goods from China by sea, it appears to me that the keys are completely in our hands; for, as to the conveying of goods of bulk, eight or ten thousand English miles along rivers and through deserts, the notion is too ridiculous to be seriously entertained. Besides, it seems that Dollars are necessary in a traffic between Russia and China, and you recommend the transmitting of Dollars; but, where, in the case supposed, will you get the Dollars? You must dig them out of your snows; for,

we shall, by the use of our maritime power, prevent you from receiving any from America.—The coffee, which you are to receive from Arabia, may be better than that of the West Indies; but, that you will be able to drink it as cheap as it is drunk at Venice, appears to me quite incomprehensible. You admit, that, in its way to the confines of Russia it must experience a land carriage of 1,200 wersts, or 900 English miles; and, supposing you had camels to carry, which, according to your account, cost nothing to keep, the drivers, I presume, would cost something. But, you have no camels there. The carriage, over the 900 miles must be by the means of horses, and, unless the roads in that country are much better than they are in England (which is not very probable, I think), each pound of coffee would, in this part of the carriage alone, receive an additional cost of one shilling and sixpence sterling. In short, what with carriage, damage, loss and waste, coffee, at St. Petersburg, brought from Arabia, would be nearly as dear as gold-dust.—I am not, observe, supposing, that it would be any injury to the people of Russia if the Frenchified part of the nation were to be totally deprived of coffee, which is of no real use to any body. But, the case is quite different with respect to cloth, and also with respect to sugar, which, though it can be done without, is not only useful, but is, in some cases, almost a necessary of life. I will say nothing about the prime cost of sugar on the Indus; I will suppose it to be got there for nothing; and that a disposition and ability to raise it and give it away would increase with the demand for it; and, then, my opinion is, that each pound of sugar would cost more than a guinea before it arrived at St. Petersburg. Let the camels live upon the air, or upon nothing, and let them cost nothing to obtain, still camels must have drivers, and those drivers must have food and raiment; and, as to "all the horses of Russia" being employed during the winter in the transport of goods, what are the Russians to do for that fuel, which, during the winter months, they employ those horses in providing? Be assured, Sir, that the Russians as well as the English, keep as many horses as they want for their present purposes and no more. Besides, if the horses are sent upon long journeys from home, in winter, they must be well fed; there must be drivers here too, and they must be fed and clothed for the journey; all which, it seems to me, you must have completely overlooked. The fact, indeed, that you state, relative to coffee, to wit, that it comes nearly

as cheap to those who use it at the extremity of the Russian empire, as to those who use it at the port where it is first landed from on shipboard, would silence all my objections, did not my observation lead me to conclude, that you must have been greatly misinformed upon this point. For, in America, the price of all articles of foreign growth bears an exact proportion to the distance of the place where they are consumed from the place where they are first landed. Salt, for instance, which costs half a dollar (half a piastre) a bushel at Philadelphia, will cost about a dollar at Lancaster, two dollars at Carlisle, and so on, till, in the settlements over the Alleghany mountains, it costs a guinea, or, perhaps more, a bushel. Indeed, it must necessarily be thus; and, therefore, you will forgive me, if I take it for granted, that you have been misinformed with respect to the price of the coffee, consumed at the extremities of the Russian Empire.—To come, now, to some more general observations, I cannot help perceiving, that you, at every sentence, betray your want of confidence in the ability of Russia to avoid feeling the blow, which England, were her statesmen of my mind, would give to that aspiring and encroaching empire. I know, that it is not in our power to hurt the people of Russia; they would be as well, and better, without commerce, for very little cloth or sugar falls to their share; but, we have it in our power to annoy their rulers, and keep them confined within their former limits. It has been owing to the folly of England, that Russia has penetrated into Germany and Turkey. She cannot, all at once, drive you back again; but, she can forbid you to show your face upon the ocean; to render Petersburg, if not a swamp, at least, a set of lanes wherein for cattle to graze; and this, were her statesmen made of the right sort of stuff, she would resolve to do, thereby giving an awful example to those, whose envy or malignity have led them to conspire together for the audaciously avowed purpose of undermining her maritime power, and of reducing her to a state of humiliation and dependance. It was well becoming of you, indeed, to assemble with Americans, in that same city of Petersburg, to celebrate the 4th of July, and to toast "*the liberty of the seas*;" and that, too, Sir, while there were on board your ships, at your Emperor's request, English officers, to teach you how to manœuvre and to fight. This was well becoming in you. There is not that spirit in England that there used to be, or satisfaction would have been demanded for this audacious and malignant insult.

Your ships have, some of them, found their way, into the Atlantic Ocean, to assist, I suppose, in effecting that famous object, "*the liberty of the seas*;" but, they will rot in the Tagus, and their crews will be buried upon its banks, or they will come to augment that power, which you are so desirous to destroy. If ever you, by any unlucky accident, cast your eye upon our English news-papers, you will see what a war there is between the selfish factions that are contending for the sway over us, and, in their mutual recriminations, you will be shocked at the abuses, corruptions, and oppression which that factious war endangers; but, you will deceive yourself, if you suppose, that the people of England, in their great and just hatred of their internal enemies, have lost those feelings, which they ought to entertain against their enemies from without; and, Sir, I can assure you, that the unanimous feeling with respect to the hostility of Russia is that of contempt, while every man amongst us, who reflects seriously, and who is swayed by no self-interested motive, hesitates not to declare, that a total breaking off of all connection with Russia, would be an event auspicious to England. It is not, Sir, upon the mart at St. Petersburg, or at Batson's coffee house in London, that you hear the sentiments of the people of England, from whom the persons who assemble at these places have an interest wholly distinct, not to say directly opposite. The great sentiment of the people, is, that, let come what will come, our rights upon the seas ought to be maintained; and you will see, Sir, that, in spite of all the foreign combinations against us, in spite of all the workings of our domestic factions, this sentiment of the nation will always prevail.

AMERICAN STATES.—The present week is rich in American news.—A motion had been made in the Congress, on the 16th of November, respecting money in the American funds, belonging to our late Lord Chancellor, the noble Baron Erskine of Clackmannan. Also a report respecting the affair of the Chesapeake frigate; and a bill had been introduced relative to the defence of the harbours against our ships of war.—But, first of the Baron of Clackmannan's money; and here I shall quote from the Morning Chronicle of the 28th of last month, lest I should fall into error. "City of Washington (place where the Congress meet), 18. Nov. 1807. Yesterday the honourable Mr. Lyon stated; in the House of Representatives, that he wished the galleries cleared and the



"doors closed, bolted, and barred, as he had some highly important matters to communicate. The House having gratified his wishes, he observed that Mr. Erskine, the British Minister, had recently transferred Stock, *possessed by his father to a large amount in the American Funds*, and in consequence proposed the following Resolution, That provision ought to be made by law, forbidding all transfers of right of action, and all monies, and other property, either real or personal, to or by any subject of the Crown of Great Britain; and also forbidding any Citizen or Resident of the United States paying any debt or demand to any such subject."—What a shame, Mr. Lyon! Want to stop; to hold in hand; to sequester, and, perhaps, finally, to confiscate, the Baron of Clackmannan's monies! Monies, which, as he has often modestly told the world, he had, during so many years, been gaining from the people of England, at the English bar! But, thanks to the foresight and sagacity of Mr. Erskine, the son of the noble lord, who is also our minister plenipotentiary in the American States your cruel project was rendered of no effect; and, how fortunate it was, that this gentleman happened, by the late ministry, to be thought the very fittest person to be sent in that capacity to America; for, if he had not been upon the spot to watch the motions of the Congress, all these monies might have been lost.—But, how will Mr Erskine get these monies home now? The transfer must have been made into American hands; hands which, in such cases, are very apt to draw up close. Supposing the monies to come, they must come in bills of exchange upon London. The bills may, or may not, be good. Other monies will be in the same situation. Bills must be had. They will be greatly above par, that is to say, more monies must be given for them than will be paid for them in London; and people must not be very scrupulous as to the goodness of the bills. Faith, the monies are in a perilous state; for, as will be perceived by Mr. Lyon's motion, there was a thought of forbidding Americans to pay any debt or demand to an English subject; and, if a law of this sort should finally pass, the monies, though transferred, will be just as far from the reach of Baron Erskine of Clackmannan as they were before the transfer took place.—It is said, indeed, that Mr. Lyon's proposition was received with marks of general dissent; and, that it was the opinion of most of the members, that, "such a step,

"*at this time*, was improper;" but it is not said, that any one objected to the measure, as one that, in no case, and at no future time, ought to be adopted; and my opinion is, that, unless we instantly send a maritime force upon the coast of America, sufficient to blockade the mouths of the great rivers, it will be adopted; and, if once they lay hold of the monies, farewell monies; for the duty of re-imbursing forms no part of their decalogue.—All this is known to the agents of Englishmen, who have money in the American funds, as well as it is to me; they will, therefore, lose no time in selling out, and sending home the money in bills of exchange; and, most apt to their purpose, they will find an abundance of people ready to draw bills, especially if things should wear a warlike aspect; for, then, the drawers will have nothing to dread from protests and damages. Exclusive of funded property, the American States are now always about twelve millions of pounds sterling in debt to England, Ireland and Scotland included; let any one judge, then, what a chance the monies in question stand of reaching their owners in England. Baron Erskine's monies will, perhaps, come home with trifling deductions; but, it is not every fund-holder, who has a son there to watch over his monies, and a son, too, so gifted, and withal in a situation that necessarily gives him priority of knowledge, as to the wishes and intentions of the persons there in power. What a lucky thing it was, that the Baron's son was so situated!—There are people, I know, who will inquire into the motives whence the noble Baron might be induced to deposit such large sums in the American funds, and who, with an affectation of profundity, will go about to trace such deposits, in the hands of a foreign nation, to their probable political effects; but, I shall not imitate these frigid philosophers. Having stated the facts which have already transpired, and hazarded a few conjectures as to others that will soon transpire; having considered the thing merely in the way of trade, I shall leave these deep-sighted philosophers to inquire and to trace, as long as they please.—I should now proceed to remark upon the reports and the bill before-mentioned, and to shew the partiality, the insincerity, and falshood, contained in the former, and folly of the latter. There are also some Congress speeches, which would merit exposure; but, I have not now room; for, it would be greatly censurable not to do ample justice to all these.—The people in the State of Massa-

chusetts' Bay are, I perceive (in November) beginning to cry out against the non-importation act, which was to go into effect in the middle of this month. I said the people of New England (Massachusetts', New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island) would never suffer themselves to be sacrificed to the frenzied partiality and vindictiveness of the Southern States; and, I am morally certain that they will not. They represent the non-importation act as impracticable; they know it cannot be enforced; and, if it could, they would not submit to its provisions.—There is one foolish fellow in the Congress, who talks about conquering Canada, Nova Scotia and Jamaica. The New-Englanders laugh him to scorn; and, to be sure, he is a sad madman. This quality in him is well known. They used to have an alliteration about him: "Red-headed Randolph rose, ranted, and roar'd." I forget the rest of the couplet; but, I remember, that it was excellently descriptive of his person, character, and manner. Conquer Jamaica! The New Englanders bid him remember, that England has some ships of war there, and they significantly hint, at the fate of the Chesapeake. They are a sensible, cool, and honest people, and they know that their government is in the wrong.—The Congress has been passing laws for establishing a cannon-foundry, for making powder magazines, for making fortifications, and for raising soldiers and sailors. I think I see one of the New England members coming from a sitting of this sort, laughing to himself, and saying, "I wish my head may never ache, till those laws are carried into effect." It would be impossible, without exciting a commotion, to raise any considerable part of the money necessary for such purposes. But, the "New Amphycionian Council" loves to talk big. With what big talk did it vote 100,000 dollars, for the purpose of erecting a tomb to the memory of Washington! After taking time to cool, it reconsidered the matter; it reduced the sum to 50,000; at the next cooling, it reduced it down to 20,000, or at 4,500, and, after all, not a farthing was expended, and the General's body, which, in consequence of a vote of Congress, had been asked and obtained from his widow, is, I believe, to this day, lying under an ill-shaped heap of boards in the wooden building, with their usual disgusting vanity, they call their *Capitol*. All these warlike laws are, like this vote about Washington, intended for foreign effect; they are amongst the means, which they are employing to bully us out of our rights and our rights; to humble us; to break

us down to the views of the maritime confederacy in Europe; to glut upon us that vengeance, which has been engendered in their hearts by the circumstance of our being able to exist a great nation separated from them.—Let no Englishman be cajoled by the insinuations, contained in their speeches and reports, that it is our rulers that they hate, and not us. They hate England; England in particular; they hate Scotland next, and like Ireland tolerably well. Of this, proof upon proof will appear in their speeches and their news-papers. They hate the English most, because they think, that they are best off; and they like the Irish, because they think, that the Irish hate the English. They care not who rules us, or how we are ruled, so that we do but suffer; so that misery alight upon our persons, and disgrace upon our name. And is there, then, one of English birth, a wretch so unnatural as to love them? Is there one so criminal as to wish success to their endeavours?—At the same time, that they are, in their usual boasting strain, talking of preparations for war with us, they are full of apprehensions of a revolt in their newly acquired territory of Louisiana, where a paper, printed in the French language, openly calls upon the people, to remember, that they are Frenchmen. To suppose, that they can collect taxes from the States upon the Mississippi to carry on a war, which, by the sole means of two of our frigates, must depopulate those States, is madness equal to that of Randolph. In short, they touch the crisis of their fate; for, if they proceed to new acts of insolence, and if our ministers have only common sense, the country is, in the course of two years, divided into three or four separate sovereignties.—I do not wish for this. There are many valuable people in the country. I wish not to see them harrassed and torn to pieces. But, if they will have war with us, or insist upon seeing us degraded, war let them have, and let it be war once for all. The very circumstance of their wishing to retain our seamen is proof of their malignity towards us. They can do without our seamen; but, they know that we want them to defend ourselves against France, and for us to be able to make that defence, they do not wish to see. This is the evident motive, by which they are animated, and what more do we need in proof of their malignant, though cowardly, hostility.—In my next, I shall return to the subject, which, of all others, is the most important at this time. The Congress must be followed, step by step; all their threats and their boasts must

be put upon record; all their actions and motives truly represented; and their fame established, wherever the English language is spoken, or read, from the Ganges to the Thames. This has long been wanted to be done; England has greatly suffered; all Europe has greatly suffered, from the deceptions with respect to the American States, their government, and the character of their people; but, the success of that deception does, I trust, approach towards its end. —As for my own part, I shall think a year of my life well-employed in communicating to the world wholesome truths respecting them, and in opening the eyes of those Englishmen, who, for the sake of that freedom of which they erroneously think them the possessors and supporters, still view them with partiality. I know, that the American clam, of whom there are great numbers in England, will abuse me without measure; but, I have more of truth to assert than even their hearts can engender of falsehood. I shall pass by the abuse of all their underlings and hirelings, and, as I used to do when amongst them, keep steadily on in the exposure of the principals. This little work, which starts into the new year with an extent of circulation greater than that of any former year, finds its way, first or last, into most of the countries and courts of the world; and so far as it goes, so far will the true character of the government, governors, and people of the American States be known. *Botley, Dec. 31, 1807.*

COBBETT'S Parliamentary History OF ENGLAND,

Which, in the compass of Sixteen Volumes, royal octavo, double columns, will contain a full and accurate Report of all the recorded Proceedings, and of all the Speeches, in both Houses of Parliament, from the earliest times to the year 1803, when the publication of “Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates” commenced.

The THIRD VOLUME of the above Work is ready for delivery. It embraces the period from the Battle of Edge-hill, in October 1642, to the Meeting of the Parliament begun at Westminster, April the 25th, 1660, commonly called the CONVENTION PARLIAMENT, which was sitting at the return of Charles the Second in the month of May following, and which voted his RESTORATION. As the Materials from which it has been compiled are drawn from the same sources as those of the preceding Volumes, it is almost unnecessary to say

any thing by way of addition to what is therein stated: but, as the Editors of the Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England, in 24 volumes, 8vo. published in 1751, conclude their labours with the Restoration, it may be proper again to state, that that masterly performance has, thus far, been made the ground-work of the present undertaking. The many Narratives of Battles, Sieges, &c. with which the work just mentioned abounds, and which serve only as an incumbrance to the Reader, and a constantly intervening obstacle to his researches, have been purposely omitted; while, at the same time, every thing connected with the real Proceedings of Parliament, and that could, by possibility, be hereafter useful to the Historian or the Politician, has been most cautiously retained. The Journals of both Houses, those great fountains of authentic information, have, in every instance, been carefully consulted and followed: Many Notes, illustrating, from the Historians of the Times, the Characters of the principal Members of both Houses, and explaining, where necessary, the business before them, have been introduced: And, to the whole is subjoined, by way of Appendix, a very scarce and curious Tract, published in the Year 1660, almost immediately after the Dissolution of the Long Parliament, entitled, “*THE MYSTERY OF THE GOOD OLD CAUSE briefly unfolded, in a Catalogue of such Members of the late Long Parliament, that held Places, both Civil and Military, contrary to the Self-Denying Ordinance: Together with the Sums of Money and Lands which they divided amongst themselves during their Sitting.*”

*** The magnitude of the Parliamentary History, the great labour and expence attending it, and the comparatively small number of copies, which, to avoid serious risk, it has been thought advisable to print, render it necessary, thus early, to adopt precautions calculated to prevent any broken sets remaining on hand at the conclusion of the work. Subscribers are, therefore, particularly requested to send in their Names to their respective Booksellers, as no Copies will, on any account, be sold, but to the purchasers of the former Volumes.—Gentlemen, resident in Ireland, wishing to become subscribers, will please to apply to Mr. Archer, of Dublin.

“*PERISH COMMERCE.*”

SIR,—It is nearly impossible for those who read your friendly invitations, and who have a thought or two to spare, to withhold from communicating them to you, especially when prompted by the bold doctrines you

advance, and the extraordinary temper you discover, at a crisis that to almost every other person is a subject of alarm and regret. You will excuse me, Sir, for thinking that whatever force there may be in your arguments, your triumph at the prospect of a change which you imagine must necessarily arise out of the present embarrassed state of commerce, is seasoned with an unbecoming degree of levity. When the clouds which are charged with sulphurous matter, burst forth in lightning and thunder; or, when the ground, labouring with confined combustibles, opens its bowels, and vents itself by an earthquake; although we are aware that beneficial consequences will follow these explosions of nature, neither the prospect, nor the event would inspire any one with laughter. And he who can "laugh heartily" at annihilated commerce, when he confesses it would produce a very great derangement of affairs in the community, and throw great numbers on the parishes, "wars more against nature" than he who in such a case attempts to find employ for the "ousted manufacturers, &c." by making roads, and canals, and works of public utility. You affect to believe that no mischief of any consequence would ensue, because if one or two hundred thousand do suffer, that is but a small proportion of 10 or 12 millions. And, as by your plan, that what one loses another saves or gains, you intimate that the sufferings will be only transferred; and no doubt you think it perfectly right that those who hitherto have had their enjoyments, should exchange circumstances with those in the community who have had their sufferings. If this could be effected as easily as one sentinel can be substituted to replace the duties of another, I should be exactly of your opinion; but, as I am fully convinced that no great and sudden change can take place in a country, without an awful civil convulsion, I cannot look forward to such an event as inevitable, without a great degree of concern. That the country has great cause to complain of shameful prodigality in its government, I am not in the least disposed to question. But viewing war and not commerce (any other than it has been very improperly made the cause of war) as the cause of all the corruptions in government, and of all the burdens on the nation, as I shall soon attempt to show, I think you, Sir, stand chargeable with the fault of promoting a continuance of those evils, by recommending a system of domination and defiance, that must for ever operate as a cause of universal hostility to us. But what is most extraordinary in your system is, that while you reprobate the value of foreign

commerce to the nation, you suppose it greatly advantageous, and indispensably necessary to maintain an immense naval force. Those who penetrate much below the surface of things, may be able to discover such necessity; but it certainly is a very general opinion, that the principal use of our maritime force is to maintain our foreign commerce, and that all our danger of invasion arises from our persisting in a monopoly of it. If then, we are better without this commerce than with it, we might discharge a large portion of our seamen, which added to the ousted manufacturers might all be turned on the land, till by dint of labour we might almost convert stones into bread. The doctrine advanced by you and Mr. Spence, if it went no farther than to shew that England can do in cases of necessity without foreign commerce, would be very laudable; but, when you state an innocent and useful traffic to be the prime and necessary cause of our misfortunes, and recommend a system of defiance calculated to separate this country from the rest of the world, this is proceeding to an extreme of barbarity. You assert that the hemp and flax this country imports, it might grow. This for aught I know to the contrary may be true. Yet, when it is confessed that the country does not grow corn enough for its inhabitants, (although I should suppose that seven-eighths of the tillable land is cultivated as well as it will admit, without an expence that the produce will not repay) I think it is very doubtful, whether we have land enough for *all our present products*, and hemp and flax besides. You assert, indeed, to my astonishment, that there are *millions* of acres in the West of England, that were formerly cultivated, now suffered to remain waste. I am at a loss to discover how you can perceive the traces of the plough which passed a century or two since over those mountains, now only traversed by hunters and hares. But, supposing it to be true, it can only be neglected because it does not pay the expence of cultivation; and as this is brought about on your own plan, by "letting things work their own way," it is no doubt as it ought to be. But you will tell me, that the reason why it will not pay for cultivation is, because we import corn, hemp, and flax, which if prohibited, would be so much wanted as to bring it to a price that would pay for producing it at home. All this may be true; but if in the natural way of letting things alone to work their way, a nation finds that it can make cloth, and hardware, &c. and exchange them for a small proportion of its corn, and all its hemp and flax, with greater cheapness, and more

general advantage than it can grow these articles, is it not better to be on friendly terms with these countries, than to shut ourselves out from a communication attended with manifest advantage; because we can and will be independent of foreign commerce. In what light, Sir, can we look upon those circumstances of different countries; that the productions of one country are so useful and desirable to another; but as a bond of union and friendship ordained by Providence? And for what reason should we haughtily dissolve this bond? It is undoubtedly proper that every nation should be independent of all others for its chief necessities; and so I believe it invariably is. And as hemp and flax are not necessary to our comfort, but to our power, our dependence on a foreign country for the article ought to teach us a use of that power consistent with the interests of the world. In what way it may be asked is commerce the cause of all the mischiefs we deplore? Does it require the establishment of a foreign office, which we are told costs the country from two to three hundred thousand pounds a year? I see no such necessity. Does it require a secretary of state for the home department—a war secretary—a chancellor of the exchequer—lords of the treasury—an host of revenue officers—120,000 seamen, with a train of national expence which has brought the debt of the nation to the amount of £540,000,000? No. Commerce requires scarcely any of this. But war requires the whole, or is at least a pretence for them. War has been the cause of the whole. War has been the cause of all our evils, while commerce is innocent of them all. Yet you who deprecate the evils of the country are for cherishing this destructive practice, and for banishing that intercourse which requires habits of peace and friendship to maintain; and to cultivate which, we must avoid those quarrels which are the sources of our growing evils. The policy of this and of every country ought to be to supply a home consumption first; but when the fertility of the land, and the industry of its inhabitants afford them a superfluity, it is certainly advantageous for them to dispose of this superfluity to other countries, and receive produce or manufacture in exchange, such as they can use; therefore, if we send cloth and hardware abroad, and receive wine and spirits, coffee and tea, or more perishable fruits, it is an advantage although the articles exchanged by us are more durable: for our own articles being an excess are of no value, but as they are exchangeable. It is only for this purpose they are made; and, therefore,

would not have had existence without it. If liability to consumption forms an objection to the value of any thing, our corn and beef are open to the objection. But, although foreign commerce is useful to its natural extent, it does not follow that we are to fight all the world to monopolize it; and still less should we adopt this maxim if we are resolved to abandon it. The policy of this country has been as mad as that of rival coach proprietors, who sometimes will carry their passengers for one half what it costs them, because their neighbouring proprietor wishes to have a share of the run. A tradesman who should form an establishment of £1000 a year, to prosecute a trade that could not produce him more than £500 per annum, would be justly deemed a fool. Yet this has been the practice of this country. We have been carrying on war for the maintenance of commerce, while we are annually obliged to borrow 12 millions to supply the expences created over and above the annual revenue, which is consequently a dead loss of 12 millions annually. I beg, Sir, you will reconsider the matter, and I entertain a hope that you will acknowledge that foreign commerce divested of war, and of chartered companies would be a benefit to the country. I will conclude this epistle with a remark on your illustration of the inutility of commerce, in the case of Mr. Nokes and the Timkin race. You observe, that if Mr. Nokes gains £10,000 a year by the Timkins in selling tea to them; if this article be prohibited Mr. Nokes's profits are gone, but the purchasers have their money to furnish both a revenue to government, and to spend among other people, and that none but Mr. Nokes would be a loser.—— Now, Sir, Mr. Spence has stated what to me appears very probable, and that is, that though a person may save the money usually laid out in foreign produce, he might not lay it out in home manufacture; the consequence would therefore be, that having less occasion for expence he would be less careful to procure the income now considered necessary. And though you have confined your statement to a single tradesman, the supposition must be, that to gain £10,000 a year, £100,000 is expended, which would be lost by its being unnecessary to those with whom wealth originates. Besides, we must generally consider foreign produce as brought to this country in lieu of a superfluous quantity of British manufacture, whether it be done directly by barter, or through the medium of money; therefore, if any article of consumption be by the abolition of commerce kept out of the country, our own pro-

duce must be taken instead, whereby the general allowance must be reduced by so much as is excluded. Tea is not only a luxury, it is become the chief beverage of the poor; and frequently constitutes a part of every meal. An article in such universal use cannot be regarded as of trifling consequence, and could not be excluded without increasing the sufferings of the poor. These remarks though hostile to your views, are submitted to you in perfect good will; if they are untenable, they will afford you means of confirming your doctrines to your readers; and if they lay just claim to truth and sound argument, I rely on your generosity to acknowledge the receipt of them.—Remaining, Sir, yours.—D.—*Falmouth, Dec. 11, 1807.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation of the Prince Regent, dated at the Palace of Ajuda, Nov. 27, 1807; and issued just upon his embarkation for the Brazils.*

Having tried by all possible means to preserve the neutrality hitherto enjoyed by my faithful and beloved subjects, having exhausted my royal treasury, and made innumerable other sacrifices, even going to the extremity of shutting the ports of my dominions to the subjects of my ancient and royal ally, the King of Great Britain, thus exposing the commerce of my people to total ruin, and consequently suffering the greatest losses in the collection of my royal revenues of the crown, I find that troops of the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, to whom I had united myself on the Continent, in the hope of being no more disturbed, are actually marching into the interior of my kingdom, and are even on their way to this capital; and desiring to avoid the fatal consequences of a defence, which would be far more dangerous than profitable, serving only to create an effusion of blood, dreadful to humanity, and to inflame the animosity of the troops which have entered this kingdom, with the declaration and promise of not committing any the smallest hostility; and knowing also, that they are most particularly destined against my royal person, and that my faithful subjects would be less alarmed were I absent from this kingdom, I have resolved for the benefit of my subjects, to retire with the Queen my mother, and all my royal family, to my dominions in America, there to establish myself in the City of Rio de Janeiro, until a general peace. And moreover, considering the importance of leaving the government of these kingdoms in that good order, which is for its advantage, and for that

of my people (a matter which I am essentially bound to provide for); and having duly made all the reflections presented by the occasion, I have resolved to nominate as Governor and Regent of these Kingdoms during my absence, my truly and beloved cousin the Marquis de Abrantio Francisco da Cunha de Menezes, Lieutenant General of my Forces, the principal Castro (one of my Council, and a Regidor de Justicia); Paetrode Mello Breyner, also of my Council, who will act as President of my Treasury, during the incapacity of Luis de Vasconcellos e Sanzi, (who is unable so to do at present on account of illness); Don Francisco de Nerocha, President of the Board of Conscience and Religious Orders; and in the absence of any of them, the Conde de Castro Mazim, (Grand Huntsman), whom I have nominated President of the Senate, with the assistance of the Secretaries thereof, the Conde de Sampaye, and in his absence Don Miguel Perrera Forfaz, and of my Attorney General Joas Antonio Salter de Mendenca, on account of the great confidence which I have in them, and of the experience which they possess in matters of government, being certain that my people and kingdom will be governed and directed in such a manner that my conscience shall be clear, and that this Regency will entirely fulfil its duty, so long as it shall please God that I should be absent from this capital, administering justice with impartiality, distributing rewards and punishments according to deserts. And these Regents will further take this as my pleasure, and fulfil my order in the form thus mentioned, and in conformity to the instructions signed by me, and accompanying this decree, which they will communicate to the proper department.

PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION.—*The following Letters were published in London, under the authority of Government, on the 19th of Dec. 1807.*

His Majesty's Ship Hibernia, off the Tagus, Nov. 29, 1807.

Sir,—I have the honour of announcing to you, that the Prince Regent of Portugal has effected the wise and magnanimous purpose of retiring from a kingdom which he could no longer retain, except as the vassal of France; and that his Royal Highness and family, accompanied by most of his ships of war, and by a multitude of his faithful subjects and adherents, have this day departed from Lisbon, and are now on their way to the Brazils, under the escort of a British fleet.—This grand and memorable event is not to be attributed only to the sudden alarm excited by the appearance of a French army

within the frontiers of Portugal. It has been the genuine result of the system of persevering confidence and moderation adopted by his Majesty towards that country; for the ultimate success of which I had in a manner rendered myself responsible; and which, in obedience to your instructions, I had uniformly continued to support, even under appearances of the most discouraging nature.—I had frequently and distinctly stated to the Cabinet of Lisbon, that in agreeing not to resent the exclusion of British commerce from the ports of Portugal, his Majesty had exhausted the means of forbearance; that in making that concession to the peculiar circumstances of the Prince Regent's situation, his Majesty had done all that friendship and the remembrance of ancient alliance could justly require; but that a single step beyond the line of modified hostility, thus most reluctantly consented to, must necessarily lead to the extremity of actual war.—The Prince Regent, however, suffered himself for a moment to forget that, in the present state of Europe, no country could be permitted to be an enemy to England with impunity, and that however much his Majesty might be disposed to make allowance for the deficiency of the means possessed by Portugal of resistance to the power of France, neither his own dignity, nor the interests of his people, would permit his Majesty to accept that excuse for a compliance with the full extent of her unprincipled demands. On the 8th inst. H. R. H. was induced to sign an order for the detention of the few British subjects, and of the inconsiderable portion of British property which yet remained at Lisbon. On the publication of this order I caused the arms of England to be removed from the gates of my residence, demanded my passports, presented a final remonstrance against the recent conduct of the Court of Lisbon, and proceeded to the squadron commanded by Sir Sidney Smith, which arrived off the coast of Portugal some days after I had received my passports, and which I joined on the 17th instant.—I immediately suggested to Sir Sidney Smith the expediency of establishing the most rigorous blockade at the mouth of the Tagus; and I had the high satisfaction of afterwards finding, that I had thus anticipated the intentions of his Majesty; your dispatches, which I received by the messenger Sylvester on the 23d, directing me to authorise that measure, in case the Portuguese government should pass the bounds which his Majesty had thought fit to set to his forbearance, and attempt to take any farther step injurious to the honour or interests of G. Britain.—

Those dispatches were drawn up under the idea that I was still resident at Lisbon, and though I did not receive them until I had actually taken my departure from that court, still, upon a careful consideration of the tenor of your instructions, I thought that it would be right to act as if that case had not occurred. I resolved, therefore, to proceed forthwith to ascertain the effect produced by the blockade of Lisbon, and to propose to the Portuguese government, as the only condition upon which that blockade could cease, the alternative (stated by you) either of surrendering the fleet to his Majesty, or of immediately employing it to remove the Prince Regent and his family to the Brazils. I took upon myself this responsibility in renewing negotiations after my public functions had actually ceased, convinced that, although it was the fixed determination of his Majesty not to suffer the fleet of Portugal to fall into the possession of his enemies, still his Majesty's first object continued to be the application of that fleet to the original purpose, of saving the Royal Family of Braganza from the tyranny of France.—I accordingly requested an audience of the Prince Regent, together with due assurances of protection and security; and upon receiving his Royal Highness's answer, I proceeded to Lisbon on the 27th, in his Majesty's ship *Confiance*, bearing a flag of truce. I had immediately most interesting communications with the Court of Lisbon, the particulars of which shall be fully detailed in a future dispatch. It suffices to mention in this place, that the Prince Regent wisely directed all his apprehensions to a French army, and all his hopes to an English fleet; that he received the most explicit assurances from me that his Majesty would generously overlook those acts of unwilling and momentary hostility to which H. R. H.'s consent had been extorted; and that I promised to H. R. H., on the faith of my Sovereign, that the British squadron before the Tagus should be employed to protect his retreat from Lisbon, and his voyage to the Brazils.—A decree was published yesterday, in which the Prince Regent announced his intention of retiring to the City of Rio de Janeiro until the conclusion of a general peace, and of appointing a regency to transact the administration of government at Lisbon during H. R. H.'s absence from Europe.—This morning the Portuguese fleet left the Tagus. I had the honour to accompany the Prince in his passage over the Bar. The fleet consisted of 8 ships of the line, 4 large frigates, several armed brigs, sloops, and corvettes, and a number of Brazil ships, amounting, I believe, to about

36 sail in all. They passed through the British squadron, and his Majesty's ships fired a salute of 21 guns, which was returned with an equal number. A more interesting spectacle than that afforded by the junction of the two fleets has been rarely beheld.—On quitting the Prince Regent's ship, I repaired on board of the *Hibernia*, but returned immediately accompanied by Sir Sidney Smith, whom I presented to the Prince, and who was received by H. R. H. with the most marked and gracious condescension.—I have the honour to inclose lists of the ships of war which were known to have left Lisbon this morning, and which were in sight a few hours ago. There remain at Lisbon 4 ships of the line, and the same number of frigates, but only one of each sort is serviceable.—I have thought it expedient to lose no time in communicating to his Majesty's government the important intelligence contained in this dispatch. I have therefore to apologise for the hasty and imperfect manner in which it is written.—I have the honour to be, &c.—STRANGFORD.

His Majesty's Ship Hibernia, 22 Leagues West of the Tagus, Dec. 1, 1807.

Sir,—In a former Dispatch, dated the 22d Nov. with a postscript of the 26th, I conveyed to you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the proofs contained in various documents of the Portuguese government being so much influenced by terror of the French arms, as to have acquiesced to certain demands of France operating against G. Britain. The distribution of the Portuguese force was made wholly on the coast, while the land side was left totally unguarded. British subjects of all descriptions were detained; and it therefore became necessary to inform the Portuguese government, that the case had arisen which required, in obedience to my instructions, that I should declare the Tagus in a state of blockade; and Lord Strangford agreeing with me that hostility should be met with hostility, the blockade was instituted, and the instructions we had received were acted upon to their full extent; still, however, bearing in recollection the first object adopted by his Majesty's government of opening a refuge for the head of the Portuguese government, menaced as it was by the powerful arm, and bareful influence of the enemy, I thought it my duty to adopt the means open to us, of endeavouring to induce the Prince Regent of Portugal to reconsider his decision "to unite himself with the Continent of Europe," and to recollect that he

had possessions on that of America, affording an ample balance for any sacrifice he might make here, and from which he would be cut off by the nature of maritime warfare, the termination of which could not be dictated by the combination of the continental powers of Europe.—In this view Lord Strangford having received an acquiescence to the proposition which had been made by us, for his Lordship to land and confer with the Prince Regent under the guarantee of a flag of truce, I furnished his Lordship with that conveyance and security, in order that he might give to the Prince, that confidence which his word of honour as the King's Minister Plenipotentiary, united with that of a British Admiral, could not fail to inspire towards inducing H. R. H. to throw himself and his fleet into the arms of G. Britain, in perfect reliance on the King's overlooking a forced act of apparent hostility against his flag and subjects, and establishing H. R. H.'s government in his ultra-marine possessions as originally promised. I have now the heartfelt satisfaction of announcing to you, that our hopes and expectations have been realised to the utmost extent. On the morning of the 29th, the Portuguese fleet (as per list annexed) came out of the Tagus with H. R. H. the Prince of Brazil and the whole of the Royal Family of Braganza on board, together with many of his faithful counselors and adherents, as well as other persons attached to his present fortunes.—This fleet of 8 sail of the line, 4 frigates, 2 brigs, and 1 schooner, with a croud of large armed merchant ships, arranged itself under the protection of that of his Majesty, while the firing of a reciprocal salute of 21 guns announced the friendly meeting of those who but the day before were on terms of hostility; the scene impressing every beholder (except the French army on the hills) with the most lively emotions of gratitude to Providence, that there yet existed a power in the world able, as well as willing, to protect the oppressed.—I have the honour to be, &c.—W. SIDNEY SMITH.

List of the Portuguese Fleet that came out of the Tagus on the 29th Nov. 1807.

Prince Real, 84; Rainha de Portugal, 74; Comte Henrique, 74; Meduza, 74; Alfonso d'Albuquerque, 64; D'Joao de Castro, 64; Principe de Brazil, 74; Martino de Freitas, 64.—Frigates.—Minerva, 44; Golfinho, 36; Urania, 32; and one other, name not as yet known.—Brigs.—Vondor, 22; Vinganea, 20; Lebre, 22.—Schooner.—Curioza, 12.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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[PRICE 10D.]

The declaration of King Charles II., issued in the year 1670, contains the following passage: "the right of the flag is so ancient, that it was one of the first prerogatives of our royal predecessors, and ought to be the last, from which this kingdom should depart. It was never questioned, and it was expressly acknowledged in the treaty of Breda; and yet, this last summer, it was not only violated by the Dutch commanders at sea, and that violation afterwards justified at the Hague, but it was also represented by them in most courts of Christendom, as ridiculous for us to demand. An ungrateful insolence! That they should contend with us about the dominion of the seas, who, even in the reign of our royal father (in the years 1635, 1636, and 1637), thought it an obligation to be permitted to fish on them, by taking of licences, and for a tribute; and who owe their being now in a condition to make this dispute, to the protection of our ancestors and the valour and blood of their subjects."

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—As the dispute with America is now become a matter of great public interest and importance, it may not be amiss, before I proceed to my intended observations of this week, to enable the reader to refer to the articles already published by me relating thereunto. They will be found as follows: in the preceding volume, at pages, 181, 236, 257, 523, 594, 673, 641, 720, 902, 961, 999, and, in the present volume, at page 16.—The whole of these articles will not cost above two hours in the reading, and the reading of them, will put any one in possession of most of the facts and arguments relating to the dispute. Thus prepared, he will enter upon the further progress of the discussion with much greater satisfaction to himself, and with much greater likelihood of forming a just opinion as to what ought now to be the line of conduct to be adopted by England towards America.—In the article, last referred to, notice was taken of the motion, made in the Congress respecting the monies of Baron Erskine of Clackmannan, in the American funds, the son of that noble lord, which son is also our minister plenipotentiary at the American States, having, as it was declared in the Congress, just transferred large sums in stock, belonging to his father. This was noticed, and very well worthy of notice it was; it being only necessary to add here, for the information of some persons, that Baron Erskine of Clackmannan is no other than the identical Mr. Thomas Erskine, who was so famed for his patriotism, during the opposition of Mr. Fox; who, in February, 1806, became Lord High Chancellor of England, with an income, from the public, of about 10,000 pounds a year, and who, upon being put out of that office, in April, 1807, had a pension settled on him for life, of 4,000

pounds a year, payable out of the taxes raised upon the people of this kingdom.—Having put these facts safely upon record, let us now turn our eyes towards the West, and see a little what the Congress has been doing.—On the 17th of November, we find a committee of the House of Representatives making a report upon the affair of the Chesapeake, which report will, as an "Official Document," be inserted either in this sheet, or the next. The report concludes with recommending a resolution, condemning the conduct of the English commander, as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the American States; and adds, that the continuation of the British squadron in the waters of the States, after the issuing of the President's Proclamation, was a further violation of that sovereignty. In the body of the report, the committee observe, that *three* of the seamen, taken out of the Chesapeake, were, as they *might* say, proved to be American citizens. They also observe, that the act of taking them by force was without a parallel in the history of civilized nations; that, if disavowed by the English government, it must be considered, as "a detestable act of piracy;" and, if not disavowed, as a "premeditated act of hostility against the sovereignty and independence of the American States." This is a pretty alternative. If our government do not choose to acknowledge itself guilty of a flagrant act of violation of good faith, our gallant officers, concerned in the affair in question, are to be considered as pirates; that is to say, as felons; that is to say, as men worthy of the gibbet. The Morning Chronicle and its faction would hardly wish us to go to this depth in the way of self-debasement.—Previous to the making of this report in the Congress, there had been a report made, by a Court of Inquiry, upon the conduct of Commodore Barron, the

commander of the Chesapeake; and, here, let us just note the intolerable vanity of these people, in dubbing a man, having only a single frigate under his command, "commodore," and authorizing him to hoist his "broad pendant." This court of inquiry report, that Captain (I mean "Commodore") Barron neglected to prepare his ship for battle in due time; that he used discouraging language to his men, when attacked by the Leopard; and, that, in short, it was entirely owing to his faulty conduct, that the ship was not defended, and that the men were taken out. The whole of the report of this court of inquiry appears to have been drawn up for the express purpose of causing the world to believe, that, if the Chesapeake had been in as good a state for fighting as the Leopard was, the former would have made a gallant resistance. It was no trial of poor Barron; the real object of it has nothing to do with him; it is intended as an apology for an American ship, the "Commodore of the American Navy," being so shamefully beaten; and, to any one who knows the parties, as I do, it must be good diversion to hear the pompous statement of "Capt. Alexander Murry, and Isaac Hull and Isaac Chauncey," while, to those who do not know them, it may be necessary to say, that, in forming an idea of them, they must totally divest their minds of all the notions, which they have been accustomed to entertain of the character of captains of our navy. But, it is remarkable, that Barron "declined 'to make any defence.'" Why? That is not said, the circumstance being introduced merely by a parenthesis; and yet the court sat a whole month, and that, too, on board the Chesapeake frigate. I dare say, every deep lawyer in the country had, more or less, a hand in the drawing up of this curious report. It is called a "*surrender of the Chesapeake.*" As if no attempt had been made at a defence. The commodore seems to have been as little anxious to defend himself as to defend his ship. His defence of himself might have been inconvenient; it might have marred the symmetry of the court's report; it might have brought out facts to render the apology more lame than it now is; and, therefore, in return for his civil forbearance, the court state, that he shewed "no want of personal bravery." This was very just; for one act of kindness should always meet with another. In spite, however, of the infinite pains taken by the Americans to disguise the truth, I believe it to be what their own news-papers stated at the time; to wit; that, as the "commodore"

had long previous notice of the intention of the English Captain, "his ship was perfectly prepared, before she left the port; and that her guns were ready loaded with double headed shot." This was the account which they themselves then gave of the state of their own ship; but, they perceived, that, in persisting in it, they were depriving their "navy" of all the apology for the disgrace it had suffered. It is this disgrace and the lurking fear that they shall not be able to wipe it off; it is the disgrace of being so shamefully beaten; it is the having given the world a proof of their incapacity to contend, for a moment, against an equal British force; it is this that mortifies; it is this that stings them to the quick; it is this that draws from their Congressmen the appellation of "pirates." Pirates, indeed! How was Captain Humphreys to know, or to suppose, that Captain Barron was not prepared for battle? A ship of war, upon the high seas, ought always to be so prepared, and especially when duly forewarned, as the Chesapeake was. Besides, will any one believe, that the warning was known to nobody but poor Commodore Barron? And, if it was known, who would believe, that he did not receive, both from the government and populace, orders how to act? The Mayor and citizens of Norfolk must have heard of the warning as well as he, because the threat of the captain of the *Melampus* was published in the American news-papers before he sailed, even some weeks before, and yet, neither his officers on board, nor the government, nor the Mayor of Norfolk, take any step to cause him to prepare his ship, and he himself quite forgets to do it! Aye, Gentlemen, in Congress and in court of inquiry, you may report upon the matter as long as you please, all this is too wonderful to obtain belief. You suspect it is so, and therefore it is that you are enraged. If a war should now come and cut you up, as it assuredly will do if it come, your ruin will be ascribable solely to your vanity. Puffed up by your former success against the foolish efforts of England, by your success in trade, and by the praise bestowed upon you by writers in Europe ignorant of your character, you must needs have ships of war, and must call them "a navy." You must needs have a navy, and talk of "sovereignty upon your waters." To see your aspiring hopes all dashed in a moment was too much for you to bear. But it is better for you to bear that than worse. Indeed this rebuff, if you are not quite incurable, may do you much good. To the vain there is nothing so useful as a good serious, signal defeat. But, if you should

be foolish enough to persevere, I venture to insure you a complete overthrow, humiliation as bitter as ever yet touched the lip of mortals. You are, it appears to me, very much in error with respect to the temper, in which your abusive threats find the people of England. Your commercial friends, including the fund-holders, have not that power here now, which you suppose them to have. We understand the nature of our commercial connection with you tolerably well; and, I do assure you, that nine hundred and ninety nine men out of every thousand care but very little about the continuance of any part of that connection, over which your government has, or can have, any controul. We now are acquainted with all your former conduct, especially that relating to the pecuniary provisions of the treaty of 1794; and we feel, that we are now labouring hard and suffering distress in order to pay you the millions, which you ought to have paid to our fellow subjects, your creditors. We now clearly see, that this is only one amongst the immense sacrifices, which we have made to a regular commercial connection with you; and, therefore, that connection we are by no means anxious to preserve. We know that your general government revenue is *all* collected at the custom-house, and we know that our custom-house revenue does not form a tenth part of what we raise; and we know, that the coal-duty, raised in the metropolis alone, amounts to one seventh part of our custom-house revenue. We can make comparisons, you see, between ourselves and you; and the result is not likely to scare us much when viewed in conjunction with your hostility, though you may have fifty instead of three, ships like the Chesapeake. But, I will tell you more about this another time.—Let us now return to the report of the Congress committee.—It is said here, that *three* of the men, taken out of the Chesapeake, were American citizens. No; it is not positively said, that they were; it is said, that the committee *might* say that they were. Doubtless they might, for the President, in his proclamation, solemnly asserted, that all *four* were American citizens. Do the committee admit, that one of them was not an American citizen? I think, it is clear that they do admit this; and, then, it follows, that either the committee has admitted, or the President has asserted, a falsehood. Which are we to believe, the committee, or the President? This is a nice point indeed. For my part, I believe neither; for I am thoroughly persuaded, that all four of the

men were English subjects, and had deserted from English ships. That they might have been in America and obtained what are called "certificates of citizenship" I will not take upon me to say was not the case; but, what had this to do with our claim upon them? this the Congress will find answered in the King's proclamation (page 669 of the preceding volume); and they will there find, that we are not disposed to acquiesce in their new law of nations, according to which all those who choose to get one of their dirty bits of paper are to be absolved from the allegiance due to their native country. The committee, however, apparently foreseeing, that their report would be exposed to remarks such as have here been made, fly off from their statement about citizenship, and say, that it is no matter who or what the men were: we attacked one of their ships of war, and that is enough. Satisfaction is "demanded" for this, the English officer is to be considered as a "pirate", and so to be treated, of course, or or what? why, they will fortify their ports and harbours! Fortify landing places of, at least, seven hundred miles in length. This is a desperate resolution to be sure; but, it is not nearly so desperate as that of going without coats and shirts and rum. The Congress may pass laws to this effect, but the people will treat those laws as Swift recommends the people of Ireland to treat the votes of the "Legion Club." —We come, then, to the question of right, respecting the search of ships of war, a question which we have discussed before. The ministers have not, in words, given up this right. They have conceded too far, and their concession has produced the present disputes, or, at least, the continuation of; but, though they have abandoned the high and strong ground, they assert it to be the duty of our naval officers to demand our sailors even from on board neutral ships of war, leaving a refusal as a matter to be settled by the king. And, observe, that this case of the Chesapeake is quite peculiar. Our officers knew that their men were in her; they had been inveigled away under their own eyes; they had been led about to parade the streets of Norfolk in defiance of them; they had been refused to their respectful applications; and there seemed no way left but that of seizing them by force, in order to prevent a total desertion from every ship, which, under the sanction of the treaty of 1794, entered the ports of the American States. All these circumstances, which form a subject of just complaint on our part, the wise and impartial committee

think proper entirely to overlook, or, at least, to pass over in silence. But, we do not overlook them here. We attend to them; we see in them an act of hostility, which would have required immediate satisfaction, if our naval officers had not, with their accustomed patriotism and promptitude, taken satisfaction in the proper way; and the Congress may be assured, that we shall not hang Captain Humphreys as a "pirate."—But, "the act was unparalleled in the history of civilized nations," whence, it may be presumed, that they and the French do not put in their claim to that character; for both have seized, by force, according to accounts published in their own news-papers, deserted seamen on board of neutral ships of war, or upon neutral territory. Capt. Decatur of the American ship of war, the *Enterprise*, seized by force an American seaman on board a French privateer, lying at Syracuse, which privateer bore the commission of the Emperor of France. And, it appears, that several seamen having deserted from the French frigate *Cybele*, at Norfolk, and entered into the service of the United States at the rendezvous, the French Captain sent an armed force to the rendezvous, demanded the deserters, and had them surrendered to him. "Aye," the Congress will say, "but this was all amongst friends." Very true; but you will hardly blame us much, if we like you none the better for being the friends of our enemies. If our officers had sent an armed force for their deserters at Norfolk, the very same place whither the French officer sent an armed force for his deserters, the militia would have been called out, a mob would have been raised, and every soul sent upon the errand would have been murdered, under pretence that they had invaded the country with a view to conquer it and "destroy its independence." Partiality like this does not become a neutral power; it is in itself, unjust and base; and the injured nation, which does not resent it, ought to be treated as we certainly should have been, if we had, as the Congress seems to wish, treated our public-spirited and gallant officers as "pirates," though, from the language of the *Morning Chronicle*, it would not be very unnatural in them to expect it. That print, of the 29th of December, says, that the Committee of Congress have given to the act of Captain Humphreys "its proper appellation;" that is to say, "piracy." Was I wrong, then, in accusing this print of being on the side of the enemies of England? It is constantly the advocate of the Americans. Its columns are filled with attempts to

justify them, in all their acts of foul play towards us.—But, we shall see more of this, by and by, when we come to speak of its defence of the President's speech, and its insinuations with regard to the lately-issued Orders of Council.—The next proceeding, which is worthy of particular notice, is a bill, said to have been brought into the Congress and read once or twice, on the 24th of November. The following, as stated in the newspapers, are the out-lines of this bill: "It authorises the President to permit or interdict, at his discretion, the entrance of our harbours to all armed vessels belonging to a foreign power, and by force to repel and move them from the same, except in certain specified cases, in which cases the said vessels are to conform to rules prescribed by the executive.—It farther, in consequence of the late conduct of the British, prohibits the entrance of any British armed vessel into the harbours or waters of the United States, except when driven in by stress of weather, or when charged with dispatches: provided that whenever reparation shall be made, to the satisfaction of the President, for the outrages committed upon the national sovereignty, it shall be lawful for the President to remove the interdiction.—On such vessel refusing to depart, she shall be deemed to have made a hostile invasion of the territory of the United States, and shall be proceeded against as an enemy, and may be seized, and brought in and forfeited, and shall accrue wholly to the captors.—All pacific intercourse with such vessel is forbidden.—The President is authorised to use the land forces and militia to seize such vessel.—He is also empowered to refuse admission to any vessel belonging to the subjects of the nation whose armed vessel shall so remain in the harbours of the United States.—It empowers any person or persons to burn, sink, or destroy any such vessel, for which a bounty of — dollars is offered on each gun of said vessel.—It authorises the President, to carry this act into effect, to fit out all the armed vessels of the United States."—This bill is nothing more than a sanction given to the President's Proclamation. It is greatly injurious to us to have our ships of war shut out of the roads and havens of the American States; because, upon their cruizes, it is necessary that they should sometimes put in to refit, and, still oftener to obtain water and fresh provisions. Out of their harbours they may be able to keep our ships, unless a considerable force were

sent to treat them with a few bombs and rockets; but, out of their roads they cannot keep them; and, as to driving them out of their "waters," as they term it, where have they the means of doing, or attempting, any such thing? All their "armed vessels" put together would not be able to make head against one fifty gun ship of England. The consequence of this law, therefore, will be to prevent our ships from going into their ports; but, it will not prevent them from obtaining provisions, an abundance of which the people will carry to them, or sell to their boats along shore, in spite of a thousand such laws passed by the Congress. One of the members complains, that our officers read their proclamations and laugh at them. Well they may; for, it is strange to me, if there be in this world any thing more ridiculous. The act is, however, malignant; it fully discovers the hostile mind; and it is an act of hostility, according to all the rules relating to the conduct of neutrals, which rules require a strict impartiality towards all the powers at war. This act of Congress openly avows a partiality. England is refused what is granted to France. A reward is offered for burning, sinking and destroying English vessels of war if found in the same situation which French vessels of war are to be permitted to enjoy. As far as the Congress are able to go they have made war upon us; they have joined our enemy; and, as to the provision, that this war shall cease, when "satisfaction" shall have been made agreeably to their wish, this is the case with all wars; for, they all cease, when the parties making them have obtained what they deem satisfaction. Observe, too, that this act has been passed in mere continuation of the President's Proclamation, which was issued immediately after the searching of the Chesapeake, and, of course, before any demand of satisfaction could have reached England. This alone was quite enough to justify the king in refusing any satisfaction at all. The Americans had taken the satisfaction; to give them satisfaction under such circumstances would have been base in the extreme, even supposing it to have been, upon the original grounds, due to them. The fact is, that, with all their hypocritical cant about the blood of their citizens flowing in the Chesapeake, they were glad of the event; and eagerly seized hold of it as a ground whereon to urge demands, which we had theretofore rejected, and in which they hoped now to succeed by coupling them with this recent case. Nay, I am persuaded, that it will soon appear, that this "satisfaction," of the want of which they so bit-

terly complain, they might, to a reasonable degree, have received from our ministers; but, that their envoy here was instructed not to enter upon any negotiation upon that point, unless it was connected with other points, having, in fact, nothing to do with it, and being of a nature not to be treated upon by us.—Of all this the people in America seem to be aware; and, we find the Inhabitants and Traders of Philadelphia, in a Memorial presented to the Congress against the "non-importation act" (which was to go into force on the 15th of December), complaining, that the President had made, upon England, unreasonable demands, and that he had shut the door against reconciliation by accompanying his demand of satisfaction with a proclamation of a nature decidedly hostile. And now, for this famous non-importation act; but, let us first, take a look at the debate upon the memorial against it. This debate is curious, in many respects. The reader will bear in mind, that this act was passed nearly, if not quite, two years ago; that it has been suspended from time to time; and, that the last suspension extended to the middle of December, 1807. It was, therefore, he will observe, upon other ground than that of the affair of the Chesapeake that the act was passed. To prevent it from going into effect in December it was that the memorial in question was presented; and upon this memorial the following debate took place, in the House of Representatives, on the 27th of November.—"Mr. J. CLAY presented a Memorial from "sundry inhabitants and traders of the City of Philadelphia, praying, that the Act prohibiting the importation of certain goods, wares, and merchandize, passed the 18th of April, 1806, may be repealed." —Mr. CLAY moved that the Memorial be referred to the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures.—Mr. ROWAN hoped the petition would not be referred to any committee. He thought it would be beneath the dignity of the House to give it any consideration. Had he been in Congress at the time the law passed, he would have voted against it; but as it had passed, and as we had received a fresh insult from Great Britain in the attack on the Chesapeake, he would not vote for its repeal.—Mr. J. CLAY said, that as the petition was couched in decent language, and involved a question of great national importance, it could not be inconsistent either with the dignity or the justice of the House to refer it to the committee of commerce and manufactures. As to the non-importation law,

“ whoever would examine it would find,
 “ that many of its provisions were very de-
 “ ficient, and in some cases totally nugatory.
 “ He pointed out some of its defects, and
 “ observed, that it contained so many ab-
 “ surdities, that he doubted whether it could
 “ ever go into operation.—Mr. CROWN-
 “ INSHIELD said, that as to the non-import-
 “ tion law, it might be obscure in some
 “ parts, but there were more than a dozen
 “ articles, on which there could be no doubt
 “ at all. Under what circumstances had
 “ that law passed? We had been making
 “ demands on Great Britain for many years,
 “ which she had refused to satisfy; and
 “ this law had been passed to induce her to
 “ do us justice. Since that period she had
 “ committed the outrage on the Ches-
 “ peake. The blood of American citizens
 “ had freely flowed in that vessel.—Great
 “ Britain had known this for some months,
 “ and yet we had obtained no redress. He
 “ knew indeed that the law in question was
 “ suspended but for a short time at present;
 “ but from the rumours which were afloat
 “ and from what he knew of the disposition
 “ of Great Britain, he entertained no hope
 “ that she would do us justice. He thought
 “ that we were sleeping at our posts. We
 “ knew that Great Britain was making ac-
 “ tive preparations: that she was endea-
 “ vouring to decay the Indians on our fron-
 “ tiers; that she was arming her militia in
 “ Canada and Nova Scotia; and that she
 “ had, besides, an immense navy. The
 “ late attack on Copenhagen had convinced
 “ us that she paid no regard to justice or the
 “ law of nations. She had in that instance
 “ violated every principle of humanity.
 “ Could we expect better treatment than
 “ Denmark, a nation that had never in-
 “ jured her? Might not our cities
 “ be wrapt in flames as well as Co-
 “ penhagen? The petitioners state that
 “ they are alarmed at the demands of our
 “ government: what were these demands?
 “ Did they know them? He knew not,
 “ although a member of that House;
 “ and yet the petitioners are “alarmed” at
 “ them. Mr. C. then moved that the pe-
 “ tition lie on the table.—Mr. MILNER
 “ could not see any impropriety in referring
 “ the petition. He was acquainted with
 “ the characters who had signed it, and he
 “ knew them to be men of the highest
 “ respectability, men who would not light-
 “ ly commit themselves. As to the Non-
 “ Importation Law, he had always regarded
 “ it as a weak and futile measure, calculated
 “ to produce no other effect than to irritate
 “ Great Britain. He would rather have

“ seen a law to prohibit all intercourse at
 “ once. He agreed with the Gentleman
 “ last up, that we were sleeping at our
 “ posts; that our affairs with Great Britain
 “ were in such a situation as to render it
 “ extremely doubtful whether they would
 “ be amicably settled; and that under these
 “ circumstances we ought not to be idle.
 “ —Mr. ALSTON moved, that the Petition
 “ be referred to a Committee of the whole
 “ House.—Mr. SMILIE thought that re-
 “ ferring this Petition to the Committee of
 “ the whole would be giving it too much
 “ importance. That there was a party in
 “ this country strongly prejudiced in favour
 “ of the British Government, he never
 “ doubted for a moment, and that this was
 “ a measure of that party, he was equally
 “ certain.—Mr. BASSET hoped the Peti-
 “ tion would be referred to a Committee of
 “ the whole on the state of the Union;
 “ not out of respect for the Petition, but
 “ out of respect for the nation. This would
 “ afford the House an opportunity of ex-
 “ pressing their sentiments on the present
 “ interesting state of affairs. The House
 “ had been sitting some time, and not one
 “ word had been uttered on the subject;
 “ he wished this silence to be broken.—
 “ Mr. CHANDLER knew not who these Pe-
 “ titioners were: he did not know but that
 “ they were British subjects residing among
 “ us: if he were certain that such was the
 “ fact, he would move to have the Petition
 “ thrown under the table, without taking
 “ any further notice of it; but as he was
 “ not certain of it, he was willing to let it
 “ lie on the table.—Mr. J. CLAY said,
 “ that with respect to the assertion of his
 “ colleague (Mr. Smilie), he would merely
 “ remark, that there was a man's name
 “ signed to that Petition, with whom he
 “ was immediately acquainted, who, he
 “ knew, did as much good for this country
 “ as his colleague, notwithstanding his si-
 “ tuation. The gentleman from Massa-
 “ chusetts (Mr. Crowninshield) had made
 “ a long harangue on the subject of the
 “ Non-Importation Law, and had said that
 “ it would not embarrass the merchants.
 “ But so extremely ridiculous was some of
 “ the provisions of that law, that it was
 “ doubtful whether a gold watch could be
 “ imported on account of the glass being
 “ prohibited. He said he felt extremely
 “ hurt at the observations of the gentleman
 “ from Pennsylvania (Mr. Smilie), when
 “ he knew that the signers of the Petition
 “ were native American citizens. But it
 “ seemed natural that a Member of Con-
 “ gress must speak on all subjects, whether

“ he understood them or not.—Mr. ELIOT spoke in favour of referring the Petition, and against the insinuation of a British party. He said that he feared there might soon be two watch words established to vote down any measure which might be disagreeable—and these were “ Confidence in the Executive,” and “ British Party.”—Mr. NELSON was opposed to referring the Petition to any Committee. He thought the House ought not hesitate a moment about throwing under the table all applications for a repeal of the law in question; particularly now, when we were, he feared, on the eve of a war, and after the British Government had boasted that we dared not put it in force, as she would consider it as a declaration of war.—Mr. RHEA spoke against referring the Petition. He observed, that when these Colonies presented Petitions to the British Parliament for a redress of grievances, they were thrown under the table. He thought that would be the most proper course on the present occasion.—Mr. FRISK contended, that the Petition was disrespectful to the House, inasmuch as it conveyed a distrust of the measures taken by Government.—Several other Members spoke on the subject, when Mr. RANDOLPH observed, that attempts had been made to denounce his friend from Pennsylvania,—(Mr. J. Clay)—a man, he said, whom he would not *disgrace* by comparing, either in regard to talent or patriotism, with any of his denunciators [Mr. Crowninshield rose to explain; but he was twice called to order by Mr. Randolph].—He said that it was the indubitable right of the Citizens of this Country to present their Petitions to this House; and a refusal to refer those Petitions was a refusal to consider them. He never expected to hear the conduct of the corrupt and hireling majority of Lord North brought forward to justify a similar conduct in that House. We had exercised the right of Petitioning the British Parliament, and they had pursued the very conduct which was now recommended here—our Petitions were treated with derision and contempt. If the prayer of the petitioners was improper, would it not be better to expose their errors in a masterly report from a Committee, than to slam the door in their faces, and, affecting all the airs of an Asiatic sovereign, refuse to hear them? We were, he believed, on the eve of a War with Great Britain; and we were treading in the

“ very footsteps of the British Ministry on the eve of the American War, and on the eve of the French War. Even the commanding genius of Mr. Fox, would not be listened to in the House of Commons—he was obliged to go out—and what was the consequence?—He was called by the unanimous voice of the nation to correct those very misdeeds to expose which he was refused a hearing when he first raised his voice against them. But it was said, that the language of the petitioners was disrespectful:—What do they say? That they do not wish us to make any sacrifice of our national honour and independence. And what is the great bulwark of our national honour and independence? Why, a miserable non importation law!—The House, Mr. R. said, “ had now been in session five weeks; and, on the eve of a war, they were discussing whether we should import locks with brass knobs or locks with iron knobs; they were sitting there looking at one another, reading newspapers, writing letters, receiving bank checks, and counting their money; and the nation was precisely in the same situation as it was when the House first assembled. If we were to have a war with Great Britain, as he believed we were, it would become the House at the outset to conciliate those by whom that war was to be carried on: he meant by “ those,” the great body of the American people, and not the rich merchant more than the landholders, but not less. The House were beginning a war on the same principles as Mr. Pitt did his war with France,—by proscribing every man who dared to question one tittle of its motives. But he trusted if it began in the same way, it would not have a similar end.—Mr. CROWNINSHIELD hoped the House would do him the justice to believe that he did not wish to derogate from the character of his friend Mr. Clay, he had always entertained the highest esteem for that Gentleman, and he always should. He had stated that the language of the petition was disrespectful, and he wished it to lie on the table; but that was surely not rejecting it. He had since, however, discovered a sentiment in the Petition which had escaped him before, and which confirmed him in his opinion of it. The petitioners say, “ they hope the peace of the country will not be endangered by an adherence to doubtful or unsettled principles.” Was it an unsettled principle

“ that a national vessel could not be searched ? He thought not. He always considered a national vessel as national territory, and that it should be maintained inviolate. He had formerly been of opinion that it would be better to pass a total non-importation law ; but for the sake of conciliating Great Britain, he had voted for a partial non-importation.—Mr. RANDOLPH said, that the Gentleman from Mas. (Mr. C.) had grossly misunderstood him. He did not allude to that Gentleman as denouncing his friend from Pennsylvania (Mr. J. Clay) ; the denunciations had been heard by the House, at least they had been by him (see above). But he had said that the Gentleman had endeavoured to make this a party question ; he still thought so, and his calling for the Yeas and Nays proved it. He would call the attention of the House to a period when men of different political sentiments held the reins of Government ; petition after petition had been presented against the Sedition Law, and yet they had always been received and heard ; although, he said, it was almost impossible to couch such petitions in respectful language. He contended that the merchants did not allude to the rights of the words which the Gentleman (Mr. C.) had quoted ; but they said that doubts were entertained that other subjects had been connected with that. And had they not a right to doubt ? He thought if the Gentleman (Mr. C.) would exchange a few of his certainties for some of their doubts, he would not be a worse man or a less efficient politician. He believed it to be a novel thing in legislation, that because the House differed in opinion from a petitioner, the petition should be rejected. —The question was then taken for referring the petition to a Committee of the whole House and it was lost. Ayes 50 —Nays 80.” —Mr. Clay’s description of the talkative propensity of his brethren, and Mr. Randolph’s of their amusements and employments, while in the House, are strikingly characteristic. They all talk ; and talk for a long while too. The old vulgar hyperbole of “ talking a horse’s hind leg off,” if ever it be verified, will find its verification in the American Congress. Our people, at St. Stephen’s, write letters too ; but I never saw any of them actually counting their money in the House ; though it is pretty generally believed, that they know how to count, whether money or noses, as well as most people. But, the American Law-givers have a desk, with pen, ink,

and paper, before each of them, and each keeps the key of his own desk. At those desks merchants read their invoices and lawyers their cases and briefs, while the trade of law-giving is, at the same time, going prosperously on.—The only part of this debate that appears to have attracted the attention of our news-writers, is, Mr. Randolph’s expressions, so often repeated, about being “ upon the eve of a war ;” and, from which expressions, these writers conclude, that a majority of the Congress are for war. A most erroneous conclusion indeed ; for, the point decided upon, supposing it to include the final fate of the non-importation act, was merely whether that measure should be tried, as a means of inducing England to submit to their terms. —We have before discussed the effects of a non-importation act upon us, and it has, I think, in the articles referred to above, been clearly proved, that such an act could not possibly do us any harm, supposing it to be practicable. I have, however, insisted, that it is impracticable ; and the Philadelphia memorialists seem to be of my opinion. But, what is this act ? What does this mighty threat amount to ? What is this thing, which is to awe England into submission ? A non-importation act. An act to prohibit the importation of all English goods ? No : not an act to prohibit the importation of English cloth, Irish linen, or English hardware ; not an act to prohibit the importation of coats, waistcoats, breeches, shirts, cravats, stockings, caps, handkerchiefs, petticoats, blankets, sheets, swaddling cloths and shrowds ; not an act to prohibit the importation of knives, forks, scissars, razors, buttons, locks, keys, and candlesticks ; all these things must be had from us, or from no country upon earth. Therefore, the Congress, in its wisdom, has thought it advisable not to include them (making, in amount, four-fifths of all the goods imported) in the articles prohibited. Well done, “ King Cong,” under which appellation your feats have heretofore been so admirably celebrated. And does your Majesty really imagine, that we are to be frightened by an act like this ? The truth is, an’ it please you to hear it, your Majesty thought, that, here in England, there was an American faction, consisting of merchants, manufacturers, fund-holders, and admirers of American liberty, able to force the government to give way ; to force it to yield any point of great and permanent national interest, rather than run the risk of producing an interruption of the traffic of the said merchants, manufacturers,



and fund-holders. This was what, even in your cooler moments, you thought, "King Cong," and in this thought you will, I am pretty confident, find that you were wrong. —But, besides the weight of this opinion, which would have applied to the case, in all times, and under all circumstances, you might think, (gentle and inoffensive Americans!) as Judge Rutledge, of South Carolina, thought, in 1794; that is to say, "that the victorious arms of France had laid England prostrate; that she was struggling under the pangs of death, and that you had nothing to do but to seize her by the throat;" a sentiment truly worthy of an American judge. Now, then, you will, doubtless, think her just expiring, and that you have only to come and perform the part of an animal, that shall be nameless, towards the old lion dying in the cave. But, she is not yet expiring. She is even greater than she was before Napoleon conquered the continent of Europe; and, as to all those "maritime powers of Europe," of whom you talk, and on whose co-operation you rely, they seem actually to have disappeared from the face of the earth. —It may be deemed singularly unfortunate for the Americans, that they did not hear of the Danish Expedition at an earlier period; for, the intelligence seems to have had a most powerful, and, I would fain hope, salutary, effect upon their minds. The reader will remember, that I said, at the time, that the attack upon Copenhagen, and the capture of the Danish navy, would have a good effect in America; and, I am well convinced, that if the intelligence had arrived early enough, we should have heard very different language in the report of the committee upon the affair of the Chesapeake; I am persuaded, we should not have heard our excellent officers denominated "pirates," and that the word "satisfaction" would not have been accompanied with the word "demand." —In the Senate (that is to say, the upper house of Congress), on the 26th of November, "Mr. MITCHELL rose to call the attention of the Senate to a motion he had made at the commencement of the session, relative to additional means of defence, and further measures of security, the seaports and harbours of the nation. This important subject had been introduced by him at an early day. It had been printed and laid upon the table for consideration, and it was his original intention to have suffered it to lie there until the official intelligence alluded to in the Message of the President should arrive from Great Britain. —

"Decent and alarming information which had reached the seat of government since the rising of the Senate on Friday last, though tinged with rumour, and resting on the credibility of private communication, had however altered his mind on the business. The invasion of Zealand, the capitulation of Copenhagen, and capture of the Danish fleet, were events of the utmost moment to the neutral powers, and taught them that the greatest moderation, prudence, and forbearance, were of no avail in guarding a mild, an unoffending, and peaceable people against the violence of its rapacious and stronger neighbour. A visitation of a similar nature might, in the course of things, be expected from the same quarter, and the fairest of our commercial cities might be wrapt in flames or battered to ruins. —Year after year had rolled away in fruitless negotiation. He doubted whether, in the present posture of affairs, there would be a satisfactory adjustment of the points in dispute. It did not follow, that the failure to effect a treaty would necessarily bring on a war. But the dominion of the ocean was so proudly usurped by Britain, and the usurpation maintained by such a prodigious naval force, that it would be calculating extravagantly upon our good fortune to expect that our rights would not be invaded by them; and in an age of the world, when it was fashionable for ruling statesmen to sweep away, like cobwebs, abstract principles of right, and written maxims of public law, it was surely a season when the weaker powers ought to employ every precaution for their safety. —It was not his intention to recommend the construction of a navy, carrying metal enough to dispute the empire of the high seas. His only object was to provide a force sufficient to protect our acknowledged territory, and to preserve peace within our seaports and harbours." —And not a word about "pirates." Not a word about seizing "prostrate and expiring England by the throat." Not a word about that "little Britain," which, by way of sneer at our title (a silly title, I confess), was the name they sometimes used to give to our country. This same "nation of pirates;" this same "expiring England;" this same "little Britain," is now, behold! the "stronger neighbour," has a "prodigious naval force," and is able, by stretching her mighty arm across the Atlantic, to wrap their cities in flames, or batter them in ruins; while the American States, though boasting of

a population equal to that of England, Wales and Scotland united, is a "weaker power," that ought to think about her safety. Surprising change of sentiment and language ! and that produced, too, observe, without even hearing the firing of the cannon or the explosion of the shells.—All is now gentle ; and Mr. Mitchell chooses to consider America as the abode of "a mild, an unoffending, "and peaceable people." Neither of these have they been towards us. During the last war, as I have shown, (Vol. 12. p. 961) they were guilty of every species of violence and injustice with respect to us ; I have shewn, in the same article, how they fulfilled the treaty of 1794 ; and, no sooner did a favourable opportunity offer during this war, than they renewed the hostile demands, which had been refused them before. A "mild" people, indeed ! Read their abusive publications : hear the language of their President and their Congress : read the toasts of their "citizens" in France and Russia ; and, then, let the Morning Chronicle and its discomfited faction call them a "mild" people as long as they please.—What are these "points in dispute," about which "year after year have rolled away in fruitless "negociation ?" What is it that this "mild, unoffending, and peaceable people" have been demanding of us ? First : that we should suffer them to inveigle away our seamen, and to keep them, in spite of us, on board their merchant ships as well as ships of war. Second : that, when once the said seamen, or any other subjects of the king, have received from them a certificate of American citizenship, we shall acknowledge them as Americans, and even if we catch them fighting against their native country, shall treat them merely as prisoners of war. Third : that we shall allow them to shew, both in word and in deed, as much partiality towards our enemy as they please, and still observe towards them all the forbearance due to a nation impartially neutral. This is the substance of their principal demands. There are other "points in dispute ;" but, these are the chief points, and our fault has been, that we have ever suffered them to become matters of dispute. The minister who should admit either of them as a fit subject for "negociation" would deserve to be hanged. My mind can conceive no mark of infamy due to his conduct. And, yet this is what the "mild, unoffending, peaceable" Americans demand of us. Our present ministers have, though not in a good manner, given them that answer, which the late ministers had not the sense, or the courage, to give

them. No negociators need now come to us from the grand "Amphyctyonic Council," or from the "Capitol" of America. They have their answer in the king's proclamation and in his late orders of council ; and they are in complete possession of every thing necessary to the forming of their judgment and their resolution with respect to the question of peace, or of war.—Mr. MITCHELL, too, must talk of England's "usurped dominion of the sea ;" but says not a word about the usurpation of America upon what she is pleased to call "her waters." What gives her a right of sovereignty there ? Her power. That is to be tried ; but, if power give her right upon those waters, why should it not give us a similar right were we have power ? England's right of maritime dominion is as ancient as the name of England ; and, are we now to be called usurpers of the seas, or of any thing, by Napoleon and the American Congress ? The Americans plainly see, because they must plainly see, that the present exercise of our maritime power is absolutely necessary to our existence as an independent nation ; but, they do not see, perhaps, that that existence is at all necessary. And, yet, there are men amongst us (though now very few in number) who abet their cause, who endeavour to apologize for, and even to justify, their malignant insolence.—It is quite good to hear this Mr. Mitchell, who exclaims so strongly against the "usurped dominion" of England, express his readiness to grant whatever sums may be necessary to keep the Indian nations in subjection. He names several of these nations, and adds : "whatever "is necessary for teaching the Indians to "dread our displeasure, shall receive from "me all the countenance I can give." Now if we were to talk in this style of the Americans what would they say ? And yet would it be so unjust as it is in them to treat the poor wretches, whom they have already driven nearly out of existence ? This is "usurpation" in reality. They have driven off the people, and taken their territory. They hunt the owners of the soil, they hunt the wild beasts upon that same soil. And yet this gentleman talks quite gently against those who "sweep away, like cobwebs, abstract "principles of right." We have dispossessed nobody upon the sea. We have killed nobody to get the dominion of it. The dominion is necessary to our existence as a great independent nation ; and we exercise it with as little of exclusion and of rigour as the circumstances of the times will admit.—Mr. MITCHELL, after making a circuit of the immense territory, called the United States,

and talking about fortifying and defending, moved for "a committee" upon the subject. This is the way they go on: the exclusion they generally come to is, to enquire; that is to say, not to conclude. This is the way, in which all their stormy sessions have been spent; and this is the way in which the present will be spent.—But, whence is the money to come for "fortifications and armed vessels?" Why, Mr. MITCHELL says, that "the Treasury is in a condition to furnish the necessary sums without imposing a cent (a hundredth part of a dollar) of tax upon ourselves." So this poor man, too, believes, in good earnest, that the tax upon imported cloth and rum is not paid by the people who consume them, but, in some incomprehensible way, by the manufacturer, the merchant, the ship, or the sea. And, I dare say, now, that he, good man, believes, that this additional tax upon goods imported would be wonderfully productive under a non-importation act. Not to push this sort of arguing any further, however; not to waste my little remaining room in trifling with the patience of the reader, I beg leave to state to him, that, in 1798, when some very trifling preparations were made for a resistance of the aggressions of France, the Congress was compelled to have recourse to internal taxes, and that, amongst others, taxes were imposed upon houses, land, and, if I mistake not, negroes. The tax upon whiskey, which had been imposed some years before, cost more than the whole of its produce in the quelling of an insurrection which the tax excited; and, before the taxes of 1798 could be repealed, it was necessary to disband the handful of men that had been raised, to evacuate the few little posts that had been garrisoned, and to sell almost the whole of the naval stores and even the ships, belonging to the far-famed "American Navy." This was, by most men in America, thought bad policy; but, with such grudging were the internal taxes paid, that Mr. Jefferson, by promising to disband, dismantle, and to abolish the taxes, gained his election against Mr. Adams. If this was the case with respect to a rupture with France, who was then at war with England, and who had scarcely a ship of the line left, what must be the expence of the means necessary to defend America against the navy of England?—With a little knowledge of fortification, and with a good deal of knowledge as to the local situation and means of the principal sea-ports of America, I give it as my decided opinion, that the whole revenue of that country, suppo-

sing its commerce to continue uninterrupted, and supposing the interest upon the national debt to cease to be paid, would not, in ten years time, put the principal towns upon the sea coast in a state of security against an English squadron, well prepared for a bombardment. We have a thousand officers, any one of whom would run his ship by the batteries of New York, and knock down the town about the ears of the "invaders of Jamaica." But, if we are to have war, we shall not need a war of this sort, and I should be very sorry to see such a war. All that we shall want, is, a good supply of frigates and sloops, orders of council and proclamations. Two frigates and four sloops of war stationed at five different places, with the addition of a line of battle ship at Marblehead, at Sandy Hook, at Hampton Roads, and at the mouth of the Mississippi, with an offer of free passage to the ships of every State that would disavow obedience to the edicts of the Congress, would settle the matter in eight or nine months, to the heart's content of all the parties concerned. The Americans know, that they cannot carry on a war against us. Their tone, you see, is already changed from "invasion of Jamaica" and Nova Scotia," to the defence of their own towns. The news from Copenhagen has taught them to think seriously; and, we shall soon hear, that, from making "demands" upon us, they will come to a complaint that we want to conquer and enslave them; which, not for us to do, they will be content, and will gladly go off with a boast, that they have, by their warlike preparations, frustrated the tyrannical designs, which we entertained against them. Well: with all my heart. I would not deprive them of this last refuge of their contemptible vanity. All that I want, is, to see them prevented from having ground whereon to boast of their having been suffered to assist in the degradation and ruin of England; and this, I trust, is what I shall see.

I did intend to have answered, in this sheet, my correspondent D, whose letter was published in my last.—I could have wished also to make some remarks upon the Morning Chronicle's defence of Mr. Jefferson's Speech, and upon its impudent observations with respect to the relative state of England and France, as dependent upon commerce, and as affected by the late orders of council. But, for want of room, these and other topics, amongst which are the affairs of Jamaica, must be postponed.

Bolley, Jan. 7, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION.—*The following Letters were published in London, under the authority of Government, on the 19th of Dec. 1807.*

(Continued from p. 52.)

His Majesty's Ship Hibernia, 22 leagues West of the Tagus, Dec. 1, 1807.

Sir,—In another dispatch of this day's date, I have transmitted a list of the Portuguese fleet that came out of the Tagus on the 29th ult. which I received that day from the hands of the Admiral commanding it, when I went on board the *Principe Reale*, to pay my visit of respect and congratulation to H. R. H. the Prince of Brazil, who was embarked in that ship. I here inclose the list of those left behind. The absence of but one of the 4 ships is regretted by the Portuguese (the *Vasco de Gama*) she being under repair: her guns have been employed to arm the *Freitea*, 64, a new ship, and one of those which came out with the Prince. The other 3 are mere hulks; and there is also one ship on the stocks, the *Principe Regente*, but she is only in frame. The Prince said every thing that the most cordial feelings of gratitude towards, and confidence in, his Majesty and the British nation might be supposed to dictate.—I have by signal (for we have no other mode of communicating in this weather) directed Capt. Moore, in the *Marlborough*, with the *London*, *Monarch*, and *Bedford*, to stay by the body of the Portuguese fleet, and render it every assistance.—I keep in the *Hibernia* close to the Prince's ship. I cannot as yet send the *Foudroyant*, *Plantagenet*, and *Conqueror*, on to Admiral Purvis, according to their Lordships' order of the 14th, which, I trust, will be the less felt as an inconvenience off Cadiz, as they appear to have been ordered thither with reference to the Russians being within the Straits, before it was known they were on my station.—I have the honour to be, &c.—
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

List of the Portuguese Ships that remained in Lisbon.

S. Sebastian, of 64 guns; unserviceable without a thorough repair.—*Maria Prima*, of 74 guns; unserviceable; ordered to be made into a floating battery, but not yet fitted.—*Vasco de Gama*, of 74 guns; under repair, and nearly ready.—*Princesa de Beira*, of 64 guns; condemned; ordered to be fitted as a floating battery.—Frigates.—*Fenix*, of 48 guns; in need of thorough repair.—*Amazona*, of 44 guns; in need of ditto.—*Perola*, of 40 guns; in need of ditto.—*Triton*, of 40 guns; past repair.—*Veney*, of 30 guns; past repair.—
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

Hibernia, at Sea, lat. 37, 47. long. 11. 17. Dec. 6, 1807.

Sir,—I have the satisfaction to acquaint you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that I succeeded in collecting the whole of the Portuguese fleet, except a brig, after the gale, and that the weather was such as to allow the necessary repairs and such distribution of supernumeraries and resources to be made, as to enable Vice Admiral Don Manuel d'Acunha Sottomayor to report to me yesterday all the ships capable of performing the voyage to Rio Janeiro, except one line of battle ship, which he requested might be conducted to an English port. I meant to escort her part of the way, but she did not quit the fleet with me last night as settled. I hope, however, she may arrive safe, as she is not in a bad state, being substituted for the *Martino de Freitas*, which was at first destined to go to England, in consequence of a fresh arrangement made yesterday on the latter being found in the best state for the voyage of the two. I have detached Captain Moore in the *Marlborough*, with the *London*, *Monarch*, and *Bedford*, to attend the Portuguese fleet to the Brazils. I have thought it my duty, in addition to the usual order, to take the above ships under his orders, to give Capt. Moore one to hoist a broad pendant after passing Madeira, in order to give him greater weight and consequence in the performance of the important and unusually delicate duties I have confided to him. I feel the most perfect reliance in that officer's judgment, ability, and zeal.—The Portuguese ships did not, after their repartition, want more provisions or slops from us than the list enclosed, which I supplied from this ship and the *Conqueror*.—This dispatch will be delivered by Capt. Yeo, of his Majesty's ship *Confiance*, who has shewn great address and zeal in opening the communications by flag of truce, which it was the interest of those in power, who were against the measure of emigration to obstruct. Lord Strangford speaks of his conduct in terms of warm approbation; on this ground I beg leave to recommend him to their Lordships, to whom his general merits as an officer are already well known. Having been in Lisbon without restraint during the intercourse, he is qualified to answer any questions their Lordships may wish to put to him.—I have the honour to be, &c.—
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

Memorandum.—The *Diana* merchant vessel, having on board about sixty British subjects, who had been detained in consequence of the embargo, came out of the Ta-

gus in company with the Portuguese fleet, and it is supposed that she bore up for England at the commencement of the gale.

FRANCE AND AUSTRIA.—*Convention between them, made at Fontainebleau, Oct. 10, 1807—Ratified, Nov. 9, 1807.*

Art. I. The Thalweg of Lisonzo shall be the limit of the Kingdom of Italy, and the Austrian Provinces, situate on the left bank of its mouth, at the bottom of the Adriatic Gulph, unto opposite the village of Christinisa, near the Canal; from thence, by the straightest line that it is possible to draw the limit, shall rejoin the ancient frontier, near the village of Bistoff; so that the two territories of Christinisa and Bistoff shall remain to the Kingdom of Italy. It shall follow the ancient frontier to the summit of Mount Nataiame, and from thence a line passing from the East to the North of Sturazella, and along the top of the mountain beyond the villages of Creda, Patoco, and Boziana, in such manner, that these villages, and that of Sturazella, may belong to the Kingdom of Italy, shall be prolonged to the summit of Mount Stre, following the ancient frontier.—II. For this purpose the Emperor of the French, as King of Italy, cedes to the Emperor of Austria, all that he possesses on the left bank of the Lisonzo, in full property and sovereignty. The Emperor of Austria also cedes to the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, in full property and sovereignty, all that he possesses on the right bank of that river unto the point indicated in the preceding article, comprising all that is situate in same part, whatever it may be, in the Ex-Venetian States, to be united for ever to the Kingdom of Italy.—The Isle of Morosina, being situated on the right bank of the principal arm of the Lisonzo, shall remain to the Kingdom of Italy.—III. In the territories respectively ceded, the subjects of either powers established on one of the banks of the Lisonzo, and possessed of property on the other bank, shall be authorised to receive the produce of their property in kind, it being thoroughly understood, that such produce shall be legally occupied, conformably to the laws of police and customs in force in either state. This arrangement only relates to that portion of territory contiguous to the river.—IV. There shall be a military road communicating between the provinces of the kingdom of Italy to the right of the Lisonzo, Istria, and Dalmatia, and reciprocally. The conventions relative to this road shall be annexed to the present act.—V. A passage through the Austrian territories shall be granted to the Russian troops

coming from Cattaro, from the Kingdom of Italy to the Nieper. These troops shall march by battalions, with arms, baggage, and artillery. Every requisite aid shall be afforded them, and an arrangement relative to their subsistence shall be settled between the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna.—VI. The difficulties which arose in the execution of the treaty of Presburgh being done away by the restitution of the Mouths of the Cattaro, the Emperor of the French engages, that the fortress of Brannau shall be evacuated by his troops and those of his allies, which fortress shall be delivered to the Austrian troops one month at the latest after the exchange of the ratifications.—VII. The present convention shall be ratified as soon as possible, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in one month at the latest, at Paris.

FRENCH COMMERCIAL DECREE, *Signed*
NAPOLEON, *and dated at Fontainebleau,*
Nov. 13, 1807.

We, Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, upon the Report of our Minister of Finance, have decreed, and do decree, as follows:—Art. I. The enactments of our Imperial Decree of the 6th August, 1807, are applicable to the cargoes of vessels which may arrive in the mouth of the Weser; those articles of merchandize, therefore, specified in the 2d article of the said decree, shall be seized and confiscated; and all colonial produce shall be accompanied by certificates of origin delivered by our commercial commissaries at the different ports where they were taken on board.—Art. II. Our commercial commissaries shall not confine themselves, in their certificates, merely to attest, from the colonies of England, nor from her commerce; they shall also point out the place of their origin, the papers which have been submitted to them in support of the declaration made to them, and the name of the ship on board which they have been originally transported from the place where they were produced, to that where the commissaries reside. They shall address duplicates of their certificates to the Director General of the Customs.—Art. III. All ships which, after having touched at any British port, on any account whatever, shall arrive in the mouth of the Elbe and of the Weser, shall be seized and confiscated, together with their cargoes, without any exception or distinction of produce or merchandize.—Art. IV. The captains of ships arriving in the mouth of the Elbe or of the Weser, must make declaration to the chief offi-

cer of the imperial customs on that station, of the place from which they sailed, as well as of those which they touched at, and shall deliver to him their manifesto, bills of lading, sea papers and registers. When the captain shall have signed this declaration, and delivered up his papers, the custom-house officers shall interrogate the sailors, one by one, in presence of two head collectors; if it appear, from this examination, that the ship has touched at an English port, beside the seizure and confiscation of the ship and cargo, the captain, as well as those of the sailors, who, upon their examination, have made a false declaration, shall be made prisoners, and shall not be liberated till after paying a sum of six thousand francs by way of penalty for the captain, and a sum of 500 francs for each of the arrested sailors, in addition to the penalties incurred by those who falsify their sea-papers and registers.—Art. V. If the advices and information communicated to the director of our customs resident at Hamburgh, excite suspicions with regard to the origin of the cargoes, they shall be provisionally deposited in warehouses, till it has been ascertained and decided, that they come neither from England nor from her colonies.—Art. VI. The line of officers of the customs formed upon the Elbe, and the frontiers of Holstein, shall be augmented by 100 men. The director general of our customs shall give the necessary orders for placing overseers detached from that line, at the ports situated on the mouth of the Weser, and for their exercising the strictest inspection of all ships which shall approach.—Art. VII. The inspectors of customs, are authorised to make visits to the Isle of Neuwerk, and to the Wats, or other little isles situated in the mouths of the Elbe and Wezer.—Art. VIII. The commandants of troops of the line, and of the Gens d'Armerie, are bound to lend their aid to these inspectors, as often as they shall be required to do so by the chief custom house officers of the district.—Art. IX. Our ministers of war and finance, are charged, each in his own department, with the execution of this decree.

RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.—*Order of Council for general reprisals against Russia.*
Dec. 18, 1807.

At the Court at Windsor, the 18th of Dec. 1807, present the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. His Majesty having taken into consideration the injurious and hostile proceeding of the Emperor of all the Russias, as set forth in the Declaration of this date, issued by his Majesty's command; and being determined to take such measures

as are necessary for vindicating the honour of his Crown, and procuring reparation and satisfaction, his Majesty therefore is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general reprisals be granted against the ships, goods, and subjects, of the Emperor of all the Russias (save and except any vessels to which his Majesty's licence has been granted, or which have been directed to be released from the embargo, and have not since arrived at any foreign port), so that as well his Majesty's fleets and ships, as also all other ships and vessels that shall be commissioned by letters of marque or general reprisals, or otherwise, by his Majesty's Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, shall and may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods, belonging to the Emperor of all the Russias, or his subjects, or others inhabiting within the territories, of the Emperor of all the Russias, and bring the same to judgment in any of the Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions, &c. &c. &c.

JAMAICA.—*Resolutions, passed unanimously by the House of Assembly, on the 29th of Oct. 1807, relative to the distressed state of the Colony, and especially to the Abolition Act, passed by the last Parliament.*

RESOLVED, That the Act of the Imperial Parliament for abolishing the Slave Trade is pregnant with evils to this island, militating not only against its general welfare and interest, but threatening its total destruction as a British West India Colony.—That depriving this extensive and yet unsettled island of the means of a supply of labourers from Africa, to cultivate the soil, must be eventually ruinous to the proprietors and others interested in it; many industrious and enterprising settlers, who have braved the difficulties and hardships, always attendant on infant establishments in the interior and mountainous situations, will, with their families, be reduced to poverty and wretchedness; and, when these settlements are abandoned by their present inhabitants, they will again become the haunts and fastnesses of disaffected and rebellious negroes. * * * That properties in possession of mortgagees, receivers, guardians, and others, must shortly fall a sacrifice to this parliamentary regulation; because, from their peculiar circumstances, they cannot be supplied with labourers, the result of which will be, to deprive a numerous description of persons, from the earliest state of infancy, to the most advanced and helpless ages, of the common means of education and support.—The

committee forbear, at present, to animadvert further on the injustice and impolicy of that part of the act which relates to the abolition of the slave trade. The British Parliament has so enacted it! But the act contains clauses, foreign to the avowed purposes of the law, which are calculated to establish measures of internal regulation, subversive of the local rights and legislative authority of this island, * * * repugnant to its colonial laws long existing, and founded upon wise policy, and most humane considerations. And that the Act of this Island of the 15 Geo. III. cap. 18, for regulating the manumission of negroes, is directly counteracted by the operation of the clause alluded to.—That the act blends two distinct objects, the one having an external operation upon our commerce and trade, which was the object first professed by the partisans of the measure; the other, from the various alterations which the act has undergone, and in which the original principles were departed from, having an internal and unjust operation, by interfering with, and being subversive of, laws which are to regulate the internal government of the colony; the enacting of which has long and uniformly been asserted by this island, and recognized by the parent state. * * * *

That, as the original settlers of this island were free British subjects, many of whom assisted in the conquest of it from Spain, it is manifest that they brought with them all the rights and privileges of Britons: that the native spirit of freedom, which distinguishes British subjects, is also the characteristic of his Majesty's loyal inhabitants of Jamaica; and that every attempt to abridge, or interfere with, the colonial rights of this island, have been constantly resisted. The arbitrary measures, in the reign of Charles II. to impose the Irish form of legislation upon this country; the many subsequent endeavours to substitute the King's instructions for laws of this island; to raise money without the concurrence of the people's representatives; have ever been resisted, and, we trust, will never be submitted to by this colony.—That persons in this island, charged with offences against the abolition act, are not, as in Great Britain, liable to be tried only in Courts of Record, but these offences are made also cognizable in the Court of Vice Admiralty, although committed in the interior of the country, which enactment is an absolute disfranchisement of the colonist, by depriving him of his birth-right, the trial by jury.—That, in regard to the resources of the island, it appears that, from the last great

efforts which have been made by the African merchant and factors in England, the importation of slaves in the current year has been so considerable, as to have produced, of the negro duties, a surplus of near £32,000 after deducting the estimate for the year, and that it is probable, that the duties which will arise from the negroes recently imported, and those which are expected to arrive before the day limited for the termination of the trade, will amount to a further sum of £20,000 making about £50,000 appropriable to the expence of the establishment of the island, or towards redeeming the island papers, which are outstanding, and which amount to £260,000, a considerable part bearing interest at eight per cent.; but, immediately after the first day of March next, that resource will be entirely cut off. That another productive branch of the island revenue, the land tax, introduced to meet the heavy debt occasioned by the Maroon war, and other martial laws, cannot be relied upon to come in aid of our exigencies to the usual extent, since the uncultivated lands are now rendered of no value to the proprietors; the stamp duties will also, necessarily, be diminished; and the operation of the deficiency law will be unavailing, with respect to the objects either of policy or revenue, since the temptation which induced settlers to come to, or to continue in, the island, will no longer exist, the natural consequence of which will be, that the white militia must inevitably be considerably diminished.—That, in pursuing the inquiry into the causes which have occasioned the reduction of the value of the staple commodities of this island in the British markets, the committee find that much light has been thrown on the subject by recent publications, which have been widely circulated, and by the report of a committee of the Imperial Parliament, made the last session, after very full inquiry.—As these publications, and that report, are accompanied by, and grounded on, official documents, and the most respectable evidence, the committee consider it unnecessary to enter on an investigation of facts, now not controverted, and think they are justified in reporting that the following appear the principal causes which have produced the extreme depreciation of our principal staple, sugar: 1st, The departure from what has been usually called the rule of the war of 1756, but which, in fact, was established long before that period, and decided, “that a neutral had no right to deliver a belligerent from the pressure of his enemies' hostilities, by trading with his co-

lonies in time of war, in any manner which was prohibited in time of peace." 2d. The peculiar relaxations of this rule, by the orders issued to the prize-courts, in the years 1794 and 1798, respectively, which, with very trifling modifications, continue to regulate the decrees of those important tribunals. 3d. The geographical position of the ports of the United States of North America, the neutral power chiefly engaged in carrying the produce of the enemies' West India Colonies, which renders the few restrictions yet retained by the last-mentioned orders, to be hardly an inconvenience, as they are got over by systematic fraud and perjury. 4th. The easy expence, and security with which, by means of this fraudulent system of neutrality, the sugars of the enemies' colonies are transported to the European markets, it having been proved that, for freight and insurance alone, the British planter pays for every hundred weight of sugar, conveyed through the parent state to the ports of Holland, or the North of Europe, 8s. 1½d. sterling, and to the Mediterranean, 12s. 6d. more than attaches on the goods of the French or Spanish cultivator, carried in neutral bottoms to the same markets. 5th. The restrictions on importation into the continental ports, from the power and influence of the French domination, whilst the temptation to resist or evade it, is taken away by the abundant supply brought under the neutral flag. 6th. A rigid enforcement of the navigation system against the British colonists, at the time when it was thought expedient to grant relaxations in favour of neutrals and enemies. The agriculture of the colonies of the latter has been encouraged by a monopoly of the demand from the United States of America, and by having their produce transported under the safe and cheap protection of the neutral flag, to every market where it was in request. The British planter, without funds or credit in the mother country, where his staple was of no value, has been restrained from bartering any part of his sugar, in exchange for the lumber and fish which could not be dispensed with, which his rum was unequal to satisfy, and for which, often, it would not be received, whilst it has been shewn that no other resources were left. He has been called upon to send to the American market such produce as he wished to sell or barter there in British bottoms, but no convoys have been appointed, no facilities given to

an intercourse which would have required the most decided and regular protection. He is required to sacrifice his all to the preservation of what is called the navigation system. Of that system he admits the wisdom and general utility; but he humbly submits, that it should be supported at the common expence of the empire; and must be permitted to doubt the justice of relaxing it for temporary purposes, in favour of other classes, and rigidly enforcing it against him alone, when not merely occasioning expence and inconvenience, but overwhelming him with ruin. 7th. The inadequacy of the demand for the use of Great Britain and Ireland, compared with the production of the colonies, which must, under the existing laws, be carried and deposited there, whether there shall or shall not be a prospect of exportation. The excess of importation, above the consumption of the United Kingdom, is nearly two-fifths of the whole quantity, or above 100,000 hogsheds of sugar; but the loss of two-fifths of the gross produce of his estate will be far from the measure of the planter's damage; the remainder can never bear a fair price, whilst the quantity in the market so far exceeds what the consumer requires. Which excess and depression are increased by encouraging a licensed intercourse with the Island of St. Domingo or Hayti. 8th. The excessive duties which continue to be levied on this staple now bearing no proportion to the price, falling nearly, if not wholly, on the grower, and not as has been at all times intended or professed, on the consumer.—To these may be added the discouragement to the planters by the consumption, in the navy and otherwise, of foreign brandies and spirits, the use of which might be in a great measure superceded by rum. A policy infringing the system of reciprocal monopoly, and aggravating distress, which more liberal conduct towards the colonies might have alleviated.—Continuing upon coffee a duty, amounting to a prohibition, in place of endeavouring to bring this wholesome beverage into general use, must be a just subject of complaint to the inhabitants of this island, and must by the committee be adverted to, as affecting the price of an important staple, which may soon be excluded from the continental market, through the only channel open to the grower.—But the overwhelming distress of the sugar-planter, swallows up all inferior and less pressing evils.

(*To be continued.*)

Lord Clarendon in the 1st Volume of his History of the Rebellion, p. 203, states, that, "when the factious members of the House of Commons wanted to have any thing pass the House which they feared would meet with opposition, they would draw up a Petition to the Parliament, and send it to their friends in the country to get it signed, and brought it up to the Parliament by as many as could be prevailed upon to do it. Their way was, to prepare a Petition, very modest and dutiful for the form; and for the matter, not very unreasonable; and to communicate it at some Public Meeting, where care was taken it should be received with approbation. The subscription of a very few hands filled the paper itself, where the Petition was written, and therefore many more sheets were annexed, for the reception of the number, which gave all the credit, and procured all the countenance, to the undertaking. When a multitude of hands was procured, the Petition itself was cut off, and a new one framed, suitable to the design in hand, and annexed to the long List of Names which were subscribed to the former. By this means, many men found their hands subscribed to Petitions of which they before had never heard."

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PEACE.—Rumours of Peace having been afloat for some days, and there being a talk, amongst the *out* faction, of promoting Petitions for Peace, I shall offer to the reader what presents itself to my mind upon the subject.—Whether it be true, or false, that the late intercourse with France and Holland, through the means of the Austrian Ambassador and his messengers, relate to proposals for negotiation; whether it be actually the case, that the mediation of Austria has been offered to England, and refused by her ministers, upon the ground of Austria herself not being independent; whether those ministers have declared, that they will negotiate only with France, directly, and, anticipating the demands of Napoleon, have expressed the laudable determination of never suffering England's ancient rights upon the seas to become matter of discussion in the arrangement of any treaty, to which England shall be one of the parties: whether any part, or all, or none, of this be true, I do not pretend to know; nor would knowledge, in that respect, be of any use towards enabling me to form any judgment upon the question of peace, seeing that nothing that can be said, or contemplated, by the negotiating parties, can alter the real state of things, as it notoriously exists. This state of things is described in very few words: Napoleon has conquered the continent of Europe. The three states, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, who retain their former names and sovereigns, and who are not actually governed by his generals and his troops, are, nevertheless, not independent; but are, and must be, compelled to do whatsoever it may please him to command them to do, and, of course, to injure, as far as they have the power of injuring, this country; while all the maritime states,

from the Baltic to the Hellespont, are under his absolute and immediate controul; England alone, (for the fate of Sweden is hardly known) of all Europe, remaining truly independent of his power.—Such is the state of things; and, in order to form a judgment as to what ought to be our terms of peace, if now made, we must first consider, what are the probable views of Napoleon respecting us. He has conquered all Europe, England excepted; and, it is in the nature of ambition, never to rest, until it can go no further. The nearer, too, that it approaches its utmost limits, the more eager it becomes. Thus have we constantly seen it, in the case before us. Long ago was Napoleon so firmly seated, his power so decidedly greater than that of any other prince in Europe, that, if security and superiority would have satisfied him, perfectly satisfied he must have been. But, we have seen, that his eagerness for conquest has increased with his success; and we now see him grasping, in every direction, to add to that power, which seems almost incapable of receiving an addition. Upon what ground, then, can any man pretend to hope, that he does not wish to conquer England; and that he has not resolved upon the conquest of England, without the conquest of whom many of his other conquests are insecure; England, whose example, if left independent, might and would, be so troublesome to him; England, of whom, for so many reasons, he bears a deadly hatred; England, who has, in all times, been the rival of France; England, between whom and France, it is now, in the presence of all nations, a contest, which shall hereafter be looked upon as the first nation in the world? Upon what ground, then, I ask, is it, that any one can pretend to hope, that he does not seriously meditate the conquest of Eng-

land ; and that, while he lives, there is any thing but an exertion of our power that will give us a chance of escaping the fate of Holland and Portugal ?—If there be no ground for hoping, that this is not the case, the advice of the Morning Chronicle, to wit, that we should bring down our minds to the new state of things in the world ; and that we should no longer be unhappy, because we cannot be so great as formerly ; this advice is perfectly useless ; for, there is no sort of submission, no degree of humiliation or disgrace, short of absolute slavery, that would satisfy Napoleon, who has left us but this simple alternative, to be the greatest nation or no nation at all.—With this alternative before us it is that we must make peace with him, if we make any peace at all ; for, whether in peace or in war, he will speedily pursue his object ; and, if it be true, that he now speaks of peace, with an intention of making a treaty, it is only because he thinks that a treaty, such as he hopes to make with us, would answer his purpose, at this time, better than an uninterrupted continuation of the war.—Therefore, in making a peace with him, we should resolve not to suffer him to profit from such peace to our annoyance. He has the land, and we have the sea. If he would restore Holland, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, and Naples to a real independence, then we might agree to relax in the exercise of our maritime power ; but, if he be inflexible as to the preserving of his controul over the states upon the coast of the continent, we should be inflexible in our resolution so to exercise our power, in peace, as to prevent the resources of those states from being turned against us at the renewal of a war.—I do not pretend to lay down what ought to be the precise conditions of a treaty with him ; but, it appears to me, that, as long as he holds controul over the states above mentioned, we never should suffer any ship of war of those states to sail upon the sea ; and further, that we should make it ground of war, if, in any of those states, ships of war were known to be erecting. I know I shall be told, that, to insist upon terms like these would be to say, that we will not have peace ; but, my answer is, that terms like these we must have, or we have only this choice left, go to war again in a year or be conquered ; and, go to war, too, in a much worse relative situation than we now are.—The late orders of council, though breathing a low huckster-like language, have, as I predicted they would, produced terrible alarm and distress in many of the countries under the dominion, or controul, of France. If this system be perse-

vered in for a year or two, it will become settled ; it will effect a revolution in men's minds with regard to that maritime dominion, which we shall be perceived to possess in reality as well as in name. It, therefore, behoves Napoleon to stifle this system in its birth ; not to let it have a fair trial ; to get rid of it, for a while at least, by a peace. Against this device our ministers ought to be upon their guard.—The “ Petitions for Peace,” of which the Morning Chronicle talks so much, will, I suppose, bear a pretty faithful resemblance, in their origin, to those petitions so well described by Lord Clarendon, in the passage taken for my motto to this sheet : and, then, all that the ministers will have to do, is, to send out their scouts to obtain addresses, breathing sentiments exactly the reverse of those expressed in the petitions. But, I am quite at a loss to foresee what the petitioners can possibly say at this time, upon the subject. To beseech the king to make peace upon safe and honourable terms is evidently useless, because he expresses his anxious wish to do that, and because, moreover, that will leave him to judge of what terms are safe and honourable. To beseech him to make peace upon any terms that Napoleon chooses to dictate, they will hardly venture ; and, therefore, I cannot see what they can say that will have any sense or meaning in it. If, indeed, a negotiation were begun, and it was understood, for instance, that we contended for the possession of the Cape of Good Hope, or the re-possession of Hanover by the Elector, and that all other matters were arranged ; then, to petition the king to give up the point, in order that peace might be restored, would have some sense in it ; but there can be no sense in a vague application to him to “ restore the blessings of peace,” without knowing, or pretending to know, any thing of the obstacles which stand in the way of accomplishing that object, which, beforehand, he assures them, he has most anxiously at heart. Indeed, it is, I think, evident enough, that under the present circumstances, to send up “ petitions for peace,” as they are called, must be considered as a mere party device ; a mere attempt of the *outs* to annoy the *ins*, and to lessen their own personal disgrace by dividing it with a portion of the people, not many of whom, however, will, I should think, be willing to become their tools.—The Morning Chronicle, which is the herald of the Whig politics, has requested the public to mark well, and to bear in mind, that Mr. Canning has said, in his answer to the Russian declaration, that “ the last negotiation was

broken off upon points, in which England was not immediately interested." Well, and what then? It might be shameful enough to break off the negotiation upon such points; but, to whom does the shame belong? To the ministry then in power certainly; and that ministry was composed of those who are now out of power. But, do we not remember, that that ministry, by the hand of Mr. Fox, declared, that they never would make peace, without obtaining the restoration of Hanover, which, according to Lord Grenville's expression, "ought to be as dear to us as Hampshire?" And yet, they have now the assurance, to endeavour to raise a clamour for peace, and to excite a prejudice against their rivals, as being resolved to withhold that blessing from the country, without any regard to the terms, upon which it might be obtained.—In this clamour, however, some of the party will hardly join; and, I think, that I here perceive, the approach, not of the fall, but of the complete annihilation, of Whiggism, which has existed for about one hundred and forty years, to the infinite injury of England.

AMERICAN STATES (continued from page 54.)—The following is given, in the American papers, of the 9th of December, as the supposed substance of Mr. Canning's note to Mr. Munroe, respecting the affair of the Chesapeake.—"Mr. Canning's answer "Mr. Monroe is said to state; that the British Government has always claimed and "exercised the right to take British seamen "wherever found; that according to modern usages of civilized nations, national "vessels were not liable to search; that Great "Britain will conform to this usage; that for "the affair of the Chesapeake reparation "will be made, and a minister sent to the "United States for that purpose. No hint "is given as to the nature or extent of the reparation. On the contrary, it is expressly stated, that the claim of the American Government to reparation is lessened by the refusal to deliver up their men, "and by the President's Proclamation, both "of which are considered as acts of hostility on our part. That the minister sent "to the United States would be expressly "instructed not to blend with the affair of the Chesapeake either the impressment of "seamen, or any other subject of difference between the two countries. The "letter is in a style more haughty than conciliatory, and calculated rather to increase than lessen the sentiment of indignation so generally excited by the unprincipled conduct of Great Britain towards neutrals generally, and particularly

"towards the United States."—There is no saying how far this may be correct; but, I think, it is very likely to be tolerably so; and, if that be the case, the Note has not much in it that is objectionable. "Great "Britain" has *not* always claimed and exercised the right in question; "Great Britain" has *never* exercised it; but England has both claimed and exercised it; and, why she should not do it now, I can see no reason, except it be found in her union with Scotland, and in her having foolishly adopted a nickname, when under the rule of the Whigs of former times. Who would not laugh at the French, if they were to call their country "Great Gaul?" We have now got a name making, together with that of the king, a long lawyer-like piece of tautology, that is perfectly ridiculous.—That the Americans should call Mr. Canning's style "haughty," is not at all surprizing; for, they would be satisfied with nothing short of licking their feet; that is to say, unless they found us seriously bent upon resenting their insolence and injustice.—The receipt of newspapers from Halifax, Nova Scotia, have enabled me to furnish the people of England with some specimens of the "mild, unoffending, and "peaceful" conduct of the Americans; and, I should hope, that these specimens would have a powerful tendency towards producing a right way of thinking, with respect to the disposition of the Americans, in every Englishman, the editor of the Morning Chronicle solely excepted. In the month of September last, a mutiny took place on board the English frigate, the JASON, Capt. Cochrane, then being in the harbour of New York. The principal mutineers were tried, at Halifax, on the 27th of that month, and two of them were executed, according to their sentence. I will first give an account of what then took place, as published in the Halifax paper of the 13th. of October.—"Yesterday "morning at 8 o'clock, William Caton "and Mounsey Tinning, two of the unfortunate men, who were sentenced to death "on the 27th ult. for Mutiny on board of "His Majesty's frigate Jason, were executed at the fore-yard arm of that ship. "Campbell, Bone, Brown and Denen, "alias Matthews, then also sentenced to death, were respited after they had ascended the platform.—As a justification "of their conduct, these men had agreed "together to persist in a charge of cruelty "against their officers, under the idea that "such a conduct, would excite so compassionate an interest in their favor, as would

" ultimately lead to their pardon ; and so
 " general had been the compassion excited,
 " that a petition had been presented in their
 " behalf by the Marine Humane Society.
 " Their execution was in consequence de-
 " layed, and the strictest enquiries instituted,
 " until the Commander in chief had become
 " so fully satisfied of the falsehood of the
 " charges, and of the great criminality of
 " Caton and Tinning, in particular, that
 " mercy could not, without injury to the
 " service, be extended to them. Just as
 " these men were leaving the cabin to as-
 " cend the platform, the whole six, expect-
 " ing to suffer, burst into tears, and, address-
 " ing the reverend gentlemen who attended
 " them, said " they could not bear to go
 " out of the world with a lie in their mouths.
 " That the charges they had stated against
 " their officers were not true, and had only
 " been made by them, in hopes to excite
 " compassion." They requested those gen-
 " tlemen to commit to writing, this, their
 " dying declaration, and they would all
 " sign it. This was accordingly done, and
 " having been favored with it, it is with
 " the utmost satisfaction we communicate
 " it to the public. They also at the awful
 " moment of their departure, declared,
 " that they, with the men recommend-
 " ed to mercy, had combined to criminate
 " their officers. They asked pardon of their
 " officers for their injurious conduct in as-
 " persing their characters, and exhibited the
 " strongest marks of penitence and con-
 " trition."

Confession.

" We, the undersigned, most solemnly
 " declare, before the Rev. Dr. Stanser, and
 " the Rev. George Wright, as we shall an-
 " swer at the day of judgment, that we
 " have never been tyrannically or ill treated
 " by Capt. Cochrane, or any of the offi-
 " cers of his majesty's ship Jason ; but, on
 " the contrary, have always met with good
 " usage, and have nothing to complain of.
 " As witness our hands this 12th day of
 " Oct. 1807.—Wm. Caton, Thomas Camp-
 " bell, Peter Bond, ✕, his mark, Moun-
 " sey Tinning, Robert Denen, alias John
 " Matthews, Patrick Brown, ✕, his mark.
 " — Witness. Robert Stanser, George
 " Wright."——Now I proceed to state,
 " from the same authority, that which will
 " clearly shew, that the crime of these un-
 " fortunate men, that their ignominious exit
 " from life, and the injury done, in this case,
 " to our navy and our country, are all to be
 " attributed to the malice, the insolence, and
 " the treachery of the Americans.—The

for our

consul at New York. In order to deliver
 those dispatches, a boat, with a Lieutenant
 and eight men in her, was sent on shore.
 She had scarcely arrived at the landing place,
 when several hundreds of people, some of
 them lawyers, assembled on it, and openly
 invited the boat's crew to desert, telling
 them, that " they were now in a land of li-
 " berty, where they would be protected,
 " and that that was the time to shake off
 " the galling yoke of British oppression and
 " slavery." The sailors, lured by such an
 invitation, and emboldened by the number
 of their new and kind friends, leaped from
 the boat, and were received, by the malig-
 nant host, with shouts of applause. The
 Lieutenant, however (whose name, I re-
 gret, does not appear), pursued them, and
 intrepidly rushing amongst the civilized sa-
 vages, seized two of his men ; and, in spite
 of the imprecations and threats that resound-
 ed from every quarter, dragged them to his
 boat, and thus returned to the frigate. But, it
 soon afterwards appeared, that this was but the
 first germ of that mutiny, the seeds of which
 had been artfully sown on board the frigate,
 by the Americans, who had been admitted
 alongside in the pilot and provision boats. Al-
 most the whole of the crew became implica-
 ted in a conspiracy, which went " to the
 " seizing of the ship, and delivering her up
 " to the Americans." The officers, with a
 courage and presence of mind, seldom to be
 met with in such perfection as in the British
 Navy, frustrated the design, and though the
 shore was hostile to them, they succeeded, by
 degrees, in securing the ringleaders. When
 they had done this, the frigate immediately
 sailed for Halifax, leaving behind, however,
 the six seamen, who had been, as above
 mentioned, invited and protected by the
 people of New York. — " This," the
 Morning Chronicle may say, " is the ac-
 " count given by the enemies of us, advo-
 " cates for America." But, I will give that
 gentleman an article from an American
 newspaper, published at Richmond, in Vir-
 ginia, on the 24th of July last, just at the
 time when the desertions from our ships at
 Norfolk, in Virginia, led to the affair of the
 Chesapeake ; and, without any shuffling and
 equivocating, let the Morning Chronicle
 tell me what he and his faction have to say
 in defence of it.—I must first state to the
 reader, that, in order to assist our officers,
 in their endeavours to put a stop to the de-
 sertion from the fleet, arising from the base
 inveigling of the Americans, the inhabi-
 tants of Halifax had associated for the pur-
 pose of giving rewards to those who would
 apprehend deserters. Upon this, the follow-

ing article, extracted, as above-mentioned, from the American paper, descants, at the same time that it expresses its joy at the desertion which prevails.—“Richmond, Virginia, 24th July, 1807.—In this day’s paper, the patriot will read with pleasure, that the spirit of desertion from the British fleet prevails to a degree, *which threatens their service with destruction.*” The merchants of Halifax, long famed for their hostility to the independency and prosperity of the United States, have formed an association to counteract this temper by rewards, &c. These voluntary instruments of the most oppressive tyranny, these advocates for human servitude and wretchedness, have offered no less than 74 dollars a man, to intercept the victims of power and oppression from the enjoyment of light and liberty. And yet, notwithstanding these efforts, and the terrors of punishment, the love of liberty seems to prevail.—How long do these Halifax associators calculate upon the enjoyment of privileges which they use for such inhuman purposes? Do they believe because a sailor is knocked down, then gagged, then manacled, and thus carried on board that *little Hell, called a British Man of War*, he will forget that he once was a member of a civilized community? that he felt, thought, hoped, and loved, with the feelings customary to human beings? —In what situation will the merchants of Halifax be, if active and open war shall take place between the United States and Great Britain? Sound policy will dictate that the British Government should be deprived of that important station? The inimical conduct of the inhabitants will, decide the question: and the enterprise of our fellow citizens of New England will soon accomplish the object.—“Yes, Halifax will be remembered; her iniquities call aloud for vengeance, and the violated rights of humanity, as well as national honour, will hasten the blow. If these enemies of human happiness and liberty associate for the perpetration of fiend-like purposes, why may not, why ought not, the philanthropists of the United States to associate for contrary purposes? *Why not give rewards and offer inducements to those who are pent up in prisons, more detestable than the realms of Tartarus, to make their escape, and seek in the land of liberty that asylum which is offered by a free and benevolent people? By such means the spirit of emancipation will be encouraged: the tidings will fly like lightning from ship*

to ship, and our foe will be deprived of the means of annoyance.—These things are hastily submitted to public consideration; they will be found to merit notice, and it is hoped may be productive of beneficial consequences. It will be strange indeed, if the United States do not contain as many who will open their purse to promote the happiness of their fellow-creatures, as are found in Halifax, who will give money to make misery more wretched.”—And this is the “mild, unoffending, and peaceful people,” of whom Mr. Senator Mitchell (see the last Register) was speaking for six or seven hours, on the 27th of November last. Here is an openly and publicly made proposition for raising a fund to induce, by the means of rewards, English seamen to desert from the service of their country, and violate their oaths. Come forth, then, Mr. A. B. of the Morning Chronicle, or Mr. James Perry, who has published your letters in a pamphlet with a preface of his own, almost, if not quite, as stupid as the letters themselves; come forth, I say, one or both of you, and tell us now, whether “the language of the news-papers of a country” ought to be considered as the language of “the government of that country.” Answer us without reserve; be plain and direct. None of your cant about “desperate politicians,” and the “calamities of war;” but, answer us this plain question: Do you, who insisted, that the language of the English news-papers, ought to be considered as the language of the English government, allow, that the language of this American news-paper, published under the President’s nose, ought to be considered as the language of the American government? Tell us, too, Mr. Morning Chronicle, whether your assertion, that the number of our seamen, on board of American ships, was trifling, will still be persisted in, after this American news-paper has, in strains of exultation, declared, that the desertion in their harbours “threatened our service with destruction.”—Mark the moral philosophy of this “mild, unoffending, and peaceable people.” Because the merchants of Halifax offer rewards for apprehending deserters; that is to say, for the taking of criminals and for the prevention of crimes, the “mild and unoffending people” think themselves called upon to offer rewards for the inviting of men to commit crimes. They look upon the people of Halifax as their foes; as people meriting chastisement and destruction, because they wish to prevent the Americans from

inveigling away our seamen, and from destroying the service of our navy. But, this is truly characteristic of them, in whose eyes it is always a crime, worthy of signal vengeance, in any one to presume to defend himself against their roguish or insolent attempts. — “Land of liberty!” The *name*, if you please, but none of the *thing*; no not half so much as there was amongst the convicts, by whom Virginia was first settled. On board of their own “little hells,” they can flog as much as they please. When their cutter, “the *Revenge*” was at Falmouth, the town was, every day, annoyed with the cries of their flogged sailors, several of whom deserted to the shore; but, just the contrary of their own practice, were taken and sent on board again. — This that I have cited, is by no means a solitary instance. I could fill this sheet with paragraphs, from American papers, none of them much less atrocious than the one I have selected. It is the language, not of an obscure individual, but of a considerable part of the leaders in the country. How vain, how stupid, how idiot-like is it, then, in us, to hope, that they are to be won by concession! Fifteen years of concession on our side and of insolent encroachment on their side have we already endured, to our pecuniary cost and to the disgrace of our character. No more of these years we have, I hope, to endure; and, indeed, I am not afraid of it; for, I suspect, that the article, which I have inserted below, entitled “the *Maniac’s Politics*,” comes from one of the ministry, and I am sure, that the writer of that incomparable piece of satire sees all the question, relative to America, in its true point of view. — The *Morning Chronicle* and his faction (for they are not to be separated) continually ring in our ears the evil consequences which will attend a war with America. I say, and, I think, I have proved, that no evil consequences to us, would arise from such a war; but, supposing there should? What has that to do with the dispute? Are we, merely because we shall lose by a war, to accede to the demands of Mr. Jefferson? If so, why not accede to any other demands that he may think proper to make? The argument is wonderfully comprehensive. It embraces all possible cases; and, if our ministers were so foolish and base as to listen to it now, they would very soon have to listen to it again. — If the *outs* should try this question, in parliament, they might bid the walls of St. Stephen’s farewell at the close of the discussion; for I am very much deceived, if they would find one man in the whole country, some

merchants and manufacturers and the American fund-holders excepted, who would not, from that hour, hold them in abhorrence. The whole of the English nation, from the highest to the lowest, now see the Americans and their conduct as they are. You will meet with no disinterested man, who entertains, or affects to entertain, any alarm at their threats. Amongst the women, and down to the very children, they are held in contempt, as a very satisfactory proof of which, I here quote the verses under the picture of “PRESIDENT JEFF,” whom the Twelfth-cake sellers selected as one of the droll characters for the diversions of those hours of English festivity, the evening of the sixth of January.

“See President Jeff sits in deep contemplation,
“O’er politic plans that relate to our nation;
“Whate’er the conclusion, we rest with reliance,
“Old England can hold all her toes in defiance.”

Would that Jefferson could see the image engraven at the top of these verses! I thank Mr. Kerr most heartily for it. Delicious as his cake was, “President Jeff” was still more delicious. — Trifling as this circumstance is in itself, it is an indication of public feeling, which the Whigs, after all, are not foolish enough to hold in contempt. — From the latest intelligence, that has been received from America, it appears, that the ever-famed non-importation act was to go into effect in the middle of December; but, I wish the reader to bear in mind, that, in the prohibitions of this act, *cloth* and *woollens* and *hardware* are not included. It must be evident, however, that the executing of the act will alarm the merchants there, and will put a stop to their orders. It will produce a state of things not much unlike war; but, if our ministers hold firm, the act will be repealed in nine months’ time. There is, of course, a stock of goods in hand sufficient to last about a year, especially as the autumnal importations have, in all probability, been made with a view to the probable ensuing interruption of trade. This stock of goods will go on rising in price, and, of course, the consumption will become more economical. From these natural causes the stock in hand will be made to last a year, perhaps, with the suffering of great inconvenience; and, upon this calculation the Congress hope to bring us to their terms. But, as was observed in the last Register, they have all along been reckoning upon wrong impressions. When they passed their act, Napoleon was in a fair way of conquering Prussia; when they issued their proclamation and sent their demand of satisfaction, in consequence of the affair of the Chesapeake, they

were full of the intelligence of the peace of Tilsit; when Mr. Munroe left England, the American merchants and fund-holders were beginning to clamour, and to form their Corresponding Societies. Thus, at every stage of their progress, they have been reckoning and acting upon what was gone by, here, without at all affecting the spirit of the country; and, at the very moment when they are supposing themselves able to awe us into compliance by commercial restrictions, we are deliberating within ourselves, whether it would not be a good thing for England, if all commercial connection with them were, for ever, put an end to. Mr. Munroe, too, who is notoriously a partizan of France, and who, for the best of all reasons, is a bitter enemy of England, would not be very likely to make representations, calculated to check the presumption of his countrymen. In short, until they heard of the affair of Copenhagen, they looked upon us as upon the eve of bending down before Napoleon and his maritime coalition; and this notion of us emboldened them to go so far, that they are now ashamed to retract. They must do something, they perceive; they must make a shew of war; but, if they are wise, they will sneak out of it as soon as possible; for woe be unto them, if once any considerable naval force be sent across the Atlantic.— Their advocates here, of whom the *Morning Chronicle* is the trumpet, are continually reminding us of the quantity of cloth we send to America and of cotton we receive from America. We have given our reasons for believing, that this exchange is of no advantage to England. We have, I think, fully proved, that it is of no advantage. Nevertheless, without any attempt to answer our arguments, these advocates repeat, with rather increasing weight of emphasis, their cuckoo-like admonitions. But, again I say, supposing us to lose by a war with America, will the *Morning Chronicle* say, that we ought to accede to the demands of the Americans? That is the question for him to answer. The Americans make demands upon us. They begin a quarrel. They demand, first, that we should suffer them to inveigle our seamen on board their ships, merchant ships as well as others, and that we should give up our right to search for such seamen. Second, they demand, that, when once the said seamen, or any other subjects of the king, have received from them a bit of paper (price nine pence) which they call a certificate of citizenship, we shall acknowledge them as Americans, and, if we take them in the act of fighting against us, shall consider them merely as prisoners of war. Third,

that we should allow them to favour our enemy by conforming to his maritime decrees hostile to us, and that we should pass no maritime decrees, or orders of council, hostile to him, or, at least, that we should not make them conform to such orders, in like manner as they had conformed to his decrees; in other words, that they shall be permitted to hold our hands behind us, while Napoleon comes in front and knocks us on the head. They demand, in short, that the king of England should put his hand and seal to a treaty, acknowledging, that America, has, under the garb of neutrality, a right to do her utmost to destroy the English navy, and to assist France in all her hostile measures against England. But, taking the demands without any commentary, will the *Morning Chronicle* say, that the ministers ought to submit to those demands, rather than go to war? I want a direct answer to this question. I have long applied for, but can never obtain it. There is nothing more mean than to persevere in making representations of the evils of war; in harping upon the loss of trade, and the distress that will arise from it; in winding up always with a cant about “desperate politicians,” urged on by “their blind passions;” without ever meeting the question, whether the demands of the enemy ought to be submitted to. “According,” says this shuffling gentleman, in his paper of Tuesday last, “According to the apprehensions of the American merchants, an embargo will be immediately laid on the American shipping in our harbours. Indeed, the best informed persons are convinced, that a war between this country and America is certain. This opinion is justified by the conduct of ministers.” What conduct? Good or bad? Why do you not strike? “Willing to wound” you are; but you want the courage to give the blow. You, perceive, perhaps, that it would recoil upon the late ministers; and thus, divided between hope and fear, you content yourself with an equivocal insinuation. When approaching war is the subject, the first question to ask is this: is our cause just? The next is: will the probable evils of war be less than the probable evils of preserving peace upon the terms demanded by the enemy as the price of a continuation of peace? If both these questions be answered in the affirmative, the conclusion necessarily is, that war ought to take place. In that case, or until these questions have been discussed, it is sheer nonsense to run on in a strain of lamentation about the evils of war; and, when the questions have been

argued by one party, coming to a conclusion that war ought to take place, it is downright brazen impudence in the other to persevere in his lamentation, without attempting to answer the arguments, by which it has been maintained, that the probable evils of war would be less than the probable evils of preserving peace upon the enemy's terms.—I wish the reader to bear in mind, that the demands of America, relative to the harbouring and protecting of our seamen, were made long before the Orders of Council were dreamt of. It was made two years ago, or thereabouts, and has been urged, in stronger and stronger language, exactly as Napoleon has advanced in his conquests. It is a demand upon us to surrender the exercise of a great maritime right; to surrender what we deem essential to the maintenance of our naval superiority. The Americans, therefore, are the aggressors. They say, we will have this of you; you shall give up the exercise of this right, or we will make you, by a war. This view of the matter ought to be constantly before us. It is not we, or our late or present ministers, who have been picking a quarrel with them. It is they who have been picking a quarrel with us; who have been taking advantage of what they regarded as our embarrassments, to extort from us, in a moment of alarm, that which should be the lasting disgrace and final ruin of our country. Talk of a peace, indeed! What terms of peace should we have to expect from Napoleon, if Mr. Jefferson, by his non-importation act, could scare us unto a compliance with his demands?—I repeat, that I do not wish for a war with America, though I am convinced it would produce good to England. The blowing down of my neighbour's trees would do me good by letting the rays of the sun in upon my garden, and in removing a daily increasing annoyance; yet, it would be mean and wicked in me to wish to see them blown down. But, if he were to avail himself of the shelter of the branches of his trees slyly to let stones drop down upon my head; I should think myself justified, not only in punishing him for his base and unprovoked maliciousness, but in going, as far as the law would allow, to deprive him of the means of gratifying his malice in future. Upon the same principle, if the Americans will leave us no alternative but that of war or a surrender of our rights; if they will insist upon going to war, unless they are permitted to hold our hands while France knocks us on the head; then I would gladly see their government demolished, and their country divided and parcelled out in such a

way, as would prevent the possibility of their making new demands, and, underhand, aiding the cause of our enemy in Europe. This, if a war take place, our ministers have it completely in their power to effect, and the effecting of it would immortalize even the Duke of Portland, whom I have (perhaps unjustly) always suspected of having a strong bias in favour of the Americans.—The “New Amphycyonic Council” talk big, and big they will talk for a while. They will pass laws for the making of cannon foundries, for purchasing arms and ammunition, for raising millions of men, for erecting fortifications, and for building ships. But, they neither will nor can do any of these. From the report of a late debate, it appears, that a motion being made for arming the militia, a member said, that the militia were 600,000 in number, and that, at 6 dollars a man, the sum required would be 3,600,000 dollars. He might have said three times that sum; for 18 dollars, that is £4. 1. 0., will not equip a private foot soldier with arms and accoutrements, in America; therefore, to arm the militia would cost more than the whole of a year's revenue, leaving nothing wherewith to pay the interest upon the national debt, not to mention the “American navy,” and the fortifications, and the other expenses of the year, including the wages of the members of Congress. Yet, the motion passed without a division; and so it would, if it had been for arming the inhabitants of the moon. The member who suggested doubts as to the possibility of arming the militia, observed, that they ought to have something better than the mop-sticks, with which they were at present armed. This was no figure of speech. It was the representation of a real fact. I have seen part of the rabble which they call their militia; and, with the exception of the officers, I never saw one of them with a bit of iron, in any shape, in his hand, the whole thing being a mere burlesque. Mr. Randolph, the wise author of the motion, said, that the far greater part of the militia had arms of their own; alluding, I suppose, to the Birmingham fowling pieces, which they use most dexterously in the killing of squirrels and birds. If these are replaced by muskets, the muskets must go from England, or, at least, from Europe; and, if war take place, how are they to go?—But, the best of it is, that, in a war against us, this famous militia will be of no use; for we shall not, I hope, be silly enough to attempt “expeditions” against them. An order from the Admiralty to take, burn, sink, and destroy, with

five ships of the line, ten or twelve frigates, a good supply of sloops, and a bundle of proclamations, will settle the matter speedily ; and it is quite as well to employ our ships in this way, as to let them remain idly flapping their sails up the Mediterranean or along the iron coast of France. I do not think it would be necessary to take any one post upon land, except, perhaps, to cover an anchorage near the mouths of the Mississippi. Nova Scotia, on one side, and New Providence, on the other side, would be quite sufficient as places of rendezvous and for the speedy condemnation of prizes. There would be a bustle with privateers for a few months ; and, about September next, the grass would begin to grow in the streets of the cities, all which are situated near the coast. I cannot help, thus early, to press the objection to expeditions, which must be terribly expensive, and which, against the Americans, would be, besides, worse than useless ; because such enterprizes would find them employment. I would securely stop their holes, and leave them to quarrel and fight amongst themselves, which they would soon infallibly do.—Accustomed, as I so long was, to live under the abuse of the English-hating faction in America, I was not at all surprised to hear, the other day, that some of them here had hired the columns of a dirty wretch, who conducts an obscure opposition paper in London, called “ *THE STATESMAN*,” wherein to publish infamous aspersions upon my character ; but false and infamous as these are, they are trifling to what were, by persons of the same description, published in America, and the sole provocation of which was, my having stood forward in defence of the rights and the character of my native country. As to the half-famished caitiff, who has sold himself to this work of furbishing up frequently ranted lies, I shall leave him to pine away with the faction who are so base as to accept of his services ; and, his American employers may be assured, that no abuse of theirs shall ever draw me aside from the question between the two nations. I have not suffered personal injuries, great as they were, to brude themselves, into my mind I will not, but certainly never into the discussion. Besides, if I were to balance the love that I bear towards some persons in America against the hatred which I bear towards others, the former would have the decided preponderance. I have, as far as my information would go, fairly stated the facts relating to this dispute ; I have plainly expressed my wish that a war should take place, rather

than that my country should submit to the American demands ; I have fully given the reasons upon which that wish is founded ; and, my opponents, instead of attempting to shew, that my facts are false or my reasons are unfounded, resort to outrageous invective, to calumnious, and infamous personal accusations, which they know to have been preferred before, and which they know to have been unanswerably proved to be void of even the slightest foundation. I want no better proof of the badness of their cause.

COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY.
—The IIIrd. Volume of this Work being now published, I think it right to give, respecting it, some information more than has been yet given, and more, indeed, than it was, until now, in my power to give.—In the Prospectus, and also in the Preface, it was stated, that, as to the necessity of such a Work, it was, at this day, no easy matter merely to find the several books containing an account of the Parliamentary Proceedings, some of those books being very scarce and others excessively voluminous ; that, supposing them all to be at hand, the price of them was no trifling consideration, seeing that it was quite improbable that any one would be able to purchase them for less than One Hundred and Fifty pounds ; that, these difficulties overcome, others, and more formidable presented themselves to the acquiring of information ; for, that the volumes were so numerous, some of them so bulky, all of them loaded, more or less, with matter unauthentic, or wholly foreign from the subject, their contents so badly arranged and, through the most bulky part of the work, they were so completely destitute of running Titles, Tables of Contents, and Indexes, that it must be the labour of many years for even the most industrious person, to come, by such means, at any thing like a competent knowledge of the History of the Parliament of England.—With a view of removing these difficulties, which I, in common with others, had experienced, the present work was undertaken. It was desirable to have it as little expensive as possible, but without omitting any thing authentic, really making part of the Proceedings of Parliament, and without crowding the matter so as to create, in that way, a new obstacle to perusal and research. A calculation was made ; and, it was found, that, to combine economy with convenience, the form adopted for the Parliamentary Debates (which is the same as that of the Political Register), would be the best, and would have the additional recommendation of causing the volumes of this

new Work to correspond with the volumes of the Parliamentary Debates, both works united making a complete Parliamentary History, from the earliest times down to the present day. From this calculation, it appeared, that, by carrying each volume to the extent of 1500 pages, or thereabouts, the whole of the work would be comprized in Sixteen Volumes, which, at the price of a guinea and a half each volume, would bring it within the compass of moderate expence. To almost every one, it will, at first sight, seem incredible, that the whole work, as above described, should come into so comparatively small a space. But, when it is considered, that so large a part of the several works above enumerated, is taken up with Narratives of Battles, Sieges, and of Domestic Occurrences; that whole pamphlets of the day, and very long ones, are, in many places, inserted, just as they were published and sold; that, when we come down to a later period, we, in numerous instances, find three-fourths of the volume filled up with Papers of mere momentary utility, substantially repeated in subsequent, less diffuse, and more correct statements; and that (as any one may easily verify) the Sixteen Volumes of this work will contain as much print as One Hundred and Forty common octavo volumes: when all this is considered, I shall not be thought to speak at random, when I say, that the whole of the authentic and useful records of the Proceedings of the Parliament of England, of that of Great Britain, and of that of the United Kingdom, down to the year 1803, when "COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES" begin, will be comprized in these sixteen volumes.—To each Volume (as may be seen from those already published) there will be prefixed a full and clear Table of Contents; and, in the last Volume, there will be given a GENERAL INDEX to the whole Work, so complete that, I hope, it will be found to leave nothing of any importance difficult to be referred to.—As the Work has proceeded, new sources of information have opened; the examination of one work has led to the examination of another. Official Documents, and also Speeches have been found in books, never looked upon as containing an account of the proceedings in parliament; so that, from a list which I have now made of the books which will be necessary to the completion of the work, I am satisfied, that they will cost not less than seven hundred pounds. Besides these sources, afforded by the press, several manuscripts have been received from gentlemen, anxious to have them preserved in

this permanent shape; and, I cannot let slip this opportunity of soliciting further communications of this sort, especially relating to the period from 1743 to 1774, during which the Proceedings of Parliament, were (as evidently appears from our collections already made) given, in print, in a manner so very defective and erroneous.—It was resolved, at the outset, to adhere, through every stage of the proceedings, to the most strict impartiality; nothing has, hitherto, nor shall be hereafter, either omitted, or inserted, on account of its being favourable to the reputation or the doctrines of any party. Whatever appears to have been actually said or done, in either House of Parliament, that has any tendency to what ought to be the object of such a publication, has been, and shall be, as far as authentic materials will go, recorded with scrupulous fidelity.—I have already observed, that the undertaking of this laborious task was suggested by the difficulties actually experienced by me; and, as I was desirous of coming at useful knowledge myself, so, in the planning and executing of the Work, practical utility has been the great object, leaving matters of antiquarian curiosity to the few persons who have leisure for such pursuits. In short, my desire was to make a book, of which, in putting it into the hands of my children, I might safely say, "Read this; herein will you find a full and faithful account, as far as any man living can know, of what has been said and done in the Parliament, from its first existence to the present day. Herein also, and nowhere else, will you find the true history of your country, a knowledge of which, from this source, will enable you to avoid the errors, which are but too frequently imbedded from the reading of those romances, which are dignified with the title of *Histories of England*." Here will you find all the treaties, now upon record, ever entered into by your country; the history of all its connections with foreign nations; of the various changes in its religious establishments; of its manners at the several stages of its progress; of all the national failings and national virtues of our forefathers. Here you will not see a description of those forefathers, a faint, a partial, or exaggerated resemblance of them; but you will see them rise before you, and you will hear the words from their own lips." Such a work it was my desire to make; and such a work I flatter myself I shall succeed in making.—The fourth Volume comprizes the Period from the Restoration in 1660 to the Death of Queen

Anne in 1714, will be published in May next, and the two succeeding volumes during the present year. The materials, as far as the press has enabled us to collect, are already collected; the great difficulties of the undertaking are all overcome, and I can now, if health does not fail, pledge myself for the publication of at least three volumes in every year, until the sixteen be completed; and, in order that nothing may be wanting in the execution of the printing, and that it may be as clear and durable as possible, Mr. T. C. HANSARD, the printer, has erected a Stanhope press, the powers of which are such as to insure to a sheet so large as that of this work, an uniformity and indelibility of impression, equal to those which are given to sheets of the smallest dimensions.—In conclusion, it is necessary to state, that, though I was, from the first, confident of the final success of the work, to risk largely would have been imprudent; that, therefore, I began, and have thus far continued, with printing Fifteen Hundred copies; but, that the subscriptions have now risen to a number sufficient to induce me to begin the Fourth volume with Two Thousand copies; and I cannot refrain from adding (I confess, with some degree of pride), that neither the Prospectus nor the Published Volumes have ever been advertised in any Newspaper, Magazine, Review, or other publication, but in the Political Register only, and, even in that, not above six or seven times. I wished to see what I was able to accomplish, in this way, with my independent powers; how far the Work would succeed by its own bare merits; how far the merit of useful labour (for to no other do we make any pretensions) would meet with reward.—In future, when a volume is ready for delivery, an intimation thereof will be given in some of the most widely-circulated newspapers; and, it being necessary, as must be evident from the circumstances above stated, to take, thus early, precautions, calculated to prevent any broken sets remaining upon hand at the conclusion, I take this opportunity of requesting all those gentlemen, who, take the work, to send their names to their respective booksellers, as no copies of any newly published volume will, on any consideration, be sold, but to purchasers of the former volumes.—Gentlemen residing in Ireland, wishing to become subscribers, will please to apply to Mr. Archer, of Dublin.—N. B. Such Gentlemen as may be in possession of materials which they may wish to contribute towards the completion of this Work, and all

others having communications of any sort to make respecting it, are requested to address their Letters to me, at No. 5, Panton Square, London.

The several CORRESPONDENTS, whose letters have not yet been inserted, are assured, that they will all be duly attended to; but, they must perceive, that it is necessary to suit the contents of the Register to the events of the time of publication. The discussions, relative to the Poor Laws, Tythes, and Commerce in general, are not, at this moment, of so much immediate interest, as those relating to peace with France, and war with America.—I beg all persons, who have to write to me, upon public matters, to direct their letters to No. 5, Panton Square, London; and it is proper to add, that, for the reason before fully stated, I must decline receiving any that are not free of the charge of postage.—*Southampton* is not the post-town of *Botley*; *Bishop's Waltham* is. Scores of letters have gone back to the general post-office for the want of being postage-free; but, after the notice that I have given, the fault is not mine.

Botley, January 13, 1808.

THE MANIAC'S POLITICS.

(Extracted from the *Courier of the 9th January, 1808.*)

The unfortunate Maniac, whose interview with the Hon. Mr. Villiers, at Cranburn-Lodge, in Windsor Forest, we mentioned yesterday, was last night conveyed back to the mad house at Bethnal Green. There are some particulars in this unhappy man's case, which take it out of the common course of cases of lunacy, and which are calculated to excite in a more than common degree our sympathy and our pity. His anxiety to gain an interview with Mr. Villiers was extremely great, and his solicitations so earnest, accompanying them with saying that what he had to state would be attended with such excellent effects, that the servants did not hesitate to admit him. The account, as our readers recollect, said that he wished Mr. Villiers to introduce him to His Majesty, because he had several plans to submit, and some public grievances to lay before His Majesty. Mr. Villiers naturally enquired the nature of those plans, and the subject of those grievances. The unhappy Maniac entered into them fully. He began with the Catholic question, upon which he was extremely agitated and vehement. He said that the country was lost without Catholic emancipation and without abolition of tythes; he enlarged upon Bonaparte's attachment to

religious toleration, desiring Mr. Villiers to see how the Emperor Napoleon attaches his subjects of every description to his government, and banishes religious discord from among them; that all the Catholic nations must be averse to any connexion with us; and that this was the real cause of the failure of all the coalitions against France.—He passed rapidly to the Danish expedition, against which he spoke in strong terms; calling it unprecedented, atrocious, and monstrous; praised much the pacific and gentle nature of the Danes; bemoaned the robbery committed upon them, and expressed extreme anxiety that the Danish fleet should be sent back immediately.—The next subject he took up was that of our treatment of America, and asked what must be the consequence should the voice of our desperate politicians succeed in prompting us to a war with the United States? He had at his fingers' ends all the calculations about cotton, and was quite uneasy at the distresses which the want of cotton gowns and caps might produce: asking at the same time, what is to become of the immense multitude of our population, employed in the different departments of the cotton trade, should the American cotton be excluded from our market?—He was very violent upon the subject of our treatment of America, inveighed against Mr. Lyon's motion relative to the transfer by young Mr. Erskine, our minister in America, of his father's stock in the American funds, and exposed Mr. Lyon's origin, dwelling with much force upon his having emigrated from Ireland, and been sold upon his arrival in America for a couple of bulls. He said that he ment to press his Majesty to consider what was likely to be the future state of the country since a former keeper of his Majesty's conscience had not thought proper to trust his fortune in it, but had chosen to invest his money in the American funds in preference to the British.—He was very desirous that his Majesty should encourage petitions for peace, and talked of the 10,000 men who had lately assembled in a room at Oldham, in Lancashire, to draw up a petition for peace. Peace upon Bonaparte's own terms, he strenuously advised, Bonaparte being disposed to treat us with all the clemency and moderation of a conqueror.—He talked much of Lord Strangford's dispatches, and bursting into a louder tone, said, he felt it to be his duty to expose fully, and, *unanswerably*, the mean devices by which the Treasury advocates, and among them the accredited agents of ministers, had attempted to mislead the public into a belief that the emigration of the court of Lisbon had been

partly owing to the measures of our Cabinet. He contended, from Lord Strangford's dispatch, that neither he nor his employers had any share whatever in the fortunate event which had taken place—that every thing was done by them which men could do to make the plan fail—and that much loss had been sustained by their blunders, notwithstanding the lucky accidents which befriended us.—Lord Strangford's appointment as Minister to the Brazils, seemed to give him great uneasiness.—The idea of his Lordship having translated a work of Camoens inflamed his indignation; and he said when he saw this person sent to represent, among a new and allied people, the dignity of our Sovereign, and of the bravest, most *manly*, *truest* nation on the face of the earth—when he saw that the interests of England, of her commerce, and her political relations with her only remaining Ally, were to be intrusted to a young Poet, it was natural for him to give vent to feelings which he experienced in proportion to his patriotism, and in common with every thinking man.—Finally, he said, his object in his proposed interview with his Majesty was to impress upon his Majesty the necessity of calling back to his councils “all the talents, weight, character, and consideration in the country,” who could alone save the country by making peace upon Bonaparte's own terms.—Mr. Villiers towards the latter end of the unhappy maniac's speech, having suggested some objections to the accuracy of his statement, he instantly took fire, and said he had all the documents in his pocket; upon which he directly pulled out a large bundle of *Morning Chronicles*, and said “here are the documents,” which he threw indignantly upon the table; hinting that he was the Windsor correspondent of the *Morning Chronicle*, and that the letters in that paper signed A. B.—Veritas—an Englishman—Junius—were written by him. This may account for the great similarity between several parts of the Maniac's speech to Mr. Villiers, and some articles in the *Morning Chronicle*.—It may also account for the *Morning Chronicle* being more accurately and fully informed upon the subject of the proceedings of the Maniac at Windsor than any other paper.—Since his return to Bethnal Green, all persons “of talent, rank, weight, and consideration in the country” have been to see him.

IRELAND, AS IT IS.

VINDEX, LETTER I.

Sir,——The accumulating dangers of the British Empire, the vast importance of the

resources, which may be derived from Ireland, for surmounting them, and your persevering and public spirited endeavours, to direct public attention to the situation of that unhappy country, must inevitably force the consideration of its affairs upon parliament, at an early period of the approaching session. The measures, pursued by the *patriots* on the other side of the channel, and the language, held by their partisans on this, shew clearly, that the subject will be brought into discussion, without a possibility of option or alternative. Indeed, so many, so various, and such essential interests depend upon the unanimous co-operation of all parts of the empire, at this moment of expected universal warfare, that the legislature could not, consistently with its constitutional duty, abstain from a solemn inquiry into the causes of discontents, notoriously existing in any one part of the kingdom, with a view to re-establish universal harmony, by a wise and salutary redress of limited or local grievances. Taking it for granted, therefore, that either, from a sense of duty, the parliament, or, from party motives, the ousted faction, will bring this most important question into early discussion; I am persuaded, that a fair, a candid, and an impartial statement of the real situation of that country, will not be unacceptable to your readers, and may have very beneficial effects, by removing the gross misconceptions that too generally prevail upon this subject.—It has been the lot of Ireland, during the whole of last century, to be made the sport, and the prey of the factions, that successively possessed themselves of the government there. The same cant words, that marked the distinctions of parties in this country, were adopted with equal zeal, and maintained with more opposition and obstinacy in that. Red hot loyalty and hollow and hypocritical patriotism, proved alternately, the instruments of party aggrandisement. The men at the head of affairs were frequently changed, but the measures of the executive continued uniform and unaltered, into whatever hands the administration of affairs might have fallen. Popular complaints, and public grievances were equally postponed by every faction, to the more interesting objects of promoting family jobs, and providing for party connections. Any liberal system of policy was incompatible with such contracted views and selfish principles. There could be no generous expansion of motive, no upright or enlightened principle of administration, whilst the source of every noble impulse, of every exalted sentiment was contaminated in the hearts of all descriptions of public men, by

the sordid influence of avarice and personal ambition. That power, which was so eagerly sought for private ends, was exercised without much regard to public interests. If the men in office could but preserve their places, they were little solicitous for the removal of public grievances. The nation became successively the dupe, and the tool of cunning courtiers, and canting demagogues; who, as they ascended to power, by deceiving the people, invariably endeavoured to preserve it by betraying them. Hence that distraction of councils, that rancorous hostility of political antagonists, which spread animosity and disunion throughout the kingdom, and laid the foundation for those deplorable scenes, which can never be remembered without affliction, nor contemplated but with horror. Several important measures, however, had been, from time to time accomplished, highly conducive to the prosperity and independence of Ireland; but their success was, in no small degree, owing to critical times and fortunate combinations of circumstances. Much had been done, but much still remained to be achieved; when designing men, taking advantage of the want of confidence in public characters, and the sense of disappointment on the part of the people, precipitated a convulsion, that threatened immediate ruin to that, and great and imminent danger to every other part of the empire. The storm was some time gathering, whilst all the phenomena of the political atmosphere portended a dreadful explosion. The eventful moment at length arrived, when by the favour of Providence, the vigilance of the existing government, and the jarring elements, which produced the tempest, the havoc it occasioned, was, in a great measure, confined to the spot upon which it burst. The shock was violent and tremendous, but the fury of the hurricane was soon spent; yet, though an apparent calm succeeded, the bodings of just apprehension had not been so easily silenced, and the distant, but scarce perceptible rumblings of new convulsions seemed to attest, that the hour of peril was not then past.—This was the state of things in Ireland, when the question of an incorporating union was brought forward. Alive to the dangers, that hung over the country, aware of the fruitlessness of hope, for measures of conciliation from their own distracted parliament, and anxious to transfer the cause of a whole people, from partial, provoked, and prejudiced judges, to the bar of a liberal and enlightened legislature, every man in Ireland, who loved British connection, and detested French principles and fraternity, gave his cordial

and strenuous support to the measure. It would be invidious, as it would now be ungenerous, to impute sinister motives to those, who, in parliament, opposed the union. They are now politically defunct as a body, and it is not my disposition to violate the sanctity of the tomb, or insult the ashes of the dead. History will do justice to their motives and their conduct; and, in deciding upon the characters of the principal agents in this transaction, will reveal, how far their hostility to the measure may, or may not, have been influenced by the same considerations of partial or personal interest, which dictated the local opposition displayed against it in various particular parts of Ireland. The great mass of the people was either favourable, or certainly not hostile, to the union. The Protestants were divided on the question; the Catholics, where they did not support it, were absolutely neuter; but, the thinking and disinterested part of the community, of whatever sect or persuasion, were its most zealous advocates. A century of political squabbles, and disgusting contests for the loaves and fishes, had sufficiently proved the inefficiency of the existing order of things, to any purposes of enlarged policy or national tranquillisation. Whilst the Irish legislators had liberty and the glorious revolution constantly in their mouths, they cherished oppression and persecution in their hearts. They kept four-fifths of the nation in a state of civil bondage, and called that freedom; they maintained with a high hand the insulting ascendancy of the remaining fifth of the population, and called that the constitution. In their jargon, the nation was free, because the fiction was not enslaved; as if it was possible for a popular constitution to exist, where the people was excluded from all the benefits of it. Looking, therefore, to the materials, of which the Irish parliament was composed, looking to the manner, in which that body was usually chosen and constituted; looking, too, to the inevitable and no remote consequences to Ireland, and to the Empire, of a perseverance in the narrow and illiberal policy, with which that country had been so long and so fatally misgoverned, every impartial and considerate man of the nation hailed the measure of union, as the dawn of a new and auspicious period in the annals of his country. The support, however, which that measure received, was not gratuitous or groundless. If the prospect held out to Ireland, had not greatly varied from the gloomy features presented in the sad retrospect of its sufferings, there could not have been found an Irishman, who would be a party to

the partial extinction of his country from the nations of the world, or who would not have preferred even the mockery of independence to the reality of subjection, aggravated by the continuance of unmitigated political oppression. It was upon the distinct and recognized admission, that the union would lead to the total abolition of those odious restrictions, which had so long disfigured and disgraced the Irish code, that the union was so effectually supported. For, as his Majesty's reign had been distinguished by successive acts, for the relief of his Catholic subjects from disabilities, imposed upon them in times of turbulence and danger, and these acts had uniformly originated with the government, and were pressed upon the Irish Parliament, it could never have entered into the head of any one, that any opposition to the final abolition of all distinctions was to be apprehended in any quarter, after the demise of that parliament. Still less could it have been apprehended, that such an opposition would have been made by any branch of that legislature, which had approved of the constitution of Corsica, or passed the act, 31 Geo. 3. chap. 31 for the settlement of the Canadas. By the constitution of Corsica, which, I believe, was fully confirmed by his Majesty, though not sanctioned by Parliament, the Catholics of that island were granted privileges, not enjoyed by any British subject, and even a religious establishment was arranged for them, in concert with the Pope. The act of settlement of the Canadas, which is an act of the legislature, establishes the Catholic religion in those provinces, by authorising the Catholic clergy to receive tythes from their Catholic parishioners, and allows the council and legislature of these colonies to be composed indifferently of Catholics and Protestants. Two French wars have occurred, since the transfer, by treaty, of Canada to Great Britain; and yet it is notorious, that no symptom of disaffection to the British government has ever appeared amongst its inhabitants, either before or since the act of settlement. It would be difficult then to point out any good reason, why Catholics, who had been, *prima facie*, less trust worthy, as having imbibed necessarily, under their former government, French feelings of hostility against this country, should be admitted to the enjoyment of political rights, which are to be denied to native Catholics, whose every feeling is truly British, and whose only security it is to identify with British interests and connection. But, if the reason of the thing be not easily discoverable, the principle of faith, upon which this

distinction has been attempted to be justified, is still more unintelligible. One cannot easily conceive a scruple of conscience, that could apply to one, without being equally applicable to both cases. It would appear to common sense, common honesty, or vulgar notions of obligation, impossible for any casuistry to establish any difference between the two cases, that would not be favourable to the claims of the Catholics of the United Kingdom. But, I shall not pursue this topic further now. What I have stated will be sufficient to expose the folly and absurdity of the ground, on which these claims are said to be resisted. The question does not, at present, need to be much pressed. Growing dangers will open men's eyes to its importance. The rational part of the British public, and the whole of the Irish public (for I make no account of their mad bigots) are converts already to the doctrine, no less liberal than just, of equal burthens—equal laws—equal rights. The time is not very distant, when these claims must be granted. By must, I do not mean external force, but moral obligation. Political necessity will impose the obligation, and motives of prudence will discharge it. The suitor may in the first instance meet with a repulse; but, if the dame, after some dalliance should still continue to hold out, she runs the hazard of seeing her inamorato engrossed by a rival. Mr. Grattan says that there is a French party in Ireland. I do not believe it; but, I am sure, not, that there is a discontented party in Ireland, but that Ireland is discontented. If Great Britain turn a deaf ear to the just complaints of that nation, she may create, what I am convinced does not now exist there, a French party. I must confess, however, that I do not think the final emancipation of the Catholics of such importance, either to the interests or tranquillity of Ireland, as it is to the security and welfare of the empire. The grant of political rights, which are, and would be, unavailing, with respect to the great bulk of the population of that country, could not render them insensible to the pressure of the heaviest practical burthens, to which the mass of any nation has ever yet been subjected. But the throwing open the different departments of the state to the talents and ambition of so numerous a class of subjects, as the Roman Catholics, would have the most immediate and decisive beneficial effect upon the public service. In the army and navy this would be particularly felt, for the sons of the nobility and gentry of that persuasion, who would immediately take advantage of the opening, would draw after them such a multitude of

persons into both services, as would in all probability carry the effective strength of each to the full amount of their respective establishments. But, as a tranquillising measure for Ireland, the emancipation of the Catholics would prove very ineffectual. To the multitude, that is rather an object of allowable pride, than of any real utility. A few of the higher classes might indeed have an opportunity of taking advantage of it, to get into situations of political consideration, from which they are at present excluded. When I consider how little is demanded, or can be acquired, by the emancipation, I find it difficult to account for the impediments, that obstruct its progress, on any other score, than that of dire insatiation. No shadow of suspicion was ever entertained against the higher classes of the Catholics, and yet it is to them that indulgence is to be dealt out with a sparing hand. Every right, that the lower classes of Protestant subjects enjoy, is equally participated by the Catholic of the same rank, without any inconvenience or evil whatever. In the higher classes, independent of the general attachment, that must be felt to a common and equally protecting government, education, habit, and the possession of property afford ample security for the constitutional use of any political right or privilege, which may be granted to them. The whole question refers to them exclusively, at least, as to any immediate effect of its adoption. For, as to the great majority of the Catholics, they are not sollicitous for the removal of disabilities, which do not affect themselves, except so far, as artful and designing agitators may persuade them, that the removal of these disabilities is connected with the redress of their grievances. To tranquillise Ireland, therefore, the only effectual course is, to inquire fully into the causes of the discontents, that exist in that country, and to endeavour to remove them, as far as legislative remedies can be applied for that purpose. Those, who know Ireland best, must be sensible, that, though parliamentary interference may do much, there will remain many sources of grievance, which cannot be come at by any legislative enactments. The evils, which weigh down that unfortunate country, have not their foundation altogether in any defect of law, or abuse of power, or limitation of rights, or exclusive privileges; but they are compounded of all these, exaggerated—aggravated—exasperated by base passions, rancorous prejudices, and factious feelings, which, like so many excrescences, fasten upon the fair stock of society, and intercept the nourishment, that should be allowed freely to circulate, and

carry life, fertility, and vigour, to all its most remote or minute branches. From such a complication of causes there must naturally result many grievances, which cannot be redressed by any positive institution. Of this we have a satisfactory, or rather, (because such a circumstance cannot be satisfactory) an indisputable evidence in the proceedings, lately set on foot, in that country, by the *patriots* and land proprietors, with respect to tythes. Those very public spirited and disinterested gentlemen would fain persuade us, that the great hardships of the people of Ireland, arise solely from the operation of tythes. But they do not seem to be aware, that the clergyman's property, in tythes, rests upon as valid a title in law, and upon a much stronger ground in reason, than their property in their respective patrimonies; and one cannot help pitying the fatuity, with which they are endeavouring to sap the foundation of their own titles to their possessions, by decrying or weakening titles, which are founded upon precisely the same authority. I do not, nor can I, deny, that the operation of tythes in Ireland is a grievance; but, I still do contend, that with all the vexations attending their collection, they form but a very small portion of the oppression, under which the great body of the people of that country labours. Yet, I would ask, how it has happened, that those very patriotic gentlemen, in descanting upon the hardships of tythes, have uniformly connected them with the clerical establishment. They could not be ignorant, that one-third of the tythes of Ireland is in the hands of lay proprietors, and it was in fairness due to that most respectable body, the clergy of Ireland, that they should state, how far the exactions of those lay proprietors kept pace with, or fell short of, the rates levied, on behalf of the clergy. The fact is, that, in all times, the church and the clergy have been a most abundant theme of ridicule and obloquy to unprincipled witlings and hollow politicians. A short lived popularity would be the consequence of overthrowing the church establishment, but if the mass of the people were to be admitted to a participation of the plunder, they would not easily be induced to respect that popularity, if it interfered with the pursuit of similar game. I would not be understood here to insist, that tythes ought to be continued in their present shape in Ireland: on the contrary, it is my firm conviction, that the country would derive most important benefits from a fair commutation;

and, I am equally persuaded, that the clergy would be gainers by any arrangement, that would give them an adequate compensation for their property in tythes. My object has been not to justify grievance, but to repel aggression. It has been a favourite practice with the landed proprietors of Ireland, to cast a veil over their own exactions, by drawing the whole attention of the public to their misrepresentations of those of the clergy. As the subject will certainly be discussed in parliament next session, it becomes the duty of every man who is anxious for the tranquillity and welfare of that country, to illustrate it with all the light which his experience can supply. With this view the present communication is addressed to you, Sir, and, if you should deem it worthy of insertion, it shall be followed by others in succession, on the same subject, and to the same purpose; which, however deficient they may be, in style or manner, will certainly possess the merit of excluding all matter, but what is founded on unexceptionable authority, or bottomed upon the personal experience and observation of, Sir, yours, &c. &c.—VINCE.—London, December 14, 1807.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

(Continued from p. 64.)

JAMAICA.—*Resolutions, passed unanimously by the House of Assembly, on the 29th of Oct. 1807, relative to the distressed state of the Colony, and especially to the Abolition Act, passed by the last Parliament.*

What has been long known and felt here, has been lately fully proved before a Committee of the House of Commons, that, from the operations of the causes which we have only briefly adverted to, the great staple of the British West Indies, sugar, does not sell in the markets of the mother country for the duties, with the expences and charges of sending it there.—And that, with the exception of a few plantations on a very large scale, or under circumstances peculiarly fortunate, no revenue whatever is left to the planter, for the support of his family, or the satisfaction of his creditors.—The committee need hardly represent that the only permanent source of taxation must be the clear revenue of the individuals composing the society, who give up a proportion of it to the general use, and for the common safety, in whatever manner that proportion may be raised.

(To be continued.)

George Rose, Secretary of the Treasury, under the late minister, Pitt, states, in a pamphlet, entitled "A Brief Examination into the Increase of the Revenue, Commerce, &c." that the whole of the voluntary contributions in France amounted to but "a trifle more than the free gift of an English manufacturer to the Voluntary Contributions for carrying on the last war" (by which war commerce was increased instead of diminished), "the single subscription of which manufacturer, in one payment at the Bank of England, was 10,000l." The writer adds, that he "feels infinite satisfaction in publishing to the world the name of Robert Peel, Esq. of Eury, Lancashire, who thus exalted the national character." The writer does, however, omit to state, that, in a very few months after this free gift was made, to the exaltation of the national character, the said English manufacturer was created a Baronet.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PEACE.—It appears, that, within these few days, the sort of pacific ogling, that had been going on for some time, between France and us, has been put an end to. But, a publication, in the French official paper, "the *Moniteur*," of the 7th instant, does, in an indirect way, let us know what are the views and intentions of Napoleon with respect to peace.—This publication is a commentary upon the king of England's Declaration, issued in answer to that of the Emperor of Russia; and, through this channel, we are given to understand, that a formal recognition, on our part, of the "Liberty of the Seas," will not be insisted upon, at the ensuing peace. This way of conveying his sentiments to us, and of letting us know his intentions, is, to say the least of it, unworthy of the man who calls himself, and who really is, the conqueror and lawgiver of Europe.—I look upon no other part of the commentary as being of any importance. I care not what he says of, or what he does to, Prussia or Russia or Austria or Hanover or any other of the countries of Germany or Italy. I leave the disputes about the treaty of Tilsit and Lord Lauderdale's mission to be settled by those, who think that reasoning about rights and wrongs has any thing to do with the termination of our war with France. I see, in Napoleon, a man who has conquered the continent of Europe; whose mind is firmly bent upon the conquest of this kingdom; who was in hopes of being able so to embarrass us, as to induce us to give up those maritime rights, without exercising which it is impossible that we should resist his power for any length of time; who has now perceived, that he cannot, at present, frighten us into a formal surrender of those rights; and who has, therefore, taken the circuitous way, above-mentioned, to let us know, that he will not now insist upon that point.—Let us now take the part of the paper, which relates to this matter. It comes after a quotation from that part of the Declaration of the King,

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wherein he says, that he will, in spite of all combinations against him, assert those rights, the exercise of which has maintained the maritime power of England. Upon this passage it is, that the *Moniteur* makes the following remarks.—"That which has maintained the maritime power of England has not been tyrannical principles or maxims, but the policy, the energy, the good sense, and the prudent conduct of your ancestors; it is the divisions which they have often had the address to scatter on the continent. That which will essentially contribute to its destruction is the thoughtlessness, precipitancy, violence, and silly arrogance of their successors. The Emperor of Russia wishes for a maritime peace. Austria, France, and Spain participate in these sentiments. You have declared that the negotiation with France 'was only broken off upon points affecting the interests of Russia.' Wherefore, then, we again ask, do you continue the war? Why, it is because you do not wish for peace."—Let us imitate the *Moniteur*, and dispatch as we proceed. "Tyrannical principles" is a phrase of doubtful meaning, in this case; because, what you call tyrannical, we do not; and, while we thank you for the just applause, which you bestow upon our ancestors, we must insist, that it is merited, only because they held, and resolutely acted upon what you are pleased to call "tyrannical principles;" for, from the time that this country bore the name of England, it claimed a right of sea dominion, as absolute as that which any sovereign, or state, has upon the land; and, the fault, nay, the crime, of their descendants has been, that they have, step by step, receded from this claim, placing England, in respect to maritime rights, upon the same footing with the other states of Europe, yielding, by little and little, to the newfangled code of maritime laws, hatched in the universities of Germany, by the professors pensioned by Denmark, Russia, France, and Holland. Our

“ancestors,” of whose “policy, energy, and good sense” you speak, would have made war for their whole life long, rather than have suffered the powers of the continent to encroach upon the maritime dominion of England; it is, therefore, an unlucky choice in you to appeal from us to them, who speak to us from the grave, and reproach us for having already, dastard-like, given up, what they, at all hazards, through all troubles and revolutions, so resolutely preserved.—And what is there in the principles of our maritime rules, which savour of “tyranny?” You think it no tyranny to erect a kingdom of Westphalia, in virtue of your right of conquest. Indeed, king Jerome expressly tells his new subjects, that it is upon that right he comes to reign over them. The same is your plea in all the countries upon the continent of Europe; and, I am by no means disposed to dispute its validity. Conquest gives right of dominion. It is so; it always has been so, from the time of Joshua to the present day; and it always must be so. But, if you claim this right upon the land, why are not we to claim it upon the sea? There is no difference in the two cases, that I can perceive, except this, that, while it is notorious, that your conquests are not at all necessary to the defence of France, it is equally notorious, that to exercise dominion upon the sea is absolutely necessary to the defence of England. To say, that the sea is not liable to the same rules as the land is absurd. It suits you to call the sea the “high-way of nations,” because it is upon the sea alone that we have power to annoy you, or to defend ourselves; but, can it be maintained, with any shew of reason, that a nation surrounded by the water, a considerable part of its property and population being always upon that element, shall have no rights there other than those possessed in common with continental nations? You may as well attempt to persuade us, that the birds and the beasts have as much right to the use of the waters as the fish have.—The next passage of these remarks of the *Moniteur* is well worthy of attention. “It is because you do not wish for peace that you raise useless questions. France, Austria, Spain, Holland, Naples, say, as well as the Emperor of Russia, that they proclaim alike the principles of the armed neutrality. Those powers have, doubtless, the right to declare the principles which are to be the rule of their policy; they have the right to say on what conditions it becomes them to be your enemies, or neutral. You, you proclaim anew the principles of your ma-

ritime laws. Well, then! This opposition of principles will not be an impediment to the re-establishment of peace. They have on neither side any effect during peace; they have no application except when you are at war with a maritime power; but in that case each government has the right and power to consider the first violation of its flag as an act of hostility. The circumstances in which you will then find yourselves will determine your conduct then. If it is with France that you are at war, you will not judge her a power sufficiently feeble to render it indifferent to you whether you draw other enemies upon you, and you will shew some consideration for the rest of Europe. You did not venture to insult the flags of every power, till you had the address to arm all the continent against France. It was then your maritime principles were changed; and they became more unjust and more violent, in proportion as your continental connections became more contracted, or your allies maintained with more difficulty the struggle in which you had engaged them. It was thus that when Russia was obliged to collect all her force against the French in Poland, you violated her flag, and refused her, in respect to her commercial treaty, concessions which you shewed yourselves disposed to grant when she had no longer any enemies to combat. The powers of the continent, in proclaiming anew the principles of the armed neutrality, do but announce the maxims upon which they purpose to act in the next maritime war. You cannot prevent their directing their policy as they understand it; they exercise in this the right which appertains to all governments, and to the usurpation of which they would have nothing to oppose but the ultima ratio regum. On your part, you proclaim the principles of your maritime laws, that is, the maxims which you will employ in your next war. The continent has no interest in demanding from you either declarations or renunciations. Declarations would have no effect, from the moment you might think you could forget them with impunity. Renunciations are without an object, since we cannot renounce what we do not possess. If we judge of what you will do, by what you have hitherto done, we may conclude, that you will not require from the powers of the continent, either declaration or renunciation; and as they will demand none from you, there is hence no question to discuss,

"no difficulty to resolve; there is nothing which can retard for a day the blessings of peace."—This is, I think, as palpable a *sneaking* as I ever met with in all my life. As awkward a one, too, as it is possible to conceive. Mr. Talleyrand's good genius certainly did not predominate in the hour when these notes were penned. What! all the boasting about "*conquering* the liberty of the seas" come to this! Why not have told us, at once, that you found that you had got hold of the wrong horn; that you had been deceived; that you, therefore, gave up the design of forcing us to yield the right of search: why not act thus, and not attempt to sneak out of the difficulty, by a shuffling trick like this? The Emperor of Russia is put forward to bear the brunt: it is his words that have such and such a meaning: you seem to have completely forgotten all Napoleon's threats and vows upon the same subject: you seem to wish to make the world forget, that he has pledged himself to the continent of Europe to "*conquer* the liberty of the seas;" and, if a peace were now made, at a moment when we, in fact, exercise a complete maritime dominion, what would become of this pledge, unless we were made to renounce that dominion? But, let us see, how the poor Emperor of Russia stands, as to this matter. He (wise and valiant prince!) has declared (see Vol. XII. p. 896), that "he abrogates, for ever, the convention of 1801; that he proclaims a-new the principles of the armed neutrality, that monument of the wisdom of the Empress Catharine, and binds himself never to recede from that system." Now, who would not have thought, from this, that this wise man was resolved to have a share of the glory of "*conquering* the liberty of the seas?" Not at all, it seems; and that he only meant to say, that, in the next war after this, he would act upon the principles of the armed neutrality; and, of course, that, if England should set those principles at naught, he would again proclaim them a-new as to be acted upon by him, in the next war after that. Verily this is almost too foolish to be believed of the "young and noble-minded and high-spirited monarch," who, with the other of Prussia, "breathed his vows and plighted his troth, over the tomb of the great Frederick, at Potsdam."—But, it appears now, that there is "nothing to renounce." What was it, then, that Napoleon so often talked of "*conquering*?" To conquer a thing is to obtain it by force: to take it from an enemy, or to compel that enemy to give it up to you. Now, you ac-

cuse us of having arrogated to ourselves the exclusive freedom of the seas; take it from us you cannot, or, at least, you acknowledge that you have not done it yet; and, if you do not make us give it up, it is clear that you do not conquer it; so that, your declaration, that this question need not be agitated in negotiations for peace, amounts to a complete abandonment of the promise, to fulfil which your word has, a hundred times, been pledged.—You affect to regard the Emperor of Russia's declaration as having no reference to the present war, because he is engaged in the war, and, therefore, cannot be now affected by our maritime dominion; but, you forget, surely, that the neutrals are affected by it, and ha through the sides of the neutrals. I might say neutral, for there is but one; but, then, that one is mighty, as long as she is neutral, having more merchant shipping than all the continent of Europe put together, Holland only excepted. Now, is it of no importance to espouse the cause of this great neutral state; to apply the principles of the armed neutrality to her; to insist upon her "neutrality being respected," in his sense of the words; and, not to make peace with us, until we do so respect it? Is this of no importance? Are the poor fellows, who live across the Atlantic, and who are passing non importation acts and building log-houses and mud-forts and gun-boats, wherewith to aid you in "*conquering* the freedom of the seas;" are these poor fellows, after all their toasting with you at Petersburg and Rochefort, following the example of the imperial toast at Tilsit, to be left in the lurch to "*conquer* the liberty of the seas" single handed? Since, however, this is the real meaning of the Emperor of Russia, we certainly shall very soon come to an accommodation with him: if he means not to act upon the principles of the armed neutrality during war, we shall have no objection at all to his cherishing them, with all his paternal and princely care, during peace.—The conclusion of the remarks of the *Moniteur* glance at what we may be disposed to demand. "If however, you should raise the strange and novel pretension of imposing upon France, and the other powers of the continent, by an act of your will alone, the obligation of subscribing to your maritime laws, this is as if you were to require that the legislature and sovereignty of Russia, France, and Spain, should be transported to London—a fine prerogative for your parliament. It would be the same as if you were to proclaim everlasting war, or as if you

"were to fix as the termination of war the moment when you should have seized on St. Peterburgh, Paris, Vienna, and Madrid. But if this be not at the bottom of your sentiment, there is no further obstacle to peace: for, according to your own expressions, 'negotiations were broken off on points which touched immediately not the interests of his Britannic Majesty, but those of his Imperial Ally;' for the Imperial Ally of his Britannic Majesty, has informed you, that peace 'is henceforth the principal end of his wish, the principal object of his interest.' Yes, but, though we did (very foolishly, I allow,) make the Emperor of Russia's interests an impellent to peace, during the negotiation of Lord Lauderdale, it does not follow, I think, that, now that he wishes for peace, as the ally of France, that that circumstance alone ought to induce us to make peace.—No, we do not want to see any 'sovereignty transported to London.' We have quite sovereigns enough here; but, we have all a great desire, not to see the sovereignty of England transported to France; and, if we make peace now, leaving France the absolute mistress of all the continent, and with full leisure and means to stock the harbours of Denmark, Holland, Portugal, and Spain with ships of war, we can, without being gifted with prophetic powers, clearly perceive, that it could not be long before such a transportation would take place. Therefore it is, that we do see an obstacle to peace, though we wish for that event; an insurmountable obstacle to peace, while Holland in particular remains under the controul of France. We do not wish you and your friends and allies to 'subscribe to our maritime laws.' We only want you to evacuate Holland and Denmark and Spain and Portugal; to take away your troops to a certain distance, and to leave the people to do as they please with their own countries respectively. Till this, or something like this be obtained, what is the use of peace to us? It can be only the name of peace: for, we must arm again in a year, or be conquered. We do not want to conquer you. We, the people of this kingdom, care nothing at all about the manner, in which you may surround France with subordinate principalities and fiefdoms. It is no matter to us whether you make Mr. Talleyrand or his valet a prince. You may have as many king Dukes and king Dukes as you please; and we know not that the change is for the worse: but we ourselves wish to remain under the name of Englishmen, and to

have no rulers of your setting up, entertaining a confident hope, that all the alteration wanted here we are, without any of your help, quite able to effect. For this reason it is, that we dread such a peace as would leave all the continent bound in your chains, and all the harbours, dock-yards, and naval arsenals at your command. Either, therefore, you ought to be made to restore a real independence to the countries above-named, or, to stipulate, that no ships of war shall be built in those countries, or sail out of their harbours, during peace. It is useless to tell us, that this is "to proclaim eternal war." Such a phrase is nonsense; because we must all (not excepting Napoleon) die at no very distant day; but, however long the war may last, though it were to descend to our great grand-children, they would say, as we now say, that war, with all its evils, is preferable to being conquered by France. —The question with you is: "*war*, or "*peace*?" But, with us, the question is, "*war*, or *slavery to France*?" That is to say, if you refuse the conditions above suggested; for, without those conditions, peace and independence we could not enjoy. This vast difference between your situation and ours ought never to be lost sight of. You risk nothing by peace, upon terms such as these; but we risk every thing, without those terms. If you are ready to make peace upon such terms, our ministers will shew themselves the tools of low selfish passions, if they do not give us peace; but, if you refuse such terms, they will certainly have our support in carrying on the war. —As to the cause of this change in your tone towards England, it lies not very deeply hidden. You have now subdued the continent; you have pushed your commercial prohibitions to their utmost extent; and you have found, that our means continue as great as ever, and that, so far from being fear-stricken at the peace of Tilsit, we have, since that event, demonstrated less dread than before. The truth is (and you perceive it), that, instead of profiting from the wars of the continent, as you always asserted, and perhaps thought, those wars were a continual drain upon the fruits of our industry; and, as lately conducted by your enemies, a continual deadener of our spirits. Their cause we made our own; their defeats we could not avoid considering as the defeats of ourselves; and, by degrees, forgetting the glorious example of our ancestors, and even overlooking the means which God had given us for our protection, we at last came to that state of mind, which led us to conclude, that the fate of England was to be

decided upon the plains of Moravia and Poland. The peace of Tilsit, after having stunned us for a moment, gave a new turn to our thoughts; and, I hope, and believe, that the historian will have it to record, that, taught by this event to look at home, to consider the immense resources, natural as well as acquired, of our country; the strength arising from the industry, the patient enterprise; the valour; the confidence unmingled with suspicion, of her people; the mass of means collected upon so comparatively small a spot, and means, too, so manageable, so easily brought into operation and wielded against every foe: that, thus taught to consider, we looked back with shame to the days, when foolish or wicked ministers had made us believe, that our existence as a nation depended on the caprice of some half-ideot upon the continent, or upon the intrigues of a French or German strumpet, whose friendly protection we had purchased with sweat and with blood; that, from a contemplation of our past follies, we came to wise and manly resolutions for the future; that we explicitly declared our resolution, to maintain the dominion of the sea, in all its rigour, since our enemy had obtained the dominion of the land; and, that from this we did not, in the smallest particle, desist, until we had compelled that enemy, who had repeatedly vowed our destruction, so far to relax in his rights, obtained by conquest, as to enable us to make peace with him, without danger to our independence or injury to our character.—The Morning Chronicle, however, appears to see the matter in quite a different light. He has eagerly seized hold of this new tone of France, as being a proof of a pacific disposition on her part. Nay, he looks upon the abandonment of the pretension to compel us to surrender our maritime rights; he looks upon this as a “*concession*,” and tells us boldly, that now the obstacle to negotiation being removed, our ministers will, at once, set about the work of peace, unless they are resolved upon carrying on war to the utmost extremity. A “*concession*!” So then, the abandoning of any pretension whatever is a concession? Napoleon has, I believe, in so many words, said that he would destroy this new Carthage, which we, from vulgar tradition, call England; and, now that he condescends to let us know, that he does not mean absolutely to destroy us, we are, of course, to look upon that as a concession. Napoleon has conceded so far as to suffer us to exist. “The ministers will enter upon negotiation, if they be not resolved to carry on the war

“to extremity.” Upon negotiation? To be sure they will, whenever they see a fair opening for it, though it would be unwise to shew any very great eagerness. But, though they may, and ought, to be ready to negotiate; and though I agree, that the titles and other assumptions of Napoleon and his family ought to be no obstacle; yet, it does not follow, that peace must be made, because he has now graciously condescended to say, that he does not mean to force us to give up our maritime rights. Now, as before, the question whether peace be proper, will depend wholly upon the terms.—The Morning Chronicle has an argument in favour of peace, to which, I think, none but a very “desperate politician” would have resorted; namely, the distressed state of the cloth-makers in Yorkshire, who are, as he affirms, all thrown out of employment in consequence of the demand for cloth for exportation having ceased. I have proved, as clearly as the fact would admit of proof (see Vol. XII. p. 875), that the total number of persons, employed in manufacturing goods for the foreign market, and in exporting those goods, did not amount, in England and Scotland, to more than 400,000, including women and children, from the cradle upwards. Mr. Spence, in a third and enlarged edition of his pamphlet, availing himself, as he acknowledges, of my information and arguments, has, from a more deliberate calculation, concluded, that the number does not exceed 300,000. Now, supposing the whole 300,000 to be thrown out of employment, it is only adding about one fifth to the paupers already in England, Wales, and Scotland. The evil would be very great, I allow. God forbid, that I should speak of it with levity. But, the effect would be to “starve” nobody, the parish paupers being full as well fed and clothed as a great part of those, who are not paupers. The same quantity of food and fuel would remain in the kingdom; and I think, it will not be contended, even by the Morning Chronicle, that clothing would be dearer. The effect would be this: those who, from being able to earn their living, would descend into the list of paupers, would become somewhat debased, and those who possessed the real property of the country, would be obliged to support them, a considerable part of the burthen falling, as in justice it ought, upon those districts and those persons, who have been enriched by the labour of the manufacturers now thrown out of employment. We are constantly reminded of the immense increase of Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, and other

places. "All this," say the partizans of commerce, "is the effect of what you wish "to see perish." All this, we say, is an evil, and, amongst other reasons for this opinion, we urge that of its being a hot-bed for luxury and pauperism. But, laying this question aside, for the present, all these buildings, all this suddenly acquired wealth has arisen out of what? The labour of the manufacturers; the labour of those, who, as the Morning Chronicle asserts, are now starving for want of what, think you? Not of food and raiment, for it is clear that the war takes none of that away; but of *work*; "actually starving for "want of work!" That is to say, the poor wretches have, by their labour, enriched their respective neighbourhoods, and now, that their masters have, for a while, no demand for their labour, they will suffer them to die with hunger and with cold. Oh, no! Not so, at any rate, unless, indeed, which is rather improbable, all the justices of the peace, in the districts alluded to, be master-manufacturers. The food and raiment is all here, just as completely as it would have been, if commerce had received no check; and, I am in no fear, that the ousted manufacturers will not receive, generally speaking, as much of it now as they did before; the only difference being this: that, while they gave work for their food and raiment, their masters and the land-owners derived great profit from the existence of the manufacturers, whereas they will now derive no profit from it, but will be obliged to give back part of their profits to support those manufacturers without labour, than the justice of which nothing can, I think, be more evident. Not so, however, appear to think the master-manufacturers and land-owners of the districts in question. They fail not, when it suits their purpose, to proclaim the advantages which they derive from commerce; they refer us, and not in the most modest manner, to their opulence and greatness, and their spinning-jenny Barons; but, the moment their profits are checked, they complain of the miseries of the poor souls, upon the fruit of whose labour they have fattened. They call them "the starving poor," as if they had nothing more to do with them. Having no more profit from their labour, these poor are no longer theirs. They are melted down, all at once, into the mass of the nation. From the operation of a similar principle it is, that we never see a *senaker* hanged; because, the moment any of the members of that sect are discovered to have a hanging propensity, they are "read out of meeting," and when

the poor wretches come to their foreboded end, they belong to the Church of England, which, like the nation, is obliged to own all those who are disowned by every individual and every sect. But, the Quakers have another principle, which the knights of the shuttle do not seem anxious to adopt; that is, that it is their duty to maintain all their own poor, a principle, which, in the country where I have been intimate with them, they act upon in the most kind and liberal manner, an example, which, if it be not beneath the dignity of the knights, I would beg leave to point out for their imitation at this time.—Here it is that the shoe pinches. This is the cause of the petitions for peace, with which we are now threatened. It is not "starving manufacturers," that we hear crying for food and raiment; but, the avareicious clamour of those who have been enriched by their labour, perceiving that now they shall be compelled to give up a part of their riches to keep life in those, by whose labour they have been enriched; rather than do which they would see their country humbled in the dust.—We are told of the "respectability" of the petitioners; that is to say, of their riches. To be sure. The more property a man has, the more he has to pay towards the parish rates; so that these petitions are, in fact, petitions against the poor-rates, under the guise of feeling for the poor; just as the long parliament made use of the king's name in a war against his authority and life. Pass an act to divide the poor-rates of the manufacturing districts amongst all the parishes of England; make all those, who have not shared in the profits of commerce, share in the burdens which it thus, occasionally brings; do something so manifestly iniquitous as this, and, though I will not say, that the knights of the shuttle will not grumble at the suspension of their profits, I will engage that they shall talk no more about petitions for peace.—Thus far I have treated the matter upon a supposition, that all the 300,000 persons employed in manufacturing for exportation are now actually thrown out of employment, and are living, and must continue to live, in a state of pauperism. But, it is notorious, that much more than two-thirds of the export trade still exists, though it will, in all probability, be further diminished. To leave nothing, however, in dispute upon this score, I content myself with taking for granted, that even the "maniac" will not deny, that a part of the export trade will continue; and, then, it follows of course, that a part of the 300,000 persons above described, will not be caused to "starve".

by the war. Another part of them we may reasonably suppose, will, rather than "starve" accept of the forty guineas, which Lord Castlereagh's wise military plan has caused to be the bounty for serving in the militia, especially as, to the said forty guineas, are added very good food, clothing, and lodging, during the time of service, without the least possible danger to life or limb. I will mention no more particulars, but refer the reader to the Register, Vol. XII. pages 837 and 875, and to Mr. Spence, 3d edition, page 60 and onwards. where, as I flatter myself, he will see it clearly proved, that the total loss of foreign commerce, and, of course, the throwing out of employment of all the manufacturers, employed in making goods for exportation, could not produce any injury to the nation, nor any hardships of long duration to the labouring manufacturers, though it would certainly considerably lessen the profits of their masters, would transfer a part of their profits to other classes of tradesmen, and would, there is every reason to hope, prevent any future counting-house minister from creating spinning-jenny Baronets.—But, after all, what has the situation of the manufacturers, or of any other class of the people, or of the whole of the people, rich as well as poor, in the kingdom; what has it to do with the question of peace, or war, taken in the abstract; unless you come, at once, to the conclusion, that it is better to be conquered than to undergo hardships? If you come to this conclusion, there the matter ends; for, as the enemy's people have told you, that they must now suffer great hardships, having so well proved to you that they can suffer them for almost any length of time; and, as by submitting to suffering themselves, they are able (upon this supposition) to cause you to suffer too; the result necessarily is, that you must be conquered. A petition to the king, therefore, to surrender these islands to Napoleon, because the suffering of the people would thereby be put an end to, would have some sense in it; but, to petition him to restore the blessings of peace, without pointing out the terms, is mere senseless talk, and cannot be fairly ascribed to any but selfish or factious motives. It matters not who is at the helm, or how the war began. These are circumstances which have nothing at all to do with the question. My fear is, that these ministers will, like the Addingtons, make a peace, whenever they find it likely to secure their places longer than they could hold them without peace, though I shall be glad to find, that my fears are groundless.

If the country was in the hands of the best men that it can boast, the question of peace would still remain the same; for, however justly they might detest the conduct of their predecessors for a long series of years; however anxious they might be to punish public-robbers, and to prevent their future pillage, of what use would any of, or all, their efforts be, unless they preserved the independence of the country. To be sure, when one reflects upon the shameful waste of the public resources; upon the scandalous abuses that are suffered to exist, and that are openly countenanced and fostered; upon the prodigality that daily insults us with its boasts: when one thus reflects, the devil is apt to tempt one with a wish, which it were useless to describe. But, we must resist this temptation, and resolve, first of all to keep out the foreign foe, and next to crush, as soon as possible, our foes within.—In taking my leave of this subject, I do not like to let slip the opportunity of saying a word or two upon the effect which war has upon the prices of provisions, and, of course, upon those of labour. The last scarcity happened during war; and, I remember it was said by Mr. Fox: "the country *may* be conquered by a peace, but the people *must* eat;" a saying which was frequently quoted, about the time, but which certainly discovered not much profundity of reflection in the great orator, from whose lips it proceeded. In Vol. VI. of the Register, page 239, I showed, that, during the last half century, bread had been, upon an average, rather cheaper in war than in peace; and now, after four years of war, wheat sells for sixteen pounds a load. The average price of the quartern loaf was $10\frac{1}{2}$ d. during the last peace, and $10\frac{1}{2}$ d. was its price on the 28th of last month, as will be seen by the table at the close of the preceding volume. Indeed, one would seek in vain for the reason, whereon the saying of Mr. Fox was founded; for, war has no effect upon the seasons; it does not add to the number of mouths to be fed; if it takes some hands from the plough to wield the musket, it, in this country, brings others to the plough from the shuttle; and, if it neither takes from the quantity of food produced nor adds to the demand for food, where shall we look for a solid reason for the opinion, that war is the cause of dearth of provisions, an opinion which may in some cases, lead to great national calamities?

AMERICAN STATES.—In this number, or in the next, will be inserted the American "non-importation act," the passing of which is intended so materially to aid in that

famous undertaking, "the conquering of the liberty of the seas," and which, after being suspended, time after time for nearly two years, has, with singular good luck, been put into actual execution, just at the time, when the emperors Napoleon and Alexander have notified to the world, that it is not, at present, their intention to conquer the liberty of the seas.—By a reference to this act, it will be perceived, that, comparatively speaking, few articles of our goods are prohibited; but, particularly, woollens, of which the Americans import little of a fine quality, they, in this act, prohibit the importation of none but the very finest. Yet, the observance of this act, narrow as are the limits of its extent, they would not, either in peace or war, be able to enforce for nine months.—They allow the importation of goods from the Cape of Good Hope, or beyond it; but, that channel will, I should suppose, soon be stopped.—The chief point for observation, however, at present, is this: that this hostile act was *passed*, as will be seen by a reference to it, on the 16th of April, 1806, a year and a half before the affair of the Chesapeake took place, and long before any of our orders of council, restraining American commerce, were thought of. This act was passed for the obvious, nay, the acknowledged and declared purpose, of compelling England to accede to the demands of America. Of those demands we have before spoken; but, whatever they were, it is of importance to bear in mind, that this act of expected compulsion, this act of, at least, more than denigrificity, was passed a year and a half before the affair of the Chesapeake took place. Let us not be told, then, that we have stirred up a war with America by our attack upon that vessel, or by our orders of council.—The ground of the non-impetration act was, as far as I have been informed, a refusal, on our part, to yield to a demand, made on the part of America, that we should enter into a stipulation, that, in future, "no American vessel, of whatever name or description, should, in any case, be detained, or searched, for men." The author of a pamphlet, entitled "WAR, OR NO WAR," published at New York, in December last, has, by way of stricture upon this demand, the following passage:—"Then, John Stiles may send a vessel from Philadelphia to Liverpool, under the American flag, and while lying there, should be a highwayman, who had committed robbery with murder, take refuge aboard her, they may be completely protected, and carried to any

place of safety. The civil officers of Great Britain, aided by the military, may solicit in vain; or the vessel may become a transport, and take in a regiment of Frenchmen to land in Ireland, and should a British cruiser meet her in the channel, she must nevertheless pass unmolested; for no British commander has a right to search for men.—Thus, John Stiles gains the distinction of being able to protect the traitor, the murderer, the robber, the spy, or the enemy of any nation, against British authority: for Great Britain has a right to search his ship for men. Few, I believe, will be inclined to carry the rights of John Stiles so far. Yet the doctrine, as laid down, and as contended for by many of the supporters of our sagacious president, goes completely to this length. Whether the *great* *man* has actually instructed his ministers in London to this effect, as his friends say, is not for me to affirm. But if he has, I may say with much sincerity, that if it should not increase my conviction of his weakness and inconsistency, it would of his rashness."—The same writer says: "multitudes of English, Scotch, and Irish sea-faring men become possessed of certificates of naturalization by purchase, or by perjury, as soon as they have fairly got foot on our shores. The fraudulent manner, in which they are covered, or attempted to be so, by American protections, has so often been detected, that it has brought a serious imputation upon our national character."—Now, though the writer, here quoted, may be well disposed towards England, and also of the party opposed to Mr. Jefferson; yet, he would not have ventured to make a statement like this, and at such a time, too, had it not been undeniably true. I cite it merely in corroboration of my own statements upon the subject; for to me the knowledge of the facts has long been familiar.—It is probable that Mr. Jefferson would have contented himself with something short of the "rights of John Stiles;" he would, perhaps, upon our supplication, have so modified the demanded stipulation, as to have left us at liberty to prevent him from sheltering felons in England, and from conveying the enemy's troops to our shores; but, if a whole ship's crew had deserted to his ships, he would have protected them all. The extent of the mischief, which would have arisen to us, from acceding to this demand, sets all calculation at defiance. With our right of search duly executed, and with the consequent continual dread, on

the part of the deserters, of being taken and punished, the Americans have now some thousands of our seamen on board their ships; what would that number be, then, if it were proclaimed, through our fleets and squadrons, that, by solemn treaty, we had bound ourselves not to touch any man, who should be found on board of an American ship, American ships being in all the ports and parts of the world? It is evident, that such a treaty would unman our navy. It would unman any navy; for, where is the sailor, English, American, French, or any other, who would not accept of such offers, if held out to him? But, it was precisely because they knew that it would have this effect, that the Americans demanded it at our hands. To join in the fight they were not disposed. They thought we were hard pressed. They thought England was down, and to use the words of their judge, Rutledge, upon a former occasion, they would gladly have "seized her by the throat"; but, like Falstaff, they had some fears that she might rise again, or, at least, give them a blow in her last convulsive agonies; and, therefore, to unite safety with enterprize, they resolved to proceed in imitation of their great Sangrado-like physician, Dr. RUSH, that is to say, insinuate a lancet into her veins, let her bleed, to use one of his phrases, till she was "as white as New-Jersey veal", and, when she became motionless, approach her, and, with the malice of fiends, snigger in her face. This was their plan of operations; this was the design of the "mild, non-offending, and peaceable American people"; and, yet, there are Englishmen, or an Englishman (for, I should hope that the editor of the Morning Chronicle is the only one), who has the assurance to hold out to the public, that this people was to be "won by concession."—The Courier newspaper has published an extract of a letter, from Capt. WILLAUMEZ to General Turreau, the French minister in the United States, which extract I here insert, after observing, that it is stated, that the Captain met the brig, which he mentions, at sea.—"I have just apprehended four seamen deserters from the Valeureuse frigate, which I found on board an American brig, where they had engaged at seventeen dollars per month. Now, Sir, if you can succeed in making the American Government pay down a compensation for this misconduct in seducing thus our seamen, you will punish it by making it smart in that point in which it feels the most; viz. its avarice in money, and

"with so much the more justice, that these people have for three years past been continually injuring our marine, by seducing our best seamen".—Now, this letter, which bears date, on board the *Fondroyant*, at the Havannah, 25th October, 1806, is hardly a counterfeit; and, we have never heard of any demands, made, by the American government, upon France, touching this searching for seamen. And yet, why not upon France as well as upon England? "Why, they hate us and love the French." That is a very good reason for their partial conduct; but a very bad one for our hoping to win them by concessions; by further concessions, I should say; for we have been making concessions to them for fifteen years past. This letter wears all the appearance of authenticity; and the sentiments are precisely those, which the French entertain with respect to the American government, which they despise beyond the power of decent words to express; to a degree, indeed, that I have sometimes thought to surpass the bounds of strict justice. Yet does it cling to them. Its love appears to be attracted and preserved by contempt. The real fact is this, that the Americans hate the French rather more than they hate us, personally; but, they *fear* them, and our cowardly conduct, for several years past; indeed, ever since the peace of 1783, has made them despise as well as hate us. —I have before given my opinion as to the incapacity of America to carry on war, without producing her own destruction as a federative union of States. I will, now, from the pamphlet, above quoted, shew the reader what is written and published upon the subject, in America. Suppose the author of "WAR, OR NO WAR", to be a party opponent of Mr. Jefferson; yet, where facts are stated, and that, too, in such a form, there must be some truth whereon for them to rest; or, at least, it is pretty evident, that they are generally admitted as truths.—"Our commercial source of finance" (that is to say, the collections at the custom-house) "produces annually somewhat above fifteen millions of dollars (or £3,375,000). A very few ships of the enemy might rob us of it; and not only so, but also lay our commercial towns in ashes, annihilating our property to an incalculable amount. If this stream of revenue should be dried up, where could we look for support? Where is our system of internal taxation? Where should we find means to pay a direct tax should it be levied? Our commerce once gone, and our means

“ of raising ready money are gone with it. “ We fortunately have no mines of considerable value; and it is notorious, we “ have very little coin remaining in the coffers of our citizens. Hence we can look “ to commerce, and to commerce alone, to “ fill our treasury; which, without it, would “ very soon be empty. The whole of our “ revenue at this time arising from other “ sources, would not half pay our civil list. “ Hence we perceive, we are leaving to the “ mercy of every maritime foe, the only “ means we have in our power, for an easy “ and adequate support of our government. “ Let us suppose, that a war with Great “ Britain at this moment existed. Whence “ should we derive a revenue to carry it on? “ From our commerce it will be answered. “ But four-fifths of our commerce, to speak “ moderately, would be immediately annihilated. From our trading towns, and “ banks of deposit. Very well; but would “ not our trading towns be either burnt or “ plundered? Or supposing, contrary to “ reason, that neither of these happened to “ any one of them; their business being “ interrupted, would they not be obliged to “ cast their dependence upon the country “ instead of supporting government? How “ many who now find full employment, “ would be obliged to turn vagrants for “ sustenance? How many now in affluence, “ would soon be reduced to poverty? Our “ doors are open; and the robber may enter “ and plunder as he pleases. Our banks of “ deposit, however, would afford a temporary “ supply. But who will invade private property, “ to gain an ignominious respite? I grant you, “ a very good republican might; but then it “ would be only to borrow it; and no one “ could be under apprehension but that it “ would be scrupulously returned, with interest. “ But again, another difficulty would arise. “ Our banks contain little else but fictitious “ capital; they might emit paper in abundance; “ yet, in a time of doubt and uncertainty, “ what scheme would give it currency? The “ stockholder would by no means find himself “ exempt from the general calamity. On the “ contrary, his bubble would burst; and he “ would tell you, paper was not silver, nor parchment “ gold.”—Such is the statement of this “ writer, and it is, in no respect exaggerated. “ There is no internal tax worth speaking of. “ I believe, the post-office is now the only “ source of internal revenue; and, observe, “ that four-fifths of the custom duties are “ collected upon goods going to, or coming from, “ England and her possessions. The very

word *war* (with England), then, takes away “ four-fifths of the whole revenue; nor, let it “ be forgotten, that nearly one half of this “ whole revenue is wanted to pay the interest “ of the national debt. Where, then, if they “ have war with us, are the stockholders to “ find their next year’s dividends? Are they “ to come from internal taxes to be imposed? “ “ King Cong ” knows well, that it would “ be safer for him to thrust his head, hydra as “ it is, into the fire, than attempt to impose “ internal taxes, the total amount of which “ should equal a quarter part of the taxes now “ arising from English goods. How farcical is “ it, then, to talk of this people making “ a navy,” and “ fortifications,” and “ raising “ an army.” That they might make an in- “ road into Upper Canada is probable enough; “ because the people of Hampshire might “ easily invade Surrey; but, they will never “ reach Lower Canada; and, if they were to “ do it, and to conquer wild woods, seeing that “ the “ liberty of the seas ” is not so easily “ conquered, what would they gain? “ They “ cry,” says the writer above quoted, “ for “ more land, although we cannot cultivate, “ or even raise boundaries to, the fiftieth “ part of what we already have in pos- “ session: for an extension of jurisdiction “ they cry, although, from its enormous “ size, the Union is already threatened with “ dismemberment.”—I have spoken be- “ fore of the “ American navy ” and fortifica- “ tions. In terms very contemptuous cer- “ tainly; but, as will appear from the next “ and last extract I shall make from this pam- “ phlet, not beyond the truth.—“ The na- “ vy has been sold, burnt, and wasted away, “ until it has almost disappeared. Our “ arms, arsenals and military stores, instead “ of receiving considerable augmentation, “ have suffered all the diminution of ac- “ cident and decay. The fortifications of “ our different harbours were in a condi- “ tion to prevent our being the derision of “ an invading enemy. These have been “ demolished, or have mouldered back to “ earth, until you can scarcely find a piece “ of ordnance mounted for a signal gun. “ Where is the ship that has been built? “ Where the barrier raised against inva- “ sion? Where the preparation for defence “ worthy of mention? None is to be found “ along our extensive and exposed coast. “ The timber and materials for putting “ afloat the ships of the line, authorized by “ law, are gone with the rest; while the “ ruins only remain, to reproach us for our “ folly, or as memorials of the desolating “ effects of time.”—And, this is the peo- “ ple who are going to war, while they cut off,

by barely pronouncing the word war, four fifths of their revenue. This is the people, whom the *Morning Chronicle* would fain persuade us to fear; would fain persuade us to make new concessions to, in order to appease their wrath.—But, I shall be asked, “how did they carry on war *before*, “without revenue?” Oh, oh! You mean they should go to work again to the making of paper money, and to the taking of people's goods by force with that money, and to the confiscating of the property of Tories (or rich men), and to the paying off old scores with an act of “*King Cong*,” in short, you mean, that there should be another revolution. That is quite another thing; and, it is a thing, too, which if they do go to war, you will certainly see take place, their war against us (for it is they who make it) being evidently destined to terminate, like the war, which, as the table tells us, was, by the glasses and dishes combined, made against the hammer.

Botley, Jan. 21, 1808.

KING'S SPEECH.

On Thursday, the 21st of January, 1808, the two Houses of Parliament having met, the Session was opened by Commission, with the following Speech, which was read by the Lord Chancellor.

My Lords and Gentlemen,—We have received his Majesty's commands to assure you, that in calling you together at this important conjuncture of affairs, he entertains the most perfect conviction, that he shall find in you the same determination with which his Majesty himself is animated, to uphold the honour of his crown, and the just rights and interests of his people.—We are commanded by his Majesty to inform you, that no sooner had the result of the negotiations at Tilsit, confirmed the influence and control of France over the powers of the continent, than his Majesty was apprized of the intentions of the enemy to combine those powers in one general confederacy, to be directed either to the entire subjugation of this kingdom, or to the imposing upon his Majesty an insecure and ignominious peace.—That for this purpose, it was determined to force into hostility against his Majesty, states which had hitherto been allowed by France to maintain or to purchase their neutrality; and to bring to bear against different points of his Majesty's dominions, the whole of the naval force of Europe, and specifically the fleets of Portugal and Denmark.—To place those fleets out of the power of such a confederacy became therefore the indispensable duty of his Ma-

jesty.—In the execution of this duty, so far as related to the Danish fleet, his Majesty has commanded us to assure you, that it was with the deepest reluctance that his Majesty found himself compelled, after his earnest endeavours to open a negotiation with the Danish government had failed, to authorise his commanders to resort to the extremity of force, but that he has the greatest satisfaction in congratulating you upon the successful execution of this painful, but necessary service.—We are further commanded to acquaint you, that the course which his Majesty had to pursue with respect to Portugal, was happily of a nature more congenial to his Majesty's feelings. The timely and unreserved communication by the court of Lisbon of the demands and designs of France, while it confirmed to his Majesty the authenticity of the advices which he had received from other quarters, entitled that court to his Majesty's confidence in the sincerity of the assurances by which that communication was accompanied.—The fleet of Portugal was destined by France to be employed as an instrument of vengeance against Great Britain. That fleet has been secured from the grasp of France, and is now employed in conveying to its American dominions the hopes and fortunes of the Portuguese monarchy. His Majesty implores the protection of Divine Providence upon that enterprise, rejoicing in the preservation of a power so long the friend and ally of Great Britain; and in the prospect of its establishment in the new world with augmented strength and splendor.—We have it in command from his Majesty to inform you, that the determination of the enemy to excite hostilities between his Majesty and his late allies, the Emperors of Russia and Austria, and the King of Prussia, has been but too successful; and that the ministers from those powers have demanded and received their passports.—This measure, on the part of Russia, has been attempted to be justified by a statement of wrongs and grievances which have no real foundation. The Emperor of Russia had indeed proffered his mediation between his Majesty and France. His Majesty did not refuse that mediation, but he is confident you will feel the propriety of its not having been accepted until his Majesty should have been enabled to ascertain that Russia was in a condition to mediate impartially, and until the principles of the basis on which France was ready to negotiate were made known to his Majesty.—No pretence of justification has been alledged for the hostile conduct of the Emperor of Austria, or for that of his Prussian Majesty.—His Majesty has not given the slightest

ground of complaint to either of those sovereigns, nor even at the moment when they have respectively withdrawn their ministers, have they assigned to his Majesty any distinct cause for that proceeding.—His Majesty has directed that copies of the correspondence between his Majesty's ambassador and the minister for foreign affairs of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, during the negotiations at Tilsit, and the official note of the Russian minister at this court, containing the offer of his Imperial Majesty's mediation between his Majesty and France, together with the answer returned to that note by his Majesty's command; and also copies of the official notes, presented by the Austrian minister at this court, and of the answers which his Majesty commanded to be returned to them, should be laid before you.—It is with concern that his Majesty commands us to inform you, that notwithstanding his earnest wishes to terminate the war in which he is engaged with the Ottoman Porte, his Majesty's endeavours, unhappily for the Turkish empire, have been defeated by the machinations of France, not less the enemy of the Porte than of Great Britain. But while the influence of France has been thus unfortunately successful in preventing the termination of existing hostilities, and in exciting new war against this country, his Majesty commands us to inform you that the King of Sweden has resisted every attempt to induce him to abandon his alliance with Great Britain; and that his Majesty entertains no doubt that you will feel with him the sacredness of the duty which the firmness and fidelity of the King of Sweden impose upon his Majesty; and that you will concur in enabling his Majesty to discharge it in a manner worthy of this country. It remains for us, according to his Majesty's command, to state to you that the Treaty of Commerce and Amity between his Majesty and the United States of America which was concluded and signed by commissioners duly authorized for that purpose, on the 31st of December, 1800, has not taken effect, in consequence of the refusal of the President of the United States to ratify that instrument. For an unauthorised act of force committed against an American ship of war his Majesty did not hesitate to offer immediate and spontaneous reparation. But an attempt has been made by the American government to connect with the question which has arisen out of this act, pretensions inconsistent with the maritime rights of Great Britain: such pretensions his Majesty is determined never to

admit. His Majesty, nevertheless, hopes that the American government will be actuated by the same desire to preserve the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries which has ever influenced his Majesty's conduct, and that any difficulties in the discussion now pending may be effectually removed. His Majesty has commanded me to state to you, that in consequence of the decree by which France declared the whole of his Majesty's dominions to be in a state of blockade, and subjected to seizure and confiscation, the produce and manufactures of his Kingdom, his Majesty resorted, in the first instance, to a measure of mitigated retaliation; and that this measure having proved ineffectual for its object, his Majesty has since found it necessary to adopt others of greater vigour, which, he commands us to state to you, will require the aid of Parliament to give them complete and effectual operation. His Majesty has directed copies of the orders which he has issued with the advice of his Privy Council upon this subject to be laid before you, and he commands us to recommend them to your early attention.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,—His Majesty has directed the estimates for the ensuing year to be laid before you, in the fullest confidence that your loyalty and public spirit will induce you to make such provision for the public service as the urgency of affairs may require. His Majesty has great satisfaction in informing you, that, notwithstanding the difficulties which the enemy has endeavoured to impose upon the Commerce of his Subjects, and upon their Intercommerce with other Nations, the Resources of the Country have continued in the last year to be so abundant, as to have produced, both from the permanent and temporary revenue, a receipt considerably larger than that of the preceding year.—The satisfaction which his Majesty feels assured you will derive, in common with his Majesty, from this proof of the solidity of these Resources, cannot but be greatly increased, if, as his Majesty confidently hopes, it shall be found possible to raise the necessary Supplies for the present year without any material addition to the Public Burthens.

My Lords and Gentlemen,—We are especially commanded to say to you, in the name of his Majesty, that, if ever there was a just and National War, it is that which his Majesty is now compelled to prosecute.—This War is in its principle purely Defensive. His Majesty looks but to the attainment of a secure and honourable

Peace ; but such a Peace can only be negotiated upon a footing of perfect equality. The eyes of Europe and of the world are fixed upon the British Parliament. If, as his Majesty confidentially trusts, you display in this crisis of the fate of the country the characteristic spirit of the British Nation, and face unappalled the unnatural combination which is gathered around us, his Majesty bids us to assure you of his firm persuasion; that under the blessing of Divine Providence, the struggle will prove successful and glorious to Great Britain. We are lastly commanded to assure you, that in this awful and momentous contest, you may rely on the firmness of his Majesty, who has no cause but that of his people, and that his Majesty reciprocally relies on the wisdom, the constancy, and the affectionate support of his Parliament.

IRELAND, AS IT IS.

VINDEX, LETTER II.

SIR,—What has been remarked of the texture of the English language, that it has more anomalies than any other known, may be more truly applied to the oppressed condition of the Irish people. In contemplating the severe and multifarious grievances, which that nation endures, one can easily perceive the universality of oppression; but it is vain to look for that unity or uniformity of cause, that generates the sufferings of other afflicted countries. It is a maxim equally applicable to politics as to physics, that the simpler the cause the less injurious will be the consequence. It is not the single fountain, from which a great river may take its rise, that swells its proud tide, and makes it flow with majesty to the ocean. Various accessory streams feed its progress; and the flood, which it discharges at its mouth, is the accumulation from many sources. The oppression, which flows from any single cause, is simple, and may be light, when spread over the vast surface of society. But, when all the springs of power are opened, when every channel, through which oppression can flow, contributes its contents to swell the common tide, how frightful must be the effects of the desolating inundation. Those, somewhat elevated in rank or station, may escape with little comparative injury, but all the lower orders of the community must be overwhelmed by the flood.—The iron rod of a government falls with most weight upon the objects, most immediately within its reach, and spending its force, as it descends, is scarcely perceptible, when it touches the lowest links of society. The oppression of an overbearing aristocracy par-

takes, in some degree, of that property of a despotic government, which exempts the lower orders from its severity; but, as it multiplies the sources of infliction, must aggravate the sufferings of a nation. The tyranny of the mass, collecting and concentrating every element of intolerance and arbitrary power, pours forth such a huge flood of oppression, as to overthrow every barrier, and involve all classes of society in one indiscriminate state of misery and degradation. These are the three great sources of national suffering; for to some one of these may be traced the oppression of every nation, whose calamities are recorded in history. Yet not to any one of these, nor to a combination of any, or of all of them, are the miseries of the Irish nation to be ascribed. The wretchedness of that people appears written, in legible characters, over the face of the land; but, whilst the effect is thus visible in the light of day, the obscurity of midnight darkness envelops, and conceals the real cause from view. Many truths, various errors, and much misrepresentation have been published upon this subject, but no writer, that I have consulted, has, according to my opinion, pointed out the radical, the remote source of all the evils, that mar the internal quiet and prosperity of that country. Catholic disabilities, and the hardships, arising from tythes, have been, and are, at present, much insisted on, as the great causes of Irish grievance. It would be false, to assert, that the Irish nation has no just ground of complaint, no well founded claim for redress, under these heads; but, it would betray a gross ignorance of the subject, a total disacquaintance with the real state of the people of Ireland, to contend, that the removal of either, or both, could have any permanent effect upon the internal tranquillity of that country. These are but symptoms; the disease lies deeper. The force of habit, or the flattery of self-love, may render those, who are most affected, least sensible of the existence of the disease. The patient, mistaking the symptoms for the complaint, looks with confidence to re-establishment upon their removal; yet, unless the physician eradicate the peccant cause from the constitution, the relief is but temporary, the relapse certain, and often fatal. In tracing the real source of the malady, with which Ireland is afflicted, we must not look, solely, to the Protestants, or to the Catholics, or to the clergy, or to the privileged orders, or to the unprivileged classes; we must consider the whole, as forming one body, presenting certain indications of its real indisposition, in those affections, which ap-

pear to pervade every part of that whole. Partial observers, or interested individuals may, without violation of truth, ascribe to a part, what belongs to the whole. The premises may be true, though the conclusion fall short of the extent, to which it would be borne out by them. Such views and such deductions answer all the purposes of a sect or a party, that may have an interest, in disguising the true state of the case, or in embarrassing the government and deceiving the public by a false one. There is no subject of public importance, upon which so little correct information, or so much real ignorance is betrayed in this country, as in the impressions given and entertained, on the actual state of Ireland. To form a judgment by the factious representations of those men, who scandalously abandoned the Catholics, whilst in office, one would suppose, that emancipation was now a measure of the last importance to Ireland. In my former letter, I stated, and I here repeat the assertion, that the total emancipation of the Catholics, would prove an incalculable benefit to the empire, without having any considerable effect on the internal state of Ireland. I am convinced, that any man, acquainted with the general catholic mind, will agree with me, that the measure, if unaccompanied by others for the redress of practical grievances, would not have the smallest effect, either to eradicate Mr. Grattan's quaint *pimple*, or supercede the necessity of Mr. Sheridan's equally quaint *pouch*. But, even though the balsam of emancipation were to clear the complexion of the beauty from the pimple, it would not remove from the constitution those ill humours, of which the pimple is but a symptom. The act of emancipation would have no more influence upon the wretched peasant, than an act, for allowing him to inhabit a slated house, would have, in reconciling him to his miserable cabin, because of the privilege conferred upon him, of being lodged, as well as his superiors, if ever his circumstances should enable him to procure the accommodation. His grievances are practical, his wants real; and it is not by the communication of political rights, which he can never hope to enjoy, that he is to be reconciled to great present privations and grievous prospective burthens. Every honest and impartial man must be a friend to emancipation, but no good or well intentioned subject would wish to force that question into discussion, at present, without some reasonable prospect of success. Indiscreet precipitancy would only tend to retard an event, which every day of sober reflection, on the part of those, who now oppose it, must accelerate

to its final accomplishment.—The subject of tythes and their operation are equally misrepresented, and alike misunderstood in this country. On the ground of right, the property of the clergy and of lay impropiators, in tythes, is unquestionable; and certainly the attack upon that description of property comes with a very bad grace from the land proprietors. It would be superfluous here to enter into any proof of the common law right of the clergy to tythes, in their several benefices. That proportion of the produce of the soil has been imprescriptably vested in the church; and, I doubt much, whether any land proprietor in the empire, can produce so venerable a title to his estate. It is necessary to bear this in mind in order to decide upon the principles, which have actuated the land proprietors of Ireland in their hostility to the rights of the clergy. It has been stated above, that the title of the clergy on tythes is immemorial and imprescriptable; not so the claims of the Irish land proprietors. Nine tenths of the lands of Ireland have been regranted on forfeiture since the reformation. The lands, of course, passed to the grantees, subject to the claims of the church, which were indefeasible even by the crown; for those lands only, which belonged to the suppressed monasteries, were, or could be, granted over by the executive, discharged of tythes, because these lands alone were previously exempt from their operation. The proprietors, therefore, of nine-tenths of the lands of Ireland, whether claiming by descent, or purchase, from the original grantees, or their representatives, must hold their estates according to the terms of the original grant. They can have no right to what was not, and could not, be conveyed by it—the property of the clergy. Every species of tenure, by which land is now held in Ireland, has been effected in the contemplation of this prior claim of the clergy. The purchaser and the occupier have acquired their different degrees of property or interest, upon lower terms, in the proportion, that the amount of the tythes diminished the value of the acquisition. It would be unjust, therefore, not only to the clergy, but to those, who either sold or let lands, under this impression, to give, by the abolition of tythes, so valuable an accession of property to the present proprietors or terre-tenants, for which no consideration whatever had been paid, or reserved, at the time of making the purchase or the lease. I know it may be said, that it is not the total abolition, but a reasonable commutation, of tythes, that is sought. I admit that commutation is the ostensible object of those

persons, who have stirred this question on the other side of the channel; but my argument will apply equally to commutation as to abolition, unless that commutation be adequate to the clergy, and still levied off the soil. In 1734 the land proprietors of Ireland abolished tythes of agistment by an arbitrary vote of the Irish House of Commons, declaring any professional man an enemy to his country, who should be concerned in any process for the recovery of tythes of agistment. This felonious injunction, for it robbed the clergy of their property without any colour of law, was afterwards legalised and placed upon the Statute Book at the Union. But, who were the gainers by that transaction? Were they not the proprietors themselves, whose pasture and feeding grounds were enhanced in value by being thus exonerated from the claims of the clergy? No man will venture to assert, that the public was in the smallest degree benefited. Neither beef, nor butter, nor mutton, was reduced in price, in consequence, and there is good reason to think, that the present high rates of tythes, in that country, are owing to that measure, which, by confining their operation to so small a portion of the surface of the country, as that employed in tillage, rendered an increase of rates absolutely unavoidable. Should the land proprietors succeed in 1808, as they did in 1734, in reducing the remaining incumbrance of tythes, affecting their lands, would they, or the public profit by the change? The instance, just quoted, will suffice to answer that question. Every article of agricultural produce would continue at its full price, unaffected by the change, and only the present occupier, and the land proprietor in reversion, be benefited, unless the commutation should still respect the soil as its object. In any other case, the public at large would be altogether the sufferers, as there would be no diminution of prices, and the land owners would proportionably increase their rents, whilst the whole weight of the commutation, if not confined to the soil, would be to be defrayed by the public. If the land proprietors were generously and disinterestedly to come forward, and offer to forego the benefit, they enjoy from the abolition of tythes of agistment; if they were justly and nobly to declare, that they had inherited their estates, subject to the recognised provision for the church, and were disposed to act honourably by the clergy, to deal fairly with the public, and to conform to the conditions, upon which their properties were granted; if they were to propose, that all the productive lands in the kingdom,

should be charged, according to a certain rate by the acre, or the plough land, in order to relieve tillage grounds from the exorbitant incumbrance, to which they are at present exclusively, though, perhaps, under existing circumstances, necessarily subjected for the support of the Irish church establishment; if, in their affectation of zeal for the interest of the public, they were to manifest any real feeling for the sufferings of the people; or, whilst ostensibly seeking redress of national grievances, not covertly to promote their own private interests; if they shewed any disposition to acquiesce in a common sacrifice for a common object; or, if their efforts were directed to the attainment of popular relief by any measures of general operation, not by the plunder of a particular body, we might respect their motives, however difficult we might feel it, either to approve the means they have resorted to, or enter into their particular views upon so important a national question. But, let it be had in remembrance, that the land proprietors, who are now creating an outcry against tythes, for the severity with which they press upon the lower orders, are the very identical description of persons, who procured the abolition of tythes of agistment, which cast the whole of the burthen of tythes upon tillage lands; and, consequently upon the poor. Had they exerted themselves, for the relief of the people, in 1734, with the same activity and perseverance, which they displayed in prosecuting successfully the exoneration of their own pasture grounds from any part of the charge, there would not be any discontent, at this moment existing amongst the Irish peasantry, on the score of tythes. Tythes of potatoes were, at that period, but of comparatively recent imposition, and had never been generally submitted to, nor levied without obstruction. From the first introduction of that nutritious root into Ireland, until about the middle of last century, its cultivation was attended with complete immunity from any contribution to the clergy. The exaction of a high rate, therefore, from a species of tillage, which had never before been the object of any such charge, was, as may be reasonably supposed, not quietly acquiesced in. White Boys, Right Boys, and various other denominations, and combinations of lawless nocturnal insurgents associated, from time to time, for the purpose of resisting the charge with open violence, and committed atrocities, that disturbed the tranquillity of the country, and called for the direct interposition of the military. The pressure of tythes was unquestionably the immediate cause of

these different insurrections; but, when the mistaken and misguided instruments of the popular tumults began to feel their power in the spread of their force and depredations, they uniformly extended their views and measures of redress, to every species of oppression, under which they had suffered. It was the fashion, at the time, to ascribe these troubles, and the outrages that followed, to the dissatisfaction and fury of a Popish mob. The fact was, however, that the vengeance of the rioters, was indiscriminately levelled against the dues exacted by the Catholic priests, the tythes levied by the Protestant clergy, and the exorbitant rents demanded and enforced by the land proprietors and middlemen.—There were as many acts of violence committed against the priests, and persons concerned in levying distress for rent, as against the agents for tythes, who were universally represented as the sole objects of popular hatred and resentment. The excesses of the deluded multitude served only to enhance the hardships, which they sought to alleviate, and the repeated disturbances of the country had the effect of intimidating enterprising British capitalists from embarking in any, the most promising speculations, in that devoted Kingdom. The landlords accused the clergy, who, in turn, retorted the charge upon them, of being the source of the national grievances; and the populace, whenever goaded into resistance by the overflowing measure of their oppression, directed their attacks, with equal violence and without any distinction, against rents, tythes, and the exactions of their own clergy. It was, in the last degree, false, therefore, to ascribe such disturbances to any religious motives: they were the unhappy, illegal, and ill judged struggles of an oppressed population, to obtain by force a redress of existing grievances, from whatever source they might have proceeded, and a greater number of Catholic priests, than of any other description of persons, suffered from popular resentment during these convulsions. The whole of the South of Ireland, at the commencement of the year 1786, presented a melancholy and alarming picture of public suffering and popular outrage. The spirit of insurrection, which had antecedently been confined to the obscurity of night, and the shelter of an assumed disguise, gaining confidence from numbers and impunity, encountered the face of day, and prosecuted the purposes of redress and violence in direct and declared defiance of the civil power. The timely interposition of military force, and a few deplorable, but unavoidable execu-

tions restored public tranquillity. Such had been the state of things, when the land proprietors, taking advantage of the prostration of the people, and the consternation of the clergy, procured their famous vote of agistment. On that occasion, the people were betrayed, and the clergy sacrificed; for whilst the latter were deprived of their property, the former were left exposed to the same unmitigated grievances, with all the aggravation, that must have been the consequence of throwing the whole weight of the church establishment upon tillage lands. What confidence, then, I would ask, ought to be placed in the professions of men, who are so actively alive to their own interests, and have shewn such morbid sensibility to the hardships of the great body of their countrymen? Is it to be supposed, that they who put up their lands to public competition, and let them only to the highest bidder, will abstain from taking any advantage of the alleviation of the pressure of tythes, by a correspondent increase in their demands? If they had ever been known to decline an opportunity of swelling the amount of their rent-rolls, however presented, they might, perhaps, be allowed to possess some claim to the public spirit and disinterestedness, which they affect. It might then be safely admitted, that the public, and particularly the poorer classes, would derive some substantial benefit from the abolition or commutation of tythe. But the spirit of exaction, which pervades all classes of the community, is ever craving and never satisfied. Whatever may be taken from the amount of tythes will be added to the amount of rent; so that the wretched hind, who is taught to expect some alleviation of his burthens, must find all his hopes frustrated, all his prospects blasted, when at length it shall be discovered, that the only effect of the change will be, to transfer to one hand, that oppression which had previously been dispensed by two. —It is not to any one class, or to any particular body, therefore, that the distresses and oppression of the people of Ireland are to be ascribed. They are all equally infected with the thirst of income; and, whether land proprietors, clergymen, land jobbers, farmers, proctors, middlemen, or even cottagers, they avail themselves of every occasion to promote their selfish objects, without any regard to the miseries of the victims to their rapacity. Mutual jealousies, no less than party feelings and religious prejudices, give rise to reciprocal accusations; but, whilst the multifarious authors of the public calamities, are occupied in alternate charges and denunciations, the unvaried source of op-

pression becomes inveterate and progressive. In such a state of things even prosperity becomes a national scourge: for, whilst it adds to the number of the affluent, it multiplies the authors and instruments of popular oppression. Religious differences, political disqualifications, or civil disabilities, produce at present, little more than nominal distinctions. The broad line of separation is not to be traced amongst the population of Ireland, between sects or factions, between parties, principles or professions, between orders or classes, or any known and recognised divisions or subdivisions of well regulated communities; it is simple, obvious, and definite, palpably discernible throughout every part of the country; and, without ever losing itself in the obscurity, that veils the limits of minor distinctions, draws a clear and comprehensive line of demarcation between the two grand, though very disproportionate, divisions of the people of Ireland; these who have some property, and those who have none but their labour; in a word, the oppressors and the oppressed. The selfish principle, that induces the great land proprietor to extort the highest possible rent for his lands, passes with the possession to his tenant, and descends with accumulating force through all the intermediate tenures, until it falls with insufferable effects upon the lowest denomination of occupants, the labouring poor. This is the great source of all the grievances and discontents in Ireland, and this proceeds not from the influence of religious prejudices, or the exercise of political ascendancy; it is the melancholy consequence of that unhappy system of legislative exclusion, which annihilated all identity of feeling, and destroyed any community of interest, during the last century, in the Irish nation. Laws were made for the security of property, rather than for the protection of the people. The great body of the nation, therefore, which was cut off by impolitic statutes, from any inheritance in the land, sunk insensibly, though rapidly, in moral estimation, to the level of its political degradation. The possessions of the predominant party were of much more consideration, than the rights of the prostrate, or the interests of the many. A new and unnatural system of public sentiment and moral feeling was quickly adopted, worthy of, and accommodated to, this most monstrous scheme of civil society. The mass of the population, who were by law prohibited from acquiring any property, became a species of property to their supe-

riors, and were held in nearly the same degree of estimation, as the animals, that composed the stock upon their estates. Successive relieving statutes have let in all descriptions of subjects, of whatsoever religious persuasion, amongst the proprietors; but their moral or mental habits have not undergone any revolution, correspondent with the change that has taken place in the civil and political condition of the great body of the people of Ireland. The proprietors, the new or the old, the Catholic or the Protestant, and the various denominations of middlemen, who hold under them, still act upon the principle, of making a property of the people, by extorting from them an enormous amount of revenue, for the small portion of land, which they cultivate for the support of their families. In my next I shall establish that point, and shew, that the labouring poor alone yield to their oppressors, whether proprietors or middlemen, a revenue exceeding, in amount, the public income of the state. It will be for the Imperial Parliament then to determine the real source of the grievances of Ireland, and how far the statements of Irish proprietors are to be confided in relative to that subject. I shall only add, that, in what I have stated, I had no intention to convey any impression, as if tythes were not a great source of public grievance in Ireland; my principal object having been to shew, that, though represented as the most prominent, they were neither an exclusive, nor the most considerable cause of the distresses and discontents of that wretched country.—I am, Sir, &c.—VINCE.—*London, December 20, 1807.*

“*PERISH COMMERCE.*”

SIR,—As Mr. Spence acknowledges the basis of his system to be the same with that of the French economists, I have presumed to trouble you with a few remarks on that subject, which, if either he or you confute, I shall admit that you have gained your point. The doctrine of the economists is this,—that the manufacturer adds nothing to national wealth; because while he is employed in increasing the value of raw materials or rude produce, he consumes, for his own subsistence, a quantity of grain equal to the value of the commodity which he produces. The error of this doctrine is however easily detected. It arises from fixing, in an arbitrary manner, the value of manufactured produce, and stating it to be only equal to the quantity of

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corn necessary for the subsistence of the manufacturer. To render this however more apparent, it will be necessary to explain the nature, and point out the original source, of value. Value is in every case, I believe, constituted by labour, or the difficulty of producing any commodity. I shall not stop here to explain how the liberal arts and a knowledge of those sciences which time and capital are necessary to acquire, obtain a preeminence, but merely remark that the labour of one man appears to be originally equal in value to that of another, and that he is entitled to demand for the work of his hands that quantity of the produce of another person's which it required an equal length of time to fabricate. In bartering my goods with another person's therefore, I do not state my commodity, but my labour, against his. It is perhaps true that the agriculturist is capable of producing a greater quantity of grain than the manufacturer can of any commodity; but as things become increased in quantity, or as a less degree of labour is required for their production, they become diminished in value, and therefore a small quantity of manufactures may be stated against a large quantity of grain or rude produce.—It is here to be remarked however, that as every manufacturer, as well as the agriculturist, produces a quantity of those articles which he is employed in fabricating equal to the supply of many individuals besides himself, he is entitled to rank this surplus of his labour with the surplus of the labour of other artificers, and to set off a certain portion of it, according to its quantity, against that portion of the superfluous food raised by the agriculturist which he receives, and in the same manner to barter the remainder among the followers of other arts for the other necessities which he may require. The value of manufactures is never so much lessened by competition as to resolve itself into the mere subsistence of the manufacturer, because he could never be satisfied with so inadequate a return for his labour, and would therefore betake himself to another profession; and even that ingenuity which tends to increase the facility of the fabrication of any commodity never reduces its price beyond a degree which does not leave the manufacturer the full value and due reward of his industry. By nothing, however, is it better proved that the productive capacity of agriculture does not surpass that of other arts than by this,—that agriculture and manufactures may be made to change circumstances, in such a manner, that it may be demonstrated in an inverse ratio to

the system of the economists, that while an agriculturist is employed in raising grain he consumes manufactures equal to its value. Nothing can indeed be more evident than that the agriculturist is as much maintained at the expence of the manufacturer as the latter is at that of the former; and that the price of grain resolves itself into the amount of the manufactures exchanged for it, as much as the price of manufactures into the amount of the food which is received for them. Of what use is it, therefore, in demonstrating a difference between the circumstances of manufacturers and agriculturists, to say that the manufacturer has transmuted articles of a perishable into those of a durable nature, or the agriculturist those of a durable into those of a perishable nature? For each consumes what the other creates; each gains what the other loses; each exchanges that which is of no use for that which is of use to him; each gives no more of the work of his own hands for that of the other's than its value, the relative amount of which that competition which exists among agriculturists, as well as manufacturers, always renders exact.—But instead of saying that one species of labour is more productive than another, it would be more correct to say that one commodity is more easily produced than another; which however can only have the effect of proving it to be of less value. For if the labour required to produce any commodity be small according to its quantity, the price must be in the same degree low; if, on the contrary, great, the price must be proportionally high. An equality must be observed in apportioning the emoluments of different professions, in order to induce the application of the members of society equally towards them, and there can be no other rule for this distribution of reward than labour. All arts are equally useful which society can afford to cultivate; and all professions must be equally paid if they are equally necessary. Even the soldier, the judge, and the menial servant, who produce no tangible commodity, are entitled to rank their labour as equal to a portion of the superfluous produce of almost all the manufacturers within the society to which they belong, as all derive benefit from it; and to be remunerated for the security and facility which they give to the production of articles of necessity and luxury, or the addition which their labour makes to the enjoyment of them, with a certain portion of them for their own consumption.—The only difference which is to be discovered between the productive nature of agricultural labour and that employed in other arts

appears in this—that the farmer, besides deriving, from his profession, a revenue for himself, is enabled at the same time to pay a rent to the landlord; while the manufacturer can spare nothing from the revenue necessary to reward his own labour, and to replace the wages of the men and the expense of the tools which he employs. This difference between manufacturers and agriculturists is however more nominal than real. The rent paid to the landlord is evidently a profit on stock for money or property invested in land, which does not exceed the ordinary return of expence and maintenance, and places him in no more advantageous circumstances than any other capitalist; and if a master manufacturer borrows money for carrying on his business and pays interest for it, or if it is recollected that he pays a price for the rude produce which he manufactures, he will be found to be exactly in the situation of a farmer paying a rent. But by those who contend for the superiority of agriculture, the comparison is generally made between journeymen manufacturers and farmers. To be fair however, it should be between the master manufacturer and the farmer; for the capacity of a landlord is an addition to the profession of the latter. A landlord and a tenant are to be considered as engaged in two distinct trades, in which two capitals are employed, and from each of which a profit is to be derived. But it is obvious, that the rent received by the landlord is paid by manufacturers, or that they give articles to the tenant in exchange for grain equal to a revenue for himself and another to the landlord,—only because the two stocks employed, *in justice*, demand it. Stock is again to be considered but as an accumulation of labour, which, on account of its utility, necessarily demands a certain revenue. In every case, indeed, however much the intricate nature of the subject may perplex our judgment, profit always resolves itself into a reward for labour, and as the competition between the members of society, in the different arts, reduces this reward to exact justice, it is impossible that the agriculturist, more than those who are engaged in other professions, can derive any extraordinary or unjust reward from his labour, or that it can therefore be in any higher degree productive to himself or the community than that which is engaged in other professions.—With regard to the necessity of foreign commerce, I shall only quote the following words of Dr. Adam Smith, from the chapter which he writes on the agricultural system. “The “perfection of manufacturing industry,”

he says, “it must be remembered, depends altogether upon the division of labour, and the degree to which the division of labour can be introduced into any manufacture depends upon the *extent of the market*.”—E.—*Scrvie*, 1st January, 1808.

POPULAR EDUCATION.

SIR,—Various have been the plans proposed by theoretical writers for the improvement of mankind. Among the most specious of these may be reckoned, what has been usually termed a popular education. The connection between truth and virtue is thought to be so intimate, that by whatever means the former is accelerated, by precisely the same, and to the same extent, will the practice of the latter be promoted. Than this opinion, it is scarcely possible to conceive one, at greater variance with the whole tenor of human experience. Were it true, that in the same proportion as nations emerge from a state of barbarism, they were known to cultivate those graces which tend to adorn the human character, then indeed there would be some apparent propriety, in using every possible exertion towards a general diffusion of knowledge. But luxury has hitherto, in an infinite variety of forms, been the inseparable concomitant of refinement, just as much as avarice has been of commerce, or rapacity of power. From the history of what country may the moral influence of knowledge, even when it has truth for its object, be deduced, is therefore neither an invidious, nor an useless inquiry? For, is it not a lamentable fact, that the mind of man may be highly improved, while he remains a stranger to every emotion almost, which ought to agitate his breast.—The plan of education proposed by Mr. Whitbread, I am willing to believe, originated in an ardent desire of promoting the welfare of a large class of his fellow creatures. But, that there was any rational probability of its accomplishing the end in view, may be very fairly questioned. Its being so nearly related to the far-famed discoveries of those high-toned philosophers, who are ever crying up the omnipotence of truth, afforded a strong presumption against it, in the judgment of sober minds. The bare possibility of living to see a motley company of ploughmen, thread-spinners, and tobacco-twisters, disputing with their great-grandmothers, concerning the eternal fitness of things, seems enough to support the drooping spirits of these venerable sages. Accustomed, however, to rely with confidence

on the intrinsic value of their own paradoxes, it was not until very lately that they condescended to solicit the friendly aid of the plodding politician. — But at length, with the assistance of a chosen disciple, they have really and in good faith resolved upon the quixotic experiment of renovating the human nature, of transforming the world.— One of a less sanguine temperament might suggest the expediency, not to say the propriety of these devotees of metaphysics taking an accurate, and as far as is practicable, an extensive survey of the conquests which they have already made. Perhaps, with comparatively few exceptions, it would be found, that by how much their opinions have been embraced, more especially by the lower orders of society, by so much has the love of regularity, of sobriety, and of justice diminished among them. I am aware, that the majority even of thinking people, are in the habit of reverting to what is called the dark ages—to that period, when, if prophane history may be credited, enthusiasm and superstition, in a manner, revelled with human ignorance—to that period, when the spiritual concerns of kingdoms, were consigned to the care of an old man at Rome—to that period, when a diocesan bishop, or even a common priest was qualified to search the inmost recesses of the human heart—we are in the habit, I say, of looking back to that period with a mixture of horror and contempt.—Yet, is it any thing more than reasonable to enquire, whether since we have thrown off the yoke which our fore-fathers placed upon our necks, we have made any great improvement in a moral point of view.—Do we still retain the same simplicity of character, the same love of our country, the same chivalrous and undaunted spirit, and in short, the same regard to public and private worth? Are we in possession of an equal portion of happiness now, as when we were devoutly adoring an absolute monarch, whose will was law, and doing homage to spiritual guides, who kept the keys of our consciences, by circumventing every avenue to our understandings? Who can answer either of these questions in the affirmative? And if no one can, how romantic must it be to think of essentially ameliorating the condition of the poor, merely by informing their minds.—An appeal more ostentatious than wise, has been made to Scotland, in behalf of the beneficial effects of education, to the lower orders of society. Surely it could be made by those only, who were but very partially acquainted indeed, with the manners, the customs, or the prejudices of the

inhabitants of that favoured country. That their sobriety, their hardihood, and unwearied attention to business, is not derived from books, nor to be traced to any system whatever of mental improvement, is a fact which might be very easily proved. For some years past, their manners have been confessedly on the decline, nor is it difficult to discover the cause of their degeneracy. At the period of the French revolution, when the rage for freedom became fashionable, and when the Reform societies, those detestable associations, were in the zenith of their glory, the fatal infection was communicated to the Scottish peasantry, and it is greatly to be feared, that the venerable remains of their ancient character were then irrecoverably lost.—From being the most happy people in the world, they suddenly became peevish and discontented. Poor mechanics, who could scarcely earn a paltry subsistence for their families, busied themselves in fruitless investigations respecting the origin of government. And, those whom one would not once have dreamt of employing, to adjust a common difference between two friends, conceived themselves destined to give laws to nations, and to pronounce with emphatical decision, on the natural, the inalienable rights of man.—Mighty truly were the achievements accomplished by means of philosophical information, and rational discussion!!—It appeared, as if every spark of patriotism, and of loyalty, which had so often warmed the breasts of the sons of Caledonia, had then been extinguished for ever. They could no longer brook the idea, of confining their peculiar affection within the narrow boundaries, by which nature had wisely chosen to separate one portion of the human race from another. No; their enlarged minds felt greatly indignant at a thought so mean. While, however, they were sacrificing largely at the shrine of equality, the ties of kindred were forgotten, as well as the sacred laws of rectitude and of honour. Light be the turf upon the breast of that immortal statesman, who boldly stepped forward, and dispelling the awful delusion, rescued his country from impending destruction:—Happily, the poison of revolutionary and democratical principles, wide as was its range, and fatal as were its effects, did not reach many country parishes, owing partly, though not entirely, to their insular situation, and among these alone shall we find the genuine Scottish character.—Among these, some happy families will yet be found, who, untainted by the general pollution, regulate their conduct by that most

unpopular of all principles, namely, *that they have nothing earthly to do with the laws, but to obey them.* On this account, perhaps, more than on any other, they have arrived at the summit of human felicity. In spite of placemen and pensioners, as well as the whole host of muckeaters at Lloyd's, they are, through unwearied assiduity, prospering in their several callings. But in large towns, the case is materially different. In these, the effects of popular education are sensibly felt. What is the fruit of their reading? Were I to answer, penury, uneasiness, perplexity and sorrow, I do not know that I should be much wide of the truth.—The inhabitants are fonder of copying the vices, than of imitating the virtues of their more southern neighbours. In crowded cities passion rules and rages. The understandings of the people may be irradiated; but their hearts are awfully depraved. And, while they are eternally ringing in our ears the magical aphorism, *magna est veritas, et prævalet*, or that other still more pernicious maxim, *truth must be favourable to virtue*, they are exemplifying those tempers and dispositions, which human nature ought not to possess. May heaven guard my country against the impious designs of those dauntless speculators, who wish to deprive them of every remaining portion of their happiness.—Ignorance may be denominated the parent of the welfare of individuals and communities. The term, however, is very equivocal, and is often grossly mis-applied. To be ignorant of what is commonly dignified with the name of wisdom, would, in a vast variety of instances, be no common acquisition. Were we total strangers to the feverish sensibility of Rousseau, and the daring impiety of Voltaire, the present discontents would speedily subside. Murmurings and complainings would be heard no more for ever. The age of popular clamour, of oligarchical despotism, would be succeeded by that of chivalry and of manly sentiment. But it is almost hopeless, perhaps completely visionary, to expect so total a revolution in human opinions, at least in our day.—Democratical principles have now been of so long standing in this country, that they have, so to express myself, become consolidated into our general habits, and habit is assuredly the greatest tyrant that ever plagued any people.—Still, however, it were unmanly to despair—rather against hope, let us believe in hope. Happy, happy, says the Moniteur, will it be for England, when she once more becomes a monarchy.—It is pretended by the partizans of Mr. Whit-

bread's scheme, that the chief, if indeed not the only object they have in view, in instructing the people, is to enable them to read the sacred scriptures. Really, there is something truly laughable in the idea of such men as Godwin for instance, wishing the people to pursue a course of reading of this description. Against such contemptible hypocrisy, it were in vain to argue. But permit me to ask Mr. Whitbread, (and I know he is incapable of professing what he does not believe) whether he thinks seriously, that the people would read *nothing else* than the bible. Are they in no danger of having their religious principles undermined by Infidels, or perverted by a certain description of dissenters? And is it a matter of any moment, whether they prefer the sophisms of a Voltaire, to those of a Priestly?—Will not the moral effects be precisely the same in either case? The votaries of Atheism, and the followers of Socinus, though they do not go by the same name, naturally enough rally round the same standard.—They both cry hideously for the diffusion of knowledge, and by that term they invariably mean, the mere glimmerings of unassisted reason. From the propagation of their blasphemous dogmas, persons of real learning and taste have little to fear. It requires no uncommon sagacity to perceive, that what they call profound reasoning, is nothing more than mere subtilty attenuated into manity.—Yet it is very unfortunate, that the ignorant, and those who can just barely read, are ever ready to receive the maxims of a perverted understanding, of a sickly imagination. Persons who can just read the sacred writings, but who are wholly incapable of forming a proper judgment upon their important contents, are those among whom the shafts of scepticism fly thickest, and make the greatest ravages. From this numerous class, who constitute the majority in all civilized countries, every thing is to be expected, or every thing must be dreaded.—To encrease their happiness by adding to their enjoyments, and diminishing the quantity of their labour, cannot fail of being the wish of every benevolent mind.—But how is this to be done?—Not surely by instructing them how to spend their leisure hours in laborious idleness. Not by making them disrelish as tasteless and insipid, the manly pleasures of the field, and substituting in their room, those kind of books, which will have a tendency to enervate their minds, to foster luxury and effeminacy.—But say the popular education philosophers, by teaching these people to read, we effectually aggravate

their happiness; for we know that intellectual pleasures, are not only much more intense, but likewise more permanent, than those which belong to us as animals.—This hypothesis, on which so huge a superstructure is to be reared, is perfectly gratuitous. It has indeed ever appeared to me to be palpably absurd. A few wild visionaries might be found, who would impudently assert, that they have derived more real satisfaction from the poems of Virgil, or from the musical tones of Catalani, than from the best sirloin of beef in Smithfield market. But is it so with mankind in general? No: it can then only be the case, when the animal functions are impaired by intemperance, by idleness or profligacy, and when the various objects of sense have been enjoyed to satiety. A good dinner is so great a blessing, that he who does not sincerely prize it, ought in justice to be deprived of it. Probably an Italian songstress, or some other strumpet who displays her limbs, the working of her thighs, and the intonations of her voice, before a concourse of spectators, might preach up the intensity of mental pleasures—it is her trade; but what person of sense would hesitate a moment to call her a dissembling vagrant. She lives upon the hard earnings of the labouring poor—is supported in splendour, by their cries and by their blood. Her very existence depends upon the encouragement of the popular education system. Its overthrow and her irrecoverable ruin, are events, which, how distant soever they may be, must ultimately go together. Apart, however, from considerations of this kind, may we not inquire whether it is really true, that by teaching people to read, we encrease their happiness.—I am much mistaken indeed if the reverse is not the fact. Look at our manufactories, at those of Manchester and Birmingham for instance, and you will find that the miserable wretches who occupy them, generally speaking, can just *barely read*.—Are their leisure moments devoted to the sacred page? Alas! they are open contemners of that stupendous light, which has often gilded the blackness of human misery, which has been proved to be the balm and the cordial of the present life, as well as a sovereign antidote against the fear of death. Do they read only useless publications? Were they satisfied with these, to reform them would not be, as it now confessedly is, a forlorn hope.—But the fact is, their reading is chiefly confined to those puny pamphlets, which are calculated to give poignancy to the violence of their unruly passions.—If at any time they ascend higher than these,

that species of reading is preferred, which acts at once as a stimulus to the understanding, and a narcotic to the heart. These then are some of the blessed effects of popular education. I would solemnly ask Mr. Whitbread, whether if the peasantry of England had not been able to read, the consequences resulting from such publications as *The Age of Reason*, or *The Rights of Man*, would have been half so tragical, as it is to be feared they have. He knows full well they would not. That class who are particularly liable to have their judgments perverted by false reasoning, is physically incapacitated from viewing a subject in all its various bearings. In truth it is not their province. True they have a natural desire to add to the stock of their ideas; but it is their good fortune to remain ignorant, when knowledge is so dearly purchased—Happy ignorance! the child of innocence! Who does not at once perceive the truth of that beautiful apostrophe of the bard of Mantua,

O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona norint
Agricolae! —————

It were imprudent in me, however, to exercise the patience of your readers any longer, and the rather as it may be pretty nearly exhausted. I shall, therefore, conclude with a single remark.—Although to be pointed at as the patron of ignorance, might be irksome to one's feelings, yet as I am only reiterating, through the medium of a most useful work, the sentiments of some of the most accurate reasoners both in morals and politics, I shall willingly put up with any appellation, which does not exclude me from their fraternity.—With high respect, I remain, Sir, your constant reader,
J. Mac ————— P.

11th Dec. 1807.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Russia.—*King of England's Declaration, in Answer to that of the Emperor of Russia. Dated at Westminster, Dec. 18, 1807.*

The Declaration issued at St. Petersburg, by his Maj. the Emperor of all the Russias, has excited in his Maj.'s mind the strongest sensations of astonishment and regret.—His Maj. was not unaware of the nature of those secret engagements which had been imposed upon Russia in the conferences of Tilsit. But his Maj. had entertained the hope, that a review of the transactions of that unfortunate negotiation, and a just estimate of its effects upon the glory of the Russian name, and upon the interests of the Russian Empire, would have

induced his Imperial Majesty to extricate himself from the embarrassment of those new counsels and connections which he had adopted in a moment of despondency and alarm, and to return to a policy more congenial to the principles which he has so invariably professed, and more conducive to the honour of his crown, and to the prosperity of his dominions.—This hope has dictated to his Maj. the utmost forbearance and moderation in all his diplomatic intercourse with the Court of St Petersburg, since the peace of Tilsit.—His Maj. had much cause for suspicion, and just ground of complaint. But he abstained from the language of reproach. His Maj. deemed it necessary to require specific explanation with respect to those arrangements with France, the concealment of which from his Maj. could not but confirm the impression already received of their character and tendency. But his Maj., nevertheless, directed the demand of that explanation to be made, not only without asperity or the indication of any hostile disposition, but with that considerate regard to the feelings and situation of the Emperor of Russia, which resulted from the recollection of former friendship, and from confidence interrupted, but not destroyed.—The Declaration of the Emperor of Russia proves that the object of his Maj.'s forbearance and moderation has not been attained. It proves, unhappily, that the influence of that power, which is equally and essentially the enemy both of G. Britain and of Russia, has acquired a decided ascendancy in the Counsels of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg; and has been able to excite a causeless enmity between two nations, whose long established connection, and whose mutual interests prescribed the most intimate union and co-operation.—His Maj. deeply laments the extension of the calamities of war. But called upon as he is, to defend himself against an act of unprovoked hostility, His Maj. is anxious to refute in the face of the world the pretexts by which that act is attempted to be justified.—The Declaration asserts that his Maj. the Emperor of Russia has twice taken up arms in a cause in which the interest of G. Britain was more direct than his own: and founds upon this assertion the charge against G. Britain of having neglected to second and support the military operations of Russia.—His Maj. willingly does justice to the motives which originally engaged Russia in the great struggle against France. His Maj. avows with equal readiness the interest which G. Britain has uniformly taken in the fates and fortunes of the powers of the Continent. But it

would surely be difficult to prove that G. Britain, who was herself in a state of hostility with Prussia, when the war broke out between Prussia and France, had an interest and a duty more direct in espousing the Prussian quarrel than the Emperor of Russia, the ally of his Prussian Maj., the protector of the North of Europe, and the Guarantor of the Germanic Constitution.—It is not in a public Declaration that his Maj. can discuss the policy of having at any particular period of the war effected, or omitted to effect, disembarkations of troops on the coasts of Naples. But the instance of the war with the Porte is still more singularly chosen to illustrate the charge against G. Britain of indifference to the interests of her ally: a war undertaken by G. Britain at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining Russian interests against the influence of France.—If, however, the peace of Tilsit is indeed to be considered as the consequence and the punishment of the imputed inactivity of G. Britain, his Maj. cannot but regret that the Emperor of Russia should have resorted to so precipitate and fatal a measure at the moment when he had received distinct assurances that his Maj. was making the most strenuous exertions to fulfil the wishes and expectations of his ally (assurances which his Imperial Maj. received and acknowledged with apparent confidence and satisfaction); and when his Maj. was, in fact, prepared to employ for the advancement of the common objects of the war, those forces which, after the peace of Tilsit, he was under the necessity of employing to disconcert a combination directed against his own immediate interests and security.—The vexation of Russian commerce by G. Britain is, in truth, little more than an imaginary grievance. Upon a diligent examination, made by his Maj.'s command, of the records of the British Court of Admiralty, there has been discovered only a solitary instance in the course of the present war, of the condemnation of a vessel really Russian; a vessel which had carried naval stores to a port of the common enemy. There are but few instances of Russian vessels detained: and none in which justice has been refused to a party regularly complaining of such detention. It is therefore matter of surprise, as well as of concern to his Maj., that the Emperor of Russia should have condescended to bring forward a complaint which, as it cannot be seriously felt by those in whose behalf it is urged, might appear to be intended to countenance those exaggerated declamations, by which France per-

severingly endeavours to inflame the jealousy of other countries, and to justify her own inveterate animosity against G. Britain.—The peace of Tilsit was followed by an offer of mediation on the part of the Emperor of Russia, for the conclusion of a peace between G. Britain and France; which, it is asserted, that his Maj. refused.—His Maj. did not refuse the mediation of the Emperor of Russia; although the offer of it was accompanied by circumstances of concealment, which might well have justified his refusal. The articles of the treaty of Tilsit were not communicated to his Maj.; and specifically that article of the treaty in virtue of which the mediation was proposed, and which prescribed a limited time for the return of his Maj.'s answer to that proposal. And his Maj. was thus led into an apparent compliance with a limitation so offensive to the dignity of an independent sovereign. But the answer so returned by his Maj. was not a refusal. It was a conditional acceptance. The conditions required by his Maj. were—a statement of the basis upon which the enemy was disposed to treat; and a communication of the articles of the peace of Tilsit. The first of these conditions was precisely the same which the Emperor of Russia had himself annexed not four months before to his own acceptance of the proffered mediation of the Emperor of Austria. The second was one which his Maj. would have had a right to require, even as the ally of his Imperial Maj.; but which it would have been highly imprudent to omit, when he was invited to confide to his Imperial Maj. the care of his honour and of his interest.—But even if these conditions (neither of which has been fulfilled, although the fulfilment of them has been repeatedly required by his Maj.'s ambassador at St. Petersburg), had not been in themselves perfectly natural and necessary; there were not wanting considerations which might have warranted his Maj. in endeavouring, with more than ordinary anxiety, to ascertain the views and intentions of the Emperor of Russia, and the precise nature and effect of the new relations which his Imperial Maj. had contracted.—The complete abandonment of the interests of the King of Prussia (who had twice rejected proposals of separate peace, from a strict adherence to his engagements with his Imperial ally), and the character of those provisions which the Emperor of Russia was contented to make for his own interests in the negotiations of Tilsit, presented no encouraging prospect of the result of any exertions which his Imperial Maj. might be disposed to employ in

favour of G. Britain.—It is not, while a French army still occupies and lays waste the remaining dominions of the King of Prussia, in spite of the stipulations of the Prussian treaty of Tilsit; while contributions are arbitrarily exacted by France from that remnant of the Prussian monarchy, such as, in its entire and most flourishing state, the Prussian monarchy would have been unable to discharge; while the surrender is demanded, in time of peace, of Prussian fortresses, which had not been reduced during the war; and while the power of France is exercised over Prussia with such shameless tyranny, as to designate and demand for instant death, individuals, subjects of his Prussian Maj. and resident in his dominions, upon a charge of disrespect towards the French government;—it is not while all these things are done and suffered, under the eyes of the Emperor of Russia, and without his interference on behalf of his ally, that his Maj. can feel himself called upon to account to Europe for having hesitated to repose an unconditional confidence in the efficacy of his Imperial Maj.'s mediation.—Nor, even if that mediation had taken full effect, if a peace had been concluded under it, and that peace guaranteed by his Imperial Maj., could his Maj. have placed implicit reliance on the stability of any such arrangement, after having seen the Emperor of Russia openly transfer to France the sovereignty of the Ionian republic, the independence of which his Imperial Maj. had recently and solemnly guaranteed.—But while the alleged rejection of the Emperor of Russia's mediation, between G. Britain and France, is stated as a just ground of his Imperial Maj.'s resentment; his Maj.'s request of that mediation, for the re-establishment of peace between G. Britain and Denmark, is represented as an insult which it was beyond the bounds of his Imperial Maj.'s moderation to endure.—His Maj. feels himself under no obligation to offer any atonement or apology to the Emperor of Russia for the expedition against Copenhagen. It is not for those who were parties to the secret arrangements of Tilsit, to demand satisfaction for a measure to which those arrangements gave rise, and by which one of the objects of them has been happily defeated.—His Maj.'s justification of the expedition against Copenhagen is before the world. The Declaration of the Emperor of Russia would supply whatever was wanting in it, if any thing could be wanting to convince the most incredulous of the urgency of that necessity under which his Maj. acted.—But until the Russian Declaration was published, his Maj. had no reason to suspect that any

opinions which the Emperor of Russia might entertain of the transactions at Copenhagen, could be such as to preclude his Imperial Maj. from undertaking at the request of G. Britain, that same office of mediator, which he had assumed with so much alacrity on the behalf of France.—Nor can his Maj. forget, that the first symptoms of reviving confidence, since the peace of Tilsit, the only prospect of success in the endeavours of his Maj.'s ambassador to restore the ancient good understanding between G. Britain and Russia, appeared when the intelligence of the siege of Copenhagen had been recently received at St. Petersburg.—The inviolability of the Baltic Sea; and the reciprocal guarantees of the powers that border upon it, guarantees said to have been contracted with the knowledge of the British government, are stated as aggravations of his Maj.'s proceedings in the Baltic. It cannot be intended to represent his Maj. as having at any time acquiesced in the principles upon which the inviolability of the Baltic is maintained, however his Maj. may, at particular periods, have forbore, for special reasons, influencing his conduct at the time, to act in contradiction of them. Such forbearance never could have applied but to a state of peace and real neutrality in the North; and his Maj. most assuredly could not be expected to recur to it, after France has been suffered to establish herself in undisputed sovereignty along the whole coast of the Baltic Sea, from Danzig to Lubec.—But the higher the value which the Emperor of Russia places on the engagements respecting the tranquillity of the Baltic, which he describes himself as inheriting from his immediate predecessors, the Empress Catherine and the Emperor Paul, the less justly can his Imperial Maj. resent the appeal made to him by his Maj. as the guarantee of the peace to be concluded between G. Britain and Denmark. In making that appeal, with the utmost confidence and sincerity, his Maj. neither intended, nor can he imagine that he offered, any insult to the Emperor of Russia. Nor can his Maj. conceive that, in proposing to the Prince Royal terms of peace, such as the most successful war on the part of Denmark could hardly have been expected to extort from G. Britain, his Maj. rendered himself liable to the imputation, either of exasperating the resentment, or of outraging the dignity, of Denmark.—His Maj. has thus replied to all the different accusations by which the Russian government labours to justify the rupture of a connection which has subsisted for ages, with reciprocal advantages to G. Britain and Russia; and at-

tempts to disguise the operation of that external influence by which Russia is driven into unjust hostilities for interests not her own.—The Russian Declaration proceeds to announce the several conditions on which alone these hostilities can be terminated, and the intercourse of the two countries run wild.—His Maj. has already had occasion to assert that justice has in no instance been denied to the claims of his Imperial Maj.'s subjects.—The termination of the war with Denmark has been so anxiously sought by his Maj., that it cannot be necessary for his Maj. to renew any professions upon that subject. But his Maj. is at a loss to reconcile the Emperor of Russia's present anxiety for the completion of such an arrangement, with his Imperial Maj.'s recent refusal to contribute his good offices for effecting it.—The requisition of his Imperial Maj. for the immediate conclusion, by his Maj., of a peace with France, is as extraordinary in the substance, as it is offensive in the manner. His Maj. has at no time declined to treat with France, when France has professed a willingness to treat on an admissible basis. And the Emperor of Russia cannot fail to remember that the last negotiation between G. Britain and France was broken off, upon points immediately affecting, not his Maj.'s own interests, but those of his Imperial ally. But his Maj. neither understands, nor will he admit, the pretension of the Emperor of Russia to dictate the time, or the mode, of his Maj.'s pacific negotiation with other powers. It never will be endured by his Maj. that any government shall indemnify itself for the humiliation of subserviency to France, by the adoption of an insulting and peremptory tone towards G. Britain.—His Maj. proclaims anew those principles of maritime law, against which the armed neutrality, under the auspices of the Empress Catherine, was originally directed; and against which the present hostilities of Russia are denounced. These principles have been recognized and acted upon in the best periods of the history of Europe; and acted upon by no power with more strictness and severity than by Russia herself in the reign of the Empress Catherine.—Those principles it is the right and the duty of his Maj. to maintain: And against every confederacy, his Maj. is determined, under the blessing of divine Providence, to maintain them. They have at all times contributed essentially to the support of the maritime power of G. Britain; but they are become incalculably more valuable and important at a period when the maritime power of G. Britain constitutes the sole remaining

bulwark against the overwhelming usurpations of France; the only refuge to which other nations may yet resort, in happier times, for assistance and protection.—When the opportunity for peace between G. Britain and Russia shall arrive, his Maj. will embrace it with eagerness. The arrangements of such a negotiation will not be difficult or complicated. His Maj., as he has nothing to concede, so he has nothing to require: satisfied if Russia shall manifest a disposition to return to her ancient feelings of friendship towards G. Britain; to a just consideration of her own true interests; and to a sense of her own dignity as an independent nation.

RUSSIA.—*Order of Council for general Reprisals against Russia.*

At the Court at Windsor, the 18th of December, 1807, present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.—His Majesty having taken into consideration the injurious and hostile proceedings of the Emperor of all the Russias, as set forth in the Declaration of this date, issued by his Majesty's command; and being determined to take such measures as are necessary for vindicating the honour of his crown, and procuring reparation and satisfaction, his Majesty therefore is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general reprisals be granted against the ships, goods, and subjects, of the Emperor of all the Russias (save and except any vessels to which his Majesty's licence has been granted, or which have been directed to be released from the embargo, and have not since arrived at any foreign ports.) so that as well his Majesty's fleets and ships, as also all other ships and vessels that shall be commissioned by letters of marque or general reprisals, or otherwise, by his Majesty's Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, shall and may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods belonging to the Emperor of all the Russias, or his subjects, or others inhabiting within the territories of the Emperor of all the Russias, and bring the same to judgment in any of the Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions, &c. &c.—CAMDEN, P. WESTMORLAND, C. P. S. HAWKESBURY, MULGRAVE, ST. HELEN'S, SP. PERCEVAL, G. CANNING.

JAMAICA.—*Resolutions, passed unanimously by the House of Assembly, on the 29th of Oct. 1807, relative to the distressed state of the Colony, and especially to the Abolition Act, passed by the last Parliament.*
(Continued from p. 96.)

If a community shall ever be reduced to that calamitous situation, when the whole clear income of the proprietors of the soil shall have been put in requisition for the treasury, there can remain in that country few objects of legitimate taxation.—It has been proved beyond the possibility of being controverted, that the cultivators of sugar in this island, comprehending both landholders and farmers, are, with very few exceptions, in the unfortunate state supposed, even if they were exempt from the burthen of debts.—The greatest proportion of the taxes of this country is raised on this body of proprietors directly, and a considerable share of the remainder indirectly, through various classes of the inhabitants, whose chief means of support are drawn from the sugar plantations.—It were vain to search for means of levying part of a revenue that does not exist. And it is painful to the committee to state, that it will be impracticable to continue to raise within this island, these contributions which were cheerfully paid in happier times, unless the sugar planters shall be enabled to support their share of the public burthens, by some radical, effectual, and permanent measures, which shall restore and ensure to them an income, bearing a just proportion to their large capitals, on which our local taxes have been heretofore chiefly assessed.—That, from the unexpected sums which have been, and may be, collected, from the extraordinary importation of Africans, as before stated, and the unexpected falling in of debts due to the public, it may be practicable, with rigid economy in all other branches of the public expenditure, to continue such subsistence another year. And the committee recommend to the House to vote sums necessary for giving the said additional subsistence to the 31st day of December, 1808. The committee humbly hope, that, on a faithful representation to our most gracious Sovereign, of the calamitous situation to which his loyal subjects of this island are reduced, his Majesty, with his accustomed benevolence, will recognize the uniform zeal with which the voluntary contributions towards the comfort of his Majesty's troops in this island have been made, whilst the inhabitants had the means: and, considering the state to which proprietors, once opulent, are reduced, that his Majesty will be pleased to direct his ministers to adopt such measures as shall be necessary for protecting this yet important colony from the general funds of the empire, to which it contributes so large and disproportionate a share. And the committee recommend to the House to appoint a committee to prepare a most humble address to his Majesty, setting forth these

our grievances and oppressions, earnestly beseeching his Majesty's commands on his ministers to adopt proper measures for our relief and redress.—Ordered, that Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Grant, Mr. Whitehorne, Mr. Sims, and Mr. Finlayson, be a committee for that purpose.—II. Resolved, That this House, for itself, and on the part of its constituents, and of all other persons in any manner concerned in the welfare of this island, do, in the most solemn and decided manner, protest against the act of the Imperial Parliament, passed on the 25th day of March last, entitled, "An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade," not only as a breach, on the part of government, of the conditions under which his Majesty's subjects embarked in the settlement of this island, but as a novel, unjust, and unconstitutional interference with its internal government and affairs; calculated to defeat and to subvert our laws, to deprive us of our dearest birth-rights, the trial by jury, to raise envy and jealousy in the breasts of the settled negroes; subversive of an ancient and admitted principle of the British constitution, that no laws can be binding on those who are not represented in the parliament which enacts them, placing not only our rights and properties, but also our lives, in the most imminent danger, and tending to promote disaffection in the minds of his Majesty's most loyal subjects.—III. Resolved, That the legislature of this island has, and ever had, the exclusive and absolute right to enact its own laws, and to regulate entirely its internal government and affairs: that the Imperial Parliament hath not, nor hath any other power upon earth, the most distant right to interfere therein (except only his Majesty, in the instance of disallowing the laws here made); and that in support of the dearest rights and liberties of our fellow subjects, it is our duty, by all constitutional means in our power, to resist the attempt that has been, and every attempt that may be, made, to destroy or to abridge that right.—IV. Resolved, That this House, in more fortunate days, when the situation of the inhabitants of this island was different, and when the burthens and restrictions imposed by Great Britain were infinitely less oppressive than they now are, has never failed in shewing the strongest disposition to render the situation of his Majesty's troops in this island most comfortable; and that this house is still influenced by the same disposition; but is totally deprived of the same means.—V. Resolved, That the usual pay and subsistence granted to his Majesty's white troops stationed in this island, to the extent of 3000 men, be continued to

them until the 31st day of December, 1808; in the first place, by exhausting the funds to arise from the duties on new negroes, under the act commonly called the additional duty bill, and, as to the deficiency, out of the monies to arise from some or one of the other money bills to be passed this session.—VI. Resolved, That the abolition act, by its totally destroying, for the future, the customary revenue under the negro duty bill, by its baneful effects on our ordinary resources, and its general tendency to overwhelm the unfortunate settlers and inhabitants of this island, in combination with the excessive duties and charges on our produce, and the well-known general distress of the colony, render us totally unable to make any provision for his Majesty's troops, beyond the period above-mentioned, nor can we contemplate a renewal of such grants, until, by a redress of our grievances, the minds of our constituents respecting our constitutional rights shall be quieted, and the possession of the means shall again enable us to bear so heavy a burthen.—VII. Resolved, That under the pressure of a heavy public debt, and of individual distress, now actually felt and become insupportable; and from the prospect of the calamities which must be the inevitable consequence of the abolition act, it is absolutely necessary to relieve all ranks, by moderating the taxes, and by retrenching the public expenditure in every possible manner, even in some cases of acknowledged public benefit and advantage. That the vote of the House, refusing the annual grant of £15,000 for roads at a distance from the sea, by which internal settlers, who so much augment our strength, are discouraged, should be followed up by a resolution to suspend for the present all grants for public buildings and barracks, except in a limited degree and under very apparent necessity.—VIII. Resolved, That the further prosecution of the measures about to be adopted in the Imperial Parliament for the relief of the sugar colonies: the repeal in toto of the abolition act; or, if that cannot be effected, the absolute repeal, at least of all the obnoxious and unconstitutional enactments thereof, coupled with a full compensation to the island for its losses, sufferings, and disappointments, in consequence of the abolition of the trade; the adoption by the British government of the means of affording general protection to this colony at the general expence of the empire; and, above all, an abandonment by the Imperial Parliament of every pretension to an interference with our internal government or affairs, are objects of the highest importance

to this island, and call for the immediate, the serious, and most energetic attention of the island agent.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Report, made in the Congress, Nov. 17, 1807, touching the Affair of the Chesapeake Frigate.*

Mr. Blount, from a Committee of the House of Representatives on a part of the President's Message, reported this day on the subject of the attack on the Chesapeake. The report commences with an expression of sensibility at this outrage: states the receipt of information relative thereto from the state and navy departments; presents a general view of the circumstances, observing that it might be said to have been incontestibly proved, that William Ware, John Strachan and Dan. Martin (three of the four persons taken out of the Chesapeake) are citizens of the United States; but the committee add, that they conceive it unnecessary for them or the House to go into any inquiry on that part of the subject, as in their opinion whether the men taken from the Chesapeake were, or were not citizens of the United States, and whether the Chesapeake was or was not within the acknowledged limits of the United States at the time they were taken, the character of the act of taking them remains the same.—From the foregoing facts, it appears to your committee that the outrage committed on the frigate Chesapeake has been stamped with circumstances of indignity and insult, of which there is scarcely to be found a parallel in the history of civilized nations, and requires only the sanction of the government under colour of whose authority it was perpetrated, to make it just cause of, if not an irresistible call for, instant and severe retaliation. Whether it will receive that sanction, or be disavowed and declared an unauthorized act of a subordinate officer, remains to be determined by the answer which shall be given to the demand of explanation; that answer, now daily expected, will either sink the detestable act into piracy, or expand it to the magnitude of premeditated hostility against the sovereignty and independence of this nation; and until its true character shall be fixed and known, your committee deem it expedient to decline expressing any opinion as to the measures proper to be adopted in retaliation to it. But the committee add, as other acts of aggression have been committed within our ports and waters, such as these mentioned in the President's Message, the committee are of opinion, that it is expedient to provide more effectually for the protection of our ports and harbours; but

not being prepared to report specifically on that subject, they ask further indulgence of the House; and submit the following resolution:—Resolved, That the attack of the British ship of war Leopard on the United States frigate Chesapeake, was a flagrant violation of the jurisdiction of the United States; and that the continuance of the British squadron (of which the Leopard was one) in their waters, after being notified by the proclamation of the President of the United States, ordering them to depart the same, was a farther violation thereof.

ENGLAND.—*Order in Council, relative to Neutral Commerce. Dated Dec. 18, 1807.*

At the Court at Windsor, the 18th day of Dec. 1807, present the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.—His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that nothing in his Majesty's Order in Council of the 11th of Nov. last shall extend, or be construed to extend, to permit any vessel to import any articles of the produce or manufacture of the enemies' colonies in the West Indies, direct from such colonies to any port of this kingdom; and it is further ordered, that all vessels which may arrive in the ports of this kingdom direct from the colonies aforesaid, shall, nevertheless, be released, upon proof being made that the charter-party or other agreement for the voyage was entered into before notice of this order. And the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury, his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the Judges of the High Court of Admiralty and Courts of Vice-Admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein as to them shall respectively appertain.—W. FAWKENER.

FRANCE.—*Decree against English Commerce, dated at Milan, Dec 17, 1807, and signed by the Emperor Napoleon. Together with a Supplement by the French Minister of Marine.*

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Rhinish Confederation:—Observing the measures adopted by the British government, on the 11th of November last, by which vessels belonging to neutral, friendly, or even powers the allies of England, are made liable, not only to be searched by English cruizers, but to be compulsorily detained in England, and to have a tax laid on them of so much per cent. on the cargo, to be regulated by the British legislature.—Observing that by these

acts the British government denationalizes ships of every nation in Europe, that it is not competent for any government to detract from its own independence and rights, all the sovereigns of Europe having in trust the sovereignties and independence of the flag; that if by an unpardonable weakness, and which, in the eyes of posterity, would be an indelible stain, such a tyranny was allowed to be established into principles, and consecrated by usage, the English would avail themselves of it to assert it as a right, as they have availed themselves of the tolerance of governments to establish the infamous principle, that the flag of a nation does not cover goods, and to give to their right of blockade an arbitrary extension, and which infringes on the sovereignty of every state; we have decreed, and do decree as follows :—Art. I. Every ship, to whatever nation it may belong, that shall have submitted to be searched by an English ship, or to a voyage to England, or that shall have paid any tax whatsoever to the English government, is thereby, and for that alone, declared to be denationalized, to have forfeited the protection of its king, and to have become English property.—Art. II. Whether the ships thus denationalized by the arbitrary measures of the English government, enter into our ports, or those of our allies, or whether they fall into the hands of our ships of war, or of our privateers, they are declared to be good and lawful prizes.—Art. III. The British islands are declared to be in a state of blockade, both by land and sea. Every ship, of whatever nation, or whatsoever the nature of its cargo so may be, that sails from the ports of England, or those of the English colonies, and of the countries occupied by English troops, and proceeding to England, or to the English colonies, or to countries occupied by English troops, is good and lawful prize, as contrary to the present decree; and may be captured by our ships of war or our privateers, and adjudged to the captor.—Art. IV. These measures, which are resorted to only in just retaliation of the barbarous system adopted by England, which assimilates its legislation to that of Algiers, shall cease to have any effect with respect to all nations who shall have the firmness to compel the English government to respect their flag. They shall continue to be rigorously in force as long as that government does not return to the principle of the law of nations, which regulates the relations of civilized states in a state of war. The provisions of the present decree shall be abrogated and null, in fact, as soon as the English abide again by the principles of the law of nations, which are also

the principles of justice and of honour.—All our ministers are charged with the execution of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the Bulletin of the Laws.

As a Supplement to this decree, there is in the Official Journal the following Circular Letter, addressed by the Minister of the Interior to the Chamber of Commerce:—You are not unacquainted, gentlemen, with the late acts of the British government; that last stage of the oppression of the commerce of the world; you know that it has resolved to destroy the feeble remains of the independence of the seas. It now thinks proper, that henceforth no ship shall navigate the seas, without touching at its ports, without a tribute to its pretended sovereignty, and without receiving from it an ignominious licence.—Thus the ocean is henceforward only the field of slavery! The usurpation of the most sacred of the rights of nations is consummated, and this tyrannic yoke is to press upon them until the day of vengeance, or until brought to a due sense of moderation, the English government will itself calm its rage, and break that sceptre to which the nations of the continent will never consent to submit.—I am calling our common attention to the important circumstances which must powerfully induce us to awaken your patriotism and your wisdom. One would have imagined, that every obstruction and restraint that clogged the course of the commerce on the continent, had been exhausted; still, however, they are going to be aggravated by the measures lately adopted by England; but they will find our minds made up to struggle against, and to overcome, this new mode of oppression.—We must not shut our eyes to the consequences. Importation and exportation, already so much restricted, will soon be much more so. Every thing connected with maritime commerce; every thing that depends upon it, will now be liable to more difficulties, to more uncertainty. There are, however, two channels that still remain open.—The power of attacking every ship that renounces the independence of its national flag, by a shameful submission to the British sovereignty, and by navigating under a British licence, will open a wide field to the hopes of our commanders. Such a resource will not prove ineffectual, and French commerce will not devote itself uselessly to that sort of warfare which never lets courage, dexterity, and decision, go unrewarded.—We have moreover to hope that neutral ships will elude the vigilance of the English cruisers; the immense extent of the coasts of the empire will favour and protect their enter-

prises.—These resources ought not to be undervalued, nor counted for nothing. France will submit to a temporary situation, which can only change with time, and with new exertions; but her enemy shall not deprive her of the main basis of her prosperity, her internal communication, her relations with the continent, where she no longer sees any but friends or allies; her soil will not be less fertile, her industry will not maintain itself the less, though deprived of some materials which it is not impossible to replace.—To this last proposition I am rather anxious, gentlemen, to direct your attention. You have advice to give, and examples to hold out to commerce. You must already foresee the effect of the privation of certain materials, more especially for cotton, and of ingredients for dying of cotton, of which a quantity has been stored up in France: that which we shall derive from the Levant, and that which, at a more distant period, we shall reap from our indigenous culture, not unsuccessfully essayed, will suffice to support, in a great measure, our manufactures; but in the expectation that some of them may experience privations, we must have recourse, as far as possible, to hemp and flax, in order to provide occupation for those manufacturers who would no longer be employed with articles of cotton. It were desirable that we should circumscribe our consumption within the products of the materials the growth of our soil, and restrain the unhappy effects of habits and taste contracted for manufactures, that would render us dependent upon foreign countries.—The materials for dying may become scarce—but many of them may be replaced by the productions of our soil. We will dispense with the rest by a slight sacrifice of some colours, which may please from their apparent greater beauty, without adding any thing to the intrinsic goodness of the article. Besides, no small reliance is to be placed on the genius of our manufacturers: it will triumph over those difficulties.—The channels, which in spite of these usurpations, will remain open to importation, may not suffice for the consumption of sugar and coffee; these objects of secondary utility may become scarce; but the great mass of the nation will not suffer from this temporary privation: habits of indulgence too widely indulged will be counteracted and restrained by the rise in the price.—And besides, is it to be supposed that the Great Nation will allow itself to be intimidated by the privation of some futile enjoyments? Her armies have endured, without a murmur, the most pinching wants; that great example will not have

been held out in vain; and when we have in view to reconquer the independence of the seas; when we have in view to rescue and redeem commerce from the ruinous acts of piracy that are juridically exercised against it; when we have in view the vindication of the national honour, and the breaking down of those fœdæ caudine which England is attempting to erect upon our coasts, the French people will support with the dignity and the courage that belong to their great character, the momentary sacrifices that are imposed upon their taste, their habits, and their industry. The commerce of Europe will soon, no doubt, be rescued from oppression. The interest of nations; the honour of sovereigns; the magnanimous resolutions of the most powerful of the allies of France; the power and wish of the hero who rules over us; the justice of a cause to which Heaven will grant its protection; every motive concurs to decide the contest; nor can its issue remain uncertain. Accept, gentlemen, the assurance of my sincere esteem.—
CRETIV.

PORTUGAL.—*Additional Proclamation of the Prince Regent, previous to his embarkation, dated 26 Nov., 1807.*

The governors whom I was pleased to nominate by my royal decree of this present date, to govern these kingdoms during my absence, will have the usual oaths administered to them by the cardinal patriarch, and will attend with all solicitude, vigilance, and activity, in the administration of justice, distributing the same impartially, and maintaining a rigorous observance of the laws of this kingdom.—They will preserve to the natives all the privileges which had been granted to them by me and my royal predecessors.—The plurality of votes will decide on the reports the respective tribunals may lay before them, regulating themselves according to the laws and customs of the kingdom.—They will direct literary professions, offices of criminal and civil judicature and revenue, according to the forms heretofore practised by me.—They will protect the persons and properties of my loyal subjects, selecting for military occupations those who may be deemed worthy thereof.—They will endeavour to preserve to their utmost the tranquillity of this kingdom, to provide for the troops of the Emperor of the French and King of Italy good quarters, and to supply them with every thing they may require, during their stay in this kingdom, averting all and every insult that may be perpetrated, and punishing with rigour any that may occur; maintaining always the good harmony

which ought to be displayed to the armies of nations with whom we find ourselves united on the continent.—Should it by any occurrence happen, that any of the said governors are absent, a plurality of votes will elect a successor. I trust to your honour and virtue, that my people will not suffer inconveniences during my absence; and should it be God's will that I should return shortly to my kingdoms, that I may meet every one contented and satisfied, reigning among them that good order and tranquillity which should exist among subjects who have rendered themselves so worthy of my paternal care.—Palace of our Lady of Ajuda, on the 26th of Nov., 1807.—(Signed)—THE PRINCE.

The following are the principal members of the royal family of Portugal, who have embarked for the Brazils:—Maria Francisca Elizabeth, Queen of Portugal and Algarva, born December 17, 1734, married her uncle, Don Pedro III. King of Portugal, who died 25th May, 1806.—Juan Maria Joseph Lewis, Infant of Portugal, Prince Regent, born the 13th of May, 1767, and married June 9, 1785.—Charlotta Joachina, Infanta of Spain, and Princess of Brazil.—Maria Ann Francisca Josephina, sister of the Queen, born October 7, 1736.—Maria Francisca Benedictina, sister of the Queen, born July 24, 1756; married Joseph Francis Xavier, Prince of Brazil, who died the 10th September, 1788.

The following are the children of the Prince Regent:—Don Antonio, Prince of Beira, born August 12, 1798.—Michael, &c. born October 26, 1802.—Maria Theresa, born April 29, 1793.—Isabella Maria Francisca, born May 19, 1797.—Maria Francisca, born April 22, 1800.—Isabella Maria, born July 4, 1801.

DENMARK.—*Answer of the Prince Royal to the Traders who wished to correspond with England. Dated 27th Nov., 1807, at Copenhagen.*

I must acquaint the trade, that it is impossible to modify the orders contained in the publications of the 9th and 14th September.—The King, in confining himself to the sequestration of enemy's property, has done all that was in his power to assist those of his subjects whose fortunes might fall into the hands of the English.—He has even exceeded what so perfidious an enemy merits.—Besides, nothing ought to chill the ardour of a noble vengeance: and the merchants may at once, by arming privateers, recover their capital, and avenge the country and the king.—With respect to the re-

establishment of a correspondence, that measure is incompatible with the orders given to break off all communication between England and the continent.—We ought to reject such an idea in a country like Denmark, where laws are passed not for mere pleasantry, and to be broken. The king is not ignorant that measures demanded by the general welfare often injure the personal interests of some of his subjects; but the testimony of his conscience consoles him, having preserved as long as possible to his people the benefits of peace, and having altered his conduct only at the period when the most revolting aggression provoked the most vigorous resistance against a perfidious enemy.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Non-importation Act, passed 18th April, 1806.—Together with a Supplementary Act, passed about 10th Dec. 1807.*

Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America, in congress assembled, that from and after the 15. of Nov. next it shall not be lawful to import into the United States, or the territories thereof, from any port or place situated in Great Britain or Ireland, or in any of the colonies or dependencies of G. Britain, any goods, wares, or merchandize, of the following descriptions, that is to say:—All articles of which leather is the material of chief value.—All articles of which silk is the material of chief value.—All articles of which hemp or flax is the material of chief value.—All articles of which tin or brass is the material of chief value, tin in sheets excepted.—Woollen cloths whose invoice prices shall exceed 5s. sterling per square yard.—Window glass, and all other manufactures of glass.—Silver and plated wares.—Paper of every description.—Nails and pikes.—Hats.—Clothing ready made.—Millinery of all kinds; and pictures and prints.—Nor shall it be lawful to import into the United States, or the territories thereof, from any foreign port or place whatever, any of the above-mentioned goods, wares, or merchandize, being the growth, produce, or manufacture of G. Britain: or Ireland, or any of the colonies, or dependencies of Great Britain: provided, however, that no articles which shall within 15 months after the passing of this act be imported from any place beyond the Cape of Good Hope, on board any vessel cleared out before the passing of this act from any port within the United States or the territories thereof, for the said Cape of Good Hope, or any place

beyond the same, shall be subject to the prohibition aforesaid.—Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that whenever any article or articles, the importation of which is prohibited by this act, shall after the said 15th of Nov. next, be imported into the United States or the territories thereof, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, or shall, after the said 15th of Nov. next, be put on board any ship or vessel, boat, raft, or carriage, with intention of importing the same into the United States, or the territories thereof, all such articles, as well as all other articles on board the same ship or vessel, boat, craft, or carriage, belonging to the owner of such prohibited articles, shall be forfeited, and the owner thereof shall moreover forfeit and pay treble the value of such articles.—Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, that if any article or articles, the importation of which is prohibited by this act, shall, after the said 15th of Nov. next, be put on board any ship or vessel, boat, craft or carriage, with intention to import the same into the United States, or the territories thereof, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, and with the knowledge of the owner or master of such ship or vessel, boat, raft, or carriage, shall be forfeited, and the owner or master thereof shall moreover each forfeit and pay treble the value of such articles.—Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, that if any article or articles the importation of which is prohibited by this act and which shall nevertheless be on board any ship or vessel, boat, raft, or carriage, arriving after the said 15th of Nov. next, in the United States, or the territories thereof, shall be omitted in the manifest, report, or entry of the master or the person having the charge or command of such ship or vessel, boat, raft, or carriage, or shall be omitted in the entry of the goods owned by the owner or consigned to the consignee of such articles, or shall be imported or landed, or attempted to be imported or landed, without a permit, the same penalties, fines, and forfeitures shall be incurred and may be recovered, as in the case of similar omission or omissions, landing importations or attempting to land or import, in relation to articles liable to duties on their importation into the United States.—Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, that every collector, naval officer, surveyor, or other officer of the customs, shall have the like power and authority to seize goods, wares, and merchandize imported contrary to the intent

and meaning of this act, to keep the same in custody until it shall have been ascertained whether the same have been forfeited or not, and to enter any ship or vessel, dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, for the purpose of searching for and seizing any such goods, wares, or merchandize, which he or they now have by law in relation to goods, wares, and merchandize subject to duty; and if any person or persons shall conceal or buy any goods, wares, and merchandize, knowing them to be liable to seizure by this act, such person or persons shall on conviction thereof, forfeit and pay a sum double the amount of value of the goods, wares and merchandize so concealed or purchased.—Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, that the following addition shall be inserted to the oath or affirmation taken by the masters or persons having the charge or command of any ship or vessel arriving at any port of the United States, or the territories thereof, after the said 15th of Nov. next, viz. "I further swear (or affirm) that there is not to the best of my knowledge or belief, on board [insert the denomination and name of the vessel] any goods, wares, and merchandize, the importation of which into the United States, or the territories thereof, is prohibited by law: And I do further swear (or affirm) that if I shall hereafter discover or know of any such goods, wares, and merchandize on board the said vessel, or which shall have been imported in the same, I will immediately and without delay make due report thereof to the collector of the port of this district."—Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, that the following addition be inserted after the said 15th of Nov. next, to the oath or affirmation taken by importers, consignees or agents at the time of entering goods imported into the United States or the territories thereof, viz. "I also swear (or affirm) that there are not, to the best of my knowledge and belief, amongst the said goods, wares, and merchandize, imported or consigned as aforesaid any goods, wares, or merchandize, the importation of which into the United States, or the territories thereof, is prohibited by law: And I do further swear (or affirm) that if I shall hereafter discover any such goods, wares or merchandize among the said goods, wares and merchandize, I will immediately and without delay report the same to the collector of this district."

(To be continued.)

On the 27th of November, 1807, Mr. Lyon stated in the House of Representatives, "That he wished the galleries cleared, and the doors closed, bolted, and barred, as he had some highly important matters to communicate. The House having gratified his wishes, he observed, that Mr. Erskine, the British Minister, had recently transferred stock, possessed by his father to a large amount in the American Funds."

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS.—I. *King's Speech.* II. *Ireland.* III. *Places in Reversion.*—Before we proceed to the giving of any account of what has passed in the parliament, it seems necessary to say a few words relative to the state of the two factions, who are engaged in a continual war against each other, the chief object of which war being the possession of the places in the gift of the crown, and of the great emoluments, arising from that possession.—During the recess, the father of Lord Howick having died, that lord became a peer, and, of course, could no longer remain in the House of Commons, where, after the death of Mr. Fox, he had been, what is called the "leader of the opposition." Another "leader" was, therefore, to be selected, as some thought; but, it would seem, that the post, like that of Earl Marshall of the Kingdom, is now become hereditary; for, as it were of course, Mr. Ponsonby (a name little familiar to our ears), who is a brother-in-law of Lord Howick, his lordship having no nearer relation in parliament, takes upon him, as the newspapers tell us, to perform the functions, lately performed by his noble relation. It is he who now asks questions of "his Majesty's ministers;" it is he who is now called "the honourable gentleman opposite;" it is he who now nods *yes*, or shakes *no*, while the ministers are speaking; it is he, under whom arrange themselves, giving their votes as he gives his, numbers of men, whom, for reasons too evident to mention, I will not attempt to describe.—This change of leader is not, however, any disadvantage to the out-faction. It would, indeed, have been hard if they had experienced disadvantage from any change, considering who was their leader before. But, somehow or other, there does appear to be a sort of shame attached to this transfer from the late leader to the present one. There are some of those good pliant souls, commonly called country gentlemen, who shrug up their shoulders at it. In fact, some, to my certain knowledge, do really doubt, whether

subjection to George Rose be not just as reasonable and as honourable as subjection to Mr. Ponsonby; and, as to the people, they are no longer to be persuaded, that they have any, even the smallest interest in such matters. They care not, which faction is out: they have seen both in, and, as to places and pensions, they have seen no difference in their conduct. The outs may, therefore, bawl to the people to come and take part with them; but, no aid will they ever receive from that quarter. Our answer to them always will be: it was you who made war for Hanover; it was you who told us that Hanover ought to be as dear to us as Hampshire; it was you, who, in your first act, enabled lord Grenville to hold two offices, incompatible with each other; it was you who made the Lord Chief Justice a member of the cabinet; it was you who brought in a bill to augment the number of Hanoverian troops in this kingdom; it was you who proposed to subject our private cellars and brewhouses to the survey of excisemen; it was you, who, after ten year's execration of the principle of the income tax, came, and, at a single stroke, almost doubled its amount, while, however, you took care wholly to exempt from the operation of that tax, the property which, under whatever name, the *king* might have in the funds: yes, it was you, who, more than any other set of politicians, owed your elevation to the good opinion of the people, and who, the moment you were safely seated in power, set that opinion at naught, and seemed to glory in proving, that you had always intended to dupe the people, and that, in point of insincerity, you scorned to yield to any set of courtiers that ever existed.—The *out* faction had, during the recess, gained nothing at all in any way, but they had lost by events, giving rise to questions, upon which they would naturally be divided. The *in* faction had gained in the same proportion; and, it was expected by every body, that there would be many deserters from the former; an expectation, which, in a few days, we shall see verified.—The debate upon

the King's speech was, as far as appears from the report of it, in the newspapers, as dull an one as was ever heard. There was not a single argument made use of, which had not before, been, over and over again, made use of in the newspapers; and, it is a little hard upon us to be obliged to purchase now, in the form of parliamentary speeches, what we have before purchased, in the form of editorial paragraphs. There has been no effect whatever produced upon the public mind by this debate. Men think now, just as they thought before. The question, with respect to Copenhagen, does not turn at all upon the nature of any papers that can be produced. This is the shape in which it presents itself: Napoleon had conquered the continent of Europe, and, after the peace of Tilsit, was it credible, that the fleet and arsenals of Denmark would not have been made use of for the purpose of injuring England? "What will Napoleon do next," was the question which men put to one another. The answer was: "Why, he will bring out the Russian and Danish fleets against us, to be sure." Was not this the universal opinion? As far as my observation went it was. I believe it was the opinion of the whole nation; and, if it was so, how were the ministers to act otherwise than in the manner in which they did act, they entertaining this opinion, in common with others? I, therefore, want no papers; I want no information; the exposure of no secret intelligence; and the ministers have greatly weakened their cause by making their justification rest, even in the smallest degree, upon any thing other than the notoriety of the circumstances, under which they acted.—My lord Grenville is said to have dwelt much upon the necessity of showing the world, that parliament is not actuated by the vulgar design of "fighting Buonaparte with his own weapons;" that is, of giving up the original conflict, says he, "of justice against injustice, and set king on horse against injustice as well as king." But, this is not fairly stated. We are not proposing to take ourself as to "injustice;" for, when our enemy has set all that has been called law at defiance; when, from whatever cause proceeding, the weaker nations have been compelled to act in such a manner as to favour his cause as effectually as if engaged in open war upon his side, it is not injustice in us to do all that lies in our power to prevent them from continuing so to act. If a gang of ruffians, having a design to rob your house and murder you, enter first into your stable chambers, and, under the influence of terror, prevail upon your grooms to show them

the way and to assist in the enterprize, you, in defence of your property and life, are fully justified in killing your grooms, though you may possess the certain knowledge, that they act under the influence of fear. "Yes," say the *out* faction, "but, we did not, in this case, stop until the Danes began to act." No: nor did we kill the Danes, in the first instance. We saw, that they would be compelled to act against us; we saw that they had not the power to resist the united commands of Russia and France, or rather, the commands of France conveyed through Russia, and, under those circumstances, we demanded a security, that those commands should not operate to our injury. We meditated no harm to Denmark. We proposed to do it no harm. We only wanted to be quite secure against the great harm that it might do us: and, when people talk about the infamy of submitting to this demand of security, made by us, they seem to think, that there would have been no infamy at all in submitting to the commands of France and of Russia. It is very well to talk about "independent nations," and the "perfect equality" that exists between them, thereon grounding the question, "how should we have relished a proposition, such as that which was made by us to Denmark?" But, does not the history of the world prove, that this sort of equality has no existence, except in the imagination? That little nations must be made instruments in the hands of great nations; and that, during the convulsions of extended warfare, it is impossible for them to be independent? The well-known weakness of Denmark would have been an apology for her yielding to our proposition; but, there is nothing that the mind of man could invent, that would be an apology for our yielding to a similar proposition, made by any power. It is no disgrace for a boy of ten years of age to give up, without resistance, to a man of thirty; but, there may be great disgrace in the man of thirty giving up, without resistance, to any man whatever. Taking, therefore, all the circumstances into view, I cannot help thinking, that the Prince Royal of Denmark was actuated, in his rejection of our propositions, by motives very different indeed from those, which the enemies of the expedition have attributed to him; and that, in fact, all his invectives against us are to be ascribed to a desire of ingratiating himself with the Emperor Napoleon. He did not, probably, see with satisfaction the time approaching, when he should be compelled to aid in the destruction of England; but, it is not less probable, that he might choose to

aid in that destruction, rather than to forego the advantages of continuing in possession of his fleet and trade.—There is, however, a larger view, in which this question presents itself. If there be two great powers and many little powers, in any part of the world; and, if one of the great powers, setting at naught all the rules, by which nations have hitherto suffered their warlike operations to be circumscribed, compels all the little powers within its reach to join it in its endeavours to destroy its rival, the other great power is fully justified in resorting to similar means; for, if this be denied, then, the power which will set the rules at defiance, is sure, in the end, to conquer all; so that, the question, is, shall all be conquered by one of the great powers, or shall this part of the world be divided between them? I am for the latter. In this view of the matter, therefore, it signifies not what was the disposition of Denmark, or what was the extent of her ability to injure us. The only question to be asked is this: has the expedition to Copenhagen put us in a state the better to defend ourselves against that enemy, who is, and long has been, engaged in the work of conquering all Europe? There are persons, who will answer this question in the negative; and who talk about “rotten hulks” and “perishing stores”; but, rotten as they are, they are as well here as at Copenhagen, whence I think no one will deny, that they would soon have been gotten out under the effect of a French decree. In short, the expedition against Copenhagen is to be tried by no settled rules relating to the practices of nations: the circumstances, under which it was resolved on, were entirely without example; and our justification rests solely upon the seizure of the fleet being necessary to our safety. It is my opinion, that this and similar measures, or, at least, measures in a similar spirit, were and are necessary to our safety; and, therefore, though I lament the necessity, I approve of the measures.—Upon the subject of *peace*, Lord Grenville is reported to have expressed his regret, that the ministers insisted upon a basis to be laid down by the proposed mediator; and that, he saw no objection to a mediator not being himself independent. His lordship disapproved of petitions for peace; but, could not help feeling anxiety at the number and strength of our foes, especially when he feared that America would soon be added to them. To the expressing of which anxiety I have only this one objection, namely, that it was perfectly useless; and could answer no

purpose but that of producing, in a greater degree, the very effect which his lordship apprehended from the petitions. I do not view the question of peace in the same light with his lordship. I do not think that the increased number and strength of our enemies adds at all to our danger, because it is strength which cannot be brought to operate against us. While we had run-away allies upon the continent our danger was, in my opinion, much greater than it now is; and, be our danger what it may, to overcome it, or to be conquered, is our only choice. This is the notion, which appears to me to be the most useful to inculcate at this time. To talk about forms of treating; to amuse us with a display of terms from the dictionary of the portfolio, is not only useless but mischievous. It must, I think, be evident that England has yet to maintain a long and arduous contest, before she can have a chance of obtaining a secure peace; and if that be the case, our only study ought to be, how we shall maintain that contest. This is the question, about which the enemy should see us disputing; but, if he turn his eyes this way, he will see us engaged in nothing but little squabbles about who shall have the most of the money that is annually raised upon the public. There is a great talk, indeed, about “a crisis;” we are told, that we are “in the crisis of our fate;” but, we have been told this any time these fifteen years last past; therefore, it appears to me to be quite useless to talk about a crisis any longer.—With respect to Portugal, or, rather, the Brazils, Lord Grenville was very right. He said he could not see any new opening that the emigration would make for our commerce. “As to any commercial or political advantages to this country, said he, to be derived from the emigration to the Brazils, I cannot consent to delude my countrymen by holding out such an idea.” The *Morning Chronicle* must have been somewhat disappointed at this, after having so boldly asserted, that the Brazils were “able to supply our West-India colonies with lumber and provisions.” I do not think, that there was much necessity for his lordship’s saying what he did say, upon this subject, for, I believe, the public have been, for some time, satisfied, that no advantage whatever will arise to this kingdom from the emigration in question; while, on the contrary, it will produce a heavy and constant drain of men and money.—The whole of the debate was, as was before observed, very unin-

teresting, all the points having been so amply discussed beforehand, in the newspapers. There was one interesting circumstance, however, and that was, that Mr. Ponsonby, the new "leader of the opposition," was answered, and most triumphantly too, by Mr. Milnes, a new orator, and a very young man. At this, if we may believe the reporters, Mr. Whitbread took fire, a fire, however, more ardent than brilliant. Of the article, or paragraph, or whatever else one may call the thing, which has been published under the title of his speech, we may, indeed, say as Lord Thurlow said of the pleading of the sessions lawyers, that it was like a tailor's goose, hot and heavy.——An amendment to the address was proposed in the House of Lords, and eight peers, amongst whom was Lord Erskine, entered a protest; but, no division took place in either House; and, it is pretty certain, that, if a division had been called for, the ministers would have had a majority of three, if not of four, to one. The fact is, that the opposition, as it is called, has fallen into general disrepute as a political party. The people have no confidence in it. They feel not at all interested in any of its proceedings. There exists no hope or expectation from the efforts of an opposition now. That party feeling, which used, some years ago, to extend itself through the people, was nearly extinguished in a few months after Mr. Fox came into office, and that part of it which remained during his life, went out, like the snuff of a candle, at his death. The party feeling that now exists is confined to the mere retainers of those who are struggling for place. In short, *party*, such as it used to be, is no more; the people are no longer its dupes. Speaking of them in general, they see the matter in its true light. Two sets of men opposed to each other only while they are upon the boards of the House, the opposition being absolutely necessary to those great ends, which it would be waste of time for me to attempt to describe.——For these reasons, we shall, I think, have a very uninteresting session of parliament. The *Morning Chronicle* would fain have persuaded us, that the public looked forward to the meeting with that anxiety, which is always felt by men, who are waiting to know their fate. The public looked forward to it not at all. There was no public anxiety about it. The public well knew, that what the ministry had done, and what they would do, the parliament would sanction; and, that, if otherwise, the same measures would be adopted, whether the parliament met or not. Where, then, was there any reason for anxiety about the meeting of parliament?——II.

Mr. Sheridan, on the 25th instant, gave notice, that, on Monday sen'night, he should make a motion for the appointment of a committee "to inquire into the nature and grounds of the existing grievances in Ireland." What it may be Mr. Sheridan's intention to effect by this motion, I know not; but, I am satisfied, that something ought to be done for Ireland. Yet, it is to deceive ourselves most grossly to suppose, that Ireland, that a country of miserable people, is to be quieted and made happy by an act of parliament, enabling about thirty or forty of the rich Roman Catholics to hold offices under the crown. Besides, with what face can the out faction bring forward this proposition now, when it is well known, that, in the hope of keeping their places, they withdrew it, during the short parliament? If it was proper to be adopted, why withdraw it then? And, if not proper to be adopted, why propose it now? Why, if not purely for the purpose of embarrassing the ministers? I do not say, observe, that it ought not to be proposed, and adopted, though I have very little faith in its efficacy; but, I do insist, that for the out faction to bring it, or any thing like it, forward now, when we know, that, at the mere suggestion of the king, they suppressed it, even after it came before parliament, when they themselves were in power, would be a proceeding as scandalously factious as any that ever was heard of. If they had remained in office; if the king had not turned them out; these measures about Ireland would no more have been thought of by them, except as to the means of preventing them from being brought forward; they had been completely hushed by the royal command; but now they are working up and fomenting and inflaming, in every direction. The language of their principal publication, the *Edinburgh Review*, as it is still called, is that of a downright incendiary; it is addressed to the passions of the most blind and violent of the Irish; and, this is the conduct of men, who while in office, were ready, at the nod of the king, to postpone, for an indefinite term, even the first little thing that they had proposed in favour of Ireland!——III. On the 25th instant, Mr. Banks moved for leave to bring in a bill to prevent, in future, the grant of Places in Reversion, or survivorship. This bill, it will be recollected, passed the House of Commons last year, and was thrown out by the Lords. The motion was opposed by Mr. William Dundas, who denied, that reversions were, in general, granted to unworthy persons, and who was answered by Mr. Whitbread, in a short speech,

worth the perusal of every man in the country. He said, "it was but grateful in that right hon. gentleman, as he had been considerably indebted to reversions himself, and if he (Mr. W.) was not mistaken, was now in expectancy of one; the zeal of the right hon. gentleman against this mode of reform, might, therefore, be easily accounted for. The right hon. gentleman, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had been an infant when he got the grant of a place in reversion, now held by his noble relative, lord Arden, who had obtained it in the same way; there were many other instances in that house, and surely this called for legislative interference. The post granted in reversion to the Chancellor of the Exchequer was a most lucrative one, but yet required no other talent to fill it, than that of knowing how to count the money it produced so gratuitously.—It is good to hear them talk thus of one another. The facts are pretty notorious; but, still, their repeating of them is useful.—Sir John Newport stated, that a reform in the custom-house department of Ireland had long been wanted; but, that it had not yet been effected, and could not, because a reversionary grant of a place stood in the way.—There was a Mr. Horner, who followed Sir John Newport, and who, after some preliminary matter, said that "he thought this measure the more valuable, because it was a measure of *reform*, and that, perhaps, was the very reason of the honourable gentleman's opposition to it." I was much pleased to hear this from a good plain man, who evidently was not born to delude the world by his eloquence, and who, doubtless, recommended himself to his constituents by the known independence of his situation and character. It well became such a man to stand forward, upon an occasion like this, and gravely espouse those principles of "reform," which, in the way of justifying their patrons of the late ministry, that knot of little shoe-less Scotch hirelings, the Edinburgh Reviewers, have held up to contempt and ridicule. How must it shock a man of such apparent single-heartedness, as Mr. Horner to find, upon his arrival in London, that there are men, who absolutely sell the use of their pens and their fingers and their brains, and receive, as the price, such or such a sum of the public money, in such or such a shape, and who have, all the while, the unconscionable impudence to call themselves patriots. How must it offend his plain good sense to hear, that the late ministry, whose partizans ex-

telled them for the possession of great talents, and some of whom did possess great talents; to hear, that many of the members of that ministry had, as to practical purposes, no more power than their chambermaids, the real movers being a set of interested adventurers, well skilled in the art of disputation, industrious from necessity, and by nature flatterers of the great. How it must have disgusted such a good, hearty, frank man as Mr. Horner appears to be, to see a doughy, sordid faced, soft-headed "great man" surrounded with a swarm of these political parasites, leagued together to flatter him out of their food, and to laugh at him behind his back. But, what must have most provoked such a man as Mr. Horner, was, to find, that these literary locusts had actually begun to eat up the fruits of the people's labour; that they had, through the means of their silly patrons, begun to creep into offices and sinecures, and that, in some cases, it appeared impossible to get them out, without totally destroying the places into which they had crept, and, with those places, to destroy no inconsiderable part of the building, which all men would wish to see remain untouched. Such a good, honest hearted, simple-minded man as Mr. Horner appears to be must have been so shocked at all this as to make him almost repent of having, though only for a few months, quitted those paternal estates, which he, doubtless, possesses in some part of the country, where his absence must be severely felt.—With respect to the bill itself, I greatly approve of the principles of it, though I cannot see any great good that it would produce, unless accompanied with a restriction as to the granting of new places and pensions for life; for, we may be assured, that, if the reversion source be cut off, larger draughts will be made upon that of pensions. Besides, I am not quite satisfied, as to the motive of the late ministers, in proposing this measure; and, to say the truth, I am of opinion, that, as far as they are concerned, the main object is, to prevent the present king from granting away what ought to fall into the hands of his successor; to which successor they now look as their only, though distant hope. This circumstance should be borne in mind, when we are estimating the "public spirit," attributed to the proposing of the measure in question. I dislike the measure, too, because it will deceive some people, by leading them to believe that reforms in the expenditure are hereby begun; for, it must be evident to every one, at all acquainted with the mat-

ter, that no such reforms are, by either party, intended, or wished for.

AMERICAN STATES.—An act which shall be inserted in the next sheet, has been passed by the Congress, laying an embargo upon all American shipping, in their own ports, with a view, as they pretend, of making all the belligerent nations feel the effects of the measures which those nations have, respectively, adopted with respect to the American commerce. "We can no longer sail the sea in safety," say they, "let us, therefore, shut up our ports, lay up our ships, and thus punish the tyrants for their injustice towards us." This language differs somewhat from what we heard about six weeks ago. Instead of invading Nova Scotia and Jamaica, the heroes of the Atlantic draw themselves into their shell, and wait with patience for the effect of the privations, which they fancy themselves in a state to inflict. The embargo, laid, during last war, lasted only about six weeks, at the end of which time the whole country was nearly in a state of starvation. While it lasts now, there can be no revenue, except from the cargoes, on board of ships which have not yet arrived; and, I must beg the reader to bear in mind, that there are no internal taxes, no taxes except those collected at the custom-house upon *foreign* goods; for, twenty thousand pounds a year, which is about the sum collected from internal resources, is, in fact, nothing at all. The Congress think, however, that this measure will have an effect upon us; but, I am decidedly of opinion, that even our West India colonies are able to hold out a year, and more, without any supplies from the American States; and, I am quite sure, that they cannot keep in their ships for three months. I should suppose, that the passing of this embargo law has, at once, added a third, at least, to the value of all European goods and all West India produce; and this, too, observe, at a time when taxes, if raised at all, must be added upon internal objects. What must be the consequence of a long continuation of this embargo? I may easily guess. It is, an embargo was the only means of preventing the loss of all their shipping; unless, indeed, they had chosen to do what reason and justice dictated, namely, to declare in defiance of the French decrees, and, if refused, to join us in the war against France. Thus their warfare against us prevented them from doing; and, of course, they adopted the measure of an embargo. These modern Quakers have, at last, fallen a victim to their own greediness and envy. They took delight in

seeing war desolate Europe; and they vainly hoped to continue to profit from the miseries of all other nations. It was owing to them, that the wars in St. Domingo were so long and so bloody. They carried provisions to both parties. They supplied both with powder, ball, and all the means of mutual destruction. While some of them hired their vessels, at an enormous price, to carry off the fugitive masters and mistresses, others got possession of their plate and jewels, through the means of a Jew-like commerce with the revolted slaves. There was not a town or settlement destroyed, in the pillage of which they did not share. From Cape François they carried off the ornaments of the magnificent church, which was there burnt to the ground; and, I remember seeing, at Wilmington, in the State of Delaware, the marble slabs, that were taken up from before the altar piece. The vulgar wives of the unfeeling villains, who commanded their ships, were seen swaggering about, in the years 17, 2, 3, and 4, with the rings and snuff-boxes and ear-bobs and bracelets of the once-opulent inhabitants of the Cape, who not infrequently recognized their valuables upon the persons of the new possessors. A whole casket was sometimes obtained from the negroes in exchange for a barrel of flour. Men, not worth a dollar, were, by means like these, suddenly elevated to great wealth, and now form no inconsiderable part of the great men of that virtuous republicanism country. This line of conduct has, at last produced the effects which we now see, and I am not at all disposed to lament their existence.—In the debate upon the King's speech, the Earl of Cadogan said:—"My Lords, I wish it was possible to subvert with satisfaction upon the conduct of the United States of America; local knowledge, acquired by me at the early periods of the French revolution, enables me to form a very decided opinion with respect to that country, and I am sorry to say, my Lords, I cannot form a flattering one. I am, however, happy to learn, by the tenor of the speech, that it is not the intention of His Majesty's government to concede one point more to that illiberal and prejudiced people. My Lords, we must make a stand somewhere; and where can we do it better than in defence of our cotton and our trade, which they unequivocally demand. If America prefers French alliance to British connection, it is not in your Lordships' power to controul her choice, nor can you prevent that war, which I do not wish to see take place, but

“ which, if it does take place, my Lords, I
 “ am confident if pursued by us with judg-
 “ ment, and reference to the American cha-
 “ racter and situation, no man need fear.
 “ With respect to the affair of the Ches-
 “ peak frigate, my Lords, as a naval officer,
 “ I may be permitted to be a little preju-
 “ diced, and to hold an opinion in some
 “ small degree, differing, perhaps, from his
 “ Majesty’s government. It is not, how-
 “ ever, my intention to dispute the accura-
 “ cy of the proclamation lately issued; nor
 “ the principle of respect which is due to
 “ national ships of war, as applicable to the
 “ governments and nations of Europe: but
 “ as merited by America, if all the detail of
 “ that transaction was before your Lord-
 “ ships, I am inclined to think you your-
 “ selves would question. However, my
 “ Lords, while the American navy is con-
 “ fined to a few frigates, the compensation
 “ that has been made may not be of mate-
 “ rial import; how far it may affect us here-
 “ after, time only can shew.”—These
 sentiments are worthy of an English naval
 officer. Lord Galloway knows the Ameri-
 cans, and, of any one who does know them,
 I am never afraid of the opinion.—The
 embargo is not, perhaps, strictly speaking,
 an act of hostility; yet, when it is evident,
 that it has been determined on only as affect-
 ing us, or only in consequence of measures
 by us adopted, we should have a right to
 consider it as an act of hostility. That,
 however, would not be wise. The embargo
 will not, for a long time, do us any harm;
 and, in the meanwhile, France, Spain, and
 their colonies, not forgetting Portugal under
 its new masters, will suffer most severely.
 The quantity of American produce, carried
 into Spain and Portugal, was immense: Pro-
 visions of all sorts, the want of which will
 produce terrible effects. Nor will the want
 of coffee and sugar be lightly felt, in France.
 We all know how considerable a part of the
 comforts of the people consist in the use of
 these commodities. *We* have them still, in
 the usual abundance, and, in one way or
 other, we prevent the rest of Europe from
 having them. This is real dominion of the
 sea. If this state of things continue for a
 year or two, which it may without any in-
 jury to us, the merchant ships of all other
 nations will be rotten, and the whole world
 will acknowledge, that we have a maritime
 dominion in reality as well as in name.—
 In one respect, however, the embargo, in
 America, will, in all human probability, be
 productive of serious consequences: I mean
 with respect to the “ monish” of our late
 Lord High Chancellor, whose *protest* is, I

perceive, just published, in a pamphlet, by
 that worthy fellow-labourer, Mr. James
 Perry of the Morning Chronicle. The
 “ monish” was, indeed, transferred into
 American hands; but, as I have before ob-
 served, it would not, previous to the embar-
 go, have been an easy matter to transmit it
 to England. Now, it will be impossible,
 until, at least, the embargo be removed, and
 then the monish will not be worth above ten
 shillings in the pound. This is a striking in-
 stance of the imperfection of human fore-
 sight, though possessed in the highest known
 degree. One would have thought, now,
 that this monish, lodged in a country, so dis-
 tant from the seat of war, so free from all the
 dangers of invasion and of public bankrupt-
 cy, and watched over, withal, by a relation
 so near and dear to the proprietor and so
 well situated for the obtaining of that intelli-
 gence that would enable him to prevent the
 effects of every untoward event; one would
 have thought, that monish thus situated was
 beyond the reach of chance. But, alas!
 there arise, all of a sudden, event after event,
 that render its situation as perilous as that of
 a purse, hung out upon a tree by the high-
 way side. It is very singular, too, and
 must naturally be somewhat provoking,
 that while the fund-monish in America is
 become of such depreciated value, the
 value of the funds, in England, not only
 holds its own, but is actually increasing.
 The pension, however, of four thousand
 good pounds a year, which the noble Baron
 Erskine is to receive for life, out of the
 taxes in England, the Americans cannot
 touch. That, and also the pension for life,
 which the Baron’s worthy son will, doubt-
 less, receive out of the taxes, when he
 comes home, are safe in spite of all embar-
 goes. Mr. Lyon cannot lay his merciless
 fingers upon them. They, as Mr. Fox said,
 are as sacred as house and land.—It is
 rather singular, that Mr. Perry of the
 Morning Chronicle, who has said so much
 about American affairs, should never have
 said a word, even by way of parenthesis,
 about Baron Erskine’s monish. The letters
 of A. B. which I am positively assured were
 written by a nobleman, or, at least, by a per-
 son having a *title*, suggested numerous evils,
 that must arise from a war with America;
 but that of a stoppage of fund-monish
 appears never to have occurred to him. Did
 he forget it? Hardly. But, he thought per-
 haps, that it was something beneath his con-
 sideration. The “ *maniac*,” however, did not
 omit to mention it.—There is, at present,
 little more to be said about the Americans.
 Like a snail, they have drawn themselves

within their shell; and, as it will not be worth our while to attempt to crush them, they will push out their heads again, by and by, and will have lost all the arrogance that they formerly discovered. Their intention may, however, be to get in all their ships, and then to send out privateers. We must, therefore, be upon our guard. It will not be amiss to give our commander, upon the Halifax station, orders to place a ship, of some sort, near the mouth of each of their principal rivers, with an order strictly to search every ship that is bound inwards, and to proclaim, that, if any one chooses to go out, bound to any part of the English dominions, she shall have free and safe passage. But, great care should be taken not to let any ship go off for the dominions of the enemy.—This is all, which, at present, it is necessary for us to do, except, perhaps, the issuing of a declaration, on the part of the king, offering the Americans advantageous terms of trade with us, during the war, provided they will have nothing to do with our enemies.—The present appears to be an excellent time for crushing the French faction in America. The election, which will come on soon, in consequence of Mr. Jefferson's notification of not standing another contest, will divide the people, upon the question of "war, or no war;" and, if the "no war" party prevail, the French faction is put down for many years to come.

INDIA HEMP.—It is stated, in the newspapers, that the ministers have entered into a contract with the East India Company to supply our dock-yards with hemp. This contract it is morally impossible for them to fulfil; but, I greatly fear, that it will be made the ground of a terrible demand upon the taxes of England. The affairs of that company are in a state that can no longer be disguised. They must come again to parliament for money. The unreasonableness, the injustice of this, will be evident to every man; but, the hemp argument will be made all-powerful. We shall be told, that we cannot have hemp without supporting the Company; and, that, without hemp, our navy cannot be supported. The hemp ought to be grown here, in England, where we have plenty of land and plenty of hands. To be dependent upon India would be worse than to be dependent upon Russia. In short, this hemp contract, if the report be true, will prove a most alarming evil.

PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION.—Already, we are told, that a hundred thousand pounds, taken out of the taxes of England, has been

sent off, in specie, to the Brazils, to assist her most faithful majesty. This is only a little beginning. We shall have to pay half a million a year for this emigration, in one way or another. It will be a continual drain upon us. And, this, after all, is the result of that "glorious event," which was to produce so much good to England! When will this commercial and colonising rage cease to beggar and enslave us? Never, till the political corruptions, which are found to be so conveniently carried on through the medium of commercial and colonial associations, are, by a radical change, banished from the state. When that may be, I know not. I lament to say, that I do not, at present, perceive the elements of such a change; and I must content myself with the hope, that, some how or other, they will arise out of the present disordered state of things.

BANK OF ENGLAND PATRIOTISM.—An odd association of words, the reader will say; but, he will have seen, in the newspapers, a long statement respecting the generous intention of the Bank "to come," as it is called, "to the assistance of the country." It was my intention to have made some remarks upon the real nature of this generous intention; in the letter, however, which will be found below, this task has been executed in a manner much better than I could hope to have executed it. I, therefore, point out this letter, as being well worthy of the attention of the public, who ought to keep a watchful eye upon all the transactions between the ministry and the Bank, transactions in which the disposition of millions of money is involved. It is curious enough, that both the parties the *ins* and the *outs*, claim the honour of this proposed "*saving*" to the public. The reader will see what sort of a saving it is; and, I would fain hope, that there will be found some few members of parliament, who will have the courage to speak of the transaction in appropriate terms,

Westminster, 29th January, 1808.

BANK OF ENGLAND PATRIOTISM.

SIR;—As you have not hitherto noticed the second Report from the committee on Public Expenditure relating to the Bank of England, I beg leave to send you a few observations on the facts disclosed in that paper. Difficult as it is to follow any branch of the public accounts of this country through the endless mass of intended intricacy and expanded confusion, in which they are involved, it is still more difficult so to manage them in argument, as to leave

any hope of their arresting the attention of the public; nor should I have made the attempt in this instance, but from a thorough conviction, that the Bank of England is not entitled to the character of patriotism, which is so often vaunted on its behalf; and, that any man who will lend his assistance to extort from it even a few additional thousands, will, in the present state of the country, be rendering a real service to the people.—In commenting, however, on the report, it will be impossible to pass over the conduct of the House of Commons. If, on the one hand, it should clearly appear, that the Bank has been uniformly actuated by a sordid love of growing profit, it will be not less manifest on the other, that, although those profits have been continually pressed on the attention of the House of Commons, they have as constantly been passed over with a degree of neglect, that, in private life, would approach to criminality.—You will recollect, Sir, that in the year 1802, Mr. H. Thornton, who two years before, as Governor of the Bank, had suggested and negotiated with Mr. Pitt the renewal of the Bank charter, published a work on paper credit, in which there are the following passages. p. 68. “The proprietors of the Bank themselves are not likely to approve of any dangerous extension of their own paper; both they and the directors know the importance of confining the Bank paper, generally speaking, within its accustomed limits, and must necessarily be supposed to prefer its credit, and the paper credit of the nation, to the comparatively trifling consideration of a small increase in their own dividends;” and again, p. 146. “There can be no doubt that the credit of the Bank of England has been at all periods most anxiously consulted by its directors, and that present profit has uniformly been only the second consideration.” I cite these two passages merely to prove for the present, how repeatedly a patriotic liberality of sentiment has been urged on the part of the Bank in this particular; and, I now beg your attention while I proceed to the more important point of estimating their profits.—The various sources from which they are stated to arise are taken from the report itself, except only the seventh and eighth items, which are supplied from probable conjecture; but, the reporters themselves, with a caution, which on such occasions usually characterises their productions, have not stated the total probable gross amount: according to my calculation, it is as follows:

1.	From the interest on their capital lent to government, £11,686,000 at 3 per cent.	£350,580
2.	From the management of the public debt on the 5th January, 1807.....	265,818
3.	From the allowance for the Austrian loan.....	5,687
4.	From the annual allowance for the house.....	4,000
5.	From the allowance on the S. Sea purchase.....	1,853
6.	From the allowance on loans and lotteries averaged during the last 15 years, at per ann.	20,000
7.	From the interest on their undivided capital stated in 1797 at £3,800,000, at 5 per cent.....	190,000
8.	From the interest on the floating cash balances of the merchants, taken at £1,000,000, at 5 per cent	50,000
9.	From the interest on government average balances, stated by the report at £11,000,000, at 5 per cent	550,000
10.	From the interest on their notes in circulation on the 1st February, 1807, £16,621,390, at 5 per cent	831,069
Making a total gross profit of		£2,269,052

Before we dismiss these items, however, it will be necessary to make a few remarks on them. The first five articles can admit of no dispute. The sixth, namely, the profits on loans and lotteries, will only embrace a difference of two or three thousands per annum, and therefore is not worth disputing. The seventh, of undivided capital, is obviously similar in all respects, so far as regards the question of profit to a deposit, as it can make no difference, so as the capital is there, whether it be advanced by the government, by the merchants, or by the Bank itself. The eighth and ninth items of balances are properly called deposits, and are so admitted to be, and the tenth I fear, of the notes themselves, it will hereafter appear, is not less a deposit account than the other three.—But, it should not be suppressed, that although the report considers the balances and the notes as both productive of profit, the Bank itself does not admit that the balances are any further productive than as they tend to augment the amount of notes in circulation. The reporters, therefore, labour this point, and though it is still involved in some little obscurity, because

it embraces a knowledge of the manner in which the business of the Bank is conducted, and over which the directors have always studiously thrown a veil, yet sufficient is shewn to prove, that the balances most materially increase the profits; and it is certainly possible to shew, what is highly probable in itself, that they may increase them to the full extent of their amount.—What, for instance, should prevent the Bank from holding one set of securities, of a nature permanent and not negotiable, for the amount of their undivided capital and the average amount of the balances in their hands, and another set of a more current nature, for the amount of their notes in circulation?—Mr. Thomson expressly states, that there is a fallacy in the use of the term deposit, under which head the balances are classed, and that it is equally applicable to the amount of the notes in circulation, which he accordingly calls disposable effects: and why should it not be also applicable to the undivided capital? Or, why should not one deposit pay an interest as well as another?—Deducting the amount of collision, consisting probably of a few prize kegs of Spanish dollars, and a little gold for the service of government, what should prevent the Bank from making an interest of capital, balances, and notes, in short, of all the securities of all kinds which they can accumulate, except their own discretion?—Is it that the government, or the merchants, are so rich that the Bank can never find a borrower when they want one, or that the market is so bare of exchequer bills, that they can never find a seller, if required?—And what possible necessity can ever now exist for government paying up their advance?—Even in the year 1797, the amount on which the Bank gained an interest, exceeded the amount of their notes in circulation by three fourths. It exceeded, too, the joint amount of notes, and the deposit account or balances; and, if ever then, (when they were liable to pay in cash) the amount of the advances, on which they received an interest from government alone, exceeded the amount of their notes in circulation by one fourth, what probable limit may be affixed to these advances now, when they are withheld by the fear of no consequences, but what are of a remote operation, and in case of unlooked for events, are morally sure of a material indemnity.—The only difficulty in the case seems to consist in conceiving how any banker can gain an interest on the security deposited and the note circulated at the same time, as the security is the cashing, through which

the interest is gained; but if the reporters had found it convenient to state the amount of the securities, held by the Bank, on which they gain an interest, it would easily have appeared, that the amount of those securities infinitely exceeded the amount of the notes in circulation, and were no measure whatever of those notes, and it is even very possible to put a case to shew how the Bank may be gaining a double profit on the same sum at the same time.—Suppose, for instance, that the cash balances, accumulating and lying in the exchequer from day to day, were actually appropriated to the payment of the dividends as they came in, that is to say, that no notes should be, in any manner, reissued in lieu of those cancelled by the cash balances, except in payment of the dividends; now, as the notes in circulation would evidently decrease in the same proportion in which the cash balances increased, one could scarcely consider those cash balances as yielding a profit to the Bank; but if those cash balances, as they accrued from day to day, should be (as they are) exchanged for exchequer bills bearing an interest, and at the same time should furnish (as they might) the means of making the usual advances on omnium bearing an interest also, which advances would, I presume, be only drawn by government from day to day as they were wanted, it is clear that those cash balances, merely by means of an interior arrangement, might furnish the Bank with the means of accommodating two sets of customers with the same sum at the same time, from both of whom they might be receiving an interest, and that too, without necessarily increasing the amount of notes in circulation, as the advances on omnium might not be immediately drawn, and of course without diminishing their power of making advances in other respects.—But, Sir, if the evidence of the report should fail to shew that the gross profits of this establishment very much exceed two millions per annum, although it was stated by Mr. Pitt on the renewal of the charter in 1800, that they would not probably exceed £400,000 per annum, yet it certainly does not fail to shew the enormous amount of those profits. “For some successive years,” says the report, “an annual and temporary bonus of 5 per cent has been added to the accustomed dividend of seven per cent;” that is to say, for some successive years the Bank proprietors have been receiving 12 per cent interest for their money. But why did not the report tell us for how many successive years? How long was it after the renewal of their charter by

Mr. Pitt in 1800, that they began to divide these bonuses? How long was it after Mr. Thornton, the governor, who suggested and negotiated that renewal, had published his work on paper credit, dated in 1802, from which, I must trouble you with another extract; p. 151. After stating that the necessary profit of a bank must be at least six per cent. and gently sliding the argument into a supposition that the Bank might have gained seven, or eight, or nine, per cent. he proceeds thus: "If the whole profits of the Bank had been lately restricted to seven per cent. they would have been limited to that sum which the Bank proprietors had been for some time in the habit of receiving.—They would have been confined to a sum which would not easily have admitted of accumulation. By obtaining a higher profit the directors have secured to the proprietors the continuation of the same regular dividends, and have thus prevented that uncertainty which would have encouraged gambling in bank stock. They have also made, in the course of years, an important addition to their capital, an addition which has caused it to maintain nearly an uniform proportion to the growing extent of the transactions of the Bank, and to the advancing commerce of the country, an addition also by the help of which they have lately lent to government three millions without interest, for a short term of years, as the price of the renewal of their charter. They have thus strengthened that security which the creditors of the Bank possess, so far as additional capital can strengthen it, and they will be able hereafter, if it shall seem necessary, to invest in gold, in addition to what they could otherwise have invested, a much larger sum than they could with any propriety, have so invested in time past." Among all these good reasons for making a higher profit than seven per cent. not a word, not a hint is dropped about the prospect of any bonuses, or a future increase of dividends; but the Bank, it seems, have taken sufficient care not to add to their ability of investing in gold, (when it shall seem necessary, forsooth) by dividing their profits in due time. And will Mr. Thornton say that that dividend furnishes no moral impediment to such an investment? Again, Sir, why did not the report notice the amount of the undivided capital as well as the bonuses? Parliament would then have better known the amount of their profits. I do not remember that Mr. Thornton's book ever speaks of that capital as greater than it

was five years before, viz: in the year 1797, when it was stated at £3,800,000, although Mr. Thornton so early as the year 1800, saw the propriety of getting a renewal of the charter, 12 years being then unexpired. Why, too, did not the report notice the commutation of the Bank with government in lieu of stamps, taken I believe at £30,000 per annum, when I have been credibly informed by a gentleman concerned in only two out of the 518 Country Banks 100 now existing in the country, that his two concerns alone paid not less than 1500 per annum for that purpose, a sum equal to a twentieth part of the Bank payment.—But, it is not the interest alone of the Bank stock, which should fasten on our attention.—That, we are told, is a trifling consideration: let us then look to the principal.—In the month of June 1797, only ten years ago, the stock of the bank was at 115½ and now the report states it at 230, a rise in ten years of one hundred per cent.—And what greater risque I should be glad to ask, does the proprietor of Bank stock run than the proprietor of the three per cents? Why should the one receive a full dividend of ten per cent, with the prospect of additional bonuses on what was worth only 115½ in the year 1797, while the other only receives £2, 14s. on what was then worth 40½. What establishment in England besides the Bank has for several successive years, divided by half yearly payments, a profit of 12 per cent, and at the same time doubled the value of its capital? But the Bank of England, Mr. Thornton tells us, is quite independent of the executive government, and so are the directors too, I dare swear, all independent.—He tells us, too, when speaking of the trifling consideration of the dividends (but it is in a note), that a large proportion of the Bank proprietors do not hold more than £1000 stock.—He forgets however to tell us how much in general the directors hold.—When there are accrued bonuses of five per cent for several successive years, one would think that there must be some secrets in the direction worth knowing, notwithstanding the dividends are such a trifling consideration. Would it be very uncharitable to suppose, that if any one of that direction were in the constant habit of proffering a set of laboured reasons for his uniform support of all ministers of all parties, that such a director's line of Bank stock might furnish one of those mighty good reasons? Could not Mr. Thornton have dissipated the surprise expressed by his old friend Mr. Tierney in the debates on the renewal of the charter "that it was strange that though the salary of a director was only

£150 the office was aspired to by the richest men in the kingdom, and more eagerly sought after than any one in the gift of the crown;" but Mr. Thornton, I believe, was absent from that debate?—Did the good old lady's dear departed Cicisbeo, the late Mr. Abraham Newland, too, hold only £1000 Bank stock? The curiosity of the town has been lately gratified with the particulars of that gentleman's will, by which it seems that tho' a mere groom of the chamber all his life time, he has left property behind him to the amount of £7000 per annum: but he, too, I presume had a full share of the old lady's bonuses.—Again Sir, Dr. Smith has long ago told us, that the stability of the Bank of England is equal to that of the English government; and who is there that doubts it? Without any question, the natural durability of the present paper system will go nigh to render them both eternal.—But then again I ask, why should the Bank proprietor who has the same security as the proprietor of the 3 per cents, have any preference over him since the year 1797.—Why should the Bank have an annual premium of three per cent paid to them never to pay in gold any more? Why should they reap the benefit of their own avarice and misconduct at the expence of every other class of the public creditors.—Why should they get their Income Tax paid, by profits arising out of the balance which they hold by stopping the income tax of the other public creditors? The Bank I am sure, will not contend that the price of their stock has been increased by the depreciation of their paper, because although there might be some truth in the argument, it would not be very convenient when applied to the holders of the other stocks, who having suffered full sorely from the effects of that depreciation in other respects, are nevertheless stripped of a tenth of its depreciated value.—But, Sir, the Bank have never missed an opportunity of increasing or confirming their growing prisms. To prove this, it will be only necessary to take a short review of the opinions of parliament as expressed in their own reports.—By the report of the committee of finance in 1797, it appears that so early as the year 1796 the sum of £360 per million was chosen upon the express ground of being a reasonable compensation for the charges of management.—Within seventeen years afterwards however, the Bank had managed to raise it to £502: 10s per million, at which sum it continued till the year 1785.—In that year it was reduced: to £450 per million, although the commissioners of public accounts then stated *upon full deliberation*, that £350 per mil-

lion was very sufficient compensation, and although it had been previously stated by the auditors of public accounts, that the business might be done for £187 10s. per million.—So early then in Mr. Pitt's career as the year 1786, it appears that he had not public virtue enough left to carry the report of his own commissioners into effect:—That even then he had begun to feed and flatter the avarice of the Bank of England.—And was the sequel of his career less prodigal? In the year 1791, only five years after the report of 1786 had deemed the allowance for management excessive, the Bank would not even part with a balance of unclaimed dividends without having that allowance confirmed on the existing debt, and, accordingly, the same act of parliament which granted the unclaimed dividends confirmed the excessive rate.—By this well-timed largess in a season of approaching difficulty, and at the same time by omitting to make any stipulation for the rate of allowance on any future debt, Mr. Pitt well knew that he was not only rewarding the Bank for their past support, but that he was also gaining a security for their good behaviour in the expectation of a similar rate of excessive allowance for the future, and accordingly the rate of 450 per million passed unnoticed till the year 1797.—In that year the memorable stoppage, the natural death of the Bank, took place, and Mr. Pitt's committee of finance again expressed a strong opinion that £360 per million was a sufficient compensation for the management of the public debt; but again Mr. Pitt and Parliament in his wake passed over with neglect the suggestion of their own committee.—So the matter rested till the year 1800, when Mr. Thornton, probably seeing the growing profits of the bank, with the provident caution of an experienced captain, set about securing the mouth of the cave before he would proceed to a division of the plunder. He, therefore, on the part of the bank came to an agreement with the minister for a further renewal of the charter for 21 years, the bank consenting as a consideration for the extended charter to furnish government with a loan of 3,000,000, for six years without interest; but, at the same time taking care to exact a promise, that the public balances should not be withdrawn without compensation. The result of this agreement therefore, was, that as even at that time the average amount of the balances was fully equal to the amount of the loan, the bank, in fact, obtained an extension of their charter for 21 years for nothing, and in addition thereto got the allowance of 450 per million

on the then increased debt again confirmed by parliament; or, rather, again passed over in silence; and in silence it has remained till the publication of the present report, for I pass over the paltry sop of £60,000 per annum thrown to the public in 1806. Of that report, however, by far the most curious part is the studied apology which it contains for the conduct of Mr. Pitt at the time of the renewal.—“The circumstance of ‘the bank’ (says the report) ‘gaining a profit by the management of the public debt, appears to have been in some degree adverted to, but the propriety of the rate of allowance then subsisting did not come particularly under consideration. The documents necessary to form a correct opinion upon the complicated concerns of this extensive business, were probably not fully before either of the two parties at the time of this agreement, as it is obvious that they cannot be collected without considerable and detailed investigation, nor digested without industry and attention, and the pressure of other duties may well account for a want of leisure for so laborious a research at the period of the renewal of the charter.’” What a miserable subterfuge! The documents had been, or ought to have been already three times before parliament during his own administration. Once in 1786, again in 1791, and again in 1797. It was but carrying the report of his own commissioners made fourteen years before, and with fourteen years of increased debt to strengthen it, into effect; and his memory might have been spared this stale and shuffling apology. And shall such conduct be deemed not criminally negligent, or profusely corrupt?—Such, Sir, has been the history of the present Report*; and who, on reading it, will say that the Bank of England is a patriotic corporation, or that the House of Commons are the virtuous and vigilant guardians of the public purse? Before they can even set about correcting an evil of acknowledged magnitude, and daily and hourly increasing, twenty years are suffered to pass away, and three different reports of their own body all breathing the same language, are received and disregarded.—May the fate of the present, of the fourth report, be more auspicious. May it produce something more to the people than a few thousands from the unclaimed dividends, and a fresh confirmation or the old neglect of the present rate of allowance. May it oblige the bank to recur back to their old dividend of seven per cent. and in preventing them

from taking advantage of their own misconduct, may it place them on an equitable footing with the other creditors of the public. But, I confess, Sir, that notwithstanding the indication of an approaching storm in Threadneedle Street, which the Report seems calculated to raise, notwithstanding the hints and interviews and conferences and paragraphs, that are daily paraded to the eye on this business, I do not see that the barometer of the bank, the price of its stock, at all gives way, I do not perceive that any fears are entertained in the penetration of this grand temple of corruption for the safety of its present profits. The present price of its stock is above 226, and the directors, it should seem, place a firm reliance on their knowledge of the men they have to deal with. Of those men I shall not for the present say much. I will say, however, that if they should receive the directors of the bank with as firm a front, as they seem disposed to receive the external enemies of their country, they will so far, at least, deserve the thanks of the people. As soon as the report is disposed of, I shall request permission through the medium of your Register, to follow up the subject a little farther.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant,—H. B. —*Leves, Jan. 21, 1808.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Non-importation Act, passed 18th April, 1806.—Together with a Supplementary Act, passed about 16th Dec. 1807.*

(Concluded from p. 160.)

Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, that all penalties and forfeiture arising under this act may be sued for and recovered, and shall be distributed and accounted for in the manner prescribed by the act, entitled “an Act to regulate the collection of duties on Imports and Tonnage:” and such penalties and forfeitures may be examined, mitigated, or remitted in like manner, and under the like conditions, regulations, and restrictions as are prescribed, authorised, and directed by the act, entitled “an act to provide for mitigating or remitting the forfeitures, penalties and disabilities, accruing in certain cases therein mentioned.”

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£150 the office was aspired to by the richest men in the kingdom, and more eagerly sought after than any one in the gift of the crown ;" but Mr. Thornton, I believe, was absent from that debate?—Did the good old lady's dear departed Cicisbeo, the late Mr. Abraham Newland, too, hold only £1000 Bank stock? The curiosity of the town has been lately gratified with the particulars of that gentleman's will, by which it seems that tho' a mere groom of the chamber all his life time, he has left property behind him to the amount of £7000 per annum : but he, too, I presume had a full share of the old lady's bonuses.—Again Sir, Dr. Smith has long ago told us, that the stability of the Bank of England is equal to that of the English government; and who is there that doubts it? Without any question, the natural durability of the present paper system will go nigh to render them both eternal.—But then again I ask, why should the Bank proprietor who has the same security as the proprietor of the 3 per cents, have any preference over him since the year 1797.—Why should the Bank have an annual premium of three per cent paid to them never to pay in gold any more? Why should they reap the benefit of their own avarice and misconduct at the expence of every other class of the public creditors.—Why should they get their Income Tax paid, by profits arising out of the balance which they hold by stopping the income tax of the other public creditors? The Bank I am sure, will not contend that the price of their stock has been increased by the depreciation of their paper, because although there might be some truth in the argument, it would not be very convenient when applied to the holders of the other stocks, who having suffered full sorely from the effects of that depreciation in other respects, are nevertheless stripped of a tenth of its depreciated value.—But, Sir, the Bank have never missed an opportunity of increasing or confirming their growing profits. To prove this, it will be only necessary to take a short review of the opinions of parliament as expressed in their own reports.—By the report of the committee of finance in 1797, it appears that so early as the year 1726 the sum of £360 per million was chosen upon the express ground of being a reasonable compensation for the charges of management.—Within seventeen years afterwards however, the Bank had managed to raise it to £502 : 10s per million, at which sum it continued till the year 1786.—In that year it was reduced : to £450 per million, although the commissioners of public accounts then stated *upon full deliberation*, that £350 per mil-

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OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Non-importation Act, passed 18th April, 1806.—Together with a Supplementary Act, passed about 10th Dec. 1807.*

(Concluded from p. 160.)

Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, that all penalties and forfeiture arising under this act may be sued for and recovered, and shall be distributed and accounted for in the manner prescribed by the act, entitled “an Act to regulate the collection of duties on Imports and Tonnage:” and such penalties and forfeitures may be examined, mitigated, or remitted in like manner, and under the like conditions, regulations, and restrictions as are prescribed, authorised, and directed by the act, entitled “an act to provide for mitigating or remitting the forfeitures, penalties and disabilities, accruing in certain cases therein mentioned.”

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Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America, in congress assembled, that nothing in the act to which this is a supplement, shall be so construed as to prohibit the importation of the following articles, that is to say:—Wrappers and outside packages in which goods, the importation of which is not prohibited, usually are and shall

* The Report will be found in the Appen. to Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. C.

be wrapped or packed at the time of their importation.—2. Bags or sacks in which salt shall be imported.—3. Glass bottles or phials, in which drugs, medicines, or any other articles, the importation of which is not prohibited, shall be imported.—4. Printed books, maps, and charts.—5. Watches, mathematical, astronomical, and surgical instruments.—6. Shalloons and woollen stuffs.—Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that the articles of the following description shall be held and considered as being embraced by the description of articles, the importation of which is prohibited by the act to which this act is a supplement, that is to say.—All articles manufactured entirely of silk and wool, or of silk and flax, or of flax and wool;—Floor cloths;—Woollen cassimeres, carpets, carpeting and mats, whose invoice prices shall exceed five shillings sterling per square yard.—Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, that whenever a doubt shall arise whether any articles imported into the United States is embraced by the description of articles the importation of which is prohibited by the act to which this act is a supplement, the comptroller's decision thereon, approved by the secretary of the treasury, shall be final and conclusive, and be taken and held in every respect as the true construction of the act.—Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, that no articles which shall be imported from any place beyond the Cape of Good Hope, on board any vessel cleared out to the day of departure from any port within the United States or the territories thereof, for the said Cape of Good Hope, or any place beyond the same, shall be subject to the prohibition enacted by the act to which this act is a supplement.

JAMAICA.—*Speech of the Lt. Governor to the Council and Assembly, and the Assembly's Answer, at the Opening of the Session, 1st Oct. 1857.*

Influenced by an uniform desire to promote the public benefit, I have deemed it expedient to assemble the legislature at the earliest period I thought consistent with your private convenience.—I should have rejoiced, had I been enabled to congratulate you on the success of our allies on the continent of Europe: amidst their reverses, however, it is to be recollected that the resources of the British Empire remain unimpaired; and I trust that an honourable, secure, and permanent peace will be, under the blessings of Providence, attained by the firmness and moderation of his Majesty's councils, and by the valour of his fleets and armies.—I have much satisfaction in learning, that the general scarcity of provisions, recently prevalent,

is likely to be succeeded by abundance: the late seasonable rains will secure the island from a sudden return of this evil; yet I earnestly recommend your adopting the most efficacious measures for preventing the recurrence of so great a calamity. It was to me a source of very peculiar gratification that the distress was alleviated by the effect of my proclamation, which extended the term of the intercourse with the United States of America; but the subsistence of the inhabitants should depend as far as possible on a resource so precarious as that of a supply from distant countries.—The establishing of St. Ann's Bay as a free port, and the making of Port-Morant, Port Antonio, and Falmouth, ports of entrance and clearance, are objects of great importance, and cannot be regarded otherwise than as additional proofs of his Majesty's paternal care for the welfare of his subjects in this colony.—I rely with that confidence, which the experience I have of your known liberality so well justifies, for those supplies which the exigencies of government require.—My inspection of the militia throughout the island affords me the satisfaction of making known to you the general improved state of that essential branch of our defence. Some of the regiments in particular have made considerable progress in discipline and appearance, while the laudable spirit of emulation and loyalty, which pervades the whole body, cannot fail of producing the most beneficial consequences.—The forts and batteries along the coast have already derived advantages from your wise regulation during the last session: a system of regularity, economy, and military arrangement, now exists in this establishment, which must effectually tend to the general defence of the island.—When I reflect on the great and arduous contest in which the British empire is now engaged, it were vain to come at that our present meeting is in times of no common difficulty: from you I expect all that can be effected by public spirit, united exertions, and the sacrifice of individual interests to the general weal; from me you may rely on receiving, upon all occasions, the most cordial co-operation in every measure which is calculated to increase the public happiness, promote the prosperity, and insure the safety of this country.

Assembly's Answer.—We, his Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Assembly of Jamaica, beg leave to thank your honour for your speech at the opening of this session:—We are fully sensible of your honour's uniform desire to promote the public benefit, and gratefully acknowledge your attention in assembling the legislature at the

earliest period you thought consistent with our private convenience:—We regret the reverses which have befallen our allies on the continent of Europe; but we, however, sincerely join with your honour in the hope, that, as the resources of the British empire remain unimpaired, an honourable, secure, and permanent peace will be, under the blessing of Providence, ultimately attained:—We shall give our serious attention to your honour's recommendation of adopting the most efficacious measures for preventing the recurrence of so great a calamity as a general scarcity of provisions, recently prevalent, but which has been providentially removed by the late seasonable rains; and we gratefully own the beneficial effects of your honour's proclamation, in alleviating the distress incident to a dependence on a resource so precarious as that of a supply from distant countries:—We duly appreciate his Majesty's paternal care for the welfare of his subjects in this colony, when we contemplate the great importance of the extended establishment of the free ports and ports of entry and clearance:—Your honour may rely on our granting such supplies for the exigencies of government, as the extent of our means, and the existing circumstances of the country, will justify.—We are happy to be assured by your honour of the general improved state of the militia, and of the system of regularity, economy, and military arrangement, which, under your honour's direction, exists in the present establishment of forts and batteries, as regulated by the act of the last session:—Fully aware that our present meeting is in time of no common difficulty, when the British empire is engaged in a most arduous contest, and the colonies are suffering under the pressure of new and peculiar distresses, we are sensible, that it is incumbent upon us to sacrifice our individual interests, and to unite our greatest exertions for the general weal: and we rely with the most perfect confidence on your honour's assurance or a cordial co-operation in every measure, which is calculated to increase the happiness, promote the prosperity, and insure the safety of this country.

RUSSIA.—*Sequestration of English Property; dated at Petersburg, Nov. 19, 1867.*

By our Ukase of the 28th Oct. last, to the Minister of Commerce, Count N. Rumiantzoff, regarding the laying on an embargo upon the English property in Russia, we ordered liquidation commissions to be formed here, at Riga, and at Archangel, under the control of the College of Com-

merce.—On the representation of the minister, that the liquidation commissions appointed in 1860, were, by their mode of conducting business of this nature, perfectly adequate to the object in view. We now order that liquidation commissions be at present appointed, in every respect, strictly according to the principles and spirit of the Ukase given the 25th of Nov. 1860, upon a report of the College of Commerce in consequence of the embargo laid that year on the property of the English, with this only alteration, that the fixed number of Russian merchants to be chosen for the liquidation commission of this plan, but not otherwise appointed than with the confirmation of the minister, and in the other towns with the confirmation of the chief authorities contiguous thereto.—The said commissioners are to take cognizance of all the goods and property of the English which were embargoed by our Ukase of the 21st (ult.) Oct. 1867; and this sequestration is to be extended to all their capital monies and bills, excepting their monies placed in our Banks, which, by the laws, are in no case to be touched. The Councillor of State, and Member of the College of Commerce, Baikoff, is to be president in the commission here.

FRENCH COMMERCIAL DECREE, signed, Napoleon, and dated at Milan, Nov. 23, 1867.

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine.—Upon the report of our Minister of the Finances, we have decreed, and decree as follows:—Art. I. All vessels which, after having touched at England, from any motive whatsoever, shall enter the ports of France, shall be seized and frigated, as well as their cargoes, without exception or distinction of commodities or merchandize.—II. The captains of vessels who shall enter the ports of France, shall, on the day of their arrival, proceed to the office of the Imperial Customs, and there make a declaration of the place from which they sailed, of the ports they have put into, and exhibit their manifests, bills of lading, sea-papers, and log-books.—When the captain shall have signed and delivered his declaration, and communicated his papers, the head officer of the customs shall interrogate the sailors separately, in the presence of two overseers. If it results from this examination that the vessel has touched at England, independent of the seizure and confiscation of the said ship and cargo, the captain, as well as those sailors, who, upon examinations shall have made a false declara-

tion, shall be deemed prisoners, and shall not be set at liberty until after having paid the sum of 60,000 franks, as a personal penalty for the captain, and 500 franks for each of the sailors so arrested, over and above the pains incurred by those who falsify their papers and log-books.—III. If advice or information communicated to the directors of our customs give rise to any suspicions as to the origin of the cargoes, they shall be provisionally warehoused until it is ascertained and decided that they do not come from England or her colonies.—IV. Our commissaries for commercial relations, who deliver certificates of origin for merchandize laden in the ports of their residence destined for that of France, shall not confine themselves to an attestation that the merchandise or commodities do not come from England or her colonies or commerce; they shall indicate the place of origin, the documents which have been laid before them in support of the declaration which has been made to them, and the name of the ship on board of which they have been primarily transported from the place of origin into that of their residence.

PORTUGAL.—*Gen. Junot's Proclamation, upon entering Lisbon, Nov. 30, 1807.*

Inhabitants of Lisbon.—My army is about entering your walls; it was coming for the purpose of rescuing your ports and your prince from the influence of England.—But this prince, so respectable by his virtue, has allowed himself to be hurried away by the counsels of some wicked men who surrounded him, and he is gone to fling himself into the arms of his enemies. He has been made to feel apprehensive for his personal safety, his subjects have been counted for nothing, and his interests sacrificed to the base cowardice of some courtiers.—Inhabitants of Lisbon, remain quiet within your houses; fear neither me nor my army; we are formidable only to the enemy and to the wicked. The great Napoleon, my master, sends me to protect you.

ITALY.—*Napoleon's Decree, adopting Eugén Beauharnois, as his successor in Italy. Dated at Milan, 19th Dec. 1807.*

We, Napoleon, by the Grace of God, and the Constitution of the Empire, Emperor of the French, and King of Italy, decree as follows:—Art. 1. We adopt for our son, Prince Eugén Beauharnois, Arch Chancellor of State of our Empire of France, and Viceroy of our Kingdom of Italy.—2. The Crown of Italy shall be,

after us, and in default of our children, and male legitimate descendants, hereditary in the person of Prince Eugén, and his direct legitimate descendants from male to male by order of primogeniture, to the perpetual exclusion of women and their descendants.—3. In default of our sons and male descendants, and the sons' and male descendants of Prince Eugén, the Crown of Italy shall devolve to the son and nearest relative of such of the Princes of our blood, as shall then reign in France.—4. Prince Eugén, our son, shall enjoy all the honours attached to our adoption.—5. The right which our adoption gives him shall never, in any case, authorize him or his descendants to urge any pretensions to the Crown of France, the succession to which is invariably fixed.

The decree of the 20th confers upon Prince Eugén Napoleon the title of Prince of Venice. Another decree confers upon "our well-beloved grand-daughter, Princess Josephine, as a mark of our satisfaction to our good city of Bologna," the title of Princess of Bologna. Another decree declares the Chancellor Melzi, Duke of Lodi. After the above decrees had been read, the Emperor made the following speech:—

Gentlemen, Possidenti, Dotti, and Commerciali, I see you with pleasure about my throne. Returned after 3 years absence, I am pleased at remarking the progress which my people have made—but how many things remain to be done to efface the faults of our forefathers, and to render you worthy of the destiny I am preparing for you.—The intestine divisions of our ancestors, their miserable egotism to particular cities, paved the way for the loss of all our rights. The country was disinherited of its rank and its dignity; that country which in more distant ages had carried so far the honour of its arms and the éclat of its virtues. I will make my glory consist in regaining that éclat and those virtues.—Citizens of Italy, I have done much for you; I will do much more. But on your side, united in heart as you are in interest with my people of France, consider them as elder brother. Always behold the source of our prosperity, the guarantee of our institutions, and that of our independence in the union of the Iron Crown with that of my Imperial Crown.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates.

The First Number of the Tenth Volume of the above Work will be ready for delivery in the course of a few days.

Two historical facts.—During the existence of the late ministry, Mr. Fox being then secretary of state for foreign affairs, the son of the then Lord Chancellor, Erskine, was appointed minister plenipotentiary to the American States, that young gentleman being then called to the bar in England. About the same time, the Lord Chancellor Erskine gave to a son of Mrs. Bouverie a living, in the church of England, generally estimated to be worth twelve hundred pounds a year.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS (continued from page 174).—I. *Vote of Thanks.* II. *American States.* III. *Danish Expedition.*—On Thursday, the 28th of January, a motion was made, in both Houses, to give the thanks of parliament to the fleet and army employed in the Copenhagen expedition. At the time, when the titles and marks of honour were bestowed, upon Admiral Gambier and others, I expressed my opinion, that the measure was wrong; because, though the success of the enterprise was of great national importance, to insure that success required neither courage nor skill, except, perhaps, in a few persons of inferior rank; because, from the very statement of the advocates of the ministers, it appeared, that the means provided were such, as, when compared with the object to be accomplished, rendered failure morally impossible, because it would have been a crime to fail, and that, therefore, to succeed was little more than a negative merit; because, in short, to bestow honours upon the commanders of such an expedition, was to proclaim to the world, that it was, in English commanders, a great merit, a highly distinguishing characteristic, not to be drivellers, or traitors, since no men of common understanding could have failed, unless from a want of fidelity. These arguments, and some others, which were made use of in the Register, and in other public prints, at the time referred to, have now been repeated in parliament; against these arguments nothing of any weight has been urged; and it does, to me at least, clearly appear, that the vote of thanks, as well as the other honours, have, in this instance, been prostituted to party purposes, that is to say, to the purpose of giving to the whole measure an éclat which it did not deserve, with a view of enhancing, in the minds of the people, the merit of the present ministers. But, while the spirit of party appears to have dictated the motion for a vote of thanks, there has appeared, in the opposition to it, a spirit of exactly

the same character. Messrs. Windham and Tierney (the latter of whom had almost sworn, that he never would belong to any ministry or party with the former) seemed to have, for their grand object, the indulgence of their spleen against Sir Home Popham, who, it must be confessed, has been a zealous and formidable opponent to them in politics, but who, upon that very account, should, on this occasion, have escaped particular notice. Mr. Windham bestows many compliments upon Lords Cathcart and Gambier; with respect to them, he takes care to rub off with one hand what he lays on with the other; he brings forward the excellence of the private character of the one, and the past services (though he does not particularize them) of the other; but, of Sir Home Popham he recollects nothing but the demerits. He takes, or rather, he finds out, occasion to observe, that “one ostensible part of the expedition had been entrusted to an officer, who could only plead, in his behalf, the approbation of a self-created tribunal, in opposition to a sentence of condemnation, which had lately been passed upon him by one legally constituted, and who, in his fortune, had exemplified the old adage, “that when the King loses, the Knave wins;” an adage, which must be very old indeed, for, I scarcely think that any man now living ever heard of it before. It was travelling quite out of the natural course to notice, in this particular manner, Sir Home Popham and his court martial, especially as no particular mention had been made of his services, upon this occasion, by the ministers, and as he had received no sort of reward, though it was pretty generally understood, that of the merit of the execution of the measure, no small share did belong to him. Certainly, the approbation of the Lloyd’s men did him no honour; or, if he were, as he appeared to be, so very proud of the swords and the thanks, which they had to bestow, one might, with little regret, see him left to them as his sole possession in this way;

but, it is, I think, as certain, the "legally constituted tribunal," of which Mr. Windham speaks, was a thing, which he and his late colleagues might as well have kept out of sight; for, though the letter of the law might not be violated in the constituting of that tribunal, no great pains were taken to adhere to its spirit. I am one of those, who censured, in all its parts, the expedition to Buenos Ayres. I looked upon it, and I still look upon it, as a mere money-making adventure; but, it does appear, from the evidence given at the court-martial, that Sir Home Popham was, by the minister, invested with somewhat of discretionary powers, and the public will not fail to recollect, that no court-martial was talked of, until the intelligence arrived, that the place had been re-captured by the Spaniards. Whatever might be the demerits of Sir Home Popham, however, his court-martial should have been constituted in the usual way, and in that way the proceedings against him ought to have been conducted. The law, relative to the constituting of courts-martial, makes provision, that the members, if there be a sufficient number, shall consist of persons stationed at the place where the court is held; and, it authorizes the taking in of two or three commanders, if there should not be captains enough present, rather than bring members from another station. Was this law, so well calculated to insure impartiality, by preventing *selection* on the part of the prosecutor, observed on the occasion referred to? In the *letter* perhaps it was; for several of the admirals, members of the court, did *hoist their flags* at Portsmouth, during the trial, and a little before the trial; but they struck those flags immediately afterwards, returning from whence they came; and, though they might be said to be stationed at Portsmouth, I shall leave the proceeding to be boasted of by those who were then ministers. There was, it appears from the proceedings of the court, a "learned" counsellor, Mr. Jarvis, sent down by the Admiralty to plead against the prisoner, a thing totally unprecedented in the naval history of England. If, in sending down a counsellor to plead, and in making the court consist of admirals, the object was to give dignity and solemnity to the proceeding, how came it to pass, that neither of these precautions was taken in the case of Captain Whitby, who was tried, at the same port, upon a charge, grounded upon a complaint of the American government, that he had violated the law of nations, that he had been guilty of an act of aggression against them in their own waters, and that

he had wounded many, and murdered one, of their seamen? This trial, in which the good-understanding and, perhaps, the peace, of two nations were involved, did, surely require as much dignity and solemnity as it was possible to give it; yet, Captain Whitby was tried in the usual way; no admirals assumed temporary command upon the occasion, and no counsellor was sent down by the admiralty to plead against him. These are facts, which nobody will attempt to deny; and, with these facts before them, I shall leave my readers to judge, whether it would not have been full as well, if Mr. Windham had suffered the recollection of Sir Home Popham's court-martial, to remain as a source of secret consolation to those by whom that court-martial was ordered and organized. Mr. Tierney is reported to have said: "Why should not the house attend to the dignified example set them by another distinguished assembly—Lloyd's Coffee-house Men?—Those gentlemen knew the true value of their approbation, and were resolved not to be lavish of it; for they had not yet honoured this extraordinary service with their notice, notwithstanding their great favourite (sir Home Popham) was captain of the fleet. He believed for his part that those gentlemen had been disappointed: it was well known that they had not received the slightest notice of the signature of the capitulation in sufficient time to apprise them of the period at which the Danes began to be at open war with us. Would ministers affect to be ignorant of the sentiments of merchants in the Russian trade upon that head? Had they not actually been furnished with a list, setting forth the number of vessels captured? This must have been a sore disappointment to the trading speculations of the gentlemen at Lloyd's; they who had so relied on their favourite, the gallant officer, who while smarting under the sentence of a court martial, was entrusted with a command of great trust, and put above the heads of his seniors, men of approved service and unimpeached character. But notwithstanding the opportunity afforded their favourite, and though he was in such habits of intimacy with the mayor of Birmingham, the alderman of this place and of that, he (Mr. T.) did fear that this officer had failed in satisfying the expectations of his friends at Lloyd's." Mr. Tierney seems to envy Sir Home Popham the honour of possessing these friends at Lloyd's. But, since when is it, that the late ministers have begun to

talk (in public) thus contemptuously about the Lloyd's men? They said not a word of this sort while they were in office. They did, indeed, before they were in office, form a resolution, I believe, to make the Lloyd's fund a question in parliament; but, having obtained their offices, they appear to have thought it wise not to offend the city and its connections. For this, amongst the million other acts of meanness that they were guilty of, I was glad to see them overthrown. But, what had the Lloyd's men and their vases and swords and heir-looms to do with the Danish expedition? And what had the former conduct of Sir Home Popham to do with the question before the House? Why this, that Sir Home Popham was a favourite with the merchants; that the merchants had suffered by the Danish expedition; and that Sir Home Popham was known to have had a considerable share in the execution of that expedition. No: this was not the cause of his being dragged forward; the true cause was, that the late ministry had, in various ways, felt the effects of his talents, as a politician; that is to say, as a contestor of boroughs, and an exposé of their errors and faults; and, it was well worthy of remark, that not one of the ministers opened his lips in defence of Sir Home Popham, who, in consequence of being a person interested in the discussion, was absent from his place in the House. There has, I daresay, been some little envy excited in the naval service, by the preference, which was, upon this occasion, given to Sir Home Popham. It was to humour this, that the attack upon him was made; and, therefore, it was the duty of the ministers to repel that attack. But, these ministers are, I will engage, of the true breed; and, if so, they will never hesitate to sacrifice any one to their own convenience, however they may have profited from his exertions; and, moreover, it is precisely in proportion to those exertions that they are disposed to sacrifice him, because they well know, that, in that same proportion, it is improbable that he should go over to their opponents. Thus, they first receive the benefit of a man's talents and zeal, and, when they perceive, that he has, in supporting them, incurred the implacable enmity of their opponents, they, without the least hesitation, and, as if it were a matter of course, give him up to be worried by those opponents, taking to themselves the merit of having, by implication, disowned him; a refinement in baseness, which, it is to be hoped, none but courtiers have yet discovered, and the effects of which Sir Home Popham, fol-

lowing the fate of Sir Harry Mildmay, is in a fair way of feeling to their heart's content. With so much experience of this sort before him, it is, to me, a surprising thing, that any one of "the representatives of the people;" any one of those worthy gentlemen, who, from motives so disinterested, take upon them the labour of law-giving, should ever become what is called a partizan of any set of placemen, or, at least, that he should ever discover any thing like zeal, like sincerity, in their cause. It is surprising, that all men do not imitate the Saints; that is to say, give a measured support; always keep safely "upon their haunches," as some one said of Pitt; and, upon no occasion, suffer themselves to be urged into full speed. If actual recompence be the object, the example of Swift's Bedlamite is the thing: "Give me a penny, and I'll sing you a song; but give me the penny first." To return, now, to the debate: it ended in a division of 19 against the vote of thanks and 100 for it, Sir Francis Burdett having insisted upon dividing the honourable house, sorely against the will of the *outs*, who, as fast as they finished their speeches, marched away, Mr. Tierney having expressly stated, that it was not intended to have a division, seeming not to perceive, that any member might call for it, or, in a moment of forgetfulness, looking upon all those, who sat on the same side with himself, as being the subalterns and privates of a well-drilled party; a state of things which Mr. Tierney will never see again as long as he lives. When the thanks came to be communicated, on Monday, the first of February, it was curious enough to observe, that, though Sir Arthur Wellesley was the last upon the list of the generals present, more than one half of the Speaker's speech was addressed to him, exclusively, upon the score of his services in India, of which services not a word had been said in the vote of the House, and of which services many of those who joined in the vote, might possibly, think differently from the Speaker. Sir Home Popham, in his answer to the Speaker, is reported to have said, by way of conclusion: "that his life should be devoted to the service of his *beloved* sovereign and his *esteemed* country." I do not wish to play the critic; but, there is something so marked here, that, if the report be correct, I must say, that I think Sir Home's a very bad taste. Plain "king and country" would have been best; but, at any rate, no distinction should have been made between them. There is, besides, no reason in the distinction made by Sir Home. The love that he feels

for the king can be of no other sort than that which a man feels for his country. The idea of any personal affection, in this case, is ridiculous. The feeling is that of love for the king, as king; for the kingly officer, in fact, and for that only because it is looked upon as being the repository of the honour and guardianship of the country. To use, therefore, an epithet of ardent affection to the former, and one of sober, after-marriage regard to the latter, was, to say the least of it, to shew no great degree of judgment, and might, if coming from a person less enthusiastic, give rise to suspicions, that the motive was not altogether disinterested —

II. On Tuesday, the 2d. instant, Mr. Eden (Lord Auckland's eldest son, and the new Teller of the Exchequer, I presume) made a motion for laying before the house a copy of Mr. Jefferson's message to the senate of the American States, relating to the non-ratification of the treaty, made with us, during the late administration. The professed motive of this motion was to shew, that the president had not the power of rejecting the treaty, without the consent of the senate; that that consent had not been obtained; and that, in fact, it might yet be ratified, though the king had said, in his speech, that the ratification had been refused. Mr. Eden appears to be deeply read in the little pamphlet, called "the Constitution of the United States of America;" but, if I recollect rightly, that pamphlet, which is, however, a very flexible piece of stuff, says not a word about non-ratification of treaties. The president is to make treaties, and when he is satisfied with them himself, he is to lay them before the senate for their approbation, or disapprobation; but, if he be not himself satisfied with what his negociators have done, he wants no vote of the senate to authorize him to send a treaty back again; or, if it so please him, to put an end to the negotiation; so that, he has the power, at all times, to refuse to ratify a treaty, and, in the case before us, that refusal was given. The collateral matter of Mr. Eden's speech was, however, of the most importance. He expressed his hope, that the treaty might yet be ratified. It may, if the president should be induced to change his opinion of us; but, if he does change that opinion, it certainly will not be owing to the expression, on our part, of any such hopes, and particularly if we express them in parliament. Such hopes, if they are very dear to Mr. Eden's heart, are, I am convinced, much more likely to be realized from the effect of the king's proclamation relating to English sea-

men and others becoming citizens of America, his orders in council relating to commerce, and his orders for the sending out of ships, troops, and powder and ball to America. Speculations are afloat as to what the Americans will next do; for to remain as they are is a moral impossibility. They have, for a long time, been complaining of our laws of blockade; and, as the end of all their ridiculous threats, all their swaggering denunciations, they blockade themselves, and that, too, in their own ports. Some think, that their next measure will be, when they have got in all their ships, to invade Canada. This they can do, but not without men and arms and cannon and ammunition; and these cost money. They would easily penetrate into the country; but the country without Quebec is nothing, and they know from disgraceful experience, what it is to attack Quebec. They will, besides, have upper Canada first to subdue; and in that country, they will have to defeat a good number of Scotchmen, who are not apt to lay down their arms till they have made their assailants feel the effects of them. They must defeat these Scotchmen, or they will have them in their rear, together with a company or two of artillery. So that, even an inroad into Canada, though it may be, by a vast superiority of numbers, effected, will be, by no means, a holiday enterprise, nor an enterprise of little expense. And, whence is the money to come? I have before stated, that there are, in the American States, no internal taxes, and have shewn, that, in case of war with us, it will be impossible to collect an internal tax; that the whole of the revenue arises from custom-house duties; that four-fifths of these arise from commerce with us; that the whole annual revenue is about 15,000,000 of dollars; that more than one half of this is required to meet the annual expenses of the national debt; and, that, of course, a war with us, while it will add ten fold to the expenses, will almost totally destroy the revenue, leaving the national debt to pay its own interest and the government to maintain itself. What, then, if they resolve upon war, is to be done? Why, it appears to me, that the first step must be an act of confiscation of all debts, private as well as public, due to England, and of all property owned by Englishmen. The amount of these debts and of this property may be about 12,000,000 of pounds sterling. But, an act of confiscation would not bring more than a third or fourth part of that sum into the treasury. What it would bring in would, however, enable the government to go on for

a while; but, a creation of paper money must soon follow; and, then the country is, at once, in a state of revolution. It is thought, by some persons, that the situation of America differs materially, in this respect, from its situation at the commencement of her revolutionary war; that, banks and bank-notes having become so general, the people will not be alarmed at a new creation of such notes, especially as it will take place by degrees. But, these persons do not appear to me to reflect upon the quantity that must be created in proportion to those already existing; that the notes in circulation must be doubled in the first year; that they must go on increasing in quantity at the same rate, as long as the war continues, for that there will not be there, as in England, taxes coming in to pay any part of them off; in short, that it must be an issue of paper with the notorious want of capital in those who make that issue. Under these circumstances, not forgetting the effect of the recollection of the old paper-money, sacks full of which are, by some persons in the country, kept as a memorial of the good faith of "King Cong," it is naturally to be expected, that, at the first additional issue of paper-money, a depreciation of two or three for one would take place. Nay, I would take an even bett, that, at this moment, many people are hoarding up their dollars; and that, if an accommodation be not made with England, in a very few months, there will be a regular trade of barter for paper against money, at a depreciation of one half. As to "loans," of which some persons talk, who will lend to a government that has no internal revenue? Who will lend to a government, that will be obliged to acknowledge that it has no revenue at all; and, that it is totally unable to pay the interest (except in depreciated paper) of its former loans? France and Holland lent America money, during the revolutionary war. Can they do it now? And, if they could, would they do it, under circumstances such as now exist? During the revolutionary war, though the commerce of America suffered greatly, and though the people suffered greatly from that cause; yet, the suffering was not what it would now be. Then our enemies were powerful at sea. Their fleets were, in Europe and the West Indies, equal to our own, in point of numbers. They had a powerful fleet upon the American station; too powerful, at one time, for ours to venture to face. Under the protection of these fleets, the Americans sent out shoals of privateers, and carried on a great deal of trade with their merchant ships under the same

protection. Indeed, during that war the American mercantile marine increased; and the country was, too, greatly assisted by trade carried on under neutral flags. How completely she would now be destitute of all these means of alleviating her sufferings, I need not point out. The contrast will present itself to every mind, except, perhaps, to the minds of those, who negotiated the rejected treaty, and who left the question respecting the search for seamen "open for future discussion." To the minds of men, who could consent to enter upon any negotiation whatever, the non-importation act held, in the way of a rod, over their backs, it would be easy, perhaps, for the American minister to make it appear, that his country is now in a better situation for war than she was at the beginning of her revolutionary contest; but, certainly, not to the mind of any other human being. The late ministers talk much of the honour of the country; but, I think, their opponents may safely defy them to cite any transaction so dishonourable to the country as the entering upon this treaty, while the non-importation act existed. The case stands thus: the Americans make a demand upon us; they demand of us to give up, to stipulate, to sign and seal away, a right of inestimable value to us. No matter, however, what be the nature of the demand, a demand it is, and, because we do not immediately yield, they pass an act for the well-known and openly avowed purpose of compelling us to yield. There is something, too, in the silent language of this act unbearably insolent: "we know you to be a huckstering nation; we know you to be under the sway of your avarice; we pass this act to compel you to grant us that, which, in the end, will ruin your maritime power; and, with this act suspended over your backs, we will negotiate with you." And, to our everlasting shame, they found in England, a set of men perfectly ready to enter upon such a negotiation. Thanks to the king, we have got rid of that set of men, of Lord Holland and his little Scotch squad of flattering scribblers. This conduct on our part, was the cause of Mr. Jefferson's boldness in rejecting the treaty; and, indeed, his boldness was quite natural, after having seen us ready to enter upon a negotiation with the non-importation act in existence, especially when he saw, that our negotiators had left the question of his arrogant demand "open to future discussion." This was the main point; and, there can be little doubt, that his ministers left here, told him to stand firm, and that, in the end, our

reverses upon the continent, joined with our dread of the non-importation act, would induce us to submit. Those ministers must, too, have perceived of what sort of materials Lord Holland and Lord Auckland were composed; they must have perceived that the whole thing was, with them, a matter of mere trade, and not of politics; they must have perceived the set of notions that pervaded the minds of the whole cabinet; and, their opinion, upon this point, being submitted to Mr. Jefferson, he would, of course, make his demands accordingly. So that, again I say, that, if we have war with America, the fault will be that of the late ministers and not of the present. The dispute is, however, now brought to a clearly understood issue. The Americans demand, that we shall give up the right of searching their merchant ships for men; they have passed certain acts to compel us to submit to that demand; and the king has, in the most solemn manner, declared to the people, and to the world, that to that demand he "never" will submit. It remains, then, to be seen; it remains for the world to witness, which of the two will hold to his word, King George, or "King Cong"; which nation, after all the talk, has the least fear of the other, England or America. The officers, who have been selected to go out, are of high reputation for valour, discretion, and experience; and I, for my part, confidently anticipate a glorious result. It would, perhaps, be as well, when the seas are clear of ice, which will be in the month of April, not to wait for an attempt upon Nova Scotia, which might be made from some of the Northern States; but to go and burn the shipping and knock down the town of Falmouth, and inflict the like punishment upon a few other places; that is to say, if the Congress do not, without delay, place things in their former state, or, at least, if they can be proved to have made any preparations for war, it being manifest that such preparations are levelled at us. The effect which a resolute and prompt mode of acting towards America would have in Europe, every man of discernment will easily perceive. It would be one of the great means of enabling us to obtain an honourable, a safe, a lasting peace, in Europe; such a peace as would establish it, as an indisputable fact, that the independence of England was not to be injured by all the nations of the earth combined. Not a peace, like that of Amiens, in which we appeared as acknowledged underlings; in which, notwithstanding all our endeavours to disguise it, we stood trembling for our lives;

and, after which, we ourselves were engaged in speculations as to what would finally become of us. Not such a peace as this; but a peace which shall make every man feel confident of future safety, and that shall deprive all those who would prevent an inquiry into the terrible abuses that exist, of pretences founded upon "the dangers of the country;" a peace that shall put an end to that "crisis of our fate," in which, for so many years, the successive factions have told us that we existed. But, this sort of peace is not to be brought about by "motions for peace." Motions for peace! "Mr. Whitbread's motion for peace!" What can this mean? Why not make a motion for rain, or for fair weather? What sense can there be in such a motion? The motion, it appears to me, should be for an humble petition to the man, who has sworn that he will conquer us. There would be some sense in that, but, in "a motion for peace" I can discover nothing that is rational; nothing that has common sense in it, except, indeed, it be for peace upon the terms stated in the pamphlet of Mr. Roscoe (which pamphlet it shall be my business, as it is my duty, to answer in my next number) who appears to think, that we should be perfectly and permanently safe, to make a peace, leaving all the ports and all the naval means of the continent of Europe at the absolute disposal of Napoleon, and who sees in that military Emperor, no symptoms of a desire to do any thing more, than consolidate his authority and establish his dynasty in France.—III. On Wednesday, the 3rd instant, a debate took place, in the House of Commons, upon the following motion: "That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, praying that he "will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before the House "the substance and dates of all information "transmitted by His Majesty's Ministers at "the Court of Copenhagen, at any period "during the last year, respecting the naval "force of Denmark and particularly with "respect to any measures adopted to augment the same, or of putting it into a "state of forward preparation, or in procuring seamen to man the same in any "part thereof." This motion, at the close of a very long speech, was made by Mr. Ponsonby, the new leader of "the gentlemen opposite;" and it was opposed by the ministers, upon the ground, that the papers could not, with propriety, be made public, even if necessary to justify the measure of seizing the Danish fleet, and, that they were not necessary to that justification. At the close

of the debate a division took place, when there appeared, for the motion 108, against it 253. This debate, in which there was a pretty fair trial of strength between the two parties, was also a trial upon the subject of the Danish expedition; but, with the exception of the information, communicated to the house by Mr. Canuing, there was nothing said, which had not, in substance at least, been said before. That information was, indeed, of great importance; for, it not only strips the Danes of that fine character for inoffensiveness, which had been attributed to them by some persons, but showed, most satisfactorily, that it was next to impossible, that they could have felt any thing like shame or sorrow at giving up their fleet upon the conditions proposed by us. The ministers took the ground of necessity, evident from notorious circumstances; and upon this ground, which they should have taken at the first, the plain common sense of the country and of mankind is with them. It was well to make known to the country, facts which were not before generally known; and this has now been done; but, it was, at no time, proper to lay any stress upon "secret" information, because that was sure to excite doubts as to the great plea of necessity. Some of those, who insist, that this is a new system of morality, upon which we are acting, may, probably, be sincere; but, I would ask any one of those gentlemen, whether, if he had, in the course of a year, seen Sweden invaded through the means of Denmark; a hostile fleet lying in the ports of Norway, and another in those of Sweden, he would not have cursed the imbecility of those ministers, who waited patiently, to see Napoleon effect an object, so dear to his heart? Much has been said about the consequence of the future hatred of the Danes towards us. The hatred of a nation, I allow, is not to be wantonly provoked; but, will any one pretend, that it is possible for any future hatred of the Danes to produce acts more hostile to our welfare, than those of which Denmark has been guilty for the last thirty years? In what way is the hatred of that nation to operate upon us? In the way of war to be sure. Well, then, as I have, upon a former occasion, clearly shown, they have availed themselves of every opportunity of proving to us the existence of this hatred for the period above mentioned, without having recently discovered, in any part of their conduct, the slightest inclination to amend their ways. But, in taking a final leave of this subject (for it is now pretty well exhausted,) I beg leave to repeat, that if

the Danes had been as good a nation as they are a bad nation; if they had been towards us, as harmless in their future probable views and in their past conduct, as they have been mischievous, still, if I had been minister, I would, if they had rejected the proposition made to them, have seized their fleet and arsenals; because, though ever so willing to resist the power of France, it was manifest that they wanted the ability; because, situated as they were with respect to our enemy, it was also manifest, that they would have been made use of as instruments in his hands, for the purpose of insuring our subjugation; and because, having the power of my country committed to my hands, it is my duty so to employ that power as to prevent every thing which manifestly tends to its subjugation, let who will suffer from my exertions. And this is no "new morality." It is morality as old as the hills and the valleys. It is a morality which must be adopted; or, we must confess that there are certain political evils greater than that of seeing one's country conquered.

Westminster, 5th Feb. 1808.

IRELAND, AS IT IS.

VINDEX, LETTER III.

SIR,—If there be any case, in which, more than another, it behoves those, who venture to state an opinion, to satisfy their own minds perfectly of the justice of their impression, it is that, wherein their opinion, if adopted and acted upon, would be decisive of the happiness or misery of millions of their fellow creatures. Yet, so indisposed or incapable is the bulk of mankind, to undertake or exercise this important function of intellectual and independent beings, that there is no imposition too gross, no error too flagrant, not to obtain the countenance and support of the ignorant and unreflecting. The facility of being deluded is the prerogative of the vulgar and unlettered; and whilst there are dupes there will be impostors. Even those who are fully competent to form a judgment, are the automatons of habit, influence, or association, unless where their own immediate interests hang upon the result of their decision. Public measures are of wide operation, and comparatively distant consequences; and, unless their effects be locally felt, or faithfully exposed, the generality of the people seldom bestow a thought upon them. This is more particularly the case, when the interests of remote parts only of the empire are at stake, and the existence of habitual prejudices adds to the facility or popular delusion. Weak men with heated imaginations, and wicked men with factious

objects are equally ready to promote their respective purposes, by stimulating the very worst propensities of the unthinking part of the community. No part of the empire has suffered, in this way, so much as Ireland, because no part has been so uniformly traduced, misrepresented, and condemned, either in the whole or in part, by almost all of those, who have undertaken to give to the British public an idea of its actual situation. We have had bigots of all sects, and partisans of all factions, amongst the labourers in this department; but, from the gross misstatements in parliament, down to the unblushing ignorance and effrontery of the wretched pamphlet by Mr. John Bowles, there has not been any statement made to the public, founded upon a comprehensive conception of the real extent of Irish grievances, and the absolute necessity of adequate redress.—In judging of the actual state of Ireland, it would be absurd to apply any standard, by which the circumstances of any other country are usually estimated. Free without the benefits of the constitution, commercial without the possession of capital, and agricultural in spite of every discouragement, the state of that country defies all parallel or competition. To be justly ascertained, it must be estimated as it is, without reference to any other country; and the investigation, that is to lead to any general result, must be conducted with a view to the interests of the people, and not for local, partial, or party purposes. The great and immediate cause of the distresses of Ireland is the want of capital; the intermediate cause, which produces that want of capital, arises from the frequent disturbances, interrupting the public tranquillity, and endangering the individual security of the inhabitants of that country; and the remote or ultimate cause is to be found in the high rents and the extravagant exactions of proprietors, proctors, and middlemen. This is the climax by which we ascend to the true source and origin of Irish calamities. The statement may be unpalatable to the Irish landlords, but it is not the less founded; and no one of them, in or out of parliament, will venture to contradict it. The fact is so well known to every one, in the slightest degree acquainted with that country, that it would require more brass, than Mr. Bowles has proved himself to possess by writing on a subject, of which he is totally ignorant, to deny it. But, I shall proceed to examine the precise manner, in which these causes respectively act, and here we shall find, that, though by a regular analysis of their operation and series, they follow in the order, in which I have placed

them, yet such is the equality of their action and reaction, that they reciprocally produce each other and are produced. The want of capital acts in a variety of ways to depress the people, and retard the prosperity of Ireland. Most of the multiplied sources of employment and industry, which afford support and wealth to the population of other states, are absolutely shut to the people of Ireland for want of sufficient means to prosecute them with success or effect. Only a single manufacture, and that confined to one province, diversifies the labours of the industrious classes. A country possessing every advantage of soil, of climate, and of favourable situation for every purpose of manufactures and commerce, absolutely languishes in a declining state, because it has not the opportunity of developing its natural resources. The commercial jealousy of the English mercantile and manufacturing interests, at the commencement of last century, blasted the manufacturing prospects of Ireland, as if England could suffer by the prosperity of that country. The present century opened with some prospect of the extinction of that narrow spirit of monopoly, which constricted the health of the extremity, as the decay of the trunk. But it is in vain, that new prospects and a more auspicious feeling towards Ireland prevails, the defect of capital cramps its every exertion, and the unfortunate propensity of its gentry to emulate the expenditure of their more affluent neighbours in this country, and their consequent exactions from those, who hold under them, keep the seeds of discontent alive, and close the door against the introduction of British capital. The industry of the people, therefore, is, and must be confined to the operations of husbandry and speculations in land. Labour, like every thing else, which is to be purchased, must be similarly affected by the number and variety of markets, and the nature and extent of the demand for it. When the vent is limited and the sellers numerous out of all proportion, the price must sink, and the competition will be, not who shall gain most, but who shall lose least by the sale. Indispensable necessity obliges the unfortunate man, who brings his labour to market, to dispose of it at whatever it will fetch, because he has scarcely an alternative but irremediable want and starvation. But the measure of his suffering does not end here. The same overflow of the market, that reduces the price of labour, enhances the rent of lands, and extends to the other extreme the sources of popular grievance. Many bidders produce high prices, and avaricious proprietors take advantage of the de-

mand to add to their exactions. To this it may be answered, that the undertaking is voluntary on the part of him, who rents land, and that the proprietor has a right to dispose of his property to the best advantage. But how can that be voluntary, which is the fruit of dire and inevitable necessity? The labourer must come into any terms, or be destitute of the means of subsistence for his family. The landlord unquestionably has a right to dispose of his land on the most advantageous terms, but as unquestionably he is bound in justice to raise the price he pays for labour in the same proportion, that he adds to the amount of rent for his land. Thus between the overcharges of the land proprietors and middlemen, and the under rates of labour, the poor and oppressed peasantry are scarcely able to procure a wretched subsistence, bereft of many of the necessities, and totally destitute of any of the comforts or conveniences of life. It should in this place be observed, that the agricultural labourers are not the sole sufferers from these causes. All the working classes in Ireland, except in the cities and great towns, are cultivators, and consequently severely affected by the extravagant rents demanded for lands. The uncertainty of employment, and the ambition of being independent of the market for sustenance, make them submit to any terms, in order that they might have the means of raising produce for their own consumption. The practice, therefore, is general, when possible, amongst the poorer classes in Ireland, of tilling a certain portion of land for the support of their families. In all the acts of the legislature, for securing the rights of landlords or tenants, and regulating their respective interests and claims, there is no provision whatever to be found, that includes, within its protecting operation, this most numerous and oppressed class of occupants. An abolition or commutation of tythes would not afford relief to them, unless some effectual measures should be taken, to shelter them from the exactions of the land proprietors and middlemen. The tenure, by which they hold, is universally annual, and, if we may judge of the future by the past, there is too much reason to conclude, that, so far as their interests are concerned, the removal of the burthen of tythes would not be attended with any material advantage.—The comparative cheapness of provisions is, in general, an indication of nascent wealth and growing prosperity. In general it is so, but in this particular case it is otherwise. The price of provisions is compounded of the price of the labour, land, and materials, employed in their

production. If the price of those be low, whilst the price of any one or two of these be raised, it must follow, that there is a correspondent reduction in the price of the remaining component part or parts of the price of provisions. Thus, within the last thirty years the rents of lands have been trebled to the farmers, and quadrupled to the peasantry, whilst the price of labour has scarcely advanced one-fourth, and the price of every material necessary to cultivation has been trebled: so that, if the price of provisions has trebled within that period, as it undoubtedly has, it must be obvious, that the farmer is indemnified, for the advance of his rent, by the proportionate advance in the price of his produce, but that the great mass of the people is subjected to treble the burthen as to provisions, and quadruple the oppression as to rents, whilst their means have received only a fractional addition of one fourth, or at most one half, during the last thirty years. This point is susceptible of arithmetical demonstration. If we suppose the price of labour thirty years ago to have been as four, and that the produce of his labour was, at that time, adequate to the maintenance of a peasant's family, we may designate the price of provisions or the rent of lands, at the same period, by the same numerical denominator four. The present price of provisions, of labour, and the rent of lands let to the peasantry will be clearly ascertained, by applying the proportion of their respective augmentation to this common denominator. The result is, that labour, increased one half at most, is now as six, provisions trebled as twelve, and rents quadrupled as sixteen. So that, taking the average of rent and provisions at fourteen, the disproportion, between the labourer's necessary expenditure and his means, is nearly as two and a half to one. Under such circumstances, it would appear impossible for him, to subsist himself and his family by his labour; and the fact would be so, if the possession of a small portion of land, to raise produce for their support, did not enable him to compensate for the low price of his labour, and the extravagant rent of the land, by the intense and incessant exertions, with which he cultivates it, both before and after his daily work. This statement alone will suffice to refute the calumnies, so commonly circulated and believed of the Irish peasantry, that they are idle, indolent, and lazy. When engaged in the business of their landlords, or rather task masters, who are anxious to get as much and pay as little as they can, they unquestionably do not display as much alacrity and effort, as when working for themselves. It is not in

human nature to be reconciled to such an inequality of exaction and consideration. The wretched peasant, therefore, does not feel scrupulous of withholding some portion of his full and competent services, under a firm conviction, that, how low soever he may reduce the amount of his labour, it will still be far more than an equivalent for the remuneration, which he is to receive. It is not the peasant, then, that is lazy, but his employer, that is oppressive; and the reason why the former always is supposed, when the latter ought to be the impression, is, because the characters of both are uniformly taken from the representations of those, who think they have an interest in concealing the real state of the case, because they would otherwise become self-accusers.—The advocates of the abolition of the slave trade constantly argued, that the indolence, imputed to slaves, was a consequence of their unhappy condition. If these very humane gentlemen had given themselves the trouble to examine, but superficially, into the state and circumstances of the Irish peasantry, who are accused of the same inettiness, they would have found room for the exercise of their philanthropy amongst a population, nominally free, but actually subjected to all the miseries of bondage. They would have perceived, that the imputed quality was but a consequence of the reaction of a reasoning principle against outrageous oppression, and they would have been encouraged to engage in the laudable work of redress, by the animating prospect of procuring comfort for so many millions of their fellow-freemen and subjects. In truth and in fact, the condition of the slaves in the West Indies, except in the sentimental consciousness of freedom, is paradise, compared with the situation of the unfortunate peasants of Ireland. For though debarred of the actual enjoyment of that first blessing of man in his civil state, liberty, they possess all the substantial comforts, that can be procured from its exercise, in their sphere. Well clad, well fed, well lodged, and amply provided with every necessary care and attendance, they, unhappy as a condition of slavery must be, are yet exempted from those anxieties and afflictions, which the vicissitudes of seasons and the revolutions of property ordinarily bring upon their owners. Whatever may be the circumstances of the planter, his slaves, as a most valuable part of his property, must be properly attended to. The contrast between their situation and that of the peasants of Ireland, may be amply, though summarily, described, in the negative enumeration of negro comforts and accommodations. Bally, or rather scarcely

clad, ill fed, and worse lodged, dependant upon his own means alone for every necessary to restore health or sustain life, and exposed to all the hardships of a state of slavery without any of the advantages of a state of freedom, the Irish peasant drags on a miserable existence, embittered by intolerable practical burthens, and incapable of alleviation by the communication of any political rights.—What has been stated above renders it scarcely necessary to pursue this subject further; yet it will not be amiss to add another illustration of the amount of the sufferings of the mass of the people of Ireland. The population of that country is now ascertained to be about five millions. Protestant bigots will state it to be less, as Catholic bigots will perhaps represent it greater; but, however it may suit the former to extenuate, or the latter to exaggerate the fact, for the purpose of decrying or enhancing the Catholic claims, public documents and political calculation, prove the population of Ireland to exceed five millions of souls. Upon these grounds therefore, I take its population at five millions; and, as in this inquiry we have nothing to do with sects or factions, I shall, according to my former grand distinction, consider that population as composed of two descriptions of persons, the oppressors, and those, that are oppressed. In the former are included all the land proprietors both absentees and residents, and all the various denominations and classes of popular scourges, the middlemen; in the latter the whole mass of the labouring poor; and I have reason to assume the number of the former at one million, and that of the latter at four. Now, however accident, or good fortune, or unusual means from rare success, may enable some out of this vast number occasionally to vary their regular course of diet, the great staple of their support consists of potatoes. The average consumption of potatoes in a family of six persons amounts to twenty stones in six days, or twelve hundred and twenty stones in the year. The average produce of an acre of land in culture for potatoes is eighty-two barrels of twenty stones each. From these averages of produce and consumption we shall find the consumption of the whole four millions of people to be forty millions and six hundred thousand barrels, and the quantity of land necessary to raise that produce to be about five hundred thousand acres. It will, no doubt, be objected, that some portion of this description of persons consume other kinds of food, and consequently less of that, which is assumed, as the great staple of their support. But, though that fact be admitted, it

can have no material effect upon the result just stated, nor upon that which is to follow. The average rent, paid, for potatoe land, by the labouring poor, is much under-stated at six guineas per acre per annum, and the average rent of their cabins far exceeds two guineas per annum, whilst the average charge for tythes is at least fifteen shillings per acre. The result of these averages, which, I challenge any man of Ireland to question, is that four millions of the Irish nation raise a subsistence, such as it is, and God knows how miserable their fare is, for themselves from five hundred thousand acres of land, for which, and tythes, and the wretched hovels, they in general have to dwell in, they pay by their labour alone to their oppressors of all denominations, the enormous sum of five million two hundred and ninety thousand pounds, Irish currency, annually!!! Let the land proprietors and middlemen, who, in prosecuting their selfish objects, represent themselves as the people of Ireland, reflect upon this statement and invalidate any item of it they can; let them state, if they dare, or shew, if they are able, that the clergy, who are by law entitled to one tenth of the produce of the land, in demanding little more than one tenth of the rent, exacted for that land, are to be considered as the oppressors of the people; let them ask themselves this tremendous question, whether a population so oppressed can be wedded to their privations, or dread a change; and if, after this process, they shall persevere in bringing a case before parliament, let them take care to present themselves in a character free of suspicion, and with such a representation of the real grievances of their country, as may lead to a radical and complete investigation of its actual situation, and terminate in such measures, as the wisdom of parliament may recommend for the comfort, tranquillity, and happiness of the whole nation — I am, Sir, &c.—VINDEK.—*London, Jan. 26, 1808.*

“*PERISH COMMERCE.*”

SIR,—If the subject of commerce be not grown too stale for your Register, (it is a subject, I hope, that will be long interesting to Britons) I beg leave to send you a few observations, upon the new doctrine, promulgated by you and Mr. Spence, ‘that Britain is independent of commerce.’ Amidst your numerous correspondents, I have not seen any who have attacked your principle, although it seems to me to be not very defensible. I come, therefore, if not in due season, in due order, to storm the citadel, after the outworks have been damaged.—Mr.

Spence and you are of opinion, that Britain is independent of commerce, because commerce creates no wealth, or at least none worth noticing; but, Mr. Spence makes a distinction (a very proper one in my opinion) between the wealth, and the prosperity of a nation; and says, that, though a nation may be wealthy without being prosperous, it cannot be prosperous, without, at the same time, growing wealthy: it is, therefore, incumbent upon you and Mr. Spence to shew, not only, that commerce creates no wealth directly, but also that it does not promote the prosperity of the nation, before you can decide that the nation is independent of it. Mr. Spence affirms that *manufactures* create no wealth; but at the same time, he attributes to manufactures the flourishing state of agriculture, whence all wealth, according to him, is derived; for what reason, therefore, he should not have attributed to commerce a stimulus of a similar kind, I am at a loss to guess; since I think, it may be clearly proved, that, both commerce and manufactures act upon agriculture, in the same way, and that commerce affords, at least as much encouragement to agriculture, as manufactures do, because it not only promotes agriculture directly, but also encourages manufactures, which, by Mr. Spence’s acknowledgment, extend agriculture. Thinking, therefore, as I think, that commerce encourages agriculture in both the above ways, directly and indirectly, I cannot say that I am one of those enlightened persons, who feel no joy at a new market being opened to our manufactures; or that I can see any large branch of our commerce cut off, or in consequence of it, a considerable manufacture destroyed, and the manufacturers turned out of employment, without some degree of pain. It seems to me, Sir, that if a new market be opened for our goods, an additional spring is given to our manufactures, or our agriculture; and that, on the contrary, by cutting off any part of our export trade, a check is given to both. But, Mr. Spence makes another distinction, which is between goods of more or less value, and says that commerce obtains for us luxuries in exchange for more valuable commodities. Mr. Spence, himself, Sir, lays it down as an axiom, that the prosperity of a nation consists in expenditure, not in parsimony; and it is evident, that if consumable articles, wine, tea, tobacco, or even Mr. Spence’s new luxury, nitrous oxyd, be imported in exchange for our linen, and our hardware, the export of our manufactured goods may go on increasing, year by year, for ever: and I should think it was equally evident, if we

hoarded up our woollens and our hardware, or exchanged them for Italian marble, or for American bars of gold, that in a short time we should have none of our own goods, or more marble or gold bars, than we should know what to do with, or that they would be of no value, because nobody would buy them. Mr. Spence says, that the land proprietors ought to spend their rents for the good of the nation, that *luxuries* offer, and ought to offer inducements to them to spend these rents; but, that he means *home made luxuries*: now, is it not the same thing, Sir, with respect to encouragement to the manufacturer, whether the rents of the nation be spent in tobacco, and paid from America to our manufacturers for their goods, or whether the money be paid by the landholders for goods immediately to the manufacturers? But, here Mr. Spence and you turn upon me and say, then the commerce is useless, cut it off, or let the landholders buy the goods of the manufacturers: and I agree, that this would answer exactly every purpose, if the landholders could be induced to purchase the manufactures; but, unluckily they are already supplied with as much woollen and hardware as they want: let the manufacturers then, say you, be employed about something that the landholders do want. Now, it lies upon you and Mr. Spence to show what these articles are which the consumers will want, and which the manufacturers can supply: for my own part, I believe, it will be found, that no such articles can be supplied at home to the same extent that commerce can supply them; and, if so, it being necessary, that the land proprietors should spend their rents, that luxuries should offer inducements to them to do so; that the more luxuries are offered, the greater the inducement; that home manufacturers cannot offer so many or great inducements, as manufactures and foreign commerce together can offer, it follows that foreign commerce is necessary to the prosperity of the country; the conclusion is inevitable; and it must not be forgotten that, as Mr. Spence states, ‘for the constantly progressive maintenance of the prosperity of the community, it is absolutely requisite that the class of land proprietors should go on progressively increasing their expenditure.’ It lies therefore, upon you and Mr. Spence to show, how the fortunes of £10,000 and of £20,000 a year in this country, can be spent in home manufactures. —At page 58, Mr. Spence supposes an objection to be started, ‘that although commerce does not increase the wealth of the nation directly, it may do it indirectly;

‘but the direct creation of wealth by commerce is the opinion here controverted,’ says Mr. Spence. But, here, Sir, I should think, that Mr. Spence must have forgotten the title of his book, because Britain is no more independent of commerce, if commerce increase her wealth indirectly, than if it did so directly; and, in order to prove that Britain is independent of commerce, it must be shewn that commerce does neither the one nor the other; or, at least, that Britain can do equally well without it; which, I apprehend has not yet been proved. Mr. Spence says, that it is in consequence of the consumption of so great an amount of foreign commodities in this country, that there is so great a consumption of our manufactures by foreign nations; and, who ever doubted this fact? But if this consumption of our manufactures by foreign nations, in consequence of our consumption of foreign commodities, adds as much to the wealth of the nation by stimulating agriculture, as if that wealth had been created by commerce, where lies the difference, and what does it signify, whence the wealth is derived? If (according to Mr. S.) the land of the country produce £120 millions a year, and a sixth part of the population be employed in producing it, that sixth part of the population will consume 20 millions, and there will remain one hundred millions, one half of which is exported in some shape or other, and the remaining half is expended by the manufacturers for home consumption: on this state of the case, I cannot perceive why the nation is not indebted for its prosperity, as much to the 50 millions exported by commerce, as to the 50 millions consumed by our home manufacturers; and, it appears to me, that the nation is more prosperous, not by 4 or 10 millions at most, as Mr. S. states it, which may be gained by trade (and which, I believe, is not gained at all) but by the whole 50 millions exported in our produce, or manufactures.—But, say you, the nation can do without commerce, because commerce is only an exchange: here the money is, and it may be applied directly to the maintenance of the manufacturers, if the land proprietors chuse it. The manner in which this money is to be so applied is the case in point. Supposing any great check to the export of our manufactures, you do not suppose, that the land proprietors (or rather the home consumers whoever they be) will immediately buy the produce of the manufacture. No; for I remember in one number of your Register, that you suppose the manufacturers to be thrown out of employment, and propose that, they shall be

adduced as a demonstration. “If a coach-maker were to employ so many men for half a year in the building of a coach, as that for their subsistence during that time he had 50 quarters of corn, and if we suppose that he sold this coach to a land proprietor for 60 quarters of corn, it is evident that the coachmaker would be ten quarters of corn richer than if he had sold it for 50 quarters, its original cost. But it is equally clear that the land proprietor would be 10 quarters of corn poorer than if he had bought his coach at the prime cost.” This being the case, the following remark is added. “A transfer then, not a creation of wealth has taken place, whatever one gains the other loses, and the national wealth is just the same.” Mr. Spence, in the passage which I have just quoted, supposes that the master manufacturer derives his profit at the expence of the land proprietor, and that what the former gains the latter loses; but, this I entirely dissent from, and do contend that the latter has sustained no loss in parting with his corn, for he has got an *equivalent* in the coach in exchange for it. I say, Sir, an equivalent, for if the coach can be sold for 60 quarters of wheat, I maintain that it is worth that quantity. An article is worth just as much as it will sell for and no more. What other criterion is there to judge by? Can you, Mr. Cobbett, or can Mr. Spence point out any other? The labour of the workman, and the cost of the materials then amount to 50 quarters of wheat, and the coach is sold for 60 quarters of wheat, then there must obviously be a clear gain of 10 quarters. It was stated by Mr. Spence, that the surplus profit arising from the cultivation of land, is clear gain after the expences attending the cultivation and the maintenance of the cultivator are deducted. Then why is not the surplus produce of the coach equally clear gain. There does not appear to me to be the least difference between the two cases. In the one the value of the corn, horses, cows, sheep, and other articles on the land depends on the price they will sell for. In the other, the value of the coach depends on a similar contingency. I do, therefore, think it is quite clear that the profit which the master manufacturer derives from the manufacture of the coach is clear gain to the nation. And, I think it will presently appear that the wages of the common workman are equally so. Your correspondent Wroe, and my old antagonist (The Game Cock as he modestly called himself in his communication on the dominion of the sea, but who has proved to

be a downright dunghill on this subject, as he termed me in that) has observed that the master and journeyman manufacturers if they had not been employed in building the coach, must notwithstanding have eaten, and would in point of fact, have consumed the same quantity of food. In answer to this, your correspondent says, to have eaten without producing something in return, would have been attended with a *diminution* of the wealth of the country. Now, I think it is clear that to eat upon any event, whether upon the event of producing something in return, or upon any other, will be productive of a diminution of wealth. And, I think it is equally clear, that if the manufacturer must have eaten at all events, and have thereby occasioned a diminution of national wealth, the coach which he produces must be an addition to that wealth. It is to him as manufacturer the public is indebted for the coach, but it is not to him as manufacturer that the public loses the food which he consumes, for he would eat that food whether he were a manufacturer or not. If the diminution of food were owing to the manufacture of the coach, it might be then with reason contended that no accession of wealth was produced by means of the manufacture, not more so than if by entering a shop and taking away 21s. in silver, and leaving 1 guinea in gold in exchange, I should add to the wealth of the shopkeeper. But as the diminution of the food is entirely distinct and independent of the manufacture of the coach, this manufacture must obviously be a source of wealth, as much so as if I take the 21s. from the shopkeeper in taxes, and pay him one guinea as a remuneration for vending in his shop certain articles of my property, this one guinea would be an accession to his wealth. To ascend to a much higher subject, but which I cannot forbear noticing on account of its striking analogy. The ocean loses its waters by evaporation, and is supplied by rivers, now as this evaporation is wholly unconnected with, and not occasioned by the rivers, those rivers are undoubtedly the source of the sea; and so as the consumption of the manufacturers food is not occasioned by the manufacture of the coach, the manufacture of the coach is indisputably a source of wealth to the nation. Those are the observations which have presented themselves to my mind, in opposition to your doctrine that manufactures are not a source of wealth to the nation. I shall at present confine myself to this subject, and will on some future occasion enter into the consideration of, and attempt to answer the exceedingly ob-

jectionable matter which I find in many other parts of Mr. Spence's pamphlet, particularly that which relates to our foreign commerce in both its branches of export and import.—G.—Jan. 23, 1808.

“PERISH COMMERCE.”

SIR,—You observe in your strictures on commerce, that foreign commerce does not produce wealth, and that the manufacturers of Birmingham and Manchester might be better employed in cultivating the land. I am not a merchant, nor am I connected with manufacturers; but I have travelled through some of the mining and manufacturing parts of England, and the following observations have occurred to me. If I am wrong I shall be happy to be corrected by your better judgment.—I believe I am pretty near the truth when I state that as much iron ore, at the mine, as would make a pound of iron, would hardly cost a half-penny, and the coals and lime-stone to flux it perhaps a half-penny more, or thereabouts. The materials therefore to make six pounds of iron we will say cost about six-pence, at the mine. After it has been fluxed, and gone through the process necessary to render it malleable, it is sent to Birmingham; then it is made into steel, and of this steel the ingenious manufacturers of that place make articles of the value of £500 and upwards; I know dress swords have been made there of that value. But for the illustration of my argument, we will take the more moderate sum of £50. This sword, or whatever other article of the value of £50, is exported and sold for that amount in a country producing cotton. With this sum we will assume that 1000lbs. of cotton may be purchased. This cotton is imported into England and carried to Manchester, where, we will say, each pound is manufactured into articles of the value of 10s.; and it will be admitted that it may be fabricated into goods of much greater value. The 1000lbs. of cotton will therefore, when re-exported in a manufactured state, produce £500. With this £500, 10,000lbs. of cotton may be purchased and again imported into England. Now we have 10,000lbs. of cotton, which may be manufactured into a thousand different things for the convenience and comfort of the rich as well as the poor of this country. Is not this real wealth? And more truly so than either gold or silver? And what is it that has produced this wealth? why the labour and ingenuity of our countrymen employed upon sixpence worth of iron ore and coals. What is it that has produced this ingenuity? Is it not commerce, and were commerce to perish

would not this ingenuity perish along with it, and would not the towns of Birmingham, and Manchester, where this ingenuity is exerted to the greatest extent, be deserted and perish also? And how could you employ their inhabitants in any other way so productively as this? We now acquire the productions of the very best lands and the fruits of the labour of other countries by their industry at the forge and loom instead of the scanty crops which their labour would furnish if employed upon the sterile waste lands of England.—In your lucubrations on this subject I perceive that money, as a circulating medium, is excluded, and food substituted, in order, as it is said, to simplify the question. But is this fair? Is not the labour of the Englishmen employed on the iron of England as much the production of our country as the corn raised by the cultivation of the soil? And is not clothing a necessary of life as well as food? Or take it in your way, and call food the only national wealth. Will not hard-ware, will not manufactured cotton, instead of wine and tobacco which no doubt are superfluities, purchase grain in foreign countries? I confess I cannot answer these questions in such a manner as to enable me to accede entirely to the opinion which you have supported with your usual ability; and I therefore propose them not as a disputant, but from a real wish to have my doubts resolved.—I am aware that my story of the sixpenny worth of iron ore and coals, may bear some resemblance to that of the girl and her basket of eggs; but my iron ore is not as perishable an article; and, as I insure my goods, I go upon better grounds than that unlucky personage.—H.—24th Jan. 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

WESTPHALIA.—*King Jerome's Proclamation, dated Cassel, 17th Dec. 1807.*

We Jerome Napoleon, by the grace of God and the Constitution, King of Westphalia, French Prince, &c. &c. to our good and faithful subjects, and inhabitants of our kingdom of Westphalia, greeting:—Westphalians, Divine Providence has pointed this æra in order to re-unite your scattered provinces under one august institution, together with neighbouring families though strangers to each other.—I come to occupy this throne, prepared by victory, raised by the assent of the greatest powers of Europe, founded on a title no less sacred, by your real interest. —Too long has your country suffered from the pretensions of families and the intrigues of cabinets: you were exposed to all the

calamities of wars, and your were excluded from all the benefits of peace. Some of your towns only reaped the barren honour of annexing their names to treaties, in which nothing was overlooked but the well-being of the people who inhabited them.—How widely different are the results of the wars stirred up against the august head of my house! It is for nations that Napoleon has conquered; and each of the treaties he has concluded, is a step farther towards the end proposed by his mighty genius, of giving to entire nations a political existence, government and laws dictated by wisdom, the establishment to each of them of a country, and the direction hereafter of none in that deplorable nullity, in which they were equally unable either to steer clear of war, and avail themselves of peace.—Westphalians!—Such was the issue of the battles of Marengo, of Austerlitz, of Jena; such now is for you the result of the memorable treaty of Tilsit. On that day you obtained the first of blessings, a country. Far be now removed from your recollection these scattered dominations, the last result of the feudal system, which prepared a master for each city; these different interests are now to form but one; your master now is the law; your protector, the monarch, who is to cause it to be respected: henceforth you shall have no other.—Westphalians, you have got a constitution adapted to your manners and to your interests: it is the fruit of the meditations of a great man, and of the experience of a great nation: its principles are in unison with the present state of the civilization of Europe, and are big with prospects of improvement, which will far overbalance the sacrifices which this new order of things may impose upon some of you. You must, therefore, attach yourselves to it with confidence, since upon it rests your liberty and your prosperity.—In ascending the throne, I contracted the obligation of making you happy, and I will be faithful to it. The equality of the modes of religion shall be maintained, property assured and guaranteed. Thus shall there be established between me and my people an alliance of wishes and of interests, that shall never change. Westphalians, your sovereign henceforward relies on your fidelity and inviolable attachment.

BRAZIL TRADE.—*Circular Letter from the Portuguese Ambassador to the Governor of the Island of St. Catherine, and Condi-*

tions of exporting goods to St. Catherine, until the pleasure of the Prince Regent be known.—London, bearing date the 6th of January, 1808.

Agreeably to the letter which I had the honour of addressing you, under date of the 4th January of the present year, and in which I explained at large to your excellency the motives which induced me to sanction the sending out of British merchantmen to the island of St. Catherine, provided that their cargoes consist of articles hitherto received into the custom house of Portugal, I have now to request that you will be pleased to order that the ship——should be admitted into the custom house of that island, the captain or master of which, (who is the bearer of this letter), you will permit to unload and sell his cargo, and give directions that no more duties shall be required of her, than were paid in Portugal for the same articles; and also that those duties should not be demanded until he has sold and dispatched his cargo, in every particular conforming to the practice of the custom house at Lisbon.—And as it may possibly happen that your excellency may not yet find yourself authorised to consent to the sale of such cargoes, I earnestly request you that at all events you will be pleased to allow that they should be landed and properly warehoused, and that you will order that the ships should moor in that port, waiting there with their crews, without molestation, until your excellency shall receive the instructions and orders of his Royal-Highness the Prince Regent on this head.—Your excellency will observe, that the bearer of this letter ought also to present you with the manifest of the cargo, confirmed by me, and the licence of the British privy council; to fulfil the conditions of which, your excellency will be pleased to order the officers of the customs to deliver to the bearer a certificate of the regular discharge of the articles specified in such manifest.

Conditions.—1st. That all merchants wishing to make adventures to the Brazils without waiting for the regulations of his royal highness, should be obliged to take a licence from the privy council, which will point out the port that will be agreed on by his excellency Mr. Canning and me, and to which alone they must give bond to go.—2dly. That every master, and every shipper, will give the usual bonds at this custom house for the due delivery at the custom house of the said port.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIII. No. 7.] LONDON, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1808. [PRICE 10D.

"The waste of War is not, in its final consequences, so injurious to a state, as the luxuries and corruptions of Peace."—ADDISON.

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TO
WILLIAM ROSCOE, Esq.
LETTER I.

SIR,

Your pamphlet, published within these few days, under the title of "Considerations on the Causes, Objects, and Consequences of the present War, and on the Expediency, or the Danger, of a Peace with France," having fallen into my hands, and appearing to me to express sentiments and opinions, which, if generally adopted, would be greatly mischievous to the country, I think it my duty to make some observations thereon; and, as you have evidently pointed at me, in several parts of the pamphlet, no apology will, I presume, be thought necessary for my addressing myself, in this case, more immediately to you.

When one is told of the publication of a book, or paper, the first question which invariably presents itself is: "What is it about?" Your pamphlet is, to be sure, about war and peace; but, Sir, it is about so many other things as well as war and peace; it enters upon so many different subjects; it contains so many opinions unsupported by reasoning, and so many assertions unsupported by proof, that, to answer you upon every point would require a volume of no moderate size. If I were asked, however, what appears to me to be the object, which you have had in view, in writing and publishing this pamphlet, I should answer, that your main practical object evidently is, to induce the people, especially those of the manufacturing districts, to unite in petitions for peace; and, that your reason for this is, that the war, if continued much longer, will produce financial embarrassments, such as those which led to the overthrow of the monarchy of France, while, on the other hand, there exists, in reality, none of those dangers, which I, amongst other persons, apprehend from a peace, made at this time, and leaving Napoleon in full possession of all the ports and naval arsenals of the continent of Europe.

If you had confined yourself to this one subject, to have answered you would have been plain, straight-forward work; but, un-

der the pretence of showing, that the war has now no rational object, you have gone into a history (a very partial one indeed) of the alledged objects of both the last and the present war, not only at their outset, but also at the several stages of their progress. Not content with this, which has nothing at all to do with the question of peace or war now; you have given us a history of the warlike operations, interspersed with discussions upon points of public law and of political economy; with descriptions of the characters of public men; and with a delineation of the views and motives of political parties. To follow you through all these topics, a sentence of statement demanding, in general, a page of answer, is a task too serious to be thought of; and yet it is, on the other hand, by no means pleasant to suffer any part of your pamphlet, from the sentiments or assertions of which I dissent, to pass off under a silence, which might very reasonably be interpreted into assent. In this dilemma the course, which appears to me the best to be pursued is this: to reserve, for a future letter, all the digressive topics of your pamphlet, and to examine now into the nature of your statements and opinions, I. With respect to the real original cause of the present war between England and France: II. With respect to the breaking off of the negotiation in 1806, and the views then manifested by Napoleon: III. With respect to the relative situation of the two countries, supposing peace to be now made, leaving all the ports and naval arsenals upon the continent of Europe in the hands, or under the acknowledged controul, of our enemy.

But, first of all, I think it necessary to state to you my reasons for differing very widely indeed from you, as to the tendency of war in general, which I perceive you to consider as a pure, unmixed evil; and which I consider as being, not only necessary, as it notoriously is, in many cases, in the present state of the world, but also as conducive to the elevation of human nature, to the general happiness of mankind, and, of course, as being a good, though, like the greater part of other good things, not unmixed with evil. I am aware of the force of habit, and men are

in the habit of talking, as you do, of the "horrors of war;" but, I can safely defy you, and all the "philanthropists" now in existence, to prove, that there is, as the consequence of war, any thing a millionth part so horrid as a sight of the interior of those receptacles of disease and of infamy, which are tenanted through the influence of that luxury, which it is the natural tendency of war to abridge, and which can be completely destroyed only by war. That war makes a part of the great scheme of the Creator is abundantly obvious from the universal propensity of his creatures; who, from man himself down to the lowest reptile, discover, the moment they have the powers of motion and perception, that to war makes a part of their nature as much as to love. Look, Sir, at all the natural sports of children, and of young animals of every kind; you will find, that they are only so many sorts of sham-fights. And, if you see, that all God's creatures, in the moments of their greatest enjoyment of life; in those moments when they are free from all pain of mind and of body; when they are full of health and of spirits; when they are perfectly unrestrained, and bidden, as it were, to be as happy as their natures will permit: if you perceive, that, in such a state, they all, without a single exception, discover a propensity for war, will you still say, that war is, in itself, and for its own sake, a thing horrid to contemplate? But, not only is to war, to fight (which is the same thing) a passion natural to all the creation; but, it appears to me to be necessary to the elevation of human nature, and to the happiness of mankind; for, if we suppose a state of the world, from which war is completely and for ever banished, not only is there no longer any use for courage, fortitude, emulation, magnanimity, and many other ennobling qualities, but the very words describing those qualities have no longer any meaning; and, if you strip man of those qualities, what is he, as to this world at least, better than a brute? In giving to the different classes of men, which compose the different nations of the earth, languages so different, that the sounds used by the one are utterly unintelligible to any of the other, the Creator seems to have said, "be you for ever separate;" and, herein is implied the necessity of war; for, without war it is, I think, evident, that to preserve that separation would, unless the nature of man were previously changed, be quite impossible. As to wisdom and science, too, where would be the use of them, if war were banished from the earth? The object of the learned as well as the brave is *distinction*.

The source of distinction is public utility. Public utility, after a very little tracing, is found to rest at the point of public safety; and were it not for the occasional existence of wars, and for the continual possibility of their recurrence, public safety would be a mere sound without sense. In like manner patriotism, loyalty, fidelity under all its different appearances and in all its different degrees, would be obliterated from the catalogue of virtues; and, in short, man would, and must, become a stupid, unimpassioned animal, having no care but that of obtaining his food, and no enjoyment but that of devouring it. I am not, observe, contending, that war, may not, as well as love, be, in some cases, and even in many cases, productive of mischievous effects; but, if I look back into history, or, if I look around me at the present moment, I am compelled to conclude, that its effects are, in general, the reverse. The Greeks and Romans were renowned for their science and their freedom, but not less renowned for those than for their wars; and, which is well worthy of remark, with their martial spirit they lost their love of liberty. The two nations of modern Europe the most famed for science, and, in fact, for freedom, are France and England; and that they have been the most frequently engaged in wars is a fact too notorious to be stated. China offers us an example of a nation living in perpetual peace; and, I believe you will not deny, that, as compared with an European, a Chinese is hardly worthy of the name of man. Nearly the same may be said of all the inhabitants of Asia; whereunto may be added, that the internal government of those unwarlike states and empires is uniformly a pure despotism, the life of every subject being at the mere mercy of the prince, whose very pleasures do not infrequently consist of what we should call acts of deliberate murder, attended with a refinement in cruelty. You, Sir, make a pathetic appeal to your readers upon the horrors of war. "Were we," say you, "to divest ourselves for a moment of that irritation of mind and inflexibility of heart, which blinds us to all the evils and horrors of war, it would be impossible that we should not acknowledge the calamities it introduces, and feel a most sincere disposition to terminate them. If we turn our eyes to the continent of Europe, what devastation and slaughter has it occasioned, from the confines of Russia to the Southern extremity of Italy. If we look to Egypt or South America, we still find the same cause for sorrow and regret. At no period of society have the

“ contests of the field been more obstinate, or attended with such a profuse destruction of human life. To the sufferings and the death of the thousands who have fallen, we are to add the misery and the ruin of the tens of thousands that survive them, who have to lament the death of their relatives, their protectors, and their friends: and who, amidst grief and hunger and wretchedness, pour forth their curses on the unsparing sword of war, and on those who call it into action.” The principle, upon which you here proceed applies to *all* wars, under whatever circumstances; for, it is because human misery and a destruction of human life have been produced by the war, in which we are now engaged, that, according to your doctrine, we ought to feel a sincere disposition to terminate that war. But, Sir, though war is certainly the immediate cause of the death of many persons, it does not follow, that it is, for that reason alone, to be held in such abhorrence, seeing, that first or last, all those persons must meet with death in some shape or other. As to the wretchedness produced by war, you will find it very difficult, I believe, to show, by the use of dispassionate reason, that there is much want which arises, or which can arise, to any persons remaining at home, from the death of other persons, who are killed in war, it being pretty evident, I think, that of those who are personally engaged in war, very few indeed have been, previous to their being so engaged, the protectors of their kindred and friends. That war does, in no very sensible degree, tend to enhance the dearth of provisions has been amply proved by reasoning as well as by experience; and, though, in some countries, the suddenly withdrawing of a great number of hands from the field may have the effect of causing a scarcity of grain; yet, in this country, no such effect is to be apprehended; because, if a youth be taken, by war, from the plough to day, another, who was just quitting the plough for the side-board, takes his place to-morrow, and that, too, from causes arising out of the war. A thousand men are called from the plough, by the war, to garrison the forts at Portsmouth; a thousand others supply their place, coming, through various channels, from the manufactories, which have been destroyed by the war. The same quantity of food is raised; the same number of persons are fed; but, as the same quantity of manufactures are not exported or made, there is a diminution in the importation and creation of luxuries, and a diminution also in the vices which invariably accompany the enjoyment of those

luxuries. This is one of the general effects of war; and, hence it is, that war, in some cases, operates to the good of nations. Hence it is, that the comparatively barren lands of England are covered with rich crops, while the rich lands of Italy scarcely afforded bread to its enervated inhabitants. The state of England and France, compared with that of Germany and Italy, is a quite sufficient proof, that the general and permanent effect of war is not to destroy, or even to check, the prosperity of nations; while the history of Holland pretty clearly evinces, that the moment a nation ceases to be warlike, that moment she commences her decline, and has already made some degree of progress on her way to subjugation.

But, Sir, notwithstanding what has here been said, I am not, as you seem to insinuate, and as the *Morning Chronicle* scruples not to assert, so much in love with war as to think it a pity that there ever should be a cessation of hostilities. To speak of war as being, in all possible cases, a good, would be as absurd, as it is to speak of it as an evil, in all possible cases. I wished to enter upon the discussion with you, relative to the expediency of a peace, at this time, with France, without having against me, from the beginning to the end, the weight of that prejudice, which you have so carefully cherished, that war is, in itself a pure, unmixed evil; a thing, in all cases, to be held in abhorrence, and, of course, to be, at all times, gotten rid of as soon as possible, without much, or, perhaps, any, consideration as to the terms. And, if I have been so fortunate as to remove this prejudice from the minds of my readers, I have not much apprehension as to their decision upon the points to be discussed.

I *With respect to the real original cause of the present war between England and France*, you allow, Sir, that there were certain “impediments” relating to the evacuation of Holland by the French troops, and of the island of Malta by the English; but, that the chief cause of the war, was, the writings and publications of certain “unprincipled” individuals in England, who found an interest in the revival of the war. You complain of the conduct of the French emigrants, in this respect, and then you tell us, that “another, and still more formidable party” [of these enemies to peace] “consisted of the innumerable bands of journalists and hireling writers, who feed upon the credulity and fatten upon the calamities of a nation; men who flourish most in the midst of tumult; to whom the disasters of the country are as valued

"ble as her triumphs, a destructive battle as
 "a rich harvest, and a new war as a free-
 "hold estate. Their reiterated clamours," you tell us, "appeared like the
 "public voice. Scarcely were the preliminaries of the treaty concluded, *than*" [an odd sort of English, this] "new grounds of
 "war were discovered. By these
 "means the combustibles were prepared for
 "a new explosion." And this, Sir, is, in another part of your pamphlet, what you call
 "having shown that the present war was instigated by a few interested and unprincipled individuals." This representation of yours, Sir, is not true; and, as you have, from your frequent quoting of them, proved that you have read the several official dispatches, connected with the rupture, in 1803, you must have known, that it was not true. In no one of these papers is there contained any complaint against the English press, previous to the signing of the definitive treaty; it is notorious, that, at the time of signing the definitive treaty, and for several months afterwards, all those hirelings, of whom you speak, were engaged in praising the then first Consul and his government; and, when, in the month of July, 1802, Mr. Otto, made his complaint to Lord Hawkesbury, the only presses he complained of by name were, that of *Peltier*, the *Courier de Londres*, and of *Cobbett*. He did, indeed, add, "and others like them;" but those others it would have been very difficult for him to have pointed out*. As, therefore, Mr. Peltier and the *Courier de Londres*, belong to your class of foreigners, who sighed without ceasing for the return of feudal vassalage (not so degrading, by the bye, as the vassalage of our manufactories), you leave to me, of course, the undivided honour of having instigated the war, and of being an "interested and unprincipled individual," a "hireling who fattens upon the calamities of the nation." But, Sir, again I say, that your representation is not true, and that, as you had evidently read the official papers, you must, at the time when you wrote it, have known it not to be true. This will appear from the whole tenor of the papers, but particularly from General Andreossy's letter to Lord Hawkesbury, of 8. Germinal, year 11, that is to say, in the month of March, 1803, in which letter he says: "A few days after the ratification of peace, one of his Britannic Majesty's ministers declared that the peace establishment must be considerable; and, the distrust excited by this de-

claration, made in parliament, with as much bitterness as impropriety, furnished a commentary for the exaggeration and alarms which were circulated in depicable pamphlets, and in newspapers as contemptible as those libels. Since that time these writers have found themselves invariably supported in their insolent observations by particular phrases taken from the speeches of leading members of parliament. *These speeches*, scarcely to be exceeded by the news-writers themselves, have, for these eighteen months, tended to encourage insult against other governments, to that degree, that every European must be offended, and every reasonable Englishman must be humiliated, by such unheard-of licentiousness."† In a subsequent part of the same letter Andreossy tells Lord Hawkesbury, that the wish of the First Consul is, that measures should be adopted in both countries to prevent any mention being made of what was passing in the other; and this prevention he wished to be extended to the "official discussions" as well as to the "polemical writings;" that is to say, to the *parliament* as well as to the *press*. Is it true, then, Sir, as you have represented, that the complaint of France was made against wretched "hirelings" only; that it was a few "interested and unprincipled individuals" who blew up the flame of war? Or is your representation false? Here, in the letter of Andreossy, is a complaint made of the language of the ministry, of the opposition in parliament, of pamphleteers and of newspaper editors. Were all these "interested and unprincipled" individuals, who "fattened upon the calamities of the nation?" It is evident, not only from this letter of Andreossy, but from the generally pervading tone of the correspondence, that Buonaparté aimed at silencing, not only the press, but the parliament, as far as related to him and his actions; and that, first or last, nothing short of this would have satisfied him. You, indeed, appear to think, that there would be very little harm in the success of an effort of this kind. "To fore-
 "reign states," you tell us, "that which a country does, or which it permits to be done by its subjects is the same. With our internal regulations they can have no concern; but, they have a right to expect from us that respect for *their institutions*, which we claim for our own." Well, Sir,

† See the letter of Andreossy, Register Vol. III. p. 1055. The whole of the papers are collected in the volume, and at the place, here referred to.

* See Mr. Otto's letter, Register, Vol. III. page 1002.

and what is this respect, which we claim for our institutions? Can you cite an instance, wherein complaint has been made by England of a libel upon her institutions? How many thousands of times has the king of England been loaded, in the American papers, with every epithet and name expressive of what is hateful and wicked; how many thousands of times have all our institutions been treated in the same manner; how many thousands of times have we been called slaves, beasts of burden, journeymen thieves, and all this because we did not rise and overturn our institutions. Yet, have you never heard, I believe, Sir, that our minister in America made, at any time, a complaint upon this score. You can find no "claim," of this sort, that we have ever made; and, whether in a manner "unprincipled," or not, you have evidently invented such a claim, on our part, for the purpose of defending, or of giving the air of reasonableness and fairness to, the claim of Buonaparté, which claim, you leave your readers to conclude, ought to have been granted, in order to prevent the renewal of the war; but, I think, it will not be difficult to convince those readers, that the man who would have granted this claim, would have found no claim too great to be granted. If we are to "respect the institutions" of foreign nations, we are to respect one as well as the other; and, why should we not, then, "respect" the Inquisition in Spain? Volumes have been written by us against that "institution;" and, if we ought to be permitted to write freely upon that subject, why were we to hold our tongues as to the institutions of Buonaparté, one of which was the celebrated "Cayenne Diligence?" Why, Sir, pray tell us why, we ought not to be permitted to speak of the latter "institution" as well as of the former? About the time, to which we are referring, Buonaparté, by a sham election, made himself Consul for Life, in direct violation of what was then called "the constitution of France." This must have been a severe mortification to you, and others, whose wisdom had, in 1790, perceived the day-star of liberty advancing "o'er the vine-cover'd hills and gay regions of France;" and, out of compassion for you, we might have disguised the fact, if that had been possible; but it was impossible, and, therefore, we did laugh most heartily at the post-like senate and legislative corps. All the world laughed as well as we, "the only difference was, we dared laugh out;" and, when we were told, that this military despotism, the establishment of which could now be no longer disguised, had been caused

by the Duke of Brunswick's proclamation, issued in 1793; when we were told, as you now tell us, that it was from indignation at the attempts to conquer and enslave her, that France became warlike and became herself a conqueror; and that, having, through the courage and exertions inspired by a love of liberty, got rid of, or subdued, all her enemies, she, from the *same cause*, became herself the slave of a single military despot, who kept a Cayenne Diligence continually upon the trot; when we were gravely told this, we laughed still more; and, it was this that you would have prevented by the cutting of our ears off, or the splitting of our noses. If your doctrine be adopted, how shall we dare to write at all respecting foreign nations? Who will dare to say, that the government of France, or Spain, or Russia, or Turkey, is not as good as the government of England? Who will dare to describe the character of foreign princes or ministers? Who will dare to write history? Who will dare to write a book of travels? Who will dare, upon subjects connected with foreign princes, or states, to move his pen, or to open his lips? "In war time we may abuse them as much as we please." But, not to dwell upon the baseness of this, upon the total want of principle which it develops, when the war ceases, the newly-invented public law of libel begins again to operate; so that the identical paper or book, which was a lawful publication but yesterday, may, to-day, if a copy of it be sold (every sale being a fresh publication), subject both the author and the publisher to the loss of their ears and to confinement in jail at the discretion of the judge. After broaching a doctrine like this, it is with singular propriety, that you observe, in the true attorney-general-like style, that "to inroach upon the freedom of the press, will never be the act of any *real friend to the interests of mankind*; but, "to *restrain its licentiousness* is not to enroach upon, but to preserve that freedom." These are almost the very words of Mr. Blackstone, who, soon after he had put them into print, became a judge. This very form of words was used in the case of Mr. Heriot, who was prosecuted by that famous Whig, and "friend to the interests of mankind," Lord St. Vincent, for having published an alledged falshood relative to his conduct, as Lord of the Admiralty; and, who, in order, I suppose, to prove to all the world as clear as daylight, that the thing asserted by him was false, was brought to trial by a form of process which prevented him from producing any evidence to prove that it was true. Nevertheless, Mr. Heriot

was sent to jail for a good six months, in order to "restrain the licentiousness of the press, and thereby to preserve its freedom." I wonder, Sir, that you, who have made some noise with your talk about liberty, do not feel a little bashful at repeating, as your own, these words of Mr. Blackstone; that you are not ashamed to applaud a form of prosecution, which prohibits the person prosecuted from pleading, in his defence, the truth of the words, to have uttered which is imputed to him as a crime. I wonder you are not ashamed of this; you, who so inordinately rejoiced at the French revolution, as the dawn of liberty upon the continent of Europe; you, who have always belonged to that party, whose claim to public favour was founded solely upon their attachment to the cause of freedom, and whose constant cry, *until they were in office*, was "the liberty of the press." But, this inconsistency does really appear to me, to have arisen, in you, at least, out of an attachment to France generally, and to her ruler in particular. For his sake it is, that you would extend the operation of the law of libel to publications relating to foreign princes and states; for, though you speak of "foreign states," in the plural number, it is quite evident, that your eye is fixed on France alone; and, however angry it may make you, I cannot help expressing my opinion, that the care which you have taken to disguise the fact, that the *speeches in parliament* were complained of by Buonaparté not less than the pamphlets and newspapers, and that the infinite pains you have bestowed in order to produce a belief, that the war had no other efficient cause than the publications of "a few interested and unprincipled individuals," ought to be considered as a strong presumptive proof of your entertaining an unnatural partiality for the enemy, whose cause you have pleaded in the true spirit of a professed advocate.—But, Sir, it is not true, that the publications in England, or that the speeches in parliament, were the original cause of the present war. Mr. Andreossy says, when speaking of the publications in the *Moniteur* (which, observe, were acknowledgedly the act of the government of France,) "they are of an order too secondary to be capable of influencing such a decision" [that of war]. "Are we, then, to return to the age of tournaments? Motives of this nature might have authorized, four centuries ago, the combat of thirties; but, they cannot, in this age, be a reason for war between the two countries." He says, in another part of his letter, after enumerating

all the complaints about the language of the parliament and the press, that the first Consul "did not, on that account entertain a doubt of the continuance of peace." Now, Sir, either Mr. Andreossy, who was charged to express to us the sentiments of the first Consul, must have been wrong, must, in fact, have said what was false; or you must now be wrong. One or the other you must acknowledge, unless, which is not very improbable, you should choose to say, that Buonaparté, upon whose sincerity, on all other occasions, you have an unbounded reliance, did, in this one little instance, play the hypocrite.—I, for my part, scruple not to say, that the attempts of Buonaparté to restrain the liberty of speech and of the press would have been, if not speedily atoned for, a sufficient ground of war; but, our poor tame ministers of that day were very far indeed from demanding satisfaction for so gross an affront upon the country. Nay, they not only suffered him to make his attempts, but flattered him with success, and actually began, in the person of Mr. Peltier, to offer up sacrifices to his arrogance. You, Sir, seem to regret, that they were not more expeditious, and that the war came to rob Buonaparté of a victim. But, without a new law for the purpose, they could not proceed quicker; and, it is hardly to be supposed, that he had not some friend in this country to inform Mr. Andreossy, that, as matters stood just then, unfurnished as we were with a Cayenne Diligence, the good Addington ministry were doing all that lay in their power to accommodate things to his liking. In short, the press was fast falling under the clutches of Buonaparté, and, though you seem to have forgotten it, the members of parliament had received a hint, "that, if such reproachful language, with respect to the head of the French government, were indulged in, it would be impossible to maintain the relationships of peace and amity." So that, if any thing short of the Cayenne Diligence would have satisfied him, he was in a fair way of being perfectly satisfied.—It was not the press, then, that was the cause of the war. There were several other causes, though you, Sir, have thought proper, to keep them wholly out of sight. You speak of the "impediments" to the evacuation of Holland and of Malta, as if those impediments were the whole that had occurred, as matter of difference, between the peace of Amiens and the breaking out of the war. Is it possible, that you can have overlooked the famous proceeding, called "the German Indemnities," in which

France assumed to herself the right of dividing and parceling out the territory and the revenues of the several states of Germany? Is it, indeed, a fact, that you have forgotten, that one of her first acts in peace was to make Savoy, which was to remain independent of France, a department of France? Can you, such an ardent admirer of liberty, have forgotten, that another act of peace, on the part of Buonaparté, was to send an army to invade Switzerland, to place one of his own creatures at the head of the government there, and to make that country, as to all practical purposes, another department of France? Sebastiani's mission and report you have noticed; but, you have done it, merely for the purpose of shewing, that we, too, could complain of foul language, when directed against ourselves, totally omitting, however, to draw the distinction between publications, in pamphlets and news-papers, by unauthorised individuals, and a report made by an accredited agent of the government, made to the government by that agent, and published by that government, under its own name, having, from these circumstances, just the same character and weight as if it had been a note, delivered by the French Ambassador to Lord Hawkesbury. This you have omitted to do; and, you have, too, whether from want of principle, or not, I shall leave the reader to judge, omitted to state, that the publication which gave most offence to Buonaparté, was that of Sir Robert Wilson, whom, though you may, perhaps, include him amongst those "hirelings, who fatten upon the calamities of the nation," you have not, amidst all your avowed contempt for unmanliness, ventured to name, though there was, it appears to me, much more necessity for naming him, than for naming Mr. Peltier. But, it was not on account of the abusive language of Sebastiani's report, that it was made, by us, a subject of complaint. That report disclosed, in the usual way of the French, the views which they meant to act upon, with respect to Egypt. It discovered the intentions of Buonaparté with regard to those territories of the Turks; and, added to the other considerations of the time, was one principal cause of the renewal of the war. You appear, Sir, to have quite forgotten, too, the dispute relative to Mr. Talleyrand's "*commercial commissaries*," coming from a country, with which we had no commercial connection, and furnished with maps, charts, and mathematical instruments, instead of laws of shipping and tables of custom house duties. You forget, that, in Mr.

Talleyrand's instructions to these curious envoys, one was to ascertain the soundings of the port in which they were stationed and the bearings of the land from the place of entrance; that another was, to come at the extent of the population near the coast; another, to take an account of the naval and military force, and to sound the disposition of the people. You forget, that several of these agents were destined for the ports of Ireland, where one of them, if I am not in mistake, had actually arrived, and had begun his "*commercial*" inquiries, when the whole of them were ordered to decamp. All these things you have forgotten: no, you have not forgotten any one of them; for you have shewn us, that you have recently read the dispatches, and, having read them, it is impossible, that you should not have been reminded of all the causes of war, which I have here enumerated. These causes co-operated in producing the war. There was nothing so near the hearts of the then ministers as the preservation of peace, upon almost any terms. If the silencing of the small part of the press (for it was a mere trifle) which held a warlike language, had been all that was necessary, they would very soon have accomplished that, and would have been applauded for the act by three fourths of the parliament, by ninety nine hundredths of the press, and by a like proportion of the people, in their then disposition to sink quietly beneath the domineering spirit of France. But, the ministers, though willing to go almost any length in the way of concession and humiliation, saw that all concession and humiliation would finally fail; and, day after day admonished them, that time was only adding to the weight of their responsibility. They saw Buonaparté making bolder strides of conquest in peace than he had made in war; they could look in no direction without seeing marks of his restless ambition; and, they justly dreaded, that, taking advantage of some favourable moment, he would, in the midst of peace, accomplish, or, at least, attempt, some act of open hostility against England or Ireland. It was in this state of mind, that they resolved upon war; and though Malta stood in the fore-ground, there was a combination of causes, which really produced the event; a combination not very easy to be described, and, therefore, Mr. Addington, cutting the matter short, emphatically answered those who inquired into the causes of the war: "*We are at war, because we cannot be at peace.*" And yet, Sir, you, by the means of garbled statements and forced constructions, taking advantage of the

want of that information which must generally prevail upon such subjects, would fain make the people believe, that Buonaparté was sincerely disposed to preserve the peace, and to desist from all encroachments; and that the sole cause of the war, in which we are now engaged, arose not from any opinion entertained by our ministers that it was necessary to our safety, but merely from the irritation produced by the "unjust and offensive aspersions against the ruler of France," written and published by "venal demagogues," by "mercenary scribblers," by "a few interested and unprincipled individuals, who fatten upon the calamities of the nation;" than which attempt to impose upon the unwary and to excite discontent in the distressed, I am inclined to believe that few readers will be able to form an idea of any thing more completely unprincipled, especially when they come hereafter to compare your present exertions with that profound silence, which, while in parliament, you observed, upon the subject of the negotiation of 1806.

II. Before I speak of the *Negotiation of 1806 and of the views then manifested by Napoleon*, I cannot help making a remark or two upon the manner, in which you introduce that part of your subject, reserving, however, the pretty story about Mr. Fox and the assassin for a letter of lighter matter. "The reins of government," upon the death of Mr. Pitt, you say, "fell from the hands of his panic-stricken colleagues in office. A change in the administration of the country took place, and the union of Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox with that of their friends, encouraged the hope, not only of a speedy termination of hostilities, but of that steady and gradual amelioration in our domestic concerns, which, without alarming the fears of the weak, might satisfy the reasonable expectations of the country." Now, Sir, it appears to me, that if your wisdom had, upon this occasion, been equal to your zeal, you would not have said a word about the reins falling from the hands of the panic-stricken colleagues of Mr. Pitt; seeing that those very men have, and that, too, in a moment of the war still more calamitous than that in which they quitted office, grasped the reins of government, and, hoisting the Duke of Portland to the head of the ministry, have not only defeated their political opponents, but have adopted measures, which have made the enemy, though now become the conqueror of all the continent of Europe, lower his tone with respect to England.—You tell us, Sir, that the change

which took place, at the time referred to; that the union of Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox with that of their friends, encouraged the hope of a speedy termination of hostilities; but, you do not give us any reason, or produce any indication of public feeling, upon which this assertion is founded. Difficult indeed would it be for you to do either. The new ministry was composed of Mr. Fox and three others, who had approved of the peace of Amiens, besides Mr. Addington and Lord Ellenborough, who were in office when that peace was made; but, in this same ministry were Lord Grenville, who was at the head of the whole, Mr. Windham who was at the head of the war department, and, in one post, or another, every lord and every commoner, with, I believe, the sole exception of Lord Folkestone, who had voted against the peace of Amiens, your delightful peace of Amiens, the non-preservation of which you so pathetically lament. Nay, sir, in this ministry were, without exception, all those noblemen and gentlemen, whose speeches in parliament had given so much offence to Buonaparté, previous to the commencement of the war; and who, moreover, had, from time to time, taken special care to convince the nation, that their opinion of his character and views had undergone no material change. Pray tell us, then, sir, how their elevation to power (of which, observe, they were at the very head) could, in any sane mind, "encourage the hope of a speedy termination of hostilities." Yet, when you come afterwards to speak of the termination of the war between France and Russia, and of the second change in the ministry, which had taken place in the interim, you again advert to this disposition in the late ministry, and that, too, for purposes so evidently of a factious nature as not to leave them the possibility of their being misunderstood. "In the mean time," say you, "a change had taken place in the British ministry, founded on one of the most extraordinary popular delusions ever practised on the credulity of a nation. As the new ministers consisted chiefly of those, who had supported, with undeviating pertinacity, the war system, it was not to be expected, that any change of measures, favourable to a pacification, was likely to take place." Then you proceed to speak of the offer of Russian mediation, and to ascribe its rejection to this pertinacious love of war, in the present ministers. This is a point of great importance with you; it is the foundation work of the false notions, which your pamphlet is calculated to inculcate; and

therefore, it is necessary to remove it. The persons, now alive, who had most pertinaciously supported the “war system,” were Lord Grenville, late first lord of the treasury, Mr. Windham, late secretary of state for the war department, Mr. Grenville, late first lord of the admiralty, Lord Fitzwilliam, late president of the council, Lord Spencer, late secretary of state for the home department. Here were five cabinet ministers, all of whom had voted against the peace of Amiens; all of whom had undeviatingly contended, that no peace with Buonaparte, under circumstances, such as existed at the time when that treaty was made, could be safe; all of whom had contended, that, merely as a trial against time, the chances of war were better than the chances of peace. Now, look at the present cabinet, and you will find, sir, that there are some who were in office when the peace of Amiens was made; that almost the whole of them, not then in office, spoke in favour of that peace; and that there is not amongst them, nor, I believe, in any of the subaltern post of the ministry, one single man, who either spoke or voted against that peace. I do not say this in commendation of their conduct; for, my opinion is, that that peace was injurious as well as disgraceful to England; but, I say it for the purpose of showing, that the cause, to which you are desirous of attributing the rejection of the offer of Russian mediation has no foundation in fact, and is a pure invention of your own. I must say, too, that I look upon it as an invention proceeding from a motive, which, without the least exaggeration, may be called “unprincipled;” for, that motive evidently is to endeavour to obtain vengeance on the ministers for your defeat at Liverpool, by representing them as being so pertinaciously attached to a system of war, that, *while they remain in office*, the country, whatever its sufferings may be, and however useless and hopeless may be the continuation of the contest, has not the smallest chance of a restoration of peace. —Having cleared up this point, I should now proceed to the Negotiation of 1806; but, not having room to conclude it in the present sheet, I shall postpone it to my next, remaining, in the mean while,

Your, &c.

Botley, 11th Feb. 1808. WM. COBBETT.

“PERISH COMMERCE.”

SIR,—Such is the motto you have adopted to several of your late speculations, but before I concur in the sentiment, I require more explanation. If I understand Mr.

Spence, he does by no means maintain that foreign commerce is injurious, or that it should be either at once, or gradually given up. He says only that the loss of it would not be so hurtful as is generally imagined, which under our present circumstances is consoling, and I think he has in a great measure proved it. But if I understand you, Mr. Cobbett, you are for applying the axe to the root completely, and without ceremony. You maintain that natural wealth cannot arise from foreign commerce. Now let us take the instance of Holland. You will not surely deny that Holland *was* a rich country. Though her commerce is almost annihilated she *is* still a rich country. Her riches were not at the former period, much more than now, adventitious or floating. They were fixed, permanent, realised. How were these riches acquired but by foreign commerce? Her territory, though fertile and cultivated to the uttermost, was small and never could afford subsistence to half of the inhabitants. Her riches could not therefore arise from agriculture or her own produce, or the internal consumption either of it or her manufactures.—I conceive only one way of surmounting this example and still adhering to your doctrines as applied to this country. It may be said that the Dutch were merely *Carriers*. The gain of the Carriers though small is steady and certain. And are not we also Carriers, though not in the same proportion as the Dutch, regarding the extent of our commerce and theirs, because we have a great country to supply, and a luxurious people, while they were a small country and an economical frugal people. When we send bullion and our manufactured goods to the East Indies, and bring back teas and other luxuries, or articles we might do without, are all these consumed by ourselves? Do we not send a surplus to other countries, and from thence derive a profit which is an addition to the natural wealth? Instancing the trade to the last, the most unprofitable commerce we follow, is giving you every advantage.—Till I am better instructed, I shall hold my opinion that while the balance of foreign commerce is in our favour, however small that balance may be—if the trade of export and import were precisely at par—it is highly advantageous for the country to preserve it, were it merely because it supports a multitude of industrious people. I don't speak of the merchants or the capitalists, but the actual manufacturers. I consider it a mere fallacy or sophistry, to say these are really paid from the produce of our own soil. Were it so, the country would long ago have felt

the burden of excessive population. But these manufacturers purchase the produce from the wages which commercial men are able from the surplus gain to afford. They are in truth maintained in a great measure by foreigners, and thus commerce and agriculture mutually tend to the support and encouragement of one another.—I.

LEGISLATIVE REGULATIONS.

SIR,—There are two subjects affecting the politics of this country, which, though they have by no means escaped your notice, have not been immediately placed in a point of view as calling for legislative interference; though I confess, that to my humble apprehension, they seem to demand the early consideration of parliament. The first of these subjects relates to the liberty, which by our laws are given to subjects of this country, of becoming the proprietors of funded or landed property under the dominion of a foreign power. The second regards the propriety of a naval or military commander being directly, or indirectly, interested in the traffic of any merchandize, or other commercial speculation. No nation has ever yet depended for its support on the voluntary allegiance of its citizens. Laws have always been enacted to enforce allegiance, and to punish those who have withheld it: and though that nation must be weak indeed, whose subjects are kept in a state of obedience purely by means of force, and its existence must continue extremely precarious, yet have such compulsory laws, even in republics, been ever held essential; not as implying that the affections of the people were to be doubted, but to correct that aberration from duty, which no state can be entirely free from, and to prevent the mischievous effects which the example of one disaffected citizen might produce, by contaminating the minds of others: such being the frailty of human nature, that even error has at all periods found its votaries. If then allegiance be so essential to the welfare and existence of a state in times of tranquillity, how much more important does it become in those unfortunate periods, when the distracted ambition of one nation, or the petulant arrogance of another, threatens her with near approaching hostility. It is then that allegiance, which before was scarcely more than a name, is called upon to assume a palpable existence. It is then that a state impudently calls for her Nestors and her Ulysseses: for the most vigorous and able counsels of her subjects. It is then that she expects that those who are delegated with the great and important trust of de-

fending their country, should be animated with the zeal of a Nelson, and feel no satisfaction greater than that of "shaking-off this mortal coil," in so dear and honorable a cause. But, sir, that these purposes should be answered, it is essential that the individual should not conflict with the public interest. Self-love, however greatly affected to be despised by some, is the great masterspring of the human machine, and statesmen and philosophers must invariably regard its operations, both in their speculations and practice. To effect therefore the advantages which result from true allegiance, the subject in all his interests must be connected with his country; he must have all his nearest and dearest objects insulated within her territories: by this means the subject and the state are identified in point of benefit, and to defend and protect the latter is to preserve the treasures of the former. But when the subject is unwisely permitted to become a fundholder or land proprietor in a foreign territory, his interest is immediately divided, and the Hercules, which but for this would have been of inestimable benefit to his native state, becomes a mere useless Colossus, striding the vast ocean, with one foot on either territory, but of utility to neither. But what if the interest of the subject should preponderate against his native country? We may be told that a hero would offer up all private interest at the shrine of patriotism: but let it be remembered that all men are not heroes. However we may boast of integrity and inflexible justice, we should reflect, that only one Lucius Junius Brutus has been met with in thirteen centuries: and that the conduct of this man (a chief magistrate) in punishing his two sons for treason against the state, has been the subject of unceasing panegyric by all historians, from that period to the present: a sufficient example to prove how few are the instances in which public duty triumphs over private feeling. It is not, however, during the immediate period of a war that this distraction of interests in the subject is to be regarded; the most material consideration, is the conduct of such a man pending a negotiation, to preclude the necessity of a war. What concessions, were such an one minister, is it to be supposed that he would not make, to prevent that hostility, which would deprive him of a property upon which the splendour of his family might possibly depend! And with what advantage would that enemy treat with us, in whose power should be placed a considerable mass of the property of our subjects. Indeed view the subject as dispassionately,

and with as little prejudice as you please, it is surrounded on all sides with the most glaring disadvantages: whether we are at present laboring under any inconveniences arising from any of the circumstances before noticed, I shall not anticipate; sufficiently clear it is, that the subjects of any power possessing property in a foreign state, must to such power prove extremely pernicious in its consequences; and I therefore trust that some early legislative provision, will put an end to so baneful a practice. With respect to the second of the subjects mentioned by me, regarding naval and military commanders, either directly or indirectly engaging in commercial speculations, I shall not enter into any reasoning to shew the impolicy of permitting such a species of traffic, as the observations I have already made on the former subject, are equally applicable to the present. Whether the articles of war, or any regulations affecting our army or navy, prohibit any officer naval or military from becoming a merchant I know not; but if there be any such prohibition, it certainly does not provide against the embarking a sum of money, or being interested in the profits of any mercantile adventure, or such a prohibition is indeed but little attended to, and should be better expressed. That a naval or military commander should be influenced with no interest that may induce even a momentary deviation from the strict performance of those services which his country justly expects from him, is so self evident, that I shall not occupy more of your time, Mr. Cobbett, than to express my earnest wishes, that a regulation to this effect, may also engage the early attention of the ensuing parliament.—W. F. S.—*Lincoln's Inn, Jan. 18th, 1808.*

FUNDING SYSTEM.

MR. COBBETT,—I take the liberty of suggesting a few hints on the subject of our Public Debt and Sinking Fund, in consequence of the letter of C. S. which appeared in your last Register.—I have neither time nor ability to enter into a minute discussion of the various opinions, which have at different times appeared in your Register on this most interesting and important subject; but as I have thought your ideas to have been sometimes erroneous, I shall content myself with a few observations, in hopes that you, who are more competent to the task, will pursue the enquiry, and either acknowledge the propriety of my opinions, or endeavour to convince me that I am wrong. Your correspondent quotes from the speech

of Lord H. Petty, a passage to shew that it was the opinion of Mr. Pitt, as well as himself, that great mischief might arise from the extinguishing at once a very large portion of the national debt.—He says, that by returning all their capital to the holders of stock, capital itself would cease to be of value and the nation might be nearly ruined.—In order to prove the fallacy of this reasoning, I shall first state that I consider the whole of the national debt to be an ideal property, entirely depending on the regular payment of an annual interest, raised by taxes from the people. The continual addition to the amount of the debt must lower the value of money by increasing the sum to be raised upon the people out of the produce of their industry.—Does not this depreciation lessen the real burthen of the debt, in proportion as a pound of the interest will buy less corn than it used to do? This is some consolation to me in comparing the present debt with that of former times, the real pressure there may have been nearly equal to what we experience now.—Does not that part of the produce of the taxes which is received by the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, as the interest of the stock redeemed, keep up the price of the stocks when brought into the market for the purchase of other stock, by providing a constant supply for those who, from any cause, want to convert their fixed capital into money? In other words, does it not keep down the interest of money by making 3 per cent. worth more than it otherwise would be?—If the operation of the Sinking Fund should continue so long as to bring into the market more money as interest of the stock redeemed, than would buy the new stock wanted to be created for the exigencies of government, and what should be brought for sale by individuals, I conceive it might so raise the price of stocks, or in other words lower the rate of interest as to make the annual revenue from every kind of property proportionably less, as was the case when consols were above 90.—In this view I conceive the Sinking Fund an assistance to the commercial world, which always finds money scarce when interest is high. Suppose no part of the National Debt is wiped out, or suppose no tax producing part of the interest of the debt is repealed, but an addition is on the contrary annually made for the year's services, will not the real value of money, that is, its relative value to corn, continue to be depreciated, so as to raise the actual price of every property measured by the circulating medium, which I presume to continue to be Bank of

England notes, whilst the proportion of revenue from such property is lessened, till it shall make corn nominally so much higher here than in other countries, and raise the exchange so much against England as to make bullion bear a higher value in that state than as coin? This would occasion two prices of every commodity, a money price and a paper price, or in other words cause the measure of property to be Bank of England notes compared with their value in the corn market, and give to those notes a price of so much silver per pound sterling, instead of saying as we now do, gold and silver are worth so many pound notes per ounce or larger weight. I conceive this has been hitherto prevented since the restriction on the bank and depreciation in the value of money, by an actual depression in the general market of the world for bullion, by the increased quantity furnished from America, and the lessened demand for it in France, &c. since the revolution, when the church plate has been melted down to aid the supply from America in the work of depression.—When the relative proportion of the price of bullion to paper money shall be found to alter, will not this be corrected by cancelling a proportion of the debt, that is by taking off a certain quantity of taxes? For as increasing the taxes or the sum to be paid out of the produce of the estates of the country raises the nominal price of corn, and thus lowers the value of a pound note; I conceive the price of corn would be reduced, or the value of a pound note be raised by the contrary operation of lessening the taxes. I call it the nominal price of corn, presuming with Dr. Smith, that the real price as measured by labour is always nearly the same. If these ideas be correct, may not the alteration in the price of bank notes as measured by bullion, become the criterion to judge how soon a part of the debt should be extinguished?—As the commissioners only buy stock voluntarily offered for sale, it is impossible they can throw more capital into the hands of the public than shall be actually wanted, and as extinguishing the debt is only annihilating taxes, how can it have the effect to depreciate the value of circulating capital according to Lord H. Petty's statement. He appears to confound the present purchases of the commissioners with the ultimate extinction of the debt, which I have endeavoured to shew must be independent of each other.—The purchases by the commissioners must raise the price of stock, that is lessen the interest or revenue from capital—but the extinction of the debt will increase the value in corn, or real value

of the interest or money so derived from capital.—I remain, &c. LASEY.

TITHES.

SIR,——As very great and important business, will in all probability, be agitated and discussed at the ensuing meeting of parliament; there is none of a domestic nature of equal weight and importance than the subject of tithes, as the abolition of which is fervently and seriously prayed for by thousands of his Majesty's faithful and loyal subjects, both clergy and laity; and although I much admire, and approve of your remarks and observations upon most subjects upon which you write, yet I am truly astonished at your objections for a commutation, in lieu of this most abominable and detestable of all taxes and imposts, this curse upon industry and agricultural improvements, which nothing can ameliorate but a total abolition. It is far from my wish that the clergy should sustain one farthing loss by any innovation or change in the tithing system, my most ardent wish is to make the church truly respectable, and I am confident every landholder and occupier, will readily and cheerfully pay more by commutation than they do at present.—When we consider the manifold disputes, the enmity and hatred which is established and riveted, between the tithe owner and farmer, not only for their lives, but frequently descend to generations; when we see our churches deserted, and religion fast declining; when we see in our courts of justice thousands of pounds expended in law, arising oftentimes from the most frivolous causes, must surely be a conviction how grievous and detestable the present tithing system must be to every one. To illustrate that disputes at law frequently arise from frivolous causes, I beg leave to state the case of a very industrious, honest, worthy friend of mine, residing in the western part of this country. The great bashaw Tythe-Monger, who is a layman, has been in the practice of taking his tithes in kind, and from an election pique he harboured against my friend, ordered his men whom he sent to collect his tithes, to treat him with every kind of insult and indignity; accordingly, when they first came to collect their tithes, they let their trace horses loose in a fine field of wheat, to eat and trample my friend's corn, while they loaded their carts; at another time they left open a gate which they passed through, and let a number of cattle into another field which was not cut, and did considerable damage; at another time broke open a gate, and went into another corn field, and carried away what they

thought proper before the tithe was set out, and when my friend went to remonstrate, and pray they would discontinue to harass and injure him in such manner, he received no other apology than the most heinous curses and scurrilous abuse, which was too much for John Bull to take, and he gave one of the fellows who was the most abusive and impertinent a box under the ear; and, I dare say, Mr. Cobbett, you and every reader of your Register, will say, what a pity but he had given him a good threshing. And for this great assault the great tithe-monger has actually instituted a suit against him, which is now pending in a court of law. To enumerate how very grievous and obnoxious the present tithe system is, would fill a volume of your Register. Consider, Sir, how many millions of acres of waste land would be brought into cultivation, if a commutation of tithes should fortunately take place, and how many of hands would be employed in such cultivation, which now is thrown out of employment by the rigorous decrees of Buonaparté. I am persuaded, but few landholders will begin this great national improvement, without an alteration takes place in tithes, for no sooner has the farmer brought his land into an excellent state of culture, at an immense expence, but in comes the tithe man immediately for the tenth of its produce.—I beg to state the case of a gentleman who inclosed a part of Mindip Hills near Bristol. He made an excellent fence, ploughed it thrice over, and carried an immense quantity of manure; and for the first crop (which I believe was oats) the tithe man's demand was ten shillings per acre the whole value of the land per acre by the year, the gentleman discontinued any farther improvements in enclosing his waste land, from the rapacity of this man's exorbitant demand. Such vultures, such blood suckers are the generality of tithe owners. Whenever the abolition of tithes takes place (and which I hope I shall live to see) what a happy, prosperous, thriving country will Old England be. Our granaries will always be filled with corn, and in case of bad crops, or bad harvest which often occur, we shall always have a store for every emergency, without the aid of any foreign power to supply us. And however lukewarm many people may be about a revolution or change of government, arising solely from the oppression of tithes, if this odious tax could be removed, and an equivalent substituted, we may then bid defiance to Buonaparté and his subjugated vassals. Our churches will again be filled with thousands of absentees, religion will revive and prosper, and unanimity, cordiality,

and brotherly love will be established between all ranks.—I am, Sir, &c.—J. F. D. Taunton, Jan. 8, 1808.

TITHES.

SIR;—Much has been written in your Register lately on the subject of tithes: but amongst the different opinions which have been there advanced, nothing according to my apprehension has evinced either knowledge or ability.—The learned and the unlearned,—the landlord and the tenant; even the merchant, the tradesman and the mechanic, have raised their voices against tithes, as being oppressive: but it is to be doubted if a few of these rightly understand what they consider as obnoxious.—To shake the structure on which tithes are founded, needs more than common ingenuity; but to prove that the reasonings and assertions of those who try to raise a clamour against them, are fallacious and absurd, requires not splendid attainments, but simply a few facts that are growing a little antiquated and almost forgotten, through the supineness of the clergy.—There is a monition (quoted by Lyndwood) from Winchelsey, Archbishop of Canterbury about the year 1300, to the clergy of his province, desiring them “to admonish and induce their parishioners to “pay fully and without diminution the “tithes of milk, &c. &c. &c. :” “but if “they should fail to obey, let them (the “clergy), compel them, &c. &c.” This document sufficiently proves that the law of tithing existed, was recognised and acted upon in those days. Now, Sir, as Winchelsey was Archbishop some few years prior to the year 1300, I shall assume it, as being undeniably 500 years ago, and proceed to ask, whether the Howards, the Russells, the Greys, the Grenvilles of the present day have a more ancient, or can make out a more honorable and legal claim to their possessions than the parson to his tithes? I deny that they can. Then Mr. Cobbett what are those innovators and meddlers about, who wish to overturn this ancient law? Allow me to ask, that, when you are about to purchase a piece of ground, if you do not first of all consider that it is subject to a land tax and tithes? And if you do not pay accordingly? All records convince us that our ancestors did so. Do you think that any one of your correspondents knows an instance, where a purchaser has been taken by surprise and has been really ignorant of the tithe laws.—You and I may as well say to the butcher of whom we buy a serloin of beef, that it is oppressive to make us pay 9d. a pound for the bone in it, as that a man should in the

days declare tithes to be so ; we ought to know that there are bones in the beef ; and every purchaser of an estate does know that the estate is subject to tithes, if he has not paid an equivalent for its being tithe free.—I shall leave it to those who have leisure and inclination to settle whether tithes are due “ jure divino ” or “ jure humano ” or whether it was a pope or a king who was the first author of appropriations ; it is enough for me to have proved their antiquity to be as great or greater than any other tenure ; as in so doing, I humbly presume that my argument in defence of them is unanswerable.—I am not so blind and prejudiced as not to discover some hardships in the strict gathering of tithes ; but every succedaneum which I have seen proposed, has been inefficient and inadequate ; and I am constrained to express my fears that no plan can be adopted, which will be better for the community, and at the same time secure the independence of the clergy, than the old fashioned one, which system-mongers are anxious to annihilate.—I am, &c. &c.
—D. X.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

BRAZIL TRADE.—*Circular Letter from the Portuguese Ambassador to the Governor of the Island of St. Catherine, and Conditions of exporting goods to St. Catherine, until the pleasure of the Prince Regent be known.*—London, bearing date the 6th of January, 1808.

(Concluded from p. 224.)

3dly. Besides, every master and shipper will bind themselves to pay at the custom house of the said port, the same duties that were paid in Portugal upon every such article, or in lieu thereof, such as may have been already established by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.—4thly. According to your offer, and to ascertain that no contraband goods are exported thither, the manifest of the said cargo sworn, and authenticated as usual at this custom house, will be signed by the agent and consul general, Mr. John Charles Lucena, and by me.—5thly. On these conditions, which contain all that fair trade can wish for at present, I will most willingly provide every captain with a letter of mine to the governor of said port, informing him of what I have done, and requesting him earnestly to require immediate instructions from the Rio de Janeiro, in case his Royal Highness is already arrived ; and should his Royal Highness be not yet arrived, requesting him besides not to enforce the existing laws, but to suspend them until he receives the in-

structions required, which cannot be long in coming, and in the mean while not to molest, but permit the said ships to wait peaceably for the new orders ; unless he should be authorised by his former instructions to admit the entry of such goods, on paying the same duties as in Portugal, and to allow the captains to invest their proceeds in the produce of the country, in which case I will ardently request the Governor to facilitate this trade.—P. S. I need not say, that upon your application with the licence of the privy council, &c. &c. the manifest will be signed by me, and my letter to the governor will be delivered immediately, without the least expence to any of the concerned.—N. B. I request their excellencies the viceroy and governor of the different ports of Brazil, which this ship may enter in distress, that they will cause it to be accompanied by a guarda costa to the port of the island of St. Catherine, in order to avoid any unjust suspicion against the captain, of illicit commerce.

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ENGLAND.—*Blockade of certain ports in Spain, notified to the American Minister, in London, by Mr. Canning, 8th Jan., 1808.*

The undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has received his majesty's commands to acquaint Mr. Pinkney, that his majesty has judged it expedient to establish the most rigorous blockade at the entrance of the ports of Carthagena, Cadiz and St. Lucar ; and of all the intermediate ports, situated and lying between the said ports of Carthagena and St. Lucar ; Mr. Pinkney is therefore requested to apprise the American Consuls and merchants, residing in England, that the entrance of all the ports abovementioned are, and must be considered as being in a state of blockade ; and that, from this time, all the measures authorized by the law of nations, and the respective treaties between his majesty and the different neutral powers, will be adopted and executed, with respect to the vessels attempting to violate the said blockade, after this notice.—The undersigned requests Mr. Pinkney to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

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AMERICAN STATES.—*Mr. Jefferson's Letter to the Assembly of Pennsylvania, declining the offer of serving again, as President. Dated, Dec. 10, 1807.*

GENTLEMEN,—I received in due season, the Address of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, under cover from the

Speaker of the two Houses, in which, with their approbation of the general course of my administration, they were so good as to express their desire that I should consent to be proposed again to the public voice, on the expiration of my present term of office. Entertaining, as I do, for the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, those sentiments of high respect which would have prompted an immediate answer; I was certain, nevertheless, they would approve a delay which had for its object to avoid a premature agitation of the public mind, on a subject so interesting as the election of the chief magistrate.—That I should lay down my charge, at a proper period, is as much a duty as to have borne it faithfully. If some termination to the service of the chief magistrate be not affixed by the constitution, or supplied by practice, his office, nominally for years, will, in fact, become for life, and history shews how easily that degenerates into an inheritance.—Believing that a representative government, responsible at short periods of elections, is that which produces the greatest sum of happiness to mankind, I feel it a duty to do no act which shall essentially impair that principle; and I should unwillingly be the person, who, disregarding the sound precedent set by an illustrious predecessor, should furnish the first example of prolonging beyond the second term of office.—Truth also requires me to add, that I am sensible of that decline which declining years bring on—and feeling their physical, I ought not to doubt their mental effect; happy, if I am the first to perceive and to obey this admonition of human nature, and to solicit a retreat from cares too great for the wearied faculties of age.—For the approbation which the General Assembly of Pennsylvania has been pleased to express of the principles and measures pursued in the management of their affairs, I am sincerely thankful; and should I be so fortunate as to carry into retirement the equal approbation and good will of my fellow-citizens generally, it will be the comfort of my future days, and will close a service of forty years, with the only reward it ever wished.

ETRURIA.—*Proclamation of the Queen Louis Maria, upon dissolving the Government.*—Dated at Florence, Dec. 10, 1807.

In pursuance of a convention between their Majesties the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, and the King of Spain, Tuscany has been ceded to his Imperial Majesty; and yesterday evening the Queen (to whom other states are to be assigned) departed hence with a train of between forty

and fifty carriages, containing baggage and private property; after which the Etrurians were discharged from their oath of allegiance, and the government declared to be dissolved by the following proclamation:—Charles Louis, Infant of Spain, King of Etruria, &c. and on the part of his Majesty, her Majesty Maria Louisa, Infanta of Spain, Queen Regent of Etruria.—Whereas his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy has informed us, that, by virtue of a treaty concluded with his Catholic Majesty, other states are appointed for us in exchange for the kingdom of Etruria, ceded to the most illustrious Emperor by the aforesaid treaty; we consider our reign in Etruria as dissolved from this day, and hence discharge the Etrurian nation from every oath of allegiance towards our Royal Person.—Yet we cannot separate from subjects so dearly beloved, without publicly assuring them of our entire gratitude, and of the memory which we shall at all times retain of the faithful attachment which they have displayed during the time of our government.—Yet if there is a thought which can diminish our affliction at such a separation, it is this, that the kingdom of Etruria—that so obedient a nation becomes subject to the happy government of a monarch who is adorned with the most heroic virtues, among which the constant care is pre eminent with which he labours to assure the prosperity of the people under his authority.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Message of the President to the Congress, relating to an Embargo, Dated, Dec. 18, 1807. Also the Act of Congress laying the Embargo, passed Dec. 22, 1807.*

MESSAGE.—The communications now made, shewing the great and increasing dangers with which our vessels, our seamen, and merchandize are threatened, on the high seas and elsewhere, from the belligerent powers of Europe, and it being of the greatest importance to keep in safety their essential resources, I deem it my duty to recommend the subject to the consideration of Congress, who will doubtless perceive all the advantage that may be expected from an inhibition of the departure of our vessels from the ports of the United States. Their wisdom will also see the necessity of making every preparation for whatever event may grow out of the present crisis.

ACT.—Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, that an embargo be and hereby is laid on all ships and vessels in the ports and places with-

in the limits or jurisdiction of the United States, cleared or not cleared, bound to any foreign port or place: and that no clearance be furnished to any ship or vessel bound to such foreign port or place, except vessels under the immediate direction of the President of the United States; and that the President be authorised to give such instructions to the officers of the revenue, and of the navy and revenue cutters of the United States, as shall appear best adapted for carrying the same into full effect. Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be considered to prevent the departure of any foreign ship or vessel, either in ballast, or with the goods, wares and merchandize on board of such foreign ship or vessel, when notified of this act.—Sect. 2. And be it further enacted, That during the continuance of this Act, no registered or sea-letter vessel, having on board goods, wares and merchandize, shall be allowed to depart from one port of the United States to the other within the same, unless the master, owner, consignee, or factor of such vessel, shall first give bond with one or more sureties to the collector of the district from which she is bound to depart, in a sum of double the value of the vessel and cargo, that the said goods, wares, and merchandize, shall be relanded in some port of the United States, dangers of the seas excepted; which bond, and also a certificate from the collector where the same may be relanded, shall, by the collectors respectively, be transmitted to the secretary of the treasury. All armed vessels possessing public commissions from any foreign powers are not to be considered as liable to the embargo laid by this act.

SPAIN.—*Decree against England, dated Jan. 3, 1808.*

The abominable attack committed by English ships of war in 1804, by the express order of that government, when four frigates of the royal fleet, which, sailing under the full assurance of peace, were unjustly surprized, attacked, and compelled to surrender, determined me to break all connection with the British cabinet, and to consider myself as at war with a nation which had so iniquitously violated the law of nations and of humanity.—So atrocious an aggression was a sufficient motive for breaking all the bonds which unite one nation with another; even had I not considered what I owe to myself, to the honour and glory of my crown, and to my beloved subjects. Two years of war have elapsed, and Great Bri-

tain has not moderated her pride, nor renounced the unjust domination which she exercises over the seas; but, on the contrary, confounding at once friends, enemies, and neutrals, she has manifested the formal intention of treating them all with the same tyranny.—From these considerations I determined, in February last year, in conformity to the wise measures adopted by my intimate ally, the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, to declare, as I have declared, the British isles in a state of blockade, in order to see if that measure would reduce the British cabinet to abdicate its unjust supremacy over the seas, and to conclude a solid and durable peace. Far from that, the English government has not only rejected the propositions which were made on the part of my intimate ally the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, whether directly or by the mediation of different powers friendly to England, but also having committed the most enormous of atrocities and injuries, by its scandalous attack on the city and harbour of Copenhagen, it has thrown off the mask; and no person can any longer doubt that its insatiable ambition aspires to the exclusive commerce and navigation of the seas. Nothing can prove this more evidently than the measures which that government has just adopted by its orders of the 14th of November last; by which it not only declares the coast of France, Spain, and their allies, and all those occupied by the armies of either power, in a state of blockade, but has even subjected the ships of neutral powers, the friends, and even the allies of England, to the visits of English cruizers, and to be forcibly carried into an English port, where they are to be obliged to pay a tax on their cargoes, the quantity of which is to be determined by the English legislature. Authorised by a just right of reprisal to take the measures which shall appear to me proper to prevent the abuse which the British cabinet makes of its power, with respect to neutral flags, and to see if we cannot force it to renounce so unjust a tyranny, I have resolved to adopt, and do hereby require there shall be adopted, in all my states, the same measures which have been taken by my intimate ally, the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, and which are of the following tenor.—[Here follows a literal copy of the decree of the 26th December, issued on this subject by his Majesty the Emperor and King.]

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIII. No. 8.] LONDON, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1808. [PRICE 10d.

From a Report of a Committee of the House of Commons, printed in 1802, the following item stands on the credit side of the Civil List. "By amount of sums advanced to His Royal Highness, the Duke of York, which is to be repaid by instalments of £1,000 quarterly, from 1st Jan. 1805, £54,000. 17. 6." So that, it appears, from this document, that the Duke of York has drawn this large sum of money from the public purse, over and above his pensions, pay, and allowances; and that, according to the statement of the Report, the repayment (which was not to begin until three years after the advance was made) is to be so slow, that the interest, at 5 per centum, will swallow up five eighths of the principal.

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TO
WILLIAM ROSCOE, Esq.
LETTER II.

SIR,

Upon reverting to the subject of the Negotiation of 1806, I cannot, upon reading your remarks a second time, forbear taking some notice of the curious "incident," which appears to have led to the opening of that negotiation, namely, the tender of his services made by an assassin to Mr. Fox. This was, indeed, a curious "incident;" and yet, somehow or other, it has happened, that there never was an incident that gave rise to less conversation, in public, or in private. It was a thing, which, as it were by compact, all men were in the mind to pass over in silence. As to myself, I will tell you flatly and plainly, that I looked upon the whole as being a matter of mere contrivance, as completely as any "incident" of a play-house piece; and, the reason why I never said this before, was, that Mr. Fox being dead, I felt a repugnance at commenting upon the part, which he had had the weakness to act; which repugnance is now outweighed by the considerations arising from the evident motives, whence you have set forward this almost forgotten incident. The story of the incident is this: a person makes shift to get from France to England "without a passport," a very extraordinary thing in itself; but hither he comes, and, going to Mr. Fox, tells him, that a scheme had been formed for killing Napoleon, at Passy, attended with neither risk nor uncertainty. Mr. Fox drives him from his presence; but orders him to be kept in custody of the police, until the French government be informed of the matter, which information is given by Mr. Fox to Mr. Talleyrand, in a letter dated on the 20th of February, 1806; and, when it becomes pretty certain, that the information is received in France, and, of course, that measures are taken to defeat the intention of the assassin and his colleagues of Passy, the assassin is sent off

out of the kingdom. This letter of Mr. Fox brings him one from Mr. Talleyrand Perigord, formerly Bishop of Autun, and one of the guardians of the holy oil, which had been kept in a bottle at Rheims, ever since the coronation of Charlemagne. The Bishop conveys to Mr. Fox the thanks of his imperial and royal majesty, Napoleon, and, at the same time, gives him, in the way of "news," an extract from the Emperor's speech to his legislators, about peace; this, accompanied with a hint from Mr. Talleyrand, upon the same topic, leads to a negotiation in form. But, first let us, since you will have it so, inquire a little into the probabilities of the plot at Passy. First, it is, as was before remarked, not a little extraordinary, that any one should, without the consent, or connivance, of the French government, get from France to Gravesend. Where was he to embark? On board of what? How was he to pass unmolested? Secondly, upon the supposition, that the plot was really formed, the house taken at Passy, and the preparations for the murder all duly made, how came Mr. Talleyrand not to let Mr. Fox know whether the thing had been discovered, or what had been the result of that inquiry, to which Mr. Fox's letter would naturally have led? Thirdly, how comes it that we have never heard the *Moniteur* say any thing upon the subject, which was one of great public interest; and how comes it, too, that neither the envoy of the assassins, nor any one of the band, has ever been brought to justice? Mr. Fox certainly did not act as I should have done. I should have looked upon the man as sent from France, in the same manner that M^{lle} de la Touche was; I should have had him confined, and strictly examined; and, should, in the meanwhile, have informed the French government, that, unless it could be clearly proved, that preparations for assassination had actually been made at Passy, the envoy would be considered as a spy, and very soon hanged in that capacity. This is what I

should have done in a like case, and should never have thought of availing myself of such an opportunity to give a mark of my "attachment" to Mr. Talleyrand. I see much of a want of presence of mind; much of weakness, in this proceeding, on the part of Mr. Fox; but, it will, I believe, require a pair of those party spectacles, that you seem to have on your nose, to see any thing of "noble-mindedness" in it. Mr. Fox, disguise the fact how you will, must have seen through the trick that was attempted to be played him; or, at any rate, the best that can be said of him, in this case is, that he was the dupe of Mr. Talleyrand. And, Sir, you gravely retail to us the recognition, on the part of Talleyrand, of "those principles" of honour and virtue, by which Mr. Fox "had always been actuated, and which," as Talleyrand said, "had already given a new character to the war," thereby intimating, that theretofore, our government had carried on the war like assassins, though it should have been remembered by Mr. Fox (if forgotten by Mr. Talleyrand), that the war had theretofore been carried on by persons, then composing two-thirds of the cabinet, of which Mr. Fox was a member. But, at the close of this your eulogium on Mr. Fox, you have a most unworthy insinuation. You say: "Even the political opponents of Mr. Fox *ought* to have felt rightly upon such a subject. They ought to have known, that it was no effort to his great and generous mind to reject the proposals of an avowed assassin." And, how do you know, Sir, that they did not feel rightly upon this subject? What warrants you in supposing, that they would have employed the assassin? And, if this be not what you mean to insinuate, to what rational purpose does your observation, with respect to them, tend? For my part, when I came to see the papers (Parl. Debates, Vol. VIII. p. 91, and the following pages) I thought the conduct of the then opposition remarkable for forbearance; and, if Mr. Fox had been alive at the time when the discussion upon those papers took place, I am inclined to think, that the assassination plot at Passy, which certainly equals the "Meal-Tub Plot," or any of the other plots of the reign of Charles II. would have been made to afford, at St. Stephen's, where you then were, a good deal of merriment; especially if you had taken it into your head to describe the conduct of Mr. Fox, upon that occasion, as "exemplifying, in the most striking manner, one of the most important maxims of morality, and exhibiting to the world a noble proof, that, amidst the rage of national and in-

dividual animosity, the eternal laws of justice and of virtue were neither overthrown nor shaken." The horse laugh, which would have drowned your voice long before you had arrived at this period, would have convinced you, that if you chose to be the dupe of the Bishop of Autun, there were not many others disposed to follow your example.

Mr. Talleyrand, as if he had been a little ashamed of the miserable trick he had resorted to, got rid of the subject in great haste, and proceeded to that of peace. The negotiation was opened, and that, too, at the very place which the French must have wished. In speaking of this negotiation, you appear to be sadly divided between your anxiety to vindicate the conduct and the motives of France and your fear of throwing blame upon your own party; but, after long apparent struggles in your bosom, the former gains the preponderance, and you make a very decent sacrifice of your friends upon the altar of your country's enemy. You tell us, that, in the first place, England insisted, that Russia should, as an ally of hers, be a party to the treaty; that, while a debate was going on about this, Russia, though in spite of our remonstrances, entered upon a separate negotiation; that, being now at liberty to treat for ourselves, a dispute arose about the basis of the treaty, and that, "unfortunately," we insisted upon the state of actual possession, as a basis, though neither the language of Mr. Talleyrand nor the circumstances of the case could warrant us in so doing; that, while this dispute was going on, the treaty between Russia and France arrived at St. Petersburg, where it was refused to be ratified, which induced us to return to our first resolution of not negotiating in conjunction with Russia, though "the terms were such as might have satisfied both the honour of the sovereign, and the expectations of the British ministers; that, "unhappily" the negotiation was thus broken off, and the contest continued for interests not our own." We will speak of these "satisfactory terms" by-and-by; but, here we must stop to ask you, who it was that conducted this negotiation on the part of England? Why, those very men, whose departure from office you have, in another place, told us, deprived the nation of all hopes of peace. But, there is a question, in which you, Sir, are more nearly concerned. There were, in parliament, two discussions, relative to the negotiation of 1806, the principal one on the 5th of January 1807 (See Parl. Deb. Vol. VIII. p. 505), when Mr. Whitbread moved an amendment to the

address proposed by Lord Howick. After an eulogium on Mr. Whitbread's speech, upon that occasion, you say, in a tone of lamentation mixed with anger, "yet, the motion of Mr. Whitbread" (which softened the asperity of that of Lord Howick) "was negatived without a division." And, whose fault was that? Why, it was the fault of your pacific ministry. It was the fault of those very men, whose elevation to power, you tell us gave the people a confident expectation of peace, and whose fall you tell us, deprived the people of all hope of peace. Not altogether, indeed, was it their fault; for, though they had a decided majority in St. Stephen's, yet, the "negative without a division" was not their fault, but *your* fault, and every man's fault, who disapproved of breaking off the negotiation. It was in your power to divide the House. It required no knack at speaking for an hour at a time. A single syllable, distinctly pronounced, would have been sufficient; and, if you refrained from making so slight an effort to serve the cause of peace then, when your party was in power, what credit is due to your professions now? A negotiation is broken off upon grounds, which you represent as feigned; the enemy, you say, offers satisfactory terms of peace; our ministers come to parliament with an assertion that a continuation of the war is rendered unavoidable by the injustice and ambition of the enemy; you now say that this assertion was false; and yet, oh, patriotic gentleman; "real friend of mankind;" and great enemy to "the tragedy of war!" What do you do? Sit, at the back of the minister, like a mouse in a cheese; say not a word; give your silent assent to what you now say was a false assertion; but, the ministry being changed, and the new ministry having ousted you from your seat in parliament, you come forth in a pamphlet and say that, which you ought to have said in your place in parliament; you now address to faction and distress, that which you ought to have addressed to the public spirit and reason of the nation. Upon the supposition that you were incapable of speaking (which is not, however, the fact, you having spoken, in all, six times); upon this supposition, or upon the supposition that your talents and faculties are of that peculiar sort which are not to be brought to bear against a minister, to whom you are looking up for emoluments or honours; upon this supposition, which is the most favourable to you that I can conceive, why did you not bring out your

pamphlet at an earlier period? The time for it to have been useful was immediately after the parliamentary discussion, above referred to; and, if that had been, from your great duties as a law-giver, let slip, you surely might have published it after you were happily disburthened of that charge. But, no; you stop till the rupture of the negotiation has produced all its mischiefs; you stop, in short, until the very hour, when you think that your pamphlet, joined to the distresses in the manufacturing districts, will have a chance of producing an effect hostile to the party, to whose superior cunning you owe your fall as a public man. You now affect to lament the consequences of the rupture of the negotiation; you now display before the public its terrible effects upon the North of Europe, seeming to suppose, that we should forget, that no small part of those effects had been already produced, when the discussion in parliament took place. In short, it is as clear as noon day, that of what you have now said, against the breaking off of the negotiation, not one word would, in any way, have been said by you, if the late ministry had remained in power, and if you had remained in parliament. Such a person it becomes to be cautious how he accuses others of a want of principle.

It is true, however, that what has here been said has little to do with the question itself, though it may, by exposing your conduct and motives, be useful in counteracting your designs. The ministers might be much to blame for breaking off the negotiation, though you could not discover it, until they were out of place, and though, so far from appearing to discover it in due time, you, with all the information before you, gave your silent assent to a solemn proceeding, the purpose of which was to give to their conduct the stamp of public approbation. To come to a decision upon the merits of the case itself, we must now take a view of those "satisfactory terms," which were offered by France, during the negotiation of 1805. These terms were: that Hanover was to be restored to the king, Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, the French possessions in the East Indies, and Tobago, in the West Indies, were to be left in our hands; while the only condition which France asked in return was, that we should leave her the absolute mistress of every port upon the continent of Europe, those of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark excepted, the island of Sicily being to be surrendered to her, and the king of that country being to be made a pensioner of

Spain. "Hanover for the honour of the crown, Malta for the honour of the navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the honour of commerce." This was the ingenious arrangement of Mr. Talleyrand, of whom you seem to be an humble pupil; for you, too, tell us, that the terms offered by France were "such as might have satisfied both the honour of the sovereign and the expectations of the British ministry," had not their "determination not to desert our Russian ally prevented such terms from being accepted." As a proof of the truth of this assertion of yours, you refer to the declaration of Lord Lauderdale, that the arrangement contended for, by us, in favour of Russia, "was considered as an object, *more interesting, if possible,*" to England, than those points which "might be considered as peculiarly connected with her own interests;" and, in confirmation, you quote the King's Declaration, recently made with regard to Russia, in which the Czar is reminded, that "the negotiation of 1806 was broken off upon points, *immediately affecting, not his majesty's own interests,* but those of his imperial ally." Upon the strength of these declarations you assert that the war, after the negotiation of 1806, was "continued for interests *not our own,*" leaving out, with your usual fairness, all the qualifications accompanying the expression, in both declarations. Lord Lauderdale only says, that the arrangement desired for Russia was an object "*more interesting,*" than those points peculiarly connected with our own interests; and he adds, "*if possible;*" clearly implying that those points were of themselves of very great interest. And, in the king's recent declaration, the word "*immediately*" so qualifies what follows, as to give to the declaration a meaning not at all different from that of Lord Lauderdale, which meaning plainly is, that, though, as to the interests of England, there were great differences, yet, it happened, that it was upon points more immediately connected with the interests of Russia, that the negotiation was broken off. But, to have adhered to the fair construction of these declarations would not have suited your purpose, which was to bring your readers gradually to the following clenching argument: "that, as the non-compliance by France with our demands, on the part of Russia, was the *only* reason for continuing the war, there exists not *now,*" when that reason is effectually removed by the avowed hostility against us, either "any just ground of offence against France

"for her conduct in this transaction, or any difference of interest between the two countries, which can now be alledged as a motive for continuing the war;" an argument, which might have done honour to counsellor Bramble or counsellor Bothershem, but which one would have expected to be scorned by a man putting forward such high pretensions to fairness and integrity; for, to say nothing more of the false premises upon which you proceed—was above the level of a journeyman calico-weaver, does not perceive, that, though the reason for beginning a war, or continuing a war, may be removed, in the course of the war, there may be other reasons arise, in the course of the war for its continuance, or prolongation; and that the same set of terms, which would have been desirable at the former stage of the war, would be totally inadmissible at the latter? You say, "my enemy seizes your county of Lancaster; you go to war in order to recover it; you succeed, but he gets possession of Somersetshire; and, are you to cease the war, because the original reason of it is removed?" This part of your argument, is, therefore, worth nothing; and, as to the proposition, that "we have no just ground of offence against France for her conduct in the negotiation of 1806, *because* Russia has now openly avowed her hostility against us," it is too miserable a mockery of reasoning to merit serious remark. Not only may it happen, that a new reason for continuing a war may arise, during a war; but it may happen, that the new reason may arise out of the removal of the original reason; and this has been the case in the present instance; for, if we were now to negotiate, the basis and the terms ought to be very different indeed from what they might have been at the period of the negotiation of 1806. And, yet you tell us, that the war is now continued "without an object and without a cause," merely because we have lost the ally, for whose sake we, more immediately, broke off the negotiation conducted by Mr. Fox.

The terms, as above stated, would, in my opinion, have given to this country, in the state in which it was in 1806, not a moment of real repose. Hanover is set in the foreground, though it would be very difficult to shew how the restoration of that electorate could have been an honour to the "crown" of England. That France would offer to restore it was foreseen and foretold, long ago; and, the mighty sacrifice she therein would have made must be evident, when we recollect, first, that she has strip-

ped it of its very skin, and next, that she could, at any time, have re-occupied it at her pleasure. It was one of the sins of the late ministry to demand the restoration of Hanover, their motive for which was evident to all the world, namely, that of flattering certain prejudices as the sure means of keeping their places; and, it is not a little surprizing, that you, Sir, you who clearly wish to pay your court to the people, should have held forth, as a great concession to us, the restoration of that, which the whole nation regards as a mill-stone about its neck. But, the truth appears to be, that you were divided in your hopes and fears here again. You must have perceived, that the restoration of Hanover was not a favourite object with the nation; but, on the other hand, your anxiety to justify France induced you to make the most of the offer with respect to that miserable electorate. She offered us, however, the Cape of Good Hope (a possession of Holland), Malta, her colonies (or rather factories) in the East-Indies, and the island of Tobago, of all which we were in actual possession, while there existed not, in the world, the means of taking any one of them from us; and, if you do not perceive the fact, Mr. Talleyrand did, that the perpetual possession of all these, and of all the colonies of both hemispheres, would not have tended, even in the slightest degree, to the security of England, in which respect they were, all taken together, of far less importance than that little dot in the map of Europe, called the island of St. Marcou. You pass over, with great cautiousness, what France would have retained, in case we had made peace upon the terms proposed. You tell us that the King of Naples was to have had "the Balearic islands and an annuity from *Spain*, to enable him to maintain his *dignity*;" but you omit to state, that he was to have been deprived of the island of Sicily, by the peace, which Napoleon had not been able to take from him during the war; and, you also omit to state, that Sicily and Italy in possession of France, Malta must be given up by us for want of the means of feeding its inhabitants. In short, there appears to me to have been offered by France nothing that would have enabled us to dismantle, without abandoning all ideas of safety, a single ship of war, or to disband a single regiment that was, at the time the negotiation began, necessary for our defence; and, the whole of the negotiation only tended to confirm men in their former opinion, that Napoleon would consent to no peace, that should not work more rapidly than war towards his grand object,

the conquest and complete subjugation of England. You, however, think very differently. You think him perfectly sincere in all his pacific professions; and, as the reason you give in support of this opinion may be comprehended by others, though it is not by me, I shall here state it in your own words. "Whether the ruler of France was "or was not sincere in his professions for "peace, I shall not undertake to judge. "There is, however, *one circumstance* "which strongly favours the idea that he "was so, and which may, therefore, be "allowed to stand against the vague assertions, so generally made to the contrary." [Now, reader, watch narrowly for this circumstance.] "As Hanover was to be immediately and unconditionally restored to "its elector, an application appears to have "been made, during the negotiation, by "Bonaparte to the king of Prussia, to "whom the possession of it had been ceded "by France as a conquered province, to "deliver it up to its former sovereign." [Have you found out the circumstance yet, reader?] "This application excited no "small share of indignation on the part of "the king of Prussia, who is said to have "expressed his determination, not to allow "himself to be divested of his dominions at "the will of the French ruler." [Have you got it yet?] "The consequence of this was "a most singular complication of affairs, "We were already at war with Prussia, "who had also refused to divest herself of "Hanover, although she had not the slightest pretensions to the sovereignty; and "though the establishment of peace between England and France might have "depended upon it." Have you found the "circumstance" yet, reader? If you have, you will do me a favour to lend me a little of your sharp-sightedness; for, after having read the paragraph over twenty times, with the utmost anxiety to find the statement of a circumstance "strongly favouring the idea "that Bonaparte was sincere in his professions for peace;" and that was to be "allowed to stand against the assertions, "so generally made to the contrary;" after all this anxious perusal, I can find, not only no such circumstance stated, but nothing at all that has any connection with the subject. Perhaps, however, Mr. Roscoe, you may mean, that the application made to the king of Prussia, for the surrender of Hanover, was a proof that Napoleon confidently expected, that he should soon have to restore it to the elector, and, of course, as confidently expected that a treaty of peace would grow out of the negotiation then going on,

Aye; but this, Sir, is quite another thing. He might confidently expect, and sincerely wish for, a thing called a treaty of peace with England; and yet, at the same time, entertain towards her, views the most decidedly hostile. It was some circumstance such as would have favoured the idea of his being really peaceably inclined towards us, that I was expecting to hear you state; such, for instance, as an offer to set Holland and Spain free. This would have been something; this would not only have stood against "vague assertions," but against that chain of reasoning and of facts which have been advanced as the foundation of the opinion that he was not sincere in his propositions for peace; but, the offer of Hanover to us, so far from standing against such reasoning and facts, tend only to confirm us in the conclusions drawn from them.

Upon this part of the subject more will be said in my next letter, when I come to examine into the nature of your statements and opinions with respect to the relative situation of the two countries, supposing peace to be now made, leaving all the ports and naval armaments upon the coast of Europe in the hands of, or under the control of, our enemy. The present I shall conclude with a remark or two upon the point to which you seem to entertain special objections, rights of sovereignty. You tell us, in the passage above quoted, that "Hanover had been ceded by France to the king of Prussia, as a compensation, and only recently after you have to speak of the refusal of Prussia's refusal to believe it up to the point of the application of France's compensation observe, "that Prussia had not the slightest pretensions to the sovereignty" though the country (a conquered country) had been ceded to her by France. You acknowledge the right of conquest in France; you acknowledge her right to cede the country to Prussia; and yet you assert, that Prussia had not the slightest pretensions to the sovereignty of it, when France chose to command her to give it up; and, moreover, you justify France in demanding it without any equivalent, acknowledging that France has still a right to consider it as her own, and to estimate it in the terms of a treaty, when she is making with us. Any thing so decidedly, so undisguisedly, so much as this, I never before met with in any English writers; and nothing so impudently profligate in any of the reports of the Bishop of Autun. In vain would you save appearances by the pithy misrepresentation which follows; "Yet Prussia was now to be our ally; and this country had to defend her in a war occu-

sioned by her unjust refusal to restore to their lawful sovereign the patrimonial and long descended dominions of the House of Brunswick." No, Sir, it was not a refusal to restore them to the elector, it was a refusal to give them up to France, and that, too, without any equivalent, that France might have them as an article of cession to us in the treaty that was, as was then expected, about to be made. You, all along, speak of Hanover as something, and, indeed, as a great thing, which France had to restore to us; before she could restore it she must possess it in right of conquest; that right she had ceded to Prussia; the right of Prussia must have been just as good as the right of France; and yet you contend, you flatly assert, that to the sovereignty of Hanover Prussia had not the slightest pretensions. There may possibly be some few persons, in England, who have, through all the transformations of the French government, from a simple democracy up to a simple military despotism, retained their original partiality for the rulers of that country; and these persons may applaud your present efforts; but, if I am not the most deceived of men, those efforts will, by every other description of persons, be considered as proceeding from a want of principle as lamentable as that has been witnessed for a long series of years.

I am, yours, &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Batley, 1st Feb., 1806.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—The good citizens of this virtuous young empire are, it would seem, resolved not to leave the smallest doubt in the mind of any man living, that all which I have said *bad* of them is short of the truth. They will, before they have done, put their friends here to the blush, I am afraid, and will go very far towards confirming the truth of the late assertions of the Bishop of Autun, namely, that republican government is "fit for nothing but to make men rascals." This is the substance of what the Bishop said; and yet, it is very strange, that some of those who were attached to the Bishop while he held republican government to be absolutely necessary to preserve men from becoming brutes, should be attached to him now as much as they were before.—The first thing which I have to notice, relating to the American States, is a quarrel between Mr. John Randolph one of the members of the House of Representatives of the United States, and General Wilkinson, who has

long been entrusted with commands upon the Western frontier of the United States. It appears, that Mr. Randolph had long suspected Wilkinson of being in the pay of Spain, with whom the American States have had many squabbles about boundaries, &c.; and that, at last, some documents came into the hands of Mr. Randolph, whereon to substantiate the charge. Amongst others, the following letter, from the Baron de Carondelet, Spanish Intendant at New Orleans, to a Mr. Portell, at New Madrid, dated 20th January, 1806. "In the galley the Victoria, Bernardo Molina, Patron, there have been sent to Don Vincent Folch nine thousand six hundred and forty dollars, which sum, without making the least use of it, you will hold at my disposal to deliver it at the moment that an order may be presented to you by the American General, Don James Wilkinson."—This letter, duly attested, Mr. Randolph produced, in his place, on the 31st of December last, and made a motion upon the subject. After some time spent in debate, the discussion was adjourned. I must now copy from the Washington newspaper of the same date. The matter is curious; and of political importance, because it affords us a true picture of a people, with whom we have, at present, a great deal to do. The reader will bear in mind, that we are here going to speak of the "most virtuous people upon earth," as they have called themselves, even since the commencement of this present session of Congress.

"This morning the town was alarmed by bills, stuck up at every corner, corners of streets, &c. The following is a copy, as near as I can recollect:—

"HECTOR UNMASKED!

"In justice to my character, I denounce to the world, John Randolph, Member of Congress, a prevaricating, base, calumniating scoundrel, poltroon and coward.

"JAS. WILKINSON."

Correspondence between Randolph and Wilkinson.

"Washington, Dec. 2, 1807.

"Sir,—I understand several expressions have escaped you, in their nature personal, and highly injurious to my reputation. The exceptionable language imputed to you, may be briefly and substantially compassed in the following statement. That you have avowed your opinion I was a rogue—that you have ascribed to me the infernal disposition to commit murder, to prevent the exposition of my sinister designs, and through me

"have stigmatised those citizen soldiers, who compose the meritorious military corps of our country. No person can be more sensible of the pernicious tendency of such cruel and undeserved reflections, in their application to public men or private individuals, than yourself; nor is any man more competent to determine the just reparation to which they establish a fair claim. Under these impressions, I can have no hesitation to appeal to your justice, your magnanimity, and your gallantry, to prescribe the manner and the measures of redress, being persuaded your decision will comport with the feelings of a man of honour, and that you will be found equally prompt to assert a right or repair a wrong. I transmit this letter through the post office, and shall expect your answer, by such channel as you may deem most proper. I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

"JAS. WILKINSON."

"The Hon. John Randolph."

"SIR,—Several months ago I was informed of your having said, that you were acquainted with what had passed in the grand jury-room at Richmond, last spring, and that you had declared a determination to challenge me. I am to consider your letter of last night, by mail, as the execution of this avowed purpose, and, through the same channel, return you my answer. Whatever may have been the expressions used by me, in relation to your character, they were the result of deliberate opinion, founded upon the most authentic evidence, the greater part of which my country imposed upon me the painful duty to weigh and to decide upon; they were such, as to my knowledge and to yours, have been delivered by hundreds of the first men in the Union, and probably by a full moiety of the American people. In you, Sir, I can recognize no right to hold me accountable for my public or private opinion of your character, that would not subject me to an equal claim from Colonel Burr, or Serjeant Dunbaugh. I cannot descend to your level. This is my final answer.

"JOHN RANDOLPH."

"Brigadier General Wilkinson."

"Washington, Dec. 23.

"SIR,—I have received your letter of the 25th instant, by mail, in which you violate truth and honour, to indulge the inherent malignity and rancour of your soul. On what 'level,' pray Sir, shall we find the wretch, who, to masquerade his

“ cowardice, fabricates falsehoods, and head-unprovoked insults upon unmerited injuries? You, John Randolph, are this man, and your own breast can best solve the proposition. You ‘ cannot descend to my level;’ vain equivocal thing! And do you believe this dastardly subterfuge will avail you, or that your lion’s skin will longer conceal your true character? Embrace the alternative still within your reach, and ascend to the ‘ level’ of a gentleman, if possible; act like a man, if you can, and spare me the pain of publishing you to the world, for an insolent, slanderous, prevaricating poltroon.

“ JAMES WILKINSON.”

“ N. B. The first idea suggested by the indecency of your response to my letter, was the chastisement of my cane, from which the sacred respect I owe to the station you occupy in the councils of the nation, has alone protected you; and to the consequent conflict of feeling and duty must be ascribed the delay of this note.

“ JAMES WILKINSON.”

“ John Randolph, Esq.”

There is every chance, I think, of Wilkinson’s being bribed by Spain; for, as to “ commercial concerns,” what commercial concerns could he possibly have? But, this is nothing new. It was proved as clear as day-light, that the secretary of state, in the time of Washington, asked the French minister, Fauchet, for a bribe; and, to say the truth, the fact excited no public indignation, and very little surprise. To what a state, then, must that people be! I know what a state they are in; I know how unprincipled they are; I know what profligates they are, women as well as men; but, I wish to rest upon facts such as these now laid before the world, and which facts none of their interested advocates can deny. An extract from a Boston paper of the 31st of December will enable the reader to judge of the correctness of my opinions, with regard to the effects of an embargo in America. “ All the letters from Washington announce a war with Great Britain as nearly inevitable. The embargo was carried by the influence of a spirit hostile to Great Britain, and of course not very independent of France. *‘ If the people of New England quietly submit to the system of attacking our fate to that of France, our independence is at an end.’*—The embargo appears, by the language of the government papers, intended to produce a coercive effect upon England. What would we compel her to do? To make reparation

“ for the attack on the Chesapeake? She has sent Mr. Rose, expressly commissioned to do all that her character can suffer to be done without degradation, to satisfy the wounded feelings of our country. He is now near our coast if not arrived, bearing the olive branch, and tendering us satisfaction, peace and good will. It is therefore madness to say, the embargo has any relation to the attack on the Chesapeake. What then are we to compel Great Britain to do by this embargo? She shall abandon her claim to her own subjects whenever they can get on board our merchant vessels! This is the only point that now labours between the two governments. To effect this concession on the part of England, we are called upon to sacrifice the prosperity of the country—to submit to the most distressing privations—many to absolute ruin, and all this with dignity and patience.—Let those who already see consternation stalking through our streets, and hundreds of poor but industrious men, even on the second day of the embargo, standing without any employment, suing for some means of earning a day’s support for their family, let them imagine this state of things, protracted a few months, and judge of the consequences. Will they be supportable? It is evident from the tone of the National Intelligencer, and corroborated by all the letters we have seen from Washington, that the embargo is to last, until its effects are felt across the Atlantic.—If so, it must continue many months. Can it be borne with dignity and patience?—We have given, in all, towards twenty millions of dollars, to prevent the French from owning territories in our neighbourhood. It is now confidently asserted that Buonaparté has made arrangements, in his way, with the government of Spain, to cede him the Floridas! Thus, after wasting our treasury, and incurring an enormous debt, to secure the management of our own affairs without interruption, we are to have a French colony bordering with us upon the Atlantic. It is as evident as any thing can be, that with such a territory running so far beyond them as our Louisiana possessions, we are more exposed, and less able to defend ourselves than ever. Thus ends the miserable policy of attempting to attain security by purchasing the ground that a suspected and meddling tenant might occupy.”—Now, this seems to me to be a pretty good answer to A. B. of the Morning Chronicle, to Mr.

Roscoe, upon the same subject ; and to Mr. Alexander Baring, M. P. who has written a long and most soporific pamphlet in defence of the conduct of America, under the guise of an examination into our conduct towards America. I recollect something of the author of this pamphlet, and of his connections ; and, I would beg leave to suggest to him, that M. P. after his name, should, in candour, be followed by any titles which he may choose to attach to those connections ; for, it is by no means fair that the reader should see but one side of him. This is a proper man, indeed, to answer Mr. Spence ! We see no "melancholy effects" following embargo here. We do not see a picture like that described above. It is easy to conceive how the Orders in Council will affect Mr. Baring, but Mr. Baring is not England ; nor can he be considered as an impartial judge in the case. It has been stated by the ministers, that the Orders of Council have *not* diminished the commerce of England. I wish they may ; but, I am sure they will make misery enough in Spain and Portugal, and that they will produce most serious inconvenience in France, and in every country under her controul. Napoleon's ministers call upon the *chemists* to find out something to answer the purpose of sugar and coffee ; and I have heard of a project for making grass into beef in France, without the help of the stomach of an ox. One is just as probable as the other. Let us try these Orders for a year or two. Let us try the sovereignty of the sea ; and, I am very much deceived, if, at the end of that time, Napoleon will not be disposed to make a *real* peace with us. The contest now, is that of England against all the rest of Europe. A few years of this will give quite a new turn to men's minds ; it will make the idea of being a match for all the world familiar to us, which will be infinitely more valuable than all the commerce of all the Barings and of every body else. I can easily conceive an apology for such a person as Mr. Baring. Men brought up, from their infancy, to count their gains, must be expected to feel most sensibly any measure by which their gains are diminished. They may write and advise what is hostile to the interests of their country, and yet be very honest men ; because they see things through a false medium. Their gains they identify with their country's good ; and, when their gains are diminished by any measure, they naturally conclude that such measure is injurious to the country. For my part, I am satisfied, that the Orders of Council are well calculated to promote the permanent

interests of England, and being so satisfied, I embarrass myself but very little as to the effects which they may have upon individuals, especially such as are so closely connected with other countries as to render them less than half Englishmen.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT.—The subjects of the greatest interest, which have been brought before parliament, since the publication of my last remarks thereon, are, first, the *Danish Expedition* ; second, the intended motion upon *India Affairs* ; third, the *Curates' Suspension Bill* ; fourth, the *Droits of Admiralty*.—A motion similar to that made in the Commons, was made in the House of Lords, relative to the Danish Expedition ; that is to say, a motion for the production of the papers, or information, upon which the expedition was undertaken, it being alledged by the "gentlemen opposite," that positive proof of the hostile disposition of Denmark, or, at least, of the intention, and the power, of France, to seize the Danish fleet, was necessary to justify our conduct towards the former power. In this debate, the "gentlemen opposite" certainly had the best end of the argument ; because the ministers, very unwisely, had, at several stages of the proceeding, talked of such information as the grounds of their measure ; whereas, if they had rested their justification solely upon the notorious circumstances of the case, they would have been plagued with none of these discussions ; the common sense of the country being with them, they might have left their opponents to indulge in their unavailing accusations. But, not only did their timidity ; their want of courage to defend the measure upon the only solid ground, lead them to pretend to have received positive information ; they did not stop here, and say, that we cannot reveal this information, without great injury to the public service, but, in the debate in the House of Commons, Mr. Canning did produce papers ; that is to say, he read parts of letters from Mr. Garlike, our late minister at Copenhagen, and also of letters from Lord Hutchinson ; and, having done this, it appeared impossible to give any good reason why the whole of the correspondences should not be produced. Motions were, therefore, made for this purpose ; and though they were negatived, as all motions against the minister are, I think, however odd it may seem ; though these motions were negatived, the public could see no reason whatever for the refusal, it appearing manifestly unjust, that you should tell me

that the exposition of the correspondence would be injurious to the nation, at the very moment that you yourself read from it those parts which suit your purpose. Here we have an instance of the mischievous effects of that eternal desire to triumph in debate. There was not the least necessity for the reading of the papers in question. The speech of Mr. Canning, without any other facts to state than such as were notorious, and needed only to be brought together, and placed in a strong light before the public, was quite sufficient. Not sufficient to satisfy every man, perhaps; but, certainly ninety-nine men out of every hundred. But, this was not enough. There must be a debating triumph, and this triumph, like most triumphs gained by unfair means, has been but very short-lived.—It was curious, however, to hear the language of the Outs, upon this occasion. They were quite indignant that Mr. Garlike's correspondence had been misrepresented, which misrepresentation might injure his fair fame in foreign countries. They did not make the motions, or the speeches, you would have thought, for any purpose connected with a desire to harass their rivals in the race of profit and power; no, but from a deep sense of the injustice, which had been done to this gentleman, who, they were under great apprehensions, might, by the courts abroad, be suspected of having said one thing to them and another thing to his own government; rather than leave him in which predicament, they would almost snuff martyrdom, as far, at least, as martyrdom could be inflicted by the hearing of long speeches. Generous souls! I dare say, that Mr. Garlike, who, though he is said to be a most accomplished diplomatic minister, may know little about St. Stephen's, was overpowered with such an amazing display of generosity; but, if he be wise, he will leave it to be, like other righteous deeds, its own reward.—Lord Hutchinson stood in need of no defender. He spoke for himself; and, he not only cleared up the misrepresentation, which, as he stated, had been made with respect to his letters, but told a long story, gave a detailed narrative, of his conversations with the Emperor Alexander, naming, however, as far as it proved any thing, that the war with Russia was *not* *predicated* by the Danish expedition, though he thought it was *hastened* by that measure. But, of what use was it to give us the words, or the opinions of that Autocrat? What are his sayings and opinions to us? Is he the only judge, or any judge at all, of what is necessary to the

safety of England? But, now that he is the avowed enemy of this country, he is with some people, become a very wise man, and, I suppose, they will soon begin to think, that his government is an admirable one. Nay, complaints are made against the press for abusing him. It is very true, that the base hirelings, who had applauded him to the skies but a few days before, did, the moment he had made the peace of Til-it, begin to assail him in a most unmerciful manner, not forgetting to hint, that a repetition of the effect of poor Paul's "two penny-worth of whipcord" might be of sovereign utility. This was very base, certainly; but, from us, who always thought justly of him; who always held him and his armies in a proper degree of estimation; who always abhorred the idea of relying upon him and his slaves for the preservation of the independence of England; from us, all that can be expected is, that we should now abstain from downright abuse of him, being perfectly at liberty to laugh at him as much as we please. It would appear, that there is something contagious in the touch of princes. Most men, who have been admitted to converse with them, become their eulogists; and yet, as far as I have been able to verify facts; as far as the public conduct of princes can warrant the forming of an opinion, I can discover no other general cause for this than that of vanity, the vanity, the empty vanity, of being considered as the friend of a prince; as if that alone were any thing honourable; as if it added to the importance of the person professing such friendship. Two countrymen being in a wood, where King William was hunting, said the one to the other, in a tone of exaltation, "the king rode so close by me that he almost knocked me down."—"Aye," said the other, "but he spoke to me."—"Indeed! what did he say?"—"Why he said, with such a noble voice, *stop out of the way, you son of a*—" The vanity here displayed was not at all more contemptible and ridiculous than that which we daily witness in persons who have not the same apology that might be made for these poor woodmen.—During these debates, relative to the Danish Expedition, Marquis Wellesley, according to the newspaper reports, made a *long* speech, in which he dwelt much upon the unprincipled ambition of Napoleon; upon the ravages of his conquests, and his total contempt of all the principles upon which nations have hitherto acted towards one another. This was all very true; but, I am afraid, that the noble Marquis will see, that, notwithstanding all the violences and crimes

of Napoleon, he will not only escape (for a while at least) with impunity; but will be flattered and caressed; that, not only will he be suffered to enjoy the fruits of all his dethronings and plunderings and murders, but that all these will receive a sort of legal sanction, by and by when we come to make peace, in like manner, the noble Marquis will see, as a notorious strumpet is, by the ceremony of marriage (when she has the good luck to find a man base enough to marry her) "made an honest woman," and, if she chance to have a rich or powerful husband, becomes an object of praise and admiration. Nay, it would not at all astonish me, if Napoleon, thus purified, were to set up for a satirist of tyranny and plunder, verifying the old saying, that "the 'greatest rogue cries rogue first.'" But, let us hope, with the noble Marquis, that, in the end, justice will take place; that, out of this unnatural state of things, will arise, some how or other, the means of inflicting vengeance upon the heads of all those, who are now able to set law and justice at defiance.—The second subject of parliamentary debate, which it appears to me necessary to notice, is a motion, or rather intended motion of Lord Folkestone, relative to *India Affairs*, and particularly, as it would seem, to the transactions in Oude, first brought forward by Mr. Paull. His lordship proposes to confine himself to the moving of certain resolutions, expressive of the opinion of parliament, as to those transactions; but, Mr. Tierney, and the rest of the "gentlemen opposite," are for a committee of inquiry; they are for a regular *set to*, and not for a single motion, which will get rid of the matter at once; they are for bout after bout, making, in the whole, a grand combat. The most interesting point, connected with this discussion, will be, however, to see in what manner the "gentlemen opposite" will take the matter up. The public cannot have forgotten the manner, in which, *while in office*, they treated Mr. Paull; the means which they made use of to thwart all his endeavours to institute a fair inquiry into these very transactions. They have now no other information to go upon, than what he wrung from them with almost as much difficulty as he would have got one of their places; and, if they proceed at all, they must proceed upon that, for which they are indebted to him, after having subscribed their hundreds of pounds, for the purpose of keeping him out of parliament, that he might no longer have the power to torment them with this very subject, and after having treated him with such intolerable arro-

gance and injustice, when, at a later period, he had the indiscretion to put himself within the reach of their fangs. For this, amongst other things, I was glad to see them overthrown; and, if ever there was perfect justice done to men, upon this earth, it is that which they have experienced at the hands of the Wellesleys, who, the moment the king's determination was known, voted against them, to a man, and are now amongst the most formidable of their opponents. It will, indeed, be curious to see how the "gentlemen opposite" will now take this matter up. The eyes of the public will be, as they well know, fixed steadily upon them; and, for myself, I give them my word, that I will not fail to do my best, in order to enable my readers to judge of their conduct now, compared with their conduct, as connected with the same subject, in 1806.—The *Curates' Suspension Bill* has made no great figure in the report of the debates; but it relates to a matter very particularly worthy of public attention. The history of it is this: In 1796, an act was passed, having for its object the bettering of the situation of curates of the established church; but, into the same act, after it got to the Lords, was interwoven a clause, making a former benefice voidable, in case the incumbent accepted of a perpetual curacy, augmented by Queen Anne's bounty. Before this act was passed, a perpetual curacy might be legally held with any other benefice or benefices. Nothing could be more reasonable than this provision; because the intention of the augmentation of the revenue of the perpetual curacies, was, to make it sufficient for the maintenance of a clergyman. Nevertheless, the act being generally considered as containing nothing but provisions relating to *stipendiary* curates, there did, with respect to the clause just spoken of, a general ignorance prevail. Under the influence of this ignorance, the Rev. James Scott was, in 1805, nominated to the perpetual curacy of Titley, in Herefordshire, having, in 1801, been presented to the rectory of Brampton Bryan, in the same county, by his brother-in-law, Lord Oxford, with whose consent and approbation he accepted of the perpetual curacy. In 1806 (Mr. Scott being out of England, as chaplain of a king's ship), Lord Oxford, finding that, in consequence of the act of 1796, his brother-in-law had, by accepting the curacy, to which acceptance he had given his consent, forfeited the living of Brampton Bryan (the latter being worth seven times, perhaps, as much as the former); took advantage thereof, and presented another person

to the living. To prevent the effect of this, a bill was brought in, and passed, during the last session of parliament, suspending the effect of the above-mentioned clause in the act of 1790; and, the bill, just now passed, repeals that suspension; so that Mr. Scott loses his living.——With respect to the suspension bill, it was not at all more unjust than the suspension bill passed in 1800, or 1801, relative to non-residence, which professedly had an effect upon past actions, and was to all intents and purposes, *a law after the fact*; or, what the “learned” call, an *ex post facto* law. But, I am not pleading its defence; and, I should have voted for its repeal, especially as it appears that Mr. Scott, having two benefices with cure of souls, left them both, while he went even out of the kingdom, no matter in what capacity, but, in fact, in a capacity which gave him a third clerical income, in doing which, though he has but too many, whose example he can plead, it is, I think, impossible for any one to justify him. Yet, what shall be said of Lord Oxford? He first gives him the living; he next gives his consent and approbation to the acceptance of the curacy; and, then, he avails himself of a clause in an act of parliament, of which Mr. Scott, at least, was ignorant, to take from him the living, worth seven times, nay, I believe, ten times, as much as the curacy. I think, I may safely defy any one to cite me any thing to match this transaction. The subject admits not of amplification. There can be no comment upon it which would not weaken the impression produced by the bare facts. The only point, upon which a doubt can possibly arise, is, whether Lord Oxford did actually give his consent and approbation to the acceptance of the curacy by Mr. Scott; and, if we were to place no reliance upon the assertion of Mr. Scott, undenied by Lord Oxford, still the undeniable fact, that Lord Oxford himself, upon Mr. Scott's acceptance of the curacy, became his tenant of the tythes belonging to the curacy, would completely remove all doubt; for, as Mr. Scott states, in his petition, it is “the strongest proof of the knowledge, assent, and privity” of Lord Oxford, to the nomination and appointment of Mr. Scott to the curacy.——Such was the opinion which Mr. Scott's curate at Brampton Bryan entertained of the transaction, that he, though, probably, a very poor man, refused, it seems, to accept of the living; and, it was not until some time had been spent in the search, that an acceptor was found, in the person of a Rev. Mr. Graham, whose readiness to show his obedience

to the law was the subject of high eulogium with the Archbishop.——The *Droits of Admiralty* would, if we had room, form a most copious subject, which, for the present, I shall content myself with merely opening——At a time, when we are called upon to sacrifice our “last shilling and our last drop of blood,” it becomes our duty to enquire into how *millions* are expended. The Royal family, in all its branches, have an abundance allowed from the taxes, without any occasional grants at all. The aggregate of the sum is immense, and makes no trifling figure when compared with the sum necessary to maintain twelve hundred thousand poor.——We are told, that these *Droits of Admiralty* are very ancient; and so were many things now no longer in existence. For every innovation that is to diminish our liberties or to encroach upon our property, an apology is founded upon the altered circumstances of the times and the world. Well, then, why are we not to make the same plea for a change with respect to these *droits of admiralty*? If we look back, I'll warrant we shall find, that, during all the preceding reigns, from the Norman conquest downwards, the *droits of admiralty* have not amounted to a sum so large as that of the present reign alone.——But, there are so many important considerations that present themselves as appertaining to this subject, that I will not attempt to enter upon them here.——Below I insert the debate, as I find it in the *Morning Chronicle*, being anxious to give to every thing connected with this matter as extensive and as speedy a circulation as possible.——The reader will not fail to notice what Mr. Sheridan says about the *Prince of Wales*. There will be few of the grants that will not find an advocate in one, or in another; and, if the enquiry was in any other hands than those of Sir Francis Burdett, I should expect to see it die away in smoke.

DROITS OF ADMIRALTY.

Debate, in the House of Commons, 11th Feb. 1808, as given in the Morning Chronicle.

SIR F. BURDETT rose, in pursuance of notice, to make his motion relative to the captured property at the disposal of the crown. He thought it unnecessary, in the first instance, to enter upon any detail. It appeared to him, that these accounts being intended as a ground of parliamentary proceeding, must be granted of course. He would, therefore, for the present, simply move, that there be laid before the house an account of all captures by his Majesty's Naval Forces, since the year 1792, claimed to be, or

remaining at the disposal of the crown; stating the amount of each capture, the net proceeds, and the application up to this day.—THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, that it was almost impossible, if not entirely so, to make up an account of such individual captures. Much of the proceeds of these captures had accrued to the king, not *jure coronæ*, but in his capacity of lord high Admiral. A great part had been given to the captors, and the whole was as much the property of his majesty as the appropriated portion of the Civil List. Whatever might be the policy of this, the house had sanctioned it. Unquestionably, if bad advice was given to the crown in the disposal of this money, that would be a good ground for parliamentary inquiry: but, considered as a fund, the house could not intermeddle in the application of it. When this sum had grown to a large amount, grants had been made out of it for the public service. Grants had certainly been made out of it at different times to the younger branches of the royal family: but this was so far from being illegal, that he doubted whether it would be considered by any as an improper application. The hon. baronet had a right to know what had been the proceeds since 1792, and what was the amount at present. But as he had alleged no instance of misapplication, he ought not at this moment, to insist upon an account of the application. It would be sufficient for him, therefore, to confine himself to the other points at present, and afterwards move for any further information, when he had examined the papers, and stated any grounds for desiring farther information.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT had no objection to follow the line chalked out to him by the right hon. gent. for the great object he had in view at this time was to have the amount before the house. He had not, indeed, as yet stated any facts of misapplication; yet he apprehended the house would not endure that so large a sum should be at the disposal of the crown, without any inquiry, even although it should be admitted that the crown had the legal right, of which, however, considerable doubts were entertained.—SIR CHARLES POLE expressed his approbation of the motion of the hon. baronet, for all his reflections on the subject convinced him that the admiralty court ought to be upon a new footing.—THE ADVOCATE GENERAL observed, that the admiralty court had nothing to do with the subject of this motion. Before the house proceeded any further in it, it was proper that it should know what grounds could be made out for an inquiry. The captured pro-

perty came to the king in a double capacity. That which was seized before the declaration of war, and the issuing of letters of marque and reprisals, belonging to him *jure coronæ*. That which was captured afterwards was his as lord high admiral, whose rights accrued to the crown when the office was put into commission. But it was the custom to give up what part belonged to him in this capacity, or, after the issuing of reprisals, to the captors. Another species of property was that which was captured in port, or by such as were not licensed captors. This was properly the *droits* of the admiralty, and belonging to the king in virtue of the office of high admiral. In 1795, when the French made an irruption in Holland, encouragement was held out to the inhabitants to remove to a neutral country, and if they did this, the property detained here on that occasion was to be restored to them. But as they had not done this, it was condemned to the crown as taken before reprisals. The Spanish property seized before reprisals in 1796, was also condemned as the *droits* of the admiralty. On the breaking out of the war in May, 1803, hostilities were not commenced against Holland till the 16th of June following; Dutch property, however, was detained in the mean time, and afterwards condemned as prize to the crown. Spanish, Prussian, and Danish property was condemned under similar circumstances, the captors having no claim; and in case of a convention to restore it at the end of the war, the crown would be bound to do so. But no convention of that sort existed, and consequently the property remained at the disposal of the crown. Then how was it applied? A moiety, or perhaps two-thirds was granted as a reward to the captors—a circumstance that must be pleasing to the hon. baronet (Pole) who was so anxious for the interests of the naval service. Another part had been applied to the relief of the public exigencies of the state, to the extent of two millions—one having been granted some time ago and another lately. Part had been applied to the relief of those who had suffered from the breaking out of the war. The Spanish government had sequestered property belonging to this country, which, by a stipulation in the treaty of Amiens, they had engaged to restore. This was not done, and some of the captured property belonging to the crown, was applied to the relief of the sufferers. Another part had been granted to captors who had not been allowed to act under the ordinary discretionary powers; and another to those who had suffered from the insolvency of

captors. These had been the different modes in which this property had been disposed of. But he did not by any means wish to keep out of view, that a very small part of it had, out of his Majesty's grace and liberality, been conferred on the younger branches of his family. Was he the only father in the kingdom who was not to be allowed to make grants out of funds, appertaining to him by law, to his own children? If any thought so, he was not ashamed to say that he differed from him. The house would dispose of the motion as it pleased, but no instance of misapplication had been stated—no grounds of inquiry had been laid. The house was competent, certainly, to go into such an inquiry, but in his opinion no reason had been assigned for the exercise of its right on the present occasion.—MR. LUSHINGTON perfectly agreed with the last speaker, that this motion had no reference to the Admiralty Court. He also agreed with him in the greater part of what he said relative to the right of the crown to this property; but differed from him materially as to constant propriety of the application. One instance of misapplication he would state to the house. An hon. baronet (Sir H. Popham) whom he saw in his place, had, in the year 1767, obtained leave of absence on half pay from the naval service, in which he was then a lieutenant. He went to Ostend, and there procured a ship, the *El Etrusco*, bearing the Imperial flag, in which he freighted a cargo for the East Indies. He there exchanged his vessel for an American ship, and carried a cargo to Canton in China; having taken in a fresh cargo there, of which a French supercargo at Canton had a share, he sailed first for Ireland, and from that to Dungeness, where he landed goods, or, in plain English, smuggled them [Hear! hear! and laughter]. Lieut. Bowen of the *Brilliant* frigate, Capt. Robinson, seized the ship in Ostend Roads, after a person had escaped on shore with part of the goods. This vessel was brought to judgment in the Admiralty Court. During the proceedings, the hon. baronet claimed his share of the cargo and freight; but when it became necessary to serve a process of the Court upon him, he was not to be found, and, in short, had absconded. The ship was condemned; but for all the trouble, the inconvenience, and loss of time occasioned in the prosecution of the business, Captain Robinson did not receive one shilling. Yet afterwards, in consequence of a Treasury Warrant, signed by the Marquis of Blandford and Mr. Long, founded upon a report for that purpose, re-

instantly signed by the right hon. gent. (the Advocate-General) £25,000, was restored to the hon. baronet [Hear! hear!] being the amount of his claim, and that too without deducting from it any of the expenses of the process. It was some time, indeed, before the right hon. gent. (the Advocate-General) could be induced to give a recommendation to this effect, and his scruples were highly to his credit. These circumstances formed part of the Records of the Admiralty Court, but he had only received the papers that morning. Here, then, was an application of a large sum as a reward for a violation of the laws of the country. He was glad, therefore, that a disposition appeared to examine this subject, but he thought the business would be very imperfectly done unless the house attended to the application of the money, which was, perhaps, the most material point of the whole.—SIR H. POPHAM observed, that having been thus personally attacked, he could not but offer a few observations in his own vindication. Although, if the hon. gent. who had thrown out such aspersions as had never been used in that house, had given him any previous intimation of his intention to bring forward circumstances in which he was particularly concerned, he would have been better prepared to meet his statement. He would, however, now advert to a plain and well known fact. The house would recollect he went to the East Indies at a period of profound peace, and had been there employed in the service of the East India Company. If the hon. gent. would consult the records of the India House, he would find that lord Cornwallis, the Governor General, and the Council, had recommended him strongly to the Court of Directors, and said that he had deserved that the Directors should apply to the Admiralty to promote him. He had besides received acknowledgments and presents for his services. He was not, surely, the only British Officer who had gone on board a neutral vessel in order to acquire knowledge and skill in his profession. It was singular that the hon. gent. should select him as an object to attack for what had been so generally done. Surely his exertions in India must have been very extraordinary [a laugh] to induce the Governor and Council to recommend him so strongly, and to produce this particular attack. Perhaps he was sorry that he had gone out under a foreign flag; many might, in a moment of disappointment, do things which they might afterwards disapprove. But he trusted that he would never violate the laws of his country, nor resort to smuggling without there being

something in the case which would do away the essence and effect of the offence. He hoped this matter would be fully inquired into, and thoroughly sifted, that the House might be enabled to judge upon a complete view of all the circumstances.—Mr. SHERIDAN fully agreed with the hon. captain, that after the attack which had been made upon him, the matter ought not to rest there. It was due both to the house and him, that the matter should be investigated. He also agreed, that his hon. friend behind him might have given some notice of his intention; but then it was to be observed that he had only read the papers that morning, and had stated the facts upon an occasion which had suddenly arisen. But if it was necessary to have this affair inquired into, upon the statement of his hon. friend, it was much more so after the defence of the hon. captain. He said, he had, like other officers, entered, in time of peace, on board a foreign vessel, to acquire additional skill in his profession. But how did other officers engage in these services? They were employed entirely in their own profession—but who ever heard of their taking advantage of a foreign flag to trade to the East Indies, and land teas at Dungeness?—The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER rose to order. It was not consistent with any rules of order or justice, that a conversation should be carried on so long that had only arisen collaterally; and that personal attacks should thus be made on an individual, without giving him any notice, or allowing him time to prepare his defence. To what purpose was this carried on? There was no motion on that particular question before the house; and it was impossible that such a statement, unauthorised as it was, could be a sufficient ground for calling, in the first instance, for an account of the application of the sums arising from captured property belonging to the crown. He hoped the right honourable gentleman himself would thank him for interrupting him; and he also hoped that an opportunity would be afforded of fully considering the case which had occasioned this deviation from the main object.—Mr. SHERIDAN rose again, but not, he said, to complain of the Chancellor of the Exchequer having interrupted him; on the contrary, he should now abstain from any further comment on the hon. captain's (Sir Home Popham) defence—at the same time, Mr. Sheridan shewed, that he had been perfectly in order, and now only deferred his argument from a principle of delicacy, understanding the Chancellor of the Exchequer to agree with the hon. captain, that a further

and full investigation was absolutely necessary. After what had passed, after the charge so distinctly and forcibly made, and urged by a member in his place, it was absolutely necessary to the character and honour of the hon. captain, but what was of more importance, it was essential to the character and honour of the House that such an investigation should take place.—Mr. Sheridan then said, he should add only a few words on that part of the question which related to the *application* of the money arising from these *Droits of Admiralty*. He had no hesitation in saying that he not only did not censure, but he cordially concurred in, and approved of that part of the application this day avowed by his Majesty's Judge Advocate, namely, his majesty's gracious gifts to the younger branches of his illustrious Family. No member but must feel that their incomes never had, under the pressure of the times, been adequate to the expenditure imposed upon them by their rank and situation, and he had never heard any charge of wanton extravagance preferred against any one of the illustrious individuals alluded to. So far was he, therefore, from objecting to these acts of his majesty's paternal generosity, he only lamented that his majesty's royal munificence had been confined to the younger branches of his august family. Had the heir apparent participated in it, he believed the house and the country would have not merely been satisfied, but gratified; [hear! hear!] for never must it be forgotten, that the Prince had an unliquidated claim, which, greatly to his honour, feeling for the public burthen, and the difficulty of the times, had been, by his royal highness's express desire, suspended, but not abandoned, (he meant the arrears of the Duchy of Cornwall): that debt still remained indisputably due, either from the sovereign or the public; and, towards the discharge of that debt, he could not conceive an application of the funds now under discussion, more grateful to the people, than in part directing them towards that object. His majesty's munificence towards the younger branches of his august family, was an act of bounty, in the latter case it would be an act, not of bounty merely, but of justice.—THE ADVOCATE GENERAL said, that this property was not properly condemned to the crown, but came by a forfeiture, which on good grounds might justly be remitted. The ground on which he recommended the grant to the hon. captain, was this. He had gone to Ostend, and from that sailed under a foreign flag to India. If he was restrained as a British subject from doing so

by the law of his country, unquestionably this was a violation of it. But it was perfectly well known to the Indian government, that he was there, and it was the policy at that time to encourage exportation from India in foreign vessels. Whatever offence had been committed, was against the East India Company, and as they had by implication remitted it, he thought himself justified in recommending the remission of the forfeiture.—**MR. TIERNEY** called the right hon. gent. to order, as he was entering upon a defence of the hon. captain, instead of confining himself to the facts for his own justification.—Some discussion arose here about the question under discussion, whether it was the original motion or the amendment suggested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and in some measure assented to? —**SIR FRANCIS BURDETT** however, now refused to withdraw his motion. The apparent fairness of the right hon. gent. opposite, had led him rather to assent to his amendment at first, because his object was to get an account of the large sum at the disposal of the crown, without the controul of Parliament, thinking this a sufficient ground for an enquiry. But since the gross and flagrant instance of misapplication, stated by the hon. gent. behind, had come to his knowledge, he considered the application as the most important part of the subject, and must persevere in his original intention. He should abandon his duty if he withdrew his motion, and he doubted, if the house would allow him were he so inclined.—The discussion thus of course proceeded on the original motion.—**THE ADVOCATE GENERAL** proceeded to state the grounds on which he had recommended the remission of the forfeiture. It amounted to this, that the company themselves had, by employing the hon. captain in making soundings, and by giving him presents, &c. recognized his right of going to India, as much as if they had given him a licence. The only question was, whether, under these circumstances, the forfeiture ought not to be restored, and it had been determined that it ought.—**MR. LUSHINGTON** disclaimed all idea of reflecting upon the right hon. gent., who, he was well informed, had acted in this business reluctantly. In his own justification, he stated, that he had heard the facts long ago, but doubting whether they had been accurately stated, he had from hearing the notice of yesterday, applied at the proper place this morning, and seen the documents. He thought himself in duty called upon to make the statement, in opposition to the assertions on the other side, that there had been no

misapplication of the Admiralty Droits.—**MR. BRAND** said, that the opposition to the account of application convinced him, that it ought not to be dropped. The misapplication had been proved in one instance, at least in a statement that had arisen out of the partial communications on the other side of the manner in which these sums were applied. They appeared to have a consciousness that all was not right on that score.—**MR. HUSKISSON** then moved the Amendment proposed by his right hon. friend, That an Account be produced of the Net Proceeds of the captures, &c. since 1793, together with the Balances in hand.—**THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER** said, that the only difference between himself and the hon. baronet was as to the production of an account of the application. He contended that this was not necessary, till a misapplication was stated. One instance had been mentioned, —but it had not been proved; and came rather under the description of a forfeiture which had been remitted—a thing that was very common.—**MR. ADAM** said that it would be wiser to call only for the amount of the sum in the first instance; neither of the motions would include the case which had been adverted to. This ought to be investigated, but in order to get at it, a motion must be made for an account of the forfeitures remitted.—**SIR CHARLES POLE** observed, that neither of the motions were so full as he could wish. He stated that it often happened that ten years elapsed between the capture and the time the captors could get their prize money. In such cases prize money was of no use.—**SIR FRANCIS BURDETT** said, that his motion was sufficiently comprehensive to include all that was material at present.—The house then divided. For the original Motion 57. For the Amendment 82.

MR. ARTHUR YOUNG

ON

AGRICULTURE, MANUFACTURES, AND COMMERCE.

SIR,—I have read with much attention the several papers which have appeared in your Journal, upon the subject of trade and manufacture, under the title of *Perish Commerce*; and, I have considered with equal attention the essay recommended by you, and written with great ingenuity by Mr. Spence; but, I must confess myself to be very far removed from that sort of conviction, which you seem to think should flow from his reasoning: the same doctrines were warmly debated about forty years ago in France, and in my opinion sufficiently re-

futed by various writers both in England and on the Continent. The controversy lasted a considerable time; but it has slept for above thirty years; the Economists gave the name of *Physiocratie* to their science, which engaged the pens of many extremely able men whose works abound with observations equally luminous and important, but involved in such a cloud of verbiage, and perplexed with such a jargon of terms, technical in their science, that the large measure of liberality and truth is to be separated from much error, and many mistakes: the leading points which those writers laboured to prove, were

I. That agriculture is the only source of national wealth.

II. That manufactures and commerce add nothing to national riches.

III. That as agriculture pays all taxes, let them be imposed in whatever manner they may, all should be laid, in the first instance, on land.

These are the doctrines which Mr. Spence and you, Sir, have undertaken to re-establish, with some variations, in a series of papers which manifest great powers of intellect, and vigour of expression. I have waited in earnest expectation of seeing some of your numerous correspondents examine the doctrine as a question of fact and experience, rather than one of theory and reasoning; but, as I do not perceive that any one is inclined thus to treat the subject, I am induced to send you some doubts upon it, and beg leave to refer you for more particular objections to my *Political Arithmetic* printed in 1774.

There is a measure of truth in the first of the above maxims, for a nation may exist without commerce or manufacture, but not for a moment without agriculture; but such truths are about as valuable as the ink that traces them; they are rendered interesting not from being true, but by the conclusions that are drawn from them; and the grand conclusion drawn by the Economists and agreed to, illustrated, and applied to the state of this country by yourself and Mr. Spence, forms the subject of the second of these maxims. Mr. Spence has however some observations, that apparently deviate so widely, that I must beg leave to trouble you with two or three quotations. In the following he allows nothing to commerce.

"Having thus stated the grounds of my conviction, that we derive *no national wealth whatever, from our commerce*, I proceed, &c. p. 64."

In another place he considers it as unnecessary.

"There can be no doubt then, if such be the painful nature of those opinions, which resolve our greatness into our commerce, that all those who hold such opinions, would be highly gratified to have their fallacy proved to them. They would doubtless be rejoiced to have it convincingly made out, that our greatness is independent of our commerce; and that our glory and our prosperity need not suffer diminution, even though we had infinitely less trade than we have, p. 9."

But, from the utmost attention I can give to the chain of Mr. Spence's reasoning, I cannot see the consistency of such opinions with other passages in his work, which apparently militate directly against them. Thus he says,

"The value obtained in foreign markets for the manufactures which a nation exports, resolves itself into the value of the food which has been expended in manufacturing them, and the profit of the master manufacturer, and the exporting merchant. These profits are undoubtedly national profit. Thus, when a lace manufacturer has been so long employed in the manufacturing a pound of flax into lace, that his subsistence during that period, has cost £30, this sum is the real worth of the lace; and if it be sold at home, whether for £30 or £60, the nation is, as has been shown, no richer for this manufacture. But if this lace be exported to another country, and there sold for £60, it is undeniable that the exporting nation has added £30 to its wealth by its sale, since the cost to it was only £30, p. 43."

And again more decisively,

"An attention to facts will prove in opposition to the opinion of the Economistes, that in Britain agriculture has thriven only in consequence of the influence of manufactures; and that the increase of this influence, is requisite to its further extension, p. 22."

That manufactures are nothing more than a transmutation of food into fabrics, was started and amplified by the Economistes; Mr. Spence thus adopts it,

"None of this wealth, however, could with truth be said to have been brought into existence by the manufacturer, for as the land proprietor had given in exchange for the produce of the manufacturers labour, an equal value in food, which no longer remained in existence, all the merit which could justly be conceded to the latter, would be his having transmuted wealth of so pe-

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valuable a nature as food, into the more durable wealth of manufactures. p. 18."

Now, Sir, it seems to me only necessary to oppose some of these passages to each other, in order to shew, I will not say a direct contradiction, but at least ground sufficient for a suspicion that there must be some degree of uncertainty in the combinations whence such conclusions are drawn; and that the subject has not been examined with that attention which its importance demands. The error may perhaps be found in the transmutation idea; the food is admitted to be wealth, wealth flowing from agriculture, the fabrics are wealth, but still agricultural wealth; as it has been no more than a transmutation; but, I contend that it is a creation; and not by the farmer who cultivates, but by the manufacturer who demands. Without the demand the food would have never been produced; the cause of producing is in the consumer, much more than in the cultivator; who is a machine employed to make a commodity demanded, and becomes a machine that has lost its wheels if that demand ceases. A machine that would not, as to present importance, have had any existence had not such demand arisen. If I understand Mr. Spence in the passage quoted from p. 22, he will not deny it, inconsistent as it may seem with the general train of his reasoning.

The habits of my life for forty years, have given me a decided preference for agriculture; but, Sir, it is for an agriculture animated by a great demand; and, when I hear the sister employments depreciated which constitute that demand, I must readily confess that I am alarmed, lest the first and great basis of our national prosperity should suffer as much from its friends, as ever it did from enemies.

Mr. Spence gives the following definition of wealth; "Wealth is defined to consist in abundance of capital, of cultivated and productive land, and of those things which men usually esteem valuable. p. 11."

That abundance of cultivated and productive land is wealth, will not be easily controverted: but, let me be more explicit and affix to the word abundance, the idea of that abundance which we possess in England. Then, I presume, Mr. Spence will admit that this abundance has been created by the demand formed by manufactures and commerce, as forming two of the great parents of national consumption. This fact does away the peculiarity of one article in this definition. The other two, *capital and things usually esteemed*, belong equally to manufactures and commerce. This defini-

tion then, will not agree with the general clue of the reasoning that depreciates commerce and manufacture.

The same gentleman says, "Gold and silver are undoubtedly wealth, yet they are but a small portion of what has properly a claim to that title; and a nation which has abundance of gold and silver, is in fact, not richer than if it had none. It has paid an equal value of some other wealth for them. p. 20." There is much truth here, but it should be well discriminated. Gold and silver are expressly admitted to be wealth; but then, it is added, that a nation is not the richer for them. Is a man richer for having a grainery full of corn, far exceeding his own consumption? Why is he richer? Because he has that which will purchase every thing else. Then money is wealth for the same reason; and still more so with a nation, for foreigners will take your money, though not your paper, or corn.

The great importance of money would, perhaps, in no other circumstance be better understood, than by clearly analysing another observation of this writer, wherein he attributes all our wealth and greatness to the establishment of manufacturers as a distinct class. p. 24.

It would, however, lead me too far to give this, but if you reflect upon it, you will presently convince yourself that this step in the national progress depended absolutely on money, and could not have been taken without it.

But, Sir, it is time to come to facts, and experience; are there no facts to which we can refer? Has the progress of our commerce been so regular as not to afford some better data, than reasoning and supposition? I think a period may be found, in which a great decline in the exports and the imports of the kingdom did occur; and it seems more satisfactory to examine what were the consequences, than by any train of logical reasoning, to justify so enormous a paradox as the idea that we could now lose all our exports and imports with so small an inconvenience as you and Mr. Spence seem, in a measure, to suppose. Such a period did occur; and it has occurred but once, from 1698 to 1806. Through that long period the rise of export, and import, was gradual and almost regular, except during the American war. The exports then fell about one fourth, and it well deserves Mr. Spence's attention (for it is the circumstance to which he attaches the cure of the malady) that the imports fell nearly in an equal degree. Here then was a great experiment, and we have only to examine the result, in order to un-



derstand how far it is safe to trust to logical reasoning in questions of political economy. I was a farmer through the whole of the American war, and long before it; and experienced evils of a very different complexion from any Mr. Spence supposes; it was but a taste of the dish which this gentleman

tells us may be rendered harmless. But forbid it policy, that it should ever come again to my table! A few circumstances will give an idea of distress well worth the attention of politicians. The price of corn was ruinously low.

	Wheat.	Rye.	Barley.	Oats.	Beans.
1776.	4 9 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 4 $\frac{1}{4}$	2 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 10 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 3 $\frac{3}{4}$
1777	5 8 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 6	2 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 11 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 6 $\frac{1}{4}$
1778	5 3	3 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 10	1 10 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
1779	4 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 11	2 5 $\frac{1}{4}$	1 9	3 0
1780	4 5 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	2 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 7 $\frac{1}{4}$	2 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ *
Average	4 10 $\frac{1}{4}$	3 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 6	1 9 $\frac{3}{4}$	3 2 $\frac{1}{2}$

The products of grass were equally depressed.

Combing Wool per tod of 28lb.

	s.	d.
1778 - - - -	14	6
1779 - - - -	13	6
1780 - - - -	11	6
1781 - - - -	10	6
1782 - - - -	10	0
1783 - - - -	14	0 †

from 30 to 40 per cent. lower than for 40 years preceding †. Many farmers had 3, 4, and some even 5 years wool on hand—and the stock became so great as to keep down the prices several years after the cause had ceased to operate, thanks to the abominable police of our wool laws. The difficulty of getting rid of any live stock was great. The farmers were in such distress that labourers could find but a very partial employment, and numbers fell a burthen to the parishes. All lands not underlet before, sunk in rent considerably: an intimate friend of mine was obliged either to reduce a farm from £500 a year to £350, or suffer arrears to that amount; he preferred the former. Every species of improvement was arrested; not a shilling spent that could possibly be saved. No wonder that the price of the soil itself should be equally affected. Land fell from 30 to 20 years purchase: some was to my knowledge sold at 19.

If it be asked what occasioned so many circumstances marking distress, that admitted not of a doubt; I can only reply, that every well informed man at that time in the kingdom, attributed it to the decline of manufactures and foreign commerce. Our export trade did not sink more than one-fourth of the total; and this was attended by a corresponding fall in the imports, which

should according to Mr. Spence's principles have proved an immediate remedy: but no such matter; not the smallest effect to lessen the distress so universal in the agriculture of the kingdom. The decline in commerce and manufactures had an *immediate* effect in lowering prices, which could not be felt 6 months by any class in the state without lessening the consumption of fabrics—a reaction which again played back on the farmer, till the effect became a system of vibrations of saving from incapacity to consume. There was no visible or known transfer in consumption stated by Mr. Spence: the money or value before employed on foreign superfluities, was not transferred to different objects made at home; but the power, the means of consuming fell. Corn, cattle, and wool sunk in price, and the landlord instead of rent from many tenants, saw entries of arrears; the labourer idle, or working for low pay; the farmer with his products unsold; and the landlord with tax bills and arrears, were all people who would have spurned at the visions of comfort, had they been held forth in advice to *transfer consumption* from one object to another; *Mr. Politician, we spend all we receive; what would you have more?*

If the decline of one-fourth of our export trade (though accompanied by Mr. Spence's remedy of a decline in the imports also) had such an effect as every old man now living experienced in the American war, what should we have to expect at present from the loss of the whole! Far am I from asserting that ruin must be the consequence; but, thus much I may venture to assert, that it is not a speculation to be treated lightly, or contemplated with the complacency of political apathy; erroneous hope may be as mischievous as undue fear.

An observation is however necessary here. I do not conceive that the facts stated amount

* Annals Vol. IV. p. 391. † Annals Vol. IX. p. 332.

† lb. p. 456.

to the least proof, that any naval war at present would be attended with such an effect; and this for reasons so obvious, that to enlarge upon them would be useless.

Before yourself, Sir, or Mr. Spence are ready to determine that the annihilation of commerce would not be attended with extremely pernicious effects, let us examine what it amounts to.

British produce and manufacture exported in

1804	-	-	-	£40,349,642
1805	-	-	-	41,008,942
1806	-	-	-	43,242,176

Of which, produce makes about 2 millions*.

Imports into Great Britain in 1806.

Northern European produce	-	£4,431,754
Southern European	-	2,542,740
American and colonial	-	12,085,899
Irish produce and manufactures	-	3,245,742
British fisheries	-	469,146
Prize goods	-	735,938
Sandries	-	1,482,870

Exclusive of East Indies† - 25,094,089
1807.

Imports from the East Indies } £
and China in 1804 ‡ - } 5,214,621

British and foreign shipping employed in the trade of Great Britain in 1806.

Entered inwards.	Ships.	Tons.
British	-	12,110 §
Foreign	-	3,792
		612,800

Tons of Shipping belonging to the Ports of the British Empire.

1794	-	1,589,758
1804	-	2,268,570¶

1806 Exported exclusive of produce - - - 41,242,176

Re exportation of imported commodities ** - 9,124,479

59,366,655

The exportation trade or foreign commerce of the kingdom, without saying any

* See the account ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, April 8, 1807.

† Account ordered to be printed April 8, 1807.

‡ Ordered to be printed April 18, 1806.

§ Navigated by 88,963 seamen.

|| Account ordered to be printed April 8,

¶ Account ordered to be printed April 15, 1806.

** Paper ordered to be printed the 18 April, 1806.

thing of imports, amounts to the value of fifty millions at the lowest, employs 12,000 ships, and near 90,000 seamen. Were it possible here to detail the innumerable links of this immense chain, which ties together the manufactures and commerce of the kingdom, and animates the exertion of every farmer in Britain, we should think that man bold, and that politician a daring one, who can speak lightly of such an annihilation, or can dream of rolling at pleasure, so mighty a tide into any new and imaginary channels.

Add the exports and imports together, the amount is

1806 Exports	-	-	43,242,176
Imports	-	-	25,094,089
China, &c. 1804	-	-	5,214,621
			73,550,886

The imports must include the payment of the seamen, but not in the exports; half the amount at £50. - - 2,250,000

75,800,886

£10 per ton, estimated to last 12 years £1,235,343. We know not the proportion employed by foreign trade, if half, it will be * - - 617,671

76,418,557

It would demand too much time to carry the estimate as far as it would go, but whether it be 70 millions or 80, the conclusions must be nearly the same. It may be useful to consider any such amount in comparison with the grand and admitted basis of national wealth, the product of the soil. Let us call the land rent 35 millions, and suppose half to be grass, and half arable: the produce of grass is usually estimated at double the rent, that of arable was formerly supposed to be treble, but we will calculate at quadruple; then the produce of the former will be 35 millions, and of the latter 70, together 105 †. The value imported and exported with the additions above noted, amount then to near three-fourths of the gross produce of the soil of England: 78 millions would be exactly so, and is more than double the land rent of the kingdom.

* In so rough an estimate it is not of consequence to be accurate, a slight inspection will shew the various items are omitted.

1,482,412 tons of shipping at

† The object before me is not an accurate estimate of products, but to accept one that has been referred to by other writers.

The immense vacuity, which would be the result of cutting off our foreign commerce, Mr. Spence fills by a dash of his pen.

"If Buonaparté succeed in destroying our export trade, our import trade must fall with it; and exactly in proportion as the former suffers, so must the latter. It is this inevitable loss of our import trade, which will supply the remedy for any evils that may affect our manufacturing class, dependent on our export commerce. When we can no longer obtain the commodities with which foreign nations have been wont to supply us, we must necessarily seek for succedaneums at home, p. 68."

"For instance, if the consumers of the articles which we import and sell at home, to fifty millions, were to resolve no longer to consume them, is it not self-evident, that if they chose, they might take the place of our foreign customers, and purchase with the fifty millions thus saved, the goods to the same amount which we now export? p. 66."

The theory of the case here supposed (for purer theory never found its way into the pages of *Utopia*!) whatever ingenuity may be found in it, proceeds upon ideas more easy to trace in paper than to realise in practice. The writer delivers it as if difficulties were out of the question, difficulties, which, even upon his own principles, and granting his own facts, do not seem to be sufficiently considered; he remarks,

"In what, then, can the sums above this amount, which are spent by the numbers in this country, who have their £10,000 and £20,000 a year, be expended but in luxuries? And, as from this consideration, it is plain, that the population of the manufacturing class, at present occupied in providing necessaries, is fully equal to fabricate all that are wanted of this description, it follows, that the additional population of this class, can only be employed in the manufacture of new luxuries, p. 39."

It appears to me that Mr. Spence here answers himself: he states truly that the demand for necessaries being supplied, our manufacturers could only be employed in providing new luxuries, but by whom are these new luxuries to be demanded? Evidently by those who have saved the amount of our imports, that is to say, those who have drank foreign wines, and tea, and consumed sugar and spices, may instead thereof consume finer cloth, carpets, hats, sticks, and gloves, &c. Did the higher classes cease to consume foreign wines, tea, sugar, and spice in the American war? Without doubt they

consumed on the average proportionably to their receipts of income: when arrears took the place of rent they ate and drank less, but did not transfer their consumption of commodities which they wanted, to more cloth and kettles, and beef which they did not want. Nor could they have done it for a very plain reason; the lessened consumption followed the decline of income, which left them nothing to transfer. Mr. Spence ought to admit the justness of this remark, as he has with much truth observed on the mischief which would follow landlords hoarding instead of consuming.

"Let us suppose, that, patriotically induced by this reflection, they resolved not to spend, but to save the £1,000,000 which their revenue amounted to. Is it not self-evident, that all those members of the manufacturing and unproductive classes, who had, directly, or indirectly, been accustomed to draw the revenue destined for their subsistence, from the expenditure of this sum, would have their power of consuming the produce of the earth diminished by the whole amount of this £1,000,000? And if so, it follows that they would be obliged to use food, both less in quantity, and deteriorated in quality. The farmer consequently, could not sell so much of his produce, nor at so good a price as before, and thus he would be incapable of paying the rent, which he had been accustomed to pay, and, in the end, the land proprietor would be as much injured by this saving scheme, as any of the other classes of society. p. 34."

It is rather surprising that a writer of Mr. Spence's abilities, while so judicious a reflection passed in his mind, should not see how directly applicable it is against his own system. If landlords by hoarding or withdrawing from circulation, would thus injure manufacturers, and by consequence farmers and themselves, if by thus persisting in saving for five years, they would, as Mr. Spence in another place observes, have no income at all, does it not by fair parity of reasoning follow, that with drawing a large portion of commercial profit and circulation, would be attended with similar effects? The deduction is direct and decisive: the inconveniences would be the same; the stagnation similar; and consumption lessened in proportion to the amount withdrawn. This I conceive is one of the weakest links in the chain of his argument; the stagnation resulting from a decline of commerce is a privation of income; consumption stagnates with income; and the first notice which the landlords would receive of a necessity of transferring their consumption from fo-

reign to domestic commodities, would be the decline of their own incomes, being an inability to consume any thing in proportion to the amount of such declension. The loss is first felt, by merchants and master manufacturers; it descends through all the classes employed by them. The farmer is next affected; then all the labourers in husbandry; then landlords, and every class in the state who are benefited by their expenditure; and in this progress of degradation the ramifications on every side spread through a thousand different professions and employments, with an unceasing reaction. In such a state of things, to suppose that any of these classes can make a pause for consideration, and determine before hand to transfer their consumption from one object to another, is an idle delusion. Every man continues his accustomed consumption till his income lessens, and the only change that takes place is his expenditure lessening with his income. We have experienced the effects of exports and imports, lessening one fourth, what then would be the effect of their annihilation altogether. If the gross produce of cultivation be stated at 105 millions, and the gross amount of manufacture and commerce as far as foreigners are concerned at 76 millions; it will surely appear a paradox well calculated to make a plain man stare, to hear it asserted that 76 millions might be withdrawn from, or transferred in such circulation of 181 millions, and that so little mischief would be the result that friends to their country could view the operation without alarm. And I should conceive that the amazement of such a plain understanding would be increased, when the explanation is given—that those who drink tea might substitute sage or balm; that those who drink wine might drink water; that tobacco being a vile weed men might leave off smoking; in a word, that those who consume commodities because they want and desire

them, might become much wiser and consume other commodities which they neither want, nor desire. Such speculations may shew, and have shewn, what great talents can effect in confounding in the minds of readers *that have been talking prose all their lives without knowing it*, the plainest dictates of common sense. But such a play of parts may be classed with panegyrics on folly, or a fever.

But, I beg leave to take another measure of this object, which a remark of your's, Sir, brings to my mind. "In no one year of the late scarcity, the corn imported from all the foreign nations put together, was more than enough to supply our wants for one week." (*Fol. XII. p. 905*)

Now, this is so far from being accurate, that the error is enormous. The imports of wheat and flour (reduced to quarters) in 1800 was 1,384,345 quarters. In 1801, it was 1,464,518 quarters. Of the 10¹ millions of our population, there may be 7 that feed on wheat; however, instead of 7 call the consumption of wheat 8 millions * of qrs. then at a full consumption in the last of those years, 1,464,000 persons lived on foreign corn; or a mean between one fifth, and one sixth of the total. The weekly consumption is 153,840 qrs. and consequently, we imported for above 9 weeks consumption, at the average ratio of consuming. But with wheat at £6 per qr. we may easily suppose that our import fed the nation during 11 or 12 weeks; to the great disgrace of the political system of this country †.

But let me further examine our importations. From 1781 to 1806 there have been imported 12,220,219 qrs. of wheat, and on an average of the 26 years 413,000 qrs. per annum. These gentlemen might therefore, be told that the manufacturers for exportation have been fed by foreign trade, Mr.

* At a qr. per head per ann.

Species.	† Corn imported in 1806.		At per Quarter.		Value.	
	Quantity.					
	Q.	B.	s.	d.	£.	s. d.
Barley	5385	5	38	6	10,367	6 3
Beans	3406	3	43	9	7451	8 9
Oats	510,242	3	25	8	654,811	8 10
Pease	1514	4	43	6	3294	0 9
Rye	829	5	47	4	1963	3 10
Wheat	1,506,986	—	79	0	5,952,594	14 0
Total	2,028,364	4			6,630,482	2 5

How many reflections doth such a table suggest! Look at the countries around the Baltic.—Look at the wastes of Britain, and draw the conclusion.

Spence contends that their number certainly is not more than 500,000, probably not more than 300,000. Now 413,000 are fed with wheat imported, and the import of oats feeds a great number of other manufacturers, who must consequently be working for home consumption. *We do not, therefore, only feed ourselves, but we cloath and supply you with a large portion of your necessary fabrics; where is this transmutation of British corn into manufactures for exportation? If it be a transmutation, it is transmuting the corn brought from Prussia and Poland by foreign commerce: you are so unable to feed us, that you do not feed yourselves without our assistance. Our demand for the products of grass is so great, that if you supply it we must go to others for corn, not only to feed ourselves, but a large portion of those who manufacture for your necessary consumption.* Thus might the class employed on foreign supply retort on Mr. Spence.

The principal consumption of well paid manufacturers, so far as the landed interest is concerned, is in the products of grass land.

Beer is an article of consequence; but of corn imported barley is but a trifle.

If we are to lose our foreign trade we should look for compensation, not in *transferred consumption*, but in raising at home the commodities hitherto imported: corn to the amount of four millions sterling: 40 or 50,000 tons of hemp and flax, and a long list of other articles, the production of which would create a great and new circulation, however inferior it might be in amount to what we had lost.

An observation might be made here in reply, but so obvious and superficial, that I trust it would not be urged by the gentleman whose performance excited these remarks. It may, however, be said—that if the manufacturers working for export be fed with foreign corn, stop the trade and the consumption of English corn will at least remain the same, or, rather be increased by the amount of the reduced consumption of half a million of amply fed workmen turned into parish paupers: and something of this sort would be the case, were it a question of mouths only, and not of income. But, Sir, you well know that all these combinations and contrasts depend, not on numbers but on income, that is, on consumption. Forty millions sterling in exported fabrics, are £50 per head per annum to 500,000 persons employed to produce them. Deduct the very small proportion of materials in a really *raw* state, and the large remainder will, when reckoned to every man, woman, and child,

form an income (above £300 a year to a family of five) in which the consumption of corn will make but a paltry amount: at a quarter of wheat per head, or 5 quarters, it will be under £20 in above £300*.

But I must confess, Sir, that I want faith, in the power of Buonaparté to hedge in the cuckoo, as stopping trade has been called—nor, do I believe, that were America to join him, our trade would suffer in any degree that would *necessitate* us to make an inglorious or dangerous peace. If those manufacturers who have been consumers, not of our own, but of foreign corn, should become clamorous for peace, they will take the sure means to render a safe one impossible; and were they to be listened to by government in the conclusion of it, we should have far more reason to deprecate and condemn the commercial system, than ever the writings of Mr. Spence are likely to produce. Whatever the evils resulting from a loss of trade may prove—we must manfully resolve to bear them: but let not the people be deceived into the expectation that they would be light: they would be heavy enough; and disappointed hope ought not to be added to the burthen.

It would take too much time to expatiate on the folly and madness of that policy, which has during 26 years given to foreigners so much of the benefit from our manufactures and commerce, while our own land remains waste in space sufficient to produce ten times as much: and restricting the immediate benefit to the products of grass. Could we have imported milk and butter and mutton, our legislative system would doubtless have been equally exerted in giving to Germany and Poland that supply also, of our markets. A system so full of absurdity, and gross stupidity, that I cannot attribute the constant prosperity of this kingdom, in spite of such endeavours to counteract it, to any cause but the overflowing bounties of Divine Providence, which in favour of this happy country seems employed, not only in the diffusion of direct good; but to extract it even from the very evils brought on us by our own blind errors, and misconduct. If such a series of blessings as we have experienced, hath no effect in turning the hearts of the disobedient to the wisdom of the just, we have as much cause for fear as hitherto for thanksgiving.

I intended to have troubled you with some remarks, on the third great maxim of

* I accept throughout this paper Mr Spence's data—but it might easily be shewn that they demand much revision.

the Economistes, that all taxes fall on land, which I hold to be as erroneous as the rest, and which you have very judiciously departed from, Vol. XII. p. 721, by representing them as the fruit of land and labour. But this letter has been extended to so unforeseen a length, that I shall trespass no longer on your patience.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient and very humble servant,

ARTHUR YOUNG.

*Bradfield Hall, }
Jan. 22, 1806. }*

IRELAND AS IT IS.

Index, Letter 2th.

SIR,—The security of property is so absolutely essential to the possession and maintenance of a free constitution, that, without it, civil liberty and popular rights would be idle phantoms, existing only in name. A government, that could dispose of the property of its subjects at pleasure, would have no difficulty in establishing itself independent of every species of control. Authority, without the means of supporting it, is dangerous only to the possessor; and a constitution, that withholds the dominion over these means from the executive power, best provides for the employment of them in the promotion of public objects and national interests. It is to the spirited resistance made, at all times, by our ancestors, against the arbitrary attempts of government to invade the security of private property, that we are indebted for that system of civil rights and political freedom, which is so justly the pride of this country, and so universally the envy of the other nations of Europe. Nay, the most essential part of our present constitution, the great council of the nation, originated with the Saxons, whose property in their possessions was absolute and allodial, vested wholly in themselves, and thoroughly independent of the paramount rights of any superior. The Normans modified the right by an alteration of the tenure. They secured to the individual his possessions, but subjected them to the operation of paramount rights and feudal conditions; yet, the property still remained, though in a qualified shape, guaranteed from invasion in any quarter, and creating that spirit of independence, which, after many struggles and various success, has at length terminated in the establishment of the wisest system of civil government and municipal law, that ever existed in any nation.—The security of property, therefore, is not more essential to private happiness than to public rights, and the principle of its legal inviolability, which

has been consecrated by the example and practice of so many ages, was never, at any period, so well understood or so scrupulously acted upon, as at present. Reposing under the shelter of equal law, the meanest subject is protected in his possessions, which cannot be wrested from him, even by the legislature, without a full and adequate equivalent. The same salutary influence of legislative justice and legal protection, which guards the property of the individual from violation, spreads a shield over the property of the public, or of public bodies. The property of the clergy, any more than that of the laity, cannot, consistently with this principle, be approached, except under the sanction of an act of the legislature, and for a just compensation. The right of the clergy to their tythes is of common law foundation, and consequently not to be affected, so far as the present possessors are concerned, in any other manner, than as any private property of an individual, which may be required for a public use, that is, upon a fair estimate of its value and an adequate equivalent. It is quite another question, how far it may or may not be desirable, to continue the compensation to the successors of the present incumbents, who have a property in possession in the revenues of their benefices. To indemnify the latter would be but an act of justice; to continue the equivalent, in the same proportions, to the former, must be a question to be determined by considerations of expediency.—Upon the score of right, the clergy of Ireland have as good a title to their tythes, as the land proprietors have to their estates. But this right vests, absolutely, in the present incumbents alone. As no clergyman can look upon himself, as heir or successor to any benefice, during the incumbency of the present possessor, no one can complain, if the legislature, in its justice and wisdom, should regulate the succession, in a manner most likely to promote the general interests of the church establishment. But it may be said, that, though no individuals have a vested right to the succession, the right is at all times vested in the whole body of the clergy, and that, therefore, any equivalent, which might be given to the present incumbent, ought to be continued to his successor, because he must be one of that body, in which the right at all times, resides. In admitting the aggregate right, it is not necessary, that we should subscribe to the individual advantage. If the title be in the whole body, and not in the single person, who may be appointed to succeed, it would follow, that the benefit of the suc-

cession ought to be extended, as much as possible, amongst the members of the aggregate body. When a benefice of two or three thousand pounds per annum falls in, there can be no doubt, that a person, eminently qualified, could be procured, to undertake the duty, with a revenue of five or seven hundred pounds per annum; and there can be as little question, that the remainder of the revenue of such benefice could be most advantageously employed, in adding to the amount of the small livings under one hundred pounds per annum. This, however, is not a subject to be discussed here, where the object is an inquiry into the operation and effect of tythes, in Ireland, and to ascertain the amount of popular grievance, that arises from that cause. In this investigation, the consideration of the subject naturally divides itself into three distinct points of view, in which it will be necessary to regard the question of tythes; 1st. the intrinsic oppression of tythes from their partial operation; 2dly. the aggravated oppression of tythes from the vexatious mode of collecting them, and the exactions of proctors and tythe farmers; and 3dly. the grievous consequences, that result to the nation from their inequality of pressure, and the discouragement of agriculture, that is the consequence. But, before I proceed to examine either of these heads, I must anticipate an objection, which may be made, namely, that the property in tythes has been inalienably vested in the church, and is, therefore, not within the operation of that right, which the legislature constantly exercises, of disposing of the property of any individual, which may be necessary to the service of the state, upon giving a fair equivalent. Tythes are, in reality, a public property, assigned by the legislature to a particular body, as a remuneration for the performance of certain public services. The same authority, that conferred the property, has the power of regulating or altering the services to be performed; and it would be absurd to suppose, that it had not an equal control over the terms of remuneration. In fact, the parliament of Ireland, by abolishing tythes of agistment, first by an arbitrary vote of the house of commons, and lastly by the act of union, has clearly shewn, that the clergymen hold their property, in tythes, subject to the discretion and regulation of the legislature.—In order to form any adequate idea of the severity of tythes, under the first point of view, in which I propose to look at their operation, it will be necessary to consider them in relation to justice and to expediency; that is, as to

their aggravated pressure upon a small part of the surface of the country, and as to the policy of leaving the particular classes, which, at present, bear most of the burthen, still liable to such an incumbrance. The origin of tythes lies in those remote ages, when the produce of agriculture constituted the principal, if not the only, source of national income. The provision, therefore, for a national clergy could not otherwise have been procured, than by subjecting the profits of land to some charge for their support. As rents were then paid in kind, so also were tythes. Such was the origin of the establishment. Possibly the example of the jewish institution might have influenced our ancestors, in regulating the rate of this charge; and, though the divine right was never dreamed of, as is abundantly manifest from the silence of the gospel, the practice of the primitive church, and the glaring difference between the jewish and christian establishments, it is yet natural to suppose, that the proportion was adopted from the institutions of that nation. Thus did tythes originate. From the circumstances of the times and the rate of contribution, imposed upon the only source of income then known, we may collect, that tythes were, in their first institution, intended to be a provision for the ministers of a national religion, proportioned to the respectability of their situations and to the extent and importance of the benefits, to be derived to society from their professional exertions and instruction, and that they were intended equally and impartially to affect all property. As every individual in the community participated in the services of the clergy, so none could reasonably object to contribute their full and fair proportion to their support. The individual, who contributed, was amply requited in the pastoral attentions and spiritual edification of the order he supported. This was all fair and just; both parties were punctual, and both were satisfied. The consideration followed the value, which of course must have preceded the consideration. The clergyman received, without deduction, the portion allotted to him by the state, and the layman was easily reconciled to a sacrifice of a small portion of his temporal effects, to reward the services of those, whose duty it was to watch over his eternal interests. But how different must the case be in a country, where the great mass of the population is of a different persuasion from the clergy, for whose support tythes are levied; in which, neither the whole of the property, nor the whole produce of the land, is subjected to the charge; in which,

those who enjoy the advantage of the services of the clergy, contribute but a very small portion of the public provision for the establishment, whilst the greatest portion of the burthen bears altogether upon the poorer classes, who never derive any benefit at all from the establishment? Here consideration must be raised as the value sinks. The spirit of monopoly and the dæmon of bigotry may, and must, often go hand in hand, and unite to persecute, as well as to collect. The individual, who is assessed, looks upon it as a severity, to be compelled to contribute, what produces him no corresponding advantage. His ingenuity is exerted to evade, his prejudices instigate him to defeat the claim, and every effort of fraud, artifice, and intimidation will, almost naturally, be essayed to render the charge upon himself light, and to the clergyman unproductive. Mutual interest, the only sure basis of reciprocal integrity in transactions, that regard property, cannot mediate, and the person, who is constrained to pay for what he does not, cannot, or will not, receive, easily persuades himself of the propriety of endeavouring to reduce the consideration to the standard of the value. The clergyman procures his stipend without satisfaction, and it is given with reluctance. The people loudly murmur, whilst their turbulence and often outrageous conduct, become a source of general apprehension and universal complaint. All parties are discontented, and the hopeless evil, that generates this extremity of dissatisfaction, and undermines the peace, good temper, and virtue of society, grows too inveterate to yield, but to the wisdom of legislative interference.—This short sketch will be sufficient to convey some idea of the state of Ireland, as to tythes and the oppression, arising from the intrinsic defects of the present system. The abolition of tythes of agistment has narrowed their operation, from extending over the whole surface of the country, to that limited portion of it, which is wrought with much labour and heavy expence, in the various processes of agriculture, I mean tillage. The necessity of indemnifying themselves for the deficiency of revenue, created by the exemption of pasture and feeding grounds from the operation of tythes, has constrained the clergy to raise their rates, upon the small portion of land, that remains subject to their charges, infinitely higher, than it would otherwise be desirable, or perhaps prudent, for them to attempt. And, as the rates are always regulated by the value of the particular crop, and potatoes yield a more pro-

fitable return than any other species of culture, potatoes are consequently estimated higher in the clergyman's book of rates, than any other crop. Thus the average charge for tythes of potatoes is fifteen shillings per acre, for wheat thirteen, barley thirteen, bere thirteen, oats eight, and meadow land five. These charges sometimes vary considerably in different districts, but the variation is, as often above, as below, the averages here stated. Barley, for instance, and potatoes are often charged one guinea, and one guinea and a half, in particular places, per acre. Such local exorbitance, however, is only to be incidentally noticed. The object of this paper is not to exaggerate grievances, but to collect undeniable data, and make them the foundation of general and indisputable results. The various averages above stated will give one general average of eleven shillings per acre. The amount of revenue of the Irish church establishment has usually been estimated at half a million annually; but without imputing any sinister motives to those, who estimate it at that sum, and who take infinite pains to represent the Irish clergy, as in a state of comparative poverty, I must be allowed to carry my estimate of the annual amount of tythes much higher. I believe it to be little short of one million, but I shall take it, for the sake of avoiding all possibility of cavil, at eight hundred and twenty thousand pounds. Now by applying my general average charge per acre to this sum, that is, by dividing this sum by eleven shillings, we shall find that the whole number of acres, liable to the charge, does not exceed fifteen hundred thousand, five hundred thousand of which are cultivated by the labouring poor, which, at fifteen shillings per acre, pay to the establishment three hundred and seventy thousand pounds, being nearly one half of its whole revenue. There is but one other datum necessary, towards a clear conception of this question, in relation to the justice of the case. The whole surface of Ireland is estimated at fifteen millions of acres. The following results then follow obviously. One tenth of the superficial contents of Ireland bears the whole weight of the tythe establishment; one third of that proportion, being one thirtieth of the whole, is charged with nearly one half of the whole tythe establishment; that proportion of the population, which has no property, is compelled to pay to clergymen, from whom they derive no advantage, nearly one half of their whole provision, levied off one thirtieth of the surface of Ireland, whilst the remainder of the population of that country, possessing the

whole of the property in it, contribute little more than the other half of the provision for their own clergy, from twenty-nine thirtieths of the superficial contents of the country. Is it necessary to add another observation to prove the iniquity of such a state of things? Would it not be an insult to a man of common sense, to attempt to give a direction to his feelings or his indignation, by any remarks, calculated to impress the expediency of some modification? This statement speaks for itself, and requires not farther comment or illustration.—I come now to consider the grievances, arising from the vexatious manner, in which tythes are collected in Ireland, first premising, that, in general, these vexations are not imputable to the clergy, for, if the real fact were known, it would appear, that, so far from gaining, they lose by most of those transactions, which constitute the oppressions, of which so many and so just complaints are made. The clergyman cannot manage his own concerns in tythes, because, in the event of litigation, he cannot be a witness in his own cause, and a direct interference, in such worldly transactions, would be derogatory from the character and sanctity of his official functions. He is, therefore, both from feeling and from necessity, obliged to employ agents to manage his business, and it is, not unfrequently, the fault of his parishioners, by their harrassing opposition to his interests, that he withdraws himself altogether from any concern with them, and lets the tythes of his benefice to a tythe farmer. When a clergyman does not resort to this course, he employs an agent, who is called a proctor, to superintend the administration of his temporal concerns in the parish, in the collection of tythes and the adjustment of a composition for them. The proctor is usually allowed ten per cent. by his employer, upon the gross income of the parish. If this were all, there would be no just ground of complaint. But the proctor, not content with this allowance, levies an infinitely larger income from the parishioners, under the head of fees. To give a clear view of this point, it will be necessary to state, briefly, the manner, in which the business of the composition for tythes is conducted. In the spring of the year, the proctor and his assistants make a tour of the parish, in order to estimate, by inspection, the growing hopes of the husbandman's toil. The value, they set upon each particular crop, is set down in a book, the black register of their extortions; and the entries in this book govern their conduct, when they come to regulate the composition in

each particular case. Before the harvest^s gathered in, a meeting of the parishioners^s is summoned to attend the proctor, and often the clergyman, for the purpose of tythe letting. Each individual agrees to a composition for his own tythes, and, as a year's time is generally given for the payment, he passes a promissory note for the amount, first paying the proctor his fees. It should be observed, however, that, when the owner of the crop refuses to agree to the composition demanded, his tythes are sold to another person. There is no such practice, as setting out the tythe for the clergyman to draw it. If two or three, in a parish, were to give notice to that effect, it would be considered a conspiracy against the clergyman, and ample damages would be recoverable. The fees of the proctor, to which he can have no legal right, he being the servant of the parson and sufficiently paid by his employer, amount to ten per cent. nominally upon the composition, but infinitely exceed that sum by means of his fraud and exactions. Every sum, under ten shillings, compounded for tythe, he charges as ten; and every sum, over ten and under twenty, he charges as twenty, so that by rating all the intermediate sums, as the decimals next above them, and imposing a fee upon each, as for such decimal, he levies an exorbitant average of direct and compound percentage, of not less than twenty per cent. upon the whole amount of the composition. The tythe farmer also following up the principle, upon which he rents a parish, disposes of the tythes to the highest bidder. In his train are valuers, bidders, canters and process servers, and the whole tribe of popular pests. The proctor strips, but the tythe farmer scourges his victims. Should the owner of the crop be disposed to compound for his tythes, at any reasonable rate, a bidder is at hand to enhance the price; should he hesitate to raise his proposal to the advanced offer, a canter steps in, and intercepts the natural claim, which the cultivator has, to become the purchaser of the fruits of his own industry. So that, whether compounding or not compounding, between the bidders puffing, the canters unprincipled interference, and the exorbitance of the tythe farmer, the husbandman is sure to be the sacrifice. Whenever a parish is let, by the clergyman, to a tythe farmer, he uniformly reserves the whole income, which he antecedently derived from it, deducting only the allowance of ten per cent. usually given to proctors. In a parish, so circumstanced, the profits of the tythe farmer arise principally from the plunder of the people. The

clergyman continues to receive the same amount of income, but his parishioners are subjected to contributions, commensurate with the avarice and rapacity of his representative, the tythe farmer. Twenty per cent. falls infinitely short of the amount of such exactions, which frequently equal, and sometimes exceed, the income reserved by the clergyman. It will be obvious from this, that, at the very lowest calculation, an addition of one fifth is thus made, to the burthen of tythes, not for the support of the clergy, but for the advantage of those miscreants, who so unfeelingly traffic upon the distresses of their native country. The evil, however, does not stop here. Not content with the allowance made by the clergyman, equal to his proctor's salary, and the amount of his exactions in the gross, the tythe farmer swells the black list of his enormities, by exacting the same amount of fees as the proctor. Enough has now been stated to enable any man of common sense, employing only the most superficial observation, to estimate the average of the aggregate and arbitrary contributions, wrung from the agriculture of the country and the industry of the poor, by these vile agents of popular grievances, the tythe farmers and proctors. The allowance from the clergyman to his proctor is ten per cent., which, with twenty per cent., the estimated amount of his illegal fees, gives him a revenue of thirty per cent. upon that proportion of the tythe establishment, which is managed by him. The tythe farmer, on the other hand, has the same profits, under the same heads, with the addition of at least twenty per cent., the lowest profit which he can derive from his farm in the tythes. Taking the profits of the proctor, therefore, at thirty per cent., and those of the tythe farmer at fifty per cent., the aggregate of both is eighty, which gives a general average, upon all the tythes in the kingdom, of forty per cent., as the measure of their oppression. This subject will appear with more cogency by reducing these general statements to a definite result in specific sums. Thus an establishment of eight hundred and twenty thousand pounds, at forty per cent., yields three hundred and fifty thousand pounds to proctors and tythe farmers; and, of this sum, one hundred and forty thousand pounds are paid by the labouring classes. It would be idle to weaken this case by superfluous declamation or argument. If the melancholy picture of popular suffering, exhibited in this detail, produce no conviction of the magnitude of the grievance and the urgency of redress, no human colouring can give it a more imposing form,

or more expressive features. The characters are so legible and distinct, that even he who runs, may read, and the most transient glance must carry conviction to any susceptible mind.—I am disposed to think, that even the deputation, from the self-constituted Hibernian society, though wholly intent upon schemes of evangelical amelioration, could not have overlooked the evidence of temporal misery presented in every stage of their rapid progress through Ireland. It is true, these gentlemen travelled with such velocity, and were so exclusively taken up with the importance of their mission, that they may not, possibly, have been as observant, as men, who should mix, considerations of sublunary comforts, with their views for promoting the spiritual welfare of a nation. Yet, if they did not resign themselves to actual slumbers, or to religious reveries, the moment they entered the mail coach, which alone could have enabled them to travel over so large a space, in so short a time, if their eyes were competent to the ordinary functions of organs of vision, or their minds susceptible of common impressions, they must have perceived enough to satisfy them of the practical misery of the country, notwithstanding their spiritual prescription of the great mass of its inhabitants. Of all the publications upon the state of Ireland, that I have seen, the report of a deputation, from the Hibernian society, is the most reprehensible and mischievous. It is from the first to the last an uninterrupted tissue of ignorance, presumption, bigotry, and intolerance. The individuals, who composed that deputation, may be good and well intentioned men, as well as the misguided members of the society, that deputed them to their mission. But, surely, the abstract merit of good intention cannot sanctify the actual violation of every principle of candor, moderation, and decency. If this assuming deputation had laid in their claim to inspiration, they might have some colour of claim to the credit, which they confidently expect to be given to their report. But, without the agency of the Divine Spirit, it is impossible, that it should be exempted from the application of those rules of rational consideration, which decide upon the merits of all human productions. The deputation set out from Dublin on their progress, on the thirty-first of last July, and after visiting Kilkenny, Clonmel, Waterford, Cork, Limerick, Gort, Tuam, Armagh, Dundalk, and Drogheda, they returned on the nineteenth of August to Dublin, after having performed a journey of between eight and nine hundred miles, in

twenty days. It will, surely, be obvious to every unprejudiced mind, that, in so short a time, and in the precipitancy of such a rapid transit through a country, no idea could be formed of the exterior manners, still less of the internal principles of a people, which would warrant any person, having a regard for his character or for truth, in making any positive assertion upon the subject, even without committing the principles of a society, professing to have been formed for *bonâ fide* public purposes. In reality, the report appears to have been drawn up with a view to the objects of the society, but without any reference whatever to the actual state of religion in Ireland, and the mission of the deputation was adopted purely as a sanction for its publication. The fabricators of this more than monkish document of religious exclusion never once thought, that their production would be ever minutely examined, and trusted to the credulity of the British public, which swallows with avidity every tale respecting Ireland, and to the habitual apathy of those, acquainted with the real state of that country.—But the notice I have taken of this report, has diverted me, for the present, from the consideration of the grievous effects of the operation of tythes on the agriculture of Ireland. I could not, however, resist the impulse of indignation, I felt, at finding a few enthusiasts, daring enough to put up a whole nation to the ban of sectarian interdiction. The officiousness of these zealots will be productive of serious consequences, if not restrained by the timely interposition of some competent authority. The few observations, that I have made upon their presumptuous publication, will, I hope, have the effect of inducing those, who may see them, to reflect, before they receive the *ipse dixit* of a body, so constituted and conducted, as the criterion of the religious state of a calumniated people, or a proof of the impartiality and justifiable zeal of an officious and intolerant communion of sectarists. I shall take my leave of these evangelising gentry, for the present, having already encroached too far upon your indulgence, but shall seize another opportunity, with your permission, after I shall have detailed the actual grievances of Ireland, to resume this subject, in order to expose the absurdity, infatuation, and dangerous tendency of the projects, and modes proposed for executing the projects, of this intemperate and intolerant society, and of their post travelling missionaries.—I am, Sir, &c.—VINDEK.—London, Feb. 8th, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND.—Order in Council, relating to Portugal and the Brazils, dated Jan. 6, 1808.

At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 6th of January, 1808. present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.—Whereas it is expedient, in the present state of the subjects of her Most Faithful Majesty, and during the interruption in commercial correspondence between Great Britain and Portugal, that claims should be permitted to be given for Portuguese property brought in and detained by his Majesty's ships of war and privateers; his Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that claims for Portuguese property, given by persons duly authorised by the owners, or by the Consul or other person authorised by the Portuguese Minister resident at this Court, shall be admitted in the High Court of Admiralty; and it is further ordered, that immediate restitution shall pass of all such property as shall appear by the bills of lading or other documents found on board Portuguese ships, coming from Portuguese settlements to the ports of Portugal, to belong to her Most Faithful Majesty, or to any of her subjects residing at the date of this order, in the Brazils, or in any foreign settlement belonging to her crown, or in England, or in any country in amity with his Majesty, upon a general claim for every such ship and goods, given by the consul under the authority aforesaid; and it is further ordered, that the property of the subjects of her Most Faithful Majesty, at the date of this order, residing in Portugal either belonging to them separately, or jointly with subjects residing in the Brazils, or other places beforementioned, shall be pronounced to belong as claimed, upon a general claim given for the same on board such Portuguese ships as aforesaid; and it is further ordered, that the property last-mentioned, as well as all other property, under private claims already given or to be given, and pronounced to be Portuguese property, and belonging to persons resident in Portugal at the date of this order, shall remain subject to his Majesty's further orders; and, in the mean time, shall be put into the joint custody of agents to be named on behalf of his Majesty, and on behalf of the Portuguese Minister resident at this Court, or of any claimant; and that such parts thereof as are perishable, or which it may be otherwise expedient to sell, shall be sold by the aforesaid agents, under commissions to be issued by the High Court of Ad-

miralty, and the proceeds thereof deposited in the said court:—And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury, his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the Judges of the High Court of Admiralty and Courts of Vice-Admiralty, are to take the necessary measures herein as to them shall respectively appertain.—W. FAWKENER.

FRANCE.—*Commercial Decree, signed Napoleon, and dated at the Thuilleries, Jan. 11, 1808.*

Napoleon, &c. upon the report of our Minister of Finances, seeing our decrees of the 23d November and 11th December, 1807; with the concurrence of our Council of State we have decreed and do decree as follows:—Art. 1. When a vessel shall enter into a French port, or in that of a country occupied by our armies, any man of the crew, or a passenger, who shall declare to the principal of the Custom House, that the said ship comes from England or her colonies or countries occupied by English troops, or that it has been visited by an English vessel, shall receive a third part of the produce of the net sale of the ship and cargo, if it is known that his declaration is exact.—Art. 2. The principal of the Custom House, who shall receive the declaration mentioned in the preceding article, shall, in conjunction with the Commissary of Police, who shall be called on for that purpose, and the two principal custom house officers of the port, shall cause each of the crew and passengers to undergo, separately, the interrogatory prescribed by the second article of our decree of the 23d November, 1807.—Art. 3. Any functionary or agent of government, who shall be convicted of having favoured the contravention of our decrees of the 23d of November and 17th December, 1807, shall be prosecuted in the criminal court of the department of the Seine, which shall be formed into a special tribunal for this purpose, and punished, if convicted, as if guilty of high treason.—Art. 4. Our ministers are charged, each in his respective department, with the execution of the present decree.

HOLLAND.—*Decree against Sweden, signed by the King of Holland, and dated on the 18th of January, 1808.*

Louis Napoleon, by the grace of God and the constitution of the kingdom, King of Holland, and Constable of France.—Whereas we have received information that the orders adopted relative to the blockade of the British islands, have not been carried in-

to execution with like force against Swedish ships; and whereas this kingdom is equally at war with Sweden and England,—We have decreed, and hereby decree as follows:—Art. 1. Every Swedish ship which shall enter the ports of this kingdom shall be immediately seized, and also all Swedish merchandise shall be confiscated.—II. All Swedish subjects, who may have heretofore exercised diplomatic functions within our kingdom, or who may have served as consuls or commercial agents, and who still remain in Holland, are required to leave the kingdom immediately upon the publication of this decree.—III. All other Swedish subjects who may be found in our ports, or other parts of our kingdom, shall immediately be arrested, and treated as prisoners of war.—IV. The measures at present in force for the blockade of the British islands, shall, in like manner, and without exception, be made applicable to Sweden.—V. Our ministers of finance, justice, and police, are charged with the execution of the present decree, which shall be proclaimed at all places where its publication may be necessary.

PRUSSIA.—*Declaration against England. Dated at Munich, Dec. 1, 1807.*

The King being obliged, by the 27th article of the treaty of peace of Tilsit, concluded on the 9th of July, 1807, to shut, without exception, the Prussian ports and states against the trade and navigation of England, as long as the present war lasted between England and France, his Majesty has not hesitated to take progressively the most appropriate measures to fulfil his engagements.—In directing these measures, his Majesty did not dissemble the prejudice and loss which would result to the commerce of his dominions in general and that of his subjects, who, by a long series of misfortunes, have acquired new rights to his paternal solicitude and benevolence; but his Majesty yielded to the consolatory hope, that the mediation offered by Russia to England, by accelerating the return of a definitive peace between G. Britain and France, would soon bring about an order of things more congenial to the particular interests of each power.—The King has been deceived in his just expectation; the events that have taken place since, and which are too well known to render it necessary to recapitulate them, far from bringing the so much desired period of general peace nearer, have only placed it at a greater distance.—All communication is broken off between Russia and England. The declaration of his Majesty the Emperor

of all the Russias, published on the 26th Oct. proves that there is no longer any relation between those two powers. His Prussian Majesty, intimately connected by all his relations with the cause and system of the continental neighbouring and friendly powers, has no other rules of conduct than his duties founded upon the interests of his states, and the obligation contracted by a solemn treaty. —Conformably to these principles his Majesty, setting aside those considerations which he had hitherto respected, in the vain hope for a speedy general pacification; and having refused, since the mission of Lord Hutchinson, to receive at his court any English diplomatic agent, has just ordered his legation at London to quit England as soon as possible, and return to the Continent. —His Majesty the King of Prussia, in making known the resolutions which his engagements and the interest of his monarchy impose upon him as a duty, declares by these presents, that, till the restoration of a definitive peace between the two belligerent powers, there shall be no relation between Prussia and England.—FREDERICK WILLIAM.

PORTUGAL.—*Decree by General Junot for confiscating English property.*—Dec. 4, 1807.

All goods, jewels, and silver, as well as moveable and landed property of any nature whatsoever, belonging to any individual subject to Great Britain, found in any territory of the Portuguese dominions, shall be confiscated.—All goods of British manufacture, of any kind whatsoever, shall be also confiscated.—It is expressly ordained, that any person of whatever class, who shall have in his possession any sum or goods belonging to subjects of Great Britain, shall appear and declare the same in the course of three days, at the Secretary's Office, M. Legoy, appointed commissary *ad interim*, whose residence is at No. 10, opposite the Fountain of the Loretto; and in the interior parts of Portugal these declarations are to be made before the magistrate of the place.—Any person who shall not make a true and exact declaration, shall forfeit ten times the sum of the object so declared, and shall receive besides corporal punishment, if the object should deserve such.—Any goods or property which may have been any ways concealed by either Portuguese or French merchants, or those of any other nation, shall be declared in the same manner under the like penalties.—The administrator general of the finances, and the regency council, are charged with the execution of this decree.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation of the Inquisitor General. Dated at Lisbon, under the Seal of the Holy Office, Dec. 22, 1807.*

Don Joseph Maria de Mello, titular bishop of Algalva, inquisitor-general of this kingdom, member of her majesty's council, and her confessor.—To all the faithful of the holy church, health, peace, and the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, our Saviour and God. —The place of inquisitor general of this kingdom which we occupy, unworthy of it as we are; the holy episcopal character with which we are invested; the exemplary zeal with which the most eminent and venerable cardinal patriarch of Lisbon has just recommended, with so touching an unction, in his last pastoral letter, the preservation of tranquillity, peace, and Christian union, necessary in all times, and above all in the present; all these considerations impose upon us the duty of concurring on our side, and as far as we can, in a salutary object, and without which we cannot hope for any happiness either upon earth, or, which ought more to concern us, in the life to come. We address them to all the faithful of the holy church, to the inhabitants of this city and kingdom, we conjure them to be attentive and docile to the wise and pacific instructions of their venerable father and pastor, in a circumstance which concerns their present fate and their eternal happiness. We can do nothing better than to recall to them the paternal advice of that great prelate. Let them consider the situation in which we are, the favours which the Divine Goodness has heaped upon us, in the midst of our tribulations; let them bless God in all things; let them adore with an humble and contrite heart the immutable decrees of Providence, and let them be grateful for the innumerable benefits we have received from his all-powerful hand.—Let us reckon amongst these signal benefits, the peace and good order which have and do reign in this kingdom since a great army has come to our succour.—We are certain of our happiness if we know how to profit by it—we enjoy equal security both in our houses and out.—Let us not forget that we owe these advantages to the zeal and activity of the general in chief who commands us, and whose virtues we have long known; that the army which is in the midst of us is that of his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, Napoleon the Great; that that Monarch has been sent by God to protect religion, and render people happy; that he will pour upon us the blessings of peace, if we love each other with fraternal charity—that by that means reli-

gion and its ministers will always be respected, and that in fine we shall enjoy all sorts of happiness if we shew ourselves worthy of such great protection. It is thus that we ought to conduct ourselves to accomplish faithfully the precepts of the Lord, who commands us to obey power, not through fear, but through a duty of conscience.—Let us incessantly have before our eyes the touching exhortations which the venerable pastor of this city and diocese has addressed to his flock, to unite them in Christian charity, and to obtain peace and repose, of which we have so much need; and because that object is of the greatest importance, even for the preservation of the purity of our faith, we conjure all the deputies of the council general of inquisition and other ministers of the holy office, to unite their zeal to ours to maintain and consolidate the public tranquillity.—We recommend it especially to all the regulars in general, and to each in particular, to give, in all circumstances, the example of perfect submission, as it becomes the ministers of a God of Peace, who offer daily the sacrifice of propitiation, and who ought to be models of evangelical perfection to the people.—We exhort them to recall without ceasing to the faithful their duties, and above all to impress them with this truth, that there never can be too much peace and union. And in order that our letter may reach all the tribunals of inquisition in the kingdom, we have caused it to be stuck up and published in the churches of our district, in the accustomed form.

DENMARK. — DISPATCHES PUBLISHED BY DENMARK, RELATIVE TO THE COPENHAGEN EXPEDITION. — PUBLISHED IN JANUARY, 1808.

Extract of a Report from M. Rist, formerly Charge d'Affaires from Denmark to the English Court, to the Minister of State, Count Bernstorff.—London, 27th Sept. 1807.

It was probably to give more weight to those considerations, which Mr. Canning proposed to me, by reading to me yesterday his first minute of the proposition of the Court of London, that he thought it right to add to a brief exposure of the consequences which the refusal on our part to treat would be attended with. He then read to me the following five menaces.—It contained—1. The confiscation of all the vessels already detained, and yet to be detained. 2. The capture of our colonies. 3. The destruction

of our trade. 4. The possibility of being obliged to introduce Swedish troops into Copenhagen. 5. The necessity which might arise of rewarding and indemnifying his Swedish Majesty with the possession of Norway.—Mr. Canning judged it fit to leave out these menaces in the copy of the verbal note which he sent me.

Extract of a Report from the Same to the Same. London, Oct. 2, 1807.

I thought Mr. Merry had taken his departure, when he called on me yesterday, and told me, that intelligence, received by government, had retarded his departure, and made Mr. Canning wish to see me once more before he dispatched him. I accordingly waited on the minister, accompanied by Mr. Merry. The object of the interview was to acquaint me that a messenger, arrived this morning, had brought the confirmation of the disposition of his Swedish Majesty to co-operate with his Britannic Majesty for the common interest, in case that his assistance should be wanted; in other words, that Swedish troops were ready to replace those of the English government in Zealand, if the latter were obliged, on account of the capitulation, as another destination, to evacuate that island. Mr. Canning concluded by proposing to me to avail myself of the departure of Mr. Merry to press my Court to accede to an arrangement, the refusal of which would unavoidably be followed by the Swedish co-operation, and to represent to my Court the urgent necessity of coming speedily to some preliminary accommodation.

Letter from Count Bernstorff, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Wretterstedt, First Secretary of the Cabinet of his Swedish Majesty.—Kiel, Oct. 17th, 1807.

Permit me, sir, to apply direct to you, to require of you officially an explanation, which it is important for my Court to obtain in an authentic manner. The English government thought proper to make a proposition, founded in part on the threat of a co-operation of Sweden in the hostile measures of Great Britain against Denmark. The cabinet of London dares to assert, that his Swedish Majesty has offered to cause the English troops in Zealand to be replaced by part of his own troops, in case that the former should be obliged to evacuate that island.

To be continued.

"The gentleman appears to be so completely absorbed in the contemplation of the sins of England", that he "has not a moment's leisure to notice any one of the numerous enormities of France."—AMERICAN FARMER.

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TO
WILLIAM ROSCOE, Esq.
LETTER I I.

SIR,

Before I enter upon the matter proposed to be treated of in this letter, give me leave to request your attention to the letter of a correspondent, which I shall insert by way of postscript to this, and in which, as you will perceive, the "incident" of the assassin is regarded as an invention of Mr. Fox himself. I do not say, that I adopt the opinion of my correspondent; yet, I must confess, that he has staggered me; and, however reluctant my readers may be to acknowledge an English statesman to have been guilty of such an act of meanness, they will, doubtless, be more reluctant to shut their ears against the truth. The matter ought to be cleared up. It was strange, that the assassin should be taken to Mr. Fox's house; that he should not have been talked with in the presence of any *third* person; that police-officers, and not king's messengers, should have to deal with him; that there should have been no talk about the matter, at the time when he arrived, or when he was sent away; and, that the whole should remain a profound and impenetrable secret, till the very moment that the negotiation papers were laid before parliament. I should like to have this matter inquired into. The messenger, or police-officer, who brought the assassin up from Gravesend, and who took him to and from Mr. Fox, will be able to say that he did it. Some of the police-magistrates will be able to say, that they committed the man to prison; or, at least, the jailor will be able to produce some record of the receipt and delivery of this famous person. Some inquiry of this sort is necessary, not only to the vindication of the conduct of Mr. Fox, but also to that of the character of the English government; for, what can be more injurious to that character, than the supposition, that the minister for foreign affairs, by collusion with his colleagues, had recourse to such a stratagem for the purpose of opening the way to a negotiation with the enemy? Pray, Sir, think

of this: and, be assured, that, until the matter be cleared up, there will generally prevail most serious doubts, not as to whether there was any reality in the plot at Fassy, but, as to whether the honour of the invention belongs to the late ministry, or to Mr. Talleyrand; for, as to its being an invention, by one or the other, there is no doubt at all. This is a subject, which, in all likelihood, would never have been agitated, had it not been for your meddling indiscretion; and, therefore, upon you it devolves as a duty to clear the matter up, so as to remove the impression which your revival of it has produced.

Now for the remainder of your pamphlet. In describing the events of the last continental war, you have occasion again to speak of the conduct of Prussia, and you call her taking possession of Hanover "*an indecent seizure*;" but, we never hear you talk of any act of indecency committed by France, though you had before spoken of the "*cession*" of that electorate to Prussia by France. How could it be an "*indecent seizure*," if it was a "*cession*?" All, however, are criminal in your eyes, except Napoleon. If he put a king in possession of an electorate, the act is "*a cession*," on his part, in virtue of his "*right*," as conqueror; but, on the part of the power who receives it from him, if that power fall under his displeasure, the act of receiving is "*an indecent seizure*." Well might you, in your preface, make an attempt to ward off the charge of partiality for France.

Having brought us down to the treaty of Tilsit you say: "*of the part which Great Britain acted in this dreadful struggle, it is not necessary to say much. The inefficiency of that union between her and Russia, which had been so triumphantly dwelt upon, as likely to restrain, or overturn the power of France, soon became manifest.*" And then you proceed to state, that we were utterly unable to send a single man to assist her, or to make any diversion in her favour. Upon this latter point there are two opinions; and, you will observe, that the Emperor of Russia, that fa-

mous Autocrat, whose offer of mediation you choose to regard as sincere and equitable, has declared to the world, that your friends, the late ministers, might have sent him men and money and have made diversions in his favour. I, for my part, am of a contrary opinion; and, if I blame them at all for their conduct in that war, it was for sending money to Prussia, and for attempting a diversion in Egypt. But, who was it, that “dwelt so triumphantly” upon the union of England and Russia? Not I. Not the nation, who never expected any good from it. Not the then opposition; because, whatever they might think, they would take excellent care to say nothing, that might run the risk of implying approbation of the conduct of their rivals for power and profit. Who was it, then? Why, the late ministers; those men, for whom, upon every occasion that offered, during your short-lived senatorship, you voted. It was they who triumphed; and you, Sir, were one of those, who, tacitly, at least, joined in the triumph, while I was using the utmost of my endeavours to guard the nation against being deceived by the hopes and expectations, which you held forth, as the consequence of the union, of which, now that it has failed, you stand forward to speak so contemptuously. I thought, that the union was a wild project; I thought, that the states against which France was drawing the sword, were rotten to the core; I thought, that there was a moral cause, more powerful than her arms, working for France; I thought, that Napoleon would “reach Petersburg by May day,” unless the Emperor submitted to his terms of peace. All this I thought; but, all this I *said*, even before the French troops began their march against Russia; and, if you had thought the same; or if you had anticipated the consequences of the union, at which you now laugh, why did you not say so, at the time and in the place, when and where your opinions might have been adopted by others? A person, not then in parliament, may, with perfect consistency now, for the first time, express his disapprobation of the refusal of the terms of France in 1806, and tell us to look at the consequences of that refusal, connected as it was with a new coalition project; but you, who were then in parliament, who said not one word in the way of disapprobation of the rupture of the negotiation or of the forming of the new coalition, stand now self-accused of a want either of spirit or of principle.

The Danish Expedition is a most copious topic with you, as, indeed, might have been expected; and, to say the truth, if you have

failed in making your readers believe, that it was marked with every character of atrocity, the fault is not in your want of good will to that purpose. According to you, the Danes have, all along, observed a wise and temperate policy (not excepting their league with Russia and Sweden in 1801); they have maintained a firm and undeviating independence; neither influenced by intrigues nor intimidated by threats (not excepting the plea which they made of the threats of Russia for entering into the coalition of 1801); they were, indeed, “naturally devoted to our interests.” These are falsehoods so notorious, that one is surprised how you could have expected them to pass for truths amongst any portion of even the least informed of the people of England. The Danes themselves acknowledged, nay, they pleaded in justification of their conduct, in 1801, when they joined in a coalition to compel England to give up the exercise of the right of search, that they were unable to resist the commands of Russia; and they have since acknowledged, that they withdrew their troops from the frontiers of Holstein upon the threats of France; and, with these facts, so well proved, so completely undenied, you coolly assert, that they have undeviatingly preserved a dignified independence, unmoved alike by blandishments and by threats. With a like adherence to truth you proceed through a detail of the several circumstances of the expedition, the merits of which having been so amply discussed already, shall now be passed over. But, there is one passage in this part of your pamphlet, which deserves particular attention. In speaking of the doctrines, which have been held, upon this occasion, you tell your readers, that a reverend divine has lately asserted, from the pulpit, in the face of a learned university, “that the nations of the earth have “no laws in common, and that, where “there is no law, there can be no transgression. That they are to be considered as “so many wild beasts, and that the strongest, when it has the power, has also the “right to destroy the weakest.” Now, Sir, my firm belief is, that this is a falsehood of your own inventing; and, if there were no other reason for this my opinion, the false statements which I have already noticed, in other parts of your pamphlet, would be sufficient; but, why did you not *name* this reverend divine? Or, if that would have been to show a bad taste, why not point out the particular occasion? Why leave the designation so very bald, if not for the obvious purpose of avoiding detection? That some such words may have been made use of, by way of

illustration, and explained by the context, is possible; but, that any gentleman of the university, has declared, from the pulpit, that the nations of the earth are to be considered as so many wild beasts, and that the strongest, when it has the power, has also the right to destroy the weakest, is what I do not believe, and what, I am convinced, will not be believed by any one of your readers, whose ignorance, or whose sectarian prejudice and bitterness, do not disqualify him for the forming an impartial judgment in the case. Of *me*, you say that I have dared to insult the common feelings and the common sense of mankind, by "asserting that *might constitutes right*." This, in the naked way in which you state the assertion, is another falsehood. I asserted, and still assert, that there is no law, to which nations implicitly bow; that there is no rule by which they are bound; that there is no common tribunal amongst them; that there is no where any judge to decide between them and no where any power to enforce obedience to any decision; and that, therefore, it is, after all, amongst nations, might which constitutes right, and must constitute right in all cases, where the sword is the judge. But, is this a general and sweeping assertion, that "might constitutes right?" And is it *moral* right that is here spoken of? You must certainly know better. I use the word *right*, in the sense, in which you use it, when you tell your readers, that Hanover was ceded to Prussia by France, "who possessed it by the *right of conquest*." That is to say, by the right of *force*; that is to say by *might*; and, when you are speaking of the rights of France, dear harmless France, you seem to have no objection to the application of this doctrine, though it would, perhaps, be very hard to imagine any case, wherein right has been more completely founded upon mere might than in that of Hanover. But you proceed to complain of me for saying, that, "with the maritime power, which this country now possesses, not a ship belonging to any other nation should be suffered to pass the seas, but upon conditions prescribed by us." You are, Sir, without exception, the most flagrant misquoter, the most barefaced garbler, that ever appeared in print. Just as if I had founded the proposal of exercising this rigour at sea upon the sole circumstance of our having the *power* to exercise it. Just as if I had said: "Now, my boys, it luckily happens, that we are able to oppress and insult all the world, therefore, let us do it." But, my readers will remember, that, in the first place, I claimed for my country no rights

upon the seas, which had not been claimed by her in the best times of her history; and, that, in the next place, I stated the exercise of a rigorous maritime sovereignty of the seas to be necessary to our *defence*, as long as Napoleon should insist upon an absolute controul over all the sea-ports and naval arsenals of the continent of Europe; and added, that, in proportion as he was disposed to let go his hold of those sea-ports and arsenals, in proportion as he was disposed to grant the former freedom to the land, we ought to be disposed to relax in the exercise of our sovereignty upon the waters. Was this a recommendation to our government to shut up the channels of the sea, against all other nations, *merely because we were able to do it*? Equally gross is your misconstruction of the meaning of that passage, in the king's declaration against Russia, wherein he says, that "it was time that the effects of that dread, which France has inspired into the nations of the world, should be counteracted by an exertion of the power of Great Britain." "Thus," say you, "after having poured out accusations against the policy of Buonaparté, we are, at length, become converts to it, and *confess it to be right*." Is there, Sir, in the declaration, which you have quoted, any such confession? On the contrary, is not the merciful policy of Buonaparté complained of, in that declaration? The meaning of the words quoted is this: "that France having, by the dread which she has inspired, caused nation after nation to become the enemies of England, whose lenity towards such nations had only tended to induce others to follow their example in yielding to France without resistance, it was time to put a stop to this, it was time to counteract the effects of a dread of France, by showing to such nations that they had something to dread from the exertion of the power of England." And this you call a confession that the tyranny of Buonaparté was right. My neighbour, who is my enemy, has, by divers acts of severity, inspired such a dread amongst the cottagers of the manor, that they are induced, one after another, to assist him in his projects for my total ruin. I perceive, and say, that his conduct towards them is unjust, and wicked to the last degree; and I myself, though I have the power, refrain from using it against them; 'till, at last, their accumulated hostility threatens even my existence. There is one, who lives just close by me, who has more power to injure me than any of the others, who has, upon every advantageous occasion, shown a hostile disposition towards

me, who has very recently apologized for his hostility by alledging that he was unable to resist the commands of a neighbour less strong than my chief enemy (and who is now leagued with my chief enemy); to this cottager, now quite exposed to the power of my chief enemy, who having long set all law at defiance, openly threatens that he will make him use his axes and bill-hooks and scythes for my destruction; to this cottager I go, and demand the surrender of these instruments of mischief, accompanied with a promise to return them to him, as soon as I have settled matters with my principal enemy. He refuses; talks of his independence, which he has before shown to be nothing; talks of the law, which he knows to be a dead letter. Well, say I, if you will not surrender without force, I must and will force you, for my very existence depends upon these your arms being kept out of the power of my great enemy. I lament the necessity, but this I must do, or I perish. Now, is this to follow "the example of my enemy?" Is this to confess that his conduct towards the other cottagers "was right?" We are now, you say, "apostates to the cause of virtue, independence, and integrity, which we pretend to have so long supported, and openly acknowledge, that it cannot contend with that of iniquity and oppression." If a man attack me with a knife, and I, for the purpose of preventing him from destroying me, have recourse to my knife also, I thereby certainly acknowledge, that my naked hands are unable to contend with a knife; but, am I, for that, to be called an apostate to the principles of fair boxing? The difference between us is, that he, by choice, resorts to his knife, and I to mine from necessity; he for the purpose of destroying me, and I for the purpose of preserving myself. You have here the argument of my lord of Clackmannan (whose son is our Envoy in America), that is to say, that we began the war with revolutionary France upon the ground of her having set the law of nations at defiance, and that, therefore, we should, by no means, have acted in violation of those laws. But, Sir, in the course of this war, we have seen the several nations of the continent quietly submit to this violation of law on the part of France; we upheld what was called the law, as long as we found any nation willing to uphold it too; but, when we saw them all submit to its violation by our enemy, and even join their forces to that enemy against us, or, at least, refuse to join us against that enemy, or even to

remonstrate against his aggressions, were we still to adhere to the law? When we saw him respect no law, either of neutrality or of war; when we saw almost every nation in Europe, and the American States too, bow to his will; when all that had been called public law was, in fact, at an end, were we alone to be bound by it, merely because we began the war for its support? If a general be ordered to quell a rebellion, is he to be bound down to the letter of the settled law of the land, while his opponent sets it at defiance? But, as if you were afraid of leaving it to be supposed, that you attributed criminality to Napoleon, you hasten to let us know (or, rather, perhaps, to let *him* know), that, though you have, for a moment, supposed "iniquity" in him, in order to impute iniquity to us in following his "example," you yourself are by no means satisfied, that he has ever done any thing wrong, with regard to neutral nations. The passage I allude to is curious: "*Conquerors, in open war, have, indeed, been cruel and unsparing to their enemies; governments which have displayed an open hostility to more powerful states, or which, after repeated remonstrances, have persevered in maintaining alliances supposed to be injurious to a belligerent and successful power have been changed, or extinguished; but, . . .*;" and, then follows your assertion that the affair of Copenhagen is infinitely worse than any thing of this sort. That you allude here to Buonaparté and his remonstrances there can be no doubt, and that, by the "persevering" government you mean particularly that of Portugal there can be as little doubt. Not a word of disapprobation escapes you. You do not justify Buonaparté in his seizure upon Portugal and his extinguishing of the government, merely because that government would not obey his orders in confiscating English property; in words you do not justify this act; but, your tone and manner are justificatory. You wanted the courage to say, that which your unnatural partiality could not refrain from insinuating. He made "repeated remonstrances" did he, Sir, against the alliance between Portugal and England? What "alliance" was there? None. A treaty of peace and commerce, but no treaty of alliance whatever. Nay, the Portuguese were willing to shut their ports against English ships. This even was not enough; and the government was extinguished, the country seized upon, because the government would not consent to commit an act of fraud upon England. This you term "*perseve-*

"ring, after repeated remonstrances, in alliances supposed to be injurious to a belligerent and successful power." Well, but, there was just the same sort of "alliance" existing between Denmark and France as between Portugal and England. We remonstrated with Denmark repeatedly, as will be seen by a reference to the dispatches; but, we could not prevail on her to break with France. At last we see her completely at the mercy of France and our new enemy Russia. And what do we ask her to do? Not to confiscate French and Russian property; not to give us a farthing; but to place in our hands, until the end of the war, that fleet, which, as she had before asserted, she was obliged to employ against us, when Russia alone commanded her so to do. She refuses, and we seize the fleet, making war upon her for the purpose. But, we attempt not to change or to extinguish the government, as France did in the case of Portugal, though, in this case, we might take to ourselves the title of "conqueror" and "successful belligerent" with full as much propriety as you have applied those titles to Napoleon. Add to this, that we are notoriously in a state of great peril from the combination formed against us, and that France is in no peril at all; that we act from necessity and she from choice; that we seek for safety, and that she openly declares her intention to destroy us. Yet, you say not one word in disapprobation of her seizure upon Portugal, you allude to that act in a tone apologetic; while you ransack your poetical vocabulary for terms of reproach wherewith to describe our seizure of the Danish fleet. After this, nothing that comes from your pen, need surprize us, and we naturally look for passages such as the following. "That, if Denmark was weak, we should have supported her." But, she would not let us support her. Read the dispatch of Lord Howick, and you will find, that she would, upon no account, suffer us to send to her assistance, which we repeatedly offered to do. "Thus we should, at the same moment, have converted a neutral into an ally, and raised that ally to importance, a part of the policy of Buonaparté, which it would be much better for this country to have imitated, than to have contended with him in that course of conduct, by which he is stated to have inspired so much dread into the nations of the world." Why do you say "*he is stated*?" Is it *not so*, my good attorney? Or, are you afraid, that he will take the law of you? I observe, that, all through your pamphlet, when you have to speak of

his acts of violence, you always put the assertion into the mouth of somebody else. He "is accused" of so and so; it "is pretended" that he has done this and that; "we impute" such and such motives to him; "the supposed" views and conduct of Buonaparté. But, from the beginning to the end, not one bad act or bad motive do you impute to him. Leaving you, however, to hug yourself in the imaginary safety which conduct like this will provide for you, in case the worst should happen, let me ask you, Sir, where you have been able to discover those neutrals, whom, "*by supporting them*," Buonaparté has "converted into allies?" And where have you found out those allies, so converted, whom he has "*raised to importance*?" Have you found them in Holland, in Prussia, at Hamtburgh, in Switzerland, at Genoa, at Naples, in Portugal, in Spain? Good God! What an impudent assertion, and that, too, from a person, who quotes Scripture as glibly as a methodist preacher, and who, therefore, ought to have remembered, that "lying lips are an abomination to the Lord." Austria you tell us, was so indignant at our proceedings against Denmark, that "she is said to have declared war against England." This was very unfortunately chosen as one of the consequences of the expedition, seeing the fact is now notoriously false, though you might not be apprized of it. The correspondence between Prince Stahremberg and Mr. Canning fully proves, that the Emperor of Austria (poor man!) did not only not declare war on account of the Danish expedition; but that he has, since that event, been made the miserable instrument, in the hands of France, to propose an opening of a negotiation for peace between us and the latter power, in order to save that power the mortification of having made the proposition itself. Our ministers treated that proposition in the manner that it deserved. They did not sneak into a negotiation under beggarly pretences of "attachment," either to Napoleon or Mr. Talleyrand. They expressed their readiness to treat, but they would correspond upon the subject with no one but the enemy; and despised the idea of an invented assassin. You, however, are so fond of this invention, that, in vindicating your attack upon the Danish expedition, you once more bring the assassin on board, and that, too, in a manner, which is worthy of particular notice. Having spoken of the principle, upon which the ministers, in their declaration, justified the Danish expedition, you proceed thus:

"The assertion of such a principle is the more unpardonable, in the British ministry, as they had before them the recent example of one of their predecessors, who, in rejecting the proposition made to him to assassinate the ruler of France, has placed *this important subject in the most striking point of view*. It was, indeed, *but too apparent*, from the observations to which this circumstance gave rise in the House of Commons, on the part of some of those who now direct the affairs of this country, that the conduct of Mr. Fox on that occasion was *beyond their comprehension*, and consequently *not likely to be the object of their imitation*." Why, no. The sham assassin had not succeeded in imposing upon any person of common sense, and, therefore, it was not likely that the trick would be imitated. But, you, Sir, who anticipate complaints against you upon the score of partiality towards France, because you have used no harsh language towards her or her ruler: you, who beg to be excused from joining in the abuse of Napoleon; you, mild and modest gentleman, scruple not to accuse your political opponents of a disposition to employ assassins, if the occasion were to offer itself, though those opponents are the persons to whose hands the affairs of the country have been committed by the king, for whose person and authority you profess so much respect. "It was but too apparent, that they would not have imitated Mr. Fox." That is to say, that it was but too apparent, that they would have accepted of, and rewarded, the services of the assassin. Now, what were the circumstances that made this so very apparent? Why, Mr. Perceval blamed the word "attachment," which Mr. Fox made use of in his letter to Talleyrand. That was all that was said about the assassin part of the correspondence; and, as no one, whose heart is not made of the very basest materials, can, in my opinion, entertain any sincere "attachment" towards Talleyrand, I must, of course, believe that Mr. Fox was not sincere in his use of the word; and, so believing, I also blame him for using the word. I am not speaking of personal affection. That was out of the question between Mr. Fox and Talleyrand. It must, if existing at all, have been an attachment founded upon Talleyrand's character or conduct; and, if Mr. Fox did entertain such attachment, I am sure he was unfit to be entrusted with the confidence of either the king or the people of England. And yet, according to you, Mr. Perceval's

having expressed his disapprobation of this phrase is to be considered as a proof, that he and his colleagues would, if the occasion were to offer, hire an assassin to take the life of the Emperor of France. Here you are excessively bold; here there is no mark of the meek, unoffending philanthropist. You are timid and tender hearted only towards Napoleon and his allies. The poor king of Prussia you abuse without mercy; the Prince Regent of Portugal you represent as "*persevering*" in his attachments hostile to France, "in spite of all remonstrances;" the editors of the English press you call "interested and unprincipled individuals;" and the ministers you clearly accuse of a disposition to employ assassins to take off their enemies. It is not, then, your want of the faculty of abuse; it is nothing of mildness and moderation in your nature that disqualified you for joining in "recrimination against the French people and their ruler;" but, the cause is to be sought for in your partiality for that people and their ruler, of which, indeed, you appear to have been conscious, when you were protesting, by anticipation, against such a charge. And, Sir, if it be glaringly inconsistent "in those who have been uniformly hostile to the cause of rational liberty, and the constitutional rights of the subject in this country, now to abuse the despotism of France," is it not equally inconsistent in you, who have been so loud in your professions in favour of liberty here, and who, with such unbounded joy, hailed the dawn of liberty in France, now to discover so decided a partiality for the despotism established there? You do not say, indeed, that you love that despotism; but it is quite impossible that you can have any great aversion to it, otherwise you could not discover such cautious tenderness towards the person, who is known to be its founder. Not only do you discover a tenderness towards him; but you miss no opportunity of bestowing your praises on him; and, though all that you have said of him were true, instead of being, for the most part, false; or, supposing you to think it true, still, had you been a hater of despotism, at the bottom of your heart, you would have been more sparing of those praises. We are often struck with admiration at the bravery and hardihood of highwaymen. There were few persons who were not so stricken, upon reading the account of the man lately killed in the woods in Sussex, who had lived in those woods, in the dead of winter, many days and nights with scarcely any covering upon any part of his body, who,

when hard pursued, and, at last, closely beset by a troop of horsemen, sunk himself under the water, all but his head and one hand, there remaining, for several hours, keeping his fire-arms ready to discharge upon his pursuers, and who, when finally overpowered by numbers, rejected the offer to spare his life, and was killed in the act of defending himself to the very last extremity. There were few persons who could read this account without feelings of admiration; but, I will venture to say, that, in the thousands of conversations, to which it gave rise, there was not one, wherein detestation of the robber and the murderer was not almost the only feeling that was expressed. You, however, a philanthropist by trade, seem to be of a different taste. You are lavish in your praises of the valour, the skill, and the wisdom of Napoleon; upon all these topics you *speak for yourself*; but, when you have to speak of any of his misdeeds, though the fact be notorious, you take care to put the words *into the mouth of somebody else*; and, in all cases, where it is possible to make an Old-Bailey-like defence for him, that defence is made by you, with as much apparent earnestness and zeal, as if, at the several paragraphs of your pamphlet, you had received a refreshing fee. I do not mean to insinuate, that you have received, or that you expect, any fee at all; but, I think, the public will agree with me, that this conduct of yours is a pretty good proof, that you have no very deeply rooted hatred to despotism, and that all your cry about liberty must be regarded as merely poetical.

I should here have proceeded to the concluding and most important subject treated of in your pamphlet, the main object of which might be dismissed in a few pages; but, there are so many misrepresentations and falsehoods to expose, as I proceed, that another letter will be necessary for the purpose.—In the mean while, I remain,

Yours, &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Bolton, 23d Feb. 1808.

POST SCRIPT. The following letter, Sir, it appears to me to be your duty to answer; for, again I beg you to believe, that this letter expresses the opinions of the public in general.—“ Sir, in your last, you have some “ pertinent remarks, respecting the assassin “ who offered to Mr. Fox to put Buonaparté “ to death. On this point both Mr. Fox “ and Mr. Roscoe attacked you, as instigating the assassination of Buonaparté, in saying, that, “ if you were a Frenchman, “ you would attack him by another instru-

“ ment than a pen.”—The writer of this “ has heard, that a king’s messenger, a “ chief, or favourite, and well informed “ person, did say, soon after the publication “ of the Negotiation Papers of Mr. Fox “ with France for peace, about a year ago, “ that no one ever could discover, that there “ was any such person as the one described “ by Mr. Fox; that he, the messenger, had “ inquired of all the other messengers, and “ that they had made every inquiry, but that “ no one could find that such a person had “ been in custody, and they were all per- “ suaded that no such person ever appeared “ before Mr. Fox. Neither at the Alien of- “ fice could any account be found of such a “ person. It would, indeed, have been “ strange, if any such person had offered “ himself to Mr. Fox, after the notoriety of “ Mr. Fox’s abuse of those, whom he, by a “ strained construction, pretended had ex- “ cited assassination.—Mr. Fox, I am “ persuaded, fabricated the story, in order “ to commence a correspondence with the “ French government for a negotiation for “ peace; and had he succeeded in making “ peace, and the fact been known, he would “ have been praised for his ingenuity, as he “ is now, by Mr. Roscoe, for his humanity. “ In either case, the trick was to tell to his “ advantage.—Mr. Fox was sworn Se- “ cretary of State, Feb. 7, 1806, and gazet- “ ted the 8th. On the 20th, he wrote the “ letter to Talleyrand about the assassin, “ saying “ a few days ago” the assassin “ came, &c. &c. Mr. Fox could not have “ been a week in office when the assassin “ addressed him; and it is singular, that “ during the half year he afterwards lived, “ though his conduct to this assassin was a “ profound secret, no other assassin offered “ his services. Ent, pray look at the letter! “ The assassin came to his house, not to the “ office, and was with Mr. Fox alone in his “ closet. He would not be in custody of a “ police officer, but a king’s messenger, as “ it is such the Alien office employ.—How “ far did Mr. Fox, by this step, reflect on “ the general character of the English go- “ vernment? And what becomes now, of “ Mr. Roscoe’s half dozen pages on Mr. “ Fox’s humanity and morality? I repeat my belief, Sir, that the whole story was a “ pure fabrication; if it was not so, the “ contrary not only admits of proof; but of “ easy proof, unattended with any circum- “ stance that can possibly be injurious to “ any one upon earth, not excepting the as- “ sassin himself, who, seeing that he was so “ very lucky in escaping from France to “ England and from the justice which he

"ought to have had dealt him here, need, surely, not be afraid of any consequences which can result from the desirable and desired proof of his having been here. *Who* took him away? *Where* was he landed upon the continent? Why such squeamishness about keeping him here, until M. Tuleyraud's answer was received? "Our laws did not permit us to keep him long in prison." No? They have permitted men to be kept a good while, in prison. Mr. Cobbett, without any trial or examination.—Were I to state all the suspicious circumstances that present themselves to my mind, I should extend this letter to a length that might be inconvenient to you, and that certainly would be useless.—I am, Sir, your friend, and No. 58, PHILANTHROPIST.
—Feb. 22, 1863."

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT.—I. *Orders in Council.* II. *Petition of the Middlesex Grand Jury.*—Upon the Orders in Council discussions have taken place, in both Houses of Parliament; and, of course, as these orders have been advised by the *ins*, the *outs* discover that they are very mischievous and wicked things. After volumes have been spoken and written upon the subject, there are very few persons, comparatively speaking, who seem to have a clear idea of what these famous orders are, or, of the effect which they are intended to produce. In spite, therefore, of the stultifying effects of the many speeches which I have read, relative to these orders, I will endeavour to communicate to the reader my ideas respecting them; which I shall do, however, with great diffidence, being far from certain, that my ignorance of the matter is not equal to that of almost any one of the orators whose speeches I have read. Here, then, at a venture. The Emperor of France having, by his several decrees, obstructed, as much as lay in his power, all commerce with England, carried on by neutral ships, and having, by one particular decree, declared this whole Kingdom in a state of blockade, and ordered his cruisers, of course, to seize, as lawful prize, neutral vessels, bound to or from any port of this Kingdom; having, in short, declared to the neutrals, that he should consider the slightest mark of their having had, or being about to have, communication with England, as a proof of their ships and cargoes meriting confiscation, the *late ministers* intimated to the neutrals (there being only Denmark, Portugal, and the American States), that,

if they submitted to these mandates of France, England, in exercising her undoubted right of retaliation, would, of course, seize and confiscate all neutral ships and cargoes, bound to or from any port of France, or under the known controul of France, or in a country allied with France in the war. The neutrals do submit; for, neither of them make any public remonstrance, or protest, against the decrees of France. There are instances cited, in which the decrees were acted upon; but that is of no consequence; for, if the decrees had their intended effect, namely, that of putting an end to all communication between England and neutral states, there would, of course, no captures ensue; and, if they did not produce that effect to the desired extent, they would naturally produce it in some degree. Less communication with neutrals would exist in consequence of them; some ships would be prevented from coming to England, and all would come charged with an additional weight of insurance. Thus matters stood until November last, when the present ministers caused the Orders in Council to be issued, which orders contain a set of rules intended to prevent France, all her allies, and all the countries under the known controul of France, from having any communication with neutrals, except through the channel of the custom house of England, where the goods of the neutral, intended for those countries, are to pay a duty, which duty, finally paid by the enemy, will go into the English treasury. There are numerous rules contained in the Orders in Council; but this one will suffice for our purpose, because the arguments, on both sides, which apply to this, will, with some insignificant variations, apply to all the rest.—There are two objections, which the *outs* make to this rule; the first is, that it is contrary to the law of nations; a very vague charge, and one that cannot be substantiated, even if we were to admit the book of a Frenchman, whose name was Vattel, and which contains merely the opinions of the said Vattel, to be the book of the law binding upon England; for, neither in that book, nor in any other book upon the subject, is there much chance of a case such as that now before us. The better way of stating the objection is, therefore, to say that the rule which we have laid down is *unjust*. This, indeed, the *outs* do say. They say, we have no right to *punish* America, for instance, because France has broken through all the rules relating to neutrality. Very true; nor do we intend to punish America; we intend to punish France; and, if America

suffer, it is neither our fault nor our wish. The decrees of Napoleon are intended to injure us. That is very fair, and we have a right to retaliate. But, the decrees of France relate to America; they make America an instrument in producing the injury to us, therefore, we have a right to make America our instrument in producing injury to France. Let France repeal her decrees, and America ceases to suffer. As matters stood, previous to the Orders in Council, a ship-load of tobacco came from America to England with all the additional price, which arose from the high insurance, occasioned by the danger of capture in consequence of the French decrees; while another ship-load of tobacco went to France, free from such high price, because there was no danger of capture from us. Was this just? To suffer things to remain in such a state would have been a most base desertion of our naval superiority. But, say the ours, the Americans did remonstrate against the French decree, and obtained an assurance, that it should not be enforced with regard to them. This is not the fact. No such assurance is contained in the note of the French minister to the American minister, upon this subject; and, if such an assurance had so been given, we had nothing to do with it. The decree contained no exceptions; the decree remained unrepealed; and there was not, and is not, any public act of the government of the American states, protesting against either the principle or the practice of that decree. Here, therefore, was a complete acquiescence, on the part of America; and, I think, it evidently appears, that the correspondence between the American and French minister was intended for no other purpose, than that of putting the former in possession of *something to shew to us*, in order to induce us to forego our intended and threatened retaliation. But, how the out faction can stand up, in the face of the correspondence now published, and complain of the measures of retaliation, must be matter of astonishment to every one not accustomed to observe the conduct of political parties. At the outset of that correspondence (which, as having been laid before Parliament, will, of course, appear, in its place in the *Parliamentary Debates*), Lord Howick writes to Mr. Erskine thus: "I transmit to you also the copy of another Note presented by their lordships to the American commissioners, previously to the signature of the treaty, on the subject of the extraordinary declarations and orders of the French government, issued at Berlin on the 10th of November last.

"This note I must recommend to your particular attention; you will state to the American government, that his majesty relies with confidence on their good sense and firmness in resisting pretensions, which, if suffered to take effect, must prove so destructive to the commerce of all neutral nations. *His majesty has learnt, that the measures announced in the decree have already, in some instances, been carried into execution by the privateers of the enemy, and there could be no doubt that his majesty would have an undisputed right to exercise a just retaliation.* Neutral nations, cannot, indeed, expect that the king should suffer the commerce of his enemies to be carried on through them, whilst they submit to the prohibition which France has decreed against the commerce of his majesty's subjects. But though the right of retaliation would unquestionably accrue to his majesty, yet his majesty is unwilling, except in the last extremity, to have recourse to measures which must prove so distressing to all nations not engaged in the war against France."—Has America resisted the pretensions of the decree? It is notorious that she has not; and, it is equally notorious, that the president, in his last speech to the Congress, says that he has nothing to complain of in the conduct of France, though the French decree, observe, remained unrepealed, and unmodified. The consequence is, then, that, according to Lord Howick's own letter, we had a right to adopt the measure of retaliation, especially as events had occurred, which rendered such measure more and more necessary to our safety. And yet, Lord Howick and his patriotic colleagues are now blaming the measure, and that, too, upon the ground of its injustice towards America.—The other objection to this measure, is, that it is *impolitic*; that it is calculated to injure us, more than it is to injure France. I will not repeat the arguments that I have already, more than once, made use of to prove the contrary of this proposition; but, I think, the negative of it might be pretty safely inferred from what Lord Henry Petty has said in support of the affirmative. He is reported to have told the House of Commons, that the "arts of sublimation," to which the French would have recourse, would be lasting injuries to this country and to her colonies. Why, now, if, by these arts, the French should find out chemical sugar and coffee and cotton, what harm would that do us? None that I can see; but, while the discovery is going on, the inconveniences of France must

be very great indeed, while the Orders in Council must go near to the producing of starvation in Spain and Portugal. Holland also must suffer severely. Hamburg, Denmark, Russia; all must endure, not only inconvenience, but suffering; and the two-fold consequence of that suffering will naturally be, a perfect conviction of the great power of England, and a hatred of France whose ambition exposes them to the effects of the exercise of that power. But, his lordship apprehends, that we are in greater danger from a *glut* than France is from a *scarcity*. He is afraid that we shall die smothered with sweets; or, if we survive the effect of the sweets, that a superabundance of cloathing will kill us. The fact is, however, that we hear a general outcry raised in France, and in all the countries under her controul, against these Orders in Council; we hear an out-cry in America also; but we hear none in England, except amongst persons like the Barings and amongst the opposition, both animated by motives purely selfish.—The bill for giving effect to the Orders in Council has been carried by a very great majority in the Houses of parliament, and is certainly approved of by a still greater majority out of doors. The measure is looked upon as an act of defiance of all the world; as an assertion of our right of maritime dominion. The enemy, encouraged by our long forbearance, issues, in the heyday of triumph and from a capital which he has conquered, a decree declaring England in a state of blockade. As if he had said: “Now, that I have conquered the continent, I will set seriously about my last labour, and will begin by ordering the islanders to be closely shut up, until I have leisure to invade them.” Our answer to this is, an Order in Council, making him pay a duty into the English treasury upon every article of foreign goods that he receives; and this we *enforce*. “I will suffer nothing,” says he, “to come to the continent from or through England.” To which we answer: “the continent shall have nothing that does not go from or through England.” Why, the very effect of such words, if adhered to, outweighs, in the scale of national consequence, all the commerce of all the Barings on earth. Lord Henry Petty, however, thinks nothing of this. Nay, he thinks, that it would be bad policy to induce America to declare war against France; because it would diminish the sale of our manufactures. A fine statesman it must be, who has a mind of this stamp!—The publication of the correspondence with America has brought to light a fact, which I have often said I believ-

ed to exist; namely, that the late ministers went a considerable way in giving up to America the great point of the right of searching for seamen. It is clear that Lords Holland and Auckland did pledge themselves to do *something more* than enforce the strictest possible orders for regulating the manner of searching. Now, what was that something more? They are hard pushed by Mr. Canning, to explain what they meant; and, it must be confessed, that they give an answer far from satisfactory; and, in short, it is evident, that, rather than have gone to war with America, they would have abandoned the right altogether. For this, if for no other reason, it was a fortunate circumstance for the country that they were dismissed. When one of them tells us, that it would be a misfortune to see America at war with France, because, by that event, we should lose the sale of certain manufactures, what are we to expect from them? It is abundantly evident, that the politics of the little clan of Scotch writers prevailed in the late cabinet; that the ministers were the mere funnels, through which they blew; and that all would have been peddling and patch-work. It was so long ago as December, 1806, that I took the alarm as to their intentions with regard to America; I endeavoured to communicate that alarm to the public; and I flatter myself that my endeavours were not without avail. I stated my reasons for fearing, that a good treaty would not come out of the hands of Lords Holland and Auckland; that my fears were well founded the *proof* is now before the world. Well might the President refuse to ratify the treaty, not finding it to contain all that he demanded. He sent it back, too, like a set of *articles of capitulation*, underwritten here and there: “this I agree to; this I reject; this I agree to, provided so and so.” What an insolent proceeding! Yet, if the late ministers had been in place, when this disfigured instrument came back, my firm belief is, that they would have resumed the negotiation upon the former basis, and would, like the commanders of a town, summoned to surrender and reduced to its last dead horse, have put their hands to the humiliating conditions imposed. The right of searching for English seamen on board American ships ought never, for one moment, to have been entertained, as a point for discussion. Not only was it so entertained by the late ministers; but it was expressly left open for future discussion, and a note of that purport accompanied the treaty. What was this but to acknowledge that there were entertained by our own government doubts respect-

ing the existence of the right? Upon the same principle, that commerce ought to be preferred to every thing else, they would, in all likelihood, have acted after the peace of Tilsit; and, then, instead of throwing Napoleon and his vassal states into consternation, as we now have, we should have been totally occupied in sending negotiations to Paris, and in looking out for the enemy's flotilla.—II. A Petition from a late Grand Jury of the county of Middlesex, complaining of certain enormities in the management of the Cold-Bath-Fields prison, was, a few days past, brought before parliament by Mr. Sheridan (who, while *in office*, said not a word about abuses of any sort); but, it was withdrawn, at the suggestion of the ministers, because it purported to be the petition of a grand jury who were *no longer* a grand jury. The object of this was, of course, to obtain delay, and to take from the petition a part, at least, of its consequence. It was presented the next day, signed by the foreman of the grand jury, in his private capacity; so that, it is now the petition of one individual, instead of being that of the Grand Inquest of a County. The substance of the petition has been given in the news-papers; but, I do not choose to offer any remarks upon it, until I can lay it before my readers at full length. It is truly curious to observe how indifferent and cold the opposition appear to have been upon this subject. No animation; none of that eagerness which they discover in pleading the cause of the "poor, harmless, suffering Danes." The prisoners in Cold-Bath-Fields prison are their countrymen, and are entitled to their protection; but, then, there was, in all probability, nothing to be gotten; no debating triumph to be obtained, in this case; and, there was, on the other side, the fearful consideration of what might happen in the way of indirectly giving credit to the former exertions of Sir Francis Burdett. The petition, however, neither party, nor both together, can stifle. It must appear in print; and it is one of the things, which will, in the end, produce those effects, which every good man so anxiously wishes for. Along with the petition should appear *the names of all the persons*, who signed the first petition; for the public will very well know how to decide upon the question of "informality."

Botley, 25th February, 1808.

TYTHES.

SIR,—When a periodical work, like yours, has forced itself into notice, and is

become, by its own intrinsic merit, the object of general attention and perusal, it imposes on its author a sort of necessity to preserve the character it has acquired, by admitting into its pages such contributions only, as have some merit at least to recommend them. The first requisite for good writing is good sense, and sound argument. An ingredient, almost as necessary, is good grammar. And although, where the former obtain, a few small errors in the latter may be easily overlooked; yet when the language made use of is as barbarous and ungrammatical, as the facts are false, and the arguments inconclusive, you need not fear to incur the loss of your merited reputation for impartiality, by refusing to admit such compositions into your Register: and I am sure your readers in general would have thanked you, if you had spared them the trouble of labouring through the sapient reflexions of your sagacious correspondent, J. F. D. the tythe hater of Taunton. After having observed, "that there is no business of a domestic nature likely to come before parliament of an equal weight and importance *than* the subject of tithes, as the abolition of *which* is seriously and devoutly prayed for, &c." he very sagaciously tells us, that nothing can *ameliorate* this most abominable impost but a total *abolition*. This appears to me a curious way of mending a thing. And to mend the matter still more, he proposes an equally curious mode of abolition; viz. by commutation. I always thought till now that Taunton had been in the South of England; but, I conclude that I have been under a mistake, and suspect that it is situate in the North of Ireland. J. F. D. then tells us that our churches are deserted, and our religion declines; because, what? Because the farmer, who rents his land is subject to the payment of tythes; and who, *therefore*, pays so much less rent to his landlord as the tythe is worth, wants to cheat the person who is intitled to that tythe of his just dues. For (as D. X. in the next letter has truly said) the owner of the tythe has as good a right to that tythe, as the owner of the land has to his rent: the law, and prescription, which is a branch of the law, has given it to him. Is not this the fact, Mr. Cobbett? And if it be so, is this honest? In 99 cases out of 100 of the disputes that occur between the owner and tythe payer, is not the main cause of them to be found in the unjustifiable attempts on the part of the latter to beat down the other, and compel him to accept a very inferior and unequal price for his tythe? It is almost universally true, that when a new incumbent appears in a parish, a combi-

nation of the farmers is immediately formed to harass him into an acceptance of their own terms: a natural feeling of resentment against oppression frequently urges the tythe owner to resist such attempts, and he resolves to take his tythe in kind: this again irritates the farmers, who "work him up" as the phrase is in the poor rates: and so the quarrel continues with mutual aggravations: but, as I said before, it generally originates in the unjust and unmanly attack of the multitude against the individual, in their base attempts to make an unfair bargain with him in the outset, whether he be a lay proprietor, or a member of the church.—J. F. D. then condescends to let us into a very great secret, viz. that disputes at law of a very serious import, frequently arise from frivolous causes. But, surely, Sir, we do not want an oracle from Taunton to tell us that. We know very well that the feather of a partridge, or the scent of a hare has given rise to more litigation, than all the disputes about tythes that have been agitated since the days of Archbishop Winchelsey, 500 years ago. (No bad argument this, by the bye, in favour of a position of your own, Mr. C. that a propensity to war, or to fight, which is war, is a passion natural to all the creation.) But what has this to do with the right to tythes? Does J. F. D. seriously think that if his Bashaw tythemonger harboured a pique against his friend, he would not have contrived to indulge it even if he had been no tythemonger? A pack of fox hounds would have done the business as effectually. But this is not an evil arising out of the tythes, but from the malevolent spirit of man. I defy J. F. D. and all the Solomons of Taunton Dean to contradict me in the assertion, that if my rich neighbour injures me, a poor cottager, by turning his trace horses into my little field of wheat, and trampling the corn which is to feed my family, or by leaving open the gate of the next field, and giving access to other cattle, and thereby doing me considerable damage, or by throwing down my fences and carrying off my corn before the tythe is set out, a jury of my Somersetshire neighbours will teach him a better lesson, and give me ample redress for the injury and insult. And the greater the distance in point of rank and fortune between me and my oppressor, the more signal will be their visitation upon him for his injustice. This, Sir, is not mere theory: every circuit brings it into practice.—Observe, Mr. Cobbett, that I am not defending the *policy* of the present system of tything: but let not those whose right to tythes is as indisputable as that of a lord of a manor to his tines (a

right scarcely less obnoxious than the other) or of any land owner to his rents, be hunted down and persecuted for claiming their own: let not this right be loaded with an abuse which belongs not to it: let us not remedy one evil by substituting a greater: and above all, let us do as we would be done by, and render unto every man his due. I dare say, were I a farmer, I should rather not let the parson's team into my field: but considering duly that 9 tenths only of its produce belonged to myself by the law of the land, and that the remaining tenth by the law of the land belonged to some one else (no matter whom it not being mine) I do think without complimenting myself too highly, I should have honesty enough to offer him a fair price for it; if we happened to differ about that price, which if it were a fair one, would very rarely happen, I should propose to call in an honest surveyor, who knew the value of the thing, and would do what is right between man and man, and abide by his decision. And where is the tythe owner, Mr. C. who would reject this offer? Or rather, where is the farmer who is honest and just enough to make it?—I protest, Sir, I have not seen or heard of any plan that appears to me so likely to reconcile the shepherd to his flock, and to cut up by the roots that prolific source of parochial contention, the quarrels about tythes, as the appointment under the authority of parliament by the magistrates of each county, of a competent person in each parish as a surveyor and assessor, who should be sworn to a due and impartial discharge of his duty, and subject to a heavy fine for every breach of it, whose duty it should be to assess and ascertain the value of every tythable article: for which he might be paid by a poundage or percentage to be limited by statute, and to be borne equally by both parties, who should be bound by the assessment so to be made. This plan I think at least as likely to fill our churches, and restore unanimity, cordiality, and brotherly love between all ranks, as J. F. D.'s plan of amelioration by means of abolition, brought about by commutation. If you think these strictures worth your notice, I am sure they will receive it. But if they should not find a place in your Register, I shall not quarrel with your impartiality, being sure to find your pages filled with better matter than can ever flow from the pen of your constant reader and admirer.—*Suum Cuique.*—*Feb.* 17, 1808.

P. S. From a passage or two in the Taunton Apollo's letter, about a revolution and change of government, I am almost inclined to suspect that something more is meant

than meets the ear, and that whilst he pretends to quarrel merely with tythes in the ordinary acceptance of the word, he in fact, means to convey a sly censure on administration, who have not only sanctioned, but adopted the principle of tything in an unlimited extent, by taking from the subject a tenth of the whole produce of the country of every denomination. O, ho! Mr. Slyboots!!

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Letter from Count Bernstorff, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Wetterstedt, First Secretary of the Cabinet of his Swedish Majesty—Kiel, Oct. 17th, 1807.

(Continued from page 320.)

The loyalty of the sovereign, whose intention it is thus attempted to calumniate, and the nature of the relations which subsist between Denmark and Sweden, sufficiently prove the falsity of that insidious assertion.—But we shall feel great satisfaction to be authorised by his Swedish Majesty himself, to answer by a formal denial an insinuation more injurious to him, than it is to us. This, Sir, is the only motive which induces me to demand of you a frank and positive explanation on this subject.—I take leave to request you will send it me by the bearer of this letter, Mr. de Holsten, Lieutenant of the Royal Navy.—I feel happy in having an opportunity of calling me to your recollection, and of offering you the assurance of my high consideration.

Answer from Baron Wetterstedt, Minister of State. Helsinki, Oct. 27, 1807.

I had this afternoon the honour to receive, through Lieutenant Holsten, the letter which your Excellency has addressed to me, dated the 17th October.—As the duties of my place do not allow me to deviate from the regular mode of official communication between the two courts, your Excellency will permit me to restrict myself entirely to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, and to express to you the happiness I feel in having the opportunity of renewing to you the assurance of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be, &c.

Note addressed by the Minister of State. Count Bernstorff, to Baron Taube, Chargé d'Affaires of his Swedish Majesty. Kiel, Nov. 5, 1807.

The annexed copy will inform Baron Taube of the object of a communication, which the Undersigned, Minister of State, thought it right to address to Baron Wetterstedt, First Secretary of the Cabinet of his

Swedish Majesty. The latter having judged a mode of communication inadmissible, which, from the absence of the Swedish embassy, and the interruption of direct correspondence with Stockholm, appeared to the undersigned the only way, and, at the same time, the speediest and most authentic mode of communication. It only remains to request Baron Taube will have the goodness to express to his court the wish contained in the note addressed to the afore-said Baron.—It is of material importance for the Danish government to be enabled to refute, in an authentic manner, an invidious charge, clearly destined to compromise a sovereign, whose loyalty is above all suspicion, to make him share in the odium, which attaches to a conduct equally atrocious and perfidious, and to produce a misunderstanding between Sweden and Denmark.—The undersigned requests Baron Taube to accept the assurance of his high consideration.

Note addressed by Baron Taube to Count Bernstorff, Minister of State. Kiel, November 5, 1807.

The undersigned Swedish Chargé d'Affaires has just received the note, with which his Excellency Count Bernstorff, has this day honoured him.—Although the events which have taken place, as well as the season, seem already to resolve the question which forms the object of your Excellency's note, the undersigned will take the earliest opportunity to bring it to the knowledge of his master, and flatters himself, he shall soon be able to return the answer.—The undersigned avails himself with pleasure of this opportunity, to request his Excellency will be pleased to accept the assurance of his sincere respect.

Note addressed by Baron Taube to Count Bernstorff, Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Kiel, Nov. 24, 1807.

The undersigned has not failed to bring to the knowledge of the King, his master, the contents of the note which his Excellency Baron Bernstorff addressed to him, the 5th of November last, and of the copy which accompanied the same.—It is by order of his court that the undersigned hastens to declare to the Danish minister, that all explanation with regard to the note above mentioned becomes superfluous, his Majesty being of opinion that he ought solely to be judged by his actions, which he shall always know how to justify.—The undersigned having the honour to present this answer to Count Bernstorff, Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, begs leave at the same time to repeat the assurance of his high consideration.

Note addressed by Count Bernstorff, Minister of State, to Baron Taube. Kiel, Dec. 4, 1807.

The undersigned, Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, has had the honour to receive the note, which Baron Taube had the goodness to address to him on the 24th November, in order to declare that the court of Stockholm deems it superfluous to give the demanded explanation to the disposition which the English minister has thought himself authorised to send his Swedish Majesty with regard to Denmark. The Danish government thought to render a service to the Court of Sweden, by offering an opportunity to refute a charge which it felt inclined to consider as calumnious, and which, so long as it remains undenied, cannot but compromise him against whom it is preferred. The said government is the more surprised at the refusal of the explanation solicited, as this refusal is but too liable to be considered as a tacit acknowledgment of the intentions which were announced to him in an official manner by the intimate ally of Sweden.—And these pretended intentions being already hostile against Denmark, she was the more of opinion that she owed it to herself to demand from the Swedish government a denial thereof, without waiting, that actions should furnish the necessary information on the subject. The reasons which occasioned the above demand existing still in all its force, the undersigned is authorized to expect here, and requests Baron Taube will have the goodness to support it at his court. He has the honour to repeat, on this occasion, the assurance of his high consideration.

Note addressed by Baron Taube to Count Bernstorff.—Kiel, Dec. 21st, 1807.

The undersigned has brought the note to the knowledge of the King his Master, which Count Bernstorff had the goodness to address to him the 4th of December, touching the explanation required by the Court of Copenhagen, with regard to a pretended denunciation of intentions entertained by Sweden, to occupy the island of Zealand with Swedish troops. The King avoided once to explain himself on this subject; but as the Danish government required an answer, the undersigned is ordered to declare in an official manner—That had his Majesty judged it necessary to occupy Zealand with his troops, jointly with those of his ally, he should have done it; and the King wishes that he may never find himself in the case to regret that he acted otherwise. The undersigned has the honour to renew to Count Bernstorff the assurance of his high consideration.

FRANCE.—January 20, 1808.—Motives of the Senatus Consultum upon the Conscription of 1809, declared by Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely, Minister of State.

Senators, when your wisdom called out the conscripts of 1808, your wishes were directed towards the peace which signal victories had prepared—you wished to ensure new means of conquering and pacifying. The success surpassed your hopes—the flames of war are extinguished upon the Continent—a durable peace has been sworn between the two greatest Sovereigns in the world, and Europe has time to breathe.—But there is a government to which the repose of Europe is despair, to which peace is terror, to which discord is necessity, and war hope. England has replied to the offer of a generous mediation offered by the Emperor of Russia, by carrying fire and the sword into the territories of his most ancient ally, by professing more solemnly contempt of the rights of nations, by proclaiming more inhumanly the principle of eternal war. The indignation of all Sovereigns has replied to the injurious manifestos, to the cunning declarations, to the barbarous acts of the Cabinet of St. James. The predictions which the orators of his Majesty made to you a year ago in this Tribune are realized. It is, we said, 'from the bosom of the Continent, which England would set in a flame, that henceforth a terrible war shall be waged against her. It is by applying to her on all the European shores the principles she has applied in all seas, that we shall bring her back to the ancient principles of the law of nations and of civilized states. It is by exiling her ships from all the coasts where we have soldiers and allies, that the English ministry will be punished for the culpable refusal of giving peace to the world.' Such, senators, were the words we addressed to you in speaking of the conscription of 1808, and behold a sacred and powerful league is formed to punish the English oligarchy, defend the rights of nations, and avenge humanity. From the Baltic to the Mediterranean, from the Nile to the Narva, but few points remain to the English ships where they can land, or where they are not forbidden to touch.—But it is not sufficient to have, by a just reciprocity, pronounced against England that dreadful sentence of outlawry; she must not be permitted to be at rest in the seat of her iniquitous domination, upon any of her coasts, in any of her colonies, under any points of the globe, which are not yet interdicted to her. It is necessary that, repelled from one part of the world, menaced in all others, England should know not where to direct the little military force of which she

has the disposal ; and that our armies, more formidable than ever, should be ready to carry into her possessions our victorious and avenging eagles. Such, gentlemen, are the motives which have determined his Majesty to demand a new conscription.—The levy of the preceding year has been, as you foresaw, the pledge of continental peace—the levy of this year will be the presage of a maritime peace. The pillage of the arsenal and port of Copenhagen—the emigration of the Portuguese fleet, have not yet left the Continent without ships.—Our legions can yet reach the English militia ; Ireland may yet hope for succour against oppression ; India may yet expect deliverers ; and while our ancient phalanxes shall march to hasten the days of justice, new legions of young warriors shall be trained to discipline and to battle, under the paternal eye of those warlike magistrates, of those senators generals, who with so happy a zeal have already formed brave men to replace those whom war has snatched from the country, or who have been restored to their families.—His Majesty will have a superabundance of means to realise his pacific views, or to execute his warlike projects. To the powerful armies of his faithful allies, his Majesty will unite, for common defence and triumph, so formidable a mass, that success will not long be doubtful.—So just a cause will not be vainly defended by so much force, and protected by so many powers. A league so imposing in its elements, so generous in its policy, so just in its objects, so great in its means, will at length bring back our enemies to justice through fear, or to submission through victory.

HOLLAND.—*Commercial Decree.*—Jan. 23, 1808.

Considering that every European nation ought to co-operate with all its might to the triumph of the cause of the continent, in a contest which will not be of long duration, and whose result is not doubtful. Considering that our particular duty as well as the dearest interests of our people command us to accede in all points to the desires of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, our illustrious brother, and even to surpass his hopes. Considering that the indemnity and relief which our kingdom has a right to demand and expect depend entirely upon the powerful intervention of France. Considering, in fine, that however great the sacrifices hitherto made by this country may be, and however painful its situation, both under the relations of commerce and those of finance, it is of much greater interest to dissi-

pate all the doubts that might exist with respect to our intentions, and to prove to Europe, in the most signal manner, our attachment, and that of our people, to the common cause; have decreed and do decree as follows:—Art. I. From the publication of the present decree all the ports of our kingdom shall be shut against all ships, whatever be their denomination. Those only are excepted from this disposition, (and provisionally till a new order,) of which mention is made in the 2d article.—II. Armed ships of our allies are not included in the exclusion directed by the preceding article. They may enter and quit our ports, and bring in their prizes by conforming to the ordonnances issued relative to the entrance and departure of ships of war.—III. Ships of the allies or neutral powers, which may enter our ports to avoid the danger of the sea, shall have no communication with the interior of our kingdom. They shall be subjected to quarantine, and be under the most severe superintendence. The commandant of the port shall make them put to sea as soon as the weather shall permit.—IV. Fishing boats are under the direct superintendence of the civil and military authorities upon the coast. These authorities shall take care, on their responsibility, that no communication take place, by means of the fishermen, with the enemy's ships and other ships. To that end, there shall be placed as a sentinel, a soldier on board each fishing boat. On the return of the boat, the sentinel shall make his report of what has passed during the fishery, contrary to the dispositions of the present decree, and the owner of the boat and crews shall be prosecuted with all the rigour of the laws. Given at Utrecht, 23d January.

FRANCE.—*Decrees for raising Conscripts and for uniting certain Countries with France.*—23d Jan. 1808.

The Conservatory Senate assembled to the number of members presented by act 90, of the act of the Constitution of the 22d of Primaire, year 8, having considered the project of the *Senatus Consultum*, drawn in the form prescribed by article 57 of the constitutional act of the 16th Thermidor, year 10—After having heard on the motives of the said project, the orators of the Council of State, and the report of the Special Commission nominated in the sitting of the 18th of this month ; the adoption having been discussed with the number of voices prescribed by article 56 of the organic *Senatus Consultum* of the 18th of Thermidor, year 10, decrees as follows:—Art. I. Eighty thousand Conscripts of the Conscrip-

tion of the year 1809, are placed at the disposal of government. 2. They shall be taken from among the youths born between the 1st of Jan. 1789, and Jan. 1, 1790. 3. They shall be employed, should there be occasion to complete the legions of reserve of the interior, and the regiment having their depots in France.—The present *Senatus Consultum* shall be transmitted to his Imperial and Royal Majesty.

We require and command, that these presents, sanctioned by the seals of state, and inserted in the *Bulletin des Loix*, shall be addressed to the courts and tribunnals, and administrative authorities, that they may be inserted in their respective registers, and observed, and caused to be observed; and our Grand Judge, the Minister of Justice, is charged to superintend the publication.

NAPOLEON.

By another Decree of the Conservatory Senate, in the same form, and in a like manner signed by Buonaparte, the towns of Kehl, Wesel, Cassel, and Flushing, are to be united to the French Empire. Kehl to the department of the Lower Rhine; Cassel to the department of Mount Tonnerre; Wesel in the department of the Roer; and Flushing in the department of the Scheldt.

FRANCE.—*Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs relative to Portugal. Made in Oct. 1807, and published Jan. 24, 1808.*

There is no sovereign in Europe who does not acknowledge, that if his territory, his jurisdiction should be violated to the detriment of your Majesty, he would be responsible for it. If a French ship were seized in the port of Trieste, or Lisbon, the government of Portugal and the sovereign to whom Trieste belongs, would have to consider that violence and damage done to your Majesty's subjects as a personal outrage—they could not hesitate to compel England by force to respect their territory and their ports: if they adopted a contrary conduct, if they became accomplices of the wrong done by England to your subjects, they would place themselves in a state of war with your Majesty. When the Portuguese government suffered its ships to be visited by English ships, its independence was violated by its own consent, by the outrage done to its flags, as it would have been had England violated its territory and its ports.—The energy ought to be placed in a state of interdict, in the midst of the seas, of which he pretends to

reserve to himself the empire. In this position, all powers could and ought to expect from each other a mutual support.—And at what a moment did Portugal betray the cause of the continent? Ought England to expect still to have an ally, when, exercising her violence on every sea, she menaced the new world as well as the old; attacked, without any motive for aggression, the flag of the Americans, and dyed their own shores with their blood—when, scandalously famous by the disasters of Copenhagen, which she surprised in the midst of peace, she sought, in the pillage of her arsenals, for some sad and bloody spoils.—But the scandal of this understanding between the Portuguese government and England may be traced to other times. When England meditated, in 1803, the rekindling in Europe that war which your Majesty has so gloriously terminated, she sent a fleet to Lisbon; the ministers had conferences—time has developed the object and the result.—Have not the English squadron sent to the River Plate touched at Janeiro? Did not the troops sent to Buenos Ayres and Monte Video receive provisions from the Brazils? Those distant succours may have escaped the attention of Europe; but she saw Portugal receive and victual in her ports the English ships destined to blockade Cadiz, to attack Constantinople and Egypt; those which were to land troops in Naples to stir up revolt; those which were to introduce English merchandize upon all the coasts of the Mediterranean, though Portugal knew all the ports in the South were shut against them.—A French consul, whom Portugal had acknowledged and admitted to the exercise of his functions in the port of Faro, has been taken from his house by the intendant of the customs, sent to prison, taken out only to be exiled, and the Portuguese government refused for three months to repair that outrage.—Protestations of neutrality ill concealed this hostile conduct. The court of Lisbon should have explained itself without shuffling. Your Majesty proposed it to accede to the system of the continent, and had it done so, you would have forgotten every thing.—Far from deferring to your Majesty's proposal, the Portuguese government had no other solicitude than that of informing the court of London, of tranquillising England relative to her interests, of guaranteeing the safety of the English and of their property in Portugal.

(To be continued.)

"The civility of this man is wonderful: he spares us the trouble of contradicting him, by contradicting himself. Nay, he goes still further, and, by proving himself to be a liar, spares us the pain of calling him so."—POPE, LETTERS.

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TO
WILLIAM ROSCOE, Esq.
LETTER IV.

SIR,

The part of your pamphlet, which remains to be examined, is, as you state, intended to show, that a peace with France, to be made as soon as possible, upon the terms before proposed by her, is absolutely necessary to the safety of England, and that "nothing but a political suicide, a total incapacity to meet the bounties of Providence and to improve its blessings, can induce us to hesitate for a moment, as to the course we ought to pursue." If you had, by any regular chain of reasoning, founded upon admitted, or notorious, facts, endeavoured to make the truth of these assertions apparent, it would have required but a short space, wherein to answer you; but, you have mingled, or, rather, mashed up, so much of history and of other matter along with the argument which you employ, that, after much pains taken to pick out the latter from the former, I find myself obliged to follow you through thick and thin.

Amongst the fatal consequences of the Danish expedition, you mention our loss of all continental allies. "In every contest," say you, "that may henceforth take place between France and England, British courage alone must be employed, and British blood must flow. We are now effectually deprived of those powerful allies, who hitherto engaged the attention of our enemies, and rendered the continent the theatre of war." Sentiments of the same turn are expressed by you elsewhere, and, it must not be forgotten, that you set a high value upon Hanover (a thing which France has to offer us), and tell us, that, if we had but accepted of Napoleon's terms of peace, we might have had our share of influence upon the continent. This is your language, and these are your sentiments, when you are endeavouring to impress your readers with an idea of the evils of the Danish expedition, and to induce them to believe, that the terms of peace, which were offered by France, were such as we ought to

have accepted of. But, by-and-by you have to say something about continental connections, as considered with regard to the peace that may now be made; and then, it being your object to induce us to insist upon nothing that Buonaparté is likely to wish not to grant, your sentiments are quite altered; and you tell us, that you hope, that "foreign reign subsidies will never again be adverted to, but to be execrated." In another place, that, "if, instead of *blindly aiming at continental influence and connections*, we duly estimate our own interests, importance, and security, we may regard all the efforts of France to rival us, as a maritime power, without dismay. The balance of power, that *chimerical source of war and blood-shed*, now exists not even in name. Let us attend more to ourselves and less to our neighbours." All this would have been very well, if it had stood by itself; if it had not appeared in the same pamphlet with your affected lamentation at the fatal consequences of the Danish expedition, amongst which you number the loss of our "powerful allies upon the continent," which loss has left us, for our defence, "Brit courage and British blood alone." But, you had two purposes to answer, and but one matter to work upon. You wanted to persuade us that the Danish expedition had produced a fatal consequence to us; and you also wanted to persuade us, that leaving the whole of the continent with all its ports and arsenals, in the hands of Napoleon, would not be at all dangerous to us. To effect the former purpose, it was necessary to set a high value upon the aid we derived from continental connections; to effect the latter purpose, it was necessary to decry those connections, and to represent England as self-dependent for her safety. You wanted to blow both hot and cold, and, if you had (poor gentleman!) but one mouth, it was nature's fault, and not yours.

But, we are now coming to a passage, at the penning of which you must certainly have invoked the genius of the great Talleyrand, and at the conclusion of which you must have bridled up your head, with a self-

congratulatory smile, saying, "there, petti-loggers, match that if you can." It has been thought, and said, by many persons, that the French aim at the destruction of our constitution, liberties, and religion; and, as the destruction of them would naturally be included in the conquest of England, the French do, in my opinion, aim at that destruction. By way of combatting this opinion, you ask: "At what period, since the revolution in France, has the French government *proposed* to us, that we should relinquish, or divest ourselves of, our constitution, liberties and religion?" To whom did you address this, Sir? Certainly you must have supposed, to the most base or the most stupid of mankind. You are a fit person, indeed, to complain of insults to the common sense and common feeling of the nation; you, who have the impudence coolly to desire us to believe, that the French do not wish to destroy us as an independent nation, *because* they never have made to us a formal proposition to give our consent to such destruction. Verily, if your verbal discourse be like your written, the rabble of Liverpool treated you with unaccountable forbearance. You proceed to tell us, that "neither in the negotiations of 1801, 1803, or 1806, do we find traces of any proposition on the part of France, which could infringe, in the slightest degree, upon the independence, the interest, or the prosperity, of this country." You may know, though I do not, how to distinguish between national "interest" and "prosperity," or you may, from your intimacy with John Doe and Richard Roe, think, that tautology is a beauty in composition; but, as to the substance of what you say, it is this, that, from the beginning to the end, France has not, in any of the three negotiations, *proposed any one thing*, to which we had any solid ground of objection; an assertion, which, from my soul, I believe, Arthur O'Connor himself would not, for his character's sake, venture to make in the face of the world. You appear to be aware of an exception that even your political friends (if you have any) might wish you to have made with respect to the propositions, made through Andreossi, relative to the press, and the speeches in parliament; but, say you, "even the complaints made by the French ruler against the licentiousness of the British press were abandoned, and eventually formed no part of the discussions;" though you had, before, taken infinite pains to inculcate a belief, that the present war arose *wholly* from the publications in England against Buonaparté; that "it was instigated by a few in-

terested and unprincipled individuals;" that "it is *demonstrated*, that the disagreement arose from publications in this country." But, here again, niggardly nature has refused you the two mouths. When you wanted to cause it to be believed, that England began the war without any reasonable cause, and that there existed, in reality, no grounds of hostility, and no grounds of alarm as to the designs of Buonaparté, then it was necessary for you to find out *the real cause of the war*, and that cause was, the offence which Buonaparté took at the publications in England; but *now*, when your object is to persuade us, that your great friend (I must call him so, however it may shock your modesty), has not the least desire to do any thing that can, "in the slightest degree, infringe upon the independence of England," you find it necessary to speak very lightly of the complaint about our "licentious press," and to tell us, that, before the war broke out, those complaints were abandoned, and, at last, "formed no part of the discussions;" in other words, that the publications from the press were *not* the cause of the war, and that what you have before asserted, upon that subject, was a wilful falsehood.

Barren and disgusting as these contradictions are, however, they are quite equalled by some which are yet to be noticed. You tell us, that the cause of war now acknowledged is, that "if peace were once established, it would enable France to *create a marine*, by which she might overpower the British navy and subjugate the country." These words you insert as a *quotation*, but *without reference*, for a reason best known to yourself. No, Sir; this also is false. It is not thus, that the objectors to peace express themselves; for this would be to declare for "*perpetual war*," a declaration, which, with your usual attention to truth, you have ascribed to us. We say, or, I do, at least, that, if we were now to make peace with Napoleon, leaving him in possession of all the ports and naval arsenals upon the continent, and without making any stipulation to prevent the creation of a marine, that he would, in a very few years of peace, create a navy sufficient to overpower us; and, that, therefore, we ought to keep on the war, till we can obtain the separating of some of the maritime states from him, or a stipulation such as I have mentioned; because, in the case of a peace, now made, without such stipulation, we could not disarm a ship or disband a regiment; that the expences of peace would be equal to the expences of war, and the danger infi-

nity greater; that he would obtain repose, and that we should receive an augmentation of inquietude; that he, never having any apprehensions of us, would have leisure to mature his maritime projects, while our navy must from the very nature of its constitution become, day after day, in a state less formidable than it now is. This is what I have, over and over again, stated; and, if you had taken this statement, you would have had *something to answer*. But, now, let us hear what you say in order to convince us of the absurdity of the alarm arising from the notion, that peace, now made, upon the terms proposed by France, will enable Napoleon to create a marine. You tell us, that France is, by nature, not a naval power; that, in the most prosperous days of her navy, she was unable to cope with the fleets of Holland; that those persons are almost insane, who seem to imagine, that, because Buonaparté has been so successful by land he must, if he turn his attention that way, be equally successful by sea; and that, therefore, we may safely make peace, leaving dreams of alarm to the unmanly creatures who entertain them. But, lest your powers of *soothing* should fail, you, a little further on, try the effect of threats, and tell us, that, if we will not make peace, then Buonaparté may, and, in all likelihood, will, beat us by sea. You say, that, in the commencement of the French revolution, France was not military; that the attacks made upon her made her military; that, if she had been left *quiet*, she would not have become formidable to her neighbours; that she was compelled, in her defence, to take a government purely military; that, "*in like manner*," France is not now a naval power (though she has been "*attacked*" by a navy for many years), and, if left in a state of *tranquillity* would not be at all likely to attempt it; but, "*if compelled* to assume it, *if threatened* with perpetual war, *if harassed* from year to year by protracted hostilities; *if compelled* to become naval for her own *safety*; then it is impossible to say that the same spirit which has been manifested by land may not be excited by sea, an event greatly to be dreaded, and the more to be apprehended, as she is now associated, in the *same cause*, with almost every maritime state in Europe." Poor, injured, "harrassed" France, "*compelled*" to become naval for her own "*safety*!" Never was there anything uttered so devoid of principle as this. I defy the Old Bailey to produce such an advocate. And so, sir, you wish to tame us as they do elephants; stroke us with one hand and

cudgel us with the other? When it is your purpose to sooth us into peace, we are told that it is a mark of insanity to suppose that France can ever rival the naval power of England, but, when you take up the cudgel, we are warned to take care how we provoke her to become a naval power. While the former scheme is in your mind, you tell us, that France, even in the best days of her navy, was unable to cope with Holland, quite forgetting to tell us that Holland *now* makes part of France; but, when you come again to your cudgelling operations, you do not forget this circumstance, but remind us, that almost every maritime state in Europe is now under the absolute controul of France, or, as you, with your accustomed candour, choose to express it, "*associated with her in the same cause*." But, sir, as to your argument, there is a little deficiency in point of analogy, to which, in your next edition, it may not be amiss for you to attend. Give me leave to place it before you in as clear a light as I can. France (*you say*), at the beginning of her revolution, was not military (false in fact); the attack upon her made her not only military but a military conqueror, and that because "*the nations of the continent became her instructors in military tactics*." France (*you say*) is not now naval; but a perseverance in a naval war, on our part, will, or at least may, *as in the other case*, make her not only naval, but a naval conqueror. No, sir; and if you have deceived yourself by this sort of logic, your brain is of that kind which Swift describes as not capable of bearing many skummings. You quite overlook the want of similarity in the circumstances. It was (taking your fact for granted), at the *beginning* of her war that she was not military; but it is at the *end* of fifteen years of war that she is not naval, though the war has, all along, been naval as well as military, as the total destruction of her fleet, old as well as new, is, to her, at least, a convincing proof. For your argument to have been worth anything, as applied to the purpose which you had in view, there should have been *no naval war* all this time; or, you should have been able to say, that France was destitute of a navy in 1792, and that now, in consequence of our "*attack*" upon her, she had drilled herself into a formidable naval power. "*The nations of Europe*," you tell us, "*have been her instructors in military affairs*," and you express your fear, that, unless we make peace, we shall, in like manner, "*become her instructors in naval affairs*." Become! Now, really, sir, I must charge you, in your capacity of pleader for France, as being very

ungrateful ; for, have we not been endeavouring to instruct her these fifteen long years, in all sorts of naval affairs, in battles of all sizes, and in all parts of the world, not forgetting to give, as it were purely for her sake, here and there a lesson to her allies, even unto those nations, who “ are “ now associated with her in the same “ cause ” (say *good* cause in your next edition, to make the thing complete) ; and, if they have, not one of them, profited from our instructions, in all that time, what reason is there to suppose, that they will begin now to profit from them ? This is your main argument ; upon this argument you ring all the changes ; and in this argument, which is one of experience, you are completely beaten, fifteen years of experience having proved, that, *in war*, France, though having for her principal object, the destruction of England constantly in view, and though having at her command almost all the naval force of the continent of Europe, has been daily sinking as a maritime state ; and, yet you would fain make us believe, that the only way to prevent her from becoming formidable at sea is *to make peace* with her, and that, too, upon terms, which shall leave her in quiet possession of all the means which the continent affords for the creation of a navy. Your proposition, stripped of all its useless words, and connected with undeniable fact, is this : the only danger which we have to apprehend from the hostility of France, is, that she may create a naval force ; she has now, and has had for some years, almost the whole of the naval means of the continent at her disposal ; we have been at war with her for fifteen years, and she has been daily sinking in naval power ; *therefore*, in order to prevent her from rising in naval power, let us make peace with her as soon as possible, and insist upon no stipulation that shall prevent her from making use of the absence of our naval force for the creating of a naval force of her own. This is, disguise it how you will, the advice which you give to your country ; advice which no man would give, who was not the enemy of his country, or, at least, who, from want of real patriotism, had not suffered his spite against his party opponents to get the better of every higher consideration.

You admit, sir, for argument's sake, that France would, in case of peace, increase her navy so as to threaten the independence of England ; and, under this admission, you ask : “ What is our remedy against it ? “ The answer,” you continue, “ is ready “ from the whole tribe of alarmists : PER-

“ PETUAL WAR. This is the *avowed* object “ of all their exertions, the sole preservative “ against their terrors. Continually haunted “ ed in imagination by the spectre, Buona- “ parté, they cannot sleep in peace, unless “ the blood of their fellow subject flows daily “ and hourly flowing in their defence, in “ every part of the world.” For malignant aspersions there is nothing like a philanthropist by trade ; but, sir, while you were drawing such a hateful picture of the cowardice of others, you certainly forgot those symptoms of unfeigned fear, which you exhibited at Liverpool, where you retreated at the very sound of the voice of your opponents, crying, if we are to believe the published reports, like a stout Italian, when a little blackguard of a dozen years old has given a hoist to his board of brittle images ; you must have forgotten this, or you would have shown some compassion for the cowardice of us, who are, at least, your countrymen. But, sir, where is it that you have to refer to what you have here given as the answer of those whom you (brave man !) term the alarmists ? *Who* has ever said, that “ perpetual war is the object of his exertions, and the *sole* preservative” against the dangers which he apprehends ? I believe, that no one has ever said it, in print or out of print. But, I will tell you what we say : we say, that a war to last until our grand children are fathers of families ; that a war for a hundred years to come, would be preferable to the subjugation of our country by France ; and, preferable, too, to a peace, which, in our opinion, would speedily lead to such subjugation. Whether the sort of peace which you recommend would have this effect, is a question which has before been discussed by me,* and which I shall not discuss again here ; but, that you feel conscious of the badness of your cause is pretty evident from your having recourse to such flagrant misrepresentations as that which I have just noticed. Perhaps, however, it is in the way of induction that you have made this statement of our sentiments. We insist, that perpetual war is preferable to subjugation by France ; we insist that perpetual war is preferable to such a peace as would speedily lead to subjugation ; we say what sort of peace we should think preferable to war ; you are, I suppose, of opinion, that we shall get no such peace as

* See Register, present volume, page 65, and subsequent articles upon the subject of *Peace*, where I have used arguments, which, as far as my knowledge reaches, no one has yet attempted to answer.

this latter; and, hence you conclude, that we are for perpetual war, which, in this way, you take us to have openly avowed, as the sole preventive for the evil which we dread. But, observe, you take it for granted (for argument's sake) that our apprehensions are well founded, as to the *means* that it would put into the hands of our enemy; and how do you console us? Why, by telling us, first, that we have not the power, by continuing the war, to prevent the operation of those means; but, next, that the "immense preparations for subduing us are *not* the voluntary act of our enemy, who has, *probably*, other objects in view; but are forced upon him by the *persevering* hostility of this country, and the declared purpose of waging against him perpetual war; or, in other words, of contending with him, till one of the two countries be destroyed as a nation and subjugated to the will of the other." It is useless to repeat the accusation of falshood, so often before proved upon you; it is useless to express one's contempt of your misrepresentations; but, it is still less useless to ask you where you have ever seen such a declaration on the part of England against France. You do, indeed, quote a passage from the author of *War in Disguise*: "He (Buonaparté) says 'there is room enough in the world for him and us. 'Tis false; there is not room enough in it for his new despotism and the liberties of England.'" Whereupon you, like a true pettifogger, ask: "How did, then, the liberties of England exist so long in the same world with the *ancient government* of France? Or, why were Mr. Pitt and his friends so anxious to establish that government?" What a miserable quibble! Is it not evident, that the author of *War in Disguise* was not talking about the *internal* despotism of Buonaparté? Is it not manifest that he was speaking of his *universal* despotism, and particularly of the effect of his power over the maritime states of the world, to induce England to set about counteracting the effect of which power was the avowed object of the pamphlet in question? A man who can be guilty of such glaring misconstruction; who can wilfully expose himself to the imputation of ignorance, rather than forego the advantage to be derived from falshood, is well worthy of being the advocate of the cause you have espoused; but, he might, methinks, have spared us his moral reflections and his references to holy writ. There is, indeed, one way, in which we may be said to force Buonaparté to make vast preparations for invading us, namely, in *refusing to*

put on his yoke quietly. "It is the *second* blow that makes the battle," say the Quakers; and, as towards the Emperor Napoleon, you, Sir, appear to be a perfect "Friend." The refusal of the Prince of Portugal to make a fraudulent seizure of English property, held under the sanction of the law, you term a "*persevering*, after repeated remonstrances, in the maintaining of alliances supposed to be injurious to a belligerent and successful power;" and our conduct you describe by the words "*persevering* hostility;" that is to say, that by our persevering in a refusal to submit to Napoleon's terms, we *force* him to make vast preparations for invading and conquering us. "Under *such* circumstances," you proceed, "there can be no doubt that every effort will be made by him for the invasion of these islands." And then you go on again with your threats. But, Sir, why do you not address yourself *to him*? Since you find us so "*persevering*;" so mulishly obstinate in our reluctance to put our heads into the yoke, why do you not ask him to think of some terms of peace that we shall look upon as safe? This is a way of putting an end to the war, that has not, it would seem, come athwart your mind; and yet, there appears to be nothing unnatural in the idea; unless, indeed, you regard it as the height of presumption in us to think of any terms not strictly conformable to the dictates of his promulgated will. In that case your conduct is consistent, whatever people may think of you as a legislator and a patriot.

Suspecting, apparently, that the infallibility of your own judgment may be doubted by some few persons, at least, you appeal for a presumptive proof of the inoffensiveness of the views of France, to the opinions of the several sets of ministers, under whom negotiations have been carried on with her for the termination of war. You tell us, that Lord Sidmouth and his colleagues, in 1801; that the same ministry, in 1803; that Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, in 1806; perceived no such objections to a pacification as the fears of the alarmists have now discovered; and that even the present ministers, have acknowledged, in the face of Europe, that there was no substantial cause for hostility between France and this country, either from apprehensions of this, or of any other, nature; but, that the war was continued on account of *Russia only*, and that his majesty was contenting for interests not his own." This falshood I have exposed once before; but in this place, it is stated still more distinctly and, therefore, shall again be pointed out

The words of the declaration were, that "the negotiation was *broken off*" upon "points, *immediately* affecting, not his majesty's own interests, but those of his imperial ally." Now, was this a declaration, in the face of Europe, that his majesty, in continuing the war, was "contending for interests not his own?" And, that there was *no substantial cause* for war between England and France, but that the war was continued on account of Russia "only?" What an impudent misconstruction! What a scandalous attempt to mislead the uninformed! Besides, what was this famous negotiation of 1806? To hear you, Sir, would not any one suppose, that it was a negotiation, just upon the point of ending in a treaty of peace, when some demand of ours in favour of Russia came, unfortunately, and broke all off again? To hear you, who would not imagine that this was the case? But, the fact is, as the fact pretty generally is with respect to your representations, completely the reverse; for this promising negotiation, instead of being upon the point of ripening into a treaty of peace, had scarcely begun to show blossom, when it was blasted by a dispute about the *basis*, that is to say, about the foundation upon which the negotiators should *begin to talk about terms*. The negotiation, in truth, never really began; it never existed; and we call the silly thing, which was going on in 1806, a *negotiation*, only because we have no word whereby to characterize it. Yet you speak, all along, of the negotiation as an affair of great importance; you speak of the parties as being *agreed as to terms*; and you express your approbation of those terms, as well you may, for they are the dear offspring of your own prolific brain. Such a way of representing transactions, may do very well for the Lives of Lorenzo de' Medici and Pope Leo the Tenth; but with regard to transactions of yesterday a little more fidelity is required. The several sets of ministers, to whose opinions you have appealed against "the alarmists," all bear witness against you. In 1801, Lord Sidmouth and his colleagues expressly declared, that they had made peace "by way of *experiment*," and accompanied this declaration with another, that a large peace establishment would be necessary, in order to keep us upon our guard against probable dangers; which declaration, as you well know, was complained of by Buonaparté. In 1803, the same ministers declared, that we were at war with Buonaparté, *because we could not live in peace with him*; and they repeatedly stated their suspicions of his hostile designs even

during the short interval of peace. After breaking off the negotiation of 1806, the late ministry solemnly declared, "that the restoration of the general tranquillity was retarded only by the *injustice and ambition of the enemy*." These are excellent authorities for you to appeal to in corroboration of your opinion, that the views of France are just and moderate; that, the manner in which the last negotiation was put an end to is a proof, that there is *now* no rational object in continuing the war, and a ground whereon for the people to proceed in petitioning the king to hasten negotiations for peace.

Thus, Sir, have I had the patience to go through the whole of your pamphlet; and, I must say, that so much misrepresentation, misconstruction and falshood, accompanied with so little truth and sound reasoning; so much assurance with so little candour; so much malice with so little wit; so much profession of morality and religion with so little of the practice of either, I never before met with in any one of the hundreds of political publications whereon it has fallen to my lot to remark. You appear to me not only to have laid aside, or set at nought, that conscience, of which you speak so feelingly in your preface, but also to have been so infatuated as to suppose that there was not, in the whole English nation, one single person capable of detecting your miserable attempts at deception. As to your partiality for France, which is too glaring to be denied, I do not impute it to a desire on your part to see that country conquer your own. You do not proceed that length in your wishes. That is a state of things, which, indeed, you do not at all contemplate. You have a liking for the rulers of France, partly because they are the enemies, not of your country, but of the politicians you hate in your country; and partly, I am afraid, because they are triumphant. You owe the French rulers a grudge and the French people too, for having, by their actions as well as their solemn declarations, so completely belied your opinions and predictions; but, you have not the courage to acknowledge your error, and you therefore still have an attachment to them, while you throw the blame upon the powers by whom they were, as you call it, attacked. Your excuse is, that they were compelled to adopt a simple military despotism in their own defence, forgetting, apparently, what is notorious to all the world, namely, that, it was not 'till after they were out of danger, nay, after they had brought their enemies to their feet, and trampled them under their feet, that they adopted a

simple military despotism. This you must know as well as the rest of mankind; you must be satisfied, that the French are, by nature, disqualified for the enjoyment of what we call freedom; that their minds are as much averse from entertaining the idea as oil is averse from mixing with water; that, in short, a Napoleon, or some such master, they not only must have, but will have from choice. All this you must now clearly perceive; you must, in your heart, despise the French for it; but, the worst of it is, take away the French as objects of your admiration and applause, and your soured temper leaves you no object at all, which is a state of existence too dreary for any man to endure. There is another feature in your pamphlet, which I dislike; and that is, that you never, by any accident, suggest a saving of the public money, though one would think that it must have occurred to you, as being likely to contribute towards the lightening of those burdens, of the weight of which you fear the fatal consequences. The vile jobbing of the ministers; their greediness; their uniform propensity to screen speculators; their waste of the public money, in all manner of ways; none of this do you blame. You hate them only as bitter enemies of the French, and, in that light only it is that I view them with approbation. The late ministers were full as bad as the present, as to the management of the public money; and, they were, besides, very cold indeed in their feelings for the honour of the country. These present ministers have done more for the maintenance of that honour than has been done before, since the year 1792; and for this reason I prefer them. You would prefer them too, if you were not actuated by feelings of revenge, joined to your partiality for France; and, at any rate, if they have nothing more formidable than your pen to resist, they are secure in their places for life; for, the effect of every word, which you utter against them, is totally destroyed by your evident partiality towards your country's enemies. You hate your dog for devouring your eatables, but when you perceive that others hate your dog *because* he keeps the thieves from breaking into your house, you not only keep him, but your resentment against him is a good deal softened by the discovery; and do you not think that the nation will be actuated by similar motives?

I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c.

Botley,

WM. COBBETT.

March 1, 1808.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

“PERISH COMMERCE.”—Under this

head I must place the little which I think it necessary to say, at present, upon the subject of Mr. ARTHUR YOUNG's letters, the second of which will be found in this sheet. The statement in this second letter, respecting the consequences of a total stop to the *importation of corn*, is, at the first glance, truly alarming, so that I, who am not very apt to be scared by battalions of figures, have really started back at the array of Mr. Young. Having taken time to rally, however, I find that my alarm was groundless; and, as the matter is of great public importance, I cannot let it pass without some few observations respecting it.—I had said, upon a former occasion, that, compared with the annual consumption of the nation, the importation of food was a mere trifle; and that I believed, that, in no one year, did the importation amount to more than sufficient to feed the people for *one week*. This Mr. Young says he was astonished at; and he has now shewn, that the average annual importation of corn, for 26 years last past, has amounted to nearly, or perhaps quite, two millions of pounds sterling. Now, the population of Great Britain is 11 millions, and, if we allow the food of each individual, taking one with the other, to cost about 4s. a week, one week's food amounts to the two millions of pounds; so that, if this rate of subsistence be admitted, I was not much out in my reckoning, and that the average consumption of individuals surpasses four shillings a week there can, I think, be very little doubt. It will not do to tell me, that it is *only corn* that we are here speaking of, and that individuals do not consume 4s. worth of corn weekly; for, though this fact be correct, I answer, that, if we have a plenty of everything else but corn, we can do with less of that; and that, the only way of estimating is, to speak of *food* altogether.—I wish Mr. Young had informed us what quantity of provisions of various kinds is annually *exported* from Great Britain and Ireland; for, I am inclined to think, that the amount of it would surpass that of the imports. The shops in America, strange as it may seem, were tolerably well supplied with *English cheese*, which, of course, would remain at home, if we ceased to receive American corn. Mr. Young does, however, say that the supplies of corn from America are not worth speaking of; and I was glad to hear him say so, because, as the public will have perceived, the American clan have been endeavouring to frighten us with the spectre of *famine*, to arise out of the cutting off of these “abundant supplies.”—Great praise is due to Mr. Young for his researches, for

his accuracy in detail, and for the ability with which he discusses all the subjects of which he treats; but, I do think, that he leaves the arguments of Mr. Spence wholly unanswered, it being impossible that any combination of facts can upset a principle, supported by reasons, which cannot be shown to be erroneous. Besides, what has Mr. Young's experience proved? Only this, that, at a particular period, when manufactures were languishing *wheat was cheap* and agriculture upon the decline, as indeed, it must necessarily be. I see no great evil in this, being anxious only, that the point may be settled, that England can exist great and free, independent of *commerce*, by which, observe, I always mean, trade with *foreign nations*.—There is one other topic, touched upon by Mr. Young, which I wish to advert to for a moment: I mean, his proposed *General Enclosure bill*. That such a bill would be like the bed of Procrustes; that it would be an outrageous invasion of private property; that it would fall upon title deeds and records with teeth as unsparing as those of a paper-mill; that it would give rise to confusion and litigation without end, must, I think, be evident to every man at all conversant in the divers tenures and claims appertaining to the unenclosed lands of this kingdom. But, what good would it produce? Would it cause more corn to be raised? If it would, it would be a calamity; for corn is now *too cheap*; at least, so have said the parliament, in their acts for exportation. Would it cause more persons to be born and raised up? Why, then, increase of consumption would go hand in hand with increase of production; and no increase of abundance would take place. But, my opinion is, that it would cause no increase at all in the quantity of food raised; and this opinion I shall retain, until I see *all the lands now enclosed producing every year*, a crop more than sufficient to pay all the expences of rent, taxes, and tillage. When I see such an accession of hands as to have brought out manure, and to have worked all the land, now enclosed, into this state; then I shall say, "enclose more land, for we cannot make this more productive;" but, while I see one third part of the enclosed land producing annually nothing at all, or, at most, not half enough to pay the expences of rent, taxes, and tillage, I shall continue to think, that a *General Enclosure bill* would be a wondrous monument of national folly.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.—The bill giving effect to the rules laid down in these Orders, gave rise to a discussion, in the House of

Commons, on the 24th of February. The bill establishes imposts and prohibitions with respect to goods, going from England to the Continent, and, as was observed in my last, the regulations adopted in the Orders will necessarily compel most of the goods, which the Continent receives from abroad, to pass through our Custom-house. Amongst the articles enumerated in the bill was *Jesuit's Bark*, a well known medicinal drug. Mr. Whitbread caught hold of this as a fine topic of declamation, moved for leaving out the article, and insisted that this was "an *inhuman* mode of warfare;" just as if *we* had begun it. The object of this bill, and of all the regulations in question, is to retaliate upon the Emperor of France for his decree, declaring England in a state of blockade; making it criminal in any nation to hold any sort of commercial communication with us, and providing a punishment for such crime; placing us under an interdict; depriving us of aid and comfort to be derived from foreign connection and intercourse. What do we? We retaliate, but with less rigour; for, upon certain conditions, we allow a communication with the Continent. He makes no exceptions in favour of *our sick*. No exceptions at all; and why should we? Mr. Whitbread's logic is this: "if you prevent the removal of disease, you must, on the same principle, wish its increase; and this principle will lead to the promotion of poisoning and assassination;" the conclusion he evidently aimed at being, that those who approve of this bill, would promote assassination, if they had the opportunity. No, Sir; for though I approve of this bill, I would not promote assassination any more than you would; though I approve of the bill, I do not wish to prevent the removal of disease, any more than you wish to prevent the removal of thirst by charging sixpence a pot for your porter, when you see many poor wretches who cannot possibly get it at that price. You cannot, I dare say, sell your porter cheaper without danger to your fortune; nor can we suffer the bark to go to France without danger to our fortune as a nation, because the same argument which will apply to the bark will apply to every other article, the very object of the bill being to produce *suffering and distress* amongst those who are leagued together, whether willingly, or not, for our destruction. You, Sir, like Mr. Roscoe, never seem to recollect, that the enemy has it, at all times, in his power to put an end to this "inhuman mode of warfare," and that, too, by the simplest of all means, namely, that of *ceasing to carry it on himself*. "Oh,

“yes; a fine story, indeed, to expect him “to recede!” Why, really, Sir, if we do suffer ourselves to yield to insolent pretensions like this, we are unworthy of being independent; we not only must perish as a nation, but we *ought* so to perish.—You are alarmed, lest Napoleon’s agents should go to his hospitals and say: “Behold, here “is an English act of parliament, which “prevents you from obtaining a remedy for “your complaints.” If such were to be the conduct of his agents, the effect, it appears to me, would be this: the sick soldiers would say: “Aye! is it so, indeed? Why, “then, that England is a great power yet. “The acts of that parliament are mighty “things. England is not humbled, nor is “it so very easy to conquer her. What! “can that parliament, then, shut up all the “channels of the boundless ocean? Why, “then, France, after all our fighting and “conquering, is little better than a besieged “town.” This is what they would naturally say upon hearing only one side of the story; but, if they were to hear the other; if they were told, that this was, on our part, merely an act of retaliation, and that they might have Jesuit’s Bark the moment their commander chose to revoke his interdict against us, their execration would fall upon his head and not upon ours.—Mr. Wilberforce was, upon this occasion, with the Jesuit’s Bark party. He, acute gentleman, discovered a distinction between this case, and the case of a besieged town. He saw, that, in the latter case, a prohibition of this sort might induce a general to capitulate; but, that there was not the least probability, that the prohibition proposed would put an end to the present contest with France. Putting an end to the contest is not immediately contemplated; what is in contemplation is, to make the Continent rue the effects of abetting a man, who has sworn our destruction, and who has placed us under an interdict. Now, the people of the Continent, in France as well as out of it, have yet the power of giving vent and effect to their feelings, or they have not; if they have, the sufferings which our prohibitions produce amongst them must lead to openly expressed hatred against him who is the cause of those prohibitions; and, if they have not, if the people of the Continent are so completely subjected to the will of Napoleon, that no sufferings can possibly move their passions; why, then, how is it possible that any regulations of ours can work a change in their minds to our disadvantage? But, Mr. Wilberforce thinks it is certain, that Napoleon will have the bark,

some how or other; and, that all which we shall gain will be an addition of hatred from the people of France. As to an *addition* of hatred, I am not afraid of that. I believe they neither love nor hate us, any more than one can be said to love or hate an ox or a fat hog. They would willingly conquer us and pillage us, if they could, for which it would be foolish in us to be angry with them, seeing, that, if the occasion suited, we should be very likely to conquer and pillage them. At this present time all we aim at is *defence*; one way of defending ourselves is to weaken our enemy, and one way of weakening him is to make him get Jesuit’s bark at the expence of a guinea an ounce instead of a shilling an ounce.—Mr. Whitbread reminded us, that, in case of a scarcity here, the enemy *might* prevent us from receiving corn from the continent, by way of retaliation; and so starve us. But, he has *already* cut off our communication with the corn countries of the continent; and, does Mr. Whitbread suppose, that he would have opened the communication last month, if we had had a short harvest? the idea is perfectly ridiculous.—The same argument that has been urged against the prohibition of Jesuit’s bark will apply to all articles whatever; for they all, in a greater or less degree, either directly or indirectly, are conducive to the convenience, and necessary to the wants of the people of the continent. By the cutting off of the supply of cotton some persons, at least, will greatly suffer; all suffering is not upon a sick bed; but all suffering leads to a sick bed; if you, Mr. Whitbread will say, prevent people from obtaining that which is necessary to keep them from suffering, you must, on the same principle, wish their sufferings to increase; and, as all sufferings lead to death, at a faster or slower pace, this principle will lead to the promotion of poisoning and assassination.—The truth is, that there was no foundation whatever for the objection, which was manifestly brought forward for the purpose of debate. To the whole of the measure, indeed, there *might* be some solid objections, but I have observed none such. The measure is a most important one. It is indeed, though not in word, a practical assertion of *the sovereignty of the sea*. As such it is looked upon by other nations; and the only fault of it is, that it was not adopted under that *name*, and that the duties now to be imposed were not denominated a *tribute*. This measure gives quite a new aspect to the war; it places us upon a new footing, and gives us a new character. We are not now going sneaking about like a set of hucksters

and smugglers, wheedling this and that neutral to be our friends and to deal with us. We say (and I am only sorry that we do not say it flatly and plainly), you shall none of you have any communication with one another, without paying tribute to us. There are some persons who call this "*piracy*," though I wish they would consider a little their piracy upon the public purse. The late attorney general (a very worthy man, I believe) called up in his brethren of the law to say, whether they ever read of the like being done before. They might have called upon him to say, whether he ever read of all the ports and naval arsenals of the continent being in the hands of one man before; and when he ever before heard of England's being declared to be in a state of blockade. What would our ancestors, at any period of our history, have said, if Henry had had the assurance to decree their country in a state of blockade? Does Mr. Whitbread think, that they would have stood balancing about *commercial interests*? They would not have hesitated a single moment to declare every country their enemy who should refuse to resist such an intolerable pretension.

LORD LAKE.—On Tuesday, the first instant, a debate took place, in the House of Commons, upon a grant proposed, by a message from the King, to be made to the successor and family of Lord Lake, and upon another grant proposed to be made for the purpose of erecting a *monument to his memory*. It was curious to see how *Whigs* and *Orts* pressed forward, as it were in rivalry, in support of this proposition. Thus they always do, when the public money is to be bestowed upon any of themselves. Mr. Whitbread, Lord Folkestone, and Sir Francis Burdett were the only persons who *spoke* against it; and, upon the division, which Sir Francis Burdett called for and insisted upon, there appeared but 25 to vote against the pecuniary grant out of 226. The pecuniary grant was of £2,000, with a retrospect; making an additional sum of 9,000l. to be paid down immediately. Never was there a more flagrant instance of the waste of public money; and this, too, at a time, when we are told, that the sacrifice of our last shilling is necessary. This Lord Lake, who was a conqueror of tawneys; who, as far as I have heard, never was engaged against any thing worthy of the name of an army, and who enjoyed, while in India, an enormous salary, receives a peerage, comes home, dies of a cold, and, then, we are called upon to make a noble provision for his family. Mr. Whitbread went only half way. He objected to the

9,000l. and the monument; but, on account of the poverty of Lord Lake's family, assented to the pension of 2,000l., though that was by far the most objectionable part or the proposition, it being, in fact, a mortgage upon the taxes of the nation to the amount of 100,000l. principal. I will here subjoin what was said by Sir Francis Burdett upon the subject, exactly as I find it reported in the *Observer* newspaper, reserving some further remarks for another opportunity. — "I feel it my duty to enter my protest against this motion, as well as against every thing of this sort in the present condition of things; and I do it on three grounds — one is that of a public nature, and the others as particularly applying to this case. Perfectly agreeing in all that I have heard as to the particular case of my Lord Lake, it is not necessary for me, and certainly not a pleasant task, to dilate at all on that subject. But services, whenever they come before the house of commons, and a demand of remuneration is made for them from the public, ought always to be of that kind and description that no man can feel any inclination to ask what these services were. They ought to be of that brilliant kind, that no question could be asked concerning them, because they are known throughout the world; or else, in my humble opinion, they ought not to be brought forward before this house as the ground of remuneration from the public. But, in the present situation of this country, and from the burthens set upon the people, it is necessary there should be more than what may be called extraordinary services to justify such a demand as this on the purse of the people. Therefore, on that ground, I shall feel it my duty to object to the vote now proposed. But, on general and constitutional ground, I object to it still more strongly; because I do think that his majesty has ample means and resources, without coming to this house, to reward all the merit that this and all the countries in the world ever produced; much more, I fear, than can be produced by this country at present; and ample, I am certain, for the reward of all the merit which is now before us. What have been the arguments used on all occasions, when an application is made for any pension by which an addition is made to the burthens of the country, which the king possesses the means of defraying? What is it but a partial ground — a pretence that there are no means in the hands of the crown to reward merito-

“ rious services ? Should these means of
 “ reward be possessed by the crown, why
 “ should they be wasted in the reward of
 “ services which do not meet the light, and
 “ probably, if known in this house, would
 “ meet the reprobation of every member ?
 “ It is on this ground that I shall take the
 “ sense of the house on this question. With
 “ respect to the merits of lord Lake, my
 “ opinion is, that the merits of the people
 “ of England, in suffering such privations
 “ as they have borne, are much greater
 “ than those of any individual, either now
 “ in existence, or who has lived since the
 “ commencement of our present difficulties.
 “ I therefore shall not only give my negative
 “ to the proposition now before us, but
 “ think it my duty to divide the house upon
 “ it.

“ The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* said,
 “ he had not a lower opinion of the merit of
 “ the people of England than the worthy baronet;
 “ but did not know how they could be
 “ rewarded with pensions. As to the power
 “ of the crown to reward merit, he wished
 “ to know whether the worthy baronet
 “ was aware of the extent of the Civil
 “ List, with which the Crown had power
 “ to reward merit, which was only to the
 “ amount of 1,200l. a year, which in effect
 “ amounted to no more than 800l., and
 “ this the king could only grant for his own
 “ life.

“ Mr. *Wm. Smith* explained his sense of
 “ the meaning of sir F. Burdett in the re-
 “ ward he expected to be given to the peo-
 “ ple of England for their merit, which
 “ was that of the vigilance of their repre-
 “ sentatives in taking care of their interests.

“ Sir F. *Burdett*.—“ Before the com-
 “ mittee come to a vote, I think it fit to
 “ say a few words more ; not in explana-
 “ tion of what I before said ; for that has
 “ been done most completely by the hon.
 “ gent. below me (Mr. Wm. Smith) : but
 “ to assign reasons why I am unable to ac-
 “ cede to the wishes of those who have re-
 “ commended to me not to divide the
 “ house. The right hon. the Chancellor of
 “ the Exchequer, not intentionally, misre-
 “ presented what I said about rewarding
 “ the people of England for the manner in
 “ which they have submitted to priva-
 “ tions, and their various sufferings. He
 “ chose to state the Pension List, as
 “ if the crown had no other means of
 “ rewarding merit, but out of the Civil
 “ List. I believe that makes but a very
 “ small part of the means possessed by the
 “ crown to reward merit—and here I might
 “ appeal to the right hon. the Chancellor of

“ the Exchequer himself ; for I think he
 “ can give me some specific information,
 “ without going out of his own family
 “ that the crown does possess ample means
 “ of rewarding extraordinary merit, with-
 “ out having recourse to the Civil List. I
 “ should be very happy to agree in voting
 “ for this reward supposing the reward to
 “ have been deserved, and there were no
 “ other means of providing it than that of
 “ adding to the burthens of the people of
 “ England. But if ministers had come
 “ down to this house, and told us that the
 “ patronage of the reversions of sinecure
 “ places were, henceforward, to be abo-
 “ lished for ever ; I should certainly not be
 “ niggardly, as it has been called, even in
 “ my mode of rewarding the memory of
 “ deserving men for their services to the
 “ public ; and that too, in the present
 “ exhausted state of the pocket of the
 “ people ; but, before I can consent to
 “ doing that, I must be assured that
 “ sinecures, and the reversion of sinecures,
 “ are to be put an end to. I must say as
 “ ministers have forced me to it, that my
 “ lord Lake's character is nothing like that
 “ of my lord Nelson's, and yet ministers are
 “ proposing to my lord Lake a monument,
 “ as they did to the memory of lord Nelson.
 “ I say that the memory of lord Lake has
 “ not the same call upon the gratitude of
 “ his country as that of my lord Nelson.
 “ I do not think that true merit will ever
 “ go unrewarded by the people of England ;
 “ and I am satisfied that if a tenth part of
 “ the patronage of ministers was bestowed
 “ only on objects truly worthy of remunera-
 “ tion, every military and naval man in
 “ this country, deserving of encouragement,
 “ would be fully satisfied, without any ad-
 “ dition to the burthens of the people.”
 “ Here he took a short view of the charac-
 “ ter of Lord Lake in India, and observed
 “ that his successes there, were not extraor-
 “ dinary, for every British officer achieved
 “ victories in India. But, laying aside all
 “ these considerations, he went upon the
 “ broad constitutional ground, that unless
 “ ministers gave the house an assurance that
 “ all sinecures and reversions in places, were
 “ to be abolished, he must persist in taking
 “ the sense of the house. “ Or rather,”
 “ said he, “ I will divide the house upon
 “ this subject,” for, “ taking the sense of the
 “ house,” is a common expression, when the
 “ sense of it is too plain already. Having
 “ stated these principles in my own justifi-
 “ cation, for persevering in my intention to
 “ divide the house, I shall not detain you
 “ any longer, but merely to say that I have

“not heard a word which has altered my original opinion on this subject.”—The Civil List! Poor civil list affords, according to Mr. Perceval’s account, only £800 a year for the king to give away, in the reward of merit. But, this civil list is a thing made of stretching materials. It can be extended this way and that way. In 1801 or 1802 (See account of 1802) there was *lent* out of this civil list, upwards of £100,000 to the king’s sons; and so the civil list fell into *arrears*; and then the minister, Addington, came with a bill to parliament for the purpose of making the people pay off the arrears; that is to say, pay, amongst other things, the £100,000 which, without the consent of parliament, had been lent to the king’s sons, and that, too, observe, notwithstanding the *Droits of Admiralty*!—More of this hereafter.

Botley, 4th March, 1808.

AGRICULTURE, MANUFACTURES, AND COMMERCE.

SIR,——It gave me very great concern to perceive by your last Journal, that the letter in which I requested you to cancel the account of corn imported in 1800, did not come to your hands in time; as I stated in it that the account was greatly erroneous. A severe disorder in my eyes has obliged me to depend on amanuensis, which has occasioned errors I much lament: the following was the importation of that year.

Corn imported in 1800.

Species.	Quantity.	At per Quarter.			Value.
	Q.	B.	s.	d.	£.
Barley ..	5,385	5	38	6	10,367
Beans ...	3,406	3	43	9	7,451
Oats ...	510,242	3	25	8	654,811
Pease ...	1,514	4	43	6	3,294
Rye	829	5	47	4	1,963
Wheat ..	318,917	—	79	0	1,259,722
Total. *	840,295	4			1,937,608

Now, Sir, as I should be sorry to trouble you merely with an erratum, permit me, on this account to observe, that it furnishes a proof of a degree of precariousness in the national resources, that ought to make a deep impression on the minds of those in

* Flour reduced to quarters at 3 cwt. per quarter.—There is an error also in the sum total of the import of wheat for 26 years, but at the average, or 413,600 qrs. is nearly the truth, I will not trouble you with the correction.

whose hands the safety of the kingdom is placed. To find that our consumption of wheat in a year of moderate plenty, exceeds the produce by more than a million sterling, accompanied as it is by a population admitted on all hands to be increasing, must surely be considered as a just cause of apprehension. Were the countries which have usually supplied us, in a state of independence and security, the prospect would be far from pleasing; but when we cast an anxious eye to the ports of the Baltic, the view becomes dreary indeed. To expect our bread from America, would be to look for it from a country whence it never came, except in quantities perfectly insignificant when compared with the magnitude of our demand. If the price of wheat was at present high, there are many who would deprecate all consideration of the subject; but the price is now so moderate as to prevent the smallest alarm; no trifling motive for such discussions as may tend to throw a light on the subject; and ought to induce the legislature of the kingdom to give a direct and steady attention to it. Who can contemplate the consequence of a short crop, a mildew, or a wet harvest, without terror? Manufactures and commerce inactive; and ill disposed minds gathering discontents into petitions for peace! It is easy to imagine such a combination, but not so easy to measure the result. I know not any view that can be taken of the subject, over which there is not suspended a dark cloud which sheds a gloom not easily dispersed: if there is any circumstance that tends peculiarly to thicken it, the present state of our extensive wastes is well calculated to do it.—Upon this subject Mr. Spence has several very just observations, but he offers one remark in which I cannot agree with him: and, as it is upon an important point, I must crave your further indulgence for a moment.—“It is calculated, that in this kingdom there are twenty two millions of acres of waste land; and, it is frequently asked, by the followers of the economists, as well as by those who are of a very different opinion on matters of political economy; why this waste land is not brought into cultivation, and why such a source of riches as this, is neglected? For this very good reason—that the greater part of this land, with the present demand for, and the present prices of the produce that could be raised from it, would not pay for cultivation. Every person who has had occasion to let land, knows, that there are many more farmers wanting farms, than there are farms to supply them; and this being the case, it follows, indisputably, that if the

waste lands in the kingdom could be profitably cultivated, it would speedily be occupied by those farmers who so eagerly seek employment for their capital." P. 28.—It is I conceive, a great mistake, to suppose that these lands remain uncultivated for want of a demand of the uncultivated produce; seeing that the prices of all the returns of grass lands are adequate to their production; with a regular import of corn to an immense amount: the reason for the scandalous state in which they are left is exceedingly different: they are under rights of commons, and cannot be touched without distinct acts of parliament to permit the plough to produce grass and corn, instead of gorse and ling. Rather than give this permission by a general act of enclosure, parliament is content that a large portion of the people should be fed by foreign, rather than by British corn; and is content to remain, at the present moment, a quiet spectator of the waste state of these lands, at a period when a short crop, or a week's mildew, would make an enormous import necessary. Ministers best know where it is to be had; to me it seems just as probable to procure it from the moon as from Prussia or Poland. Were such a moment to arrive, we should see the two houses called together; committees appointed; examinations, proceedings, proclamations issued; harangues pronounced; substitutes recommended; the volunteers inactivity; government alarmed; and Buonaparté delighted. And what would be the effect of all this? Experience has told us: the general alarm would raise the price rapidly, and thus lessening the sumption, what might have proved a dreadful famine, converted into no more than a severe scarcity; but with the foreign supply cut off we might expect these evils to attend a much smaller deficiency than produced the same evils on a former occasion. I leave to others fully to appreciate debates on Copenhagen, and the other *very important objects* occupying that attention which might be given to measures for establishing the security and prosperity of the kingdom on the solid foundation of our domestic resources. But to return; The demand for farms is at present very general, a proof that capital is not wanting; and wherever an act of enclosure appropriates a tract of waste land, neither hands nor money are wanting for its culture, plantation, or other improvement, according to the soil and other circumstances of the case. Enfield Chase is not a proof to the contrary; and were other royal forests enclosed on the same principles, the measure would be equally nugatory. If a general enclosure bill was to pass, many millions of

acres at present unproductive, would be brought into cultivation; the necessity of importing corn would be removed; and those farmers alluded to by Mr. Spence who possess capital, but want employment, would, by their vigorous exertions, soon convince that gentleman that the only obstacle in their way is the negative at present put on the power of enclosing.—I have the honour to be, Sir, &c.—ARTHUR YOUNG.—*Feb. 24, 1808.*

'CURATES' SUSPENSION BILL.

SIR,—The account published by you, in your last week's Register is so extremely incorrect, that I am induced to send you a statement, which will, I believe, completely refute the aspersions, which have been most unwarrantably thrown on the conduct of Lord Oxford, in a transaction, which you assert to be unparalleled. By the 1st of Geo. I. augmented curacies were subject to the same rules of avoidance as other benefices, and the clause inserted in the act of 1796, only declared that to be law, which, in fact, was law before.—The living of Brampton Brian was, in 1800, given by Lord Oxford to his brother-in-law Mr. James Scott. In 1805 the perpetual curacy of Titley became vacant. To this curacy Lord Oxford's ancestors had been great benefactors—to the amount of near £1200.; and, in consequence, the right of nomination had always been exercised by them. On this occasion, however, the Warden and College of Winchester disputed the right, and it appeared that they were legally entitled to it, because nothing but an act of parliament, could alienate their church preferment: but had the curacy been in Lord Oxford's nomination, he would have given it to Mr. Bissel, and not to Mr. Scott. Though a contrary statement was made, in the House of Commons, by Mr. Whitbread, yet he was positively contradicted on this point, by another honourable member. It is to be observed, that at the time of Mr. Scott's nomination to the perpetual curacy of Titley, he was a Fellow of New College Oxford, of which College the Warden and all the Fellows of Winchester, must necessarily have been previously Fellows.—It is impossible to construe Lord Oxford's having become the renter of *part* of the tythes in the parish of Titley, into a consent and approbation, on his part, of Mr. Scott's nomination to the curacy, because Lord Oxford's principal residence is in the parish, and he only rented the tythes of the land, in his own occupation. I leave it to you to judge, whether the compounding for small tythes, instead of paying them in kind

is not, what every man would do, whether the incumbent had obtained his preferment, with or without his consent.—Lord Oxford availed himself of his right to present to Brampton Brian, as soon as ever he was informed that the living was voidable. He thought himself fully justified in so doing, as disputes of a very unpleasant nature had arisen between him and Mr. Scott, in consequence of which he was anxious to remove Mr. Scott, from the neighbourhood of Brampton Brian, where his lordship has another mansion, at which he frequently resides, and the garden of which is immediately adjoining to the Parsonage House.—Lord Oxford's character and conduct are too well known, in his own county and neighbourhood, to admit of a suspicion that he would act either unjustly or oppressively towards any individual, especially towards one, with whom he was so nearly connected.—With regard to the respective values of Brampton Brian and Titley, the latter has hitherto been as profitable as the former; and had the rectory of Brampton Brian been "TEN TIMES" or even "SEVEN TIMES" the value of the curacy, which is upwards of £200 a year, how came Mr. Scott to hold this valuable rectory together with his fellowship of New College, for more than four years, when, by the statutes of that College, no Fellow can hold preferment of a greater annual value than £120?—Your assertion, that Mr. Scott's curate at Brampton Brian refused to accept the living is totally destitute of foundation.—I rely upon your candour, either to insert this letter, or to contradict what was erroneous in your original statement.—I am, Sir, yours, &c.—A. B. C.—Feb. 25, 1808.

ARMY.

SIR,—Whenever our army becomes the subject of conversation, either in or out of parliament, I always hear a great fuss made about their high state of discipline. Yet, neither members, field marshalls, generals, or inspecting field officers, seem to know wherein real discipline consists. One thinks it lies in the cut of a soldier's hair, and in the particular length of his queue; another on his being able to stand for hours on one leg like the geese on Botley common. Sir James Cradock hates the mustache: Lord Paget and their Royal Highnesses the Prince of Wales, and Duke of Cumberland, are great friends to its growth. A few years ago a dragoon was thought to be defenceless without his helmer, now he is clad in furs and tippets like a man-milliner, with a great mass upon his head. Among the heavy dragoons cocked hats are abolished, among the

light they are just coming into vogue. Even a man may become a capital good soldier by introducing some barbarous accent into the plainest and simplest English words of command. Every thing for sound and shew.—But whence comes it, Mr. Cobbett, that all this low imitation and frivolity, originate entirely in the higher ranks of the army, and that there is such a total dearth of genius and talent among that class of men who bear the name of Generals? But this would only be a temporary grievance: the evil, Mr. Cobbett, has a much deeper root. It proceeds from this, that no man of superior talent, (and very few of those who possess common sense), will remain in the army, if their rank runs so high as to remove them from the command of a battalion. The command of a battalion is an object of ambition, which almost every one who aspires to it can attain, and it is a situation also, in which a man may chance to distinguish himself. But the officer who gets a step beyond that, unless he possesses great family connexions, or parliamentary interest, sees nothing before him but "a dull, dreary, unvaried, vista of exclusion and despair." Despair drives the man of genius from the field, and the prudent man will rather turn his commission into cash, than be honoured with the appellation of General, while he starves during the rest of his life on a lieutenant colonel's pay. Hence it comes, that in the last ten years, 4-5ths of our best officers have retired from the service before they attained the rank of generals. It is the radical defect of our English army; and if you or any man in England, will point out a cure, you will render a greater service to your country than if you had added thousands to its numerical force.—I am, Sir, yours, &c.—V.

COLD BATH FIELDS PRISON.

Copy of the Petition, presented to the House of Commons, Feb. 19, 1808.

To the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of the Honourable House of Commons, of Great Britain and Ireland, in the United Parliament assembled:—The Petition of Alexander Stephens, of the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple, and Park House, in the County of Middlesex, Esquire, Humbly sheweth, That certain persons lately serving the office of grand jurymen for the county of Middlesex, to the number of about nine, having visited the House of Correction for the said county, commonly called the Cold Bath Fields Prison, on Tuesday, Nov. 3, in the year of our Lord 1807, between the hours of 11 and 12 in the forenoon:—They there discovered, that all the loaves

found by them (each of which ought to contain 16 ounces, and to be distributed daily, at 10 o'clock in the morning) were greatly deficient in point of quantity, as will be seen from the annexed statement on the part of one of the magistrates of the city of London. —That the prison weight demanded and used upon the present occasion, for trying the loaves in rotation, proved also deficient, as was fully demonstrated in both instances on the same day, when compared with the standard at Guildhall, in the presence, first, of Sir W. Leighton, Knight, then Lord Mayor; and afterwards of Richard Phillips, Esq. then and still one of the sheriffs of London and Middlesex, as well as of four of the late grand jury; and, moreover, that the scales of the said prison were false and fraudulent:

Copy of a Letter from Mr. Sheriff Phillips to William Minniewaring, Esq. Chairman of the Quarter Sessions, &c.

"SIR;—I consider it a duty which I owe the public to inform you, as chairman of the quarter sessions, and, I believe, one of the committee for conducting the business of the prison, that I was present when an appeal was lately made by the grand jury of the county to the standard weights in Guildhall; that I witnessed the examination of the pound weight for weighing meat and other provisions in the House of Correction, Cold Bath Fields, when it was found to be seven-eighths of an ounce too light; and that on weighing some loaves which were found in the same prison, by the grand jury, they appeared also to be considerably too light, one or two of them being from an ounce and a half to two ounces under weight. I should compromise the feelings which I bear towards the respectable magistracy of the county of Middlesex, if I were to omit to make this formal communication.—I have the honour to be, &c.—R. PHILLIPS, Sheriff;—Bridge street, Nov. 13, 1807."

Your petitioner, together with other gentlemen, late members of the grand jury, also discovered: that several of the liege subjects of this realm were committed to close custody in cells destitute of fire, 8 feet 3 inches long, by 6 feet 3 inches wide, two of them in irons, although sick; some, if not all, of these were innocent in point of fact, as all were then innocent in point of law, being detained under the pretext of re examination, and consequently uncondemned by the legal judgment of their peers, or even the accusatory verdict of a grand jury. Of this number were a mother, a daughter, and a son, of creditable appearance; the two former in one cell, so situated as to be exposed

to a continual current of external air, without the possibility of obtaining, even during the severest frost, an artificial warmth by means of fuel, while the convicts below enjoyed all the comforts of an open roomy ward, with occasional access to fire.—That in one of these lonely cells was closely confined a foreigner of some rank, the Chevalier de Blin, who, as we were told, by one of the jailors, while so immured, had been deprived of his reason, and who presented to your petitioner, after communicating with him for some time in the French language through the key-hole, and demanding entrance, a memorial on his knees.—That in this place, originally destined for the improvement of the morals of petty offenders, a female prisoner, as we have learned, has been lately debauched by the son of the chief jailor, or governor, who then held an office of trust in the prison, and has since had a child, now, or at least lately, burdensome to the parish of Kensington, in the county of Middlesex.—That four debtors were shut up in this House of Correction, the only communication between whom and the world, appears to take place occasionally, by means of two iron gates, at upwards of six feet distance from each other, with a jailor walking in at intervals, so as to preclude complaint; and that from the examination of a debtor, and also, by a letter from him, both in the possession of your Petitioner, it appears that he was shut up with persons guilty of robbery, and unnatural crimes.—And, lastly, that six innocent persons, the bills against whom had been thrown out by the Grand Jury, were dragged from Cold Bath-fields prison to Hicks's-hall, in open day, at the close of the session, first manacled, and then fastened together by a rope, to be discharged by proclamation.—Your petitioner, therefore, conceiving that such gross instances of fraud, coupled with such an open violation of the laws, and even of the express orders of session, are calculated to bring His Majesty's government into contempt, and cast an unaccredited odium on our most excellent constitution; thinking also, that if such malpractices were detected in a casual and slight survey, of less than two hours duration, far greater abuses are likely to be brought to light, by the intervention of the grand inquest of the nation, most humbly and earnestly solicits this Honourable House to take the premises into consideration, and by a public and open examination at its bar, or any other mode, afford such relief as may seem meet.

A. STEPHENS.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE.—*Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs relative to Portugal. Made in Oct. 1807, and published Jan. 24, 1808. (Concluded from p. 352.)*

It had neither protected the French nor their commerce; the persons and trade of their enemies have continued free and favoured. Portugal promised to join the cause of the continent, even to declare war against England; but she wished to make it, if I may use the expression, in concert with her, to furnish her, under the appearance of hostility, with the means of continuing her trade with Portugal, and through Portugal with the rest of Europe; a kind of war equivalent to a perfidious neutrality. Succours were demanded of England, and to gain time, attempts were made to deceive your Majesty by vain declarations; scruples were alleged upon some of the consequences of the war when none were entertained upon war itself, which breaks all ties.—In vain did your Majesty, deigning to condescend to these pretended scruples modify your first demands—the same refusals were renewed—Portugal made promises, but delayed the execution under different pretexts. At one time it was the Prince of Beira, a child of twelve years, who was to be sent to the Brazils to defend that colony—at another time it was a squadron expected from the Mediterranean, which it was wished to have in safety in the Tagns.—Thus Portugal, embarrassed in her artifices, making with the Court of London engagements, real and useful to the English, with France, vague and pretended engagements, waited for succours and advice from England, sought to delay the measures of the cabinet, and, humiliating herself before both, blindly committed to the chance of events, the interests, perhaps the existence of a nation, which manimously desired her not to give them up to a power so fatal to all its allies.—The epoch which your Majesty had fixed for the expected determination, which you had consented to prolong for a month, arrived. Portugal decided her own fate. She broke off her last connections with the continent, by reducing the French and Spanish legations to the necessity of quitting Lisbon.—Portugal has placed herself in a state of war with France, notwithstanding the benevolent disposition of your Majesty towards her. War with Portugal is a painful but necessary duty.—The interest of the continent, from whence the English ought to be excluded,

forces your Majesty to declare it. Longer delay would only place Lisbon in the hands of the English.

Second Report, made Jan. 2, 1808. Published Jan. 24.

His Excellency recalls to the recollection of his Majesty how necessary were the active and vigilant measures which have been taken, and so well seconded, by the rapidity of the march of the French troops—Portugal only sequestered the English goods when the English were secure from that measure, which Portugal did not even affect to execute.—She concerted her flight with the English; and a little while before we received the news of it, a courier had carried to Italy, where the Emperor then was, new protestations of attachment to the common cause of the continent. He announced the return of M. de Lema, who had not quitted Lisbon, and the arrival of the ambassador extraordinary, M. de Marialva, probably the dupe, as was the courier, of the bad faith of her court.—Portugal is at length delivered from the yoke of England; your Majesty occupies it with your troops—it had been left defenceless on the sea side, and a part of the cannon on her coasts had been spiked. Thus England menaces her at present, blockades her ports, and would lay waste her shores. Spain has had fears for Cadiz—she has had fears for Ceuta. It is against that part of the world that the English appear to wish to direct their secret expeditions. They have embarked troops at Gibraltar—they have recalled from that quarter those which had been driven from the Levant, and a part of those which they had accumulated in the city. Their cruizers on the coast of Spain become more vigilant, and seem to wish to revenge upon that kingdom the reverses they have experienced in the Spanish colonies. All the peninsula deserves to fix particularly the attention of your Majesty.

Report of the Minister of War on the Measures taken by France under the present circumstances.—6th Jan.

Your Majesty ordered me to form the first and second corps of observation of the Gironde. The first of those corps, commanded by General Junot, has conquered Portugal. The head of the second is ready to follow the first, if circumstances require it. Your Majesty, whose vigilance is never at fault, wished the corps of observation of the ocean, confided to Marshal Moncey, to be in the third line.

(To be continued.)

"A prostitution of honours and rewards, particularly for military services, is one of the strongest marks
"of national decline." — LORD MOIRA. *Speech on the Danish Expedition.*

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

LORD LAKE (continued from page 375.)
It was observed before, but is not unworthy of being again observed, that in making the grant to the family of Lord Lake, both *parties* were perfectly of accord. They can wrangle upon other points; they can dispute, inch by inch, about papers relating to any matter, wherein they can trump up a charge against each other, amounting to an allegation that they are respectively *unfit for place*. This is all fair play; but, when it is a question of merely public interest; and especially when the money of the public is proposed to be granted to one, or any, of themselves, the two factions, like two lawyers at the end of a pleading, are all politeness and complaisance, all liberality and generosity: they seem to strive to their utmost to out-do each other in protesting against every thing that is *mean*.—Of Lord Lake the people of England know nothing. There are not, in all probability, two persons out of a thousand, in the country, who know that there ever was such a man in existence; and now that his name comes to be frequently mentioned, the first question you hear, is, "who and what was he?" It is impossible to make the people believe, that a person, of whom they have never heard before, should merit, out of the fruits of their labour, such large sums of money.—Mr. Paull has, in a public letter, stated that this lord, for several years, was in the receipt of not less than twenty thousand pounds annually. Nobody has contradicted this statement, and, I believe, nobody can, with truth, contradict it. He had, besides, a lucrative sinecure, and his pay as a colonel of a regiment. Yet, the demand upon the public purse is now made, under the allegation, that he died poor, and that his family stands in need of something from the public, wherewith to maintain a degree of splendour suitable to the title of nobility. Lord Folkestone objected to this plea of poverty, and well he might; for, if it be admitted, where shall we hope to find an end to the demands proceeding thereon? The plea of one poor man is as good as that of another poor man; and, if we confine the

concession to those who have titles of nobility, the number, God knows, is by no means small. Admit the validity of this plea, and it follows, that, when once a title is bestowed, for services real or pretended, that the nation, whatever may be its circumstances, is bound to maintain the family for ever afterwards. No matter whence the poverty may have arisen. No matter from what extravagance, what follies, what vices: if, without any inquiry as to these points, the parliament is to grant money, upon the bare plea of poverty, as it has done in the present instance, it is no matter what the cause of the poverty may be; and, if we lived under a race of profligate princes (a case which history proves not to be impossible), some of them might first pillage and impoverish a subject, and then send him to parliament upon the plea of poverty, making use of their party connections for the purpose of thus disguisedly perpetrating their robberies of the people. A case of this sort, is not, indeed, to be apprehended at the present time; but, it is sufficient to show, that it may possibly exist, in order to prevent the establishing of the precedent in question.—But, seeing that poverty is the plea for a grant, out of our earnings, of nine thousand pounds in ready money, and two thousand pounds a year in perpetuity; seeing that the taxes of the nation are to be mortgaged to the amount of fifty or sixty thousand pounds (not one hundred thousand as stated by mistake in my last) upon this plea, we may, surely, be permitted to ask, *how* Lord Lake became poor? MR. PAULL'S statement respecting the pecuniary affairs of this lord is as follows, and, before he peruses it, the reader is requested to bear in mind, that this statement has not been contradicted.
"Let the conduct of Lord Lake at Lincelles, and on the continent, and in Carlton-house, have been ever so meritorious (for even Lord Castlereagh will hardly bring to our remembrance his services at Killala or in any other part of Ireland), I maintain that he was more than amply remunerated. He had his regiment, and he had the government of Plymouth. In 1800, he was offered a red ribbon; but,

in preference, he pressed for, and obtained, principally through the influence of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, the situation the most lucrative that the crown could bestow on a military man—that of commander-in-chief, and senior member of the council of Bengal, with a fixed salary, exclusive of powerful patronage, and the means of providing for his family, of £10,000 per annum, paid monthly, in a country where the legal interest is twelve per cent.—a situation that no military man, for many years past, was allowed to remain in for more than three or four years at most; a period during which a splendid fortune may honourably be acquired.—Lord Lake was appointed in 1800, and arrived in Bengal early in the following year, and I assert as a fact, what I can prove, and I dare the friends of Lord Lake to deny it, that previous to August, 1803, the breaking out of the Mahratta war, Lord Lake had saved sufficient to pay into the hands of Mr. John Rudd (who received a monthly instalment, on account of those having claims, in England, on Lord Lake), the enormous sum of £38,000, which, I was well assured by those who had the management of the fund, was the *whole* debts of the deceased general.—After the payments to Mr. Rudd of £38,000, General Lake took the field against the Mahrattas. At Allegher, Delhi, and Agra (exclusive of grain, cattle, and stores, to a great amount in value, and of every description), the sum, in *actual money*, was, eight lacs at Allegher; ten at Delhi; and at Agra, though stated at only 24 lacs in Lord Lake's dispatches, the actual sum was 34; but taking his own statement of money (exclusive of cattle, grain, and stores), 8 at Allegher, ten at Delhi, and 24 at Agra, those sums make 42 lacs of rupees, which, at £12,500 for the lac (the rate at which the money was borrowed by the Company) Lord Lake received, at these places, one-eighth of £525,000, or a sum exceeding £65,000; the elephants, camels, horses, grain, and valuables, with the whole of the camp equipage taken at Allegher, Coil, Delhi, Agra, Laswaree, Sassnee, Bidjigheer, Colthurah, &c. attendant on Hindostanee armies, amounting to 150,000 fighting men, exceeded the value of 50 lacs of rupees, or £624,000 sterling. But take their value only at equal amount to the specie, and Gen. Lake received a sum in prize money of at least £130,000 sterling. From Sept. 1803 to April 1807,

Gen. Lake received, exclusive of the interest, accruing from this enormous sum, and exclusive of field-allowances, the sum of £56,000, paid monthly, or exchanged for company paper, making, with the sum paid Mr. Rudd, an aggregate of £224,000, exclusive of the immense amount of interest received in India; and yet, notwithstanding these well known facts Lord Castlereagh has the audacity to come to parliament for a grant, from the burdened people of Great Britain of £2,000 per ann. for the successor of the deceased general.—But, gentlemen, this is not all, Lord Lake carried with him to India, his son George Augustus Lake, a captain in the army, as his aid-de-camp and military secretary, and who, as such, became postmaster in the field, and for a considerable time acting adjutant-general, or quarter-master-general, to the King's forces serving in India; which situation gave him increased rank and pay. Exclusive of the emoluments arising from the latter appointment, captain, now Lieut.-Colonel Lake, from the hour of his arriving in India, received (*living in the family of his father*) a monthly allowance of £750, or £8,000 per ann., exclusive of interest, his allowance for six years exceeded £48,000, and in that period he received also a further sum, exceeding £15,000 for prize-money, making an aggregate of £63,000 sterling, exclusive of the interest, accumulated by monthly payments. Thus I have proved, that the late Lord Lake, and his young son, received a sum, in six years, greatly exceeding £300,000; and yet, without consulting the fame of the deceased, or the distresses of the country, the King's ministers dare to propose the grant I have mentioned; and it is yet to be seen, if there is one member bold enough to resist it in the House of Commons.—Now, as I have before observed, this statement of Mr. Paull (for the making of which he is entitled to the thanks of the public) has hitherto remained unanswered. There is, indeed, no reason to suppose that it is materially incorrect. The sources of Lord Lake's wealth are pointed out; the amount of it mentioned in detail; the statement is made public; and there is not any ground for supposing, that it has not proceeded from public motives. Three hundred thousand pounds, therefore, allowing it to be fifty thousand pounds more or less, is, according to the best evidence that we possess, the sum, which, within the last seven years, has come into the hands, and become the

property, of Lord Lake and of the heir to his title. How, then, has this money been spent? Whither is it gone? One of two facts is certain: either it has been squandered away, or it is still, for the greater part, possessed. Let those, who now come to the oppressed nation with the plea of poverty, choose as to which side of the dilemma they prefer.—Mr. Whitbread said, that he was disposed to resist the proposed grant; but, when he heard the plea of poverty advanced, he was obliged to give way. Give way! what, without any inquiry, to ascertain whether the plea was founded, or not? Upon other points; upon points where *party* interests are at stake, Mr. Whitbread can express his doubts as to the correctness of the assertions of the ministers. Nay, he can contradict, flatly contradict those assertions. But, when the question is whether the public money shall be given away, he has no doubts at all, it seems, and scorns to be so illiberal as to call for any inquiry, for any proof, whatever. He delights to dwell upon the miseries occasioned by *the war*; he backs the petitions of those who call for peace; he bids the ministers look to the “hundreds of thousands of starving manufactu-”
 “facturers;” but, he appears to forget, that it is the taking of the fruits of the people’s labour, and the bestowing of them upon those who do not labour; that this, and this alone is the real cause of national distress. War creates distress in the same way; but, it appears strange, that he, who so sorely laments over those who are distressed by the war, should have no feeling for the distress occasioned by pecuniary grants.—This grant to the family of Lord Lake is another of the expences which India has brought upon England. It has been proved, over and over again, that the possession of India is injurious to this country, and a benefit to the East India Company only. But, the thousands of evils attending that possession are hidden from the sight of most men; and, indeed, if one reflects for a moment on the means which have been used, by the powerful parties interested, to persuade the nation, that the possession of India is necessary to the well-being of England, it is not to be wondered at, that deception so complete should generally prevail. The poor-houses of England are, in the one fourth part, perhaps, filled by the influence of India. That is the accursed channel, through which much of the fruit of English industry passes into the possession of those who do nothing. Yet, for the keeping open of this accursed channel we are content to sweat and to pay, and your patriots of the

new school, such as Mr. Roscoe, while they seem to grudge a guinea for the defence of England herself, are ready to grant millions for the “securing and extending of our “Empire in the East.” The grant of a million of pounds to the East India Company (which already owes the nation six or seven millions) passes the House of Commons without a single word of comment, from any quarter of that Assembly; and, there appears to be little doubt, that the whole of the *debts* of that Company, the individuals of which are gaining great *riches*, will finally, and, perhaps, very shortly, be thrown upon the nation, which is already taxed as to leave no man in possession of any thing, which, in the true sense of the word, he can call his *own*, even the proprietors of the soil being little else than the stewards of the ministry.—This is the situation, in which we are, when a demand is made upon us for money to support the *dignity* of a family, which, during the last seven years, have received out of the taxes raised upon us, three hundred thousand pounds. For, observe; it is a gross deception to represent this sum as having been derived from any other source. The plunder of the Mahrattas, for instance, consisted, I suppose, of gold and jewels, amongst other things; but, the army of India; the fleet of India; the wars for the preservation of India; the thousand of expences on account of India, are from English resources, and we shall find, that, in this circuitous way, all that is gained by Indian adventurers, comes from the sweat of our brows. Look into the account of the money annually voted by parliament; see what immense sums are voted on account of India, while, on the other side, not one penny is received from India, in any shape, or under any name. Out of these sums it is, that Lord Lake and his son have, according to the statement of Mr. Paull, in his excellent letter above quoted, received three hundred thousand pounds. What they have received in the way of salary, pay, or allowances, or under whatever other name the fingerers of our earnings have been able to invent, obviously comes from the taxes, because you will find, in the accounts before-mentioned, millions paid to the East India Company, for expences, real or pretended, of wars for their own protection, while it is notorious, that they are millions in debt to the nation; and while it is equally notorious, that they have a debt, which the nation is finally to take upon itself, which debt has, of course, partly arisen from the sums of money paid to Lord Lake and his son. Where is the

difference to us, whether we pay three hundred thousand pounds directly to Lord Lake and his son, or whether that sum be paid to them by a company, who receive the money from us, without having given us any value for it? This, therefore, is the true light, in which to view the transaction: we have, during the last seven years, paid three hundred thousand pounds to Lord Lake and his successor, and now that Lord Lake is dead, that successor comes to us for the means of supporting his *dignity*, he being too poor to support it out of his own purse. — I object to the *monument* also, not merely as a thing of expence, but as not being merited. I know of no deeds of great valour performed by Lord Lake, or by any commander that has ever been in India. Even Lord Cornwallis was a hero there. It is an inferior species of warfare which is there carried on. It is against a people not to be counted against Europeans. I should as soon think of a monument for a man, who, with a pack of mastiffs, had vanquished a numerous herd of cattle. We despise the idea of “the *conquerors* of Peru and Mexico,” yet, it would be impossible to point out any essential difference in the two cases. The heroes, indeed, who return from India, will tell you that they have had bloody fellows to encounter; but, you have always this one fact wherewith to answer them: that there are thirty or forty millions of those bloody fellows, kept in subjection, nay in abject slavery, by a *thousandth* part of their number of Europeans. There is no valour to be displayed in the defeating of such people; and, therefore, none of the rewards of valour ought to attend it. The parliament may, as far as they can go, put the name of Lord Lake upon a level with that of Lord Nelson; but they cannot, thank God, give it any other than its proper place in the minds of the people. “Brave man!” “oh gallant man!” They may repeat this as long as they please. They may even pass a *vote* to that amount; but the people will still have their own opinions; or rather, they will have no opinion at all about what they have never heard of; and they will remain heart-whole though fifty Lord Lakes should expire in a year. Sir Francis Burdett appears, from the report of his speech, to have made something sounding like an apology for denying Lord Lake to have discovered any proofs of great military prowess; but, surely, there required no apology for speaking the truth, which ought to be spoken, and freely too, of the dead as well as of the living; for, as to the maxim, that no harm is to be said of the

dead, if it means any thing more than that particular care should be taken not to exaggerate, and not to speak evil of them unnecessarily, it is perfectly absurd; because the observance of it must, of course, render biography and history, not only useless, but as far as it produced any effect at all, mischievous. What, I would ask the reader, must be the character of that maxim, the observance of which would transform the Newgate Calendar into a series of panegyrics? The gibbeted robber is *dead* as well as the peculator or corruptor or borough-monger whom he murdered; and, if the circumstance of death is to seal up our lips with regard to the latter, where is the justice of hanging up the former that his name may be held in execration as long as the last of his bones shall remain unredressed to its native dust, nay as long as the fragment of the most durable of wood and of metal, shall retain the signs of having been dedicated to the commemoration of guilt? Where is the justice of this? Let those who are advocates for the maxim answer me the question. Indeed, there seems to be no reason for this maxim, other than that it has been found in some Latin author, who, in all probability, was actuated by a selfish motive, and whose doctrine, therefore, will, it is to be feared, never want an abundance of advocates. If ever there be an occasion, where the merits of a person deceased ought to be freely discussed, it surely is when a claim is preferred, founded upon those merits. A similar discussion in history is useful, and, therefore, proper; but, in a case like the present it is absolutely necessary to the ends of justice; and, if the persons, who are to decide upon the claim, act in trust for others, and yet shun the discussion, they are guilty of a breach of that trust. — But, I may be asked, why these observations, now that the monument project has been given up? The observations apply to the grant of money as well as to the monument; but, the proposition was *made*, and it was from very shame only that it was abandoned. *How* was it abandoned too? What were the *reasons* given? These reasons are worthy of being recorded. Lord Castlereagh, who had on the 29th of Feb. given notice, that he should move for the monument, came to the House of Commons, on the 2d of March, and said, that, “in calling the attention of the house to the notice respecting a monument to be erected to the memory of lord Lake, which had been suspended by a notice, having a prior claim to the attention of the house, on a former night, did not mean

“to recur to that notice, or again to offer to the house the motion which was the subject of it. Having communicated with many persons devoted to the memory of lord Lake, and participating in the high veneration in which he held the services of that gallant man, he found that it was the general wish of those persons to give way to the *difficulties of parliamentary form that had arisen*. The family of the noble lord, deeply penetrated with a sense of gratitude for the vote passed the other night, was willing to *rest its claims on the public bounty there*, rather than press a point upon which *many of those* who had voted in approbation of lord Lake's general merit and services, may be found in opposition. In this feeling he thought it his duty to concede; but he could not help lamenting that parliament appeared to have laid it down as a principle, that the glorious testimony of a public monument was to be confined to the services of those who died in battle. Lord Howe's monument was the only exception to this rule, for that of lord Cornwallis stood on very distinct grounds. He admitted that the limitation to those who died in battle was a good and convenient general principle. But at the same time, when monuments were held to be the most appropriate marks of public gratitude, as being at the same time most honorable to the deceased, and best calculated to excite emulation in the minds of posterity, it seemed to be a strange exclusion that prevented a lord Lake, a lord Rodney, and a lord Duncan, from being found among the illustrious heroes thus consecrated to fame, while many persons of much inferior rank and merit were so honoured. The distinction would never be asked but for striking examples of merit and service, and the reward may safely be granted without the fear of deviating into abuse. It would certainly be no injury to those who fell in battle, to admit to a participation of this honour, those who had equally entitled themselves by victory, and who had no other bar to their claim but that of a greater interval of time between their service and their death. It was not the death but the service that was the proper object of reward.”—I will not pester the reader with any remarks upon these *opinions* of his lordship, which are of no more importance than the conversation which passed at mother Citalani's, when he and his wife, the other day, were honoured by an admission to a select party of that celebrated squaller. His facts are all that I shall

meddle with; and I shall be glad to know what he meant by “the difficulties of parliamentary form that had arisen” to prevent his motion for the monument. His lordship is famous for talking much and saying little, and this is an instance of his talent in that way. I know of no “parliamentary form” that there was to prevent the making of the motion, of which notice had been given. No: what he might have said, was, that the opposition which the grant had met with, made him fear, that the monument might meet with a much stronger opposition. Perhaps thirty or forty persons might have spoken against it. This, however, he would not have regarded; but, it was the *division* that he was afraid of, and he was quite sure, that the house would be divided, seeing that “illiberal” man, Sir Francis Burdett, would, in probability, be present. To have carried the question by mere dint of office and of influence would have been a little too barefaced, and he saw that it was to be carried in no other way. The reasons which he gave for withdrawing his notice were truly worthy of him and of the claimants. “The family of the noble lord was willing to rest its claims upon the vote already passed.” That is to say, they were not sublimated by their nobility out of their sober senses; and that like good, prudent, philosophical people, they preferred “the solid pudding to the empty praise;” or, at any rate, being provided for themselves, they were content to waive their claims to that which was to have done honour to the memory of him, upon the alledged merits of whom, they had claimed and obtained that provision—I cannot dismiss this subject, without going back a little to notice the reported speech of MR. BANKES, on the 29th of February. “He thought the question might be judiciously divided; he could not resist the grant of the pension to lord Lake, and differed on this as he did on many other topics, from an hon. baronet. He thought, that to liberally reward brilliant services was, in all cases, the best economy. He objected, however, to the retrospective date commencing at 1803. He disapproved also of extending the grant beyond the present lord Lake's successor. He censured the principle of annexing, of course, pensions to peerages for the mere purpose of sustaining the rank of the party. In a late review of the pension list which fell to his lot, with others, in the discharge of a certain duty, he was sorry to find so many names of high rank on that list. He thought that the honour of a monu-

ment should be confined to those who "had fallen in victory, or died in consequence of wounds received in the action that led to victory." — As to Mr. Banks's *differing* from Sir Francis Burdett, upon many other topics as well as that of this grant of the public money, it was hardly necessary to declare it; for, I will venture to say, that there are not ten men in the whole nation, who ever did, or ever will, couple their names together. If, however, we may judge from the answer of the baronet, the declaration is not likely to have any very serious effect upon either his health or his spirits; for, he is reported to have said (and he is not apt to disguise his sentiments), that he was confident, that he should be able to console himself for the want of a participation in principle with the honourable gentleman. — Mr. Banks might as well have said nothing about the pension list, until it had been forth coming; for it is now nearly a year since the making of it out was ordered upon the amended, or rather, the changed, motion of Lord Cochrane. In that list, his lordship wished to have stated only the names of *members of the House of Commons and their relations*, only the names of "the guardians of the public purse," who touched out of that purse. This was overruled, and all the pensioners were to be put into one list. This list, however, hangs back. When it comes, any one will be competent to move for a division of it; for, the thing to be desired is, a list of all the members of the House of Commons, who receive, by themselves or their relations, any sums of money out of the taxes, that is to say, out of the sums which they annually vote away. This is the list which the nation wants to be furnished with; and we shall have it, sooner or later. — I perfectly agree with Mr. Banks in censuring the practice "of annexing, as a matter of course, "pensions to peerages for the mere purpose "of sustaining the rank of the party;" but, I should censure equally, the peering of men, merely because they have, no matter how, got possession of immense sums of money, and are, thereby, enabled to bring several votes into parliament. I know that I have the misfortune to differ, in this respect, from the Edinburgh reviewers, who think this the only mode of obtaining "a true "representation of the people;" but neither that circumstance nor the silence of Mr. Banks upon the subject, does at all tend to convince me, that a man ought to be made a lord merely because he has amassed a large sum of money. — Amongst the "names

"of high rank" which Mr. Banks has found upon the pension list, I wonder whether his eye rested, for a moment, upon the name of *Lady Louisa Paget*, a daughter of the Earl of Uxbridge, who has a fortune of, perhaps, sixty thousand pounds a year. This pension could not have been granted upon the plea of *poverty*, and yet, I have never heard of any very brilliant services that Lady Louisa has rendered the country; nor is it, indeed, easy to conceive, how she can, in any possible way, have been of service to that public, from whose earnings Mr. Addington thought it proper to allow her a pension. This is very "indelicate," it will be said. A man must be a very brute to ask for the *reasons* why his money is taken by the tax-gatherer and given to a Lady Louisa; but when a poor woman comes to ask relief from the parish, it is not at all "indelicate" to enquire, and most rigidly, too, into the grounds of her claim; and, there is, besides, a law to compel fathers, who are able, to maintain such of their children (of whatever age they may be), as are incapable of maintaining themselves; a hint, from which, I think, Mr. Banks and his colleagues of the finance committee may, if they are so disposed, derive considerable profit.

MR. STEELE. — This gentleman, whose name made a great figure in the wranglings of last year, is now never mentioned. The public will bear the circumstances in mind. Mr. Steele was one of the army paymasters; he was succeeded by Lord Temple; Lord Temple found that Mr. Steele had taken out a large sum of the public money without any proper authority; these facts were laid before a committee, called the finance committee; a report from this committee was upon the point of being made, when the short parliament was dissolved; and, as the public will hardly need to be reminded, the whig papers asserted, that, in order to avoid the publishing of this report, the ministers resolved upon a sudden dissolution. Yet, mark the sequel, one whole session, and half another session, have now passed, and not one word have those whigs said about Mr. Steele and his money! No: that would not suit their purposes *now*. They have other game; and, having taken time to cool, they have considered, perhaps, that it would not be "liberal" to press hard upon poor "Tommy Steele." As to public justice, that is quite another matter. And yet, with facts like this before his eyes; with many such facts, there is a correspondent, in the present sheet, who complains of my hostility to the Whigs. I will answer him at length in another Number; but, I will now observe, that I have

not been able to discover, in any part of their conduct, one proof of their desire to promote the interests or honour of the country, and that, as far as relates to the management of the public money, I think them even worse than their successors. The very first thing that they should have set about was an inquiry into this affair of Steele. It was an affair of the utmost importance; and it was peculiarly their duty, as guardians of the people's money. This is the sort of matters relating to which they should move for *papers*. The power of the House of Commons is simply the power of the *purse*; but, for reasons which are now obvious to all the world, this is the only power, which the regularly trained opposition seem never to wish to exercise.

ARMY.—Lord Castlereagh has, I perceive, given notice of his intention to introduce into the Mutiny bill of this year a clause to give recruits the *choice* of enlisting for *life*, or for term of years. This is, in fact, to repeal the law for term of years; because there is no doubt, but by subsequent bill, or *regulation*, the ministers will take care that there shall be no enlistment for term of years.—If there ever was a measure, in their approbation of which all men of sober judgment might be said to be unanimous, it was that of changing the military service to term of years. There was only one little knot of men, under the immediate guidance of stupidity, substantial, tangible stupidity, accompanied with obstinacy proverbial, that opposed this measure, and that, too, from motives too bad and base to admit of description. Yet, is this measure now to be rendered nugatory by a side-wind clause of an act of parliament, made for the professed purpose of punishing mutiny and desertion, two crimes chiefly to be ascribed to the want of this very measure. The reasons for changing the engagement of soldiers from that of for life to that of term of years have been so often stated, and remain so completely unanswered, that it would be a waste of time to repeat the statement of them here; but, it may not be unnecessary to point out some of the consequences, which will result from the passing of the clause now proposed. The first will be a falling off in the numbers recruited for the regular army, unless a higher bounty be given; for, it never can be in the contemplation of any man in his senses to create a *fair competition* between the two conditions of service, it being evident that none but an idiot will enlist for life at the same bounty which is held out to him to induce him to enlist for five or seven years. Yes; it is

self-evident that none but a real idiot, a creature that is incapable of distinguishing an ounce of bread from a whole loaf, will ever be persuaded to work twelve hours for a shilling, when he can have, from the same master, and for the very same sort of work, a shilling for working only three or four hours. The clause, therefore, must be intended to produce no effect at all, unless it be attended with some regulation giving superior inducements to the service for *life*. The chief of these inducements must be of a pecuniary nature; that is to say, a higher bounty must be given, and then we come back again to all the evils of high bounty, which have been so long a subject of general lamentation. We shall again have men deserting in a post chaise and four; and, after all, so many men will not be raised at once for the regular army; more frequent drafts must be made from the militia, and more frequent applications to the oppressed and affrighted parishes.—Another consequence will be this: there will be a distinction made between the treatment of the men, who have enlisted for term of years, and those who have enlisted for life, unless the former *choose* to change the condition of their servitude. I leave any man, who knows any thing of the army, to judge of the state into which this will throw a regiment. I leave him to judge of the many acts of oppression that will herefrom arise. No term-of-years men must be left; for then their example would be fatal; mutiny and desertion would inevitably be the consequence. They must be frowned upon; the door of promotion must be shut against them with the hand kept upon the latch to signify, that it may be opened upon their compliance. Thus will each regiment be deprived of the best services of the best of its men, who, feeling, as they must, the injustice exercised towards them, will have nothing left them but to hang or blind or maim themselves, or to desert. I do really think, that if party malignity should so far prevail as to effect the adoption of the clause above-mentioned, it will be very likely to give rise to a general mutiny.—This sudden change in the military system, in that part of it which is certainly the most important, must excite contempt for the government in the minds of the soldiers. It is a matter that concerns them all so closely, that they *must* think about it, and they will talk about it. What must they, then, think and say of this capriciousness in law-giving? Lord Castlereagh is deceived, if he supposes, that they have their eyes shut. They have the use of their eyes and their ears and their

tongues into the bargain; and, there is this circumstance attending their remarks and opinions, that they are all of a mind. What must that mind be with respect to laws and regulations, which are changed with every change in the ministry? To what sort of motives must they attribute such changes? In this case the change is so obviously against them; it has in it something so ungracious; it has such striking marks of a return to oppression, that it must be, by them, so considered. It will be in vain to disguise the real nature of the measure by calling it a *permission to choose*. There is not a private soldier in the army fool enough not to perceive, that the government thinks that the measure last adopted left the soldier too much at liberty; loosened its hold upon him; that it now repents of what it has done in his favour; and that it wishes to re-grasp him for life. It is quite impossible to persuade him that this is intended for his good, or, that it has not proceeded from a spirit of harshness towards him; from a disregard of his feelings joined to an opinion, that he was made merely to be food for powder.—It is a well-known fact, that, at a late Quarter Sessions of the peace, an offender having had his choice, to go into the army or to Botany Bay, preferred the latter for a limited period to the former for life; expressing, at the same time, his readiness to enlist “under Mr. Windham’s Plan.” Nor is this at all surprizing. Hope is not only one of the chief ingredients in the happiness of man, but man may be said to live upon hope. Hope for something or other he will. Some will have no thoughts of leaving the army, but will live upon the hope of promotion. The number of these must, however, be comparatively small. The chief hope of the far greater part must always be the *termination of the servitude*. Let this hope be built upon a positive engagement, and the soldier contents himself therewith; because the foundation is sure, and clear before his eyes; but, if he has no such engagement to rest upon, he seeks for some other foundation, and desertion is the first that presents itself; for he must have hope, or he cuts his throat. Not only is it, in the case contemplated, to *refuse* him a lawful hope where-with to cherish his patience, but actually to *take such hope away from him*; and, as to the guineas for which he may be induced to sell it, they will be forgotten when he is roused from the sleep, into which he has been thrown by the expending of those guineas. Here, too, the effect will be precisely that which any one but an obstinate human brute, bent upon the indulgence of his

tyrannical disposition, would wish to prevent. The best of the men will be the last to be tempted to *renounce* liberty for the means of a debauch, and yet, in the way of these men it will be absolutely necessary to throw every sort of discouragement. It is useless to tell me about the honour and justice and humanity of the officers. The officers, generally speaking, will act agreeably to the will of those who are able, with a breath, to sink or to raise them; and, if that will be, that there should be no men remain upon term-of-years service, I would not for a trifle be, even for one week of my life, in the skin of a man.—There is no just ground for the change proposed; there is no good reason that can be given for it; and I trust it will not be persevered in; for, if it be, I am fully persuaded that the very existence of the army will be endangered. And, is this to be done from a mere motive of petulance? Merely to provoke an opponent; or to prevent it being said hereafter, that the great and salutary change, which has been lately adopted, with the general approbation of the country, is to be ascribed to the wisdom of that opponent? There is something so shocking in the idea that one turns from it with horror.—After all, however, if it be resolved, that nothing, however good, built up by a political opponent, shall remain undemolished, the fair way would be to bring in a bill of *repeal*. To endeavour to sap the foundation by a side wind clause; to enact a provision that shall surely work its fall; and then to cry out, that the thing was not calculated to stand, would be a most unmanly mode of proceeding, and discover a mind made up of meanness itself.—Once more I must observe, by way of conclusion, that it is paltry in the extreme, that it is despicable hypocrisy, to pretend to give the soldiers, already enlisted, their *choice* of volunteering for life, or remaining upon their present footing. There will be, and there can be, no choice in the case, unless the soldier were arrived at very nearly the end of his term. The soldier may indeed choose; for he may enlist for life, desert, or cut his throat; but, as to living, a term-of-years man, in a regiment, almost the whole of whose men are enlisted for life, with a strong desire in all the officers to induce him to enlist for life as well as the rest, the thing would be impossible. Again, therefore, I must express my earnest wish that the ministers may abandon a scheme so evidently full of danger and of cruelty.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL BILL.—“A general meeting,” says the Morning Chronicle of the 5th instant, “of the Merchants

“and others concerned in the American trade is to take place on Thursday next. for the purpose of taking measures with regard to the Orders in Council. Several resolutions are, we understand, to be proposed by *Mr. Mullett* and *Mr. Mann*, and it is said that *Mr. A. Baring*, the author of the celebrated pamphlet upon this subject, will bring forward Petitions to both Houses of Parliament. A very numerous and respectable assembly is expected, as the requisition is signed by several of the most eminent merchants in the city.”—*Taking measures!* What do they mean by taking measures? And what right have these men to meet, in greater numbers than *fifties*, any more than other people? *Mr. Baring* has, possibly, half a million of money in his pocket, a circumstance which has not tended to lessen the number of puffs, which *Mr. Perry* has inserted in his pamphlet; but, a circumstance by no means sufficient, thank God, to authorize *Mr. Baring* to dictate to the ministers and to the parliament. Sir John Newport is alarmed lest Ireland should suffer for want of the *primum* of its linen manufactory, which it now gets from America. Instead of *primum of linen manufactory*, why could not the honourable Baronet have said *linseed*. It is shorter, more correct, much more easy to be understood, and is preferable for every purpose, except, perhaps, that of convincing his readers, that the honourable Baronet was once at school.—As to the ground of alarm, however, it is purely imaginary. If, indeed, Indian corn, or water-melons, had been the “the *primum* of the linen manufactory,” the case would have been desperate; but, “the *primum* of the linen manufactory,” that is to say (throwing aside this verbose manner of expression), *linseed*, will grow in Ireland, full as well as it will in America; and, as there is a scarcity of land only, in the former country, or rather of cultivation, I see no harm, but a great deal of good, likely to arise from converting part of the linen weavers into husbandmen.—*Mr. Perceval's* answer was, that such observations would tend “to show the Americans how they might continue to distress us.” This was a crying answer. It discovered a want of resource. As if it was not the business of the opposition to make distress, if possible, in order that the country might be tired of the ministers and drive them out of their places; and, as if *Mr. Perceval* and his set had not done the same thing when they were out of office. No, no: crying will never do. The way to have answered Sir John was to have

reminded him that the Americans could not prevent the sun from shining and the rain from falling upon the land in Ireland; and, that the longer the Irish would be without American linseed, the longer the Americans would be without shirts.—When we come to talk of *distresses*, we have decidedly the advantage; and of this all the world will be convinced, if the bill now passing remain in force for a year.

Botley, 10 March, 1808.

DEFENCE OF THE WHIGS.

SIR,—In common with others of your readers, I have remarked, with some surprise, the extreme hostility which you seem to cherish against the late administration. So strong is your propensity to blame them, that you not only seize with avidity every circumstance that falls in your way, which can by any possibility be made a ground of accusation, but not unfrequently “travel out of the record” in quest of materials for censure. What can be your reasons for antipathy so violent, for invectives so acrimonious? Those who, with me, are of opinion, that the late ministers deserved well of their country, and who beheld their dismissal from office with the deepest regret, regarding it as really a public calamity, cannot greatly admire the wanton and illiberal reflections on their conduct, which so frequently occur in the Political Register. If it be inquired what the late ministers did to merit approbation, I also would ask in return, who is there so unreasonable as to expect every political virtue to be brought into full exercise, every needful plan of reform completed, every long established and inveterate abuse extirpated, by any set of ministers, within the compass of twelve short months. For my part, I am inclined to give them credit for having accomplished as much as time and circumstances would well admit of: nor ought it to be forgotten that it was the urging of a most salutary measure of reform, equally just and expedient, which occasioned their dismissal. Admitting, however, that both the *Ins* and the *Outs* are alike worthless, and deserving of the reprobation you bestow upon them, admitting that the demerits of the two factions, as you call them, if weighed against each other, would be almost equally balanced; it appears to me that the manner in which the present ministers contrived to sneak into power, and to circumvent their more manly and honourable rivals, is a circumstance in itself alone abundantly sufficient to turn the scale against those who could stoop to such artifices. Allowing, then, that the late ministers

deserve reprehension for their delinquencies, it seems hardly fair that the measure of chastisement dealt out to them, should so much exceed what falls to the share of their opponents—Indeed, at the period of the late change of administration, I could not but wonder that the secret machinations, the back-stair cabals, “the mystery of iniquity” by which that change was effected, did not draw down a few more strokes of your scorpion scourges. Before that time, notwithstanding the occasional severity of your animadversions, you appeared, on the whole, inclined to think rather favourably of the late administration. At the close of your strictures on their behaviour in regard to the Hampshire petition, if I mistake not, you declared, even on that occasion, that you wished them well, and hoped for their continuance in office. And, I perfectly recollect that in giving your sentiments on Lord Henry Petty’s plan of finance, you remarked, that whatever different views might be entertained of the thing itself, you were pleased to think that one good effect would certainly result from it, viz. that it would have a tendency to promote the popularity of the ministry, and thereby enable them to maintain their ground against the intrigues of the *secret cabinet*. I confess, indeed, that any disposition which you might discover to support the late administration, appeared to arise quite as much from a contemptuous opinion entertained of their opponents, as from any peculiar feelings of regard to themselves. For, well do I remember your being accustomed to express yourself concerning the then opposition, both as a party and individually, in the most degrading terms. You laughed them to scorn for their pusillanimous abandonment of the helm of state on the death of their leader. You treated their opposition to the executive government as equally factious and feeble. You ridiculed the editor of the *Morning Chronicle* for dignifying so contemptible a set of *would-be* statesmen, with the name of “the Opposition.” And yet, not long afterwards, you are found hailing with exultation, the triumph obtained by that very junct—the bane of all good government during the present reign—the success of whose intrigues you had just before so strongly deprecated. You are found rejoicing at the exaltation of those very men whom you had lately professed to despise: and expressing gratitude to his majesty for the change in his councils, which you said could not be for the worse, and might be for the better. I am at a loss to conjecture how you can explain away inconsistency so glaring.—In your Register of

Jan. 30, you allude to a notice, given by Mr. Sheridan, of a motion on the state of Ireland: whence you conclude that the question of Catholic emancipation, as it is called, is again to be brought forward. Now, Mr. S. expressly stated that he did not intend to include the Catholic question among the objects of his motion. Is it possible that you could have totally overlooked this declaration? If not, why was it passed over without the least notice? Why did you gratuitously assume that Mr. S. and his friends are again about to agitate the Catholic question? Why, if not because it furnished you with an opportunity of bringing a charge against the present opposition, of factious and inconsistent conduct, in proposing a measure when out of office which they abandoned when in place: because it afforded ground for accusing them of baseness in so abandoning, for the sole purpose of keeping their places, a measure which they had judged it necessary to propose. Now, I am by no means convinced that in all cases a member of parliament ought to feel himself absolutely precluded from giving support to a measure merely because particular circumstances may have led him to deem it imprudent to forward that measure when in office. And, as to the blame which the late ministers have incurred in consequence of not having resigned their places rather than consent to arrest the progress of what was called the Catholic Bill, the charge has always appeared to me extremely futile. It cannot surely be contended that it is the duty of ministers to throw up their places in sullen disgust whenever any difference of opinion may arise between themselves and the king. On the contrary, it may be asserted that such a step can but rarely become necessary, and only in extreme cases. Now, it is by no means clear to me that the case in question was one of that description. The measures which the bill was designed to carry into effect were doubtless highly *expedient* and proper, but I do not know that they were of such imperious *necessity*, as to brook no delay, to bend to no circumstances whatever. The late ministers, so far from having been guilty of any dereliction of duty, appear to have judged wisely when they resolved to relinquish their object for a time, till they could introduce it under auspices more favourable for its accomplishment. Abandon the measure! What injustice in such a charge! Were they not particularly careful to have it understood that by giving up the measure then, they did not pledge themselves never to bring it forward again? And was it not in consequence of being thus

steadily to their principles, and frank in avowing them, that they lost their places?—In your Register of Jan. 16, you say that you rejoice in the prospect of “the complete annihilation of Whiggism, which has existed for about 140 years to the infinite injury of England.” This is so extraordinary a declaration, and so much at variance with some of the doctrines you now profess, that you must allow me to call upon you for an explanation of your meaning. By Whiggism, I believe, is commonly understood those political principles which create a generous attachment to that character of freedom, which is the distinguishing feature of the English constitution. The salutary and genuine operation of these principles on a representative of the people, was well described by one of our senators, when he declared that he considered it to be his duty to keep his ear ever open and attentive to the *voice of the people*, while his eye was steadily fixed, with watchful jealousy, on the *throne*. In order to justify the flippant language above quoted, it will not be sufficient to say that you did not intend to speak lightly of Whig principles, but meant only to express your disapprobation of the conduct of the Whigs, considered as a political party. For, if so, the sentiment ought to have been differently expressed. Whiggism ought not to be brought into disgrace on account of the faults of those who profess it. If the votaries of Whiggism have sometimes erred, has not this arisen from their having lost sight of those pure and genuine principles, which, if faithfully acted upon, would have been the safeguard of their honour, and their protection from reproach? To annihilate Whiggism would be to annihilate the constitution itself. Unless, therefore, you can find out some other definition of the term than what is here given, I do not see how you will be able to defend the expressions alluded to, or how they can be reconciled with the sentiments which you are in the habit of expressing about freedom and reform. You highly value the Bill of Rights; and other constitutional laws, and strongly recommend them as the grand antidote of all political maladies. You consider them as the bulwarks of the constitution. Yet, how were these bulwarks erected if not by Whiggism?—Relying on your candour for the insertion in your Register, of these remarks,—I am, Sir, your very obedient servant,—TREBOR.—*Worcester, Feb. 1803.*

ON WAR.

SIR,—In consequence of a very able letter addressed by you to Mr. Roscoe,

which appeared in your Register of the 14th instant; I am induced to trouble you with a few observations upon an abstract principle contained in it, concerning which, it seems, you and he are at variance. The principle to which I allude, is—the general question of War: not only as affecting the present contest between England and France; but its influence upon society at large.—It is unnecessary to dilate upon the importance of the question, or to say that it is one of those which have occupied the most serious attention of the first characters in all ages, and in all countries: although, by the way, it is worthy of mention, that, with the exception of Hobbes, who contended that the natural state of man is warfare; most other eminent political writers of this country, have put it down as a state repugnant to the feelings of humanity. To understand the question better, it may not, however, be amiss to divide it into its several parts; to class those parts according to their order, and to discuss them, in as separate a manner, as their nature will admit of. This, I will endeavour to do under the following arrangement. 1st. An inquiry into the tendency of mankind to war:—2d. Whether that tendency is natural, or whether it proceeds from any other cause:—3d. The good or evil resulting from it, or the operation of its effects upon society at large:—and 4th. The advantages or disadvantages of it, when considered relatively with a disposition to peace.—I. Now, Sir, you have, I think, asserted it, as a settled principle, that a tendency to war makes a part of our nature; and, to establish your assertion, have referred us to the propensity which is exhibited in early life to engage in those sports that approximate nearest to it. The foundation of your argument is so vague, that it is not easy to understand it: but, supposing this propensity to exist, is it to be inferred that the practice is indicative of a disposition to annoy?—Is it to be inferred, that, because I learn the art of fencing, my object is to pick quarrels, and to run my adversary through the body? May I not endeavour to acquire this habit, with a view of *self defence* upon some future emergency? And so may, in like manner, this propensity to warlike exercise shew itself in our youth, and I have no doubt is instinctively implanted in us, for the purpose of preparing ourselves to act in defence of our persons. The law of “self preservation” is generally admitted to be the primary law of nature; and it is an injustice to the wisdom of the Creator, to suppose that this early spirit proceeds from motives of acting aggressively to the prejudice of another, rather than defen-

sively in one's own personal protection. That it must proceed from one cause or the other, is, certainly, very clear; but, that it should proceed from the former, is, certainly, very strange. Indeed, I know not how to entertain a thought of it, without impeaching the mercy of the Almighty; there is something so extravagantly preposterous in the idea, that He should make for the sake of unmaking; and that he should form his creatures to-day, and implant in their systems a desire to annihilate one another to-morrow. I can, however, readily conceive that the disposition may proceed from the latter cause, and, at the same time, be perfectly consistent with His views of mercy, policy, and justice: in favour of this opinion, the law of "self-preservation" is countenanced by the sacred Oracles, and forms a part of the code of Moses. "A man may be forced to kill another, in his own necessary self-defence, and then the sin is not in the slayer, but in him that is slain: for, in all cases of force, not he who is compelled to strike the stroke, but he, who is the cause of the evil, bears the whole guilt." The justice of this decree is universally admitted: and in the English law especially; where it may be adduced, and is allowed—as an argument for a breach of the peace, or for the commission of homicide itself! But I know not how it can be well defended, that we should be born with a propensity to injure one another: that this propensity should show itself before we are even physically able to put it into execution; and that it should not only be sanctioned, but be encouraged by the Creator.—In relation to this you may, perhaps, say—if there be no disposition to attack, where is the need of these precautions to defend? This question will be better answered under the second head of my arrangement, wherein I treat the disposition to attack: but conceive that disposition to proceed from, and be strengthened by principles different from those which you have stated. To this head of my arrangement, I shall immediately advert, after making an argument that is made use of by you, to prove the intention of the Creator to encourage a spirit of warfare and opposition. You mention, that He seems to have said, at the time of giving different languages to different classes of men, "be ye to you for ever separate." Now, what he actually did was very much to this effect, as appears in the 11th chapter of Genesis, ver. 10, 7 and 8: viz. "And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language: and this they begin to do. And now nothing will be restrained

from them, which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and then confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth." Herein, you say, is implied the necessity of war; for, without war, it is, you think, evident that to preserve that separation would, unless the nature of man were previously changed, be quite impossible. It appears, however, that this measure was not thought expedient by the Creator, who, evidently, produced, and believed to be sufficient—the confusion of tongues, for the purpose of disuniting His people, and keeping them in a state of separation. If His intention had been to have acted according to your idea, would He not have said—"Go to, let us go down and instil into their hearts a spirit of contention, that they may fight, and flee from one another, and be separate?" But the execution of this plan would but ill have corresponded with that amity and meekness manifested in all His works, and so justly esteemed among the principal attributes of the Deity.—II. That a tendency to war, however, does exist in the minds of some men, cannot, for a moment, be doubted; but then, it does not follow that this tendency, generally speaking (for there may be a very few exceptions) is natural. On the contrary, I cannot conceive any thing more unnatural, than that we should be gifted with a blind propensity mutually to destroy each other, without knowing why or wherefore. If it be not naturally ingrafted in the system then; it must be acquired in the growth: and if it be acquired in the growth, there must be a reason for its acquirement; and that reason such as may be readily discovered. The fact is, Sir, that the actions of most men are regulated by a principle of self-interest; and so long as the ultimate object to be obtained is for their own immediate benefit, they are not over nice as to the means which they employ to become possessed of it. The mind is, at first, inclined to startle at this idea, believing it to be repugnant to the principles of morality and justice; but when it is considered that, by an admirable connexion, *virtue* and *public happiness* are so joined together, that it is almost impossible to attain the one, without following the other,—the circumstance no longer seems strange of men acting from motives of self-interest; and, yet, in conformity with the principles of virtue. If there are, however, very few who act virtuously, for the sake of being virtuous; who accommodate their conduct to the rules of

equity, from a sheer love of equity; who pursue the paths of morality, from a pure affection for its principle; and who live with justice, piety and chastity, from an absolute conviction of their merits: there are still fewer, who love vice, for the sake of vice; who commit acts of cruelty and injustice, from an intuitive desire to be cruel and unjust; and who delight in deeds of indiscriminate murder, of calm, deliberate destruction, and of ravenous rapine,—from an unaffected fondness for their intrinsic qualifications. Nevertheless, Sir, this would be the case, if, according to your idea, we were endowed with a blind propensity to war: for, then should we be led on to the indulgence of this propensity, without any other care than that of gratifying it; our spirit of contention would prompt us to wreak our passion upon the innocent, as well as the guilty,—between whom, indeed, we should be unable to discriminate; our intellect would be disordered; our reason would lose its sway; and, in short, if “to war, to fight (which is the same thing) were a passion natural to all the creation,” as you have stated; “the blood and baseness of our natures would lead us to most preposterous conclusions.” But, if this tendency to war be not radically inserted in us, but proceed from some other cause; if it proceed from the cause which I have hinted to be the source of most men’s actions; there is no fear of its urging us to such extravagant bounds, because the argument, which I made use of before, concerning the connexion of virtue and public happiness, applies also, in great measure, to the present case. This, I shall endeavour to shew under the third head of my arrangement, treating of the operation of the effects of this tendency upon society at large: but, before quitting this head, I am desirous of explaining myself more fully, for differing from you in opinion, that the tendency of mankind to war does not proceed from blind inherent qualities, but from those motives which are the pivot, upon which, our conduct generally turns.—If some ultimate benefit is held out by engaging in a war; if an opportunity offers of bettering our fortune; if a soldier expects to be made a corporal, by fighting well; or a corporal, a serjeant; or any other officer looks to promotion for his exertions; the mystery is immediately developed, and we are no longer at a loss to discover, why it is that the love of fighting predominates. It is not the *medium*, but the *object* that is beloved; and if the object can only be acquired through the assistance of the medium; no wonder that the medium is esteemed: but

then it is not esteemed for itself, but for the object it is capable of acquiring. He must, indeed, be very fond of fighting, who exposes himself to the danger of receiving a hard knock from his enemy, for the sake only of obtaining an opportunity to give him a harder. The noble mind of Don Quixotte de la Mancha might, to be sure, have cherished such ideas; but, since his time, it would be difficult, I think, to point out another, who was so great an amateur of the profession. But, to be serious. Those, bred up to arms, do not love war for the sake of war; but, like the rest of mankind in other respects, love it from motives of self interest, or from motives, which approximate very near to it: some, more distinguished than others, love it for those virtues you have particularized: viz. patriotism, loyalty, and fidelity. Some, for reasons less noble, but equally unsubstantial: viz. honour, rank, and reputation; and others, for what the generality of mankind are grasping after: viz. wealth, power, and dominion. This position may be denied; nay, it may be denied by persons believing it to be untrue, because it is frequently dressed up in false colours and disguised so, that, upon a cursory view, it is imperceptible by the understanding: but, nevertheless, the truth of it is confirmed by actual observation, so as to render unnecessary the use of farther argument. If it were not so, Mr. Cobbett, how happens it, that the French army has attained its present pitch of discipline and order? If it were not, Sir, that each soldier looks forward to promotion, and fights for the approbation of his general; for the maintenance of his character; and, more especially, for the plunder he expects to enjoy. Do not the same causes influence our soldiers; who, brave, hardy, and perfect as they are, contemplate the amount of “prize money,” they are in hopes of obtaining, among the foremost advantages of their profession. Give them the option of fighting an enemy’s man of war, or a Spanish galleon laden with bullion, gold dust, and dollars, and see whether their love of fighting will induce them to attack the first, which, from its equipment and constitution, will lend them a harder tug; or, the latter, where, in all probability, they will meet with little or no opposition. Not only is this peculiar, Sir, to the French army, and to our navy,—but so is it with all the world: so is it with our soldiers; or else, where would be the need of “bounty,” which is held out to them as a lure to enlist in the service. What, will any one attempt to make me believe, that there is something so captivating in the

...a thing so irresistible in
 money that you talk of, that,
 putting serjeant claps a country
 on the back, and asks him to fight for
 his "king and country;" his arguments
 would be equally effective in prevailing upon
 him, without the use of money? Common
 sense tells us, not: and common observation
 proves it, not. This pure spirit of warfare
 neither exists, nor is it reasonable that it
 should exist: a man who goes into the field
 with no other view than the actual pleasure
 he expects to derive from the physical opera-
 tion of killing his adversary, is an incon-
 ceivable monster; but if he has an object to
 attain, and, although acting repugnantly to
 his feelings, yet believes his mode of action
 to be just and necessary, the case is totally
 different.—Having already made this letter
 longer than, I fear, you will find convenient
 to insert in your Register; I must defer the
 consideration of the two remaining topics,
 for the present.—I am, Sir, yours, &c.—
 W. S. L.—Feb. 15, 1808.

TYTHES.

SIR,—Among the various merits of
 your excellent Register, I have received great
 pleasure in observing the liberal admission of
 letters from your correspondents, who have
 occasionally differed from you on subjects of
 controversy, even when their authors have
 not been deficient in powers of argument,
 which are peculiarly your forte: therefore,
 there is less reason to doubt, that you will
 admit my reply to some extraordinary asser-
 tions of a gentleman, who, under the signa-
 ture of Vindex, has lately engaged in an at-
 tack, on the Irish petitioners for a commuta-
 tion of tythes.—In consequence of the very
 great attention I have for years, paid to the
 various publications on this subject, I am
 persuaded, that the ability of one party in de-
 fending them, and the conviction of the
 other in condemning them, will never be
 productive of any thing but wrangling; and
 unless the legislature decidedly interferes in
 behalf of the rights of society, in opposition
 to the tythe system; the iniquity and tyran-
 ny of *tythe gathering* will continue to dis-
 grace the law and constitution of England.—
 Vindex condescends to allow the tythe to be
 one great grievance under which the Irish
 nation at present labours; and then artfully
 pretends it is but a small part of them; hop-
 ing by this expedient of blending the tythes
 with other matter, to draw off the attention
 of your readers from that main grievance,
 so far as to discourage them from any wish
 to reform it; but he ought to distinguish
 between a grievance established by law; and

those which grow out of the corruption of
 the times; and the rapacity of individuals.
 For the whole of the various oppressions to
 which Vindex imputes the discontents of
 Ireland, he states as arising "from the ex-
 actions of Catholic priests; from those of
 tythes levied by the Protestant clergy; and
 the rents demanded by the land proprietors
 and middlemen." Surely, then, he ought
 to have marked *tythe gathering*, which more
 particularly requires the reform of parlia-
 ment, as more necessary for its interference
 than those other abuses, which the petiti-
 oners themselves might remedy, by the resolu-
 tions of county meetings, and inculcating a
 more liberal conduct in their own priests.
 The inpropriate tythes are the indisputable
 property of the laity, yet it is so little found-
 ed in reason and justice, and so obviously
 disgraceful to a free constitution, that parlia-
 ment has as much right to commute it by an
 honourable equivalent, for the benefit of the
 community, as to carry a public road through
 private property, on the same principle. No-
 thing but wilful misrepresentation, or pro-
 fessional prejudice, can attempt to support
 an argument, that clerical tythes are as much
 a parson's property, as the landed estate is the
 property of his patron: what a shameful
 claim it is to call that *property* which is no
 more than a *legal privilege of plundering*
 our neighbour's fields. The more respecta-
 ble the profession of a clergyman, the more
 it behoves them to obtain the abolition of
 such a privilege; and of "reaping where
 they have not sown," under the sanction of
 a *tythe bough*, which disgracefully proclaims
 to all travellers, *in this parish lives a tythe*
GATHERER. The appellation of tythe own-
 ER must be borne with, till the legislature
 assigns a provision for the clergy less incon-
 gruous to their religious and moral princi-
 ples. The clergy should make a point to
 distinguish the present *unavoidable* situation
 of tythe owner, from the *wilful* character of
 gathering them *in kind*, which might be ea-
 sily done by resuming their ancient distinc-
 tion of a rose in the hat, which a *tythe ga-*
therer would not venture to wear, when it
 would be a proof of his wishing to avoid an
 imputation he is ashamed of.—Vindex, who
 must be either a tythe gatherer, or employed
 as their advocate, observes "that it would
 be superfluous to enter into any proof of the
 common law right of tythes." True, that is
 the very evil complained of, that the com-
 mon law should protect a claim so inconsis-
 tent with the liberties of England; a claim
 founded on the impostures of popery; esta-
 blished by one monarch as an atonement for
 murder; and confirmed by another, to la-

galize his own seizure of the property of the convents; by dividing it among his courtiers.—Vindex does not hesitate to say “that he doubts, whether any land proprietor in the empire, can produce *so venerable* a title to his estate!!!” Admitting, that all our titles originated with William the Conqueror, subject to tythes previously established; landed estates are hereditary; did he make church livings so? What parson can say he was born to such a rectory, or can claim it before the patron thinks proper to present him? Who are their patrons? Are they not the owners of the land, of the *produce of which only*, the parson can claim a tythe? And are not the clergy, servants of government appointed in aid of the laws, to prevent the inflictions of penalties by preaching religion and morality? Was government to adopt, and protect another national religion, for example the Presbyterian, which disclaims the right of tythes; what would become of it, if it was not transferred by law to the new ministers? And to whom would that property naturally devolve, but to the owners of the nine parts? In such case lay impropriations would be an exception, but the iniquity of the tenure would soon be commuted, either by church lands, or bought out by occupiers subject to it. So much for arguments about *property*, which are much too often pleaded by the clergy.—Vindex says “the Irish petitioners could have no right to what was not, and could not be conveyed by William from the original grantees.” Therefore, they petition, and on the most reasonable ground, that they may *recover a right* to the produce of their own labour and talents, growing on their own estates, which is at present subject either to plunder or litigation. The quibble produced by Vindex, that it would be unjust to the clergy as well as to those who either sold or let land, subject to tythe which diminished the value of it, that the difference “should go to the present proprietors and occupiers for which no consideration had been paid.” It may be asked, what would they get but a property they were originally entitled to, and the satisfaction of being exonerated from an odious yoke from which almost all Europe is relieved, by the conviction that it originated from the priestcraft of Popery. But, Vindex says, “his arguments will apply equally, both to abolition and commutation, unless commutation be adequate to the clergy, and still levied off the soil.” He might with equal justice revive their original claim, which included all professions, trades, and merchandize, *as well as the produce of the soil*. In one of your former Registers,

Mr. Cobbett, you stated that annual produce at one hundred and twenty millions, therefore, only set the rights of the clergy in the aggregate at double their claims on agriculture, their revenues would amount to twenty four millions annually, which compared with *the quantum meruit of curacies at fifty pounds per annum in ten thousand parishes, would give only five hundred thousand, and leave a species of sinecure of upwards of twenty-three millions in consideration of the duty performed by curates!* Undoubtedly lay tythes must be deducted from this calculation, still it is enormous and ridiculous; and such an advocate as Vindex, had better drop the subject, who, with all his abilities has the modesty to call an attempt at an honourable commutation, “*PLUNDER*,” when that term may be applied with some degree of justice, to tythe gathering.—*A LANCETTER.*—Feb. 10, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Report of the Minister of War on the Measures taken by France under the present circumstances.—6th Jan.

(Concluded from p. 384.)

The necessity of shutting the ports of the continent against our irreconcilable enemy, and of having upon every point of attack considerable means, in order to profit by any fortunate circumstances which might present themselves, to carry the war to the heart of England, Ireland, and the Indies, may render the levy of the conscription of 1809 necessary.—The party which rules at London has proclaimed the principle of eternal war, and the expedition to Copenhagen has revealed its criminal intentions. Though the indignation of all Europe has been excited against England—though at no period France had such numerous armies, it is not sufficient—it is necessary that English influence should be attacked every where it exists, till the moment in which the sight of so many dangers shall induce England to drive from her counsels the Olygarchs who direct them, and to confide the administration to wise men, capable of conciliating the love and interest of the country with the love and interest of the human race.—A vulgar policy would have made your Majesty disarm; but such a policy would be a scourge to France, and render imperfect the great results you have prepared.—Yes, Sire, your Majesty, far from diminishing your arms, ought to augment them, till England shall have acknowledged the independence of all powers, and restored to the seas that tranquillity which your Majesty has ensured to the continent. Un-

doubtedly your Majesty must suffer in requiring from your people fresh sacrifices, and in imposing new obligations on them—but you ought also to yield to the cry of all the French—"No repose till the sea be free," "and a just peace shall have re-established," "France in the most just, the most useful," "and the most necessary of her rights."

IRELAND.

Declaration of the Protestants of Newry, lately convened by requisition—the Seneschal in the Chair.

We the Protestant inhabitants of Newry, actuated by a warm wish for the tranquillity and happiness of our country, feel ourselves impelled, at this awful and momentous crisis of human affairs, to declare, in the most open and unreserved manner, our sentiments, opinions, and wishes on a question on which the most important interests of Ireland, and of the empire, are deeply involved, viz. the claims of our countrymen, who profess the Roman Catholic faith, to an equal admissibility to the offices and dignities of the state with their Protestant fellow subjects. We aver that towards our fellow citizens of that persuasion we are actuated by sentiments of sincere good will and unequivocal kindness: that we do not consider diversity of religious belief as any ground of civil incapacity or political disqualification; and that we shall rejoice to see them restored to every privilege and capability which the other subjects of this great and free empire enjoy.—We lament exceedingly the obstacles which have hitherto impeded the accomplishment of that desirable object, and indulge the hope of seeing them removed. We are decisively of opinion, that the chief difficulty is founded on the appointment of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy of this country, who derive their dignity and rank in the church from the favour of a foreign potentate, now unhappily subjected to the dictation and tyranny of our implacable enemy. We trust we shall be excused for stating that such a patronage was unknown for nearly eight hundred years subsequent to the establishment of Christianity in this kingdom, and that it is now unknown in Catholic countries.—It is to us matter of the most sincere gratification to reflect that this view of the subject has lately been urged and insisted on by many of the wisest, the ablest and most zealous members of the Catholic body. We therefore look with respect and with confidence to the wisdom, the good sense, and

the patriotism of the respectable nobleman and gentleman who preside over the Catholic councils to this country, and from the source we presume to hope for such an arrangement as may tend to obviate this anomaly.—Under such an arrangement we entertain the most confident hope and belief that the paternal goodness of our most gracious sovereign, co-operating with the enlightened wisdom and liberal policy of the imperial parliament, would not hesitate to restore our Catholic countrymen to a perfect parity with ourselves; and we should farther hope that such an arrangement would be rendered more complete and satisfactory by such a national provision for the Catholic clergy as would admit of adequate rewards to men of liberal education and respectable attainments; rewards which the present condition of the Catholic church in this country does by no means afford.—From such an adjustment we would anticipate consequences the most beneficial and important, an efficient addition to the energies of the state, an increased facility of military exertion, an extension of mutual benevolence.—We feel that it is expedient to guard ourselves against a possible imputation, namely, that we have taken up this subject with party views, or with an intention to promote the interest of any particular set of politicians or statesmen.—We solemnly declare that we are influenced solely by views of public happiness and public advantage. God forbid that we should be instrumental in provoking discussions, or exciting a spirit, that might have a tendency to embarrass his majesty's councils. To whatever description of persons his majesty, in his wisdom and goodness, may condescend the direction of the national strength; we sincerely wish them success; and we devoutly implore the favour and blessing of Divine Providence on their exertion to protect this empire against the machinations of an incensed and most formidable foe.

ENGLAND.—On the 9th of Feb. 1808, the *Capture of the Danish West India Islands was announced in the London Gazette.*—*The following are the Articles of Capitulation.*

Articles of Capitulation for the Surrender of the Danish Islands of St. Thomas and St. John's, together with their Dependencies, entered into between General Henry Bowyer, the Commander of the land forces, and Rear Admiral the Honourable
(To be continued.)

"This is the bane, this is the curse of England, as relating to her foreign connections. Blessed with all sorts of resources necessary to the happiness and greatness of a nation, those resources, instead of remaining within herself, assume, through the intervention of commerce, a shape that deposits a considerable part of her wealth, and, along with it, the affections of no small number of the most opulent, active and intriguing of her people, in foreign countries; and, therefore it is, that her interests are made to give way to the interests of those countries, the case of nations being, in this respect, precisely the opposite of that of individuals; for, in the latter case, the debtor is, in a great degree, the slave of the creditor, whereas, in the former, the creditor is the slave of the debtor; and that, too, observe, exactly in proportion to the amount of the debt and the badness of character of the debtor."—REGISTER, Vol. XII. page 971.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.—As a last shift, in opposition to the Orders in Council, a petition has been presented to parliament by the "persons interested in the trade to the United States of America." This petition was the consequence of a meeting of such persons, called by public advertisement, which meeting was held at the London Tavern, on the 10th instant, the same day on which the petition was presented to parliament; and, just as it ought to be, Mr. Alexander BARKING was in the chair. When the vote came to be put, it was found, that there was a decided majority against the petition. This fact being stated in the House of Commons, it was asserted, on the other side, that the cause of such majority was this; that many persons not interested in the trade with the American States were present, and voted against the petition. These persons alleged, that they were interested; that they were West India merchants or planters, and, as such, could not but be deeply interested in whatever might affect our relations with the American States. This is undeniable. I think; or else what we have been so frequently told by the Americans and their advocates is false, namely, that it is from the American States only that our West India Islands can possibly receive a sufficiency of food and lumber. Surely men who have plantations in the West Indies, or having great trade with them, must, of all the persons in this country, be the most interested in whatever relates to war or peace with America. A Mr Sharpe (one of the papers call him *Shanks*) having been amongst the persons present, who voted for the petition, was asked, in the House of Commons, on what he grounded his right to be a petitioner. His answer was, that he was concerned in one of the largest manufactories at Manchester, and, of course, was deeply interested in the trade

with America, which was one of the greatest out-lets for his manufactures. Upon the same ground every one of his poor squalid weavers and spinners might have voted at the meeting; aye, every wretched soul, from whose labour he derives his income. Why might not Messrs. Cadell and Davies, Mr. Sheriff Phillips, and the rest of the booksellers, have voted, at the meeting, upon the same ground? Their books go to America; and, of course, the stoppage of that channel must diminish the sale of books. Nay, why should not I vote too, if I had chosen it? Many of my Registers and other publications, went to America; this out-let being cut off, I and my printers and booksellers and bookbinders and paper makers, and then again their rag and leather and ink sellers, and all the shoe-makers and tailors and barbers of us all, and all the butchers and bakers and millers and farmers employed in raising and preparing food for us; in short, all the whole nation is *interested* with me in the American trade, in the same way, though in a less degree than Mr. Sharpe, the Manchester manufacturer, is interested in that trade. The designation was a foolish one. It gave to every man in the country a right to attend the meeting and to vote upon the question; for, is it not absurd, that Mr Barking, who is concerned in exporting goods to America, should put forward his claim to petition parliament upon measures relating to that country, and deny a similar claim, on the part of a journeyman, who earns his bread in the making of such goods?—It was stated in the House of Commons, and *not contradicted*, that many of those, who voted for the petition, were *American citizens*. They were perfectly right. No one can reasonably blame them for endeavouring to prevent the passing of a law, which will be injurious to their country, as long as their government shall persevere in its partiality for France. What I blame them for is

for assembling under the name of *Englishmen*. Blame them, indeed, I cannot say that I do much. It was one of those tricks so common in their native land, that they may well be excused. Change of climate cannot, all at once, change their natures. Mr. Baring is, I believe, a citizen in virtue of his *marriage*; and, I would wish to obtain from him, as chairman of the meeting, a direct answer to these questions: *are you owner, or part owner, of several American ships? To protect such ships from the hands of our enemy, must their papers express that the owners of both ship and cargo are American citizens? Do you belong to that partnership or family of Baring, who advanced to the American government the eleven millions of dollars to pay Napoleon for Louisiana, and who, of course, would lose both interest and principal, if that government become unable to pay?* Now, Sir, if you cannot with truth answer these questions in the negative, I do not blame you for petitioning against what will be injurious to America; but, I greatly blame you for pretending to be actuated by a desire to do good to the people of England. From your wife's relations, who are merchants and bankers and fundholders in America, you will, doubtless, receive all the praise which you merit at their hands; from your *fellow-citizens* at large you will also receive applause, and, I dare say, you thought of this while in the chair at the London Tavern, the whole of your conduct being calculated for transatlantic effect. But, from me and my countrymen you have no praise to expect. We have married no Americans; we own no American ships; we have made no advances to the American government; and, therefore, you must not expect us to enter into any of your sympathies. —Similar to the connections and interests of Mr. Baring, are the connections and interests of thousands of persons in England; and, I have not the least doubt of the fact, that, of the petitioners, nine-tenths, if they were to make a correct account of their feelings and interests, would find the balance decidedly in favour of America. The Orders in Council, though, observe, were *not the cause* either of the *non-importation act* or the *embargo*: always bear this in mind. Always bear in mind, that these hostile acts were adopted previous to its being possible, that the Orders in Council could be known in America. Always bear in mind, that the former act was passed, with a view of compelling us to give up our maritime right of searching for seamen; and that the latter act was passed, because

America could no longer carry on any trade with us, without setting France at defiance, rather than do which her rulers chose that she should have no trade at all. Always bear these facts in mind, when you are discussing the *consequences* of the Orders in Council; but, these Orders, though they did not, because they could not, produce the two hostile acts, may possibly; and some persons say they will, cause a war with America. If they do, they will cause great injury to those who have debts in that country, whether due from individuals or from the government. They will cause a total disturbance of the affairs of those, whose property is more in that country than in this; they will throw quite off their pivot all those, who, under the name of *American citizens*, have been carrying on a free trade with the enemy, and who have, when they could escape our cruizers, been conveying into his ports the materials for making vessels wherewith for him to invade and conquer us; these Orders in Council will, in the case contemplated, cut off the payment of the interest of money lent to the American government for the purpose of purchasing from *Buonaparté* a country which he had forced Spain to give to him. All this may be the effect of the Orders in Council; but, are the persons, who will thus be affected; are these the men, whose property ought to be watched over with *peculiar care* by the members of the English House of Commons? Are these the men, to the guarding of whose immediate interests the honour, the just vengeance, of England ought to give way? —The petition, is an application from men, who, though, for the greater part, they may, perhaps, be of English birth, ought not to be considered as Englishmen. It is, in reality, a petition from Americans by adoption and by interest; and it ought to be treated as a thing coming from the City of Washington, and not from the city of London; as a petition from "King Cong." conveyed through the mouths of his subjects. If "King Cong." himself chooses to petition, which he will do, before it be long, why, then, let us hear him; but, I have no notion of sparing the feelings of his haughty majesty, who never spared our feelings, and, if he will persist in making his people suffer rather than abandon his unjust partiality for France, suffer they should if I were minister of England, and of short duration should be the reign of "King Cong." —The petitioners state, as one of the evils of the Orders in Council, that the said Orders, if adhered to, will ruin the Americans. The words are these: "That the people of



"America, even if they should remain at peace with us, must, by the want of a demand for their produce, and by the general distress our measures must occasion, be disabled from paying their debts to this country, which may fairly be estimated to amount to the enormous sum of twelve millions sterling."—The reader will do me the justice to remember, that I never went beyond this estimate. Indeed, this was the exact sum at which I stated the running debt; and I asked, what America was to do, if deprived of the use of such a credit. But, I was, in another instance, speaking of the evils of commerce; and I then spoke of this debt in the words which I have taken for my motto.—This argument of the petition is an excellent argument for the petitioners; that is to say, for persons, whose treasures are in America, and whose six per centum will vanish into air, upon a declaration of war; but, if it be a good argument as to this nation, in the present case, it must be good in all cases; and, then it becomes a settled point, that we must, by some means or other, so act as not to have war with America. No matter what she may require us to do, or to forbear to do. Do it or forbear to do it we must; or... we lose twelve millions sterling. "But, gentlemen, do consider, you have had our goods and borrowed our money; and, though we quarrel about other matters, you should pay us honestly." No: and the more we reason the more insolent they become. Like BRASS, in the Confederacy, as they perceive our hesitation return, they repeat their threats. "Ah, well, I'll call a coach," says the swindler, BRASS; and, say the Americans, "twelve millions sterling, that's all." They make demands upon us; they arrogantly and insolently demand of England, without whose permission they dare not venture upon the seas; they demand of her that she shall yield to them, what she never yielded to any power in the world, the right of searching neutral vessels for her own seamen, which seamen, by means the most fraudulent and base, they have long been in the practice of inveigling away and detaining; this demand is rejected, and upon the ground of that rejection, they pass an act to prohibit the importation of certain English goods, for the express purpose of compelling England to submit to their demand; France issues a commercial decree, intended to deter America from having any communication with England; England retaliates; thereupon the Americans, who had before threatened to set in good earnest about the

work of conquering the liberty of the seas, blockade themselves by an act of embargo. And now, behold, we are told, that, unless we retract our act of retaliation against France, the Americans, owing to their *distresses* (though, observe, the acts of non-importation and embargo preceded our Orders in Council), will not be able to pay the debts, which they owe to those Englishmen, who, for the sake of higher interest, and, as they thought, better security, preferred America to England as a place wherein to deposit their wealth. These men have now the impudence to tell us, that it is *we* who have occasioned the distresses of America, and to complain, in her name, of our injustice and cruelty, while the language they put into her mouth is, in substance, "yield to my demands, submit to my open partiality for your enemy, and to all the insults I offer you, or I shall become, from my measures of self-punishment in order to punish you, too poor to pay the debts which I have solemly engaged to pay you, whether we are at war or at peace." What should you, reader, think of a tradesman, who, being in your debt, were to say to you, make me a surrender of your right to prevent me from inveigling away and corrupting and detaining your servants; who, upon being refused so insolent a demand, should lay by his tools, shut up his shop, and swear that he would, in order to injure you, do no more business, until his demand were assented to; and who, upon being asked for the amount of the debt due to you, were to plead his poverty, arising from the cessation of his trade? What would you think of such a man? America discovers, in this case, the insolence and baseness of the virago, who, in order to screen her carcass from the blows brought upon it by abuse too great for mortal endurance, thrusts forward her helpless bastard, with a "kill my innocent baby, you cruel villain, do!" No: we do not wish to kill your baby creditors, whether peers, barons, or simple commoners; but, we are resolved, or, I hope so, at least, that what you have been unable to bully us out of, we shall not yield to their jew-like supplications. Is this, ye gods, the lofty-spirited republic of America! Are these the sons of "St. Tammany," who would rather be thought the descendants of a copper-coloured savage than the sons and heirs of Englishmen! Is this the "new Amphyctionic Council!" Is this the great and renowned "King Cong!" Sending up under-hand petitions to the parliament of England, and resting, for a hope of impunity, upon the circumstance

that others, though innocent, would share in the punishment inflicted; procuring, as it were, a pregnancy before-hand, in order to escape, or at least to defer, the day of execution; and, therein, acknowledging to the world, that all their charges, against our justice and humanity, they themselves knew to be false! Well is it for us that the blood of the parent cannot be debased by that of the children.—There is a remedy for the “distresses” of the people of America, which, as the petitioners do not seem to have thought of it, I will take the liberty to point out. More than *three-fourths* of the trade of America, that trade, the loss of which so distresses her, is with England and her dominions. What is it that has put a stop to this trade? The non-importation act and the act of embargo. Well, then, why does she not *repeal those acts*? This is a thing to be accomplished in the space of three days. What an easy remedy and how natural! Aye, but there are our Orders in Council. Yes, but these Orders do not prevent a trade with England and her dominions. They prevent a trade with France, and America cannot trade with England, unless England allows her to trade with France. Very true. Nothing can be more fair and reasonable; and all, then, that America has to do, is to ask France whether she will repeal her blockading decree. If she does, all is open again; if not, all that America has left for it, is, to endeavour to *compel* France to repeal that decree; or, if she choose not to adopt that course, to continue to trade with England and her dominions.—This is so clear and so just, that every man of common sense must perceive the reasonableness of it, and every disinterested man must approve of it. But, the petitioners know, as well as I do, that the American government are disposed to sacrifice the interests of that country, that they are disposed to make the people suffer to the utmost extent of their endurance, rather than abandon their partiality for France, which partiality this same Mr. Jefferson and his abettors formerly professed to ground upon a *similarity in principles of government*, but which they adhere to with even increased fervency, now that the government of France is become a military despotism, and now that her chiefs have declared, that republican government is the *ho-hed of rascality* (“*le foyer des scélérats*”), as may be seen by a reference to the report of Talleyrand preparatory to the last change of government in France. Mr. Alexander Baring (always ready to defend and justify the conduct of America) has, indeed, in his pamphlet,

given another reason for this partiality. When France and England are at war, America, he says, having great maritime interests, and being, of course, desirous to prevent any power from obtaining a complete predominance at sea, will *naturally* throw her weight into the scale of France, as long as France is inferior to England, in point of maritime force. She will? She will *naturally* do this, will she? She will lay aside all other considerations, and keep steadily in view the preventing of England from maintaining a maritime predominance? This is her wise, natural and obvious line of policy, is it? It may be so, and it may become those who own American ships, who lend money to America, and who are, in fact as well as in form, American citizens, to applaud this policy in her government; but, I am sure it becomes not us Englishmen to listen to their advice; I am sure it becomes us not to trust them with the guardianship of either our money or our honour. Unless England had a decided predominance at sea, France, every man must see, would soon become her conqueror. Aye, says Mr. Baring, but what is that to America? I think it is a good deal to her; but, if she thinks otherwise, I am sure it is a very good reason for our not listening to the councils of those who have her interests at heart more than they can be supposed to have the interest of England at heart.—Mr. GEATTAN, in the debate of the 11th instant, after having gone over the old arguments (with a due share of amplification), with respect to the commercial consequences of the Orders in Council, as bearing upon America, is reported to have added something touching the great political consequences of the same measure. The passage, as reported in the *Morning Chronicle*, is this: “An American war, however, appeared to the right honourable gentleman to be much more dangerous on other grounds than any that could arise out of mere commercial considerations. He called upon the British parliament to consider the consequences of *separating* Great Britain and America, and thus *dividing* and *weakening* the only force that remained in the world to sustain the character of liberty—to *hold out hopes to the Continent*. The right honourable gentleman enforced this appeal in a strain of peculiarly interesting and impressive eloquence—and concluded with exhorting gentlemen to reflect, that any loss to America or England, would but *add to the accumulated gains of France*—would but advance the strength of that power which was equally the enemy of both.”—The eloquence of

Mr. Grattan might be, for any thing I know to the contrary, "peculiarly interesting and "impressive;" but the reasoning appears to me to have been worth very little indeed. Upon the reading of this passage, who would not suppose, that the speaker had thought himself carried back to the year 1775? "*Separating Great Britain and America!*" Why Mr. Baring (who knows much more of the disposition of America than Mr. Grattan ever knew), tells us, in justification of America, that it is *naturally* her policy to throw her weight into the scale of "France," until England is deprived of her maritime superiority; that is to say, in plain words, until England be upon the eve of subjugation. That the American Government views the matter in the same light that Mr. Baring does is evident from its conduct; from its notorious and flagrant partiality to France; from its officers, civil and military, in all its sea-port towns, giving open encouragement to the inveigling away of our seamen; from the pertinacity which it has shown with respect to its demand upon us to give up our right of searching for seamen, a demand which could have no important motive, other than that of enfeebling of our naval force, and a demand, too, which, in all probability, was made, if not at the instigation, at least with the decided approbation of France. To compel us to submit to this demand an act of congress has been passed, while which act existed the late ministers had the meanness to treat with America, and they have since blamed the present ministry for not resuming the negotiation upon the same basis. From all this, from the publications, tolerated by the government of America, inviting our seamen to desert, and proposing public subscriptions to reward them for so doing; from the thousands of instances of American envy and hatred of England; from the multitude of proofs that no concessions on our part are capable of abating this implacable hostility: from all this, it abundantly appears, that Mr. Baring is better acquainted with the policy of America than Mr. Grattan is, and that to express alarm at the idea of "*separating Great Britain from America,*" would, if it had come from any one but a member of parliament, merit an epithet, which, from the deep sense of respect which I bear towards the honourable house, I shall here forbear to apply.—Mr. Grattan appears to be surprisingly affected, at the idea of "*dividing and weakening the only force*" (the force of Great Britain and America) "that remains in the world to sustain the "character of liberty, and to hold out hopes

"to the continent of Europe." But, before Mr. Grattan had given way to his feelings of sorrow upon this score, and especially before he had made an attempt to communicate them to his honourable fellow lawgivers, it might have been worth his while to ascertain the point, how, in what way, the force of Great Britain and America can now be said to be *united*; because, unless two things can, with propriety, be said to be joined together, it appears to me to be pretty nearly, if not quite, nonsense, to talk of dividing them. Did Mr. Grattan mean, that the two nations were, though not directly, yet indirectly, in co-operation? The fact is notoriously the reverse, as has been before shown; and, does he think, that, from the former state of things, when Americans carried on the trade for France between her and her colonies and her dependent states; when Americans made sham purchases of French merchant ships and so prevented the loss of the use of those ships to France; when Americans were frequently detected in evading our blockades of French ports, and in conveying to our enemy naval and military stores, when Americans were seen, in the ports of France, and (the moment Russia became our enemy) in the ports of Russia, boasting the perpetuity of the union between our enemies and America, and "success to their efforts against the tyrants of the seas:" does Mr. Grattan think, that, from this state of things, from this line of conduct, on the part of America, the oppressed part of the continent of Europe could entertain a hope of deliverance? Does he think that America here acted the part of endeavouring to "sustain the character of liberty in the "world?"—No, sir, that which is "lost "by America is *not* gained by France." If America loses by her being blockaded, if she cease to send out her ships, France loses too, because she is thereby cut off from all communication with her colonies, which colonies must go to rapid decay. America loses by being prohibited from fraudulently covering French ships and cargoes with her flag; but does not France lose by the same prohibition? America loses, in short, by every measure that prohibits, or restricts, her commerce with France and her allies; but, France and her allies lose in a much greater degree. It is not true, then, that what is lost by America is gained by France: they were, and they are, in every thing, except in open arms, united; and, as far as relates to matters of commerce, the loss of the one, in the way we are speaking of, is the loss of the other.—No, Sir; no, Mr. Grattan, the way to convert America from her obsti-

nate, foolish and base partiality to France, is not that of concession and forbearance. We have tried fifteen years of concessions (see Register, Vol. XII. page 961 and the following;) we have shown forbearance, such as was never before shown by any nation in the world, which had the power to resent injuries and insults; and, the consequence has been, new demands, fresh injuries and fresh insults. I beg the reader to refer to Vol. XII page 961. The facts there stated cannot be denied, and, with those facts before us, shall we make new concessions? and shall we exercise still further forbearance? The late ministers attempted it. The president sent his envoys to negotiate with us upon several points; and, in order to give effect to his demands, he procured an act of non-importation to be passed, ready to be put in execution against us, if those demands were refused. Our late ministers were such I dare not say what they were for submitting to treat under such circumstances, and I will not wrong my indignation by an inadequate phrase. They submitted to treat; they who talked so much about national honour, and the dignity of their Royal Master, submitted to treat in his name, with the threat of "Thomas Jefferson" hanging over his head. They did not stipulate away our right of search; but, they reserved the point for future discussion, and they did pledge their "Royal Master" to do something more, with respect to the right of search, than to take care that there should be no abuse in the exercise of it. What more they would have done we were, happily, prevented from knowing, by their dismission from office. But "Thomas Jefferson," was not to be put off by vague promises. He saw our allies fast falling before Napoleon, upon the continent of Europe, and, by way, I suppose, of illustrating Mr. Grattan's doctrine of union between England and America, in opposition to France, he seized upon that moment of our alarm, as he imagined, to send back the treaty unratified, and to point out the alterations and additions, that he insisted upon being introduced, just, as has been before observed, as a beseeching general sends back an offer of capitulation. But, as his adverse fate would have it, the commanders of the garrison had, in the mean time, been changed; and, the new ones, whatever other faults they might have (and those were not either few in number or trifling in magnitude), they had not that of foolish fondness for President Jefferson and his frenchified faction, nor were they so basely complaisant to the impudent clubs of commerce, as to be

ready to sacrifice the honour of the nation at the shrine of such despicable interests. The rejected treaty, the returned articles of capitulation, were received with an assurance given to the American minister here, that the negotiation should not be resumed, and that no new negotiation should be begun upon the same basis; for which manly conduct the present ministers have been censured by Lord Grenville, censure, however, which they will, I dare say, make shift to survive.—Here ended, I hope, the long chapter of concessions and forbearance to America; a nation that has repaid every new benefit with a new injury, every new act of kindness with a new insult, every caress with a kick and every blessing with a curse.

"Tender-handed press a nettle,
And it stings you for your pains;
Press it, like a man of nettle,
And it soft as silk remains.
'Tis the same with vulgar natures,
Use them kindly, they rebel;
But, be rough as nutting-graters,
And the rogues obey you well."

The truth of this maxim, which I applied to the Americans when we were face to face, has been strikingly verified by them. Under the English government, which towards them, at least, was mild in the extreme, they showed an uncommon jealousy of all authority; they resented every thing, which could be possibly construed into an attempt upon their liberties. Their present rulers knew them well, and knowing them, they scruple not to give them the nutmeg-grater pretty freely. Their governors and judges do things, with perfect impunity, that would raise an open rebellion in England, even at this day. It is a notorious fact, that a man, imprisoned for an assault upon his wife, was forgotten in one of their prison cells, and when the keeper recollected him, was found dead, and half-devoured by the rats. Yet, no stir did this make. There was no public proceeding of any sort instituted. Another man was sent to prison, upon suspicion of robbing the bank. He was committed by one of the bankers. The real criminal was soon found out. Yet was the first man, without any oath made against him, kept in jail for a long while, and amongst felons too, upon the ground, that he had been employed about the locks of the bank, and was, therefore, a dangerous man. A man who had been charged with a libel upon Jefferson, died in jail, in Virginia, committed by a justice of the peace, because he could not find tail to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, and this, observe,

previous to conviction. The bail demanded was greater than it could reasonably be expected that the man should obtain; though their constitution expressly enjoins, that excessive bail shall, in no case, be demanded. The tyrannical acts of the Oligarchy which now reigns in America, under the name and form of a republican government, are not to be described in a small compass. The rulers are, for the greater part, lawyers, and lawyers, too, observe, very different indeed from the lawyers in England, taken in general. A set of men, who unite, without exception, the profession of the attorney with that of the barrister; who have no sort of shame in asking for a job, and in under bidding one another; who are versed in all the arts of chicanery and fraud; and, who, when they arrive at stations of great power and influence, exercise, under the name of law and justice, oppression such as despotism never dreamt of, to all which the people submit like spaniels, while they have, at the same time, the front to invite *our sailors* to "partake of their liberty and happiness," thus exhibiting, to the world a striking instance of that harmony, which is always found to subsist between the sister vices, baseness and insolence.—In the conduct of the nation towards France, on the one hand, and towards England, on the other, we perceive all the marks of the same disposition. There is scarcely any one sort of wrong, which they have not received at the hands of France. They have had their property seized; they have been captured at sea; their ships have been shot at, afterwards boarded, and made to pay so much for each shot fired at them; they have been detained in the French colonies; their property has been taken, by order of the French commanders in the West-Indies, and paid for in bills upon France, which have been refused payment; their government, even Washington, has been nosed and threatened by the French envoy; they have discovered that envoy treating with their Secretary of State for a bribe; they, in the intercepted dispatches of the French envoy, find themselves described as the most corrupt and villainous people upon earth; some scores of them have been taken and flogged by the French; in short, they have been kicked and cuffed and buffeted and spit upon, till the French appear to have been wearied with the exercise. And yet, the consequence, as we see, is a decided, and even a growing partiality for France, while a precisely opposite conduct towards them, on the part of England, has inspired them, as towards her, with a

spirit of aggression and of insolence.—Such a nation, Mr. Grattan, is not to be won by concession, mildness, and forbearance; and, be you assured, Sir, that if we are to remain at peace with America, which, upon proper terms, I desire full as much as you (and have, I am pretty certain, greater personal reasons for desiring it), we shall have to thank the naval and military force, now assembled and assembling at Bermuda. It is in vain to disguise this fact. It is foolish to fear that we shall produce irritation by openly avowing our opinions. We have to deal with a nation by no means delicate, and who, in short, are to be induced to act justly and moderately by nothing but force.—Mr. PONSOMBY, in the report of the debate of the 10th instant, is represented as having ridiculed the idea of reducing Napoleon to reasonable terms of peace, by the means of the regulations laid down in the Orders of Council, and to have asked in a most triumphant tone: "Did the destruction of Lyons, the first silk manufacturing town in France, produce any serious effect upon the resources of that country? Was the loss of St. Domingo, the finest colony in the world, of such serious consequences to the interests of France?" I answer both questions in the negative. Why, this is my own doctrine, Mr. Ponsomby; for, have I not, when the resources arising from foreign trade have been talked of, said, "look at France, who has become strong and great in proportion as she has become less commercial." This was a most powerful argument; but, then, it was directly at war with the petition of the Sharpes and the Barings, and with all the long speeches (good God how long!) intended to show, that the Orders in Council, if persevered in, would prove the overthrow of Manchester and Birmingham, and would thereby greatly injure the country, diminish its resources, enfeeble it, and pave the way for its subjugation. Yes, Sir, this argument of yours was a complete answer to the speeches of your commercial friends, particularly Lord Henry Petty; also to the pamphlets of Messrs. Baring and Roscoe. These gentlemen all vehemently contend, that commerce is the life-blood of the nation; and that, as the Orders of Council will diminish, and nearly, destroy, commerce, these Orders will, of course, be the ruin of the nation. But you, to whose department it fell to shew that the Orders would, by diminishing the commerce of the enemy, do him no harm, laugh at the idea of a nation being injured by the diminution or

destruction of its trade and commerce. There was, I must confess, a great difficulty to overcome. It was the business of the whole faction to make the people believe, if they could, that this measure of their opponents was injurious to England, and not at all injurious to France. It was not easy to do this amongst men of impartiality and plain sense; because, it was alledged by you, that the measure would diminish the commerce of England, and we all knew that it would go near to produce the utter annihilation of all the remaining commerce in France. The effect in both countries was of precisely the same nature; the difference was only in the degree; and, as it was evident, that whatever might be the amount of the evil in England, it would be surpassed by the amount of the evil in France, the balance, it was equally evident, was in our favour. Such being the case, the course which, I think, wisdom pointed out, was, to make the most of the evils which England would experience from the measure, and to say not a word about its operation with respect to France. But, this is what a faction, in or out of place, never yet did. They never yet contented themselves with what told in their favour. They must always have more. Every thing which they oppose must be black and white alternately, as it may suit their purpose so to consider it.—After all, however, Mr. Ponsonby appears to view the Orders of Council in a light very different from that, in which they are regarded by me. It is evident, that the measure will produce great distress in France and in all her dependent states, and the consequences of this distress cannot but be favourable to us. But, the light in which I love to look at it, is that of a declaration, issued in the face of the world, that England is resolved to command the sea, and that no nation shall navigate upon it without her permission, or without exposing themselves to punishment at her hands. It was high time to do something of this sort, unless we chose to sink quietly under the domination of France. No man supposes, that Napoleon will be induced to listen to equitable terms of peace, merely because his commerce is totally ruined; but, if, by this maritime measure, we convince him that we are resolutely bent upon exercising exclusive dominion upon the sea as long as he continues to exercise such dominion upon the land, he will be disposed, if any thing can dispose him, to enter upon negotiations for peace upon terms compatible with our honour and our safety. It is, I allow it, a calamity, that the civilized world should be divided between two great master states, all

the others being, more or less closely, dependent upon their will; but, this is a calamity now not to be removed by us. Our enemy may remove it whensoever he pleases; we are ready to give up the rigid exercise of our power by sea; but this we cannot do, while he holds all the land in subjection.—America, if she were disposed to act justly and wisely, might soon put an end to the contest. By uniting in the war with us; by securing to our colonies an ample supply of provisions and lumber; by putting every one at ease with respect to manufactures and commerce, and by leaving France and her dependent states no hope of embarrassing us by a continuation of the war; by these means, she would obtain the glory of giving peace to the world. But these are means, which she will never employ, till necessity shall compel her to shake off the rancorous faction, under which she is now sinking from disgrace to disgrace. Mr. DAVIES, one of the most able and most worthy men in America, has observed, in his excellent work upon geography, lately published in Philadelphia, that “the nations of Europe cannot view with indifference a nation of transatlantic traders that discover no sympathy in the convulsions of a whole continent, no anxiety about the sufferings of other nations, as long as those sufferings open new channels of commerce, and swell the revenues of the state.” Certainly, the nations of Europe cannot view such a people with indifference. Mr. Davies has given a just picture of his nation, and a most unamiable one it is. One great reason, that the partiality to France (at all times evinced by the rulers of America) is viewed with approbation by the people, good as well as bad, is this; that France being an *irritable* power, there is more danger of a disturbance of commerce from any offence given to her than from an offence given to England. As if they said: “England we know will not interrupt us, do what we will. All, therefore, that we have to do, is to keep well with France.” This is the principle, by which the very best of the public men in America have been, all along, actuated. It is time, therefore, that we convince them, that, though not so ready to discover irritation as France is, we are not made of such lumpish materials as to be affected by no injury or insult that ingenious malice can invent; and, when they discover, that we are not disposed to brook that which they would not attempt towards France, they may, perhaps, in making up the account, find the balance of danger on the side opposite to that, on which they have hitherto thought it to rest,

and may be disposed to treat us as well, at least, as they treat our enemy.—As things now stand, America must *begin* the work of reconciliation. I have always said, that it was for the ministers to consider how far they might relax, with regard to America, in the exercise of our maritime dominion. But, America is the aggressor; she passed her non-importation act two years ago. The first step, the very first step, therefore, is the repeal of that act. That being done, we may, with propriety, and without loss of character, negotiate with her, as to a relaxation of the rules laid down in the Orders of Council; but, until she take that step, it is for us to remain immovable in our present position.

ARMY.—The Mutiny Bill has passed the House of Commons, and with the clause spoken of in my last. Thus has the measure of Mr. Windham, decidedly the best that ever was adopted with respect to the army, been, upon only a few days notice, rendered null and void. The votes for the clause were 189, against 116, a greater minority than the ministers had before met with. Out of doors, the measure has excited great general disgust, but not greater than it merits; and, it is to be hoped, that, first or last, the authors of it will meet with their just reward. —Upon this third reading of the mutiny bill, Sir Francis Burdett moved to introduce the following clause: “that no officer in the “army should be dismissed or deprived of “his pay, otherwise than by the sentence “of a court-martial, or by address of either “House of Parliament.”—This being a question of vital importance to the remaining liberties of the country, I shall here insert the short sketch of the debate, as it is given in the newspapers, referring the reader, for a more full report, to the Parliamentary Debates.

“*Sir F. Burdett*, pursuant to the notice given for him a few days since by a noble friend of his (Lord Folkestone) had to offer a clause, to prevent officers from being dismissed from the army by any other means than the sentence of a Court Martial. He thought such a provision of essential importance to the army, to the interests of the crown, and those of the country. The form of the proposition he had to make was so moderate, that he did not conceive any objection could be made to it. He was not aware of any opposition being intended, except from some loose ideas that had been thrown out, of its trenching on the Prerogative. He did not think it did. But even if it were true that it did, he should not think that would be a reasonable objection with the house, if he could shew that the power,

so far as he meant to correct it, had been exercised in a manner detrimental to the honour of the crown and the interests of the army and of the country. The army itself was constitutionally looked upon as a great infringement made by the crown on the prerogatives of the people. He did not say it was an unnecessary infringement. But as the army was constitutionally an invasion of the liberties of the people, the principle of limiting in some respects the arbitrary power of the crown, with respect to the army, could not be looked upon as trenching on the prerogative of the crown, which held the army only by the indulgence of parliament. He contended that no prerogative of the crown, ought to infringe on the liberties of the people. The clause he should propose had nothing in view but to secure that justice and fair dealings which should always mark the proceedings of the crown towards the people. He proposed to restrain only that which no king if well advised, would ever do. It was due to the officers of the army, to afford them that legal protection for their fortunes and lives, and what was of still more importance to them, their characters, which persons of other classes enjoyed. They were now wholly at the mercy of those malicious whispers, by which the ears of persons high in authority, were ever liable to be abused. Officers of the army should certainly be no worse situated in this respect than the rest of his majesty's subjects. No man whatsoever ought to be condemned or punished without a hearing. Such was the principle of British justice. The honour of which military men were so tenacious, was exposed to ruin often without the possibility of guarding against it. The discipline of the army also suffered materially by the practice he wished to correct. For when those who, if brought to trial, would be found decidedly deserving of punishment, were blended in the operation of one undistinguishing stroke of power with those who, if tried, had the means of procuring themselves an honourable acquittal, virtue and good conduct, in a great measure, lost their stimulus, and bad conduct was sheltered from a great part of that shame, which was the most effectual check upon its vicious progress. As the object he had in view was to prevent future abuse rather than to censure the past, he forbore to cast any reflection or to cite any of those cases which it would be competent to adduce. He might be told these were cases in which persons were dismissed, whom it would be hard to expose by a court martial, though it would have been highly improper to continue them in the service. Persons of this kind might be permitted to resign, and thus there would

always be a sufficient security against abuse of every kind. It was the principle of the British constitution to separate every thing odious from the crown, and to adorn it with the heavenly attributes of mercy and the power of relief. It was an inconsistency with this principle that he wished to remove, by giving to the officers of the army the same measure of justice enjoyed by the rest of the community. It was by the army that the crown was supported and the people protected, and why should the army be in a worse situation than any other part of the people in the essential point of justice? The army had now grown to such an extent, with a disposition still further to augment it, that even in point of mere numerical consideration, it was a large portion of the people. And in the present critical and dangerous situation of the country, when our safety depended so much on the zeal and energy of the officers of the army, ought they to be left in circumstances in which they might be whispered out of their rank and situation, into poverty, disgrace, and ruin, and a thousand calamities worse than any law could inflict, by the arts of a dark malignant assassin, who would not dare to meet them in the open light of genuine British justice? Courts martial afforded ample means to punish every description of offence, and when it was considered that these courts were not like juries, bound to be unanimous in their sentence, and how many descriptions of offences could be included under the very extensive and sweeping charge of ungentleman-like conduct, so often censured and punished by them, he was sure no latitude of impunity could be apprehended, by giving every accused person the opportunity of stating his case before such a tribunal. He moved a clause accordingly."

"*The Secretary at War* complimented the honourable baronet on the moderation which he had displayed; but objected to the clause because he had laid no ground for it. He urged the bad consequences of changes in the military system without the strongest reasons for it; and the necessity that the army should be dependent on the crown. It was so necessary that even if it were not the case at present, he should have proposed it now for the first time. He would wish, if it were possible, that the military should have the advantage of the common law; but it was inconsistent with the constitution and discipline of the army. The history of the world proved the necessity of strict discipline in an army, and for this it must look to a head. The instances in which the

power alluded to had been exercised were of late extremely rare; but the best effects resulted from the existence of the power. Every part of the prerogative pushed to extremes would produce abuses—such as in the making of peace or war. But this was no reason for diminishing that prerogative. An army independent of the sovereign was contrary to common sense. Such an encroachment on the prerogative would subvert the constitution. He allowed that in former times officers had been deprived of their regiments for voting against ministers. But there were no instances of this abuse in modern times. He therefore gave his decided negative to the proposition."

"*Lord Folkestone* adverted to the extraordinary manner in which the honourable secretary had answered the arguments of the honourable baronet on his side. He had complimented him first for not stating past abuses, and then objected to the clause, because no grounds had been laid for it. The honourable secretary very well knew that there were instances of the most cruel oppression that might be stated. But the honourable baronet below only looked to the future, and had laid irresistible grounds for his proposition. He had stated his object to be to protect the officers and the crown itself from doing what was known to have been done, and from the secret whispers of slander and malice. His lordship, however, expressed his hope, that the honourable baronet would withdraw his clause, and bring the subject forward in a separate bill, for so grave and important a matter required the most serious deliberation and the fullest discussion. The honourable baronet he allowed could not, however, be liable to the charge of precipitation from the other side. The noble lord opposite had brought forward his clause in a manner equally sudden; and as the honourable secretary had expressed so strongly his aversion to changes, he, no doubt, would give his vote against the change proposed by the noble lord near him. He earnestly requested the honourable baronet to withdraw his clause for the present, as he should regret extremely to be obliged to give it his negative."

"*Colonel Duckett* opposed the clause, on account that it would be making the army judges in its own cause; and also, as it proposed to refuse, for the first time, the placing confidence in the crown, when we had a sovereign who of all others had best deserved it."

"*General Fitzpatrick* said, that when he

had proposed any change in the constitution of the army, he had always stated reasons which appeared to him to make it a matter of necessity. The military laws were naturally regarded in that house with a strong prejudice; and those who were particularly attached to the principles of the constitution, applied arguments to those laws which were not at all suited to the nature of the case. They were a necessary evil, and ought not to be interfered with. The honourable baronet had been complimented for his moderation, in not going into past abuses; but he was bound to make out the strongest case before a change of this kind could be for a moment contemplated. The proposition, therefore, had his decided negative."

The motion was withdrawn, in order to be brought forward again in a separate bill. I have long wished to see this question brought before parliament. I wanted to hear what they would say to it; and particularly what the *Wigs* would say, those fine old boys, those "champions of our rights," as a correspondent in my last (whom I shall answer in my next) calls them. General Fitzpatrick spoke for the whole, I suppose; and now, I should think, that the friends of Sir Francis Burdett may set their minds at rest as to the *support* that he is to receive from the Whigs. I have before observed upon the alteration, which the increased state of the army has made in regard to the prerogative in question. When the whole of the peace establishment was not above ten thousand men, there was no danger in the prerogative; but, now, when the number of *commissioned officers* is more than ten thousand; when one can scarcely walk a hundred yards, in any street of any town, without rubbing against an officer of the army; when no small part of the members of both houses of parliament are officers of the army; and when there is scarcely a family of any note in the whole kingdom that has not some relation an officer in the army, surely such a prerogative must be very dangerous. England is now a *military country*; it is so professed to be by the ministry and the parliament; and, if this be so, and if the king has the absolute power of dispossessing, at his pleasure, and without reason assigned, every officer of the army of his means of existence as well as of his character, of what *sort*, I ask, is the government of England?—Colonel Duckett's observation, that the proposition refused to place confidence in "a sovereign, who, of 'all others best deserved it,' was, to be sure, of great weight. Yes, without doubt,

no sovereign ever deserved confidence so well as his Majesty. That is a settled point. But, the worst of it is, that there will always be men to say the same thing of every future sovereign, as there have been to say it of the past. *Pore* has a passage, the words of which I forget, but the substance of which is, that the character whom he is describing, always thought the king of the time being the best; and, when one king died, could scarce be vexed, so wise and gracious was the next. But, the qualities of the king had nothing at all to do with the matter. Sir Francis Burdett professed to wish for nothing more than to guard the officers of the army *for the future*; and, surely, to leave the fortunes, the character, and the happiness of so considerable a part of the nation at the sole mercy of the military adviser of the king is not very agreeable to the spirit of those laws, which make up what is called the constitution of England. I earnestly hope, that this subject will undergo an ample discussion. It is of infinitely greater importance to *the people of England*, than all the questions about commerce and the law of nations, which have cost the honourable members so many hard nights' work during the present session, and which have caused the printing of more papers than any man living could read in a year, though he went over them with the volubility of a law-stationer's clerk.

PORTUGUESE MERCHANTS.—I lose not a moment in endeavouring to put the public upon its guard against an attempt, which, according to a paragraph in the *Courier*, of the 15th instant, this description of persons are preparing to make upon the taxes. It is there stated, that they have had a meeting at the London Tavern, and have appointed a committee to wait upon the Secretary of State, in order to obtain indemnification for their losses, in their precipitate flight from Lisbon.—This is intolerable. What! are we to be taxed to pay for the losses, which they have incurred in trade? Do we suffer a bookseller, or a printer, to come to us for losses, which he may have sustained by fire? As well might we indemnify the farmer for his losses by the sheep-rot or the turnip-fly.—Why did they not *insure*? If they could not do that, why did they not come away sooner? They had plenty of notice.—In short, this is as impudent as the application of the adventurers to Buenos Ayres, and worse of it cannot be said.—Upon one condition I would grant them indemnification. I would make each individual give an account of his profits, since he began trade with Portugal. Those profits

he should then pay into the exchequer. I would then give him as much as he could have earned, in the capacity of a labouring man, from the time he began to trade with Portugal until the present time, deducting the sum necessary for his support as a labouring man, during that space. If he had made no profits, I would advance him out of the taxes, the amount of 12 shillings a week for a year, or, which would be much better, perhaps, send him, at once, to the parish, if he were unable to work.—What insufferable, what outrageous impudence! A set of men leave their own country, go to another to carry on a lucrative trade, continue in that trade for years, and, at last, when they can stay no longer, when they can derive no longer any profits from a trade, for the support of which their country has dearly paid in armaments and subsidies, home they come and demand *indemnification* for the loss they have sustained, in consequence of having remained to the last moment!

The *American Merchant*, whose letter came too late to be noticed, without great inconvenience, shall see his letter and my answer, in the next number. In the mean while, I think, he will regard it but fair to give me his *name*, in consequence of the base imputation contained in the last paragraph of his letter.—Whether he send his name or not, however, his letter shall be inserted.

Botley, 17th. March, 1808.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates.

The Third number of Vol. X. is ready for delivery. Complete sets from the commencement in the year 1803, may be had of R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, Covent-Garden, and of J. Budd, Pall Mall.

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AMERICAN MERCHANTS' PETITION.

Dated 10th March, 1808—The petition of the undersigned merchants, manufacturers and others, of the city of London, interested in the trade with the United States of America, humbly sheweth:—That your petitioners contemplate with the greatest anxiety and apprehension the alarming consequences with which they are threatened from certain orders in council, purporting to be issued “for the protection of the *trade and navigation* of Great Britain; *but on which*, they are induced, after mature consideration,

to believe that they must be productive of the most ruinous effects. Your petitioners are duly sensible of the necessity of making every sacrifice of personal interests, to promote the strength and resources of the country in the present extraordinary crisis of public affairs; and if the total change introduced into the whole commercial system of this country, and of the world, by the orders of council, could be conducive to so desirable an object; your petitioners, great as their losses must be, would submit without a murmur; but understanding that these orders are principally, if not wholly, recommended by an opinion, that they will prove beneficial to the commercial interests of this country, they feel it to be their duty, humbly to represent their conviction, that this opinion is founded in error; and that if the prayer of their petition be granted, they shall be able to prove, that they must be productive of the most fatal consequences to the interests, not only of your petitioners, but of the commerce and manufactures of the empire at large.—Your petitioners will abstain from enforcing, by any details, their apprehension, that these measures are likely to interrupt our peace with the United States of America; our intercourse with which, at all times valuable, is infinitely more so since we are excluded from the continent of Europe. To this only remaining branch of our foreign intercourse, we must now look for a demand for our manufactures, for many of the most important materials for their support; and for supplies of provisions and naval stores, necessary for our subsistence and defence.—Your petitioners feel assured that they will be able to prove to the satisfaction of your hon. house, that the neutrality of America has been the means of circulating to a large amount, articles of the produce and manufactures of this country, in the dominions of our numerous enemies, to which we have no direct access.—That the annual value of British manufactures exported to the United States, exceeds ten millions sterling: and—that as our consumption of the produce of that country falls far short of that amount, the only means of paying us must arise from the consumption of the produce of America in other countries, which the operation of the orders in council must interrupt, and in most instances totally destroy.—That the people of America, even if they remain at peace with us, must by a want of demand for their produce, and by the general distress our measures must occasion, be disabled from paying their debts to this country, which may fairly be estimated to amount to the

enormous sum of 12 millions sterling:—That the neutrality of America, so far from being injurious to the other commercial interests of Great Britain, has promoted materially their prosperity:—That the produce of our colonies in the West Indies, of our empire in the East, and of our fisheries on the banks of Newfoundland, has frequently found a foreign market by this means; and —That by the destruction of the neutrality of the only remaining neutral state, all possibility of intercourse with the rest of the world being removed, trade cannot possibly be benefited, but must necessarily be annihilated.—Your petitioners feeling as they do most sensibly with their fellow subjects, the pressure of a war in which their commerce has principally been aimed at by the enemy, would scorn to plead their distress in recommendation of measures inconsistent with the honour and substantial interests of their country; but they humbly rely upon the wisdom of the legislature that this distress shall not be increased by our own errors, and they confidently believe, that, if they are permitted to illustrate by evidence the facts they are here to state, and to explain many others which they shall here refrain from enumerating, they cannot fail to establish the conviction with which they are so strongly impressed;—That the orders of council are founded on the most mistaken opinions of the commercial interests of the empire, and must be particularly fatal to those of your petitioners.—Your petitioners therefore pray, that they may be heard by themselves or council at the bar of this hon. house, and be permitted to produce evidence in support of the allegations of their petition; or that this hon. house will examine into the nature and extent of their grievances in any mode which may appear advisable, with a view of affording such relief as this hon. house in its wisdom may think proper.—And your petitioners will ever pray.

CLAIMANTS ON AMERICA.

SIR,—An aspersion upon the character of the merchants having Claims under the Convention with America, which appeared in the Morning Post of the 11th of Feb. in the Report of a Speech which that paper has given as the Speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, renders it necessary that the public should be undeceived, and which I shall attempt, as well as endeavour to do justice to myself, in common with my brother claimants, notwithstanding my increased age and infirmities, since I last addressed some observations to you on the subject of the Board of

Claims on American Debtors (Vol. X. p. 149, 297). I am doubtful whether to attribute this reported Speech to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or to the errors of the reporter, but which soever it may be, the tendency of the passage I shall notice is a fit subject for reprehension, whether we consider the charge against the Board of Commissioners, or the false statement respecting the conduct of the merchants.—The observations to which I refer, as reported in the Morning Post of the 11th of Feb., arose out of the subject of the arrangement with the Bank, and are as follows: “But the Committee was in error in including in this “£475,000 part of £600,000 placed in “the Bank, in virtue of an arrangement “with the United States of America. “Though the claimants on this fund may “not have been as prompt in coming forward with demands as before, it was in “the power of the trustees to vest the money “in Exchequer Bills, for the benefit of the “claimants, whenever they should come “forward.”—It will be necessary, Mr. Cobbett, that I trace the origin of the Claim we have, not upon the Board of Commissioners alone, but upon the nation, to repel this attack upon our want of promptitude, and that, I therefore travel to the commencement of the revolutionary war with America. It is not my intention to swell my present letter beyond the limits actually necessary in the recital of our wrongs in the communication of the unprecedented treatment we have received, by far worse than that extended to very outcasts of society. I shall briefly touch upon our situation from the year 1775 to the peace in 1783, and as briefly state the sufferings we have undergone from 1783 to the present time. At the time of the commencement of the war in 1775, the American colonies stood indebted to the British merchants £4,000,000 sterling and upwards, which were withheld from them during the war, and which it was expected would not be readily discharged upon the cessation of hostilities, and the consequent peace. This conclusion is evident from the stipulation the administration of this country in 1783, when the treaty of peace was agitated, deemed it proper to insist upon, and which was adopted, viz. the 4th article in these words, “It is agreed “that creditors on either side, shall meet “with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, “of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted;” and which not only included debts due at the commencement of hostilities in 1775, but also those which had been incur-

red up to the day on which the treaty of peace was made. The right upon our part to insist upon the Americans paying those debts which certain laws of the respective local legislatures of each state in which individuals stood indebted to Britain, interdicted during one period of the war, was acknowledged, and our privilege to sue for recovery of our demands was considered to be revived, and not a doubt remained among the principal part of my brother merchants, but that justice would be impartially, regularly, and without delay administered to us; so much were they impressed with this idea, that the committee of merchants in London, created for the purpose of superintending the interests of their constituents trading to America, expressed their extreme satisfaction at the stipulated provisions of the fourth article of the treaty of peace; but hastily and rashly, indeed publicly declared their full conviction, that the American courts of judicature would instantly dispense even handed justice to the British creditors. That men inured to difficulties, wants, and deprivations, and accustomed to the frequent exercise of evasions and subterfuges, as the American debtors had submitted to during 8 years miseries of war, would instantly change their acquired habits to pursue the path of honour and honesty, was, I think, rather more than could be believed by the most credulous of the committee. This committee, however, expressed their conviction of the future correct proceedings of the American debtors, and in which sentiment they were joined by the Glasgow merchants, who went even further in their expressions of satisfaction at the stipulations of the 4th article of the treaty of peace, and their belief of the correct proceedings which would take place under it in the American courts, and declared that "every thing has been procured for them which could have been expected, when all circumstances are dispassionately considered;" and even one of our legislators suffered himself to be equally deceived into a similar belief with his constituents; I mean the Lord Advocate, who in the debates upon the provisional articles of the treaty of peace, after adopting their sentiments with considerable stage effect, drew a letter from his pocket, when on the floor of the House of Commons, (I was present at the time) and observed, "I have a letter from the merchants of Glasgow, requesting me to return thanks to ministers for the care they have taken of their interests in the negotiation, for that some had been paid, some secured, and some were in hopes of being paid the debts due by America to them." Sir, not a

single attempt was ventured upon by the legislature or judiciary of America, or the local government of the respective states, to carry into effect the stipulations of the 4th article of the treaty of peace, for several years after the peace; nor were the doors of the courts of law opened to the reception of cases of claims on the part of British creditors, in pursuance of the provisions of that article, although the Lord Advocate declared the communication from his constituents to be highly favourable. Yet, I know, and I am sure, that the merchants of Glasgow had reason to agree with me soon after his declaration, that the debts paid "were merely balances of a few shillings, and even that those were only paid for the purpose of decoying the merchants into ill placed confidence of their minutely exact conduct, and to induce them to ship fresh cargoes of goods, impressed as they would be with the scrupulous exactness of their old debtors, as well as that the "securities" taken were of no more avail than the original debts, because whatever objections there might be to the accounts current, would follow the bond, and it is going too far to contend, that the mere act of giving a bond is of equal importance with the actual payment of a debt; although I know full well that such doctrine has been always the creed of American debtors, who when pressed by their British creditors for payment, invariably have observed, "I will pay you with my bond," and deem the payment of the debt to be made from the moment the bond is given. This sort of payment, however, is not of the nature that would pass current upon the Exchange of London, to enforce which would take just as much time as would the original debt, unaccompanied with the solemnity of wax and printed paper, and still liable to every objection that might be made to the accounts current, for the balance of which the bond might have been taken. In one part alone of the Lord Advocate's observations I agree, for not only did some of the Glasgow merchants hope that the Americans would be made to pay their debts, but, I believe, nearly the whole of us; the events which occurred, however, put an end to all expectations, whatever our wishes might have been.—During the war a law was passed in America, compelling British creditors, factors, and agents to leave the colonies of America, and innumerable other impediments were also created, to prevent a British creditor from recovering his debts. One particularly in 1777, sequestering British property, and which impediments were at length completed by the total interdiction

of recovery, actually proscribing us, and declaring it to be an act of treason for any American debtor to pay his British creditor, but enabling the American debtor to discharge the responsibility of debt, by payments with their manufacture of paper money into the state treasuries, which in the year 1781 had depreciated so low as 1000 for 1, and as their estimated value of the new currency, was deemed to be equal with sterling amount in the payments into those treasuries; consequently, £1000 currency of the actual value of £1 sterling, discharged a *bonâ fide* sterling debt of £1000.—It is scarcely of any importance to notice the Suspension Act, respecting payments in paper money in the year 1780, because the act was renewed with renewed vigour in 1782, and no benefits whatever arose to the British creditor from the suspended payments, as they were unable to prosecute the debtors.—The hopes of the constituents of the Lord Advocate were not fulfilled, when the olive branch was substituted for the spear. Although the treaty of peace stipulated for the payment of debts, British creditors were not permitted to sue their American debtors, it being deemed unfair, according to the doctrine of the Americans, to allow them to obtain judgment, while the American creditors had any outstanding demands against their fellow citizens. This doctrine was adopted and persevered in until the year 1791; for, although the legislature repealed the act prohibiting the recovery of British debts in 1787, it was in fact, a virtual continuation of the prohibition, for it was also declared in the same act, that a suspension should continue until the posts were given up to the Americans, (Detroit upon their western frontiers, was one of the posts) and until the negroes who under a proclamation by the British commander, had deserted their servitude, and flocked to our standard, were restored, or compensation was made for the loss sustained by the Americans in consequence of their dereliction; thus did impediments expressly contrary to the provisions of the 4th article of the treaty of peace, against the recovery of British debts, remain in full force; we could not sue our debtors until some time after the adoption of the constitution of the American government under its present form, and which alteration took place I believe in 1788. After the expiration of nearly three years from this period, 8 years after the peace, and 16 years from the commencement of hostilities, viz. in 1791, and after the American creditors had recovered their demands from their fellow-citizen debtors,

we were enabled for the first time to commence suits against our debtors, and to recover as we apprehended, as the 4th article of the treaty of peace provided, “the full value of all *bonâ fide* debts.” I remember well when the article was first publicly declared, asking the opinion of a very worthy man, and a *rara avis*, an honest lawyer, now no more, what were his sentiments upon the tendency of the expression. Well I recollect his reply, which the event has proved to be correct, that it did not secure to us the payment of 20s. for every pound of our demand, that the full value of all *bonâ fide* debts, “did not mean” all *bonâ fide* debts in full, “but that it only guaranteed to us the full value of all *bonâ fide* debts” at the time we were enabled to get from the debtors as much as they might deem it expedient to pay us. In other words, the actual value of our debts was that which we might be able to force from our debtors (some of whom were not worth a shilling when the courts were open to our appeal, some of whom were then dead, and their property distributed and dispersed into various channels; some of whom had been compelled by law to pay their American creditors, while we were disabled from seeking redress; some of whom had retired with stock and block to the Western Waters; some of whom had transferred their property to others to evade the effect of judgment against them), after 8 years consideration whether they would or would not pay us, and after 8 years adoption of all the chicanery that could be devised by American lawyers, to prevent the recovery of a single shilling in due course of law, and loading us with the incalculable expences of protracted litigation. With all these and innumerable other difficulties,—these innumerable difficulties did we, in addition to the miseries we had experienced from the cruel detention of our property, while our creditors here were clamorous for payment of their demands, which we were utterly unable to discharge, many of us forced into the prisons of the metropolis, to which we had formerly contributed our mite to support in the sunshine of our days, and compelled to take refuge with our families, in the midst of miserable objects and disease, multiply to our severe and bitter lot, by seeking redress in the American courts of law, and by adding expence to the first loss from the rapacity of agents and lawyers. In 1791 we sued our claims in the American courts, and it was in 1793 and not before, a period of 10 years from the treaty of peace, when the first judgment was obtained in the federal court,

a court erected by the new or federal government, as a check upon the state courts; but many of us dreading the great expences attendant upon proceedings in that court, sought, but fruitlessly, for redress in the district or county of the different states; but in which judgments were not obtained until between 2 and 3 years afterwards, avoiding certainly the expences of the federal court, but adding to the great expence of time which we had cruelly been subjected to.—But, Mr. Cobbett, when the courts gave us judgments, they deducted 8 years interest during the war—a very considerable portion of our demand, and when it was proved that a debt had been paid into the American treasuries in their paper money manufacture, which did not exist when the debt was created, and, consequently, not morally binding upon us, it was held to be a satisfaction of our demands, although it never came into our hands, nor was worth one penny to us in any way whatever.—Such a fulfilment of the 4th article of the treaty of peace, entrenched as the American debtors were with innumerable impediments, Mr. Cobbett, as you must see, and no doubt of your own acquired knowledge of our situation are aware, was a derision and mockery. Remonstrances upon remonstrances were made to our own government, to administer relief to us in some shape or other, to keep us from a state of actual want, or to enable us by some strong representation to the American government, to seek redress with some prospect of success, which went on from time to time until towards the end of the year 1794, when the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, was entered into, and by which it was agreed that commissioners should be appointed to carry into effect the stipulations of the 4th article of the treaty of peace, and the American government agreed to become our paymasters.—It is not necessary for me here to state minutely what was done, or rather, what was not done under this commission, for like unto our individual applications, the national authority had as little effect as our endeavours towards a settlement, because I have in my former letter (Vol. X. p. 149 and 297) to you, furnished you with a sufficient statement of the case; it is only necessary for me to observe, that nothing whatever conducing to our individual benefit or interest, was settled, and that we were still condemned to groan under our miseries, to suffer additional delay, and to bear increased expences, while the written proofs we had of the origin of our *bonâ fide* claims were mouldering away with corroding time, and our living

witnesses descending into the vale of life, thus accumulating upon us additional difficulties, instead of clearing our direct path.—Our claims were now calculated to be in amount upwards of £5,000,000 sterling, the whole of which, every shilling, if established by proof, and which we could have proved incontrovertibly at the peace, when the whole was guaranteed to us (notwithstanding the respect I bear to the opinion of my deceased legal friend, whose sentiments I have already mentioned) was stipulated to be secure to us by the 4th article of the treaty of peace, from the individual debtors, but not carried into effect; and by the 6th article of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, adopted and assumed by the American government, and which was also not carried into execution. I cannot penetrate into the arcana of state, but, no doubt, for wise and prudential political reasons, we the merchants were doomed to be sacrificed, or what is tantamount, our interests were to be surrendered to maintain the peace of the nation; and this sum of £5,000,000 sterling, was to be compounded for by payments on the part of the American government of £600,000 sterling. I find no fault with this negotiation and settlement, if our situation as a nation was such as to require the concession and individual sacrifice; but it must be clear to every man totally unacquainted with state maxims, and the policy of government, that it is a moral axiom the nation is bound to indemnify individuals whose interests may be sacrificed for the general good, out of the public purse; that all shall contribute where all are concerned and benefited; which may be brought familiarly to our view, by reflecting that if it be deemed necessary the public should have a road through my land, although I as an individual do set a value upon the spot on which I may have been born, and which in value increased in my estimation with my ripening years; yet this sacrifice must be made by me, and hard as it might be to part with it, it would be only just and proper that I should so do for general benefit. Just indeed it is on the part of the nation requiring it for the public advantage, not a particle of injustice is there in the required act, the only injustice which could arise would be in the determination of government not to compensate me for the deprivation; but government never yet did take from the individual a foot of land, and add it to the common stock, without awarding compensation for the deprivation. If, therefore, the government deemed it politic and prudent to compound £5,000,000 of denands for

£600,000, I hold that government bound to make up the deficiency to the individuals, and to take every precaution that no time be uselessly expended in apportioning the scanty pittance paid by the American government among the hungry claimants. A period of 8 years had elapsed from the date of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation 19 years after the peace, and 27 years from the commencement of the war, when a convention was entered into between Britain and America, viz. on 8th Jan. 1802, by Lord Hawkesbury, his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the part of the former, and by Mr. Rufus King, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States on the part of the latter country, by which it was stipulated that the United States should pay £600,000 sterling in 3 installments, in satisfaction and discharge of the money which the United States might have been liable to pay in pursuance of the provisions of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, and which amounted to £5,000,000, as I have already mentioned. The last instalment of this money was paid in 1805, and for the purpose of distributing the amount, commissioners were appointed by act of parliament in pursuance of a bill brought into the House of Commons by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the time Attorney General, the beginning of April, 1803, which directed the sum of £600,000 to be divided amongst the several persons in proportion to the amount of their respective claims; and which was, in fact, no more than 12 per cent. of the amount of the whole, viz. £5,000,000, amounting, as I have stated to you in my former communication, to no more than 2s. 4½d. in the pound of every 20s. of "the full value of all bona fide debts," as the words of the treaty of peace are. Although the bill was not brought into parliament until the beginning of April, 1803, an office was opened for the reception of claims in September, 1802; and when the Board of Commissioners appointed in the act met, they continued to receive claims until the limited time, by the 7th section of the act of parliament for finally depositing claims, which was fixed for the 1st of June, 1804, after which period no claim could be received. It is, therefore, incorrect to state, as the Morning Post has stated, that the claimants have not been so prompt in coming forward with demands as before; because, if a creditor neglected to make his claim on or prior to the 1st of June

1804, his claims could not be subsequently received. The reverse of the charge of want of promptitude would have been nearer the truth, for a great many creditors were prompt enough to come forward to make claim before the Convention Board, seeing that the British government had compounded for the debts due to the British merchants, and precluded them from resorting either to the American government, or the American individual debtor, who had not from some cause or other made claim with the Board in America, under the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation; but their claims were refused to be received before the Convention Board, because they had not in the first instance made claim in America, under the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation.—We who made our claims in America, have all made our claims to the Convention Board years since, with that promptitude our immediate wants and necessities compelled us to do, and we have followed this promptitude from the time the Board was formed, unceasingly but unavailingly, to the present time, writhing under the burden of accumulating expence, delays, and impediments to remuneration; and, I cannot even now, Mr. Cobbett, as I observed formerly to you, calculate upon the final decision of the Board upon our respective claims, within less time than I have heretofore stated, long before which period we shall, and indeed will the whole of mankind in present existence, have ceased all concern in subterranean matters: *Singula de nobis anni prædantur entes*. A reflection much embittered by the innumerable sufferings and hardships and privations we have undergone, during the last 30 years, and those we have still to submit to. Insignificant as is the sum compounded for, it would have been some little relief to the horrors of our reflection, if that composition money had been rendered productive, until the Board could bring themselves to the resolution of putting some little stay to our miseries by deciding our claims: but this, Sir, has not been done. The Morning Post is equally incorrect in the assertion, in the respect that "it was in the power of the trustees to vest the money in Exchequer Bills for the benefit of the claimants, wherever they should come forward," as the fact is, that such proceeding has not been adopted. This observation is a severe censure upon the Board for neglecting and sacrificing the interest of the claimants, if they are empowered to lay out the money

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at interest, or upon the legislature, for not having attended to their interest in authorising such investment, particularly so, as the person who is reported by the Morning Post to have made the observation, is the very person who brought the bill into parliament. That the board are not to blame for the money remaining wrapped up in a napkin, as I have heretofore mentioned, I shall make appear perfectly clear. The eleventh section of the act of parliament, which was passed on the 22d of April, 1803, enacts that the three several installments of £200,000 “ shall, as soon after the payment thereof respectively in America, as the same can be done, be remitted to, and paid into the hands of the cashier of the governor and company of the Bank of England, to the account of, and with the privy, and in the names of, the commissioners appointed under this act, *and shall be and remain* in the names of the commissioners for the time being under this act, *to be paid to the several and respective persons entitled thereto* under the order of the said commissioners, or any two of them, pursuant to the provisions of this act.” Not one word of authority is delegated to the board to invest the money in Exchequer Bills or otherwise, for the benefit of the concern throughout the act; and, consequently, this money might remain in the bank until doomsday, if it could be possible that a board armed with the powers they have by this act, could, in the exercise and in the plenitude of those powers, refrain from deciding upon the cases before them. I will not, as the Morning Post has done, charge the board with acting improperly, in attributing to them power which they are not armed with, or with an improper exercise of the authority they have delegated to them; because, I have been assured that the present commissioners are men of character and ability, qualified in every respect for their arduous duties, and are not insensible to the situation their starving petitioners are, and have been for many years placed in, and are disposed to extend to each claimant his individual share of justice; but, I may without impropriety suppose in the present state of mankind, that it is not impossible others not of equal character and ability, and to whom the harsh treatment we have experienced, and the rigorous measures we have endured may not be known or attended to, may in less time than a century be placed in their stations; and that while those men may be fattening upon the *otium cum dignitate*, some trivial imperfection or other in our respective cases may be held to be of sufficient importance to delay a decision upon them be-

yond the period of the present century. This may be the case, and of this I do complain as of an event not improbable, as I am informed not one of the present board has youth on his side. Still, however, it might be some consolation for a man of my age and infirmities, to reflect that my great grandson's great grandson might be the better remunerated for my present miserable expectations, if I knew that the money paid into the Bank was laid out in Exchequer Bills, and consequently, accumulating in amount, the simple interest of which in the course of a century, taking the amount as it is now stated to be £475,000, would produce £2,375,000 in the aggregate £2,850,000, though very far short of our claims, still it would be some addition to our confined hopes; but, as it would be a further consolation to know that the greater the resulting benefits accruing, the larger would be our rateable proportion. I have to suggest the adoption of the same rule which is pursued in the City of London, where we mercantile men do not in our practical proceedings content ourselves with a calculation of simple interest profits. Certainly not, for as we receive our money we send it out again into the world, and as this is strictly correct and attended with the reflection that we can calculate upon the advantage of compound interest, which in the time I have mentioned would amount to a very considerable sum, the overplus in the present case, after paying our descendants of the sixth generation handsomely, might be made subservient to the general purposes of the nation. But how can the attempt to put this into practice be made? Where rests the power to make even simple interest of this composition money, Mr. Cobbett, for the act of parliament authorises no such thing; and it seems therefore, necessary that a new act be passed for the express purpose. The present board have some limits to what they shall not do, though from a very minute examination of the act, I cannot discover any rule of conduct positively restricting them to what they shall beneficially do. Let the obloquy remain where it should, in the administration that agreed to sacrifice us for £600,000 and having sacrificed us for that sum, still further added to it by not attending to the benefits which would arise, and in some measure compensate us for the first sacrifice, by directing that scanty pittance to be placed out at interest until the sixth generation of commissioners to meet upon our cases might deem it proper to decide them. The present board, Sir, have no more interest in the application of the monies than you have;

they are the mere tunnel as it were, through which our silvery flood of dollars is to drip into our hands, when it has been purified at the smelting house; for, I consider every day's delay as operating to exude out of us £82. 3s. 10d. simple interest during every 24 hours, the principal sum remaining as a dead and unprofitable concern in the Bank of England cashier's hands, under the act of parliament, totally unemployed. Mr. Cobbett, the good hard dollars hourly losing the polish, such at least is to be collected from the act of parliament, was the intention of the legislature. The board though armed as they are with some very great powers, are notwithstanding not armed with powers for our prospective interest; this however, is not their fault, but the crime of those who originally sacrificed us; and the Morning Post must, therefore, be incorrect, in attributing the expressions it has done to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to the very man who prepared the bill, and moved it in the house, and who must have known how an act of parliament operates, expressly declaring that the money shall *remain* with the cashier of the Bank, until paid over to the claimants; but, though our individual interest has been neglected, yet, surely, it would have been well that the legislature had not wholly overlooked that which concerns the national interest. If our prospective interest was beneath their notice, that of the nation is presumed not to be so. Why not have directed that the annual interest of the £600,000 should be appropriated to the current expenses of the office of the board. The *et ceteras* of public offices are not introduced into the national establishment without expence, and £30,000, the yearly interest of the £600,000, would have at least contributed to the discharge of claims upon government for the expence of the office, instead of becoming a permanent charge upon our taxes, as I much fear it will, for the end of the concern is far removed for any definite period. We have now entered into the seventh year of the existence of the American claim office, few claims have been decided, and small indeed has been the rateable pittance which has been doled out to a very few of us, after a patient endurance of sufferings for 33 years, and no prospect whatever presents itself of a final cessation of our miseries, unless the faint spark of life remaining in us should expire, and with that event put an end to all reflection upon our cares.—In my former correspondence, I observed, that much appeared to be done, before we received the scanty portion of our sacrifice, notwithstanding I

was gravely assured by one of your correspondents, that all the leading points were decided upon by the Board in Philadelphia, and that it was now only necessary to apply those points to the different cases, and decide upon them. Mr. Cobbett, 7 years have nearly elapsed, and comparatively speaking, we have gained not a shadow of our rights, and for what we have gained we have been compelled to submit in the first instance to the acceptance of 2s. 4½. in the pound composition, when even government acknowledges that twenty shillings is our due, because policy required the state to offer us, the mercantile part of the nation, as an expiatory sacrifice for having dared to demand the fulfilment of the 4th article of the treaty of peace by the Americans. I should hope that government will ultimately see the propriety of making up the difference to us, which I hold it to be bound to do on the principles of common justice, as it was deemed advisable to concede our property to America without our consent, and to take from us our right to sue our debtors, which we were enabled to do before the convention, or to look to the government of America for redress, if justice was withheld from us by the American judiciary.—Men may flippantly talk of concessions to America, but let every one bring the matter home to his own breast. It is easy to contend for the concession of the rights of others; but, I should wish much to know, if those men who at this time strenuously and vociferously advocate the cause of concessions to America by this nation, are willing themselves to concede what may immediately effect their individual interests. What is the concern of every one is the concern of no one; and we may, therefore, concede as a nation all our just rights, without a direct sacrifice being made of the interest of the individual; this is what those men contend for, but who would vehemently oppose a surrender of their individual interests, though the nation should require it to be done in the manner we have submitted to the surrender. But whatever is yielded to America, whatever concession may be determined upon by this country, I am fully satisfied it will only be considered by America as arising from apprehension; and that America emboldened by our wavering conduct, will never desert her system of extorting concession as long as this country has any thing left to concede.—I have ever found such to be the conduct of individuals of that country; and, I have no doubt, that the collective body retains the virtues of the component parts. My present letter has branched out into greater space

than I expected it would, when I first took up the pen; but, the subject, an inexhaustible one it is, must be my excuse with you, and momentous it is equally to its inexhaustion. Mercantile men who pride themselves on their self importance, and the consequence they consider themselves with respect to the nation at large, may fairly conclude from my observations on the treatment we have experienced, from the neglect with which we have been treated, and from the sacrifice which has been made of us by government, what value is set upon our rank in the common scale: to have suspended us by dozens would have been mercy to us, compared with the treatment we have experienced.—The value government puts upon the rank and character of mercantile men in the state, and their beneficial exertions towards the increase of commerce may be readily estimated. You, Mr. Cobbett, and Mr. Spence have been insisting that we can well do without commerce. One consideration in support of the doctrine you have brought forward into public view, and contended for, you have left to me to furnish you with, that even the government of this country acts as if commerce was unnecessary, from the sacrifice of those who carry it on; and which government assuredly would not do if it was beneficial; certainly, the best method of completely putting an end to commerce, is to sacrifice those at the shrine of the "new morality," which contends for the adoption of nothing but what concerns oneself; a like sacrificing the merchant by whom commerce has been brought to an unprecedented height, and the manufactures of the country, which through his means have been raised to a pre-eminence unexampled. Thus to extinguish our importance, is to shew in what view the commerce of the country is held, duly appreciating its value and insignificance. If the remnant of life now remaining to me, and my faculties will permit, I may again trouble you for a space in your Register, for some remarks upon the different decisions by the board under the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, and the board under the convention, now sitting in London, shewing the various proceedings which have taken place when the American debtor was a party, and now that the American debtor is no longer a party, with the objections which have been brought against our claims, which even the American agent for the debtor never contended for, though it was their interest to lessen our demands as much as possible, a difference I cannot account for; for what was declared to be law by the board in America, it does

seem to me should be held to be law by the board here; particularly as the present board consists of the identical individuals who composed the majority of the board in America, where they had to contend with men by no means deficient in skill, though possibly not possessing superior ability to the members of the present board, who, I presume, were on that recommendation selected for their office, and appointed to the consideration of the claims of—A RUINED OLD AMERICAN MERCHANT.—Feb. 29, 1838.

IRELAND.

SIR;—Catholic emancipation, and the abolition of tithes might perhaps prove auxiliary towards removing the return of the disorders, that have long afflicted Ireland, but their operation could only produce a temporary effect. It is true, that Catholic emancipation, by gratifying the pride of the Romish aristocracy, would occasion sincere efforts on their part, to excite among the lower orders of the Catholics a hearty resistance to French invasion, while the abolition of tithes would put their value into the tenant's pocket during his lease, and so far increase his means of subsistence; it is evident, however, to common sense, that the adoption of such measures could produce no solid or permanent good, when we fairly consider the source from which all the evils spring; rack rents and non-resident landed proprietors, are most certainly the primary and sole cause of all the calamities, which have afflicted that unhappy land for the last century; an exuberant population, ill lodged, ill fed, and ill clothed, will be always ready to join the standard of sedition, for the propensity is in human nature.—To describe evils without prescribing a remedy, is useless, and to prescribe a remedy when there is little hope of its being adopted is nugatory: in spite, however, of such discouraging prospects, I will trespass upon you with my opinion.—Political concessions the most liberal and extensive must prove wholly unavailing. Measures that directly come home to the root of the evil, can only prove efficient. Long have the landed proprietors of Ireland, been in the habit of extorting excessive rents from the oppressed occupiers, without any allowances or deductions for building or repairing their miserable habitations, or improving their land. The arrear to patriotism and humanity, on that score, is deep indeed, and I may venture to affirm that it will never be discharged without the vigorous and determined interposition of the legislature between peasantry and property. This I may be told would be dangerous and unconstitu-

tional : unconstitutional it might be, but the danger lies the other way. Pray what was the suspension of the *habeas corpus* and the invasion of property to the tune of 10 per cent. ? they were and are gulped down, from imperious necessity and for the salvation of the empire.—If Ireland is to be permanently secured to Great Britain, it must be by the courage and energy of the great body of her people, and their efforts can only be obtained by possessing comforts to defend. Political rights are grateful to the mind, they flatter national pride, and aristocratical ambition, but how insignificant are they to the feelings of a large agricultural peasantry, debased and brutalized by filth, and poverty ? Can Catholic emancipation give them food, raiment or decent habitations ? but what would it do for the Protestants ? would it cloth and feed them too ? so ignorant, I am persuaded, are numbers of the lower orders of Irish Catholics, and so much have they heard of this said emancipation, that they actually think that it would lodge, clothe and feed them plentifully. At the same time I can see no good reason, why the Irish Roman Catholics should not be completely emancipated ; it could not increase their physical powers one particle, nerve a single arm or forge one pike more against the state than already exists. It would be just and liberal, it would be in harmony with the spirit of the constitution ; good it might do, mischief none ; the experiment, therefore, would be reasonable and politic at the present awful crisis : true, it might mortify protestant pride, long in the exclusive possession of political power. Veteran monopolists do not like that a participation of their privileges should extend to others ; that however ought to have no weight with the rulers of a great empire, when its security is at stake.—But to return from this digression and at once to come to the point.—The relief I have in contemplation for the great mass of the Irish peasantry consists of the following measures :—1st. Let all the landed proprietors of Ireland be obliged, in future, to let their farms to the occupiers who actually reside upon, and cultivate them ; by this measure, the middle men, or land pirates, will be annihilated :—2d. Let no man occupy for grazing, more than a given quantity of land with modifications with respect to its quality ; by this measure bipeds will supplant quadrupeds, and an increasing population will find food and raiment :—3d. Let no human habitation have less than ten acres of arable and pasture attached to it ; this will secure from starvation the family who occupies it :—4th. Let all cottages and farm

houses be built and kept in repair, (as in England) by the proprietor :—5th. Let all landed proprietors, who do not reside, at least, six months in the year on their estates, pay an absentee tax of 10 per cent. the produce of which shall be solely applicable, to improve the condition of the lower orders of the people under the direction of a board instituted for that purpose : this will contribute to secure residence. Should the health or age of the proprietor require a different residence, in such case, one of his family may represent him on his estate.—Let an inspector be appointed to each county, and (if that inspector be a well informed Englishman, so much the better) who shall make an annual circuit of the county to which he is appointed, and upon oath report the condition of the peasantry, which report shall be published, specifying the proprietor on whose estate misery prevails : this would be of incalculable benefit towards meliorating the state of the lower orders of the peasantry.—Strong as these measures appear to be, certain I am, that if they are not adopted, or others which shall nearly approximate them, Ireland never can long remain in a state of tranquillity. The times are past, when a great agrarian peasantry will endure oppression without those ebullitions which shock humanity and disgrace the era in which we live. When or where we shall find an administration with vigour and virtue sufficient to carry such measures into effect I knew not. In what quarter of the political horizon shall we look for them ? In our past rulers, I could contemplate no bold comprehensive plan aimed to embrace the prosperity or to secure the stability and duration of the empire ;—their talents as men are unquestionable, their abilities as ministers, contemptible, and their patriotic virtue very suspicious ;—during their short reign, never was there a more gross or indecent abuse of power in the distribution of appointments, particularly in that profession where morality and high character should have been religiously consulted :—From the present administration, I can flatter myself with no very sanguine hope, I fear that they are trimmers and want energy to encounter a measure of such prospective magnitude,—it is not fair to prejudge,—may I be mistaken !—I well know that the measures I have suggested would excite the indignation of Irish peers, commoners, squires, and land jobbers ; to them I must beg leave to observe, that I really wish to save their throats from being cut, their lands laid waste, their country desolated, and the British empire overthrown.—It is not a little irritating to hear

an Hibernian member, with firm front, start up in the Imperial Parliament, and harangue with patriotic ardour, on the calamities of his country; he boldly affirms, that if *something* be not immediately done for Ireland, that it will become a French colony:—Agreed, but who is to do that something?—why such men, as the very honourable gentleman on his legs,—let me ask him, who is to enable the miserable wretches on his estate to clothe, feed and lodge better, but he himself? would he wish to thrust his hand into the public purse to improve the condition of his tenants? agreed,—let him do so, provided that he will replenish that purse when it is empty,—does he not put the whole rental of his estate into his pocket, undiminished by repairs, property-tax, allowances for improvements, or audit dinners, while an English landlord hardly receives three-fourths of his rent clear, and pays for every consumable article an enormous price?—In a word, there are no landed proprietors in Europe who owe so much to their country, as the gentlemen of Ireland; there is no country for which God has done so much, and man so little.—Let me exhort those gentlemen, before it be too late, to give up, (at least for seven years) the charms of Harrowgate, Margate, and all the gates and mouths, too, with precious Bath and voluptuous London, and reside in their own country,—let them lower the rents of their little tenants, and encourage, not *excise*, their industry. Let them contribute to render the habitations of the peasantry decent and comfortable. Let them give bounties for order and cleanliness, and by frequent inspection see that the intention of such bounty be carried into effect; a mere *fiat*, will never do in a country where the people in many parts have never in fact, been completely civilized—the residence of the many would give peace and security to the whole.—Between cowardice and dissipation Ireland has been nearly deserted, so that the few gentlemen who have had virtue and fortitude to stand their ground in the country parts actually maintained posts of danger.—In point, I knew a gentleman, who, for two years, never went to bed until break of day, he and his family, even including his wife, were on duty every night,—had other gentlemen acted with similar courage, vigilance, and perseverance as he did, the late rebellion never could have been so horribly powerful and tremendous as it was,—nay, it might have been prevented entirely—I know that it had been long the practice in Ireland, when the oppressed broke out into acts of outrage against their oppressors, for

senatorial adventurers, forensian demagogues, and inflammatory pamphleteers, to direct the storm against the state. Government, which had never provoked the insurrection, was bound, however, to put it down by military force; hence, being considered by the insurgents as allies to the landed tyrants, who were the original aggressors, both became the common object of democratical attack.—The fact is, Government and the Irish peasantry are far distant from each other. I know of no point in which they are in direct contact, except in the tax on hearths, and even that small duty escapes the chimney of the solitary cottager, or the cottager with one hearth.—Whether the duty on whisky or tobacco be any real grievance, I must submit to economists and moralists,—under a free constitution it is not easy to conceive how an agricultural peasantry can be oppressed by its government, I mean, where a just usage and a humane order of things, prevail; for, most assuredly, the quantum of rent should be regulated by the quantum of taxation to which the renter is subject, this is so obvious a truth, that it requires no illustration.—It is high time that the saddle were placed on the right horse,—to this very hour there are many, even thinking people in England, who are persuaded that all those disorders that have afflicted and disgraced Ireland, have been occasioned by political misrule and persecution from government, whereas white boys, oak boys, and all the boys sprang from causes in which government had no more to do than the Emperor of China.—Since the house of Hanover ascended the British throne, the people of Ireland have felt no impulse from their political rulers, by which their comforts or happiness were diminished or disturbed.—In England, all oppressions flow from Government, in Ireland they are inflicted by the rapacious hand of the landed interest.—Your most obedient servant,
26th Feb. 1808. J. W.

BANK OF ENGLAND.

SIR,—Having lately conversed with several gentlemen on the subject of the late demand made by government on the Bank of England, for the loan of three millions, to be repaid by exchequer bills (not bearing interest) six months after the signing a definitive treaty of peace, and amongst the number were members of the imperial parliament, I found them warmly to espouse the conduct of government on the occasion; and as the arguments generally made use of by them led to the same point, I conclude, that those who have defended the princi-

ples on which the demand has been made, have drawn their conclusions from the same source.—The argument is this, that a person keeping money with his banker has a right to use his balances in any way he pleases, and therefore the bank of England, standing in the situation of banker to government, that government have an undoubted right to make use of their own balances. On this subject, sir, I most perfectly coincide. But is this a fair statement? I contend it is not; for if the premises are good, that government have a right to make use of their own balances, which I allow, then what occasion was there for any communication to take place between the chancellor of the exchequer and the governor and directors of the bank of England, as to the loan of three millions without interest. I certainly should not communicate with my banker on the subject of the disposition of my balances in his hands, and of course there was no necessity for government making any communication to the bank of England as their banker. I consider therefore, sir, that the question resolves itself into a very narrow compass.—Government have either been unnecessarily demanding their right, or they have demanded what ought not to have been in the power of the governor and directors of the bank of England to grant.—For if the three millions are not intended to be drawn from the balances of government in the bank, they must consequently be taken from the surplus or savings of the company; and I cordially agree with the author of a late publication, addressed to the proprietors of bank stock, that such an accumulation ought never to have taken place; for whenever the savings or profits had warranted a division, it ought by every principle of honour and justice to have been made.—And, sir, I am bold to assert, that men who have supported the minister on this occasion, have condemned the conduct of the governor and directors in placing the company in such a situation as to have induced government to make the demand, from a knowledge which they presumed they possessed of the sums that had (so unjustly) been suffered to accumulate, to the manifest injury of each individual proprietor.—I trust, sir, that at the first general court held at the bank, the question as to whether the three millions are only to be drawn from the balances of government, or whether they are to be considered as a loan arising from the savings of the company, will be brought forward, in order that the transaction may be placed in its true light, and prevent future misrepresen-

tations; and, should it appear that the three millions are to be taken from the balances of government, I do not consider that any injury will be sustained by the company, but that the flourishing state of their finances will enable them to continue with the addition of a bonus, their usual division of twelve pounds per cent. per annum. But, should it appear that the three millions are to be taken from the savings of the company, it will be necessary to submit a motion on the subject to the court of proprietors, strongly urging them to adopt such a line of conduct as will prove the means of procuring for themselves a fair distribution of that property they have so unjustly been kept out of.—I remain, sir, your obedient humble servant,—JUSTICE.—Feb. 28, 1808.

SINKING FUND.

SIR;—Your correspondent, C. S., could not discover any sense in my "plausible" doubts, which you placed in your register of 14th November,—but to enlighten my ignorance, he charges me with sinister designs, because "I have dragged out *his* conclusions before your readers, and left behind the "certain those of Mr. Pitt and Lord H. Petty,"—as if such fine names, might not be innocently omitted for sake of brevity. He reduced their practical calculations to brief,—he adopted their conclusions, not without contempt for the authors, and now he flies to their deified names for shelter from the rule of three. His quotation 9 times, of Lord H. Petty's quotation of Mr. Pitt, was needless,—for every one had by rote, how that angel of a man *confessed* ('twas a timely and well acted confession) that a nation out of debt, is in the high road to ruin. C. S. goes on to dispel my doubts, thus (p. 910): "unquestionably they are ignorant of "the effects of competition and capital, "who can doubt the extent of the mischiefs "that must result from the *competition* of "600 millions, with a capital of 100 millions."—Now, Sir, I appeal to you, that I did not doubt such effects, if the *causes* were possible. What I doubted was, that if the 600 millions be paid *by taxes*, the circulating capital can be increased thereby, and of course I doubted that the competition so much dreaded, can have existence. C. S. goes on (p. 911) "now that the extensive "calamities of a *sudden* extinction of the "debt is *admitted* on all hands"! How? a certain consequence of an impossible cause?—no, but if it be paid by means of the Sinking Fund, which must take up before it pays down, (as we giddy-pated Irish think) any competition between the 100 and the

600 millions, is impossible. The trustees to the Sinking Fund have already taken up, say (for convenience of round numbers) 100 millions of the 600 of debt,—and I ask, if the money which they paid away for the said 100 millions, did encrease the circulating capital of 100 to 200 millions;—if it did, or did not, C. S.'s premises or conclusions are false, *q. e. d.*—Hear him again, “a nominal encrease has the same effect on real money, as a real encrease could have, and all he contends for is, that it must nominally encrease to the amount of the debt, and therefore that the real depreciation must be in the proportion which the debt bears to the circulation.” This is mere kettle-drumming, unless it means payment of the debt *without taxes*, or that the debentures in circulation are no part of the circulating capital, nominal or real, which would be to say, that they are nothing at all. It has no relation to the doubts which I have put in one sentence, “that payment of the national debt by means of taxes, taken out of the circulating capital, can encrease it.” His third sub-division of my doubts, says, that my “notion” is old,—in his first part, he says, “if it be not just, it is new.”—but be it old or new I entreat you Mr. Cobbett, to inform a society of Irishmen, who almost adore your love of your own country, whether the Sinking Fund can take a debenture out of the market until its value be first taken out of circulation, and whether 100 millions already discharged, were gathered out of a pocket where that sum was not, a miracle which our Irish faith cannot admit unless *you* make it clear.—As for C. S.'s notable advice, “to take peace any how,—to surrender the national dominion,—to go back where our forefathers left us,—to teach our population the use of arms, and our soldiers, agriculture, &c.” (p. 947). I shall only say, that it is a pity he omitted the whole plan of the law-giver called Gonzalo, in Shakespeare's *Tempest*,—“I would by contraries execute all things,—no *traffic* would I admit,—*letters* should not be known,—poverty, riches, none. No occupation,—all men idle, and women too, but innocent and pure,—treason would I not have, and nature should bring forth all abundance to feed my innocent people, &c. &c.”—C. S. concludes, “shew us that no real or nominal encrease will take place if the national debt be paid by means of taxes, and then we shall confess our error, but till then we maintain, &c. &c.”—Sir, this is cruel, that a professor,—a writer of eight long essays, occupying 90 columns of

your excellent work, should thus throw the burden of proof on his ignorant audience,—but I have only suggested doubts, and I leave them to the digestion of C. S.'s pupils.—OSGUR.—20th February, 1808.

COURT OF ADMIRALTY.

SIR,—Having perused in your Register of the 14th ult. a letter signed R., wherein your correspondent complains of abuses existing in the administration of the prize-laws, and committed (as he says) under the authority of the court of admiralty; I am induced, partly by reflections arising out of the facts stated in that letter and partly by some observations suggested by the late orders of council, to submit for your consideration a few brief remarks, not on any individual abuses in practice committed by, or under the authority of this judicial court, but on some radical defects (as such they appear to me) in its theory and constitution.—I have, indeed, Sir, long thought, and the public have thought with me, that there is much, very much, which calls for enquiry and reform in a court deciding, as this does, according to the laws of nations, on the rights and interests of the subjects, not only of this, but of foreign kingdoms also; and which ought, therefore, in its tone and temperament, its character, and its habits, to be regulated by the most scrupulous delicacy of judicial accuracy.—The first and most objectionable trait I am led to notice in the complexion and character of this court is the following:—The right Honourable Judge, who presides therein, and decides upon the cases brought for trial and for adjudication, in pursuance of orders issued by the privy council, is himself a member of that deliberative and executive body, wherein the justice and expediency of those orders is decided upon, and by whose authority they are consequently issued.—But, Sir, having thus discharged his duty as a privy counsellor, this same individual acting in his judicial capacity has to carry into execution those orders he has himself assisted in framing, and the discharge of which latter duty proves lucrative to himself in proportion to the extent of these previous orders.—For instance, should it be debated in the privy council, of which this judge is, as I have stated, a member, whether an order for detaining and subjecting to trial the ships of neutral nations should be made to extend to Swedes and Prussians or to Prussians only, the profits afterwards accruing to him in his capacity of judge are in their amount materially affected by the determination of such

question whereto he is himself assisting by his opinion and advice.—Surely, Sir, if such a combination of legislative and judicial functions can be in any wise constitutionally centered in the same individual; the execution of the latter should be compensated by a fixed and limited salary (I care not how large—the talents, the exertions and the integrity of the present judge of the admiralty deserve every honor and claim high remuneration), nor should that officer be permitted to enrich himself by judgments passed on vessels detained by his own order, and which must, as I have said, prove lucrative in proportion to the scope and extent of that order.—You, Sir, who so ably exposed the unconstitutional inconsistency of a chief justice of the king's bench being a member of the cabinet, will, I am sure, admit the equal incongruity manifest in a judge of the admiralty (paid as he at present is) having a seat in the privy council. If the former be a source of power unreconcilable with the freedom, the latter is a source of profit no less incompatible with the purity of the constitution. British justice, Mr. Cobbett, in the spotlessness of its chastity, should, like the wife of Cæsar, be inaccessible even to the suspicion of a reproach. Should you deem the present worthy of insertion in your Register, I shall trouble you with some further remarks on this court of judicature.—I am, Sir, &c.

30th November, 1807.

Z.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND.—On the 9th of Feb. 1808, the Capture of the Danish West India Islands was announced in the London Gazette.—The following are the Articles of Capitulation.

(Concluded from p. 416.)

Sir Alexander Cochrane, Knight of the Bath, and Commander in Chief of the Naval Forces employed at Barbadoes and the Leeward Islands, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, and Colonel Van Scholten, Commandant of the said Danish Islands, on the part of his Majesty the King of Denmark.

Art. I. The islands of St. Thomas and St. John's, and their dependencies, are hereby placed under the protection of his Britannic Majesty.—Answer. War being declared between the two nations, the islands of St. Thomas and St. John's, and their dependencies, must be surrendered to the forces of his Britannic Majesty.—Art. II. Military honours are to be shewn at the surrender: the officers keep and continue to carry their swords.—Answer. Agreed to.—Art. III. All the

inhabitants of the said islands are to enjoy the fullest security for their persons, property, and other rights, as well as a free exercise of their religion.—Answer. All bona fide Danish inhabitants shall enjoy the fullest security for their persons and properties, as well as a free exercise of their religion, provided they do not in any measure cover, or attempt to cover, the property of the enemies of Great Britain and Ireland. By property is to be understood, all goods and merchandise, now on shore. And to render any further explanation on this head unnecessary, it is required, that all Danish inhabitants, and those of other nations, not at war with Great Britain, shall give in, when called upon, and if demanded, on oath, a strict and impartial account of all property belonging to the enemies of Great Britain, either in their own possession, or within their knowledge, thereby fully securing the intention of this article.—Art. IV. Arms and ammunition to be delivered by a commission composed of officers of both parties; also the magazines and provisions, and what else may be found in the forts, as it shall be found to day according to returns to be drawn up.—Answer. Agreed to.—Art. V. All Danish officers, and the garrison, to be conveniently and safely conducted to their native country; and those that might desire to proceed via America or elsewhere, to be provided with proper passports, or to remain in this country if they wish.—Answer. The garrison must be considered as prisoners of war, and conveyed to Europe as speedily as possible, and every indulgence shewn them.—Art. VI. No military to be quartered in houses, but in barracks and proper rooms to be assigned by the burgher council, and a commission appointed to that end.—Answer. Agreed to; but the buildings must be such as the quarter master general approves of.—Art. VII. The Danish laws and ordinances to remain in force. All courts and judicial offices to be occupied by the present officers. Delinquents under confinement not to be released until their sentence is passed and enforced.—Answer. The Danish laws and ordinances shall remain in force, subject to the pleasure of his Britannic Majesty. The judicial offices to continue occupied by the present persons; but they, as well as all civil officers, must be subject to the approbation of the commanders in chief. The latter part of this article is agreed to on the same condition. An English custom house will be established on the same basis as in the British colonies.—Art. VIII. The king's and public treasuries, all public book keepings, and accounts, archives and protocols remain unmolessed, under the hands of the

respective officers, for mutual security and use.—Answer. All public property, and all property belonging to the King of Denmark, or to his government, must be given up (to his Britannic Majesty), and all public papers and records must be submitted to the inspection of the British. The records and papers will be allowed to remain in the proper offices.—Art. IX. His Majesty the King of Denmark, having advanced loans to the planters, the said planters continue to pay off according to the method regulated, unto his said Majesty the King of Denmark, who retains the right of mortgage on the estates.—Answer. Answered in the last article; but any sum now due, shall be paid without delay, to such persons as shall be appointed by the commanders in chief (subject to the pleasure of his Britannic Majesty).—Art. X. No inhabitant shall be compelled to carry arms, or perform duty, when he has made his oath of neutrality.—Answer. Agreed to; but they will be required to take an oath of allegiance to the British government, expressing that they will not, either openly or secretly, do any thing hostile to the British government.—Art. XI. The Americans shall be permitted, without constraint, to export the produce of the islands, and to provide them with necessities. The inhabitants are allowed to ship their produce to America.—Answer. These colonies must trade under the same laws as govern the British West India islands.—Art. XII. The free coloured people of this island shall be regarded and protected as heretofore under the Danish government, and they shall not be forced to do any military duty.—Answer. The Danish free coloured people will be protected as heretofore, and will not be forced to do any military duty; but they must take an oath of allegiance, conformably to the tenth article.—Art. XIII. In the general claims of Danish and neutral property to be respected, as belonging to its lawful owners, is also comprehended the vessels and all property afloat in the harbours, or what might arrive during the time the Danish colonies may remain in the possession of his Britannic Majesty.—Answer. Answered by the reply to the third article.—Art. XIV. Slaves to remain the undiputed property of their present lawful owners.—Answer. Slaves being property, this has already been settled by the answer to the third article.—Art. XV. The police of this island continues to perform its official functions with the same authority as under the Danish government, and according to the laws, and usages of the country.—Answer. This has already been answered by the reply to the seventh article.

—Art. XVI. The paper money issued by his Danish Majesty is to remain in circulation as heretofore.—Answer. Granted, subject to the pleasure of his Britannic Majesty.—All the forts, military posts, and vessels of war, must be given up as soon as the capitulation is ratified by the commanders in chief.—*Dated, St. Thomas, Dec. 21, 1807.*

Articles of capitulation for the surrender of the Danish Island of Santa Croix, and its dependencies, entered into between General Henry Bowyer, commander of the land forces, and Rear Admiral the Honourable Sir Alexander Cochrane, Knight of the Bath, and commander in chief of the naval forces employed at Barbadoes and the Leeward Islands, on the part of his Britannic Majesty, and Governor Lillienfeld, of the said Danish Island and dependencies, on the part of his Majesty the King of Denmark.

Art. I. By delivering up the island, all military honours are to be given. The garrison to march out with their arms, ammunition, drums beating, and flying banners. The troops shall on no account whatsoever, be considered as prisoners of war. The infantry and cavalry to remain in undisturbed possession of their arms. The corps of artillery to keep in possession two field pieces and an ammunition waggon.—Answer. The garrison shall march out with all the honours of war, as expressed, and the officers shall keep their swords; but all must be prisoners of war, and all arms, except officers' swords, shall be faithfully delivered up.—Art. II. The entire military force shall have liberty to remain in their quarters in the island, and receive their usual pay and victuals, until the same, through suitable means, and upon British expence, can be transported to some convenient place in Denmark, in possession of his Danish Majesty. None of the forces to be permitted to enter into the British service; and all to keep possession of their luggage and equipage. Should any of the officers wish to go to America, or any other neutral country, on their way home, they are to be provided with passports to that effect, and they will be permitted to stay two months in the island, from the time this capitulation is signed.—Answer. The garrison will be conveyed to England as soon as ships can conveniently be provided, and every indulgence will be shewn them. Their pay cannot be paid by the British, but they will receive the usual rations and allowances issued to prisoners of war. The officers and men will have their private property preserved to them. Passports shall be given to such officers as may require them, to go to America. Those officers who wish to re-

main two or three months, shall be allowed, and the men shall be quartered as long as they remain on the island. No other answer can be given to this article, except that the officers may rely upon every respect and civility being shewn to them.—Art. III. Those military officers, who wish to remain in the island, are permitted to do so.—

Answer. Agreed to.—Art. IV. All the arms and ammunition to be delivered up by a commission of officers of both parties; also the royal stores and provisions, and what else of his majesty's property shall be found in the forts; also the money in the king's treasuries, all according to the specification which is to be made as soon as the country is surrendered.—Answer. Agreed to; but a *bonâ fide* account supported by proofs shall be given.—Art. V. All churches and religious congregations shall be supported in their respective rights and privileges.—

Answer. Agreed to.—Art. VI. The Danish laws and special ordinances of this country, shall remain in full and uncontrolled vigour and execution as hitherto; and justice to be administered by the persons now in office. The appeal from the upper court, to go as usual to the high court of justice at Copenhagen. All the civil officers are to remain in the administration of their respective offices. The police of this island is to be administered as hitherto, with the same authority as under the Danish government, according to the received usages of the island, and by the same persons.—Answer. The Danish laws and ordinances shall remain in full force until the peace. The same officers, judicial and civil, shall remain in their several places, but subject to the pleasure of the commander in chief.—The appeal from the upper courts, must go to his Britannic Majesty in council. The police will remain undisturbed, and exercised by the same persons.

Art VII. All private property belonging to persons present or absent, to individuals, or bodies corporate, of every denomination, is to be respected, and the proprietors to remain in full and uncontrolled possession and administration of the same, by themselves, or by their attorneys.—The inhabitants of this island are to have it in their power either to dispose of their produce here, or to ship it to England, America, or elsewhere.—Answer. All Danish property on shore (except such produce as may have been relanded from on board ship since the blockade of the island; and such coffee the produce of St. Dominica now stored here) shall be fully secured to the proprietors, provided they do not in any manner cover, or attempt to cover, the property of

the enemies of Great Britain and Ireland.—

The latter part of this article will be referred to in the answer to article XIII.—Art. VIII.

No inhabitant shall be compelled on any pretence whatever to bear arms against his Danish Majesty, or any other power, or perform any military duty. The inhabitants are to keep their arms and ammunition; those who wish to remain on the island, shall swear to observe a strict neutrality, and those who may wish to quit it, shall be allowed to dispose of their property, or to appoint attorneys for the administration of the same.—Answer. The inhabitants shall not be compelled to bear arms against his Danish Majesty, but they must take an oath of allegiance, binding themselves to do nothing hostile against the British government, openly, or secretly.—They shall keep their arms, but subject to the control of his Britannic Majesty's governor.—They may remain in the island, or quit it, as they please; they may also dispose of their properties, and appoint attorneys for the administration of the same.—Art. IX. The free people of colour shall continue to enjoy their freedom and property, and in every respect to be treated as the other inhabitants.—Answer. Agreed to; they taking the oath of allegiance to the British government.—Art. X. No officer or soldier shall be billeted on the inhabitants, every assistance shall be given to procure proper quarters.—Answer. Agreed to; but proper quarters shall be assigned to the British garrison, which shall be approved of by the quarter master general of the army.—

Art. XI. The loans belonging to his Danish Majesty, are to be considered, as they really are, private property.—Answer. All property whatever, which in any way belongs to the King of Denmark must be surrendered to his Britannic Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland; and all sums now due on loans, as well as what may become so, must be regularly paid to commissioners appointed to receive the same; but the principles of equity which have governed his Danish Majesty's instructions on the subject, will be observed.—Art. XII. All public books, archives, and registers of government, or the burgher council, and all other public offices, shall be held sacred, and unmolested in the respective offices, under the care of the present officers.—Answer.

Agreed to; subject to the inspection of the British government.—Art. XIII. The ports of the colony shall be open to all American and all other neutral vessels, which shall be permitted to import provisions and supplies, and to export sugar and rum, and other colonial produce, free of duties.—The inhabi-

tants shall enjoy the same liberty of importation and exportation in their own vessels, and with regard to the payment of customs and duties on importation, be placed on a footing with the most favoured British colonies.—Answer. The colony must trade subject to the British laws, as in force in the British West India islands, and shall have whatever advantages are allowed to the most favoured British colony.—Art. XIV. His Danish Majesty has, for the use of this and the other Danish islands, issued a certain paper currency, whereof a considerable sum is now in the possession of the community. As such paper money has hitherto passed, to the great convenience of the inhabitants, it is to pass hereafter as current money, as well as pieces, dollars, rials, stivers; and no alteration to be made in their respective values.—Answer. Agreed to; subject to the pleasure of his Britannic Majesty.—Art. XV. Certain persons, Danes, having engaged in a dangerous conspiracy, for the purpose of subverting, even by means of assassination, the existing order of things, the enquiry already instituted is to proceed against the persons arrested, and such others as may hereafter be detected to have been implicated, in the same manner as if the colony had remained under the Danish flag; and when the enquiry is at an end, those persons are to be sent to Denmark to take their trials.—Answer. Agreed to; but from this time all further proceedings must be subject to the final orders of the King of Great Britain and Ireland.—Art. XVI. The commanders in chief are to dispatch immediately two swift sailing vessels to Denmark with copies of this capitulation.—Answer. The commanders in chief will forward immediately by an English ship of war any dispatches that the governor may have via London.—The forts and batteries shall be delivered up as soon as these articles are ratified by the commanders in chief.—*Dated, Frederickstaad, Santa Croix, Dec. 25, 1807.*

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PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation of General Junot, 1st February, Lisbon, 1808.*

Inhabitants of the kingdom of Portugal.—Your interests have engaged the attention of his Majesty the Emperor and King, our master, all irresolution ought to disappear; the destinies of Portugal are brightening, and her future happiness is secured, because Napoleon the great has taken her under his omnipotent protection.—The prince of Brazil, by leaving Portugal, renounced all his rights and sovereignty over this kingdom. The house of Braganza has ceased to reign in Portugal; the

Emperor Napoleon wills, that this fine country shall be governed entirely in his name, by the general in chief of his Army.—The task which this mark of the benevolence and confidence of my master imposes on me, is of difficult execution, but I hope to perform it in a proper manner, supported as I am by the labour of the most intelligent men of this kingdom, and the kind disposition of its inhabitants.—I have formed a council of government to enlighten me with regard to the good which I must do; and perennial Administrations shall be appointed, in order to point out to me the means of improving the administration, and establishing order and economy in the management of the public wealth. I shall order roads to be made and canals formed, to facilitate communication, and to cause agriculture and national industry to flourish, two branches indispensably required for the prosperity of a country, which it will be easy to restore to a people, enlightened, persevering, and intrepid.—The Portuguese troops, commanded by the most deserving of their chiefs, will soon form but one family with the soldiers of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland; and no rivalry will exist between them, but that of valour and discipline.—The public revenue, well managed, will secure to every person employed in its administration, the reward of his labours; and public instruction, that only source of the civilisation of nations, shall be diffused through the different provinces, and Algrave and upper Beira will also produce their Camoens. The religion of your forefathers, the same which we all profess, shall be protected by the same hand which restored it to the vast French empire, free from the superstition, which disgraced it; justice will be equally administered, freed from all delays and arbitrary proceedings which degrade it.—Public tranquillity shall no more be disturbed by daring high-way robbers, the offspring of idleness; and should any incorrigible miscreants be found, an active police shall rid the country of them. No hideous beggars shall henceforth offend the eyes of the industrious inhabitants of this superb capital, nor of the interior of the country; workhouses shall be erected for that purpose, where the maimed poor shall find an asylum, and the idle be employed in labour necessary for his own maintenance and preservation.—Inhabitants of the kingdom of Portugal, be peaceful and without fear; repel the instigations of those who wish to lead you to rebellion, and who do

not care how much blood is shed provided it be the blood of the continent; confide implicitly in our exertions for your welfare; you will reap all its fruits. Should it be necessary, in the first moment, to make some sacrifices, they will be solely required to place the government in a proper condition to meliorate your fate. They are indispensably necessary for the sustenance of a large army, required for the execution of the vast projects of the Great Napoleon. His watchful eyes are fixed on you, and your future happiness is certain. He will love you as much as his French subjects: endeavour to deserve his favours by a respectful conduct and submission to his will.

PORTUGAL.—*Decree of General Junot, 1st February, 1803.*

1. The kingdom of Portugal shall henceforth be entirely governed in the name of his Majesty the Emperor and King, by the general in chief of the French army in Portugal.—2. The council of regency appointed by his Royal Highness the Prince of Brazil, became suppressed from the very moment that the said Prince left the kingdom of Portugal.—3. There shall be a council of government under the presidency of the general in chief, composed of a secretary of state, charged with the administration of the interior and of the finances, with two counsellors of government, one of which shall be charged with the department of the interior, and the other with that of the finances; further, of a secretary of state charged with the war and marine department, assisted by one counsellor of government charged with the war and marine department; and of one chancellor of government, charged with the department of justice and religious worship, with the title of *Regedor*. There shall be a secretary general charged with the archives.—4. All the *Corregedores* in the neighbouring districts, all ordinary judges and justices, civil and criminal; in one word, all the public officers shall be confirmed in their places, with the exception of such dismissals as the interest of the state shall render necessary, and of the changes which may be found required in the various appointments they hold, and the nature of their functions.—5. M. Herman is appointed secretary of state, and charged with the department of the interior and the finances; Don Pedro de Mello is nominated chancellor of government; M. d' Auvere is charged with the department of the finances; M. Lhurte is appointed secretary of state for the war and marine

department; court De S. Pais is nominated counsellor of government for the department of war and that of the marine; M. Principal Castro is appointed chancellor of government for the department of justice and religious worship, with the title of *Regedor*; M. Vinez Voulanc is appointed secretary general.—6. In every province there shall be an Administrator general, with the title of *Corregedor-Mor*, charged with the direction of all the branches of administration; he shall keep a watchful eye over the interests of the province, point out to government such improvements as it shall be necessary to make, as well with regard to agriculture as to industry in general. He is to correspond on the above subject with the secretary of state, to whose department they respectively belong, and with regard to such matters as concern justice or religious worship, with the *Regedor*.—There shall also be in each province a general officer, charged with the preservation of public tranquility and order. His other functions shall be merely military, but on public festivals and solemn occasions he shall be placed on the right of the *Corregedor-Mor*.—There shall be a *Corregedor-Mor* in the province of Estremadura, who shall reside in Coimbra, and a *Corregedor-Mor* in Lisbon, and the districts belonging thereto, which shall be defined and bounded in an exact manner.

PORTUGAL.—*Decree of General Junot, dated Lisbon, 1st February 1803.*

In pursuance of his imperial Majesty's decree, bearing date the 23d December, 1807, in the name of his said Majesty, we, the governor of Paris, first aid-de-camp of his imperial Majesty, general-in-chief of the French army in Portugal, have decreed and do decree as follow:—Art. I. An extraordinary war-contribution of forty millions of crusades, shall be levied on the kingdom of Portugal. The contribution of twelve millions of crusades, imposed and already discharged since the arrival of the French shall be set off from the present contribution, and be accounted for by our receiver general.—II. Towards the said extraordinary contribution, the merchants, bankers, and holders, of rents and contracts in the kingdom of Portugal, shall pay six millions of crusades, through the intervention of the board of trade, which is proportionally to divide the said sum on all the individuals, according to the fortune which they are known or supposed to possess; and this contribution shall be discharged in the following manner:—The first third shall be

paid the 10th of the month of March next ensuing; the second third shall be paid the 1st of May; and the third shall be paid the 1st of August.—III. All English manufactures being liable to confiscation on the sole ground of their origin, shall be ransomed by the merchants who possess the same, and who are at liberty to dispose thereof as they please, by paying one third part of their value, according to their invoices. The said payment shall be made in three instalments, and at the periods fixed in the preceding articles.—IV. All gold and plate of all the churches, chapels, fraternities of the City of Lisbon, and the district belonging thereto, shall be carried to the mint, received by the treasurer thereof, under the inspection and direction of the director of the mint, within the term of 15 days. In the churches no silver vessels shall remain, but such as are required for the decent observance of religious worship, and of those vessels a list shall be delivered, signed by the person or persons who are charged with the custody and management thereof. The person who carries the same to the mint, shall receive from the treasury a receipt, in an authentic form, for the articles delivered. All persons convicted of fraud, either with regard to the declaration of the articles existing in such churches, or left there, or with respect to any like articles embezzled for their own use, shall be sentenced to pay four times the value of the article not declared or embezzled.—V. All the articles above mentioned, belonging to churches, chapels and fraternities in the provinces, shall be delivered at the houses of the receivers of tythes, within the term of fifteen days, on the same condition and penalties mentioned in the fourth article. The several receivers shall give authentic receipts for the same, and send the articles received to the mint in Lisbon, the treasurer of which is to give them a proper receipt for the same. The above receivers shall have an escort, if required.—VI. The total amount of the value of the said articles shall be deducted from the present contribution.—VII. All archbishops and bishops of the realm, all prelates and superiors of religious orders of both sexes, the regular and secular congregations which possess landed property, or capitals placed out on interest, shall contribute two-thirds of their annual produce, in case that the latter does not exceed sixteen thousand crusades: should it exceed sixteen thousand crusades, they shall contribute three fourths of the said produce; they shall, however, all be exempted from the payment of tithes in

the present year.—VIII. In fifteen days after the publication of the present decree, all prelates shall be bound to deliver to the Secretary of State of the interior and of the finances, a correct return of their yearly income, which he shall cause to be examined and verified. And every person whose return shall be found incorrect, shall be sentenced to pay double the amount of his contribution. The said fine shall be recovered out of the property of the offender by the readiest means of execution.—IX. The first third part of this contribution shall be delivered at the office of the Receiver General of the contributions and public revenue of Portugal, within the term of one month next ensuing the publication of the present decree, by the prelates above mentioned residing in Lisbon; and within the term of six weeks, by those who reside in the provinces.—X. The second third part shall be delivered at the said office within six months next ensuing the delivery of the first third, by such prelates as reside in Lisbon, and in one month after the first delivery, by those who reside in the provinces.—XI. The last one third part shall be delivered at the said office, one month after the delivery of the second, by such prelates as reside in Lisbon, and three months after the second delivery, by such prelates as reside in the provinces.—XII. All persons who possess church livings of 600 to 900 milreis per ann, shall contribute two-third parts of their annual income, and should such livings exceed 900 milreis per annum, they shall contribute three fourths of the annual produce; the payment thereof shall be made into the chest of the ordinary receiver of tithes of the district, under the inspection of the respective superintendants of tithes, who are to examine the said returns, and the same penalties shall be inflicted on the offenders.—XIII. The respective receivers of tithes shall, under the inspection and direction of the superintendants, deliver within the shortest time possible, the amount of the sum by them received into the chest of the Receiver-General of the public revenue and contributions of Portugal.—XIV. All the knights commanders of the three military orders, and of the order of Malta, shall contribute two-thirds of the produce of their commanderies, in the instalments and under the penalties above-mentioned, with regard to the prelates.—XV. All the holders of the grants of the crown shall pay double the amount of the annual contribution which has hitherto been imposed on them. The payment and delivery thereof shall be made in the manner aforesaid.—XVI.

All the proprietors of houses situated in Lisbon and in the district belonging thereto, shall contribute one moiety of the annual rent for which they have let, in case of their being let; and should the proprietors inhabit the said houses themselves, one moiety of the rent, to be determined by valuation. Payment and delivery thereof shall be made in the manner above-mentioned, and under the same penalties. All proprietors of houses situated in other towns and boroughs of the kingdom are liable to the same contribution, payable in the same form, and under the same penalties.—XVII. All proprietors of land, shall pay this year, double the amount of the tithes imposed on them.—XVIII. For all horses, mules, and servants, double the tax shall this year be paid which was laid on them by former regulations, and the amount of the said tax so doubled shall be paid at once.—XIX. All public buildings and establishments, which contribute towards the expenditure of the police, shall this year pay under the said contribution a sum equal to the amount thereof.—XX. The Sheriff shall, under the direction of the Senate, make a proportional reduction of the contribution, on all the companies of mechanics and tradesmen, whether they keep open shops in public places or elsewhere, levying the sum assessed by prompt execution, applying them to the purpose intended, and giving proper receipts to those who have paid their quota of the contribution. The Senate will cause the total amount thereof to be delivered into the chest of the Receiver General of the contributions and the public revenue of Portugal, every eight days until it shall be entirely discharged.—XXI. The Senate of the city of Oporto will cause the amount of the contribution to be levied in the same manner in the city of Oporto and in the district belonging thereto. And the said senate is further charged to compel all magistrates of all other places in the north to do the same, the northern provinces being in this case only subjected to the said senate.—XXII. The board of public welfare is to make, under the inspection of the Royal Exchequer, a similar requisition on such ships as shall be found without the jurisdiction of the senate, observing in point of payment and delivery the forms and penalties above-mentioned.—XXIII. The General in chief being desirous to indemnify the unfortunate inhabitants of Beira for what they have suffered from the march of the army through that province, orders, that the boroughs and villages situated between the Tejo and the road of Satria-

terra, &c. shall be exempted from the payment of the two first thirds of the present contribution, and from the provisions contained in the 21st article. The boroughs and villages situated on the road to Lisbon, shall enjoy the same exemption. Lands belonging to knights commanders, to holders of grants of the crown, and to other persons, pointed out in the 7th article, shall not be included in the disposition of the present article.—XXIV. The Secretary of State of the interior and of the Finances, is charged with the execution of the present Decree, which shall be printed and posted throughout the whole kingdom.

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AUSTRIA.—Declaration of the Emperor of Austria against England: dated Vienna, February 18th, 1808.

During the war which was concluded by the peace of Tilsit, his imperial royal and apostolic majesty has continually endeavoured to impress the belligerent powers with the motives which ought to induce them to concur in endeavouring to insure a general peace. The court of Vienna from that time declared its sentiments to the Cabinet of St. James's, and the imperial envoy at London, Prince Staremberg, received formal and pressing instructions. But as the British ministry, in an answer to these written communications declared that its answer must depend on its allies, the salutary propositions of Austria could not but be considered as disregarded, and soon after the treaty of Tilsit was concluded, by which the interests of the continent were regulated, without the participation of Great Britain. His imperial royal and apostolic majesty continued, nevertheless, convinced of the utility, and even of the necessity, of a general pacification; and this conviction afforded him new motives for renewing his pressing representations to the court of London.—in July, soon after the signing of the peace, the Prince of Staremberg again received orders to induce the British ministry to enter into a negotiation with France, in order that the continental peace might be connected with and confirmed by, a maritime peace; but these propositions were not more successful than the former had been, and the answer of England was evasive.—His majesty, however, thought it right to return to a subject of the most material influence on the general system of Europe, as well as the prosperity of the Austrian provinces in particular. Prince

Stahremberg was, therefore, for the third time, directed, in September, 1807, to make some farther overtures, connected with the former measures of the court of Vienna. But before his Majesty's ambassador reported the result of his communication, the Court of London declared its sentiments, with regard to a maritime peace, in so positive a manner, refusing, at the same time, the mediation of Russia, making an attack on Copenhagen, and seizing the Danish fleet, without assigning any satisfactory cause of these violent measures, nay endeavouring to justify those proceedings, their infringements of the unquestionable rights of neutral powers, by official declarations, which so evidently clashed with the principles adopted by other great powers, that it was impossible not to perceive in the course pursued by the British minister, a disposition to remove the possibility of peace to a greater distance, and not to listen to whatever had any tendency to restore the tranquillity of Europe.—The impression which this conduct, destructive of all the hopes which his Majesty had fondly conceived, made on him, was as deep as it was painful. Without waiting for the farther reports of Prince Stahremberg, orders still more urgent and more positive were sent him, than he had before received. These instructions, bearing date the 30th October, contained, 1st, a recapitulation of all former transactions, and directed him to represent to the Cabinet of St. James's, in the strongest colours, the unavoidable consequences of its conduct, and to insist, in the most earnest manner, on an open declaration of its real sentiments, with regard to peace, and to avail himself of all possible means to lead it both to sentiments of moderation, fitted for the present situation, and meeting the wishes of Europe.—The dispatches closed with the precise orders—"to apply once more on this subject in an official manner to his Britannic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to make to him the formal proposal to enter into negotiations for a maritime peace, on such principles as answered the interests of all the powers concerned, and as a provisional proof of his pacific disposition, to desist from the measures pursued against Denmark, and retract the declaration which accompanied them. Should the Court of St. James's reject these proposals, or purposely protract giving any answer, Prince Stahremberg was directed to demand his

passports and leave London with every person belonging to the embassy.—It was the Emperor's will that the above instructions should be restricted to such points of general interest, as were most likely to move the British cabinet to receive his proposals with attention and kindness; and if his Imperial Majesty ordered no complaints to be inserted of the numerous violations of his right, as a neutral power, violations, with regard to which his Majesty had not been able to obtain the least redress or compensation, the reasons, no doubt, will be obvious, which induced his Majesty to pass by in silence whatever concerned his personal interest.—His Imperial Majesty's ambassador in London could but execute the positive orders, which he received from Vienna, to their full extent. But being of opinion that he might yet indulge an hope of being able to prevail on the English ministry to shew more pacific sentiments towards France, he resolved to express, at first, part only of his orders in a note, which he addressed to Mr. Canning on the 20th November. The Secretary of State answered that note by a mere repetition of the declaration made to Austria since the month of April, 1807. As all farther representation were now evidently ineffectual, a final notification was sent on the 22d December to Prince Stahremberg, which repeated the order of the 30th October, and directed him, before his departure, to give in a note explaining circumstantially the motives of the Court of Vienna towards that of London. These dispatches, however, did not arrive in London till Prince Stahremberg had applied for, and received, his passes, and he no longer could have communication with the Secretary of State, and deliver in the note which had been transmitted to him.—This representation, which is confined to the official communications that have passed between the two governments, is sufficient to shew that the Cabinet of St. James's cannot mistake the causes, nor the motives which have induced his Apostolic Majesty to break off the connection, which has hitherto existed between Austria and Great Britain.—The Emperor, nevertheless, wishes to see the moment arrive, when the Court of London, sensible of its true interests, shall, with calmness and justice, judge of, and compare, the situation of England, with that of the other powers, and thereby enable his Majesty to renew with it his former friendly connections.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"The Secretary of this State" [J. Alex. Dallas, Secretary of Pennsylvania] "possessed great influence in the popular Society of Philadelphia, which, in its turn, influenced those of other states; of course he merited attention. It appears, therefore, that these men, with others unknown to me, all having, without doubt, Randolph [the Secretary of State] at their head, were balancing to decide on the part they should take. Two or three days before the proclamation" [proclamation against the insurgents] "was published, and of course before the cabinet had resolved on its measures, Mr. Randolph came to see me with an air of great eagerness, and made to me the overtures, of which I have given you an account in my No. 6. Thus, with some thousands of dollars, the French republic could have decided on civil war, or on peace! Thus, the consciences of the pretended patriots of America have already their prices! It is very true that the certainty of these conclusions, painful to be drawn, will for ever exist in our archives! What will be the old age of this government, if it is thus early decrepid?"—*Dispatch of the French Envoy, FAUCHER, to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, written from Philadelphia, in 1794.*

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.—I return once more to this subject for the purpose of answering my correspondent, whose letter will be found immediately below, and who seems very angry at what has been said, in the Register, respecting the American States.—In giving my readers a description of the nature and tendency of the Orders in Council, I stated, in page 336 of this volume, that the late ministers had declared to the neutral powers, that if they submitted to the audacious principle openly proclaimed by France, that England would retaliate, and would have an undoubted right so to do. I added: "the neutrals do submit, for neither of them make any public remonstrance, or protest, against the decrees of France." This assertion my correspondent says I make "in the face of the notorious fact, of the immediate explanation of the French decree, given by the French minister of marine, Dacrès, to the American envoy at Paris." That I had no wish to disguise the fact of this explanation is evident, because I mentioned it, in the article referred to, and in the very next page to that whence my correspondent has extracted what he is pleased to regard as a false assertion.—It is true, that the American envoy did address a note to the French minister of marine, representing to him, that the decree, if acted upon, with regard to America, would be a violation of the treaty existing between her and France; but, was this a "public remonstrance, or protest, against the decree?" It was a claim of exemption from the effects of its operation, merely upon the ground of a particular previous compact, and not upon that of the decree being founded upon a tyrannical principle, and being a thing to be opposed on grounds independent of all parti-

cular convention. And what was the answer of Dacrès? What was the famous explanation, which satisfied the American President, and which, it was wished, should satisfy us? Why, the answer was, *that the decree would produce no violation of the treaty between France and America*; leaving it quite undecided whether the decree would be enforced, or not. The decree remained unrepealed; it contained no exceptions; and, if it was not executed, with regard to America, this exception in the execution was, undoubtedly, owing to a conviction, that to execute it would be injurious to France. The principle, however, remained the same; the insult to England the same; and the acquiescence of America the same; as far as related to England, the relaxation of France has been obtained for the mutual benefit of France and America only. America was a neutral power; but not the only one. She had no right to sacrifice the interests of the other neutrals to her own selfish purposes. She made no remonstrance, that has ever come to light, against the principle of the French decree; she submitted to the principle; she tacitly acknowledged, that France had a right to declare England in a state of blockade, and to place her under an interdict, and merely pleaded for an exemption, as far as she was concerned, upon the ground of her treaty with France. The French minister gave a vague answer; and, it is well worthy of remark, that even this answer never was made public, until the Orders in Council began to make their appearance. The fact obviously enough appears to have been this: the decree, the conqueror's decree, issued from Berlin, was intended for general and indiscriminate operation; but, the Americans having succeeded in convincing France, that such operation

would be finally more injurious to France than to England, France relented as to the execution of the decree; and the letter of Dacrès is to be regarded as a thing contrived between him and the American envoy. But, the letter of the decree remained; the insult remained entire; and the execution took place, wherever it was thought to work more injury to England than to France. Thus France was to issue a general prohibitory decree against the commerce between England and neutral states, which, no one can deny, gave England a right to retaliate by a measure also general; but, France finding that there was one neutral, whom it would be to her interest to exempt from the execution of the decree, she grants such an exemption, and, thereupon that neutral comes and says, "France exempts me, and so must you." "No," say we, "the decree is general, and general must be the retaliation. It is the interest of France to make an exception in your favour; but such is not the interest of England. There is no way for you to avoid the effects of our retaliation, other than that of prevailing upon France to repeal her general decree, against the *principle* of which you have made no complaint, that we hear of, even in private. You have tacitly approved of that principle; and, as France has been the sole judge of the exceptions for herself to make, you must allow us to exercise a similar judgment." Could any thing be more just, or reasonable?—My correspondent says, that my assertion, relating to the *submission* of America was made also "in the face of the notorious fact, that, down to the date of our Orders in Council, no American vessel has been condemned, and only two captured," in virtue of the French decree. If this fact be true, the statements of Sir William Scott are false, which I do not believe; and I well know that a ship of ours, which re-captured an American vessel, taken under the Berlin decree, obtained *salvage* in our court of Admiralty, which might, indeed, be one cause of Dacrès's explanation. Besides, Lord Howick, long ago, informed our minister in America, that "His Majesty had learnt, that, in some instances, the decree had been carried into execution." But, I expressly said, in the article, of which this American complains, that "it was of no consequence, whether there had, or had not, been any instance, wherein the decree had been carried into execution." The decree existed, and, if no captures took place in consequence of it, the cause was, not any resistance, on the part of America,

but the inability of France to execute the decree, in that way. In other respects, however, she had the power to execute, and, if we are to retaliate, we are not to make the exceptions that suit her; that is to say, to forbear to retaliate there only, where she has not the power of execution, and where only we have that power. Lord Howick calls upon America to *resist* the pretensions of France, and declares the king's undoubted right of retaliation, unless such resistance takes place. No resistance takes place; a submission to the principle of the decree does take place; and an attempt is made to evade our retaliation by an underhand correspondence between the American envoy and the French minister of marine, kept a profound secret, as far as I have observed, until our Orders in Council began to make their appearance.—This American tells us, that to refuse to pay implicit credit to the explanation of Dacrès is "to pretend to know better than the Doctor; for, one would naturally suppose, that the opinion of a French minister, on a French decree (and still more the uninterrupted course of acting thereupon) was of more authority than the opinion of an English lawyer." So, because it is I who write a letter, saying that I have seen a black horse to-day, another man is to believe, that my words mean, that I have not seen a black horse to-day, merely because I find it convenient to say, that my words have no such meaning. According to this, no written instrument of any sort could possibly carry any fixed and determinate sense. The decree prohibits *all* trade between England and neutral states; it prohibits *all* communication between them; it lays England under a commercial interdict; it makes no exceptions; it neither calls for nor admits of explanation. But, because America and France find it to be their interest to make an explanation as to the execution of it, we are to admit of that explanation, upon the principle, that those who have issued the decree must best understand its meaning. When the poor fellow, who went to America in search of liberty, was going to the jail where he expired for having written what was called a libel upon Mr. Jefferson, he found, alas! that his meaning was left to the opinion of others, and that he was not himself to be the interpreter of it.—As to the "uninterrupted course of acting upon this French minister's opinion," that has been before accounted for. It is to be observed, however, that this American lays no weight upon the circumstance, that *other parts* of the decree were rigorously executed; such parts as Napoleon could

cause to be executed without injury to himself. A defender of Mr. Jefferson says: it was not for America to commence knight errant, and contend with France for the interests of other neutrals. That was not *expected* of her, it is true; but, if she chose not to do it; if she chose to acquiesce in the principle of the decree, upon the condition that she should be exempted from its injurious effects, that could be no reason for our exempting her in the execution of any measure of retaliation, which we might think it right to adopt. France exempted her upon the ground of self-interest; no such motive could we perceive for an exemption. On the contrary, we found her as hostile towards us as her means of hostility would allow her to be. We found her with a non-importation act, passed in order to *punish* us for not giving up to her a right, the exercise of which was essential to the preservation of, not our naval superiority, but of our navy itself. If America will so act as to make it our interest to exempt her from the effect of our maritime regulations, we shall then, doubtless, be ready to exempt her, as France did; but, until then, I hope we shall not.—No: it was not feelings of “contempt,” that the “empty blockade” was calculated to inspire. It was feelings of indignation, and of just vengeance, not only against France, but against every power, who, either by direct or indirect means, gave their sanction to the abominably insolent principle of the Berlin decree. It was not the loss of commerce, but the loss of character, which we should have sustained, by leaving that sanction unpunished. We were called upon by every motive, which, under such circumstances, ought to animate a nation, to convince the world, that every state, who dared to insult us, would rue the effects of its conduct.—What resemblance is there, I would ask, between the Berlin decree and the wearing of the title and arms of the kingdom of France, by the king of England? A title that had been won by our ancestors, who *really* conquered and who *really* governed France, and which title was as much our property as the name of any man is his property. All the world knew, that it aimed no insult against France; that it was a mere record, or memorial, of deeds long passed. Can the same be said of a decree, which was professedly intended to cut England off from all connection with the rest of the world, until the day, when she would submit her neck to the yoke of France. This American, under the influence of that unnatural and base partiality, pervading the minds of so many of his countrymen, thinks it was

a “galling yoke” that the French submitted to in permitting us to wear the arms and regal title of France; but, he seems to think very little of the yoke, which Napoleon has pledged himself to make us wear, and, as a preparatory step to which, he was endeavouring to place us under an interdict.—This correspondent charges me with “a gross mistatement of a plain matter of fact;” and then he states, with truth, perhaps, that what I said, in page 337, respecting a rise in the rate of insurance, which would naturally be occasioned by the Berlin decree, was incorrect. My statement related not to “a plain matter of fact.” It related to what would, in my opinion, naturally be the case; it was calculated upon “the danger of capture in consequence of the French decree;” but, if the secret understanding between France and America was made known in America, then there would, of course, be no such consequence. This gentleman has, however, *blinked* the matter; for, though what he has said may be true, with regard to ships and cargoes coming from America, can he prove that it was so with respect to ships and cargoes going from England to America? If he can show, that the decree had no effect upon the rate of insurance as to such property, I shall think that the merchants concerned had a contempt for the power of France; but, I shall not, even in that case, think that we ought to have exempted America from the effects of our commercial regulations, seeing that she had *not resisted* the principle of the French decree, but had tacitly acquiesced in the right of France, generally speaking, to declare England to be in a state of blockade.—The conclusion of the letter of this “American Merchant” contains the following assertion: “You conceive yourself to have “been personally ill-treated in the United States, and, it is *currently reported*, that “you said to a fellow-passenger with you “to England, that you hated the United States, and that, if ever an opportunity occurred to blow up the flame “of discord between the two countries, “you would make the most of it.”—That I was most unjustly and basely treated in the American States, and by two of the governments of that country, is a fact pretty well known to every person, who reads or hears much about America; that (with the exception of the Quakers of Pennsylvania, many other individuals in that State, and the people of New England) I hate the United States and all their mean and hypocritical system of rule, I have a thousand times declared in print as well as in conversation; and I have

farther frequently declared, that, if I, or any one most dear to me, were destined to lose my or his life in a *just* war, I knew of no case, in which that life would be lost with so little regret, on my part, as in demolishing the towns of America and in burying their unprincipled inhabitants under the rubbish. But, that I ever said, that I would avail myself of an "opportunity to blow up" the flame of discord between the two "countries," is a falsehood; and, if the author of this charge had been any thing, no matter what, but an American, by birth or adoption, he would not, particularly after the invitation contained in my last Register, have been so mean, so detestably cowardly, as to have suffered this charge to come forth unsupported by a *name*.—Those who have thought it worth their while constantly to read this publication, can scarcely fail to remember what, I think, must convince them of the falshood of this pretended report. Many are the occasions, upon which I have thought it right to point out what I thought likely to secure the good will of America; and especially have I recommended the sending of persons of high rank as well as character, in the quality of ministers thither. At the making of the peace of Amiens I deprecated the idea of "placing the French upon the back of the Americans;" and I have uniformly recommended such a line of conduct towards America as would be likely to prevent a war between the two countries; though, from the bottom of my soul, I believe, that such war would, now at least, be greatly beneficial to England.—But, of what consequence are my feelings, my love or my hatred, my forgiveness or my revenge, in this discussion? I have asked no man to rely upon my *opinions* of America. I have said, this hath she said and this hath she done. Let my statements be contradicted, and proved to be false; or, let the facts themselves be shown to weigh nothing against her character; but, let no one hope to defend her by alledging that *her accuser is prejudiced*. He who has been robbed and assaulted has certainly no prejudice in favour of the robber, but is as certainly prejudiced against him; yet, we never hear this prejudice urged against the credibility of his testimony. Who is to complain but those who have suffered? Who is to accuse, if those are to be silent who have been witnesses of the guilt?—But, after all, supposing me to have said, that I would avail myself of any opportunity that should offer to blow up the flame of war between the two countries, this may account for the asperity of my language (and I have no desire that my language with

respect to America should appear in any other light), but it can, in no wise, affect the state of the case, upon which the two nations are in dispute. It was not I who spurred on Mr. Jefferson to demand of England a renunciation of the right of searching for seamen. It was not I who inspired America with the insolent notion of forcing England to renounce this right, and to employ for the purpose an act of non-importation, passed just as a negotiation was set on foot, and kept suspended while it was going on. It was not I who counselled Mr. Jefferson to send back to the king of England a treaty, concluded and duly signed by the plenipotentiaries on both sides, and to chalk out the alterations to be made, exactly in the same way, in which articles of capitulation are returned by a besieging general. It was not I who puffed this republican sovereign up with the conceit that he was able to bully the king of England into a revival of the negotiation upon these dictated alterations of a treaty, for which revival, if our ministers had consented to it, they ought to have been hanged. It was not I who advised the base people of New York to meet in a mob for the purpose of encouraging an English boat's crew to desert from their officer, thereby exciting a mutiny in the ship, which might have ended in the loss of her and in the massacre of the officers, and which, owing to the prudence and courage of those officers, did end in the ignominious death of several of the men. It was not I who stimulated the officers of the American ships of war, as also the civil magistrates, of the town of Norfolk, to inveigle away, and to screen from the power of their commanders, the seamen of an English ship of war, which was then lying in a state of distress. It was not I who encouraged the printers of newspapers, in America, to publish, just under the eye of the general government, expressions of joy that the desertion from the English ships was going on at a rate that threatened the speedy annihilation of England's naval power. It was not I, but some fiend, who pushed on those same printers to publish a proposal for raising, by public subscription, a fund out of which to give rewards to such English seamen as should desert, and arrive in America. It was not I who insilled into the empty skulls of the Americans at Rochefort to join the French, in toasting "the liberty of the seas;" nor am I to blame that the same was done by the Americans at Petersburg, who so cordially united with the vassal of the Czar, the moment the latter became the enemy of England, and who, upon the same ground, would unite with the devil and his angels. I

had nothing to do in promoting any of those numerous acts of injustice and of insolence, which America has, for the last fifteen years, been committing against England. These are the causes of ill-blood; these are the causes of the present state of things between the two countries; these may, possibly, lead to war; but, they are none of them my work. I have, indeed, pointed them out to my readers; I have made them known to many persons who never would have heard of them except in a cursory way; and I have, I hope, contributed my full share towards exciting, in the minds of the people of England, that just indignation, which now appears to pervade all ranks of men, at the conduct of both the government and people of America. But, for the friends of America to blame me for this, is as absurd as it would be for the friends of a thief to blame the lawyers and judges for his being hanged. In exposing the culprit to the just vengeance of the nation, I have done no more than my duty; and, if duty happens to coincide with inclination, I cannot think that that circumstance requires any apology; for, if to have sustained an injury one's self is to disqualify one from speaking one's sentiments, as to the conduct of the offender, in other cases, he who has a mind to rob with impunity has only to injure every man capable of detecting and exposing him. —But, I have, I am told, gone beyond my subject. I have taken occasion to speak of the internal government, and of the morals of the people. True; but, then, let it be borne in mind, that this became necessary, when I saw the defenders of America, with their usual effrontery, holding forth the United States as the only free and virtuous country in the world. *Character* does much, especially in England. It, therefore, became me to show, that the government of America is, in fact, one of the very worst in this world; that there is no such thing as real liberty in the country; that corruption prevails to an extent heretofore unheard of; and that the people (with the exceptions which I have before made) are the most profligately dishonest that I have ever seen, or heard described. These statements of mine might be attributed to revenge. Well, let the *making* of them be so; but, when I say, that a *judge* was detected, in Philadelphia, stealing bank notes out of a till in a shop; was afterwards driven from the bench by the shopkeeper's holding up and shaking his fist at him; and that no public proceeding, and no public expressions of indignation, were the consequence: when, I say, that it was proved that the American *Secre-*

tary of State asked the French minister for a bribe, and that no impeachment or judicial proceeding was the consequence: when I say, that the separations of man and wife, and that elopements accompanied with robbery, are so frequent, that the printers of news-papers keep, for the purpose of placing at the head of advertisements, relating to eloped wives, figures of women in the act of running off with a bundle: when I make these assertions, I put it in the power of the friends of America to contradict me; I put it in their power to clear up these heavy charges against the morality of that country. I say that the Americans, as a nation, are the most unprincipled people in the whole world; their friends deny it; but their friends never choose to deny *any* specific facts; and, if these facts cannot be denied, my general assertion will be believed. Upon this subject, I want no credit for impartiality and candour. The Americans, under pretences the most false, by means the most base that ever were employed, by the vilest mockery of judicial proceedings, by openly-avowed and boasted-of perjury, robbed me of the earnings of my life up to that time, left me to begin anew with a family dependant solely upon my exertions, and have since cruelly persecuted several of my friends. For the sake of these friends more than for my own sake I hate the unprincipled nation. This hatred will never cease, until they do me justice, and therefore, it will end but with my life. But, as to the matters in dispute between the two countries, how are they at all connected with my private feelings? Were I a minister, indeed, the case might be different. Private individual as I am, and having no access to any man in power, except through the means of the press, I can have had no hand in producing those events, upon which I have thought proper to comment. —In a second letter (received yesterday), the same correspondent tells me, that war with America may be “sport to me, but that it will be death to many others.” It will not be sport to me; for I cannot but deeply lament all the hardships which my friends in Pennsylvania will suffer, and as to the perjured wretches, by whom I was robbed, I have the satisfaction to know, that many of them are already bankrupts, and, in other respects, miserable. But, to whomsoever a war will produce death, the fault rests with America: solely with her: she is the aggressor: it is for her to say whether there shall be war or peace. She has passed a non-importation act to compel us to surrender our right of searching for our own seamen. She has

passed an act for the openly-avowed purpose of forcing us to do that which would, in a short time, sap the foundation of our naval power. This act she keeps in force; and yet her interested partizans cry out that *we* are urging on a war with her. I care, comparatively, very little about the Orders in Council, as far as they relate to America. It is notorious that those Orders were not, and *could not be*, the cause of the dispute, and the probable cause of war; and yet the partizans of America keep clamouring against that measure, as the sole cause of the war that they expect and dread.—As in the case of France, so in that of America, to keep clamouring against war, is, in effect, to call upon England to submit to the demands of those powers. I have several times put to them this question, regarding the dispute with America. “Do you advise the ministers to give up to Mr. Jefferson the right of search for seamen?” Never can I obtain an answer. They talk vaguely about a conciliating disposition and language. They talk about the amount of exports and imports; but never do they give me an answer. The exports and imports are, in my opinion, and for the reasons I have given, of very little consequence to the strength and greatness and happiness of England; but, suppose one half of her comforts to depend upon them; nay, suppose the whole of her comforts to be so dependent, the case remains the same; for what our enemies, neutral as well as belligerent, demand of us is, a surrender of the sole means of maintaining our independence. If it be true, as is now reported, that the Americans are disposed to cease their unjust demands and their hostile conduct, why, then, peace with them by all means, and I have, for my part, no objection to the granting of them *commercial* advantages, nor even to a relaxation, with respect to them, in the execution of the Orders in Council; but, so long as they persevere in showing, by open acts, their unnatural and base partiality towards France, so long as they continue to make insolent demands upon us, so long am I for treating them with rigour.—If we are to have peace with America, however, we shall, I repeat, have the present ministers to thank for it. Had the *conceders* remained in power, we *must* have had war; for, the Americans, when they had gotten from us the right of search for seamen, would have put forward some new demand; and, the insolence of all their vile captains (by far the worst of all mankind, as far as my observation or hearing has gone), and all their other agents and emis-

saries and partizans, in every quarter and corner of the world, would have been such as the officers of the English navy never could have borne. In a short time, there must have been war. The firmness of the ministers, in this respect, is highly praiseworthy. The letter of Mr. Canning to the American plenipotentiaries clearly shews that he well knew whom he had to deal with; and, I am persuaded, that, though it has been loudly censured by Lord Grenville, it will hereafter be regarded as a model for those English ministers who shall have to deal with the American States.—Here, I hope, we may say, that we have done with the Orders in Council, that fertile source of parliamentary motions and debates. But, I have a word or two to add upon the second letter of my correspondent, which was not received until after the former part of this article was written. In my last, I had called upon him for his *name*, seeing that he had charged me with having declared, that I would, when an opportunity offered, blow up the flame of discord between the two countries. His answer to that call is this: “You demand my name, but I am disposed to withhold it for the following reasons. I have stated nothing as *fact*, but what rests on so firm a basis of notorious truth, that it cannot be contradicted, nor does it require the sanction of a name. What you are pleased to call a “*base imputation*,” I have given as a “*current report* only, and have qualified my remarks on it with an “if this be “true.” I have not even said this *of* you, but to you, giving you the alternative of suppression, if you chose it, or of contradiction, if in your power, as I would willingly hope it is. As a man of uprightness, therefore, I do not think I have taken a step which requires me to go forth from that privacy, which my habits and disposition desire, nor am I willing to put it in your power to hold me up by name to all that observation and perhaps ridicule, which your talents know so well how to cast, whether justly or unjustly, upon your opponents.” Verrily a most lame and paltry excuse! A *current report*! why, calling it a current report constitutes your offence. If you were to tell your neighbour, that it is currently reported that he is a thief, you would find that the subterfuge would not save your ears or your purse, according to the mode of prosecution which he might choose to adopt. As to the *alternative* which you left me, is it not evident, that you intended the *whole* of your letter for publication? Is it not

evident, that you had, as one of your principal objects, the intention of causing it to be believed, that I had *misrepresented* the case of America, merely from motives of private revenge, and that I was doing no more than acting this selfish part in pursuance of a pre-conceived and settled design? Besides, supposing me to have been at liberty, which I was not, to suppress this part of your letter, and to publish the other parts of it, I could not suppress the knowledge of it in my own mind. If I believed *you*, I must believe one of the five gentlemen (for there were no more) who were my fellow passengers to England, to be a scoundrel; and, was it acting the part of "a man of uprightness" to expose them all to the effects of my suspicions? If, in naming five men, I assert that one of them, without naming him, is a scoundrel, they have all the same ground of complaint against me. You, in effect, name all my fellow-passengers to me, and then you assert, that one of them, whom you decline to name, has said that, which, if he did say it, I know to be false; you, therefore, are guilty of the grossest injustice towards four, at least, of my fellow-passengers, and also towards myself. The truth I believe to be, that you never heard such a report as proceeding from the source, to which you pretend to trace it. That the story has obtained currency I have no doubt, nor am I at all surprized that it should. It is so natural for those who cannot answer one, who cannot deny the accusations we prefer against them, to impute to us motives of spite, like the highwayman in Joe Miller, who threatened to swear the peace against the judge, seeing that he had obviously a design upon his life.—This question respecting America, Sir, I now regard as settled. I look upon it as certain, that almost the whole of the people of England have now correct notions respecting the government, the people, the means pecuniary and military, of the American States; that they are decidedly of opinion, that war with that country is preferable to any further concession, of whatever nature and however small in amount; and, to the producing of this state of the public mind, I have the satisfaction to believe, that I have contributed as much as any private individual ever did contribute towards the producing of any national effect; a satisfaction, which I am free and forward to say, is not at all diminished, but, on the contrary, greatly augmented, by the reflection, that I have at the same time contributed towards humbling the pride of those, who used their power to treat me with the

foulest injustice, and who had the baseness, even in what they call their courts of justice, to express their satisfaction at the prospect at seeing me "blighted with misery, and "my children begging their bread." When I left them, I certainly did shake the dust off my shoes; but, the only curse I pronounced upon them was this: "May you have Jefferson for a President and Rush for a "Doctor!"

LORD WELLESLEY.—The resolutions, which were moved, in the House of Commons, by Lord Folkestone, and the discussion upon which terminated on the 15th instant, produced, at last, a vote apologizing for his lordship's conduct; but, then, that vote was proposed by *Sir John Anstruther*.—The charges, preferred against Lord Wellesley by Mr. Paull, every one has read. The proposed resolutions contained the substance of the Oude Charge. They were all, except the last, put aside, by one of those twin-brothers, *Order-of-the-day* and *Previous-question*, which seem to stick by every succeeding ministry with as much staunchness as Alderman Shaw or Billy Baldwin. The last resolution, which alone would have been sufficient for all the purposes, which the mover could have had in view, was *negatived*; and when that had been done, Sir John Anstruther moved, "That it appears to this house, that marquis Wellesley, in carrying into execution the late arrangements in Oude, was "actuated by an ardent zeal for the public "service, and by the desire of providing "more effectually for the prosperity, the "defence, and the safety of the British "territories in India."—So, Sir John calls the taking of a king's dominions away from him an "arrangement," does he? The word *arrangement* has this meaning in the Oriental Dictionary!—Let no one suppose this to be a triumph to the Wellesleys, however. The motion was carried, of course, by a great majority; but, here is not a word of *approbation*; there is not even a word of *defence*. There is only an *apology*, and just such an one as Pitt made for his "ardent-minded" friend, the Lord Advocate of Scotland. The ministers would go no further; and, the reader may be assured, that they were much better pleased with Lord Folkestone's resolutions than the opposition were. No, no: they like the Marquis very well *where he is*; but, they do not, I guess, want any of his "ardent zeal" in their cabinet. Another question is coming on respecting the Nabob of Oude; and this the ministers will also like. They will like two or three, at least, of such questions,

every winter and spring. They are sure of the Marquis's attachment; for he is, especially in politics, a very constant man; and, though things are a little changed with him since the time when he used to make his tours in India, and sail in barges like that of Cleopatra, he must have, in his past deeds, a vast fund of pleasing reflection, and stand in no need of present employments. Mr. GEORGE JOHNSTONE, whom the *Morning Chronicle*, last year, reported to be dead, is, I perceive still alive; and, he appears to have spoken against the Marquis, though he has an office of some sort (during pleasure too) under the ministers. From this it is very easy to form a judgment as to what the wishes of the ministry were. The truth is, that the ministers wish to have the support of the marquis and his eleven friends in the parliament; but, in the offices of state, they can dispense with such support. They will say, that he *meant* well; that he *thought* he was doing his best; but there they will stop, and, I greatly commend their prudence. You hear people say, "they must take in Lords Wellesley and Melville, or they cannot go on." But these people do not seem to consider that they have *got* Lords Wellesley and Melville by the firmest of all possible holds: I mean, of course, the faithful attachment to principle of those noble lords. They have them safe. I'll engage that nothing will seduce them from the ministry; that is to say, as long as the latter are found to merit the keeping of their places, and the support of so decided a majority in the two Houses of Parliament.——As to the administration of Lord Wellesley, in India, we have long been *feeling* its effects; but, we shall soon see a little more of them than we have hitherto seen. A committee is appointed to inquire *into the East-India Company's affairs*, of which inquiry, I shall be deceived if the result be not a *heavy additional tax upon the people of England*.

Botley, 24th March, 1808.

DEFENCE OF AMERICA.

Sir,—In your register of the 27th Feb. (p. 335) you make a variety of remarks on the Orders in Council of November last, asserting as facts the very reverse of the truth, on points of much importance to your general arguments. I have waited the appearance of your succeeding register, in hope that some abler pen would contradict those rash assertions, but as that does not appear to be the case, I venture to do it, confiding in your candour, so far as to admit my letter into your next num-

ber.—I will first premise (to save you all the trouble of your usual ingenious conjectures,) that I am interested in a mercantile house, trading with the United States; you shall therefore, if you please consider me, as counsel for the said States, but at the same time grant me the indulgence, that is always conceded to counsel, that of convincing by evidence, and by fair arguments drawn from that evidence.—In the paper alluded to, you say, "The neutrals do submit" (to the capture by France of their ships bound to England) "for neither of them make any public remonstrance, or protest against the Decrees of France." You say this, in the face of the notorious fact, of the immediate explanation of the French decree, given by the Minister of Marine Decrès, to the American envoy at Paris; of the equally notorious fact, that down to the date of our Orders in Council, no vessel has been condemned, either in France or Spain for trading with England, and that only two instances had then occurred, even of capture, one by a French, and another by a Spanish privateer, both of which were restored, though loaded with English goods and English passengers. To this last case, I can speak from my own knowledge, and assert, in this public manner, that the American ship *Shepherdess* sailed from this port for New York, in the month of June last, loaded with English goods, and having on board numerous English passengers; that she was taken by a Spanish privateer, and carried into Bilbao, that the American resident at Madrid immediately interfered in her favour, that she was restored, (the privateer being condemned in costs,) and is since safely arrived at New York, the letter from her owners announcing that fact, now lying before me.—I am well aware of the subterfuge resorted to by those, who defend the Orders in Council,—that Decrès's assurances to Mr. Armstrong were only his opinion, but that the plain meaning of the French decree, issued at Berlin is, that all ships trading with England shall be made prize of. This is really pretending "to know better than the Doctor," for one would naturally suppose, that the opinion of a French minister, on a French decree (and still more the uninterrupted course of acting thereupon,) was of more authority than that of an English lawyer. As the case truly stood, the French blockade had just as much effect on England, as the former title of King of France, maintained by our monarch, had on the people of that country; and I cannot help thinking, that as they bore this galling yoke, of a useless title, on our part, for a good many years,

we after having suffered their empty blockade, for a few months only, might have endured it a little longer, with those feelings of contempt, which it was alone calculated to inspire—I now come to the gross mistatement you have made of a plain matter of fact. You say, (p. 357) “as matters stood “previous to the Orders in Council, a ship “load of tobacco came from America to “England with all the additional price, which “arose from the high insurance, occasioned “by the danger of capture in consequence “of the French decrees; while another “ship load of tobacco went to France free “from such high price, because there was “no danger of capture from us.” So far from this assertion being true, the fact is, that it is wholly otherwise. The premiums of insurance through the year 1807 up to the news of the affair of the Chesapeake, were at peace rates, being only from 3 guineas down to 2 guineas per cent, according to the season of the year, or the goodness of the vessel. The house in which I am a partner, paid in April, 1807, from New York to London $2\frac{1}{2}$ guineas per cent. on one vessel, 2 guineas on another; in June, from New York to London $2\frac{1}{2}$ guineas, New York to Liverpool 2 guineas; in July, from New York to London 2 guineas. These quotations are from actual policies, taken at random from a bundle. During the same period, similar voyages from America to France were from 3 to 4 guineas per cent. having always been about 1 guinea per cent. higher than to England, owing to the chance of their being detained by English cruisers, in which case underwriters are pretty generally liable to pay some expenses. This statement will not, (because it cannot) be contradicted, and I call on you to give the same publicity to the truth, as you have already (unwittingly, I doubt not) given to the falsehood. And it is but fair to observe, that this rate of insurance is a criterion, better than all other speculative deductions, from which to judge of the practical import of the famous Berlin decree of Buonaparté.—I have distinctly told you I am an interested man, and I have as distinctly told you, that I desire only to be believed, if my facts or my arguments deserve it. But, you, Sir, are also an interested person. You conceive yourself to have been personally ill treated in the United States, and it is currently reported, that you said to a fellow-passenger with you to England, that you hated the United States, and, that if ever an opportunity occurred to blow up the flame of discord between the two countries, you would make the most of it. If this be true, Sir, you are not a very uninterested

party yourself, and therefore, whatever you say against the Americans should be received with a greater caution, than that should be, which a trader to America may offer in their favour, in the same degree as revenge is generally esteemed to blind men's intellects more than their interest.—I rely on your inserting this letter in your next Register, and am, Sir, &c.—AN AMERICAN MERCHANT.—*New Broad Street, March 7, 1808.*

IMPORTATION OF PROVISIONS.

SIR,—The great and feeling interest which every individual has in whatever relates to the plenty, and consequent cheapness of food, will form a sufficient apology for my addressing you upon the subject of your remarks upon Mr. Young's letter, which you have published in your Register for the 20th of last month.—If you are correct in the conclusions you have drawn, and this country is independent of foreign supply for the subsistence of the people, persons of every party will have reason to rejoice; but if you are in error, if our existence depends upon an import of provisions, then should a painful anxiety be felt, and men of every party unite in endeavouring to discover the cause of this fearful state of things, and to devise means to avert the approach and weight of that distress, which may compel the country to listen to terms of peace, compromising the interest, tarnishing the honor, and even perhaps endangering the safety of the nation.—Should present abundance lead us to disregard the lessons of the past, it will be too late to apply a remedy when the pressure of dearth comes to be felt. The tremendous power, and unchecked tyranny of the enemy upon the continent, have closed all the corn ports of Europe against us; and should we even remain at peace with America, that country is unable to supply the deficiency of a scanty crop. Thus precluded from all hope of effectual foreign assistance at the moment of distress, it becomes necessary to plan beforehand the means of so increasing our supply, as shall render the nation secure from the effect of an unfavorable season.—You confidently state, that we export more human food than we import; that our import of corn does not equal our export of other kinds of provision. I wish this were the fact. I read your statement with an earnest desire to find it correct, but I fear, that when you come to reconsider it, and to couple it with some observations I am about to make, you will be under the painful necessity of drawing a different conclusion. You calculate that the population of Great Britain (11 mil-

lions of people) are supported at an average cost of 4s. a head a week, or a weekly expence of about 2 millions, which exceeding the money amount of our imports, you conclude, we rely upon foreign assistance for only one fifty-second of our consumption. Ingenious and plausible as is this statement, the error of it is quickly discoverable by those who are acquainted with the habits and food of the different parts of this island. —Excepting in years of extreme scarcity, the population of Scotland and the northern counties are supported without foreign assistance upon barley and oats bread, and that portion of the population which is supported upon wheat, and amongst whom the foreign importation is divided, cannot in any case exceed 8 millions, but is seldom more than 7. Take it however at 8 millions, and instead of any theoretical calculation of 4s a week a head, let me put my statement into the quantity of wheat actually consumed and imported. It is universally allowed, that on an average one individual with another who eats wheaten bread, consumes a quarter of wheat a year. With the amount of the importation of barley, peas, beans, and rye, I shall not trouble you, as it is inconsiderable, though a great quantity of oats have been usually imported. The importation of corn, on an average of the last 5 years, ending with January 1807, is 1,133,757 quarters a year, upon your own premises of 11 millions consuming wheat. This is less than a tenth of the support of the people, or the consumption of full five weeks and a half; and upon mine of only 8 millions, amongst whom the foreign supply is divided, it is more than a seventh, or the consumption of full seven weeks and a half. Thus, instead of relying upon foreign importations for one week's consumption, we depend, upon your own premises, for above five weeks, and upon mine for more than seven weeks and a half. I can anticipate your objection to this calculation, namely, that this import is not all in wheat. Granted. But then recollect, that I have not included the import of rye, meal, Indian corn, oatmeal, rice, Dutch cheese, hams, bacon, and a very long et cetera. Now rice alone in some years has been imported to the extent of above four hundred thousand hundred weight. Still you may perhaps think I over-rate the amount, or rather proportion of imports; but should you think so, permit me to remind you of the years 1800 and 1801. The averaging of 5 years is very good, and appears fair upon paper, but it is not always warranted by practice; and I feel confident,

that you no more than myself, argue for the vanity of victory, but that we equally seek to discover truths, important to the best interests of our country. Now, Sir, we are considering the means of procuring the supply of a commodity (human subsistence) which, from various causes, is of annual produce, and of a perishable nature.—The produce of a plentiful year is little more than our annual consumption, and will not allow of being hoarded for any great length of time. Hence, though we have plenty this year, we are not secure from dearth the next. This was painfully felt in the years 1800 and 1801. In 1800 we imported 1,384,345 quarters of wheat *only*. In 1801 we imported 1,464,518 quarters of wheat *only*. This, upon your datum, is a consumption of 7 weeks, and upon mine of full 2 months, without reckoning the additional import of rice and other grains, which was a further subsistence of at least a fortnight!! or nearly one fifth of our consumption!!! This is no theory, it is plain matter of fact, and the only consolatory answer which can be given to it, is that which you have offered, namely, that we export in other articles an equal or greater quantity of human food. Yet, to support your answer, you instance only one kind of food exported, and that to only one place—cheese to America. Who ever heard of a ship load of cheese cleared out for America? Yet it is common for ships to enter inwards from Holland wholly laden with cheese, butter, and hams.—It is true, we export some provisions to Guernsey, Jersey, Gibraltar, our American colonies, the West Indies, our African settlements, and the East Indies, as well as to Botany Bay; and while we retain these possessions, and pursue our present colonial system, we shall continue under the necessity of making this export. Indeed, as things are at present, the demand for provisions which causes and is supplied by this export, ought to be considered as part of the demand and consumption of the empire, as a consumption we cannot diminish, as a drain and export we cannot lessen, and therefore as a lien upon our provision stock, which must be reckoned in every calculation upon the subject, instead of a surplus capable of being retained at home, and applied to meet the deficiency of a bad harvest. Had the sum of this export of provisions been to a foreign country, your argument would have been good to the extent of such export; but excepting the article of cheese and perhaps some small amount of Irish butter, I am not aware of any export of provision to foreign parts, of which we could avail our-

selves in a season of scarcity and want.—In addition to this general statement and reasoning, permit me to call your attention to the history of our corn trade and laws for the last century.

From 1708 to 1773, the average export of wheat was - - - 222,121 qrs. yearly

From 1710 to 1760, the average export of all sorts of grain was 600,000 qrs. yearly

From 1700 to 1756, only two years occurred in which wheat was imported.

From 1746 to 1765, both inclusive, the quantity exported exceeded the quantity imported by 6,649,609 qrs., or at the rate of - - - 332,480 qrs. yearly

But from 1773 to 1798, we have on an average imported - 346,374 qrs. yearly

From 1795 to 1800, we have on an average imported - 617,369 qrs. yearly

From 1800 to 1806, we have on an average imported the enormous quantity of 1,447,500 qrs. yearly

And our export during these latter periods, or from 1777 to 1804, have been only 5,400 qrs. yearly, and that small quantity has been chiefly to our own colonies.—By the foregoing table it appears, that from having a large annual export of grain enriching the country, and affording security against every contingency of seasons, we have gradually become an importing nation, depending for a large portion of our subsistence upon foreign supply. For the last 40 years we have been exchanging our gold and our silver for subsistence, and now a new order of things has arisen. It is now no longer a question of commercial policy; no longer a matter of profit and loss, whether the past system is to be pursued. However willing we may be to enrich other countries, to vivify the agriculture, and stimulate the industry of other nations, we shall not be permitted to purchase the agricultural produce of the continent. All the corn ports of Europe are closed, and all the wealth of these islands will be unable to purchase a supply of food from the continent. To such observations as I have been addressing you, I have not unfrequently heard it remarked, “wheat is only about “70s. a quarter.” So much the worse on every account: the price is too low to stimulate an increasing and productive tillage; this low price deceives us into a dangerous security. Even suppose it to arise wholly from a bountiful season, and in nothing to result from the present corn laws, still by next August or September it will be all consumed, and then a month’s hard rain, or should mildew blight our crops in one week, what will be our prospect? how general

will be the distress and pressure of scarcity? to what country can we look for aid? Upon import from America we cannot depend, even if we continue at peace with the United States. Thus, then, it appears to me, that a due consideration of the subject brings the painful conviction, that we rely upon foreign import to an alarming and dangerous extent; that from an export of six hundred thousand quarters of corn annually, we have gradually come to require an import of nearly a million and a half of quarters; that in years of scarcity we depend upon foreign supply for nearly a fifth of our consumption, and that in ordinary seasons we depend upon importation for a seventh part of our subsistence.—Should these remarks be deemed to merit your attention, and the dangers which I fear await us, appear of sufficient moment to call for serious consideration and the application of an immediate and efficacious remedy, I will in another letter proceed to investigate the causes of this fearful state of things, and discuss the merits of the principal remedies which have been proposed, and endeavour to suggest some further ones to the public notice.—I am, your’s, &c.—
EDWARD WAKEFIELD ——— *Duke street, Westminster, 14th March, 1808.*

SINKING FUND.

SIR;—Your correspondent C. S. (p. 938, vol. 12.) could not find any meaning in those “plausible” doubts, on which I ventured to ask for instruction, and which appeared in your Register of 14th Nov. p. 766; but to assist my ignorance, he begins by charging me with sinister designs, because “I have dragged out *his* conclusions “before your readers, and left behind the “curtain those of Mr. Pitt and Lord H. “Petty,” as if such words might not have been omitted for sake of brevity, and of the adage, nullius in verba. C. S. had reduced their poetic calculations into a prose brief,—he adopted the proof not without contempt of their authors; and now he flies to his deified name for shelter from the rule of three. His quotations of Lord H. Petty’s quotation of Mr. Pitt’s second-sight was needless, for every stock-holder had by rote how that angel confessed what he *fore-saw*; (timely and well-acted confession) that a nation, out of debt, must be in the high road to bankruptcy. C. S. goes on to dissipate my doubts thus: (p. 940) “Un- “questionably they are ignorant of the ef- “fects of competition and capital, who can “doubt the extent of the mischiefs that “must result from the *competition* of 600 “millions with a capital of 100 millions.”

It is not to the purpose. I expressed no doubt of any such thing. What I said was, that if the 600 millions be discharged, *by means of the Sinking Fund*, that such competition cannot exist, on any addition to the circulating capital; therefore, your correspondent's colloquy between Jacobin and Solomon, setting the Thames on fire, and his nine times quoted phrase of Pitt's, are all alike irrelevant. He says, (p. 941) "now" "that the extensive calamities of a sudden" "extinction" (impossible) "of the debt" "is admitted on all hands!" How, a certain consequence to follow impossible premises! No,—but if it be extinguished by means of the Sinking Fund, which must take up before it pays down, I doubted if that competition is possible. The trustees to the Sinking Fund have taken up suppose 140 millions of the 600 of debt. I ask did the money which they paid away for those 140 * millions, encrease the circulating capital or not? If it did, his premises are false, and if not his conclusions are false. C. S. asserts, that, "an nominal" "encrease has the same effect on real money as a real encrease could have, and" "all he contends for is that it must nominally encrease to the amount of the" "debt, and therefore that the real depreciation must be in the proportion" "which the debt bears to the circulation." This is irrelevant, unless it contemplates payment of the debt without the aid of taxes, and that the debentures in circulation are no part (real or nominal) of the circulating capital. It has no effect on the doubts which I have suggested in a single sentence, that payment of the 600 millions of debt by means of the Sinking Fund, which is in fact *by means of taxes taken out of the Circulating Capital*, cannot produce any increase whatever. C. S. continues (page 943) "we" "contend for the nominal increase on the" "well ascertained ground that if we expend" "the identical £10. in the market 10 times" "over in one day, we have nominally sent" "£100 in that day, and therefore depreciated the value of money as much as if" "we had actually sent £100 at one time." I know not how such axioms is applicable, or "well-ascertained," and confess I have my doubts of its truth.—His third sub-division asserts that my "notion" is old, although in his first page he says that "if it be truly" "just, it is really new,"—but be it old or new, I intreat Mr. Cobbett himself to inform

* I have no means of ascertaining this sum—and wish Mr. Cobbett may correct it, as a just view of it, is of great importance.

a society of Irish who love him because he loves his own country in earnest, whether the Sinking Fund can by any contrivance take up a single debenture out of the market until it takes the value of that debenture out of circulation, or if 140 millions of debt already paid off, were gathered out of a pocket where that sum was *not*. As to C. S. notable remedies for the ruin now in full march, *viz.* "to take peace any how—to" "surrender the naval dominion—to go" "back to where our forefathers left us—" "to teach our population the use of arms," "and agriculture to our soldiers, &c. &c." (p. 947) I only say, that it is a pity he omitted the plan of that law giver called Gonzalez in the Tempest,—"I would by" "contraries execute all things—no traffic" "would I admit,—no magistrate,—LETTERS" "should not be known,—poverty, riches," "none,—bonds of land, vineyard, olive," "none,—no use of metal, wine or oil,—" "no occupation,—all men idle,—all,—and" "woman too, but innocent and pure.—" "treason, knife, gun, or use of any" "engine, would I not have,—but nature" "should bring forth all abundance to feed" "my innocent people."—C. S. concludes, "show us that no real or nominal increase" "will take place if the national debt be" "paid, and then we shall confess our error," "but till then we maintain, &c. &c." It is not reasonable for a professor of prophecy to throw the burden of proof upon his ignorant audience. It calls to mind honest Swift's Tale of a Tub, and Lord Peter's argument, to prove that the bread which he gave his brothers for dinner, was not bread, but mutton.—I am, Sir, &c.—OSGUR.

IRELAND.

"Thus should all our efforts be directed" "to render the Irish willing, by making" "them comfortable subjects; then shall" "we most effectually have succeeded in" "opening their eyes to the evils they have" "invariably suffered, by yielding to seduction; then shall we have made the people" "loyal, from the only principle that can" "make loyalty sincere, vigorous, or rational; a conviction that it is their true interest. The landed gentlemen of Ireland" "can alone impart this conviction, for" "through them only can the lower orders" "estimate the value of the government under which they live; from them must" "originate those comforts on which that" "conviction depends; they alone can destroy the facility of seduction; they alone" "can remove the disorder, for with them" "lies the disease and the remedy, and that

"remedy consists in a fair and just commutation of tythes, in the grant of a public maintenance for the Catholic and Presbyterian clergy, in a diminution of absentees, and an increased attention on the part of resident landlords, to the welfare and happiness of their tenantry. What the clergy can do to effect such desirable objects they will do, provided the gentlemen of landed property shew no disposition to relieve one class at the expense of another; with the landlords therefore, it lies to avert the evil day from Ireland, and from the empire: they alone are competent to save both. Need I urge them more—'tis time that they awake from a lethargic inactivity; 'tis time that they look the state of Ireland fairly in the face, and for their own sake at least, endeavour to alter a line of conduct, which has stamped that face with features so expressive of ill usage and mismanagement."

SIR,——I have taken the above extract from an excellent Pamphlet, recently published in Dublin, entitled "An Enquiry into the History of Tythes, with a plan for modifying that system, and providing an adequate maintenance for the Catholic and Presbyterian Clergy," which I seriously recommend to the perusal of all members of parliament, or other hereditary or accidental counsellors of state, and integral parts of the government, as a work replete with valuable information, clear reasoning and dispassionate statement; and, therefore, of particular use, when, as in all probability there will be, a talk in parliament about Ireland and tythes, it is indispensibly necessary for the members to get a luncheon of information on these subjects, (for the pamphlet is too short to constitute a full meal); to the spread of instruction upon these interesting points, it would be injustice not to confess that your valuable Register has greatly contributed. If I do not mistake, you were the very first who detected the trick of the Protestant country gentlemen (whom you most properly designated as the keenest set in the world) and exposed it as it deserved to be exposed. Trust me, Mr. Cobbett, till that race of Centaurs is regenerated—till their bestial is converted into rational, neither Catholic emancipation, nor commutation of tythes will ever work the great work of peace. Till land is let at such rates as will enable the tiller to feed, clothe, and educate his family, the Irish peasantry must remain ignorant, naked, and wretched. It is well observed by a very ingenious correspondent of yours, "that there are mis-

chiefs in Ireland, which no legislative interference can reach." He is right, and the rapacity of squires of all sects, and their systematic grinding of the poor, is one of these mischiefs. Our whole Irish representation consisting of one hundred wise and well informed gentlemen, who, as Fontenelle said of the French academicians, "ont l'esprit comme quatre," joined to the equally wise and well informed representation of England, Scotland, and Wales, could not, I will venture to say, in their united wisdom, devise any law competent to remove this evil. It is intertwined with the very fibres of a squire's nature; he imbibes it from his mother, and his father inculcates it along with the alphabet and the multiplication table.—This is the party in Ireland that is most formidable to the real prosperity of the country; this is the sour balm that leavens the lower classes into turbulence; these are the people that Mr. Grattan should have pointed his rhetorical rockets against: he humm'd and he ha'd, and he see-sawed himself into a very pretty sort of an oratorical rage against a French party; but he should have been coolly indignant against the squires, and proved plainly and simply that they are the fountain head, from whence the real waters of bitterness flow, and that if they were but commonly just to the most grateful, noble hearted people in the world the Irish, the French party might either dwindle into dancing masters and dentists, or go to America and debate with closed doors (and windows too) upon the propriety of going without great coats and breeches, by way of distressing the Yorkshire clothiers. What wretched shuffling and twisting and temporizing is this! Will members of parliament for ever come forward and stigmatize the Irish as idle, rebellious and ungrateful, and yet conceal the real causes of these curses; the wretchedness entailed upon the Irish by the landed proprietors. One honourable gentleman makes a very neat speech, and attributes all the disturbances to the tythes; these are the Grattanites. Another tells the house that the Pope, poor man, is at the bottom of the riots. These are the Rededafites; but, I have yet heard no antisquarlist get up in his place, and declare boldly and honestly that the distractions of Ireland arise from the exorbitant price of land, the thumbscrewing of rack rents, and its ruinous, impolitic, and inhuman expedient of refusing leases, disallowing the tenants right, and enhancing the rate of farms by the horrid expedient of canting. By such infamous conduct on the part of the landed proprietors, the whole population of the country are alie-

nated. All the bonds that bind man to man, and men to their native land are snapped in twain; the permeating principles of local attachment, that like the roots of the pine, make their way through the hardness of the barren mountain, and bind the tree even to the naked rock, are rudely extirpated. Home, that dear delightful refuge of the human heart, is denied to the poor Irishman,—he may be turned from one moment to another from the hut he has reared, and the garden he has planted. And, yet this creature whom the Almighty endowed with every noble propensity, and generous feeling, shall be stigmatized as innately savage, intemperate, and intractable, because he turns upon the curs that are hunting him to desperation, and refuses to lick the hand that is raised to scourge and to torment him. This, Mr. Cobbett, is the truth—and till the truth be told in and out of parliament, things will proceed as they have done, most disastrously. I really congratulate the country that there is one channel yet left for the dissemination of truth—the Political Register is that channel. I will not pretend to assert that you are always right, but this I will affirm from a long acquaintance with the Political Register, that it contains more truth in the publications of one month, than the whole tribe of newspapers in one year; and I am rejoiced that you give a column now and then to the affairs of Ireland; they are indeed in a perilous state; but as the author from whose pamphlet I have quoted, well observes, “with the landlords it lies to avert “the evil day from Ireland, and from the “empire; they alone are competent to save “both.” I may trouble you hereafter with some further observations upon this subject, and throw out some hints upon the education of squires, which might if adopted by their sires and dams, prove eminently useful to the future breed. Ireland is of vital consequence to Great Britain, and recent events have only confirmed the observation of Sir Richard Cox, in the dedication of his history to William and Mary, after stating that Ireland had cost their predecessors an unspeakable mass of blood and treasure,—“but no cost can be “too great where the prize is of such value, and whoever considers the situation, “ports, plenty, and other advantages of “Ireland, will confess that it must be retained at what rate soever, because, if it “would come into the enemies hands, England would find it impossible to flourish, “and perhaps to subsist without it.”—I remain, &c.—MALB.—*Dublin.*

TITHES.

SIR;—Among the many letters which

have appeared in your Register on various subjects, one in your last, signed J. P. D. has, I confess, excited not a little surprise in my mind.—My object in addressing you (and I confess I do it with diffidence, being the first time I have ventured to write, Mr. Cobbett) is to notice the fallacy of J. P. D.'s statement with respect to tithes and their influence on religion; and to ask whether you seriously think the churches are deserted, and the established religion suffered to decline from any such cause?—Is it possible, Sir, such a delusion can have successfully palmed itself on J. F. D.'s imagination? Or, is not it more probable that he has taken this ground, knowing how soon, above other causes, a religious outcry will have effect. It surely cannot be difficult to trace the desertion of our churches to some other cause. It arises out of the palpably notorious negligence of so many of its clergy. I know the objections that exist against such an opinion, but I also know that you and all other honest men, Mr. Cobbett, must conclude, that while the majority, or at least a large proportion of the church clergy are deficient in their duty to the people committed to their charge, the nature and unavoidable consequence is, that the people, in their turn, should fall short in the respect due only to a man worthy of the office he sustains; and it must be equally clear, that where the ministers of religion fail to stimulate by their own energy and example, the religion of those under their care will soon degenerate into nothing but the name. Such being the case, it is to this cause principally, and not to the obnoxious nature of tythes, we are to ascribe the decline of our established religion, and the desertion of our church. I would be understood to mean, by the word “established,” the form of religion in use with the church of England; for the assertion that real religion is on the decline, if your correspondent means real religion by the terms used, I can by no means admit. On the contrary, I firmly believe it to be increasing.—I do not intend entering more on this part of his letter, for in that case I should expect, if you deemed my letter worthy any notice, you would declare your publication not the vehicle of religious communications, and very properly; but I could not read J. F. D.'s statements without a few remarks on their fallacy, as far as they refer to the point I have noticed; and though you may not admit remarks on religious topics to swell your pages generally, I have read your Register long enough to know how willing you are always to expose error yourself, as well as afford others the opportunity of doing it. I would also say a few words on another assertion in the

same letter.—J. F. D. has said, that “ were the tithes abolished, Old England would from that circumstance become happy, prosperous, and thriving,” that “ our granaries would always be filled with corn,” and that, under any circumstances, we should never need the aid of importation. And is this great and wonderful change to be effected by taking from the church its tenths of the produce of the land, and giving the value of that tenth in some other way? I do heartily join in that gentleman’s zealous hope, but I would suggest that such an event from such a cause may never take place. No, Sir, whoever may live to see this country again “ prosperous and thriving,” will witness much more important changes than the abolition of tythes: he will see our satesmen breathing the spirit of public virtue; he will see no factious opposition to those statesmen, because one set are in power and the other out; pensions and places will be done away; and a due regard paid to the country’s rights. He will see the taxes of his country lessened or more equally imposed; the national debt diminished, and our dignity, as a great and independent nation, proudly maintained. He will see a parliament pure and independent; its seats occupied according to the laws; and every member bearing within himself the spirit of impartiality, deciding according to the dictates of a conscientious, upright judgment, and not, as now, either indolently or intentionally giving his yea or nay to enactments agreeably to the side he sits on in the house.—I would not now say much on the justice or injustice of the mode adopted in collecting the tithes; I am afraid with J. F. D. that too generally it is oppressive and vexatious: but surely in the instance he has adduced his friend could have easily gained ample compensation by other means than remonstrance for so wanton an insult, so flagrant a breach of equity and justice.—The laws of this country must be defective indeed, if they permit such an outrage against society without producing adequate punishment to prevent its repetition; and if they do provide such a remedy, there must have been some defect on the part of J. F. D.’s friend, who could refrain from bringing such an offender under its operation.—I have myself known instances where much ill will has arisen on the subject of tithes, but in many of them (I mean where the incumbent has collected them himself) it had its origin with the person from whom the tithe was due, and not with the person claiming it.—I confine myself, of course, to England in my remarks, for I am unacquainted ut-

terly with this subject as it regards Ireland; although I have always understood every thing that has appeared in the Register on this point, (far as my recollection will carry me) except the letter of J. F. D. to refer only to the sister kingdom.—I am, &c.—S. A.—*London, 15th Feb. 1808.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND AND SWEDEN.—*Convention between his Majesty and the King of Sweden—signed at Stockholm on the 8th February, 1808.*

The consequences of the treaty of Tilsit, between Russia and France, unfolding themselves more and more, in such a manner as to threaten Sweden with a speedy invasion, for the purpose of enforcing her to accede to the French system; and his Swedish majesty finding himself therefore under the necessity of bringing forward, to resist its effects, a greater force than he has at his ordinary disposal, his Britannic majesty, animated with the constant desire of contributing to the defence and security of his ally, and of supporting him, by every means, in a war, undertaken for the mutual interests of both states, has determined to give to his Swedish majesty an immediate aid in money, as being the most prompt and efficacious, to be paid from time to time at fixed periods; and their majesties having judged it expedient, that a formal convention with regard to their reciprocal intentions, in this respect, should be concluded, they have for this purpose named and authorised their respective plenipotentiaries; that is to say—in the name and on the part of his majesty the king of the United kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Edward Thornton, Esq. his envoy extraordinary and Minister plenipotentiary to his majesty the King of Sweden; and in the name and on the part of his majesty the King of Sweden, the Baron D’Ehrenheim, president of his chancery, and commander of his order of the polar star, who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles:—Article. I. His majesty the king of the United kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland engages that there shall be paid to his Majesty the King of Sweden the sum of twelve hundred thousand pounds sterling, in equal instalments of one hundred thousand pounds sterling each, per month, beginning with the month of January of the present year inclusively, and to continue successively in the course of each month, the first of which instalments shall be paid on the ratification of the present convention

by his Swedish majesty.—II. His majesty the King of Sweden engages on his part to employ the said sum in putting into motion, and keeping on a respectable establishment, all his land forces, and such part as shall be necessary of his fleet, and particularly his flotilla, in order to oppose the most effectual resistance to the common enemies.—III. Their said majesties moreover engage to conclude no peace, or truce, or convention of neutrality, with the enemy, but in concert and mutual agreement.—IV. The present convention shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties, and its ratification shall be exchanged at London within the space of six weeks after the signature of the said convention, or sooner if it can be done.—*Separate Article.* The two high contracting parties have agreed to concert, as soon as possible, the measures to be taken, and the auxiliary succours to be stipulated for, in the case of a war actually taking place between Sweden and the powers her neighbours; and the stipulation which may thence result shall be considered as separate and additional articles to this convention, and shall have the same force as if they were word for word inserted therein.

PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation issued from the Office of the Secretary of State for the Affairs of Portugal. Dated Lisbon, Dec. 4, 1807.*

The rulers of this kingdom being informed, within these few days, that the prices of some articles of the first necessity had been raised to an exorbitant price, order the Senate to check every excess which may in this respect take place, with all due vigilance and severity, in order that, without the authority of government, and without the most urgent motives, the prices of provisions must not be raised; and the Senate will, by proclamation, make this known.—In prompt obedience to this injunction, the Senate hereby ordains, that no person of any class or condition whatever, shall raise the prices of all or any articles of the first necessity; beyond the rate at which such article, or any of them, were sold on the 28th of Nov last.—And whoever shall transgress this order shall incur a penalty of 8000 reis, and be confined in prison, where he shall remain ten days for the first offence, and for the second such penalties shall be doubled, and such person to be prohibited from opening a shop, or to sell any article whatever, &c. &c.—(Signed) FRANCISCO DE MENDENZ CARRAISE MULEO.

ROME.—*Notice of the Secretary of State*

Cardinal Cassoni. Dated Rome Feb. 2, 1808.

His Holiness Pius VII. being unable to conform to all the demands made on him by the French government, and to the extent required of him, as it is contrary to his sacred duties, and the dictates of his conscience; and being thus compelled to submit to the disastrous consequences which have been threatened, and to the military occupation of his capital, in case he should not submit to such demands:—Yielding, therefore, in all humility of heart, to the inscrutable determinations of the Most High, he places his cause in the hands of the Almighty; and being unwilling to fall in the essential obligations of guaranteeing the rights of his sovereignty, he has commanded us to protest, and formally protests in his own name, as well as in that of his successors, against any occupation whatever of his dominions, being desirous that the rights of the holy chair should remain, now and henceforward, uninjured and untouched. As the vicar on earth of that God of Peace who taught by his divine example humility and patience, he has no doubt, but his most beloved subjects, who have given him so many repeated proofs of obedience and attachment, will make it their peculiar study to preserve peace and tranquillity, private as well as public, which his Holiness exhorts, and expressly commands; and that, far from committing any excesses, they will rather respect the individuals of a nation, from whom, during his journey, and stay in Paris, he received so many flattering testimonies of devotion and regard.

WESTPHALIA.—*Royal Decree, by which it is ordered that the English Goods found at Marburg shall be publicly burned.*

We, Jerome Napoleon, &c. on the report of our minister of justice and affairs of the interior, have decreed, and do decree as follows:—Art. I. The English commodities, which, by orders of the prefect of the Wirra, were seized on the 1st instant, at Marburg, and which have been ascertained to be English manufacture by the merchants and assessors of the deputation of commerce, appointed to make the inquiry, and by the printed notices of the commercial house of Wendeker and Co. at Wetzlar, shall be forthwith burnt in the public places at Marburg.—Art. II. Our minister of justice and the affairs of the interior is commissioned to carry into execution the present decree, which shall be inserted in the bulletin of laws.—Given in our royal palace at Cassel, the 5th of Feb, 1808, and in the 2d year of our reign.

"As to the Petition, of which the Sheridans' advertisement talks, nothing can be a more gross deception. There is no foundation for a petition; there is even no pretended foundation. The Sheridans well know, that it is impossible for any candidate to observe the laws of election more strictly than Lord Cochrane has observed them. He despises, as all his friends do, the base and contemptible attempt here made to cast an aspersion upon his character. The whole is an impudent attempt at imposition. It is a trick whereby to get money to be pocketed by the parties. Let the contrivers be prepared, however, for a revival of the subject."—POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. XI. page 975.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

WESTMINSTER ELECTION. — At the place, in the Register, above referred to, beginning at page 973, is the whole history of the promised Petition against Lord Cochrane's return, which petition has now seen its end. It will be remembered, that, just after the Westminster contest was over, there was a meeting called, by the Sheridans and their friends, through the means of a public advertisement; that, at this meeting, the celebrated Mr. JOHN FROST was a leading man, and that his health was given as a toast, by the elder Sheridan at one time, and by the celebrated PETER MOORE at another time; that, at the aforesaid meeting, of which Peter was chairman, it was resolved to raise money, by public subscription, for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal to parliament against the return of Lord Cochrane; and, it is well known to all those who had an opportunity of hearing the language of the Sheridans and their friends, at that time, that they, in the most unreserved manner, asserted, that they were able to prove, that Lord Cochrane had been guilty of *bribery*, and that they stated one particular instance, wherein he gave an elector the sum of two guineas for his vote. I have referred to the passage, wherein I contradicted these assertions, in print; but, so well had the base tricksters, the green room gang of impostors, the vile herd of diverting vagabonds; so well had they devised their scheme of calumny, and so industrious had they been in the execution of it, that, almost every person, with whom one spoke upon the subject, appeared to believe, that Lord Cochrane would be ousted in consequence of the petition. Nay, to such an extent did this belief exist, that some of the Electors have had several meetings, in order to come to a resolution respecting the nomination of a person to be chosen in the room of Lord Cochrane, the writ for which they expected about the tenth day of this present month of April. Just as all this

was going forward, out came the following laconic report of the proceedings in the House of Commons, touching the matter in question. On Thursday, the 24th of March, "The Speaker informed the House, that, as Tuesday last had been appointed for taking into consideration the petition complaining of the last election and return for Westminster, and the right hon. Richard Brinsley Sheridan had not appeared by himself, his counsel, or agents, within one hour after the time fixed for taking the same into consideration, he had certified such default to the Court of Exchequer, in order to the recovery of the recognizances." — Thus has ended this long promised petition; thus are the green-room impostors exposed, for the thousandth time, to public contempt; and thus are the calumnies, invented and propagated for the purpose of blasting the character of an honourable man, thrown back in the teeth of those from whom they had proceeded. But, it is right that the now undeceived public should be informed of some of the silent proceedings of Messrs. *Sheridan, Frost, and Moore*, a trio of it, perhaps, to be matched in his Majesty's dominions. — In the business of the election, Messrs. DAWSON and WRATISLAW of Warwick Street, Golden Square, were Lord Cochrane's agents. Mr. Wratismaw, to whom the business relating to the petition was more particularly committed, always was of opinion, that the Sheridans, notwithstanding the important support of the celebrated John Frost, would not proceed to trial, and, therefore he delayed, till the last moment, the consultation of counsel. On Saturday, however, previous to the day appointed for the ballot, he delivered his briefs to Mr. Dallas and Mr. Warren. On the next day (Sunday), the celebrated John Frost, and, after him, his most worthy associate, Peter Moore, addressed very *civil* notes to Mr. Dawson, who, of course, delivered them to Mr. Wratismaw, and the latter expressed

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his resolution not to suffer a compromise upon any account, notwithstanding his very exalted opinion of the powers of the celebrated John Frost. On the Monday ensuing Mr. Wratlaw called upon the worthy Peter Moore, he (Moore) being confined by indisposition; and, at a conference with Moore and Frost, it was proposed by them, that Mr. Moore should be the nominee of his friend the Right Honourable Richard Brinsley Sheridan; that he should arrange with the nominee of Lord Cochrane in striking the committee; that the petition should be opened; that the counsel for the Right Honourable Sheridan should say, *that facts existed to warrant it, but that witnesses were absent*; and that the committee would, thereupon, report to the House, that Lord Cochrane was duly elected, and that the petition was NOT *frivolous and vexatious*. But, Mr. Wratlaw, who felt, doubtless, that the honour of Lord Cochrane (who had reposed implicit confidence in him) was an object of far greater consequence than the seat in parliament, though for the first, and the only independent, city in the kingdom, refused all compromise, and left the celebrated petition framers to pursue their own course. On the day appointed, he attended the House of Commons with Messrs. Dallas and Warren; and, after waiting the whole hour out, heard the order discharged. The subsequent proceeding against the petitioner and his sureties the reader is informed of; and, I think, he will be of opinion, with me, that if ever forfeiture was justly incurred, this is a case of that description.—There never was a fouler calumny than that which these people have propagated against Lord Cochrane. His Lordship was particularly scrupulous with respect to the money-matters of the election. He said to his agents: “you know what is lawful, and what is not lawful, therefore, to you and you only, I leave the expenditure.” He emptied his pockets of all money, and of no repast, paid for by him, or his agents, did he suffer any one elector to partake. A more honourable, and more truly noble-minded man, does not, in my opinion, exist in the world. His life has been hitherto spent in scenes, which tend little to qualify a man for the wars of faction; but, if he remain in health, and with a disposition to remain in England, the electors of Westminster, if they will be content without the base flatteries of the green-room, and will look to character and principles instead of to names and professions, will, I am satisfied, have no need to go a-hunting for representatives.—It has been said, and is

still said by many, that Lord Cochrane was *sent off* by the ministers; that is to say, that a *ship was given him* for the purpose of getting him out of the way; and, I perceive, that Mr. Paull, in a letter of his to the Electors of Westminster, upon the subject of the grant to the family of Lord Lake, has been misled so far as to join in the propagating of this notion, than which it is impossible to conceive any thing more false. The ship, the frigate *Enterprise*, in which his lordship now is, and in which he has recently performed a feat that would have rung through all Europe, had it been performed by any but an English naval officer, was given him about *two years ago*; previous to, and during the time of the Westminster election, he was absent by leave, on account of ill-health, which every one who saw must have perceived that he laboured under; and, when his leave of absence was expired, he went again to sea, as a matter of course, and, indeed, as a matter of necessity, unless he had chosen to quit the service, a step, which, upon no occasion, did he ever promise to take; nor did he, upon any occasion, as far as I have observed, say any thing, tending to encourage an expectation that he would take such a step.—The elder Sheridan took almost daily opportunity, during the election, to attribute the promotion, or, rather, the marked preference, which Lord Cochrane had experienced, to parliamentary interest, that is to say, to *corruption*. But, surely, the *distinguished merit* of my Lord Cochrane; not his great bravery, perhaps, for that is common, I think, to all our naval officers; but his consummate and well-known skill in all the parts of his profession; his exemplary sobriety; his indefatigable application; that spirit of enterprise which has constantly animated him, and the effects of which have been so grievously felt by the enemy: surely these might account for his having had, though a young man, a cruising station so often allotted him, a station for which his qualities and endowments so eminently fitted him. He has had admirable “*luck*,” they say. Such men as his lordship generally have admirable luck, as have also sober and early-rising and intelligent farmers. Such men have always better crops than the common run of their neighbours; their cattle thrive better; and, strange to say, they have finer weather for their seed-time and harvest. It is the same by sea as it is by land. There are, indeed, such things as *accidents* and *misfortunes* and *ill-luck*; but, the sluggish have their share of these as well as the active, and the former have, besides, to submit to the natural con-

sequences of their sluggishness. A ship is a sort of animate being, moved by the mind of the commander; and, if he be a sluggard, no matter from what cause, his ship will do but little. In this view of the thing, of how much importance is it, that a proper selection of commanders, and particularly of *cruizing* commanders, should be made?—Where, indeed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, as in the case of the younger Sheridan, to point out any public merit, then, the preference given to the party may be fairly attributed to corruption; but, not so in the case of my Lord Cochrane, who has devoted his life to the naval service, and who may be cited as a striking example of success, arising from his merits.—As a member of parliament, too, he has merit far surpassing that of almost any other man that I know. He entered the House of Commons under a pledge, given in the face of the nation, that he never would, as long as he lived, accept of any sinecure or emolument, either for himself or any relation or dependent; and that he never would touch the public money, in any way but that of his profession as a naval officer. His motion respecting places, pensions, and emoluments, held by members of the House of Commons, or by their relations, was of the greatest public importance; it required courage as great as any that he ever displayed at sea, to bring it forward; he was sure to have an unaccountable host against him; he was sure to leave scarcely any man or woman of fashion his friend; yet he did bring it forward, and did most excellently expose the corrupt views of the contending factions. One would have thought, that, if there had been some few of the electors of Westminster who sincerely distrusted his public principles, that the bare making of this motion must have done away their distrust; but, amongst men, who are capable of being cajoled by the fulsome flattery of the green-room, little good is to be expected.—After all, however, I should certainly have preferred a member, who could have been constantly in the House of Commons, where, and where only, good is to be done, if it be to be done at all; but, I greatly prefer Lord Cochrane's appearance there once in two years, to the constant attendance of any unprincipled or timid man.

AMERICAN STATES.—In a person, whose opinions and statements have been contradicted with so much positiveness and acrimony, as mine, with regard to the effects of war upon the American States, it might reasonably be permitted to indulge a good deal in the producing of proofs, as they pre-

sent themselves, of the correctness of those opinions and statements. Nor will I pretend, that I am not actuated, in great part, by this motive, in making the extracts, which I am now about to insert from the late American newspapers. I love to see my opinions confirmed by events, and who does not, especially when they have been treated with contempt and ridicule? In answer to all the alarm, which the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Barings* and the *Roscoes* have been endeavouring to excite in the minds of the people, relative to a war with America, I have said, and, I think, proved, that, without utter ruin to the union of America, *she cannot make war against England*. She is not yet at war; she is at peace; but has adopted *one* of the measures, the effects of which would have been produced by war; and now let us hear, from her own lips, what a state she has been placed in by this one measure.—The first extract I shall take comes from the *New York Evening Post* of the 5th of February. “*Look here upon this picture.*”—A late Vice President of the United States tried for treason. “The Chief Justice accused by the executive of mal-administration of the laws. A senator under trial for being a party in the treason. The commander in chief under trial on a charge of being a Spanish Pensioner. The writ of Habeas Corpus destroyed. The civil magistrate put down; not with impunity alone, but applause, by a military commander! The country on the eve of war with Great Britain, with France, and with Spain! The nation driven to an act of suicide by the embargo, passed by a republican congress, and to use the mildest reproach, without knowing why or wherefore. The nation weighed down with calamity, and imploring in vain to know the reason. The ruthless hand of destruction upon them, and every one reviled who does not applaud it! They look for reasons, and they are told of confidence! We ask for bread and they give us a stone! From *such liberty and such republicanism* good Lord deliver us!”—Yet, observe, reader, that I have been set down for an *enemy of liberty*, because I expressed my abhorrence of the American government. Will my accusers believe what the Americans themselves say of this their famous liberty? I know them to be the slaves of mean upstart pettifogging lawyers, with here and there a ‘cute bleeding doctor; but, if you will not believe me, will you believe themselves? Or do you choose to set them down as liars, because they confirm what I have

said?—The next extract is from a New England paper, the *Connecticut Courant*. “*Merchants* stand idle in the streets, inquiring if there is any news from Washington. They feel the loss of their business; the stagnation of commerce, and ask what does all this mean?—The *Mechanic* is obliged to dismiss his journey-men—his customers desert him, or call to tell him they cannot pay him a shilling of the embargo.—The *Farmer* finds no market for his produce. His notes given for and will not be taken. The *Merchant* is obliged to close his doors.—The *poor fellow*—generally honest and unsuspecting, lies on his oars. His last shilling is gone to aid a distressed shipmate, and there is not a shot in his locker. Poor fellow—he “wants but little, nor that little long,” but he can’t understand why the ship’s aground.—All—all are exclaiming what do all these things mean? Congress have laid an embargo. They have bound their fellow-citizens, hand and foot. They will not condescend to tell the people their reasons for this measure, so important, so unexpected, so pregnant with mischief.—People of America—look at your situation—ask your leaders of both parties why the times are so changed? You love your country—you seek her true interest—you will submit patiently to the losses for the good of the public; but you wish to *know* what great benefit is to be derived from the embargo? You ask in vain. All is silence and darkness. You are commanded by the administration to submit. Indeed passive obedience and non-resistance is your *only duty*.—My countrymen; be not deceived. If the embargo originated in wisdom, it will bear a strict examination—there should be no secrets on a subject so deeply interesting to the prosperity of the people—there can be no good reasons for silence and darkness.—Legislatures may applaud this measure, but the people want something more substantial than the applause of hirelings before they acquiesce.”—Did I not say, that this would be the case? Did I not give my reasons for saying so? And did not the *Morning Chronicle* and its herd of American writers abuse me for so saying? Did they not threaten us that America would starve the West Indies, and did I not answer, that she must starve herself first?—I said, besides, in case of war, pray *shut up* the Americans, and proclaim, that any State which will openly throw off the authority of the

President and his government, shall have free trade. Let any one read the following article, and then say, whether my advice was not good.—“In Marblehead, that wonderfully patriotic town, there has been something very much like mobbing. The fishermen collected in a body to the number of two or three hundred, set all the bells a ringing, and paraded through the streets, then repaired to the stores of the town, to demand supply the fishermen. Their first demand was for fish, and when they came in such articles as they could find, but fish was not to be had. The problem and the fish were on hand, and could not be sold, and that they were not able to supply them with the articles they demanded, the fishermen entered the stores and took such articles as they could find, allowing the owners to take an account of them. It is said some opened desks and took money.—They went to the wharfs and seized wood, which they divided among them and carried it to their houses. The leading democrats took great pains to quiet them, and hush up the matter, to prevent its going abroad. We are told the fishermen at Cape Ann are about to take the same course. There they are almost to a man democrats. Before next May these fishermen, as well as a numerous class of mechanics, must be in real distress. The Supplementary Embargo Bill, permitting the fishermen to go out, will afford little or no relief, for the fish will be of no value when taken, nor will the owners of vessels fit them out. We are told that good fish which were selling at 3 and 4 dollars per quintal, can now be bought for 1 dollar and 50 cents per quintal, and few that will purchase at this price.”—Marblehead is a sea port town in the State of Massachusetts’s Bay. The wharfs are the receptacles for fire-wood, brought down the rivers and along the coast. The fish was generally sent to the West Indies, to Portugal, Spain, and up the Mediterranean. The fishermen are very numerous, and, without a market for their fish, they must nearly starve, forming, as they do, no inconsiderable part of the whole of the community in that district; and, let it be observed, that, if they do not *export*, they have no market at all. There is no large community to come and take the fish off their hands. All is stagnant at once. The effect is as sudden as that of a hurricane.—In various parts of these newspapers, we have descriptions of failures in trade and credit. Four banks

have stopped payment. The newspaper of Norfolk, in Virginia, that scene of infamous treatment towards our naval officers, says: "However incredible it may appear, we have it from good authority that Major Lee, a Notary Public of Charlestown, made lately 1200 dollars in the course of one day by protesting notes!!!"—To this I will add the petition of 269 seamen to the Mayor of Baltimore, in Maryland: "Your petitioners sheweth, that by reason of the embargo, they are reduced to the necessity of applying to your Honour for relief. Many of us are now in arrears to our landlords, and our prospects are bad, as we are incapable of gaining a support by any other means than by our profession as seamen. We humbly pray of your Honour to assist us in this distressed situation, and your petitioners, as in duty bound, will for your Honour and for the prosperity of the Port of Baltimore always pray."—From petitioning they will come to demanding, and then, like the fishermen of Marblehead, they will proceed to robbery and open seizure. In short, anarchy stares the government full in the face, and that, too, at the same time, and from the same cause, *that the sole source of public revenue is totally dried up.* And, this is the nation that was to bully England! This is the nation who joined the French and the vassals of the Czar of Muscovy in toasting "the liberty of the seas!" This is the nation, at the sound of whose hostile voice the English trident was to be hidden under those waves, which, for so many ages, it had ruled! This is the nation, whose chief had the audacity to demand of us the surrender of our right to search for our own seamen, and to whom, it is but too evident, the late ministers would have made that surrender! I think, we shall have peace, and a lasting peace, with America; but, if we have, it will be owing *wholly* to the resolution which the ministers have demonstrated, not to yield to their demands: for, I know their disposition well, and I most seriously declare my belief, that, if suffered to proceed from demand to demand, they would not cease till they came to demand the crown from the king's head.—We have here an example (the like of which is not unfrequently met with amongst individuals) of a nation, brought to the brink of destruction merely by its arrogance and insolence. It stood in need of no concession from us; it was carrying on a third part of the commerce of the whole world, notwithstanding the exercise of our maritime rights. It was fast increasing in wealth and population. It was happy, if

it could have known its place. But, it must needs be a great nation; it must needs have its disputes; it must needs talk big; it must needs show the world that it could be insurmountable; when it thought the old lion was expiring, it must needs come with its hoof.—Mr. A. B. of the Morning Chronicle (that is, I suppose, Mr. Alexander Baring) told us about the danger to be apprehended from the failure of supplies of corn from America. Mr. Young (and I thank him for it) has told us, that the corn we get from thence was not worth mentioning; and, I beg the reader to observe, that, with all the ports of all the corn-countries in the world shut against us, and at the end of five years of war, indeed, fifteen years, with only ten months exception, *wheat is sixteen pounds a load*, and has not risen in price, in consequence of the stopping up of the channels of importation. But, as I told Mr. A. B. before, America cannot exist without the importation of *rum, sugar, and woollens.* These things the people will have, or they will destroy the government. The *whole* of the revenue of the state arose from a tax upon goods imported. This is gone. *All gone.* It cannot return but with a state of peace; and, I leave the reader to guess, whether it is likely to collect internal taxes from merchants and farmers and fishermen, whose affairs are in the state described in the above quoted paragraphs.—The embargo, which has produced such alarming symptoms in America, seems to have had very little effect in this country, which that embargo was intended to punish. You hear no one crying out for want of credit or of employment. The American embargo is scarcely ever mentioned, any where; and, I'll engage, that, out of the fifteen millions of people, in England, Ireland, and Scotland, there are not more than half a million, who, at this moment, know that there is an embargo in America. Mr. Roscoe, indeed, and his rabble of merchants and car-men at Liverpool, to the number of *three thousand*, it seems, have met and petitioned about peace, introducing, at the end of a long string of unmeaning flummery about "attachment to his Majesty's person and family," an expression, relating to America, that bespeaks a mind of mere childhood. They say: "trusting that, by a firm and dignified, but, at the same time, conciliatory conduct towards hostile and neutral states, your Majesty will be enabled not only to maintain the yet unbroken relations of peace and amity with a power nearly connected with us by the ties of common origin, and an advantageous commercial intercourse, but to restore, at

“ an early period, to your faithful subjects, “ and to the world at large, the blessings of “ a secure and lasting peace.” A tolerably well-rounded sentence; but what is the *sense* of it? If they are not hypocrites; if they do, as they say they do, *rely* upon “ his Majesty’s wisdom and justice and paternal regard for his people,” why this petition? Had they, indeed, said that they thought the king ill-advised, and that they hoped he would listen to them, and alter the course he is at present going on in; then there would have been some sense in what they said. What signifies their coming with all manner of praises in their mouths, and with ten-times-repeated assurances of their attachment to the king, not forgetting their readiness to sacrifice their lives and fortunes in *defence of his person and family*? He must have laughed heartily at this petition, if he ever read it, or heard it read. Silly stuff! I wonder how any man, having the smallest pretension to understanding above that of the mere well-dressed rabble, should have been induced to put his name to it. Why this eternal profession of attachment to the king’s person and family? Why this upon all occasions? There may be occasions when such professions are proper, and even necessary: in an address, for instance, at a time when a plot against the king’s person, or family, may have been discovered: at a time when treason, or insurrection, is on foot; at a time when invasion is hourly expected; but, what in all the world have such professions to do with the concerns of a shipper of goods, or those of a calico-printer? Yet none of these people can send up a representation of their sufferings, real or pretended, unaccompanied with expressions of the most tender personal regard for the king, which, to say nothing of the flagrant hypocrisy of such expressions, discover a vanity truly disgusting. The silly fellows seem to conceit, that they become exalted by the act of *writing to the king*. Like Justice Shallow, they appear to think, that they are, all at once, made relations of the royal family. Their vanity gets the better of their anger, and, instead of a bitter complaint, up comes a mawkish panegyric upon the king and constitution.—— What I chiefly intended to notice, however, was Mr. Roscoe’s (for he is said to have drawn up the petition) fine notion about “ the ties of common origin,” which so nearly connect us with America. Now, either this was intended as an argument to induce the king to adopt a more conciliatory conduct towards America, or it must be regarded as a mere expetive, as words thrown in for the mere purpose of making the sen-

tence what Mr. Roscoe regarded suitably long. If the former, I would ask Mr. Roscoe, whether he be informed of any one instance, of any one expression or act, whereby the Americans have testified towards England, *their* respect for those “ ties of common origin,” which he pretends now connect the two countries? Those who are connected by ties of common origin, generally discover a love for each other by mutual acts of kindness, which they do not, in the same way and degree, shew towards the rest of the world. None of these acts has America ever been able to bring herself to adopt with regard to England. She has, on the contrary, constantly shown a partiality for the enemies of England. The misfortunes of England have always been a subject of openly expressed joy from one end of her States to the other; and the good fortune of England has been with her a subject of sorrow, not less openly and generally expressed. Nay, such is the idea which the Americans have of those tender ties of common origin, of which the sage Mr. Roscoe speaks, that they, in order to obliterate even the memory of that origin, have devised for themselves a *fictitious saint* of the savage race, named, from God knows what cause, SAINT TAMMANY! And, they keep the anniversary of this *saint*, in the same manner that the Irish and Scotch keep the anniversaries of St. Patrick and St. Andrew, and that of St. George. At this festival they repeat *Odes* in praise of themselves (all of their own making); they sing songs, through their nose; they smoke large twists of tobacco, after the fashion of the savages; and they get as drunk as ever St. Tammany or any of his forefathers did. In a day or two after, you see all their three or four hundred newspapers filled with a detail of the proceedings of the folly-stricken wretches, and you are sure to find, that, at each meeting, there has been one or more curses unanimously bestowed upon England. And yet Mr. Roscoe would fain persuade the King, that, in his conduct towards America, he ought to bear in mind, “ the ties of “ common origin” which connect the two “ countries.” Verily this is a very silly politician, though he has written a most elegant and most excellent poem. The truth is, that the revolution of America was injurious to its people in various ways; but, in no way so much as in that of depriving them of an *ancestry*. Man not only looks forward, not only desires to live in his children or in his fame, and both if possible; but, he looks back, and desires to have lived in his forefathers; he desires to have a father, or a

grandfather, or a great grandfather, of whose character or whose deeds, or whose existence at least, he can speak of; not having neither, he desires a *country* of long standing, to which he can say he belongs, or from which he can say he is descended. Of all the natural propensities of the human mind no one appears to be more general than a veneration for ancient things. This is a feeling, of which the Americans have been deprived. They are a nation without forefathers, without renown, and without a history. They have no monument of antiquity, to which to point; no memorial of past events; nothing round which to rally; no name, fame, or character to preserve. This, I think, has been the great cause of that total want of principle, which, every one says, has been creeping in upon them ever since the commencement of the revolution. They feel the deprivation of which we have been speaking, and, in their invention of a tutelary saint and the Order of Cincinnati, they have discovered their desire to supply the want of what they have lost. But these are miserable inventions. It is a vile mockery to see a fraudulent shop-keeper, who took up arms for the purpose of resisting the first demands of his creditors, assuming the name of an old Roman, who, after having saved his country in war, returned again to the plough. These tricks do not satisfy even the Americans themselves. They hate England, because she has all her greatness the same as she had before their revolution. They hate, in a less degree, the whole of the old nations of the world. They rejoice at revolution and destruction, wherever it takes place. If their wish were accomplished, there would be left in existence no establishment of more than twenty years standing; the pride of ancestry, the example of noble deeds, the records of genius, of wisdom, and of virtue, would all be annihilated.—The cause of their malice towards England lies, then, very deep. It is not to be removed; and, we have nothing but our *power* to protect us against the hostility, which will be continually therefrom arising. I have often said to them: "You are free, as you say. You boast of your triumph over us. Your happy revolution has been accomplished. You have got from us all you asked for. You have, you say, reduced us to a little nation. Well, then, why do you still hate us? why are such pains taken to rear up your imps of children to curse us; why not bestow on us your *pity*, or, at least, your *contempt*?" They were never able to answer me; and the principal cause of their wicked machinations against me,

was, that I perpetually reminded them of the greatness of England, and forewarned them of the consequences of provoking her hostility. They knew that I spoke the truth; and it was because they felt the truth, that they sought revenge.—America has long been boasting of her *population*. It is probable that she now equals England in that respect. But, where is the equality in point of *force*? When they used to remind me, that, in the course of twenty years, they should have a population equal to ours, I always begged them to bear in mind, that salt-petre and charcoal and sulphur and iron and brass and flint and wood were very impotent materials when lying scattered here and there, but, when formed into a cart-ridge and a musquet, they became formidable means of either protection or destruction; that their nation would still continue to be the scattered materials, and that England would continue to be the loaded musquet. They may now, perhaps, recollect some of my sayings; but, I am afraid, the recollection will only tend to harden their hearts, and, not having me within the reach of their cowardly revenge, induce them afresh to persecute my friends, for which persecution the public distresses will, if their embargo continue, supply them with pretences in abundance.

GENERAL WHITELOCKE.—The trial of this gentleman has, for nearly three months past, been, for the public attention, a formidable rival of the motions for papers and of Angelica Catalani. The two former are now at an end; but Angelica, by her continual refreshers to those worthy gentlemen, who instruct the English people, through the columns of the news-papers, appears to be resolved not to let go her hold of the ass's ears. The green room tribe have heretofore been content with puffs in the third person, sometimes singular and sometimes plural; but, Angelica, apparently despising this English sheepishness, boldly comes forward in the first person singular, and claps her name at the bottom of the bulletins, in which she details to the well-dressed vulgar, the rise and progress of all her quarrels and all her ailings: it is quite a mercy that she forbears to go into other particulars.—The General's trial was, I must confess, very little interesting to me. I was glad, that we did not possess Buenos Ayres, and that for the reasons, which I stated at the time; and, though I was very sorry for the loss of the *men*, I was not one of those, who, without any proof, concluded that the fault was wholly in the commander.—As to "*popular clamour*," I do not see that it has had any *undue* effect. That the

popular cry against him was loud and general it is certain; but, so it always is too against a famous robber, or murderer; yet, we do not conclude that the latter is *innocent* for that reason, nor, that he has, when condemned, had an unfair trial. The public will, and ought to, think, upon such subjects, and, it will, of course, express its opinion.

—The chief thing to be noticed, is, the deplorable *ignorance of the military profession*, which, it has been made to appear, existed in the army sent on the expedition to South America. But, how *can* it be otherwise, when we consider the motives, whence, in general, military officers are promoted? If the same system had prevailed in the French army, for the last fifteen years, France, instead of being the conqueror of Europe, would have been parcelled out between the several kings and princes, whom that army has dethroned.—General Whitelocke appears to have acted the part of a *conceited* man; a man full of himself; a man overbearing and vain; but there is not, in my opinion, the smallest room for suspecting him of any evil intention. That his sentence is just is pretty evident; there can be little doubt of his being wholly unfit to serve in the army; and, there can be as little doubt of his being unfit *before*, as well as since, the expedition to South America.

—Now that he has *failed*, the question comes, “who selected him for the service?” Some say, *Mr. Windham*; others the *Duke of York*. It is asserted, on one side, that Mr. Windham forced him upon the Duke, and, on the other side, that the Duke forced him upon Mr. Windham. Both assertions are, I am well assured, false. Who it was that first mentioned his name, as a fit person for the command, I have not heard; but, I have heard, and from very good authority, that the appointment was determined on in consequence of the strongest recommendations, signed by several of the first officers in the military service. This being the fact (and the reader may rely upon its being so), the army has nothing to complain of, at any rate; for, if the choice was a bad one, the fault rests with the army.—There never would have been any dispute as to this point, had it not been for the workings of faction. Those who send out expeditions are by no means answerable for the conduct of the officers. To make a good choice is the duty of those who choose; but, they must, in most cases, be determined by the judgment of others; and, if an officer presents himself recommended by men eminent in the service, the responsibility does certainly lie upon those

who give the recommendation.—In the circular letter, sent, by order of the Duke of York to the army, the passage which expresses his Majesty’s consolation upon reflecting, that such disgraces as that of Buenos Ayres have never before happened to his army (or words to that amount) gave me great pleasure; for, some how or other, it had, previous to the reading of that letter, run in my head, that there had been, in some instances, affairs of nearly the same sort; and, at the hearing of the intention of trying General Whitelocke for *his life*, I thought the general might well exclaim, in the language of Macbeth, “such things have been done before, and men slept quietly in their beds!” It did seem to me, that I had a faint recollection of an affair, which happened while I was from England, in which a general, after having been beaten in his attempt upon the interior of a country, retreated, with all convenient speed, to the spot where he had first landed, and there entered into a capitulation to evacuate the country in so long a time, and to give up a great number of prisoners, before taken, and elsewhere taken, from the enemy, by whom he had been beaten. I thought I heard of this; but, the circular letter of the Duke of York led me to believe, that it must have been a lie, invented by those sad rogues, the news-paper printers in America; a belief, in which I was confirmed, when I came to reflect, that I never, upon the occasion alluded to, heard of any *court-martial*, or even of any *court of inquiry*; nay, of *no blame* whatever, in any of the abominable and detestable news-papers, who have been so ready to set up a cry upon the present occasion.—I am not at all sorry, observe, for the sentence upon general Whitelocke: I wish, with all my soul, that EVERY one, who has brought disgrace upon the army of England, whether through his cowardice or his stupidity, was, not hanged, or shot; for no man can help being a coward or a fool; no man can help, if such be his weakness, hiding his head, when another looks him full in the face; no man can, if he be half an idiot, help drivelling upon his frill and upon the collar of his coat; but, any man can help wearing a sword and receiving the public money, as a military officer, when he ought to be wheeling a barrow, and to become, himself, as soon as convenient, a wheel-barrow full of carrion. No, not hanged, or shot; but I would have EVERY such man cashiered; because, as his ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF YORK says, in his excellent circular letter, the sentence would be “a

“lasting memorial of the consequences, to
 “which officers expose themselves, who, in
 “the discharge of the important duties con-
 “fided to them, are deficient in that zeal,
 “judgment, and personal exertion, which
 “their sovereign and their country have a
 “right to expect from officers entrusted
 “with high commands.”

Butley, 31st March, 1808.

NATIONAL DEFENCE.

SIR:—As the awful day seems fast ap-
 proaching when England must be fought for
 on English ground, it becomes us to con-
 sider on what principle we are to build our
 defence: that is, whether on that of an
 armed people, or that of a standing army;
 or, in other words, whether as a nation
 under a free or under an arbitrary govern-
 ment. In this inquiry, we must guard
 against being misled, by a sort of mixture
 of these different systems which there may
 appear to be in our military establishments.
 To this end, we have only to distinguish,
 which of the principles the government act
 upon as fundamental and permanent; and
 which they merely tolerate as collateral and
 subsidiary.—The difference between the
 two systems may be tolerably well illustrated,
 by what has fallen within our own expe-
 rience in the last sixteen years.—France
 when attacked in 1792, had not a single
 friend to draw a sword in her behalf; while
 a confederacy was soon formed against her,
 whereof

Millions

The Italian States had a population of	13
Austria.....	23
The Netherlands nearly.....	2
Holland and certain German States above	7
Prussia.....	8
Russia.....	36
And England.....	15
<hr/>	
Making an aggregate of.....	104

The following States looked on,

Switzerland with.....	2
Denmark with.....	2½
Sweden with.....	3
Saxony with.....	2
Portugal with.....	2
And Spain with.....	11
<hr/>	

Making another aggregate of..... 22½

France from the then recent fall of the
 old government, and the tottering infancy
 of the new, was, in the imagination of her
 hunters, already divided as a spoil. They
 fondly thought they had only to enter her

territory, and every one to take his appoint-
 ed share in the division. But these politi-
 cians wholly overlooked one material cir-
 cumstance. They totally forgot that, when
 they confederated, France was free. Feeble
 as was her government, unprepared as were
 her people, yet the nation, because of its
 freedom, was radically strong. The con-
 federacy called forth this strength. The
 magnitude of the assault roused all the
 energies of defence. We know the issue.
 And we likewise know, that the present
 ruler, by the splendour of victories, by
 quartering his armies on his enemies and
 auxiliaries, and by flattering the national
 vanity, has preserved in full vigour under
 his military government, that energy which
 originated in liberty.—Now, Sir, when
 France turned upon her pursuers and hunted
 them in her turn, we see on all occasions
 an issue the reverse of that of her own suc-
 cessful defence; and for this plain reason,
 that the invaded nations were not free. We
 have seen all these states in succession, with
 their numerous millions of inhabitants, that
 might have furnished fighting men enow
 to have trampled their invaders under foot,
 completely conquered, and the greatest of
 them in effect no better now than provinces
 of the French empire. It was not until
 after a contest of fifteen years, that a single
 ray of defensive wisdom beamed or rather
 glimmered on the continent, where the em-
 peror Alexander was said to have armed
 600,000 of his subjects, as a volunteer
 militia: but the truth is, these were the
 slaves of the nobles, and were armed with
 the same jealousy, and precisely on the same
 condition, as English ministers have armed
 English volunteers, that is, for the mere
 occasion, and subject to be dissolved again
 in a moment, by a breath from the lips of
 those ministers—I will not stop to shew
 how, in this respect, ministers have dis-
 obeyed and betrayed the constitution, but
 proceed to remark that the imperial auto-
 crat of all the Russias, with his immense
 standing army, his thirty-six millions of sub-
 jects, and his six hundred thousand volun-
 teers, found his throne endangered by a
 single defeat on the confine of his dominions;
 which obliged him to sign at Tilsit a dis-
 graceful treaty of peace with his enemy.—
 Such are the defensive powers of despotism!
 —Now, Sir, with all this experience before
 our eyes, and with a change of fortune that
 hath thrown into the scale of France above
 one hundred and eight of the aforesaid mil-
 lions of population, to be added to her own
 original numbers, and altogether forming an
 aggregate of full one hundred and thirty

millions, capable of furnishing above twenty millions of soldiers; with all these means, I say, at the command of France, we see English statesmen granting £1,200,000 of our money to Sweden, to a country, whose revenue is perhaps one-fifth of our poor's rate, "to put in motion and keep on a respectable establishment her land forces and part of her fleet, particularly her flotilla," for the purposes of her defence, and without bestowing a single thought on the main spring of that defence, meaning the liberties of the people. Surely, Sir, greater insanity than this, never came under the cognizance of a Willis or a Monroe!—By a vigorous effort, our government possessed itself of the Danish navy and the Island of Zealand, which, with Norway, is no mean portion of the kingdom; and by certain expressions in the northern correspondence laid before parliament, it should seem as if the king of Sweden was privy to that enterprise. I will not now stop to discuss the morality of that expedition. It seems however pretty generally admitted, that, had it been necessary to our own defence, it would have been justifiable. Taking it then also considered by our ministers, and with the views which they might possibly take of approaching danger to England from the Baltic, it seems to me that those ministers did not act consistently with their own principles, by allowing the Island of Zealand, which commands one side of the Sound, to return again into the hands of an exasperated enemy.—I am no advocate for tearing a country and its inhabitants by the sword of war from one monarch to strengthen the hand of another; but when, in the course of a war, a nation can be emancipated from the government of a despot, and restored to its ancient liberty, such an act of power must always command my admiration. Despotism is a perpetual war of the sovereign on his people, and whenever a favourable opportunity, in the course of a war, presents the means of emancipation, I think they ought to be made use of. If, therefore, when Zealand had come under the power of our government, the English commanders had convened the people, laid before them the model of a free government, for themselves and the Norwegians, offering it to their acceptance, subject to such improvements as they themselves should suggest, I do not believe those Danes and Norwegians would have accused us of having coined a "new morality," or that they would have stigmatized us with any opprobrious names.—As those people must have thought themselves too weak to stand alone, they might have had no objec-

tion to have been united with Sweden, provided the same free form of government that was offered to them should have been extended to the Swedes; and if such a reformation in his state had been acceded to by the gallant Gustavus, I cannot see that there could have been any difficulty in Zealand and Norway, containing about a million of inhabitants, having been added to his dominions; and the hearts of the whole people being united in the common defence; while, with English assistance, Zealand should have repelled any attack that could have been made upon it by the French.—Under such circumstances, and by a training of the whole people to arms, agreeably to the genius of every free government, the continent might yet have beheld a spectacle, to have put to shame the rest of her degenerate sons, and to have covered with infamy those of her sovereigns, who, rather than give liberty to their people, have licked the dust at the feet of a foreign conqueror.—Even in Gustavus's present situation, his case, if he have real wisdom and magnanimity, is not to be despaired of; but it is absurd to suppose, that, if he shall refuse to give his people freedom, his throne either can, or will be defended. If there be an immense disparity of force between him and his enemies, there are great advantages in the situation, and circumstances of his kingdom. With those advantages on his side, and with the naval assistance of England, he would probably frustrate all attempts at his subjugation, provided his people had the same interest as himself in the common defence. He is doubtless in the crisis of his fate; and it is probable we shall shortly see him, either a patriot and triumphant hero, or a miserable pensioner on the bounty of this country; in which latter case we may expect to see both shores of the Sound in possession of Denmark.—This consideration revives in my mind apprehensions I have long entertained, and have on more occasions than one formerly intimated; respecting all the powers of the Baltic being enrolled among the number of our enemies. Nor is this apprehended danger like to come upon us alone, in addition to those we had already to encounter. When the whole coast of continental Europe shall form one uninterrupted line of hostility, with a sea at each extremity into which we cannot enter, our situation will require talents for government and for defence, and virtues for inspiring the people with attachment and confidence, which we have not yet witnessed among any of those who are either possessors of, or competitors for, the power of ruling over us. In any

individual port that we can blockade, a cooped-up enemy is kept in a state of torpidity, not favourable to naval improvement; but if the Sound and the Dardanelles be once shut against us, our enemies will then have within those passages extensive seas, which may be made both nurseries and schools for very numerous bodies of seamen, where they may be trained to naval war in defiance of us.—That we can be shut out of the Dardanelles we know; but whether the same can be done at the entrances into the Baltic, when all the shores shall be in the hands of an energetic enemy, I will not pretend to decide. But at all events our danger from invasion is rapidly growing to a magnitude, not only to demand for the preservation of our country every hand that can grasp a weapon; but a removal of all rankling discontents, by an honest and substantial redress of grievances. To our defence reformation is at length become as necessary, as arms and ammunition. I particularly mean that which includes in it every practicable correction of state abuses and corruptions, namely, a reformation of the House of Commons; far more than half the seats of which it is universally believed are become the private and hereditary possessions, of those who are collectively called the Borough Faction. If this be true, the liberty of our country is lost: and if this liberty shall not be speedily restored, there needs no ghost to tell us, our country cannot be defended.—If we could suppose our borough-holding grandees to desire that Napoleon should have our country, and his generals their estates, their present conduct would be quite consistent. On any other supposition, it is inexplicable. But as national defence is now a subject much studied, I trust its true principles will soon be universally understood.—I remain, Sir, &c. JOHN CARTWRIGHT.—*Enfield, 20th March 1808.*

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.

SIR,—I am induced by the letter of an American merchant, which appeared in the last number of your Register, to trouble you with a few lines on the point upon which that writer chiefly relies for the support of his argument.—I say, Sir, and I suspect that I know somewhat more of these matters than the American merchant, that the letter which has been so often quoted from M. Decrès to Gen. Armstrong is *no authority at all* for the latter to assume that American vessels were to be exempted from the decree of the 21st Nov. 1806.—I say further that, if Gen. Armstrong knew any thing at all of

the functions of his office, and of the course of transacting diplomatic business at Paris, he must have very well known that the letter he had received from M. Decrès did not invalidate the obnoxious decree. Is it indeed in any way probable that Bonaparté would allow an act of supreme legislation signed by himself, and destined to controul every power in Europe, to be explained away by the crude and unauthorised opinion of his minister of marine? But, Sir, independent of this general argument, it is well known that the minister of marine is not the competent authority from which Mr. Armstrong could receive any official communication on the subject, and, unless M. Decrès stated himself (which he did not) to be writing by order, and in the name of his master, his sentiments were no more conclusive than those of any other individual of whom the American minister might have asked advice.—In fact, M. Decrès was well aware of this, and, at the end of his letter, refers the general for a further and more decisive opinion to the *minister for foreign affairs*. He, of course, did not mean to say that the treaty between France and America would be violated; but as little does he say that the Berlin decree should not be enforced.—Who was the proper organ through which the foreign ministers resident at Paris were to communicate with the French government?—No other than Charles Maurice Talleyrand, viceroy Prince of Benevento, and such was the jealousy of the said prince and his master upon this subject that I have known them reprimand the ambassadors of some of their vassal counts for addressing themselves upon occasions of very inferior importance to the heads of other departments.—M. Talleyrand was, as I remember, absent at the time from Paris: but, do you think, Sir, that he did not, on notifying his departure to the corps diplomatique, name the person in his office with whom they were to communicate in his absence? Depend upon it that upon that, as upon other occasions, their communications were to be received by the *Chef de Bureau* in the *Rue du Bac*, to be decided upon by him, or to be by him forwarded, if the decision was beyond his competence, to the minister himself. Why then was this channel not used, and why was M. Decrès resorted to?—Why, Sir, because M. Talleyrand would either have given no answer at all, and thus have confirmed the Americans' fears, or he must have denied the application of the decree to American commerce and navigation. It was beyond the powers of ambiguity even of a Talleyrand to avoid giving in such a case a

significant, if not a plain answer, to a plain question.—It was, therefore, a convenient expedient to make the minister of another department, write a demi-official letter which you justly observe, says nothing to the main point, thus leaving both parties at liberty to avail themselves of the subterfuge :—the Americans by saying that Decrès's letter served them as an exemption,—the French by maintaining that no such exemption had been granted by any competent authority.—The latter it is clear by the decree from Milan of the 11th December last is the French understanding of the matter, nor has the contrary been maintained. It has never been said that the French acknowledged having exempted the Americans, (Regnier in his report states the direct contrary) only that the latter chose to construe Decrès's letter into an exemption :—with what reason or justice I have already told you.—AN ENGLISHMAN.—*London 28th March 1808.*

ON WAR.

SIR,—I perceive that you have inserted in your Register of the 12th instant, a paper of mine, dated February the 15th, written in consequence of some observations made by you in your first letter to Mr. Roscoe, upon the general question of war; which were intended by you as an ethical explanation of the subject, preparatory to subsequent remarks more immediately connected with the politics of the present day. In that paper, with a view of giving as clear a statement of my ideas as I thought was adapted to the importance of the question, I divided the argument into four distinct parts: two of which were employed to prove that a tendency to war, is not, as you have stated, naturally implanted in the mind; but, that it proceeds from a desire of acquiring some object supposed to be capable of affording gratification to the party engaged in the mean of action; which object is to be attained by this mean only, or is, perhaps, more readily to be attained by it, in preference to any other. The third and fourth topics, that remain to be considered, and on which, you will observe, you and I are less at variance than on the former; apply equally to the question originally introduced by you, and are, probably, objects more likely to meet with general attention: I shall, therefore, resume the discussion in the order I set out with.—III. Now, Sir, as I have admitted that a tendency to war exists, but have endeavoured to prove that this tendency is not instinctive; it may, perhaps, appear strange that mankind, in its early state,

should have ever thought of attacking one another, if they had not been guided to it by a natural propensity: and yet, it seems stranger, nay, even more unnatural, that they should have ever thought of respectively arming two bodies of their own species; for the express purpose of murdering each other, as it is called, in cold blood. To consider these acts according to the doctrine, that I have previously maintained, that men are led to fight from the desire of possessing certain objects; it will be necessary to examine into the nature of such objects, in order that we may be enabled to determine upon the third article of my arrangement, viz. the good or evil resulting from a tendency to war, or, the operation of its effects upon society at large.—In the first formation of society, a disposition to war must have been far more general than it is at this time: every man, in fact, became a sort of warrior from absolute necessity; in as far as, without engaging in pursuits of a sanguinary and warlike nature, it was impossible for him to provide the necessaries of life, and to defend himself from beasts of prey. At length, from slaying certain animals to satisfy his hunger, and from sacrificing others to render him more secure; his hands were continually imbrued in blood, and his mind was habitually accustomed to the most disgusting scenes of slaughter and barbarity: the natural ferocity of his temper was increased: his imagination,—from associating the ideas of slaying and of food, the last of which could only be procured through the medium of the first; from anticipating, I say, the enjoyment of the food, not only became reconciled to the slaughter, but took a pleasure in contemplating the act, as preparatory to the gratification of his appetite. In this state, it is not to be supposed that society entertained much sense of right or wrong: their calls were all of them essential, and all of them of the same nature. Is it to be wondered at then, that,—seeing their usual occupation, seeing their dispositions infected with a love of blood, and, moreover, reflecting upon the difficulties they must have encountered to obtain these accommodations, wretched as they were; they should be urged to the destruction of one another, provided, by this step, they were likely to gratify their wants with greater ease, or in greater plenty! From this, it must appear that the *objects*, for which mankind originally fought, were sensual: of which, indeed, a most striking example is presented to us by Garcilasso de la Vega, who makes mention of a nation in South America that went to war with other tribes,

with a view of violating the female captives that might be taken, whom they, afterwards, confined until the delivery of their offspring, which (shocking to relate) were fattened, torn from their mothers, barbarously murdered and eaten by their inhuman fathers! Such an instance of unnatural depravity is scarcely credible: the mind sickens at the thought of it, and is appalled at the profligacy of the race!—But, without going to these extreme cases, it is easy to shew that, as mankind advanced in civilization, the *objects*, for which they fought, were more rational: their wars, by being conducted by persons regularly embodied, were less bloody, less brutal, and less frequent. Heretofore, in this country, when, in feudal times, one lord made war upon another; the objects, they had in view, were mostly selfish, and the lives of their respective vassals were sacrificed to gratify some private passion of envy, jealousy, or revenge; to all of which, by our present mode of warfare, men engaged in battle are superior: and if, as is generally the case, the motives, that induce them to engage, are not so disinterested as they are frequently supposed to be; yet, when they are once in action, the motives are forgotten, magnanimity is displayed, every noble feeling is summoned on the occasion, and, instead of being egged on, as in former times, by personal malice and ill-will, each party strives to gain its end in a manner as little destructive to the other, as it can. Hence, we see that modern warfare has the advantage of that anciently in use: it is better calculated not only to repress the gross passions of mankind, but to substitute noble virtues in their room. This is greatly to be attributed to the *objects* being of a different description; but, more especially, to what is sometimes inconsiderately condemned as a proceeding repugnant to every principle of justice: I mean the fighting, as it were by proxy, in the person of an army. Surely, Mr. Cobbett, if war be necessary, (and, from the experience history affords us, it is unavoidable) it is better that it should be carried on by men who are capable of exercising discretion, of discriminating with judgment, and of acting with moderation; than by others, who blinded by their passion, think of nothing but gratifying their will, and, having lost their reason, descend to a state of intemperate brutality.—By a little farther consideration, it must appear still more evident that our present system of warfare is superior; and the notions of injustice, cruelty, and immorality attached to raising standing armies, whose business it is occasionally to fight, is a vulgar preju-

dice arising from a supposition that if such bodies were not instituted, mankind would live in peace. That this, however, would not be the case, it is humbly presumed, the preceding remarks have shewn: for, if the practice (which is itself one of the refinements of civilization) were abolished; all other improvements would decline: science, trade, and arts, no longer would be protected; and the country, wherein the abolition took place, would be reduced to a state of abject slavery to another power, by which it had not been carried into effect: or, in the event of its being universally adopted, mankind would gradually revert to its original situation of uncultivated ferocity. In aid of this, it need only be observed that civilization results, by degrees, from a spirit of warfare continually kept alive: I say *continually*, because, if the acquirement of the first object (for new objects will arise in order one after the other) be sufficient to subdue that spirit for a time; the nation which is so satisfied will never make any considerable progress: it is liable to relapse, in the interim, to its former state of barbarity, from which, each successive spirit would only be sufficient to recover it to the situation, it had, in the first instance arrived at; whence, it would again decline, and so, alternately, flow and ebb, without advancing one jot beyond the point, it had originally gained. If the Americans before alluded to had kept alive their spirit, instead of kindling it every now and then to gratify their appetites; they would, in the first place, have been better employed, and, in the next, have been made sensible of the criminality of their conduct. By way of example, take into consideration the practice of the Romans; who, in the infancy of their establishment, actuated by revenge, had recourse to a measure in a very slight degree similar, with a view, principally, of resenting an affront, they had received: after having accommodated their differences with the Sabines, a war with whom, their conduct naturally produced; they did not, however, rest at home, in indolent possession of the objects they had acquired; they did not give themselves up to, what might then be called, luxury and ease; but preserved their spirit of military enterprise, and, in the reign of their sixth king, found themselves in a condition to send out an army of 80,000 men. As they advanced in civilization, their military strength increased; so much so, that, in the time of the commonwealth (not long before Hannibal appeared) they were able, comprehending the neighbouring states in alliance with them, to muster, in the invasion made upon them by the Gauls,

700,000 foot, and 70,000 horse; and of themselves, including only Rome and Campania, they could bring into the field, 250,000 foot, and 23,000 horse! At these times, it is reported, Rome was in a higher state of civilization, than at any other respectively preceding them; and in proportion as its military establishment increased, so did the virtue of its people: which proves that a tendency to war, instead of generating immoral actions, and promoting vicious habits, elevates the mind, purifies human nature, and divests it of its sensualities. From which, however, is not to be inferred that a nation, to be prosperous, must always be at war: the objects, for which its spirit should be kept alive, are not so much the extension of its dominion, as the retention of that which it may be possessed of: if vigilance be employed in the proper direction of a tendency to war, few objects will stimulate more powerfully than jealousy of encroachment, either upon the territory itself or upon the privileges of its constitution; and a good government will always be jealous of the movements of its neighbours, whereby, (without being petulant or bickering for trifles) circumstances will occur sufficiently often to give an opportunity of combining practice with the theory. In short, for a nation to be secure in the maintenance of its dignity, and to have the power of prosecuting those measures that will give permanency to its existence; it is absolutely necessary that it should be prepared to resist encroachment, and possess the means of correcting insolence; without resorting, upon every occasion, to the efforts of its people indiscriminately amassed together; by which, the economy of its administration would be deranged, and its progress in refinement unavoidably retarded.—IV. To determine upon the fourth and last point that remains to be considered, viz. the advantages or disadvantages of a tendency to war, when compared with a disposition to peace; it is material to inquire if mankind, in a state of peace, is less averse to the destruction of one another, than in time of open war? In resolving this inquiry, it will be found that the grosser passions (to gratify which, it has been presumed, the spirit of warfare took its rise) are more readily wrought upon and less easily satisfied in peace than in open war: the absence of the nobler virtues, such as courage, fortitude and perseverance, giving in this instance, upon the same principle as in the last, a greater latitude to the will; though, at the same time, preventing its being exercised to the full extent, by fear, weakness, and irre-

solution being substituted in their stead. Hence it is that less real devastation is committed in those nations mostly living in a state of peace, than in others more frequently engaged in war; but, it is to be observed, that, in the former, attempts are often made to sacrifice human life to become possessed of certain objects; the only difference between them being, that, in the latter, open measures are employed (if any are employed at all) to effect the same purposes, which gives the party that is attacked an opportunity of exerting himself in his defence; while, in the other, insidious operations are directed against him, which, in the end, prove equally destructive, but are projected and carried into execution without endangering the aggressor.—That a disposition to peace generates *cowardice* cannot, for a moment, be disputed; and that “*cowardice is the mother of cruelty*,” is a position as generally admitted. Of these two facts, we have a prominent instance in the Chinese nation; which has been noticed by you, Mr. Colbitt, as an example of the effects of a people living in an almost perpetual state of peace! So mean and dastardly are their spirits, that, it is recorded by modern historians, the very act of laying hand upon the hilt of a sword is sufficient to make them tremble from head to foot; and he must be a man, the nerves of whose system are of a more firm and tense nature than is ordinarily the case, who can support himself from fainting at an exhibition of the blade! And yet, Sir, this is the nation whose refinement in cruelty, is such, as to display, in its code of penal laws, punishments far more excruciating than are adopted, or even known, in other countries where a disposition to war exists: in addition to breaking upon the rack, they have recourse to ham-stringing, burning out the eye-sight with unslaked lime, and many other tortures that are neither fit nor necessary to be spoken of. But, in no instance, is the abominable inhumanity of this people more conspicuous, than in the unnatural sin of infanticide, which is carried to such an extent, that, in the streets of Peking alone, it is estimated, from two to three thousand babes are annually exposed, to fall a prey, both alive and dead, to the dogs and swine that roam about in search of food! The very few times they have been engaged in war, the same cowardice has displayed itself, and has urged them to extremes as ridiculous as they were pusillanimous: in an account of the invasion of Yecuman, (one of their provinces,) it is reported, the inhabitants were so terrified, that, in order to avoid the enemy, they absolutely hanged and

drowned themselves for fear!—But it is needless to dwell any longer upon this despicable race: let us take another view at the Romans, who, by means of a tendency to war, raised themselves from a petty tribe of plundering shepherds to a great and wealthy people, who were, at once, the awe, the wonder, and yet the admiration of their contemporaries; and are, even in these days, holden up as an example of fortitude, dignity and valour worthy of imitation. By suffering their military spirit to decline, however; by giving themselves up to the luxuries of peace; and by relinquishing pursuits of a warlike nature (most likely, *for want of objects* sufficiently attractive; for they had arrived at their *ne plus ultra*, in point of dominion): this nation, this terror of the world, this conquering race of heroes was reduced to the extremity of employing hireling troops to fight its battles, which, as may be naturally expected, led to a total overthrow of the empire. The Greeks (another nation equally renowned, in history) shared the same fate, by suffering their warlike tendency to decline; so that, when attacked, in the fifteenth century, by the Turks, they were under the necessity of leaving their defence to mercenary soldiers. It being impossible to prevail upon a single native to take up arms on the occasion; in consequence of which, they, also, fell an easy prey to the ambition of their enemies.—In short, Sir, let it be considered in which way you please, a tendency to war, under proper restrictions, is not only preferable to a tendency to peace; but is essentially important to the interests of a nation. Even in private society, with the best intentions in the world, it is almost impossible to go through life without creating enemies; and it must not therefore be expected, that a nation, which is an object of universal observation, can long exist in perfect harmony and peace. War, when considered by itself, is, like most other measures that cause the shedding of human blood, hurtful to the mind and repugnant to the feelings; but, as I observed particularly in my first letter, it is not the medium, but the object, that is to be looked at: and, moreover, in support of what I then said, respecting the connexion between virtue and public happiness, it is worthy of remark, that, although the objects, which operate individually upon the respective inclinations of some men, are such as induce them to engage in war from a principle of self interest; yet, the common object to be attained by the joint influence of their exertions, can never be inconsistent with the principles of virtue, if that war be, strictly speaking, “a just

and necessary measure.” It is irrational, then, to inveigh indiscriminately, against war, without examining into the *objects*, for which it is carried on; it is folly to stigmatize it with the cant phrases of modern philosophy, without looking into the principle, upon which it is conducted. Let the object be proved defective; shew its error, and point out a remedy; and if, after this, (no matter whether the issue of the contest turn out favourable or not) war be prosecuted and human life sacrificed; then may it, with great propriety, be called a wanton waste of blood, and a pure, unadulterated evil. That this, very often, is the case, no person can deny; but then, it is not a sufficient reason why the proceeding should altogether be condemned: there are few measures, however excellent in their nature, but are subject to being misapplied, and it not unfrequently happens, that this very excellence in their nature, renders them the more liable to perversion. I am, therefore, Sir, inclined to agree with you perfectly in opinion, that war, generally speaking, is “a good; though, like the greater part of other good things, not unminged with evil.”—I remain, Sir, yours, &c.—W. S. L.—*Holborn, March 10, 1808.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

RUSSIA.—*Memorial presented to Count Romanzoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, by the English Merchants resident at St. Petersburg, the result of which was the notification by the Count that the Passports required would be granted.*—Feb. 28, 1808.

We, the English Merchants who had the honour of waiting on your excellency on Saturday morning, take the liberty of stating to your excellency in writing certain points of our conversation, to which we are most particularly desirous of drawing the attention of your excellency—Your excellency was good enough to assure us, that our detention here was only a measure of precaution, adopted until information should be received of the manner in which Russian merchants should be treated in England. On this subject, permit us most positively to assure your excellency, that all our advices from England agree in stating, that neither the property nor the persons of Russian merchants are in any way molested; and it is with the utmost deference that we presume to suggest to your excellency, that had such steps been resorted to in England, the sufferers would long since have made known their case to their friends here, and that it must have been communicated to your excellency. Al-

though an embargo was laid on Russian shipping, in consequence of the detention of British ships in this country, yet the lenient measures adopted on that occasion by his Imperial Majesty's government were not without their effect on ours.—We have now certain information, by letters of 22d Dec. (N. S.) that the embargo has not only been taken off, but an Order of Council has been issued, permitting the cargoes of all vessels which may have sailed from the ports of Russia before the 1st of January to be delivered to the consignees, and after receiving their freights, &c. allowing the ships themselves, as in time of peace, to return. We trust your excellency will not consider the adoption of hostile steps by the English government against ships of war and their crews (the obvious and almost necessary consequence of the unfortunate misunderstanding betwixt the two countries), as just cause for detaining the persons of merchants, or other private individuals: and it ought still less to affect us, who, during a long residence in Russia, have endeavoured by loyalty and good conduct, to merit a continuance of that generous protection which we have hitherto enjoyed. We further beg leave to add, that we have discharged every debt, and that in the event of our departure, no inconsiderable property will remain under sequestration. Most of our relatives have ceased to write to us, under the pleasing expectation of soon seeing us, whence our family affairs, which now demand our whole attention, as the sole means of future subsistence, suffer not a little, whilst the absence of all occupation renders us doubly sensible to the painful uncertainty of our situations. —Under these impressions we once more beg to recommend our cause to your excellency's protection; and from the favourable manner in which your excellency was pleased to express your sentiments on the subject, we ventured to persuade ourselves that your excellency will represent our case in such a point of view to the higher powers, as to produce the removal of those obstacles which have so long interposed to prevent our departure. —According to your excellency's permission, we inclose a list of the names of the young men (*élèves*) in the different counting-houses, to whose peculiar situation we claimed your excellency's attention, and in whose behalf you so kindly promised your interference. We answer for their never having been engaged in commerce, either directly or indirectly.

HOLLAND.—*Decree issued by the King of Holland, dated Jan. 24, 1808, relative to the abrogation of the Knipphausen flag.*

Louis Napoleon, by the Grace of God and the constitution of the kingdom, King of Holland, and Constable of France,—Pursuant to the actual ratification of the treaty concluded at Fontainebleau, on the 11th of Nov. 1807, by which the Lordships of Knipphausen and Varel, are united to this kingdom, in like manner as the territories which are comprised in the possessions of the princes, constituting a part of the confederacy of the Rhine, we have decreed and do hereby decree as follows:—**Art. I.** The Knipphausen flag being abrogated in consequence of the union of that territory with this kingdom, shall be no longer recognized, or valid. The consuls and other agents of Count Bentinck, as Lord of Varel and Knipphausen, shall be no longer recognized in the said capacities.—**II.** All inhabitants of the Knipphausen and Varel territories shall be at liberty to carry Dutch colours. They are charged to change the antient colours, which they may have belonging to their vessels, the same being utterly cancelled.—**III.** All requests made to Count Bentinck, for leave to sail under the ancient flag, shall immediately be sent to our Minister of Finance.—**IV.** Our Ministers of Finance, of the interior, of Justice and Police, and of Marine, are charged with the execution of the present decree, which shall be made public in all places where it may be deemed necessary.

FRANCE.—*A Senatus Consultum, of the 10th Feb. 1808, published by order of the French Government, contains the following dispositions.*

Art. I. Such foreigners as shall render, or have rendered eminent services to the state, or who possessed particular talents, shall settle in France, and introduce there any useful invention or branch of industry, shall, after twelve months residence, enjoy all the rights of French citizens.—**2.** This privilege shall be conferred to them by our special decree, by virtue of the report of a minister, after the council of state shall have been heard.—**3.** A copy of the said decree shall be delivered to the foreigners so naturalized, signed by the grand judge, minister of justice.—**4.** With this copy he shall present himself before the municipality of the place where he means to reside, and take the oath of obedience to the constitution of the empire, and of allegiance to the Emperor.

" France has but to suspend her navigation laws and the seas are filled with vessels that bring home her commerce. The English cruizers have domineered over the sea; but, like crows, that are scared by a bundle of rags, no sooner does a piece of bunting, marked with thirteen stripes, depend from the mast head, than our brave sailors are compelled to sheer off, and the wealth and commerce of France are carried as safely over the Atlantic, as if lodged in a British 74. She has millions floating which no enemy can reach; she enjoys every benefit of her colonies without the risk of capture or detention; she may fit out nothing but privateers and cruizers to attack our trade, and distress our colonies, whilst her own are beyond the efforts of our armed vessels. She lets out her colonies to farm upon a rack rent, which rent she is sure to receive, as she is the only customer for the neat produce; and thus, by a contrivance as ingenious and fortunate for herself, as it is ruinous for us, she unites the whole benefits of war with all the security of peace."—BELL'S WEEKLY MESSENGER, previous to the issuing of the Orders in Council.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—I was in hopes, that, after my last number, there would have been no further necessity of saying any thing more about this enemy in disguise; but, a publication, which has appeared under the title of a Debate in the House of Lords, and which publication includes certain resolutions, said to have been proposed to that House by Lord Holland (one of the persons who negotiated and concluded the treaty sent back by Mr Thomas Jefferson), demands particular attention. There are other subjects, which, in point of national importance, would command a preference, such, for instance, as the proceedings upon the *reversion bill*; but, this subject commands a preference in point of *time*. The American new negociators are coming; and, it is expedient that the public be put upon its guard against the numerous tricks, which the American fundholders and merchants will play off, while the negociation is going on. The debate took place on the 29th of last month, and the resolutions, proposed by Lord Holland, were as follows:—"I. That it appears to this house, that his majesty hath been advised, without any alleged provocation from the United States of America, to issue Orders in Council, on and subsequent to the 11th of Nov. 1807, for interrupting nearly the whole of the commerce of the said states with the continent of Europe; for limiting such trade to be carried on in future through British ports only (with the exception of neutral and allied ports in certain cases) thereby exposing it to such restrictions and duties, and even prohibitions, as the government of Great Britain may think fit to impose upon it; and for confiscating the property of the citizens of the said states, in all cases where the

" same shall be accompanied by particular documents certifying the place of its growth or manufacture.—II. That it appears to this house, that previous to the issuing of the said Orders in Council, a negociation had been carried on between this country and the United States of America for the maintenance of peace and friendship between them, and that a treaty had been actually signed respecting some of the most material points in discussion; that a desire had been expressed by the government of the said United States for the addition of certain other provisions to the said treaty, and that a proposal was made for renewing the negociation for that purpose; but that this offer was abruptly and intemperately rejected by his majesty's ministers.—III. That at the time when the said Orders were issued, his majesty's ministers had recently received from the ministers of the United States in this kingdom assurances that the injurious decrees of his majesty's enemies had not, in any one instance, been executed against the commerce or navigation of the United States: and that from all that had passed subsequent to the issuing of the said decrees, his majesty's ministers had every reason to conclude, that any attempt of the enemy so to execute the same, would be decidedly resisted by the government of the United States; whereby it must have happened, either that the said decrees would have continued to be wholly nugatory and ineffectual, or that the enemy, by endeavouring to enforce the same, would have driven the United States into a closer connection with this country.—IV. That it appears to this house, that the Order issued by his majesty in council, on the 7th of Jan 1807, was not intended to

interrupt neutrals in a commerce of discharge from port to port of the enemies' territories; that such was understood to be its legal construction by those who were in his majesty's service at the time the said Order was issued; and that an explanation to that effect was given by them to the Danish minister, in an official note dated on the 17th of March, 1807.—V. That in a note from the American Secretary of State to Mr. Erskine, dated on the 20th of the same month, considerable uneasiness was expressed, under an apprehension of a contrary interpretation of the said Order: That although the above mentioned note was actually received by his majesty's present ministers in the month of April last, yet no steps have been taken thereon up to the present hour, for removing the unfounded apprehensions of the American government on a point to which they appear to have attached so much importance: That by this omission, much unnecessary irritation has been suffered to prevail in America, long after it was in the power of his majesty's ministers to have effectually removed the same; and fresh obstacles to conciliation and friendship have thus wantonly been interposed.—VI. That it is, therefore, the opinion of this house, that the said Orders are in themselves unjust and impolitic; that the issuing of them at the time, and under the circumstances above mentioned, was an act of the utmost improvidence and rashness; and that, by abruptly breaking off a friendly negotiation, and withholding a satisfactory explanation on a point, on which it might have been given with so much ease and advantage, his majesty's ministers have acted in disregard of our true policy, which is to cultivate the friendship of a nation, whose interests and prosperity are so intimately interwoven with our own; and have conducted themselves in a manner the least adapted to enable his majesty to maintain that maritime superiority, on which the greatness, and even the existence of his empire so much depend.”—These resolutions were negatived by a very great majority; but, that is not quite sufficient to satisfy me. I wish to shew my readers, that they merited their fate.—The first resolution barely states well-known facts, except as far as relates to the provocation given by America. It was, upon that ground, perhaps, proper to negative the resolution; else I, for my part, should have been glad to see it pass in the affirmative; for, certainly, one object of the Orders in

Council was to knock up the trade of America with France and all her dependent states.—The second resolution censures the refusal, on the part of the present ministers, to resume the negotiation with America upon the basis of the treaty, which Mr. Thomas Jefferson had sent back, with marginal notes, like amended articles of capitulation. “The American government,” Lord Holland's resolution says, “expressed to have certain conditions added to the said treaty, and proposed to renew the negotiation, for that purpose; but, that this proposal was *intemperately* rejected by his Majesty's present ministers.” To those, who had thought it quite becoming in a king of England to enter upon a negotiation respecting objects, in order to accomplish which, the other party had passed an act of non-importation; to men who could advise the king to enter upon a negotiation with an openly avowed rod shaking over his shoulders; to men of this humble and submissive cast of mind, the turning of the poor worm, when trodden upon, would, doubtless, appear to be an act of “intemperance.” But, to those who have not the good fortune to be made wholly of earth, I think, that the rejection of the proposition of Mr. Thomas Jefferson will appear to have been marked with mildness, rather than with intemperance. The case stood thus: Thomas wished to obtain from England several concessions, the chief of which was, that she should, by positive stipulation, give up her right to search for her own seamen, on board of American ships, such ships being in all parts of the world, and every where offering to our sailors the easy means of desertion. In order to accomplish his objects, Thomas (his christian name, like that of any other potentate, is enough) sends an embassy to England, or rather, he sends over a negotiator to assist his minister already here. But, lest the eloquence of these two should fail, he procures to be passed, previous to the departure of his negotiator, an act of Congress, enabling him, whenever he should judge proper, to prohibit the importation of certain English goods; or, in other words, to cramp and embarrass, as he and the Congress thought, the commerce and the finances of England; and this act, it was openly declared, was intended to be put in execution, the moment England refused to make the demanded concessions. Under such circumstances would you, reader, had you been a minister of England, have advised the king of England to enter upon a negotiation with Thomas? Who, amongst my readers, is there, owing a sum of money to his

neighbour, and seeing that neighbour accompany his demand of payment with the shaking of a horsewhip at the creditor; who, amongst the English people, is there, that would, under such circumstances, consent, for one moment, even to *talk* about the debt? Which of them would not say: "lay down your whip; beg my pardon for the outrageous insult; and then I will discuss with you the subject of your demand, but "until you do that, I set you at defiance?"

If such ought to be the conduct of every man, in the case of a *just* demand, accompanied with an insulting threat, what ought to be his conduct in the case of an *unjust* demand, accompanied with a similar threat?

Yet did the late ministry enter on a negotiation without saying, as far as the public has heard, one single syllable about the non-importation act, which was suspended from time to time, in order to see how they would behave. Their treaty was, at last, returned by Mr. Thomas Jefferson, accompanied with the "additions," which he wished to have made. "No," said the present ministers,

"we will not *renew* the old negotiation with you. We shall be happy to treat with you upon a *new* basis; but, we will have nothing to do with the amended articles of capitulation." As a step *previous*

to negotiation, *they* would, I hope, have demanded a repeal of the non importation act; a laying aside of the horse-whip. It is said, that "America has a right to pass what laws she pleases to regulate the trade carried on with her." Very true;

and we have just as good a right to determine whether we shall enter upon a negotiation with her, or not. Your taylor, for instance, has an undoubted right to buy his cloth of another draper, and not of you; but, have you not as good a right to employ another taylor? I know there is no *law* to prevent the Americans from being outrageously insolent to us; but, I also know, that there is no law to prevent us from resenting that insolence.

Let them pass acts of non-importation, 'till the very stones in the street rise up against their stupid vanity; but, let not the said acts be pointed solely at England; let them not think to bully us out of any thing.

Mr. Canning's letter, refusing to renew the negotiation upon the basis of the amended articles of capitulation (for I can call the treaty nothing else), was, in my opinion, rather too condescending towards America. It did resent the insult; but, it did not resent it in terms sufficiently strong.

Tameness towards America has, all along, been the fault of England; nor need we much wonder at it, when we consider the

great influence, the numerous *votes*, of those, who, either directly or indirectly, have been, and still are, so deeply interested in the funds and lands and trade of America.

The questions, which I, some time ago, put to Mr. Alexander Baring, touching his American citizenship; his ownership of American vessels; his trade in those vessels to the countries of our enemy; and his ownership of American stock, being the amount of the loan, with which America purchased Louisiana of France: these questions that famous petitioner, and his no less famous publisher, of the *Morning Chronicle*, have suffered to remain unanswered. The process, by which we were to be *done* out of our maritime rights was curious enough.

"King Cong" talks big and threatens. His fund and land and ship owners here assemble, issue their circular letters, plague the ministers, and, at last, come to parliament with a petition, in which they declare, that unless matters are arranged with "King Cong," England will be ruined. He brags of his resources and his power; but they talk of his inability to pay them, if England destroy his trade. He cuts off his resources by his own act, and his minions here blame the ministers for making him poor.

"You shall yield to me," says he, "your right of searching for seamen, or I will pass a non-importation act and lay an embargo." For God's sake," cry the minions, "prevent his passing the act and laying the embargo, for, if he does it, we shall not be paid what he owes us;" and, it follows, of course, that we are to yield to him the right, for that only will prevent him from passing his act and laying his embargo.

It was upon the influence of this his faction here, that "King Cong" relied for the carrying of his ends; and, if the late ministers had remained in power, there is, I think, sufficient proof, that he would have succeeded.—To the third resolution of Lord Holland, the letter which will be found at the end of this Summary may serve as an answer.—*What reason* had "the ministers

"to conclude, that any attempt of the enemy to execute the decree would be decidedly resisted by America?" What reason? I can discover none, any where; and as to the "*driving*" of the United States into

"a closer connection with this country," alas for the poor nation, if governed by men who could really entertain the hope. Let Lord Holland read Mr. Thomas Jefferson's newspapers, of which I will presently give him a few extracts, and then talk, if he can, about America being driven into a closer connection with England.—The fourth

and fifth resolutions shew, that, if the late ministers did understand their own Order in Council, nobody else did.—The sixth resolution, which is a recapitulation of the former ones, contains, besides, the sentiment, that it is our true policy to cultivate the friendship of America, because “her interests and prosperity are *intimately interwoven with our own*.” The close of his lordship’s speech, as reported in the Morning Chronicle, before referred to, amplifies the expression of this sentiment. “When we saw all Europe under the dominion of one man, pressing and urging forward plans inimical to the interests and happiness of mankind, we might have looked to America for that order of things, congenial with our own feelings and our own views; and as forming a counterpoise to the power of the ruler of the continent.” What does this mean, reader? I fancy it must mean, that, if the Orders in Council had not been issued, America would have joined us against France. If this be not the meaning, I am sure I do not know what it is, and cannot even guess what it is. But, if this be the meaning of his lordship, I venture to assert, that his lordship has been most grossly deceived. The Berlin decree was passed long before Mr. Jefferson made his last Congress speech; long before the American newspapers proposed a subscription for giving rewards to deserters from our ships of war; long before our men were inveigled away at Norfolk and New York; long before the toasts about the “liberty of the seas” at Rochefort and St. Petersburg. But, Lord Holland and others have asserted, that the embargo arose out of our Orders in Council, and they have appealed to the American newspapers for proof of the truth of this assertion. Let us, reader, appeal to those same newspapers. In the *AURORA*, a paper devoted to Mr. Jefferson, the “chief cause” of the embargo is stated, as follows: “A proclamation of the British government, asserting her right, and declaring her determination to pursue a line of conduct on the ocean incompatible with the hitherto universally acknowledged laws of nations, a conduct which has been the subject of dispute between that government and ours for several years past, and to which she was well assured, that we could not assent, without sacrificing our national honour and independence.” This is stated as the chief cause of the embargo; and, though it appears, that our approaching Orders of Council had some weight, what is the consequence, seeing that Thomas and the Congress appear not to have relinquished

the project of forcing us to abandon the right of search? Embargo or war or some hostile act must have come; and, therefore, it is not the Orders of Council, but the resolution of England not to yield her maritime rights, that is to blame. To this point I have made many attempts to hold the citizens, who have speechified and petitioned against the Orders of Council. They seem to have no ears or tongues or pens for this question about searching for seamen, though it is manifest, that this is the question, upon which the two countries have, at last, come to an open quarrel.—I wish to satisfy the public mind upon this point. I wish to convince all men, that it is not the Orders in Council which have produced the hostile measures of America. For this purpose, I take another extract, from the same paper (*The Philadelphia Aurora*), of the 17th of February, some weeks after the Orders in Council had been received in America. “Much has been said of the pacific disposition of the British cabinet, much of their ardent desire for peace and reconciliation; but since the arrival of the king of England’s “squally” proclamation, which speaks a language which cannot be misunderstood, we hope to hear no more of this. The determination of the English ministry, expressed through their royal engine, to resist our claims and insist upon our submission, is unequivocal. It now remains for our government to say whether they will tread back the steps they have taken to procure us justice, or whether by a manifold advance they will convince the enemies of America and the world that we are not to be bullied out of our rights or intimidated to surrender our independence. There is no room now for quibbling or sophistry. The question is a plain one. Shall we defend or shall we comply? As there can be no evasion there should be no hesitation, we know the men whom we have placed at the helm of our ship too well to suppose them capable of yielding to the exactions of foreign commanders, or of striking the colours while there are hands ready to support them.—Principles of delicacy, of courtesy, of forbearance, it seems to us, should have taught a foreign court, while a negotiation was pursuing with a neutral nation, to refrain from publishing to the world its ultimate, its irremediable decision upon the most material points of that negotiation. Was ever an instance heard so singular, so opposite to the customs of civilized nations as the present. The United States and England differ upon this im-

“ *portant point, the right of search, to ad-*
 “ *just the difficulty and restore harmony if*
 “ *possible, special instructions and authority*
 “ *are communicated to our ministers at*
 “ *London; proposals are made to the Bri-*
 “ *tish government. They promise to re-*
 “ *turn an answer, and while it is hourly*
 “ *expected; on a sudden appears a procla-*
 “ *mation of that government, which pre-*
 “ *cludes all further discussion upon the*
 “ *principal object of negociation; refuses to*
 “ *hear either argument or reason, and says,*
 “ *my determination is fixed; submit or*
 “ *feel the effects of my displeasure. The*
 “ *measure appears to be a gross, a studied*
 “ *insult upon our national dignity; it seems*
 “ *intended as a ridicule upon our modera-*
 “ *tion, at the same time that it is a menace*
 “ *to frighten us from the ground we have*
 “ *taken.*”—How false these facts, how
 fallacious this reasoning, it is needless, at this
 day to show, the subject having already un-
 dergone so ample a discussion. All I wish-
 ed to show, by the quoting of this paper was,
 that it was the question of *searching for sea-*
men, and not the Orders in Council, that
 was, and is regarded as of importance, in
 America. As this writer says, the two coun-
 tries are really at issue upon this question.
 The king has declared, that he *never* will
 yield the right of search, and the Americans
 have declared, that they will not submit to
 the exercise of that right. They would, it
 is very likely, complain as loudly as Mr.
 Baring does of the Orders in Council; but,
 this they cannot do, without complaining of
France also, and their base partiality for that
 power will not suffer them to do that.—
 The American papers, which now lie before
 me, down to the 20th of February, exhibit a
 picture of national feeling and affairs very
 different from what the people of England
 would have expected to exist, had they be-
 lieved the representations of Mr. Alexander
 Baring and his coadjutor, the Morning Chro-
 nicle. It will be borne in mind, that the
Aurora, from which alone I shall quote, up-
 on this occasion, is a paper devoted to Mr.
 Jefferson and his party. Let us hear, then,
 what sort of opinion they seem to entertain
 of the virtue of the members of Congress
 and other persons of influence in America.
 —Feb. 2nd. “ *UNDER THE ROSE.* Since
 “ the arrival of Mr. Erskine’s colleague, at
 “ the seat of government, merely out of
 “ compliment to Mr. Rose, Mr. Erskine
 “ has opened a levee every *Tuesday even-*
 “ *ing*—and it is very handsomely attended
 “ by *members of both houses!*—Mr. Rose
 “ is not backward in politeness in return for
 “ these civilities. He has in the most con-

“ descending manner waited on several
 “ members at their own lodgings, and has
 “ entered into very long and *innocent con-*
 “ *versations* with them—*sub rosa!*—We
 “ propose publishing, from day to day, after
 “ the 1st of Feb., after the manner of the
 “ *court papers* in London, the *names* of all
 “ the gentlemen and ladies who attend Mr.
 “ Erskine’s levee, (*sub rosa*) merely for
 “ public amusement, and to see how *this*
 “ *kind of court news operates.*—*It is a*
 “ *fact, that fifty thousand guineas have*
 “ *been landed from the Statira frigate.*—
 “ To solve the question—Is that sum for
 “ secret service money? We have only to
 “ inspect the anglo-federal papers printed in
 “ all our seaports.—Could not your Parks,
 “ your Russels, your Langs, and your Cole-
 “ mans, your Relfs and your Bronsons, your
 “ Youngs, and your Dalchos—give some
 “ account of its *distribution*—the quantum
 “ or portion allotted to *Boston*, to New
 “ York, to Philadelphia, &c. &c.?”—
 —Feb. 4. “ The report of Mr. Rose’s
 “ *going home*, we did not believe, though
 “ we heard it before. Mr. Rose is come
 “ here to *do something.* *Bullying* and *pa-*
 “ *lavering* have failed: there is one re-
 “ source more; and that will be tried: the
 “ *GOLD* that has corrupted all Europe,
 “ and destroyed all that it has corrupted,
 “ *will be tried here.*”—Feb. 10. “ *Citi-*
 “ *zens of America, the gold of Britain*
 “ *must be diffused abundantly; or there is*
 “ *more profligacy in some of your citizens,*
 “ *than the vilest of despoticisms produce.*
 “ *MARK THEM.*”—Such is the language
 of Mr. Jefferson’s newspapers; such the
 confidence they repose in that republican
 virtue, of which they have boasted so much,
 and of which the poor deluded enthusiastic
 Brissot gave the European world such a flat-
 tering picture.—The next thing I shall
 notice, is, the alarm, evidently excited in
 America, by our expedition to Denmark. I
 said, that this would be the case, and here
 is the proof of it.—Feb. 3. “ This
 “ doctrine was advanced by English and
 “ American federalists. Denmark, they
 “ asserted, was about to throw her mite
 “ into the scale, of France to the evi-
 “ dent injury of England. This was the
 “ cry of every pimp and agent of the cor-
 “ rupt government of Britain; a govern-
 “ ment, that is never at a loss for pretexts
 “ to encroach on her neighbours—it was
 “ this government, which without the
 “ shadow of proof to substantiate her in-
 “ famous conduct, basely and treacherously
 “ accomplished the destruction of the naval
 “ power of Denmark, and piratically invad-

either territory: And why? Because Britain feared that her iniquity would justly draw down upon her own head the vengeance of the whole world.—Every man recollects this hue and cry about French influence predominating at Copenhagen. It was a fruitful, nay, the only source of justification which the friends of England could use to palliate this "deed without a name."—Mark the inevitable tendency of advocating such a doctrine.—If these wretches justified Britain *then*—will they not justify her in the commission of a similar act *now* when the U. States are charged with being under the control of Bonaparte? Every English agent and apostate American rings the same peal—and while they applaud England for attacking Denmark they virtually invite the same power to a repetition of the tragic scenes recently exhibited at Copenhagen.—They possessed no proof of the subserviency of Denmark to France—yet they justified Britain in almost annihilating that innocent nation, to appease her fears and suspicions.—They possess no proof that America is under French influence—yet there are scoundrels in this country, who are weak and wicked enough to make the assertion, and thus invite hostility.—England never did, and never can exhibit evidence of the guilt of Denmark. It was her spies and agents there who gave the false information on which the government acted. Her spies and agents here, are pursuing the same course, and they expect the same course.—*Our cities will be Copenhagen, and our ships, timber, treasure, &c. will be "unluckily" deposited in Great Britain!*—What! afraid of us? Is it possible, that the great America should be afraid of little Britain? afraid of the nation, whom, but the other day, the Americans represented as expiring under the lash of France? Oh, that example of the English worked wonders in the world! It will be a deal of strife, war, and bloodshed, ere to see the name of that city become a by-word in the American vocabulary. "Our cities will be Copenhagen!" is an excellent phrase. It is very true, that Sir John Warren would condescend to New York with a very little confidence. Still not the insolence of power, gentlemen! reflect, that the quarrel between us is *not one of your demand upon us for the satisfaction of our maritime rights.* After that answer, we are at liberty to laugh at your threats about the Copenhagenizing of

your cities. You thought, that the progress of Napoleon upon the continent, had broken down our spirits; and, your generosity suggested, that this was the happy moment for you to extort from us a concession, which would have humbled us and crippled us for ever. Your generous purpose has been frustrated; England has given the world a proof that she still is mighty; and you, from being the threatners, are become the tremblers. Your vindictive act of non-importation is answered by the sending of a force capable of destroying your ports. Where is now all your vaunting about invading Jamaica and reducing Halifax to ashes?—The embargo is making dreadful work amongst the merchants and shopkeepers, and, indeed, amongst persons of all ranks and degrees in the country. The cry against it was, at the date of the latest intelligence, pretty general. Mr. Jefferson's party had been endeavouring to obtain a vote in approbation of it, in the legislative assembly of Pennsylvania; but they had failed.—Feb. 3d. "The following is the resolution that was negatived: and such is the effect produced in the legislature of Pennsylvania, by the intrigues of men who at this moment hold offices of confidence and trust under the executive of the United States.—Whereas, the government of the United States, have deemed it expedient and promotive of the general interest of the nation to lay an embargo, and we the representatives of the people of Pennsylvania, do approve of the wisdom and patriotism of the measure; and whereas, there are to be found among us, persons claiming the rights of American citizens, and enjoying all the benefits of this free government, who are so lost to all sense of patriotism, as to reprobate a measure called for by the best interests of the country: and whereas it is incumbent upon a free people to sustain the measures of a government constituted by themselves, when they are obviously interwoven with the general interest and safety of the nation. Therefore Resolved, by the house of representatives of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, that the embargo laid by the general government, meets our hearty and entire approbation, and that we view in it a wise measure calculated to secure the peace of our country, to preserve the property of our citizens, and to procure a redress of our wrongs."—The failure is, the ready compliance, attributed to men holding offices under Jefferson: so that there must be a division even amongst that party them-

selves.—In the mean while, it is complained of, in a paper of the 18th of February, that the “tory vessels going out of the ports, on a *coasting* trip, trip off to *Jamaica*.” I said, that this would be the case; but, if this be the case at the end of six weeks, what will it be, at the end of six months? The party opposed to Jefferson ask: “what is the embargo for? Of what use is it? Why do you not go to war, or let us live at peace? Why do you keep us in this tantalizing state?” The party of Mr. Jefferson seem enraged at these questions, and answer by threats of vengeance upon the heads of their opponents. “We will tell you,” say they, “for the benefit of your British friends. The government of the United States, do not wish to go to war. As long as war is avoidable; they prefer remaining peaceably within their own homes to shedding blood without unavoidable necessity. War is neither the passion of the government nor the interest of the people; they have proved this to be their policy and their wishes by more patience and suffering than any nation ever exhibited with similar capacities for retaliation since the creation. They prefer now to remain on the defensive than to injure the unfortunate subjects of a *depraved* government—and knowing that they can do what is effectual whenever occasion calls for it, they wish to put off the evil day, because when they begin, it will be a complete work. Whenever the United States are forced to war, *stand clear—it will not be like the days of the revolution*—the law promulgated at Copenhagen, will then be the law of the land—*no neutrals*—every man must be an *active* a *decided* American—or an enemy—and from that day English influence no more disturbs nor distracts this continent—not a vestige of it will remain. The government wish to avoid the terrible operation of war—and they will, while the thing is practicable, preserve an *armed neutrality*—when forced to war, we repeat it again — **TORIES STAND CLEAR!** — Thus, as I foretold, the war they intend to carry on, is a *war upon each other*. The first three months of war would see all the *rich*, or *tories*, plundered, in one shape or another. Either by double taxes, by the occupation of their houses, by the seizing of their hay and straw and corn and pork, in the way of contribution; or else by direct fine, or confiscation. Having no foreign enemy in the country, the marauding faction would have nothing to fear. There would be another complete revolution,

and one of the bloodiest, perhaps, that ever was known in the world. “The law of Copenhagen will be the *law of the land*!” The prospect is terrible, and for this prospect the people have to thank the unnatural partiality, the vanity, the insolence, of their rulers, and themselves. Here is an instance of a nation having been brought by pure vanity, to a situation the most perilous and disgraceful that ever was witnessed. They must needs be “a great power!” They must needs dictate to England! Verily, they will repent of this for many a long day.—The party of Jefferson are proposing (paper of the 18th) to publish the names of all those members of Congress, who speak, or vote against the measures of the President, “that they may be *marked* ready against the day of *vengeance*.” Many of these have hitherto been forward enough in their hostility towards England; and, now, it seems, they are about to receive their reward. They will, probably, find to their cost, that it is much easier to raise a popular ferment than to allay it.—In my last, I spoke about the keeping of *St. Tammany’s* day, in America. One of the papers, now before me, furnishes an advertisement relating to a meeting of this sort. “A stated meeting of the Tammany Society will be held, on Thursday evening next, the 4th of the month of *Snows*, at the *council fire* of their *great wigwam*, No. 63, north Fourth street, precisely at the *going down of the sun*.—By order of the society,—**JOHN L. BAKER, Sec.—Month of Colds, 29,—year of discovery 316**”—Was there ever folly equal to this? This was an invention of Jefferson, Madison, Munroe, Dr. Rush, Mackean, and some other of the leaders, to make the rising generation believe, that they were of *Indian* origin! At these meetings, the moon-stricken professors decorate themselves with feathers and baubles and skins, after the manner of the savages, and get as drunk, oh, how drunk they get upon stinking liver-burning rum, at tenpence halfpenny a quart! This is the “*enlightened* nation!” Poor fools, as if they could, by such silly devices, obliterate history, and make the children of the honest Quakers of Pennsylvania believe, that the ancestors of their neighbours to the South came from the banks of the Mississippi, instead of emigrating from Old England by consent of a righteous judge and twelve good men and true!—Corresponding with the project of *St. Tammany* was another for forming an “*American Language*”; and, one Thornton, a native, I believe, of Barbadoes, was so far encouraged to proceed in

this project as to publish a book, an elementary book for beginners! There was to be none of our characters left. The *th* was to be represented by one character; and, in short, the shape of the whole of the letters was to be changed. But still the fools would have had all the *sounds*, all the *idiom*, all the *grammatical construction*. This was, however, to be called the "American Language;" for the wise-noddled inventor told the people, that it was disgraceful to them to acknowledge, at every breath, that they spoke the language of *slaves*. Is it any wonder, that the nation has been made mad? Is it any wonder, that they should have discovered so much malignity and so much contempt towards England? And, is it possible to open their eyes by any thing but blows? Love us they will not; but, it is quite within our power to prevent them from despising us.—I perceive, from these papers, that their famous *Federal City*, or *City of Washington*, is about to be actually abandoned, there being no prospect of its ever becoming an inhabited place. One of my sins, in their eyes, was, laughing at this foolish project. But, oh! what will become of the "*Capitol*," and the *tomb of General Washington*? There has been a legislative discussion upon the subject; and, though the Congress came to *no decision* (which is mostly the case), it is evident that the wild project must be given up. How many men have been ruined, totally ruined by this silly project, this child of the children of vanity! They must needs have a city greater than ever before existed in the world! The *plans* of this cursed thing have induced scores of builders and mechanics to emigrate from England. They have long ago been ruined, and their families, for want of the means of returning, are now begging their bread.—In the paper of the 5th of February, I find a paragraph, with which I am very much pleased. I will insert it, and endeavour to make the application.—

"There is a coincident temper, generally united in the same characters who are hostile to civil liberty. It is that abject temper, which is disposed to submit to the most despicable meannesses at the command of a superior knave or villain, with the hope of being sustained in delegated tyranny over others.—Of these descriptions are the enemies of civil liberty, the foes of virtue and concord all ways, and in all circumstances in every country. The bashaw who commands a province with the proverbial tyranny of a Turk, tells the grand seignior that it is the vilest of his slaves who addresses him;

"the priests of the Delai Lama worship and even devour his excretions; about thirty years ago the fashion of the silks and ribbons worn at Paris were *kà-kà le dauphin*. At the court of Great Britain and calls it an honour; when a wealthy native of Asia in the British provinces, meets an English nabob who has come to plunder his country in an amicable way, he is under the necessity of getting out of his palanquin or alighting from his horse or his elephant, lest his not being on foot should be considered as a want of respect. The examples might be extended to a volume—it is the *hierarchy of slaves* that produces this baseness and tyranny—and baseness it is said descends it accumulated meanness and insolence."—This is very true indeed. Nothing can be more true; nothing better expressed, except the small passage that I have chosen to leave out. But, Mr. DUANE, why did you not give us an example or two drawn from amongst yourselves? Do you think that baseness more rampant was ever seen, than that which is displayed by the American people? Or, do you look upon the shabby pettifoggers, whom they chose to adore, whose feet they chose to lick, as so much better than the Nabob and the Turk? You remember how the base wretches used to abuse me for exposing the despotic acts of Mackean, then chief justice and now governor of Pennsylvania. You remember how you all exulted at the final success of that man over me, aided by a jury of his vile slaves; and, now, I perceive, by your paper of the 20th of February, that those members of the assembly, who were formerly his supporters, have found out, that "he has violated the constitution that he was sworn to support; that he has trampled under foot the sacred rights of freemen; that he has acted, not as a faithful public servant, but as a despot; and that, against his private revenge, neither age, poverty, character, infirmity, nor patriotism has afforded protection." Excuse me, if I am glad of this. Excuse me, if I express my joy at it. The only malediction I bestowed upon you, the abettors of Mackean, was, that his life might be as long as yours. Believe me, Mr. Duane, the reign of this man is a punishment that the state of Pennsylvania deserves. He was made to be a scourge for you; a scourge that you richly merit. It must grate you, a little, one would think, when you recollect, how powerfully instrumental you yourself were in putting the rod into his iron hand. You

must remember, when I charged him with having, while he was chief justice, said, that, if he were made governor, he would pardon any man that should murder me. You must remember, that you applauded the saying. Is it not just, then, that you should feel his despotic fangs? And, will you still hope, in the face of all your present sufferings under him, to make the world believe, that you are *freemen*?—I shall conclude with an extract or two, which may serve as a tolerably good answer to Mr. A. B. (Alexander Baring I suppose) of the *Morning Chronicle*, who complained of the language of our news-papers, respecting the American government and its chief; and also to Mr. Roscoe, the sapient Mr. Roscoe, who advised the king to endeavour to cherish the kind disposition of a people of an origin common with our own. Mr. A. B. bid us beware how we spoke of the president; for, that, though he signed himself simply *Thomas Jefferson*, he was nevertheless, the sovereign of a "great nation;" and reminded us, that it was quite fair to consider the language of our public prints as the language of our government. Now, then, Mr. Baring, let us hear the language of the *Aurora*, of the 17th of February, respecting the king of England, and, observe, that this print is notoriously devoted to Mr. Jefferson—"From the "*Charleston City Gazette* of Feb. 9.—"*A report was current yesterday, in this city, of the death of the king of England, said to have been brought by captain Maudsells of the Sea Horse, which left Ramsgate on the 24th of Dec.; who states, that a gentleman arrived that day at Ramsgate from London, who informed him, that when he left the city, the great bell of St. Paul's church was tolling; which circumstance, it is said, does not take place but on the death of some of the royal family; and as the king had some days before, been stated to be indisposed, it was concluded that he had died. London papers of the 15th and 16th, make no mention of his sickness; but on the contrary, state that he transacted business on the 14th with the Duke of York.—A matter of very little consequence otherwise than there is one MONSTER less on the earth.*"—Now, then, Mr. Baring, is this the language of the American government? Now, then, Mr. Roscoe, you, who profess such an ardent attachment to "his Majesty's person and family," do you approve of this? "No." But, are you willing to *resent* it? That is the point. Are you willing to *resent* it? Are you willing to make any of those sacrifices, of which you

told the king you would be so profuse, "in defence of his person and family?"—But, belike, it is for your *country* that you have these sacrifices at hand? Well, then, hear what these your dear friends say of that country, under its well known name of *John Bull*. I now quote the close, and recapitulation, of a string of sentiments, from the same news-paper of the 10th of February.

"Strike the string, and breathe the lay,
 "Give John Bull's praises to the day;
 "Is there a woman lying-in,
 "Deserted infant, born in sin,
 "Or sinking age, or helpless youth,
 "Or maiden love, or matron truth,
 "Or man disarm'd, with guileless mind,
 "To John Bull's wiles or deaf or blind?
 "There John Bull points his purple spear,
 "Hasty, hasty rout is there,
 "There confusion, terror's child,
 "Conflict fierce, and ruin wild,
 "Agony that pants for breath,
 "Despair and unexpected death,
 "These to John Bull's glory given,
 "These his fame shall wait to Heaven.
 "And bloody tears shall wretches weep
 "When caught by John Bull—*fast asleep.*"

Now, Mr. Roscoe, how do you feel? Is this our character? are we the cowardly, cruel, deceitful race here described? At the very out-set of the dispute with America, I took occasion, in answer to an assailant, who (God forgive me if the suspicion was unjust) I took for an American; I took occasion to caution the Electors of Westminster against giving into the notion, that the Americans hated only our government. I assured those gentlemen, that the whole of the people of England were the object of American malice and abuse. My blood had to boil, for years, under this infamous abuse. I had witnessed proofs in abundance that the Americans hated us all. I had seen them make public rejoicings at the mutiny in the English fleet, at the defeat of the English army, at the scarcity of provisions in England; and, in short, at almost every event conspicuously unfavourable to England. Nor were these exultations confined to the rabble. The "constituted authorities," as they called themselves, after the French fashion, partook therein; and were imitated by many of the members of Congress. The first wish of the heart of the people of America, generally speaking, is to see England conquered, and extinguished as an independent nation; and their next wish is, that they may have a hand in it. They have, amongst them, a great number of Germans, whose malignity is proverbial, and

they have, in power, some half dozen of precious knives from the little venomous states of Geneva and Switzerland, whose very nature it seems to be to live in hatred and hostility against all great and powerful nations.—But, Mr. Baring, what do you say to this? Are we the bloody minded and cowardly race here described? Is it for this description that we are to love your American brethren? Have we here a proof of that “*mildness and peaceableness and inoffensiveness*,” with which you, in copying Mr. Senator Mitchell, choose to decorate the American character? Can you, Sir, have the assurance, have you acquired so much of the American nature and manners, as to look an Englishman in the face, and justify this? I have not taken much pains in selecting instances, or I could have filled this sheet from the eighteen newspapers now lying before me. Let the wretches proceed; but, I cannot say, that I should be sorry to hear that their calumnies had been answered by English bomb-shells. It is very well for you merchants and manufacturers, who have as much property in America as you have in England, and who are, by turns, subjects here and citizens there; it is very well for you to turn off this abuse with a laugh; but, for us, whose all is here; who have no double character; who must be Englishmen or nothing: for us it is not to laugh, but to resent, and, if possible, to revenge.—I have now, until some new attempt be made on the part of her advocates, done with America, whose vanity and insolence have pushed her forward into notice, and who has certainly gained nothing by notoriety. For many months, indeed, for years, I said not a word about her or her rulers; but, when it, at last, became a question, whether England were to be bullied by her, I could not hold my tongue. Her indiscreet partizans have challenged an enquiry into her resources and her character. The result is before the world. I will not pretend, that I am sorry to have had this opportunity of exposing her nakedness, to do which, though, certainly, it was my duty, was not less my inclination. She now stands before the people of England in her true shape and colour. I defy all the Barings and Roscoes upon earth to mislead them again as far as relates to her; and, whether we have war or peace with her, the knowledge thus communicated to the nation, upon a subject, with respect to which they were before more ignorant than with respect to almost any other, cannot, I hope, fail to be of great and lasting advantage.

Mr. Scott's reply to A. B. C. upon the

subject of the Curate's bill, shall be inserted next week.—The *City of London proceedings* upon the Reversion Bill need not have been pointed out to me: it is a subject deeply interesting to the public.—I do not insert the *Bristol Resolutions*, because I disapprove of them, as coupling an approbation of the conduct of Sir Francis Burdett with that of the selfish proceedings of the petitioners of Liverpool. I am for seeing England free from domestic oppression; but, am willing to submit even to that, rather than urge the government to make a disgraceful and precarious peace, the natural tendency of which must be to extinguish the very hope of seeing a restoration of the liberties which our forefathers enjoyed.

Bolton, 7th April, 1808.

AMERICAN STATES.

SIR;—Permit me to offer some remarks on the observations and arguments that are conveyed in a letter from an American Merchant of New Broad Street, as inserted in your Register of 26th March, p. 495; and allow me also to state some facts in addition to those he has adduced, that may perhaps contribute towards placing the subject on which he has addressed you, in a more correct point of view. This “*American Merchant*,” (I take his signature, Mr. Cobbett, in giving him this appellation, for I am sure, judging from the line of argument he has adopted, I should label both his feelings and his principles, were I to designate him a *British American Merchant*) after fastening on your remarks, the accusation of “*rash assertions*,” proceeds to allow you to consider him, if you please, as acting in the capacity of counsel for America. He tells you he concedes this point “*to save you all the trouble of your usual ‘ingenious conjectures.’*”—Now, the fact is, I am inclined to think, he yields thus much, in order that he may have the advantage of being really and bona fide considered as counsel. When I say the *advantage* of being so considered you will perceive my expression has reference to the duties and practice of a counsel, viz. to endeavour to defend his client's cause right or wrong; to suppress those truths that might make against his case, and to press forward, either under the mask of sophistry or otherwise, all the slender circumstances his ingenuity can devise in favour of it.—We will now consider this correspondent of yours, Mr. Cobbett, as counsel for America, and provided you have sufficient patience, we will travel through his arguments. After quoting your assertion that “*the neutrals*

“do submit (to the capture by France of their ships bound to England), for neither of them make any public remonstrance or protest against the decree of France,” he observes, “you say, this in the face of the immediate explanation of the French decree given by the minister of marine, Decrès, to the American envoy at Paris.” This appears at the first glance a formidable rebuke; but, Mr. American Merchant, have you never heard of the questions that were in the month of September put to Buonaparté himself, by the chief judge of the court of prize causes, and of the answers that were given? Perhaps not, and therefore that you may no longer remain in ignorance of them I will here give a copy of the document:

Questions put by the President of the Court of Prize Causes to the Emperor of France.

1st. Whether there shall be any exceptions to the decree of the 21st Nov. 1806 in favour of such neutrals, as, by their treaty, were allowed a fair trade on the privilege of neutralizing property; that is to say, vessels going or coming from England with cargoes?

2d. Whether neutral vessels in ballast should also be made liable to confiscation upon the only plea of their having, even by stress of weather or capture, entered a British port?

3d. Whether half of the confiscated property should in all cases be appropriated towards indemnifying French sufferers by British spoiliations?

Answers.

1st. That as the Decree contains no exception there shall be none made in its application.

2dly. This must be suffered to lay over for further consideration.

3dly. Answered in the affirmative.

Now, Mr. Cobbett, does not Buonaparté's answer to the first question flatly contradict the explanation given by Decrès? Your correspondent has facetiously observed, that doubting Decrès' explanation “is really ‘pretending to know better than the doctor’” Positively I do conceive, from the document I have just copied, that the doctor's man pretended to know better than his master, or else the master (Buonaparté) subsequently thought proper to no longer permit the Americans to be exempted from the sweeping clauses of his decree.—The next assertion produced by your correspondent is, that down to the date of the Orders in Council no vessel had been condemned either in France or Spain for trading with England, and that only two instances had

then occurred even of capture, both of which were afterwards restored. Now, I can cite an instance of *actual condemnation*, and which is explained in the following Extract of a Letter received from the Continent, viz: “You may depend on it that my information with regard to the French Decree concerning neutrals trading with England is correct; and as a proof of it, I can inform you that an American, loaded in England for a Spanish colony, was cast away upon the French coast, in the Channel; and both ship and cargo have been condemned, notwithstanding, the property was admitted to be American.”

—This, then, is an instance of which I will suppose your correspondent was not aware, and I have no doubt there are still more. Yes, I say, I have no doubt there are still more, and I think every impartial man will echo my opinion, after reading the following two additional Extracts from Letters from the Continent, also written, and received in England previous to the promulgation of our Orders in Council, viz. “The French Emperor has revived the Decree of the 21st of Nov. 1806, in its full force, and it has been acted upon at Antwerp.” Again; “A private advice has been given within these few days past, by the American minister at Paris, through the medium of the American consuls, to the consigners and others concerned in American vessels now in this quarter, to depart for America without delay. I have seen the minister's letter who gives as the reason for advising such a step, his fear of England letting loose her cruizers upon the American trade, when she learns that France is acting upon the Decree of the 21st Nov. last.”—I really think it unnecessary to say one word in the way of comment on this part of my letter.—I shall now proceed to the arguments and facts adduced by your correspondent, relative to Premiums of Insurance. You (he says) have made a gross mistatement of a plain matter of fact; and he then asserts, that the premiums of insurance *throughout* the year 1807 up to the news of the affair of the Chesapeake, were at *peace rates, being only from 3 guineas down to 2 guineas per cent.* &c. and that his own house, from April to July, only paid 2. and 2½ guineas per cent. Sir, the latter end of January (about the period we just heard of the famous Berlin Decree of 11th Nov. 1806) a policy of insurance was effected on an American vessel from Alexandria to Liverpool, at 5 guineas per cent. and in February, from Liverpool to Boston, and from Liverpool to Philadel-

phia, at 6 guineas per cent. I could state many other instances, but they would only unnecessarily increase the length of my letter, and I know the fact cannot be contradicted, for, independent of my own individual knowledge, I could produce several of the leading underwriters in Lloyd's Coffee House as evidences to the truth of my assertion. Thus, then, premiums *did advance* from 150 to 200 per cent. in consequence of the Berlin Decree; and I can also tell you, Mr. Cobbett, that *from the same cause*, they advanced 100 per cent. in America, without (bear in mind) any public remonstrance or protest whatever on the part of the American government—I have seen a file of New York prices current, in which a table of the rates of insurances are printed, and it there appears, that *when the Berlin Decree was known in America*, the premium on a voyage to England, *which was previously 2½ per cent. immediately advanced to 5 per cent.* Premiums continued at these advanced rates up to April, when I admit they again found nearly their former level, under the presumption that Buonaparté's Decree had not, *to that period*, been acted upon. But, Sir, if my information is correct, as stated in this letter, and which solemnly I believe it is, it unquestionably was *subsequently* acted upon (and that, too, previous to the promulgation of the British Orders in Council) when premiums of insurance again in consequence advanced.—How miserable a subterfuge has the American Merchant been obliged to resort to in order to prove his assertions with respect to premiums of insurance, (which he tells us is the best criterion “from which to judge “of the practical import of the famous “Berlin Decree of Buonaparté”) when in order to make out his case, he has been compelled to confine himself, as relates to the premiums paid by his house, to that *immediate* period, when the public apprehension was lulled as to the execution of the said Berlin Decree; and, by the bye, Mr. Cobbett, what a curious bundle of policies must that have been from which, he says, he at random, took his proof; this random collection, it would appear, threw not a single policy in his way, effected from the *latter end of January to the month of March*.—I shall here, Sir, recapitulate your correspondent's facts, and assertions, and at the same time place mine against them.—1st. He reminds us of the explanation given by the French minister of marine to the American envoy at Paris, relative to the Berlin Decree, and I place against it, the questions *subsequently* put to Buonaparté himself, by

the president of the court of prize causes, and the answers that were returned.—2dly. He asserts that, *previous* to the issuing of our Orders in Council, *no* American vessels had been condemned under the Berlin Decree for trading with England, and that only two had been captured, which were afterwards restored, and I place against these assertions, the extracts of letters I have given, speaking generally as to the actual strict execution of the Berlin Decree, and stating one vessel had *positively* been condemned.—3dly. He roundly declares that the premiums of insurance *throughout* the year 1807, up to the news of the affair of the Chesapeake, were at peace rates, being only from 3 guineas down to 2 guineas per cent., and I prove, that when the Berlin Decree was known in England, premiums advanced from 150 to 200 per cent., and when it was known in America, they there also advanced 100 per cent. I mean direct to England and Ireland.—Here, Sir, I close with your correspondent. His personal attack on yourself, and his observations relative to the title of the King of France formerly maintained by our monarchs, having been already so very successfully answered by yourself; but before I conclude my letter, allow me to assure you, that I am actuated by no other motive in writing it, than an ardent wish to assist in rendering justice to my own country, in preference to standing forward the prejudiced advocate of America and France.—I am, &c. I.—
London, 30th March, 1808.

GENERAL ENCLOSURE.

SIR.—The observations which you have made in your present volume, p. 365, on my proposing a general enclosure act, seem to flow from the rapid conceptions of an ardent mind, when viewing a few prominent points of a great political question, and pronouncing a decision without sufficiently considering the various relations of the subject: if you would give the necessary attention to such a question, nobody would discuss it more powerfully, and I must esteem it a misfortune to the public, that the editor of a paper, the circulation of which is so considerable, should have declared himself explicitly against a measure, which I must esteem as essential to the public welfare. I beg leave to examine your objections, in the order you have proposed them.—First, you are alarmed lest such a measure should produce much confusion and litigation amongst the rights and tenures by which unenclosed lands are at present held; but this is an

objection rather to the injudicious clauses supposed to form part of such a bill, if absurdly framed rather, than of necessity flowing from the measure itself; such might be the effect of a badly framed bill; but I would no more be the advocate for such an act, than any other man: it is an objection founded on a possible abuse, and were it listened to would justify every violent opposition that has been made to abundance of measures which experience has proved to be decisively beneficial.—During the first 40 years of his present majesty above 1800 enclosure acts passed, operating upon between two and three millions of acres, these acts have not proved the teeth of a paper mill, but have without doubt put an end to a multitude of litigations and have given a clear definition and much additional security to the rights and tenures by which these lands were held. Every one knows the perplexed, disputed, and litigated claims in the commonage of wastes, I would as soon assign them to the teeth of a paper mill, as leave them to the fangs of attorneys. While those in Lincolnshire who had the pasture of a great common, quarreled for the right, a Scotch drover from the highlands swept off the food. The drivers for lords of manors may profit by parochial disputes, but it would be an odd argument against a general enclosure to apprehend the annihilation of such rural amusements. That 2,000,000 acres of land could by the authority of commissioners be arranged enclosed and settled without injury or inconvenience, would be too much to assert, but there is great reason to believe that the rights of those concerned have, on the balance, been greatly ameliorated.—Should it be pleaded that these results have been produced by special acts, and not a general one, I reply, that due provision may be made for the security of all rights; and such an act having passed the house of commons, (though thrown out by the lords) is a proof that, that house was of the same opinion. In fact, the objections which have been made to bear on this part of the argument, are beside the mark upon the general question: they would form the business of the committee when employed upon the clauses of the bill.—Your second objection, asks this question, “What good would it produce? Would it cause more corn to be raised? If it would, it would be a calamity; for it is now *too cheap*; at least, so have said the parliament, in the acts for exportation.” But pray, Mr. Cobbett, what makes corn too cheap? The importation in the last seven years of 9,198,924 quarters, being on an

average 1,314,132 quarters per annum, and your declaration is, in fact, saying that this is a right state and order of things, thus to depend on *foreign commerce* instead of raising the corn at home, which would be a calamity. You are too clear headed *thus* to state your position; but, I appeal to your candour, whether the conclusion is not fairly drawn. To me I confess that such an importation seems to be an enormous evil, and which calls for more attention than all the sugar colonies and distilleries that ever existed. And if such an importation does not imperiously call for a general enclosure of our wastes, the voice of reason can no longer be heard; and we shall be governed by the policy of card table dowagers, who, pinched on the fixed annuities of past periods, remark that they hear of nothing but improvements, and feel nothing but poverty.—*We exorcise improvements.*—George, Earl of Orford, many years ago urged to me the same argument; “what can you mean,” Mr. Young, living as you do in Suffolk, “and being a good friend to Norfolk, by proposing to cultivate waste lands? Do not you see it would make corn cheap?” “And whatever benefit it might be to some” “it would certainly be mischievous to us.” That conversation was followed by the importation of millions upon millions of quarters of foreign corn; and as the present government of this country is of your opinion upon the question of a general enclosure, we have no prospect in future but to import corn if we can get it, or of famine if we cannot.—Go from Bourn Bridge to Newmarket—you will find 10 miles of heath enclosed, and converted to corn, with several new farms built and established; but scarcely any other sign of increased population—none to be found further than the merely agricultural class; but, if you examine the nearest towns and villages, you will find the old blacksmiths, carpenters, wheelers, collar makers, &c. more animated in their business; but the new demands so divided through an extent of 30 surrounding miles, as to render the effects imperceptible to the eye.—Mr. Burton, a practical farmer of great experience, and a much esteemed commissioner of enclosures, gave me the following detail of what had actually resulted from the enclosure and cultivation of 10,500 acres of waste land.

PRODUCE.			£
1000 acres of wheat	2,500 qrs. at 48s. per qr.	- - -	6,000
1000 acres of barley	4000 qrs. at 24s. per qr.	- - -	4,800
1000 acres of oats	4000 qrs. at 20s. per qr.	- - -	4,000

1000 acres of turnips feeding 500 bullocks to the profit of £5 per head	£	2,500
1000 acres of grass with the offal turnips, feeding 4000 sheep in winter, and fattened by part of the new lay grass and offal in June		3,000
5000 acres of pasture supporting 500 bullocks, bringing them forward for turnips to £3 per head		1,500
Also, 4000 sheep summer kept, wool and profit on carcase		2,000
200 cows at £6		1,200
Produce sold	£25,000	

10,000 acres.

800 remaining.

5000 acres of arable demand 200 horses, wanting each 4 acres—arable and pasture 400 acres for—corn give 5 qrs. per horse for 30 weeks, or 1000 qrs. at 4 qr. per acre; 250 acres for the 1000 qrs; 250 acres of hay 200 tons with the barns maintain them in winter: the 400 acres of pasture support them with mares and colts in summer. The improved rent £7,725. Tithe £1,500 a year. Labour £5000. Wear and tear £700. Seed £2,500. Rates £1,031. Interest of capital and small sundries £1,800, making a total of £20,256 and leaving an annual profit of £4,740.—You will see, Sir, by these particulars that these improvements were made under a very low price of corn, and a system of husbandry which, though good, is not quite correct. Labour amounting to one-fifth of the produce is pretty exactly in proportion to that of the agriculturists, and free hands in the population returns for the whole kingdom.—I have notes of many such cases, but to recite them would occupy too many of your pages. No politician could examine any instance of this kind, without being convinced that the increase of human food free in the market had been immense.—That inclosing increases the culture of corn, appears from the returns of above 1,300 parishes, this was the case with wheat, barley, and oats, and nothing decreased but pease and beans: the increase in cattle, dairies, sheep, turnips, clover and potatoes was very great: and if such have been the effects on enclosing two millions of acres, it surpasses my comprehension, how any valid argument can be produced against the utmost extension of similar exertions: but it is easy to conceive that had not these wise measures been embraced through those forty years, we should at present, have been in a situation much the reverse of what we experience: and that man would be deemed

a bold projector who should advise us, upon the question of food only, to throw open our enclosures and revert to the barbarism of our ancestors, instead of straining every nerve and exerting every means to do away, by cultivation at home, the enormous import of twelve hundred thousand quarters from a grainery, the key of which, is in the pocket of Buonaparté. Prevent the want of this importation before we hear one word of the calamity of producing too much corn.—Your third reason for objecting to a general enclosure act is thus expressed. “Would it cause more persons to be born and raised up? Why, then, increase of consumption would go hand in hand with increase of production; and no increase of abundance would take place.” There is certainly some truth here, but not, I apprehend, to the extent stated. You have repeatedly referred to the population returns, by which it appears that 1,713,289 persons employed in agriculture feed the total of 9,343,578, or in the proportion of every person in agriculture feeding himself and more than four others in different employments: and you will note that this is besides supporting all the live stock employed in the cultivation. Should it be contended that such new establishments would have the effect of creating a proportional increase in those other classes not included in the agricultural enumeration; I reply, that this is contrary to all experience: and more especially, at a moment when the manufacturing classes are under the least depression in the demand for their fabrics. The waste lands are scattered through every county, and almost through every district of every county in the kingdom. A great number of the farmers who would undertake the cultivation may already live in the vicinity of the wastes: artizans for the supply of the farmers unquestionably live in such vicinity. As to clothing, furniture, &c. &c. the warehouses and shops of the neighbouring towns would supply a far greater demand immediately: the industry of many existing traders would be animated without the necessary supposition of an increase, or, at least, of a very small one. The mere agriculturists would certainly increase, but as they contribute so largely to feed others the more they increased the better. Hence then, it is plain to a demonstration, that the increase of consumption would not go hand in hand with the increase of cultivation; and that the culture of the wastes must be considered as a great resource by which to compensate for the importation of foreign corn. In this respect improvement upon the extended

scale of some millions of acres in England only, would be a direct confirmation of what I have seen so often exemplified in the parliamentary enclosures of great commons, which have added so considerably to the productions of the kingdom; yet with a very small corresponding augmentation in the numbers of the people: in some cases, particularly in Lincolnshire, with too small an augmentation, the result of not building cottages sufficient even for the cultivators of the soil.—But a remark may be made here on cultivating wastes, when instigated by the expectation of scarcity: the law that gives the power of enclosure, might require that every man in proportion to the quantity of wastes broken up, should cultivate annually a certain quantity of potatoes: such a requisition would at once do away every possible apprehension of an increasing culture without a diminished importation. The more deeply we consider this subject the more clearly will it appear, that it must be, by means of this root that any effective steps can be taken to provide a preventative against expected scarcity. Nor should it be forgotten, that there is no crop more proper for commencing these operations on wastes. I have seen 400 bushels per acre gained in October, from lands which in February were covered with heath whins and fern.—I have dwelt the longer on this point, because I know some very able men, who from what they call *principles*, are of opinion that an extension of culture is only an extension of the kingdom *as it is*: and leaving the deficiencies of food the same as before. That they are in an error I have not the smallest doubt. Sitting by their fire sides will do for talking of reason and principles, but it is not sufficient for the attainment of that conviction which results from examination on the spot, in the villages, farms, and cottages of the country. Your last objection, Sir, is founded upon the insufficient cultivation of old lands long since enclosed; which you say ought to be improved to the utmost before wastes are taken in: but I am strangely mistaken if the past facts of the last forty years do not afford something like a refutation of this remark. A large proportion of the two millions of acres enclosed in the first forty years of the present reign are now under a very capital cultivation: above half a million of those acres were absolutely waste, now covered with the waving ears of ample harvest, or grazed by great herds of cattle and sheep, where geese and ponies were once the only stock: Dr. Price was as famous for paradoxes as for calculation; he declared as violently against enclosures as you can do:

I will not pay your talents so bad a compliment as to call him the Cobbett of that day, and yet the remark which you make was just as applicable then as it is now; the old enclosures were vily cultivated; but the politicians of that day did not successfully urge (fortunately for us at present) that, as a reason against the new speculations.—The fact is, that the state of the old enclosures cannot, in argument, be connected with the smallest degree of propriety with the expediency of new undertakings, and for this plain reason, such old enclosures are in the occupation of men who pay the rent their landlords demand: and the proprietors of the farms who may have known the fathers and grand fathers of these tenants would not be very likely to listen to advice the object of which would be to distress and ruin hundreds of families turned adrift in favour of men of more skill and greater capitals. Speaking generally land already occupied is no more at our disposition than land in the moon. And the question is, whether farmers having skill and capital but wanting business shall not be employed on waste, because certainold farms are badly cultivated. Such reasons and such motives appear to me to verge upon absurdity.—I am very ready to agree with you, Sir, that a better cultivation of old enclosed lands is greatly to be desired, and there are some circumstances and cases in which it would be even more advantageous than improving the wastes, as it would be done at a far less expense, but such exertions must depend on the general policy of the kingdom: on a commutation for tithe: on leases being universally given to tenants manifesting a disposition or a power to improve: and above all, on securing to them a higher price of corn than they have received for the last seven years.—It remains, Sir, for your readers to judge whether the measure of a general inclosure act would indeed be a monument of folly; or the basis of wealth of power and prosperity. I think it might be so framed as to prove a decided means of public security;—an irrefragable proof of attention to great and important interests. That it would improve the morals and animate the industry of the people! encrease the revenue of the public and prove in the event a MONUMENT OF NATIONAL WISDOM.—I have the honour to be, &c. &c.—ARTHUR YOUNG.—*March 26, 1808.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—*Correspondence relative to the Portuguese Trade. Feb. 9, 1808.*

Sir,——I having received your letter

of the 8th instant. and notwithstanding my great wish to forward the trade at present (as far as it may lay in my power, without intruding upon the authority of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent my master), I must confess that I found the same difficulty as the consul general did, in making out such a specific list of goods, formerly permitted to be imported into Portugal, as would set my mind, and that of all the merchants who wish to trade to the Brazils, at rest: but as I can at all times depend upon the noble and liberal principles of his Royal Highness, I hope I have hit upon a medium that will take off every difficulty, by inserting in a letter which I myself wrote to the Governor of St. Catherine's, the following postscript, which you may communicate to all persons concerned:—"Having met with an insurmountable difficulty to ascertain every article that was, or was not formerly admitted into Portugal, I must observe to you, that in case you should find in the manifesto signed by the Consul General, and countersigned by me, any article that was formerly prohibited, I beg you would ascribe the insertion to my ignorance of the fact, and not to any malice or bad faith on the part of the shippers; therefore you will be so good as to allow the sale of them for this time, or request instructions from the government of his Royal Highness."—One of the causes of the difficulty in making the list you desire proceeds from the circumstance, that some goods were prohibited as being of royal manufactories or monopolies, which at present may be wanted in the Brazils, and not received from Portugal, therefore I return the list that you may frame your manifest, excluding from it the following articles which were clearly prohibited in Portugal:—**Prohibited Goods.**—Silks, not plain and flowered.—N. B. The uncertainty of this article is saved by the P. S. Salt, liquors and wines, not the growth of Portugal; lace of gold and silver; playing cards; cotton goods of every description.—I do not know but that in future some of the above articles may be admitted, but I believe it much wiser to proceed now regularly, and to sacrifice a momentary privation to unnecessary trouble.

I remain, &c.

CHEVALIER DE SOUZA COUTINHO.

Mr. John Nodin, Spring-gardens.

Copy of a Letter from his Excellency the Portuguese Ambassador. London, Feb. 12.

Sir.—In reply to your letter of this day, I have not only to refer you to my printed

letter to the Governor of St. Catherine's, but I am beside bound in honour not to conceal from you, nor from any of the concerned, that in a letter, I myself wrote to the Governor, he is requested not to admit any ship to a clearance, whose master will not present to him the licence of the Privy Council, the manifest signed by me, and my printed letter.—All my letters to the said Governor having been written in concert with his Majesty's ministers, and my report to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, made accordingly. I do not answer for any deviation from the established regulations.—

I am, Sir, &c.

*To Mr. H. Nodin, Commercial Agent,
Tower street, London.*

FRENCH PRISONERS. — *Communication transmitted from the Transport Office, in reply to all applications made by Prisoners of War in England, for Passports to enable them to return to France.*

Transport Office.

Sir,—The Commissioners for his Majesty's Transport Service, and for the care and custody of prisoners of war, have received your letter of the _____; and in return, I am directed to acquaint you, that it is the determination of his Majesty's government not to allow any more French officers to go from this country to France, until the French government shall make some return for the very great number of French officers already sent, or shall agree to a cartel of exchange upon the fair principle of man for man, and rank for rank, according to the usual plan of civilized nations, and as repeatedly proposed by the commissioners without effect. I am, however, to acquaint you, that if the French government will send over to this country a British prisoner of equal rank to effect your exchange, or will officially certify to the commissioners, that upon your arrival in France such British prisoner shall be released, orders will immediately, on receipt of such certificate, be given for your liberation.—You will under these circumstances clearly perceive, that your detention here is entirely owing to your own government, to which any application you may think proper to make on the subject, will of course be duly forwarded.—As it is probable, that you may not be sufficiently acquainted with the English language, to understand perfectly this letter, a translation of it into French, is given on the other side hereof.—I am, &c.

(Signed) By the Secretary.

"This motion of Mr. Biddulph, instead of at once putting the ministers to the proof; instead of shewing the country what it had to expect from them, in the way of economy; instead of doing this by a proposition for abolishing such sinecures and pensions as never were melted by the parties enjoying them; instead of this, the motion was calculated, like the "learned languages," to produce an effect worse than useless; because, by the appointment of a committee, no reduction will be brought about, and because, by such appointment, some persons will be led to believe, that a reduction will be brought about. There have been such committees before; and still the amount of the grants has gone on increasing."—POLITICAL REGISTER: 21st Feb. 1807.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

REVERSION BILL.—During the last session of parliament, a bill passed the House of Commons, the object of which was to prevent, in future, the granting of any place in reversion. This bill was thrown out in the House of Lords; and, another bill, of the same tendency, lately passed in the House of Commons, has, in the upper house, met with the same fate. A third bill is now before the former house, or, is, by this time, carried up to the latter.—To be sure, it is a monstrous abuse to give a place, or office, or employment, to any one, to be held by him after the death of the present holder. It is evident, that a thousand things may happen, to make it improper that the reversioner should fill the office, of which he has the reversion; but, the impropriety becomes glaringly manifest, when we consider, that the appointment in reversion is frequently, if not generally, to children, or to persons in trust for children, or for women.—Lord Auckland's son, for instance was a mere child, when the reversion of Lord Thurlow's place, as a Teller of the Exchequer was granted to him; and, if any one will take the pains to look over the list of this sort of places, he will find almost every place granted two or three deep; that is to say, for an age yet to come.—Yet, I wish to guard my readers against the notion, that the putting of a stop to this abuse would, of itself, do the nation any great good. I wish to show to them, that the bill, if passed, unaccompanied with any other measure of reform, would prove a thing of mere sound.—[In the first place, the offices in question are *sinecures*, that is to say, offices wherein the holders have nothing in the world to do but to receive the salaries attached to the said offices. In other words they are so many pretences for giving away the public money; so many fixed annual allowances; so many perpetual existing pensions. This being the real

state of the case, I can perceive no mischief, likely to arise from the power of granting of a place in reversion, which is not full as likely to arise from the power of granting a pension to descend in enjoyment to a second or a third person, after the present grantee; and, as far as I have heard, it does not appear to be the object of any of the reversion-abolishers, now in parliament, to prevent the king, or his successor, from granting pensions in reversion.—The petitions, indeed, from the Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council, of the city of London, to both Houses of Parliament, go deeper into the matter. They complain, that there are numbers of abuses in the management and expenditure of the public money; that the speculators detected have not been punished; that there are many sinecure places and pensions which ought to be abolished, for that they not only greatly add to the burdens of the people, but create a pernicious and dangerous influence, corrupting and undermining the free principles of the British Constitution. True as this is, and useful as it is to promulgate such truths, I should not, had I been a Londoner, have joined in the petition; and, my objection would have been, that these sentiments were accompanied with what was calculated to spread abroad the idea, that the reversion bill ought to be regarded as a beginning in the good work of reform, than which, as it is evident to me, nothing could be farther from the truth.—The petitioners say, that "they viewed with much satisfaction the foundation of a committee of finance, and hailed the introduction to prevent the granting of places in reversion, as the first step towards a salutary reformation."—Did Mr. Waithman, who was the proposer of this petition, recollect, when he was drawing it up, the origin of this famous committee of finance? The motion for the appointment of the committee, was, as was stated by me at the time, calculated to pre-

vent, or, at least, to retard, any real reform in the distribution and expenditure of the public money. The committee was "to inquire *whether any, and what further, saving might be made by the abolition of " sinecure offices."* Just as if it was matter of *doubt*, whether any saving could so be made; and just as if there *had already been* savings in that way. Truly, such a foundation did not promise much good; and, whoever is disappointed at the result the fault is entirely their own. But, it does really surprize me, that so sensible, so well-informed, so clever, and so sound a man as Mr. Waitman is universally allowed to be, and as I am convinced he is, should have given into the notion, that the reversion bill, a bill which did not even glance at the abolition of any place, or the diminution of any expence, was "the first step towards a salutary reformation," when the fact notoriously was, that the late ministers had no other object in view, in bringing forward this bill, than that of preventing the king from making grants, which, if the bill became a law, would fall into the hands of his successors, the first of whom was, of course, the Prince of Wales. It does, indeed, surprize me, that Mr. Waitman, who is, in general, so clear-sighted, and who is so much above the trickery and fraud of faction, should have allowed himself to become instrumental in holding forth this measure, which had its birth in motives decidedly of a party nature, as a step in the way of a great and public-spirited reformation.—The subject has, I perceive, been taken up by that rump of faction, called the Whig Club, which, upon the exaltation of Mr. Fox, suddenly swelled to *four hundred* at a meeting, and which has now again re-dwindled to a *dozen*. It is very well for that club to make speeches about their *patriotic-principles*; but, will they show us any one act, which they did in the way of diminishing the public burdens, while they were in office? Nay, will they now say, that they will, if again in office, *reduce the number and amount of the sinecure places and pensions*? This is the question for us to put to them; for, if we are to *continue to pay the full amount of those places and pensions*, what is it to us, whether the grants be made by the present, or by a succeeding king? There is much soundness in the argument, that, if the sinecures are to continue, the granting of them in reversion is less likely to render the holders dependant, than if they were granted for one life only; and, I think, it is pretty clear, that the less frequently the gift returns into the hands of the minis-

ter, the less frequent will be the occasions, wherein it will be made the means of corruption. The fact is, that the places in question are, in general, granted only for one life at a time. Such has been the greediness, such the prevailing desire, to live upon the labour of the people, that the ministers, for many years back, have had no sinecure places to grant, but merely the reversion of places. There is always in existence a crew of place-hunters who wait for dead men's shoes; and thus have the places been engaged for half a century to come.—"Aye," say the advocates of the reversion bill, "but, the only way to *abolish* these "places is, first, to prevent the granting "of them in reversion; because, *until "they become vacant, they cannot be abo- "lished."* It is because the reversion bill affects to be founded upon this principle, that I dislike it, more than upon any other account. It is because a sanction is thus given to the audacious doctrine, that, let what will happen; let the distresses of the people be what they may, sinecure places are to be regarded as private property, as a freehold estate, and are to remain untouched, though the people, by whose labour the holders are supported, should be reduced to a degree of misery, that would drive them to seek for relief, even under the yoke of a conqueror. Half a century is too long for this nation to wait for the effects of "a salutary reformation." I hope to see a salutary reformation much sooner than the end of the life of even the oldest of the present sinecure placemen.—I was sorry to see Mr. Waitman at the Whig Club. If he thinks that any good is to be effected in that way, he is grievously deceived. The public are sick of both factions. The *wranglings* of the last year have put a finishing-stroke to confidence in public men; and, though it is quite clear, that a *great change must* take place, particularly in the management of the public money, not a soul will stir to assist the endeavours of the present opposition, who, as all the world perceive, have no other object in view than that of ousting their rivals, and getting into their places.—I shall be told, perhaps, that this was *always* the case. But, the reading, which a compilation of the *history of the parliament* has compelled me to perform, has convinced me of the falsehood of this assertion; an assertion constantly made by all those, who are interested in the support of a system of corruption. It was not until about a century ago; not, indeed, until after the Revolution, that a regular system of parliamentary opposition was organized and acted upon; and,

if that system had been organized before, there never would have been such a revolution; never would have been a revolution, until the miserable people, assisted, perhaps, as the people of Spain now are, by a foreign invader, had risen, with despairing and bloody minds, to tear the whole fabric to pieces. No: a regular opposition; a dead set opposition; a division of the representatives of the people into two distinct sets of pleaders, arrayed against each other upon benches deriving their names from the parties occupying them: this does *not* make a part of the constitution of England: it is a terrible evil, grown out of the neglect and violation of that constitution—is it not a lamentable thing, to see, at a time like this, whole months spent in eager and angry contest; and, during the whole time, scarcely any one thing seriously discussed, or proposed, having for its real object the guarding of the nation against the dangers that await it? To see all the powers of the minds of so many men of such great talents, so eminently qualified, by nature as well as by experience, for the task of giving a right direction to the public mind, and of infusing into the whole mass of the nation courage and public-spirit; to see all these powers wasted in despicable bickerings and vexatious propositions? To have expected many indications of public-spirit might have been unreasonable; but, surely, selfish and corrupt as are the times, we might have expected to see some *one*, out of so many hundreds, to set us an example of willing sacrifices to the good of the country; yet, no such example, amongst all the numerous candidates for power, have we seen.—I must now return to the reversion bill, for a moment, in order to notice the debate, which took place upon it, in the House of Commons, on Monday last, the 11th instant.—The bill was new-modelled. In order to render it palatable in the House of Lords, it was made to *suspend* the power of granting places in reversion, “during the *inquiry* now pending in the House of Commons.” LORD PORCHESTER moved an amendment, making the bill what it was before; that is to say, a prohibition of any future grants of places in reversion.—MR. STEPHEN opposed the amendment. He said, “that it had by no means been yet proved that the abolition of the practice of granting offices in reversion was injurious to the country, and it appeared to him to be at least a very questionable assertion to contend that it was so. He deprecated the disunion between the co-ordinate branches of the legislature, and condemned in warm terms

the attempts that were making at such a critical period as the present, when the executive government had but too many difficulties to contend with to trench upon the prerogatives of the crown, and by that means to increase those difficulties in a tenfold degree.

“SIR FRANCIS BURDETT combatted the arguments of the learned gentleman (Mr. Stephens), who having rebuked others for the temper shewn by them in this debate, had himself exhibited more of what was peculiarly denominated temper, than he had often witnessed in that house. Indeed, the whole speech of the learned gentleman seemed to have proceeded from it, consisting chiefly of reflections cast upon persons no longer in office, and its whole scope and tendency seemed to have that in view, rather than the question, or any of those important considerations naturally suggested by it. To this must be attributed the palpable defectiveness of the learned gentleman’s reasoning; which appeared to him no less erroneous with respect to principles of politics than of law. The learned gent. had adduced the situation of Europe, and the circumstances of the times as arguments in favour of prerogative; even if this granting of reversions was an abuse, these were not times in which it ought to be restrained.—Was it possible we could cast our eyes over the map of Europe, or the page of its History for the last fifteen years, and still be advocating despotism, and putting our trust in Standing Armies? Should we never learn that an armed people, proud of, and devoted to liberty, was the only method of making a country unconquerable, and a government secure? What! was it any want of prerogative that made Austria, Prussia, Russia, and all the despots of Europe fall at the feet of France? Or was it the want of their subjects’ hearts that deprived them of energy and support; that left them in the hour of danger abandoned and forlorn? This should teach princes and states, that those who had been accustomed to “crook the pregnant hinges of the knee” before one master, could as easily perform the same baseness before another; which consideration might put them out of love with flattery and fawning; and teach them, that despotism was not less impotent than cruel, not less marked by infamy than folly; nor more to be hated than despised.—He had learnt, not only from those great writers whose theory, as the learned gent. said, unfortunately differed

“ from the practice of the constitution—he
 “ had learnt not only from them, but also
 “ from high prerogative lawyers, amongst
 “ others from Sir H. Finch *, the high pre-
 “ rogative lawyer, in the high prerogative
 “ times of that high prerogative king,
 “ Charles the First, who lost his head for
 “ his prerogative, which he owed not a lit-
 “ tle to his high prerogative lawyers, that
 “ though the prerogative extended, as they
 “ said, to every thing, yet it could not ex-
 “ tend to abuse, because, being in its nature
 “ for the benefit, it could not be exerted to
 “ the injury of the public. Why, then, the
 “ question was, were those Reversionary
 “ places for the benefit or injury of the pub-
 “ lic? But, they were pointed out as a griev-
 “ ous injury and abuse by the committee of
 “ this house. This house had adopted that
 “ principle, framed a bill acknowledging it,
 “ and abolishing it, but we were now to be
 “ told it was unpalatable to the lords, that
 “ we must yield it to their prejudices: but
 “ it concerned too deeply the honour and
 “ character of the commons, which he would
 “ not consent to yield to the prejudice or
 “ the pride or the corruption of the lords,
 “ against which he would oppose the privi-
 “ leges of the commons. Nor would he
 “ consent, that the commons, in a measure,
 “ no matter how small, of economy, of sav-
 “ ing the people’s pockets, of controlling
 “ public expenditure, should bate an inch of
 “ privilege, much less sacrifice the princi-
 “ ple, which, in fact, was the whole of this
 “ bill. The hon. gent. who brought for-
 “ ward this bill—now proposed, to be ren-
 “ dered totally worthless, by a compromise
 “ with ministers, (and for whom he certain-
 “ ly entertained a better opinion than he had
 “ been pleased to profess he entertained for
 “ him) recalled to his mind, upon this oc-
 “ casion, Bottom the weaver, who playing
 “ the part of Lion in pageantry before the
 “ court, and being excessively apprehensive
 “ least he should cause any alarm, when he
 “ makes his appearance in his lion’s hide,
 “ pops his head through a hole in the neck,
 “ and says, “ don’t be alarmed, for I who
 “ act Lion am not Lion, but Bottom the
 “ weaver, don’t be frightened, an if you
 “ were frightened, ’twere pity o’ my life. I’ll
 “ roar ye as gently as any sucking lamb.”—
 “ The learned gent. who had just sat down,
 “ had expressed his disbelief of the existence
 “ of any unconstitutional influence exer-
 “ cised by irresponsible persons, and con-
 “ troling the responsible ministers. This

“ influence, however, was felt early in the
 “ present reign, denounced first by my Lord
 “ Chatham, and he believed the public was
 “ well convinced it did exist—a mysterious
 “ and malignant power whose hand, felt, not
 “ seen, had stabbed the constitution to the
 “ heart.—But, of all the many curious
 “ circumstances which had attended the
 “ progress of this bill, nothing appeared to
 “ him more curious than the conduct of mi-
 “ nisters about it: they were not for it, and
 “ they were not against it: to the court
 “ they apologized for themselves, saying—
 “ “ We are not against it, because it will do
 “ you no harm:” to the people, “ We are
 “ not strongly for it, because it will do you
 “ no good; we do not wish to delude you,
 “ the measure is trifling, (negatory, said the
 “ Secretary at War,) it would be deceiving
 “ and raising the expectation of the people,
 “ only to disappoint it; it would afford them
 “ no relief.” Now, he perfectly agreed as
 “ to the inadequacy of the measure—the
 “ smallness of the boon; but, it was a com-
 “ mencement of reform, it acknowledged
 “ the principle—the necessity; and there-
 “ fore, he should vote for it. He would
 “ also observe, that it was the last drop that
 “ made the cup too full; that the peo-
 “ ple were full of sorrows and sufferings,
 “ tossing and rolling on the bed of sick-
 “ ness; that the present turned their
 “ anxious eyes towards that house for
 “ relief—and they should beware how
 “ they disappointed them, and turned
 “ their eyes elsewhere in despair.—
 “ But, it seemed, that ministers objected
 “ to a measure so inadequate, so paltry, not
 “ worth the people’s acceptance. They
 “ had better stomachs for reform—wanted
 “ something more substantial. He sup-
 “ posed they wished for some independent
 “ country member to get up and propose
 “ that the ancient undoubted right of the
 “ people to annual parliaments, chosen by
 “ themselves, should be restored—or that
 “ no person bribed, or who should be brib-
 “ ed by a place or pension should have a
 “ seat in the Commons House—that the
 “ good old laws of the land, Magna Charta,
 “ Bill of Rights, and Act of Settlement,
 “ should be restored, by repealing all those
 “ unconstitutional acts which had nearly
 “ annihilated them; or some other propo-
 “ sition worthy to be entertained by an
 “ English House of Commons.—He could
 “ not set down without expressing his as-
 “ tonishment at the quarter from whence
 “ the opposition to this very moderate mea-
 “ sure came,—from those who, for doing
 “ nothing, had received and were receiving

* See Cobbett’s Parliamentary History
 of England, Vol. II. p. 55.

“ large sums of public money, who ought to have been the very last to oppose it, or rather, who ought to have been amongst its most cheerful patrons and promoters—even though actuated by no other motive than that which guided every prudent tradesman, and made him consider present security, as well as future gain. He would, and with no unfriendly voice, call upon those persons to consider, whether, by their opposition to this bill of Reversion, they might not produce bills of Resumption; whether they might not, by opposing this small commencement of reform, cause themselves speedily to hear sounds the most unpleasant, he should suppose, to their ears—for he would have them recollect, that it was not the first time in the history of this country that the necessity of the times, and the indignation of the public, had echoed through the land *resume and refund.*”

“ MR. WINDHAM did not think that the measure of abolishing Reversions would be so productive of advantage to the people as was supposed. The assertion of the hon. baronet, that it would be the commencement of reform, was to him no recommendation of it, knowing, as he did, the dreadful dangers which might ensue from misguided attempts at reformation, of which we had had sufficient examples in a neighbouring country. As to the corruption that was so generally asserted to exist among the higher orders, he contended that that corruption existed in an equal degree in the lower, and that the tree struck its root as deep into the earth as it elevated its branches into the air.”—After Mr. Windham came, it appears from the report, Mr. Sheridan: but, I can hardly believe, that the speech attributed to him ever fell from his lips. He has astonished me many times, but, that he should make the speech, which has been published under his name, is quite incredible. He spoke with great *warmth*, too, the reporters tell us. It was represented to me, only a few days ago, that he was *ill*; and really, if this report be correct, I am afraid that the representation was but too well founded. But, it is impossible. He never could have uttered the words. No; not even Mr. Sheridan could have made such a speech.—The words, published as his speech were these:—“ Mr. Sheridan could not be provoked to say a word at so late an hour, by any thing but the extraordinary positions which he had just heard from his right hon. friend. What! all corruption in the state was to be found only at the root! The people were the

root, and from the people then sprung up all corruption! He must beg his right hon. friend to recollect that he had successively represented such a variety of places, whether the county of Norfolk, Norwich, St. Mawes, or Higham Ferrers, that even a memory like his, and such a known acquaintance with the constitution of parliament, could not well enable him to say of what place he was really the representative. His right hon. friend had chiefly insisted, that the root of corruption was to be traced only to the people. He would contend the very contrary. It was government that was the seducer; the people the seduced. The present question would put it to the test; and if his right hon. friend's principles were to be adhered to, it would only prove, that the drippings of the top of the tree were the real cause of the blighting of the branches, and the corruption of the root. Where root, branches, &c. were undermined, could any fair fruit be after expected to blossom from such a ground?”—Now, how the reporter could insert this appears to me to be astonishing. It was an answer to Mr. Windham, but it answered what he did not say. He said, that corruption had gone as far amongst the poor as it had gone amongst the rich; as far amongst the low as amongst the high; that the tree of corruption had shot as far downwards as it had shot upwards, a figure perfectly corresponding with the well-known observation respecting the oak, that its tap root penetrates exactly as far into the earth as its topmost twig mounts into the air. As to the truth of the proposition, which this figure was meant to illustrate or embellish, that is another matter; but, if Mr. Sheridan did give the answer, which is here imputed to him, he must have been out of the house when Mr. Windham spoke; for, if he had been disposed so glaringly to misrepresent a member's word, he could not have ventured to do it, knowing that the misrepresentation must be perceived by every one who heard him. Did Mr. Windham say, that corruption “sprang up solely from the people?” No. He did not say, that it sprang up from the people at all. He said, that the tree had shot as far downwards as it had upwards; but, he said nothing about the seed, or about who had sown the seed. Now, as to the fact, let any one look at *Honiton* and hundreds of places that could be named, and deny, if he can, that the corruption has shot as far downwards as it has upwards. Let any one look at the election of Alexander Davison; nay, let any one look at the number of votes, which were obtained, upon a late occasion, for a person,

whom it is needless now to name. These, if we had not thousands of others, are quite sufficient proofs of the truth of Mr. Windham's assertion: In fact, it is only because the electors are corrupt, that corruption prevails at all. If they were to do their duty, there would not exist the food for corruption to feed upon.—I imagine, I could easily point out the reason why Mr. Sheridan chose, upon this occasion, to post himself up, as it were, for an advocate of *reform*. Yes, I could easily assign a cause for this wonderful ebullition of popular spirit. But, he may rest assured, that the persons, whom he had in his eye, even if they had now another opportunity of making a choice, would convince him, that they are not easily to be led to alter their minds, as to any part of his conduct or character. It well became him, indeed, to talk about St. Mawes and Higham Ferrers! His election and his riding in the dirt-covered car with Sir Samuel Hood, were, one would have thought, sufficient to have induced him to say nothing about elections; and, as to *sinecure places*, it is well-known that he has now, or lately had, a pretty good one (I suppose it has come back to him upon the death of Lord Lake); it is also well known, that the Whig ministry was scarcely formed, when he obtained for his son a sinecure worth three thousand pounds a year, that son receiving at the same time, pay as a captain in the army; it is also well known, that he asked for himself the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster, another sinecure place worth three thousand a year, and that he asked it for life too. In fact, men more greedy of the public money than himself and his son, it is, I think, impossible to find, even in this country, at this time. He has always been hunting after place, which is very well, perhaps, but, then, he should never attempt to play the part of the disinterested man.—It is odd enough to hear him expressing his *indignation* at Mr. Windham's defence of sinecure places; he, who is a sinecure placeman, and would have been, if he could, a double-handed sinecure placeman, and whose son (of whom he is so proud, as he told the electors of Westminster) was, as long as the ministry would permit him to be so, a sinecure placeman, the place having been obtained by the means of the father. Mr. Windham is no sinecure placeman; he never, in his life, pocketed a farthing of the public money; he must, therefore, have spoken from principle; and, though I differ with him in opinion, as to sinecure places, cannot help respecting him for the manly declaration of his sentiments. If every man

would, like him, *speak out*, we should always know what we had to trust to. He says plainly, that he disapproves of any attempt to reform the parliament; he acknowledges that corruption exists; he wishes it did not; but, he tells us, that, in his opinion, the remedy would be worse than the disease. Let no man suppose, that he has not *reasons* to give in support of this opinion. It is our business to combat those reasons, and not to abuse him for entertaining the opinion, or for acting upon that opinion, until it be proved to be erroneous. At any rate, he is not an enemy to be hated, who speaks out; who acts without disguise; who scorns all subterfuge, and who is willing to run the risk of defeat.—It will not be forgotten, that this advocate of reform, never talked about reform, *while he himself was in place*. Before and after, but not during that time, when he had the power to speak with effect. It has been the same, with regard to all the other subjects, which, from time to time, he has taken up. There have always been some means found out of mollifying and silencing him. During the last session of parliament, he *talked about* a bill respecting the powers of the police magistrates; he gave notice of his intention to propose such a bill. Now we hear no more of it; and no more of it we shall hear, unless a similar motive should again animate the patriotic proposer.—It must have surprised a great many people to see Mr. Sheridan thus turn upon Mr. Windham all of a sudden. His friendship is like that of a cat. He will purr about you for a long while together; but, by-and-by, when you least expect it, he gives you a scratch. He now appears to be purring to Sir Francis Burdett, the man by the means of calumniating whom he gained the support of the friends of Sir Samuel Hood; the man against whom chiefly the speeches and toasts at all his election dinners, during the first contest, were levelled; the man, in short, whom the Whigs sought to destroy by all the means that malice could invent and baseness execute. This purring, however, will not succeed; and, therefore, if Mr. Sheridan be wise, he will make the best that he can of a steady attachment to his old party.

INDIA AFFAIRS.—The recent intelligence from India, or, "our Empire in the East," is of a gloomy complexion, in my sight, only inasmuch as it gives an account of the loss of a great number of English officers and soldiers. It may serve to make men reflect justly on the nature of the wars we carry on in India; and may lead them to the conclusion, so much to be desired, name-

ly, that the possession of that country is a terrible evil. This, it seems, is to be *the last war*; but, we have been told the same thing for more than thirty years past. There is a constant, a never-ceasing war in India. There is not always actual fighting; but, there are always going on preparations for fighting. What right, in God's name, what right have we to do this? How is it possible for us to justify our conduct, upon any principle of morality? Conquests in India are not at all necessary either to our safety or our comfort. There is no glory attending such conquests and their accompanying butcheries. We must be actuated by a sheer love of gain; a sheer love of plunder. I really believe, that the history of the whole world does not afford an instance of a series of aggressions so completely unjustifiable and inexorable. — But, the Indian branch makes a considerable part of our *political system*. These colonies, on the other side of the globe, have no small share in the decision of all questions relative to us here at home. The East-India interest is *embodied*, and it is always held in the hands of the minister of the day. The East-India adventurer is enriched by money paid out of the taxes raised here, and that money he frequently employs for the purpose of obtaining the power of taxing us, for facilitating which employment the borough system is most admirably calculated. If corruption at elections were prevented, if the laws relating to elections were obeyed; if the constitution of England were adhered to, there would be little danger from combinations of any sort. If those who pay the greater part of the taxes were all to have their free voice; and if the qualifications were such as the law intended them to be; if no man having alien interests, and being exposed to no temptation to swerve from his duty, which duty, supposing him to be properly qualified, would have a perfect coincidence with his interest; if such were the state of the representation, (and such the constitution of England means it should be,) the nation would be in no danger whatever of seeing either its honour or its interest sacrificed to such bodies as the East-India Company; but, while things continue in their present state, it is impossible, that such sacrifices should not be made. — It is said now, that some regulations will be adopted, in India, for the purpose of conciliating the natives, and especially for the purpose of preventing any future attack upon their religious prejudices. This alludes to the *whisker shaving* affair, which was, indeed, a notable instance. But, the Indians knew

only one half of the story; and, if they had been informed, that we were putting whiskers upon the faces of Englishmen, they might, perhaps, have taken the thing more quietly. If they could have seen whisker Mellish riding in a dog-cart to and from the Brentford election, they might, perhaps, have profited from so striking an example of complaisance. This man exceeded, in that way, any one I ever heard of, in this or any other country. He put a pair of most odious bunches of hair upon his face; he disfigured himself; he voluntarily rendered himself ugly, and, to all appearance, for no reason whatever except that of paying his court to those, who preferred the look of a German to that of an Englishman! Here, ye slaves of Hindostan! Behold this example, and repent of your refractory behaviour! — It would seem, that delegated rulers in "our Eastern Empire," are really alarmed at the threats of Napoleon, and are making preparations for defence, on the side of Persia. That is good. I wish to see them upon the alert. It will bring on the desired result. It will hasten that result; and will make it as certain as if Buonaparte himself were to enter India with an army. And here I must observe, how abominably cowardly our language respecting the French is. We appear to be more afraid of six Frenchmen than of thirty millions of Indians. When we are beaten, or in danger of being beaten in India, we always ascribe it to *the French*. Like the fellow in one of Goldsmith's plays, "go where we will we find the Parlez-vous;" and always are we, upon land, most dreadfully afraid of him. As to India, we are not at all ashamed to acknowledge, that, if the French could throw in a trifling force of their own, or, even a body of military officers only, we should soon be driven out of the country. We never hear the French expressing such terrible apprehensions at the influence of English military officers. These apprehensions of our India rulers are, however, by no means unfounded; for, if the French should get but a mere footing, they will very soon upset a company of as comfortable sovereigns as the world ever saw.

PORTUGAL. — The situation of Portugal, respecting which I have, in another part of this number, inserted an account, is truly shocking; but, it is no other than what I expected and foretold. Portugal cannot exist, in the present state of its agriculture, without importation. — It is stated, that an application was made, in the latter end of last month, to our admiral Sir Charles Cotton, by General Junot, to suffer some provisions

to come into Lisbon to prevent the people from starving, and that Sir Charles has sent home for instructions. I think, I should not have sent home. The chief object of the Orders in Council, and of the blockades, was *to produce distress* in France, and in all the countries under her controul. This is the immediate object of preventing provisions from going into a besieged town. But, there is, in the latter case, a consequent object, and that is, the surrender of the town by the enemy. Now, though no state of distress, no ravages of famine, could, perhaps, be reasonably expected to induce the French to evacuate Portugal, and, if they were to do it, we could not take possession and hold it; yet, a sort of capitulation might have been made. The French might have been required to yield something. The worth of the plunder, for instance, which they have made upon English subjects. They might have been required to give up or drive out the Russian fleet. This may, perhaps, be done yet; but, the sooner the thing had been done the better. I am aware of the horrors of famine. I hear the cries of humanity in favour of a starving people; but I hear them also in a town besieged; and I never yet heard of town in that state being supplied by the besieger. I shall be told, may be, that the Portuguese are our old friends and allies; and so were the Dutch; and so were the Russians. Portugal now belongs to France; two millions and a half of people have submitted to her authority; the ports and resources of Portugal are now arrayed against England. This being the case, we must consider the Portuguese as enemies. Amongst the effects of the Orders in Council, I always counted greatly upon the *distress* to be produced in all the countries dependant upon France, and especially upon the starving of Spain and Portugal. Now, though I feel sorrow that Portugal should have so acted as to bring herself into a state of starvation; I cannot say that I am sorry that starvation has been the consequence. I should be sorry that a speculator should have so acted as to bring himself to the gallows; but, I could not say that I was sorry that he had been hanged. —Terrible as the effect of our power is, in Portugal (and it will soon have, I should think, a like effect in Spain,) it cannot fail to be attended with advantages to Europe in general. The example is, indeed, dreadful; but it will be the more efficacious. It will tend to convince the yielding nations, that there is something still more to be dreaded than the armies of France. The greediness of trade has, until now, prevented us from making the true use of our naval

power. Napoleon having, by his commercial decrees, cut off our trade, we have been driven to do that which wisdom long ago pointed out to us. — Portugal will now, instead of an additional weapon in the hand, be a mill-stone about the neck of France. The fate of that wretched country will teach the people of Europe, that there is a boundary to the power of Napoleon. He himself cannot but feel, that it must tend to render him odious, to cause his name to be hated and cursed, and to render his sway of precarious duration. All these, Mr. Roscoe, and not your Landerdale negotiations, and petitions from Liverpool, lead to a secure and lasting peace.

SPAIN. — A very confused account (inserted below from the news-papers) of an insurrection in Spain shews, I think, clearly, that the last remaining branch of the House of Bourbon has not many months to enjoy even the name of regal authority. That infatuation and imbecility, which have, in all the other countries of the continent, paved the military road of the conqueror, seem to have worked double tides in the monarchy of Spain. It is not long since we saw the king accusing his son of being engaged in a conspiracy against his life; and, it is pretty generally asserted, that the queen had as little of constancy as the king had of sense. Profligacy and extravagance in the Royal family; little peculation in the nobles; and a total want of public-spirit in the people, who are, to say the best of them, as corrupt as their rulers: these are the causes of the present distracted state, and of the approaching subjugation, of Spain; and, let no man hope, that similar causes will not, in every country where they prevail, produce, first or last, similar effects. Riches, luxury, corruption, cowardice, passive submission at home, subjection to a foreign foe: this, the history of the world tells us, is the invariable progress; and, I am afraid, that it tells us besides, that a nation, once deeply corrupted, never yet regained its purity, without feeling the scourge of a conqueror, or passing through the fire of revolution. — In the approaching change in Spain, I, therefore, see nothing to regret. It appears to be impossible, that the people can be placed in a state more wretched and degraded than they now are. Let us endeavour, let us Englishmen, each according to the utmost of his means, make an effort, at least, to prevent a similar fate from befalling our country; for, we may be well assured, that, in the immutable decrees of Providence, there is no article containing an exception in favour of us.

AMERICAN STATES. — My querulous

correspondent, the "American merchant of New Front Street," has sent me another letter, which I have inserted, and, upon one part of which only I shall make any observation. He says, in answer to my question, so often repeated, that he would *not* give up the right of searching for seamen; but, that he would take care to *prevent abuse in the exercise of it*; and this is all, as he understands, that the American president asks for. If he does really understand this, his understanding must, I should suppose, have been asleep, for some months past; for, we learn, from the correspondence between Lords Holland and Auckland and Mr. Canning, that our negotiators went as far as they could possibly go in assurances that *all abuse in the exercise of the right should be effectually prevented*. But, this is not all. The king, in his proclamation upon the subject, strictly enjoins and commands all his officers to exercise this right of search with the *least possible degree of inconvenience* to the ships, which they judge it necessary to search. Well, what *more* are we to do? It is impossible to do any thing more, without doing away the right as to all its practical utility. And, observe, that this proclamation, so far from having satisfied the Americans, is, in all their newspapers, on both sides, stated to be the *sole* cause of the non-importation act being put into force, and the *chief* cause of the embargo.—Having entered upon this subject, I will now state a most curious and interesting fact, relating to the embargo, which was omitted last week. It appears from the Charleston (South Carolina) city gazette of the 16th and 17th of February last, that a "*large number of British subjects, seamen in the American ships,*" went, on the 15th of that month, in a body, to the English Consul, at that port, and requested him to give them *relief, or employment*. Now, then, where are the Morning Chronicle and its correspondent A. B. to affect a laugh at the idea of many of our seamen being on board the American ships? This is a most unfortunate fact for those gentlemen, as well as for the American negotiators, who have invariably asserted, that the number of English sailors on board of the American ships was not worth notice, and that the men taken out of them by our searchers were, almost in all cases, Americans. Whence, then, did this "*large number*" spring at Charleston?—This is a very curious effect of the embargo. That self-blockade was adopted to prevent us from taking our seamen out of American ships; and, one of the effects of it has been to make those sea-

men voluntarily withdraw themselves from their ships, which has, at the same time, furnished us with a proof of the falsehood of the allegations, upon which they founded their demand of a surrender of our right of search.—The Morning Chronicle, of the 13th instant, has made an extraordinary display of its understanding upon a matter connected with the embargo, but which connection it does not appear to have perceived.—It publishes a proclamation of the king, dated on the 11th instant, which it prefaces with the following sagacious remark. "We understand that the following proclamation by the king in council has been issued. It is another proof that the system which has been so rashly adopted is found to be *impracticable*; and, therefore, day by day, *relaxations* of the principle are forced upon ministers."—Now, what, reader, should you imagine was this "*proof*" of the "*impracticability*" of the Orders in Council system? What should you imagine was this *relaxation, forced upon the ministers*? Read the proclamation, and then admire the profound ignorance of this oracle of the Whig politicians. "GEORGE R.—Instructions to the commanders of our ships of war and privateers. Given at our court at Windsor, the 11th day of April, in the 48th year of our reign.—Our will and pleasure is, that you do not interrupt any neutral vessel laden with *lumber and provisions*, and going to any of our colonies, islands, or settlements, in the West-Indies, or South America, to whomsoever the property may appear to belong, and notwithstanding such vessel may not have regular clearances and documents on board, and in case any vessel shall be met with, and be in her due course to the alleged port of destination, an indorsement shall be made on one or more of thy principal papers of such vessel, specifying the destination alleged, and the place where the vessel was so visited. And in case any vessel so laden shall arrive and deliver her cargo at any of our colonies, islands, or settlements aforesaid, such vessel shall be permitted to receive her freight, and to depart, either in ballast, or with any goods that may be legally exported in such vessel, and to proceed to any unblockaded port, notwithstanding the present hostilities, or any future hostilities which may take place; and a passport for such purpose shall be granted to the vessel by the governor, or other person, having the chief civil command in such colony, island or settlement."—Now, one would have

thought, that no one at all conversant in the maritime affairs of the world, could have failed to perceive in this proclamation, *an offer made to the American merchant ships to trade with the English West-Indies in spite of the embargo*. Yet, I'll warrant you, that it never entered into the noddle of this gentleman, that the order to our commanders to dispense with the production of "*regular clearances and documents*" could have any such meaning. A very poor noddle has he! The American ships (the *only neutral ships* now in the world) are, observe, all *embargoed*; that is to say, they lie in their ports under a positive law, forbidding them, under heavy penalties, to go thence to any other port or country in the world. To offer them a free passage, then, to the West-Indies, or to any other part, would have been a pure absurdity upon any other supposition than that of their setting the embargo law at defiance. The law permits them to go from one *American port* to another *American port* as often as they please; and, as I stated in my last Register, they had, in some cases, as was asserted in their newspapers, taken advantage of this exception to run off to Jamaica with a cargo. But, there was some danger in this; because, if met by any of our cruisers, they would be liable to be siezed, seeing that they could not possibly have any other than their *coasting* clearance on board. To secure them against this danger, the present proclamation provides, that, if they *say* that they are bound to our settlements in the West Indies, or South America, they shall not be interrupted, and that one of their papers shall be endorsed by the English commander who may visit them, specifying the alledged destination and also the place where visited by him. This secures their going to one of our settlements; because, if met again, and *out of the track*, they are siezed. —Having thus invited them out to sea, and secured their arrival in our own colonies, the proclamation next provides for their having due encouragement to take away the produce of those colonies; and, for this purpose, allows them to go with such produce to any part of the world, except to a port blockaded by us. And this the noddle of the Morning Chronicle has conceived to be a "*relaxation of the Orders in Council system, forced upon the ministers!*" Let us try an instance in detail. JONATHAN SLYBOORS lies with his brig, the "*Fair American*," embargoed in the port of Boston. There are his brothers Ezra and Zekiel and Natty, and his cousins to the third generation, all his seamen, lounging about for want

of employment. Sugar and Molasses and Rum are mounted up to double price, while lumber and fish and pork are sunk to half price. "I vow," says Jonathan, "I'll not '*bide* here." He buys a cargo of lumber and provisions, to the custom-house he goes as bold as a lion, and there he demands and obtains a clearance for Norfolk or Wilmington or Charlestown or Augusta. He is on board at three strides, up goes the anchor, and off goes the Fair American for Jamaica, leaving the embargoed crews, whose master has less enterprize than hers, to eat molasses and to drink rum at double price, while they themselves have no pay. She is met by one of our cruisers at sea; but, upon alledging that she is going to Jamaica, her papers are endorsed, and she is suffered to pass.—Thus, our islands obtain provisions and lumber.—"Well now," says Jonathan, "I vow, you, Governor man, I don't like to go back just yet. I'll go to those Frenchmen's country try with a cargo of coffee." In he takes it, and away he goes to France. If he be met by one of our cruisers, he has the passport of the Governor of Jamaica to show; if he be met by a French cruiser, I'll trust to Jonathan's ingenuity to convince him that he took in his cargo at Martinico; which ingenuity will also serve his turn when he comes into Bourdeaux or Havre-de-Grace.—Thus, we make the enemy consume our colonial produce, while we prevent neutrals from carrying him any from his own colonies.—And this the Morning Chronicle calls a "*relaxation of the Orders in Council system, forced upon the ministers!*" Oh, thou blind guide! Thy printer's devil understands as much of these matters as thou dost. Well, but what will Jonathan do next? Perhaps, by this time, the embargo fit is off; for he has now been four months from home; and, if that be the case, he will laugh at the Congress and the law. Perhaps, though, the fit is not off. Well, it is little matter, either way, for he may sell the "*Fair American*," or give her away, his voyage having cleared much more than the worth of her. But, Jonathan will do no such thing. From France he will clear out for Martinico again, and, with the Governor of Jamaica's passport, well let into one of the planks of the brig, he will come through our cruisers to London or Liverpool. There he will take in a cargo for Boston; his clearance will carry him through our fleets and cruisers, and he will stand the chance of smuggling in his cargo. Once *out* at sea, however, in the first instance, he may follow what course he pleases, as long as he takes care to obey the English proclamations and Orders in Coun-

oil; but, the longer the embargo continues, the greater will be the temptation to smuggle in cargoes from England. One lucky hit will, in that case, make a man's fortune.—Even if "*futu.e hostilities*," that is to say, *war with America*, should break out, Jonathan may go right back home with his coffee and rum and molasses, if he chooses; and thither he will go too, when the scarcity becomes great, in spite of all the acts that the Congress are able to pass.—This proclamation is a very wise measure. It is calculated to meet the event of war, at the same time that it exactly suits this state of demi-warfare, in which, by the folly of the American government, we are now placed with that country.—And this is what the Morning Chronicle calls "*relaxation of the*" Order in Council system, *forced upon the* "ministers!"

CURATES' STIPEND BILL.—I have time only to say, that I most heartily wish this bill success. It was defeated by the late ministry, who could have had no other object in view, than that of pleasing the owners of livings. Mr. Perceval has always been respected by me on account of this bill; and, his persevering in it, *through all situations*, places him in striking contrast with the apostate patriots, to whom he has been opposed in politics, and who have, to a man, broken their promises, the moment they got possession of the power of fulfilling them.—This, indeed, is a step in the way of *real reform*—Some one expressed a desire to have *two debates* upon the principle of this bill; but, if there were to be two thousand speeches, and if *all* the speakers were opposed to it, they never would make one man of sound sense believe, that it is just towards a parish to give its clerical revenues to a man, whose face it never sees, while he who really performs all the duty that is performed receives not more than two thirds of the amount of the wages of a journeyman mechanic.

Bollev, 14th April, 1808.

PORTUGAL.

Famine has visited the wretched Portuguese.—At the date of the last advices, the 22d ult. hundreds, it is said, were lying dead in the streets of Lisbon. What, however most decisively proves the extent of the evil, is this, that General Junot sent out a flag of truce (the fact is without a doubt) with a deputation to Sir Charles Cotton, at the head of which was M. Michael Setard, a respectable Portuguese, to supplicate (the precise term used) the Admiral to *suffer some* provisions to come into Lisbon,

to save the people from perishing. Though Sir Charles was convinced of the reality of the alledged scarcity, yet he thought, it seems, a compliance with such a request beyond his powers, and therefore dispatched the Coquette for precise instructions.—Various letters have been received descriptive of these horrors; the following is from one of the gentlemen appointed to the deputation, and was written before he set off:—"Lisbon, March 21, 1808.—I have only time to inform you of my having been authorised, with several others, by this government, to proceed to the English fleet, now blockading our port, for the purpose of prevailing on Admiral Cotton to permit provisions to be brought hither, as we are absolutely on the eve of a famine. Under these dreadful circumstances we rely on the humanity and liberality of a generous nation, and we trust that his excellency will commiserate the distressed situation of the inhabitants of this devoted city and its environs, and grant liberty for provisions to enter the port, otherwise we must literally starve. Should we succeed in the object of our mission, it will revive the drooping spirits of the people, and save the lives of thousands and ten of thousands, who otherwise must meet their fate in the worst and most terrible of all deaths—a death from hunger."

SPAIN.—INSURRECTION.

Madrid, 19th March, nine o'clock at night.—Since Sunday the 13th inst., such important events have taken place, that the hurry in which I write will not allow me to arrange them in a proper order. Certain intelligence having been received of the Emperor of France coming here, it was asked on the part of the King, and at the request of the Admiral (the Prince of Peace), what was the object of his journey, and whither his troops were directed to march?—The answer was, that he came in a peaceable manner, for the good of the nation, and to make a Prince happy. The King, with his natural simplicity, and with great satisfaction, shewed this letter to the Admiral, who being immediately aware of the blow which threatened him, prepared to make arrangements to escape to Mexico, taking with him the King, whom he succeeded in persuading to follow him, apprizing him with what they had to fear from the arrival of the Emperor and his troops; and for this purpose the Admiral took out of the royal chest 36 millions of rials.—In the course of last month, he had sent already 60 millions to Corunna, which were destined for Lendoin, where he has 40 millions of dollars. On Wednesday

he arrived in Madrid, and withdrew on Sunday, in the evening, according to his usual custom, to Aranjuez. As soon as he arrived there, he called a meeting of the council, in which the flight of their Majesties were discussed. — The following day (Monday), early in the morning, the signatures of the three principal persons were collected, and when Cavellero's turn came, he said that he did not chuse to sign, nor should he allow them to do what they intended. The King represented to him in the most earnest manner the danger in which they found themselves; the general discontent of the people of Madrid, demanded his head (as the Admiral had falsely made him believe). Cavellero said that there was no such thing, that all was false, and that he had been deceived. — The King immediately answered—Do they deceive me? Do they betray me? Who is the Traitor? — That is the gentleman, pointing to the Admiral, who drew his sword—The council immediately broke up. The principal party, consisting of Cavellero, the Prince, Alenire Fernando Nunes, who they say was wounded, as were most of the *Grandes*. This happened at night: at the noise the life guards entered, and among them the halbert-bearers, and soon afterwards the mob. The project, which was for some time only suspected, was ascertained by the orders given to the life guards.—On the following day (Monday) in the morning, the life guards took post on the road of Ceanna. The hall of the council and the whole of the palace presented a scene of popular tumult. Some of the guards cried out "kill him," others "seize him!" and some pointed the sword to his breast. The Prince Asturias clung to the Admiral, who placing himself between the troops with fixed bayonets, fled to his house, or concealed himself in the palace, and the queen to her apartment. On Wednesday in the evening, a mail arrived, with an order for the garrison of Madrid to assemble and prepare to march. At 7 o'clock at night the bearers of those orders went to all the coffee-houses, and wherever they found officers or guards, directed them to join their corps, and through the whole town the carriages and horses were put into requisition. The troops remained all day in their quarters, which none of them were on any account permitted to leave, and much fermentation was observed among the people. And it was a matter of joy to them to go to the house of the Admiral, to see that he had no longer a guard of hussars. The council of Castille met the same day, and continued in deliberation from ten in the

morning until four in the afternoon, to answer the two questions of the King, whether he should leave the country, and whether his people were disturbed: to which questions the reply was, that he ought not to leave the country, nor would they allow him to do so. That the people were quiet and loved him, as he might himself see, if he would come to Madrid. This and the whole of the preceding day, nothing but complaints, clamours, and farewells, were heard in Aranjuez, because the king entertained the project of departing, until two in the afternoon, when a courier arrived from Napoleon, assuring him that he came with pacific intentions. This intelligence was immediately promulgated, and the lamentations were converted into shouts of joy, congratulations, and embraces throughout all Aranjuez. The patriarch returned home full of joy, exclaiming, "nothing is the matter, every thing is settled, go and make it public, let every one know." At half past eleven o'clock the same day, five loaded waggons passed through Aranjuez. Silva and Don Vicente arrived and brought the news, and a courier dispatched by Cavallero brought it to government, with a charge to proclaim as soon as it should reach Delicias, "All is settled, I am the bearer of good news, and of the orders for the troops to depart."—At midnight all the king's guards, the admiral's hussars, the volunteers of the state, and the cavalry with loaded carbines and pistols, and the artillery with lighted matches were on duty.—Yesterday (Thursday), in the morning, the annexed edict was posted, intended to undeceive and tranquilize the people; but at the same time, it was well known, that the admiral was neither apprehended nor disgraced, as had been reported. On the contrary, on the Tuesday, the royal family breakfasted at his house, and on the following day he was at the palace, which grieved every body, and the inhabitants of Aranjuez continued much disturbed. Last night the admiral withdrew from the palace at eleven o'clock, and at one attempted to escape. The life guards observed it, approached, and having ascertained the fact, fired a pistol, at which signal the rest of the guards assembled, and a throng of people endeavoured to force their way through the admiral's hussars who surrounded his house. Some of the life guards were killed, and Don Diego Godoy (the admiral's brother), who was at the head of his regiment of Spanish guards, ordered them to fire, but none obeyed. He repeated the order, when the people, and even his own soldiers fell on him, fired at him, beat him, and tied his hands and feet. The

disturbance became general, from a belief that the royal family (who were in bed) intended to escape. Forty life guards set off at full speed after the admiral, who had fled, and they succeeded in overtaking him, when they bound him, and took him to the palace at two o'clock; they came up with him at Ocunna. The princess of peace and her daughter they caused to alight, put them in a coach drawn by the peasantry, who conducted them to the palace, and delivered them to the prince, who came out to receive them with two candles in his hands.—This day, at 8 in the morning, our royal family appeared in the balcony of the palace, to thank the people. At 12, two decrees were posted up in Madrid, one of which addressed to the president of the council, is in substance as follows:—

“The king, in order to undeceive your lordship and the council, and that the public may be correctly informed of what occurred last night, makes known, that in consequence of a disturbance between some hussars and life guards, some military and peasants assembled induced by an erroneous belief that their majesties intended to leave the country, but their majesties neither think of leaving the country, nor have they ever thought for a moment of withdrawing themselves from the bosom of their beloved subjects; that at five o'clock in the morning every thing was quiet in the palace, and he directs the president to make it known, in order that the public may banish from their minds all false reports,” &c. &c.—

The second decree recommends the public to hold good harmony and peace with the French troops, who are to pass through the capital and its environs, on their march to Cadiz.—This evening, the annexed manuscript decree was published, which levelled the Grand Colossus; such is the general joy and satisfaction of the public, that I doubt whether a general peace would cause a greater; and we all publicly congratulate each other. The public look upon the French without fear, without dread, and as their deliverers. The privates will be received at their quarters, and the officers at the mansions and dwellings of the great. Order is recommended.—To-morrow about 4000 will enter the city—the following day the imperial guard—and on Monday Prince Murat. General report says, that the emperor is detained by these occurrences, because letters from Bayonne and Yrun say, that he arrived there on the 12th, and others contradict it. La Manche is in a state of much confusion, and the people are deter-

mined to prevent the departure of the royal family, the intelligence of which had reached that province.

DECREES.

“Aranjuez, March 18, 1808.—As I intend to command my army and navy in person, I have thought proper to release Don Manuel Godoy, prince of the peace, from the employ of Generalissimo and Admiral, and give him leave to withdraw whither he pleases. You are herewith informed of it, and will communicate it to whom it concerns.—*To Don Francis Gill.*”

Madrid Gazette, March 18, 1808.—His majesty has been pleased to transmit the following decree to his excellency Don Pedro Cevallos, First Secretary of State:—“My beloved subjects! Your generous agitation in these circumstances is a fresh proof of the sentiments of your hearts, and I, who love you as a tender father, take the earliest opportunity to condole with you in the distressed situation in which we are placed. Be tranquil; know that the army of my dear ally, the emperor of the French, traverses my kingdom with ideas of friendship and peace. Its object is to march to the points which are threatened with the danger of a descent by the enemy, and the junction of my life-guards has no other object than to protect my person, and they are not intended to accompany me on a voyage, which malice endeavoured to represent as necessary. Surrounded by the unshaken loyalty of my armed subjects, of which I have received such unquestionable proofs, what have I to fear? and should any imperious necessity require it, could I doubt of the assistance which their generous bosoms offered me? But no such necessity will ever be witnessed by my people.—Spaniards, allay your fears; conduct yourselves as you have hitherto done towards the troops of the ally of your good king. In a few days you will see peace and tranquillity restored; your hearts and mine enjoying the happiness which God bestows on me in the bosom of my family and your love. Given in my royal palace of Aranjuez the 16th March, 1808.—By the King, A. D. PEDRO CEVALLOS.”

CHALMERS ON NATIONAL RESOURCES.

SIR,—In a work which has lately appeared, entitled “An Enquiry into the Extent and Stability of National Resources,” by the Rev. Thomas Chalmers, I see some of your own favourite speculations very much

extended, and set upon a footing different from any that has yet appeared. The train of reasoning appears to me to be most luminous and convincing, and calculated to establish a position which must prove in the highest degree consolatory in the present circumstances of the country, that the loss of trade so far from being a ground of alarm or despondency, leaves the nation fitter than ever for all the purposes of defence and political independence. The great principle of his argument seems to be founded upon the manner in which he conceives the population of a country to be distributed. There is first, an agricultural population employed in providing food. There is secondly, another division of the population employed in labouring for the other necessities of common life. And there is, lastly, a remaining division, whose only employment is to administer to the luxuries of the wealthy, and to whom he gives the very significant name of the *disposable population*.—In his first chapter, he conceives the country to be secluded from all foreign intercourse. The disposable population lies at the mercy of those who are the proprietors of its maintenance. They can be withdrawn from any one employment to any other. If their employers chuse to dispense with their services in one line of industry, they can destroy their present employment, but then they can give them the same maintenance as before in some other more suited to the taste or circumstances of the country. The disposable population must accommodate to the demand of those who are vested with the ability of maintaining them. If this demand changes from one species of luxury to another, the disposable population must of course be translated from one species of manufacture to another. As the demand changes from luxury to defence, our original proprietors can withdraw their wealth from the purchase of luxuries altogether, and make over the price of them in the form of a tax to government. In this case, the disposable population must be thrown loose from their present employments, many manufactures must be annihilated, and great additional extent given to every department of the government service. While other writers are perpetually talking of the extension of manufactures, this author makes it out that from the ruin of the manufacturing interest, we can collect the means of adding to the power and resources of the nation.—In the second chapter, Mr. Chalmers discusses the subject of foreign trade. He proves that the disposable population employed in carrying on the different operations

of foreign trade, are as completely under the controul of our inland consumers as the manufacturers for home consumption, and that the manufacturers of our exported articles derive all their maintenance from an antecedent ability that exists in the country. This has been most ably and satisfactorily proved by Mr. Spence, in his pamphlet entitled "*Britain Independent of Commerce*." But the argument derives new light from the peculiar cast of our author's speculations. Mr. Spence insists principally on the refuge which the people discarded from foreign trade, would have in the home manufactures of the country. Mr. C.'s mind seems to be more engrossed with public and national objects, and insists chiefly on the refuge which they might have in the extended branches of the government service.—In his third chapter he takes up the case of a country that derives part of its agricultural produce from abroad. He attempts to estimate the increase which this additional food, and additional population give to the resources of the country, and concludes that it is beyond all comparison insignificant, when contrasted with the addition which may be afforded by an equal part of our own natural population. The whole population subsisted upon foreign grain, bears a very small proportion indeed to the whole population of the country, and though all intercourse with other countries were suspended, there is enough in the agricultural resources of Britain, to make up instantly for the want of importation.—The fourth chapter treats of profit and capital. The income of the manufacturing capitalist is derived from the ability of the inland consumer, as well as the maintenance of the manufacturing labourer. Profit forms part of the price that is paid for the article, and though the manufactures of the country should be destroyed in consequence of some new change in the system of affairs, the ability still remains to uphold the labourer in his former comfort, and the capitalist in his former splendour and distinction.—The fifth chapter treats of productive and unproductive labour. He here attempts to expose the futility of this distinction, and to rest the usefulness of every species of labour upon the usefulness of its ultimate effects; it is of no consequence whether the enjoyment which we derive from any species of labour comes to us or not through the medium of a tangible and marketable commodity, it is enough for us that it administers to our enjoyment. The question of preference resolves itself intirely into a question of advantage; and that species of labour deserves to be most encouraged, which is found to

be most subservient to the purposes of usefulness. On this principle it is quite ridiculous to object to the extension of our military system, on the score of its withdrawing the population of the country from productive to unproductive industry. It only withdraws the population from the office of administering to our luxury, to the office of administering to our security. The enjoyment of security is balanced with the enjoyment of luxury; the one clearly outweighs the other, and the question is of course decided.—The sixth chapter treats of taxation. In the principles of this chapter, he may not be supported by your concurrence, or that of the generality of your readers. The course of his speculations leads him to give a decided preference to the income tax, though the modifications which he proposes serve to palliate, if not to remove the chief inconveniences which have been alledged against it.—The next chapter treats of the effects of taxation on the labouring classes of the community. The author contends that the comforts of the peasantry cannot be permanently abridged by taxation, that a virtual exemption from all taxes is the necessary privilege of a labourer's condition; that any tax imposed upon labourers is in the long run infallibly made up to them by an advance in their wages; and that it is therefore unwise to hold out the shew of oppression to the lower orders of the community, when every tax which they appear to pay to government, is in fact paid by their masters and employers. He takes occasion when upon this subject to enter into considerable length on the compulsory service of government; and exposes in the strongest terms its cruelty, its impolicy, and its injustice.—His last chapter is employed in clearing away a number of difficulties and objections; and in his conclusion, he applies the principles of his performance to the question of peace or war; he attempts to ascertain how long a country may be able to maintain a warlike system, and what is the limit of its exertions; and arrives at this consolatory result, that the country was never at so great a distance from the limit of its exertions as at this moment, and never so prepared to embark in a war unexampled in its magnitude, and indefinite in its duration.—I am, &c.—IV.

MR. WAKEFIELD'S 2D. LETTER.

SIR,—Upon the data, which I think I have pretty well established in my former letter, I will now proceed to consider,—*First*, Whether there exist at this moment any circumstances which are opposed to the

fact, of our being a largely importing country, have a tendency to counterbalance the evil, and in any degree to secure us from those dangers to which I fear we are exposed.—*Secondly*, I will endeavour to trace out the cause or causes of our present situation, after which will arise the consideration, whether there exists a possibility of avoiding those dreadful consequences, with which I think we are threatened.—Could it be shewn, that we export provisions to an equal extent with our import of them, this would be one fact, counterbalanced by another; and one, not only consolatory, but perfectly satisfactory. The returns from the Custom-house, however, prove the contrary.—It is with pleasure, then, that I recollect, there does exist a resource of which the legislature might avail itself at a moment of dearth, famine, or any other extreme emergency; one which I am aware, should only be resorted to, with the greatest reluctance and caution; one that ought to remain un-reduced and unimpaired, until the last moment, until the most dire and fearful necessity should call for its being expended or in any way diminished.—Alarmed as I am, for the reasons I stated to you in my former letter, I rejoice that we do possess a large and available grainery, that there is a consumption of corn, not strictly necessary to the existence of man; and to which, in a season of scarcity we could have recourse. I advert to the corn consumed by the distilleries, by the breweries, and by horses used only for pleasure. If ever the necessity should arise of making use of this resource to apply this luxuriant consumption of corn, for the necessary sustenance of man, it should be recollected, that it will be followed by the discouragement of the farmer. What can be a greater discouragement than the depriving him of such markets, as the distilleries, the breweries, and the maintenance of pleasure horses.—This discouragement will not be felt at the moment, but the evil consequences of it will be permanent, the fear of bad prices, and inadequate returns for his labour and capital, once excited in the mind of the farmer, will relax, if not destroy the spirit and life of enterprise and exertion; it will cause him to lessen the sums he had been accustomed to spend in agricultural improvement; he will manure less; he will be tempted to lay down his lands in haste, and, therefore, in an extremely bad state.—These evils will be continued ones; they are such as the legislature should never create, but when driven by the necessity of averting the pressure of an evil, so great and so dreadful, as famine. The demand which a farmer has for corn,

by reason of the distilleries, the breweries, and horses kept for pleasure, fortunately counteracts the ruinous effects of the importation of corn. It has been thought, by almost every one a matter of great wisdom, to annually purchase, or, to speak more correctly, to lay up an income, under the name of a Sinking Fund, which supports the national credit, by means of its reaction, against the millions which are yearly borrowed, and added to the national debt. If this is a wise measure in finance, must not the same policy be good in regard to human sustenance. We import a given quantity of provisions, this is bad enough in every sense for the country. In the grain consumed (as I have already described) in the distilleries, &c. we have a consumption within ourselves which we can stop, and make as much use of as if corn was laid up in a grainery. This is the only counteraction, of which I know, against the importation of corn; a counteraction of the utmost importance, and in as much as the proportion which this internal superfluous consumption bears to our import of grain, is larger than the proportion which the sinking fund bears towards the national debt, so much more important, and greater is the security of the country. I consider this as a comparison of which use may be fairly made. But, Sir, I cannot leave this part of the subject, without stating in the strongest terms the danger there would be to the country, by the most trifling admission of any thing leading to the conclusion, that any but the people of England should be permitted to consume, much less to expend the contents of this national grainery; this resource so truly the property of the public, who have made it so, by exciting the British farmer to create this produce by the encouragement which this profitable market has held out to him, in consequence of which he can supply the public with food, at a price attainable by all classes of the community. The instant the farmer shall be deprived of the demand created by the distilleries, &c. the corn which he has raised for the of purposes, will be thrown on the market as shewman sustenance; then the fall of price will depress his enterprize, and damp his exertion. The necessary consequence will be, that his produce will shrink in proportion, will lessen as his prospects are darkened. This would be the case, even if the people of England themselves wanted, and urged by necessity availed themselves of this resource. Should then any body of men, either in or out of the kingdom be permitted to glut and ruin the market of the British farmer, for purposes of convenience or profit? Shall we

for a moment think of thus discouraging our agriculture for the sake of any colonial advantage whatever? Shall we permit the colonies to say to the distiller, and the brewer, &c. you shall no longer consume the produce of the British soil; but, instead thereof, you shall consume the produce of our plantations; you shall enliven our enterprize and augment our gains; though at the expence of the mother country, and at the hazard of her suffering from scarcity, dearth, or even famine. This would be nothing less than giving a preference to present gain, over future wealth, prosperity, and safety. However consolatory to the public may be the knowledge of this resource, which is a counterbalance to the importation of corn, it is accompanied with an anxious conviction of the urgency and necessity of preserving and securing this resource, with the utmost jealousy and caution. It is a fund of subsistence, of which the country will never avail itself, but with the greatest circumspection and reluctance, and only on the utmost necessity. The possession of this fund is not to be put into comparison with any other public possession whatever; and the greater the danger arising from an importation of subsistence, the greater necessity of watching over, and augmenting this only source of reaction. This argument I make use of, upon the single ground of feeding the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. But, if I proceed, and consider this ruinous importation, and the possession of this resource, as they affect the wealth, the revenue, and the trade of the kingdom, every argument is strengthened, every circumstance is rendered more impressive and conclusive.—Recollecting the millions of British money, paid in the course of the last fifty years to foreign farmers; and feeling that the same produce might have been procured at home by expending these millions in England; I deprecate the system which has been pursued, and I call for the consideration of the public on this subject; not alone, upon the ground of necessity, but upon that of policy also, to guard against a system which if continued, will first impoverish, and then starve the country.—In another letter I will resume the subject of my first to you.—And am, Sir, yours, &c.—EDWARD WAKEFIELD.—*March 24, 1808.*

CORN IMPORTATIONS.

SIR, —The letter of Mr. Edward Wakefield, which appeared in your last Register, treats of a subject of such extreme importance, that it seems almost to be a duty incumbent upon every one, who differs from

him in opinion, to deliver his sentiments. If the observations I am about to offer are, in your judgment, worthy of notice, you will perhaps favour me by inserting them, when you find it convenient to do so. You will, doubtless, have perceived that the whole force of Mr. W.'s arguments depends upon a certain account of exports and imports with which he has furnished us, and which, I will take for granted is correct. But, Sir, as he professes "to argue, not for the vanity of victory," but "to discover truths, important to the best interests of our country," I am at a loss to conceive why he should have taken into consideration our exports from 1777 to 1804 only, which year, I believe, is not included, whereas in considering our imports, he is very particular in giving us "the enormous quantity" imported from 1800 to 1806. In the former part of his letter he expressly mentions the years 1800 and 1801 as years of dearth, and I am surprised that this circumstance should not have appeared to him a sufficient reason for exporting so small a quantity as 5,400 qrs. during those and the two following years. If his list of exports had extended to the present time, it is very probable his alarms might have abated, and have ceased to produce uneasiness in others, which, at this time, is certainly desirable; when clamours and disaffection are attempted to be raised in different parts of the kingdom, which his statement has undoubtedly a tendency to increase. The surest way of coming to a just conclusion on this subject, appears to me to be this; viz. to ascertain the average quantity of wheat produced in the country one year with another; which may be done, I conceive thus: It is generally allowed that there are 50 millions of acres of land in a state of cultivation, one half of which, from the general mode of agriculture which is adopted, are arable. Now, Sir, of this half, again, I presume, it will be readily granted me that one fourth part (I might say one third) is employed in the growth of wheat. If I am correct so far, we have, every autumn, about 6 millions of acres of wheat to reap, and, reckoning two qrs. only on each acre, we gather into our barns the "enormous quantity of 12 millions of qrs." Mr. Wakefield supposes, that the portion of the population in Great Britain, which is supported upon wheat, cannot exceed 8 millions; and, he adds, is seldom more than 7. You suppose them to be 11 millions. In the former case, if it be true, that on an average one individual with ano-

ther who eats wheaten bread, consumes a quarter of wheat a year, we shall have 4 millions; in the latter one million to spare. I do not take upon me to assert that I am exact as to the number of acres employed in the growth of wheat, but I am very near the mark. At any rate the number of acres may be easily known, and pursuing the same mode, as I have done here, the average quantity of wheat may be also known.—The present low price is a sure proof that there is a great abundance in the country. And I should be glad to know the quantities exported and imported during the last two years. Perhaps, Mr. Wakefield may inform us—I am, Sir, &c.—D H.

AMERICAN STATES.

SIR,—It was not my intention to trouble you or the public with any reply to the remarks you were pleased to make on my former letters, in your Register of 20th March, for as you pretty nearly gave up the point, as to the premiums of insurance, and the whole course of your observations respecting America proved, that you really do feel towards the United States, all the resentment that I had heard attributed to you; it seemed to me not very important, to the practical result, whether you had used the exact words, I was assured you did, and I am too little of a partizan, and too little accustomed to political controversy, to be disposed to continue the strife.—But the letter in your Register of the 9th inst. under the signature I, contains insinuations respecting my motives and arguments, of too malignant a nature to be suffered to remain unanswered. I am told that it would be to libel my feelings and principles, were he to designate me as a *British American Merchant*, and that I am the prejudiced advocate of America and France. If such is to be the language held towards an individual, who feels powerfully conscious that his motives are pure and upright, even if his opinions are mistaken; if every man, who doubts the wisdom or the equity of the decisions of the reigning ministry, is to be branded as a traitor to his country, and a retainer of the enemy; then, indeed, is the liberty of the press a mockery, then is that best part of our constitution, the force of public opinion, a perfect nullity, for no honest man can canvas the justice, or the policy of our political conduct towards foreign nations, without incurring the odium of being represented as a traitor. But, I re-

pel your correspondent's insinuations with disdain! I am, Sir, an *English* American merchant, which, unless I am mistaken, is more than he can say for himself. I love my country better than I love my own interest; I have children, who must stand or fall by my country; and it is only because, I have believed her to be doing an injustice to America, which I also believed, and still believe, was sought to be justified on grounds of misrepresentation; and, furthermore, because I believed our interests as a nation would suffer by that injustice, that I endeavoured to set you right on some points, which appeared to me to have a bearing on the subject. These were my only motives, and I own that I feel somewhat indignant at the foul and base insinuations, which your correspondent I. has thrown out respecting me.—My object was truth, and as I am convinced by I.'s letter, that I have been mistaken in saying that "the premiums *through* the year 1807, up to the news of the affair of the Chesapeake, were at peace rates;" it is my duty thus publicly to admit my mistake; but, at the same time, it is fair I should be allowed to explain how I fell into it. After all, it is little more than the mistake of a month, and does not affect the argument; and your correspondent should be careful not to fall himself into mistakes, whilst he accuses me of them. Yet, he says, (p. 566) that we heard of the Berlin Decree about the latter end of January, 1807, when I have before me a London newspaper of December 9, 1806, giving the decree at full length. This gentleman has thus made no small mistake in point of time also; but, as I have no doubt he meant to quote correctly from his memory, I accuse him not of intentional misrepresentation, and I only ask the same civility for myself.—The fact is, (as I have now ascertained) the virtual suspension of that decree as to the Americans, (I mean Decrès's Letter) was known here in the latter end of January, 1807. Speaking from memory, I had supposed, when I wrote you my first letter, that this was known here the end of December, 1806; and recollecting, that in a few days afterwards, premiums did fall to their usual rates, I inadvertently used the words "through the year 1807," instead of "from the news of Decrès's letter to that of the affair of the Chesapeake."—The premiums your correspondent I. quotes, are assuredly higher than peace premiums, though not greatly so, when allowance is made for the season of the year, and the various quality of ships, which constantly affect the premium. In confirmation of this opinion, I find

amongst our policies one of the 30th Jan. 1807, from Virginia to London at 4 guineas, which considering the season of the year, is so very little above the peace premium, that it is clear the alarm was fast subsiding; and I think it will turn out, that the insurance effected by I. in February, was very *early* in that month. His remark, that premiums kept up in America till April, is, I doubt, not true; but is only the obvious consequence of the length of time required to convey intelligence across the Atlantic. Your correspondent has recapitulated his arguments, suffer me briefly to recapitulate my facts.—The Berlin Decree was known here in December 1806. It was known here in January 1807, that the American Minister at Paris, has protested against the decree, as affecting American commerce, had been assured it should not be molested. Premiums of insurance, which unquestionably rose here greatly in this interval, fell very shortly after Decrès's letter was heard of, to peace rates, and so continued till July, when the affair of the Chesapeake was known.—The insidious questions put to Buonaparté by the French prize court, and his answers to which overturned Decrès's assurances, were not put till September, were certainly not known here till October, if even before November; but I cannot speak with absolute certainty to this point; the material thing is, that our Orders in Council were issued, before it was possible to know whether America would protest against the enforcement of the Berlin Decree or not. I think this is a fair summary of facts, and if it be admitted to be so, I think I have proved my former assertions to be essentially true.—Had we not issued these Orders in Council, I think America had now been at war with France. If, *therefore*, to wish we had not issued them, be an offence to my beloved country, I am indeed, "the most offending man alive."—On the extracts of letters from the continent produced by your correspondent I., I will only remark, that they all speak in general terms, without naming place, or ship; and, further, that I have never been able to learn distinctly, that any ship had actually been condemned in France, Spain, or Holland, previous to our Orders in Council. I stated a ship by name, that had been distinctly released after capture and trial, which is rather more to the point; and I seriously do not think there is any authentic advice in London, of an actual condemnation up to the period I have mentioned.—I have now done with your correspondent, and will take the liberty to say one word to you in reply to your question, in page 491,

"Do you advise ministers to give up to Mr. Jefferson, the right of search for seamen?" I do not; but to abandon a right, and to exercise it without wrong, are two different matters. If the Americans insist on the unqualified abandonment, I fully agree, that we are bound to refuse it; but, I have understood distinctly, that all they desire, is to have this search so exercised, as to avoid the many acts of oppression, which they say are committed under its colour. If I state this incorrectly, it is not from a desire to mislead; but, because I think it to be the truth. —I am, Sir, your humble servant,—AN AMERICAN MERCHANT —*New Broad-street, April 11, 1808.*

AMERICAN STATES.

SIR,—I have read with a considerable degree of attention, all the articles that have appeared in your Register on the subject of America, during the last six months. Had your exertions in the cause, and for the honour of your native country, been confined to this one point, you would even then have been intitled to the thanks of every honest and dispassionate man; but, as your meritorious labours on this subject, form but a very small part of your works, this nation, in my opinion, owes you a debt of gratitude very rarely due to the conduct of an individual. In describing the frauds of American debtors, and the obvious bias which such men as the Barings have to sacrifice national honour to private interest, you have made out a very strong case in support of your arguments against commerce, though perhaps you carry your doctrines a little too far. I think commerce has become a curse to this country, from having been carried to too great an extent, to the prejudice of the more important interests of society; but such is the force of early impressions, and perhaps, you will say, prejudices, that though totally unconnected with trade myself, I cannot go quite as far as you do in reprobating it; but, at the same time, confess that every year's experience diminishes my estimation of its importance. We live in extraordinary times, Mr. Cobbett, so I am not much surprised to find the philanthropic Mr. Roscoe, indirectly advocating the cause of France; or, rather of Buonaparté; and Mr. Alexander Baring more openly acting as the advocate of America. This man has the effrontery to defend and plead for the Americans, telling us too, that they are naturally inclined to the side of France, as long as she is inferior to us at sea. Has commerce so far stupified the understanding, or corrupted the principles of this politico-mercantile gentleman, that he brings

forward the friendly disposition of America towards France, as a reason that we should concede and truckle to his Transatlantic friends? He shews the cloven foot more plainly than A. B. of the Morning Chronicle. He is not a man to be listened to on this subject, on which self interest must naturally incline him to deprecate a war with "the virtuous young republic," to the government of which he has, perhaps, lent his money. Few amongst us—who are Britons at heart as well as by birth, who have not placed our money in the American funds, who have resolved to stand by our country to the last, who never basely console ourselves with the idea that should the worst happen, we can then, deserting our native land, fly to America where we had previously insured our welcome;—few of us I say, shall feel any regret should Mr. Alexander Baring, or even should the late Lord High Chancellor Baron Erskine, of Clackmannan, know from sad experience the perfidy of American debtors. I think it would be attended with good effect, Mr. Cobbett, if you were to consolidate what has lately appeared in your Weekly Register on the subject of America, into a small pamphlet. You have displayed much acute reasoning, and advanced many stubborn facts, which might by this means be more generally diffused throughout the kingdom than they perhaps are at present, as many people, from the almost universal interest taken in the subject, would read the pamphlet who have not had an opportunity of seeing the numbers of the Register, in which the conduct of America has been so ably discussed. By inserting this in some future Number you will oblige, —Yours, &c.—ALGERNON.—*March 21, 1808.*

AMERICAN PETITIONS.

SIR,—When Mr. Baring and his petitioning junto, exclaimed so loudly against the intrusion of clerks into the meeting of American merchants, I guessed (well knowing the character of the faction) that we should find, on inquiry, that a large number of their supporters at the meeting were of that description; but, I did not suppose they would have pushed impudence and inconsistency so far, as to have permitted those very clerks to have signed the petition presented, as the petition of merchants. Yet, Sir, one of the first names affixed to the patriotic petition from London (patriotic, indeed, if, as reported, it is signed chiefly by Americans) is that of one Palmer, who though a petitioner, and of course incapable by law of giving evidence in his own cause, was one of

the principal witnesses called by "Councilor Brougham" to bear testimony before the House of Commons, of the fatal effects of the Orders in Council—On the cross examination, by the House, of this important person, he was obliged to confess that he was "the agent, or, if you please, the clerk of Guest and Co.;" that he had signed the requisition for the meeting at the London Tavern, in the name of his employers, without their knowledge; but, that he had very cautiously subscribed the petition with his own. When a member of the house (Mr. Croker) naturally enough, one should think, wished to inquire by what right, or in what character, this clerk had put himself so forward before the house and the country as a merchant, the whole party took alarm; Mr. Citizen Baring, my Lord Temple, and even Mr. Bragge Bathurst (Mr. Vansittart sat just behind him) thought such an inquiry unnecessary and even injurious: "Palmer," they alledged, "had signed the petition, and that should content the house." Mr. Croker and Mr. Pole Carew, thought that "in forming an estimate of the weight and respectability of a petition, the weight and respectability of the petitioners were no bad ingredients, and that in considering what regard was due to evidence, it was not quite superfluous to be satisfied of the veracity, experience, and character of the witness." Then came Sir John Newport, referring to the petition, and discovering that it was entitled the petition of merchants, manufacturers, and *others*, and that though it might appear that this clerk was neither merchant or manufacturer, it could not be denied that he was one of the *others*!!! Oh rare Sir John! So anxious, however, were the party to uphold Mr. Palmer, that undeterred by Sir John's defence, they divided the house, and on the house deciding that the inquiry should proceed, they were put to the open shame of having one of their chief requisitors, petitioners and witnesses, proved to be no more than a clerk, who sometimes signed one name, sometimes another, and whose connexion with America was neither more or less than that the house at whose desks he wrote were concerned in the American trade, and that "he himself had some little matters of money due to him from persons of that country!!!"—Now, Sir, one little word as to the Manchester Petition, I observe that out of the 25 or 30 signatures, there are 7 in the name of Phillips; I observe also, that one of the witnesses is called Phillips; I should be glad to know, whether there are 7 separate firms of the name of Phillips in Manchester; or, whether one

firm, instead of signing Phillips and Sons (or whatever its title may be) has split itself into 7 signatures, judiciously intermixed with the other names: this is a piece of candour which one might well expect from the fellow labourer of Palmer, alias Guest and Co. Merchant, alias Agent, alias Clerk, alias something or other—Before I conclude, allow me to furnish you with an epitome of the evidence already collected at the bar of the house, which I trust will have the same effect in the country that it had there.—Q. What has occasioned the interruption of our trade with America?—A. The Orders in Council.—Q. Do you not attribute this interruption partly to the non-importation act, to the non ratification of the treaty, and to the American embargo?—A. I attribute it to the Orders in Council.—Q. Does the difficulty of importing into America arise from their non importation act, which prohibits that trade, or from our Orders in Council which permit it?—A. From the Orders in Council.—Q. Is the non-exportation of American produce from their own ports, attributable to their embargo which prevents the sailing of ships, or to our Orders in Council that permit it?—A. To the Orders in Council.—Q. How do you account for the non payment of American bills, which (if intended to be paid) should have been provided for 2 or 3 months before the Orders in Council were made?—A. By the Orders in Council.—Absurd, Mr. Cobbett, as this appears, I venture to assure you, it is no caricature; when the evidence comes to be published, you will find, that however dilated, glossed, or perplexed, it may be, it will in essentials, tally exactly with the foregoing abridgment.—I shall expect, by and bye, to hear it asserted, and proved by merchants, manufacturers and *others*, that the appearance of the Comet, the battle of Friedland, Lord Lauderdale's Parisian duress, the capitulation of Rosetta, and the discontents in Ireland, are all chargeable on the infamous, impolitic, and ruinous Orders in Council.—I am, Sir, &c.
—M. M.—*March 21, 1808.*

THE RUINED AMERICAN MERCHANT.

SIR, — I deem it to be incumbent upon me to address you again, much sooner than it was my intention when I sent you my letter of the 29th of February, and which you have inserted in page 441 of the present volume of your Register, in consequence of an act of parliament having recently, and since my former letter to you been passed, respecting one of the many grievous complaints I have been compelled to make respecting the

balance of money remaining in the hands of the cashier of the bank, to the credit of the Commissioners on American Claims. It is necessary that I do so for two reasons.—First, Because it is not generally known to my brother claimants that such an act has passed, or that it was in the contemplation of government it length to pass such, or that it was intended to employ the balance for the benefit of the claimants; and, in truth, Mr. Cobett, it was a subject altogether not referred to, until the appearance of your *Standard* on the 29th of February, even by the Government. But, why so much secrecy in passing the bill through the House of Commons? Is it absolutely necessary to do good by stealth? Why not have publicly communicated to those unfortunate men, who are the subject of the act of parliament, the intention of government, and have boldly heard their opinion upon, and objections, if such they had, to the wording of the proposed act. The bill was raced through the house without comment beyond the aye and no of the Speaker; no notice whatever taken of its provisions by the watchful guardians of our liberties and property, and was suffered to pass into an act sub silentio, and so far as the knowledge of the merchants interested in the subject may extend, it would remain a dead letter without your insertion of the fact.—The other reason is, because my complaint of the sacrifice made of us and our interests by government, in not originally authorising the money paid by the United States to be placed out at interest, and providing prospectively for our benefit in consequence of the sacrifice made of us in conceding our claims upon America, amounting to £5,000,000 for £600,000, is partially done away, and it is proper that I acknowledge the act of government in this respect having in my former letter referred to the money remaining in the bank unemployed, and expressly stated the propriety of parliament placing it out at interest, and of which there should not have been the doubt of a moment. Largely interested as I am, even I should have remained equally ignorant with my brother claimants of the fact of the act of parliament having passed, had not the act been stated to be in the daily papers, an act for the relief of the American loyalists; this directed my attention to ascertain why government should still year after year keep in pay, and extend its protecting power to that body of men, many of whom have been more than amply remunerated for losses, while others of them sought indemnity for imaginary losses; and again others paid for the loss of property and professions, who

when the war with America broke out, were infants “mewling and puking in the nurse’s arms;” paid out of the daily labour of British industry, and rioting their annual pensions paid by the British government to them as British subjects at this day in their dear native land America, and laughing at the gullibility of John Bull, that these persons might possibly be intended to be again and again remunerated, while we, the merchants faithful to our native soil Britain, were starving on hopes which we had indulged for 33 years, and to attain which, the age of an antediluvian would not be sufficient to insure; naturally awakened me to the reflection upon our severe and unprecedented lot. Whatever tends to our interest and benefit, or, on the contrary, whatever may be enacted even to our prejudice, and to add to our protracted days of misery, should be openly and boldly communicated to us; and, therefore, as the secret publicity, if I may be allowed the expression with which this act is ushered into the printing press of Messrs. Eyre and Strahan, precludes the knowledge of this addition to our laws among my brother claimants, I adopt this mode of communicating the fact for their information. The act, Mr. Cobbett, was passed on the 21st of March, and it declares (in support of my assertion of the accumulating years that may yet be expended) that “a considerable time may yet elapse before all the claims of persons entitled to receive any compensation out of the said sum of £600,000 are adjudged, and it may be expedient that such part of the balance of the said sum of money remaining in the hands of the cashier of the said governor and company undistributed, as to the said commissioners shall seem fit, should in the mean time be vested in Exchequer Bills.” After which it enacts, that it shall be lawful for the commissioners to withdraw such part of the balance of the £600,000 as to them shall seem fit, and invest the same in Exchequer Bills. Vague and unsatisfactory as is the act which imperatively compels nothing, still the delegation of a power to make interest of the money is a shade better than was its former situation locked up in the bank; but it may still remain there if it is not deemed expedient to withdraw it from its strong hold, and unless the commissioners shall hold it to be fit to add interest to principal. I approve not, Mr. Cobbett, of milk and water laws similar to this; if it is deemed a good to adopt that which the act certainly enables men to do in the exercise of their discretion, or under the influence of caprice compel them to do it, leave it not to indefinite authority. If it is fit and expedient to give the power to

withdraw this money from the bank, why not make it incumbent upon the holders of this money to appropriate it to useful purposes in the way of gain, for the benefit of the much injured and insulted claimants, and let not the possibility remain of this money continuing for the next seven years, as it has several years hitherto up to the time of passing the act, wholly unemployed (at least not employed for the benefit of the neglected sufferers) at an annual loss of £30,000. As government have at length thought proper to declare that interest may be made of this money in future, and have by the act now passed, decided upon the impropriety of the conduct of those men who composed the administration at the time the original act was passed individually, the same men who now hold the reins of government, and who neglected to make interest of the money heretofore, it would have been well if they had not deemed it proper to confess their negligence or wilful misconduct, at least to have struck out some means of indemnification for the loss sustained by us upon the £600,000, during the years it has been suffered to remain an incumbrance in the hands of the cashier of the bank. £30,000 a year, will in 7 years amount to £210,000, a sum more than equal to one-third of the amount of the price of the composition money, the price of our sacrifice by that very able and experienced negotiator Lord Hawkesbury, who with that happy liberality for which he justly ranks eminently high, stipulated only for £600,000 to discharge £5,000,000, when Mr. Rufus King was empowered by America, to agree to the payment of £1,200,000, this high trait in the character of that nobleman, certainly entitles him to the thanks of the virtuous republican, and, from the time of the acceptance of the composition, insolvent American debtors, and the gracious smiles of King Cong, as you stile the dear ally of France. It is to be recollected too, that this concession was made by men who severely retort upon the proposed concessions of the Fox administration to America, a concession far exceeding, I mean in principle (for what is the concession of £5,000,000 to the mind of men accustomed to the amount of the national debt, one hundred times that sum), any concessions granted or about to be granted by the late administration, of which Mr. Fox formed a part. However, which soever party actually made the greatest concessions is not material to us, now, our rights having somehow or other been frittered away by one party or the other, and by which, is of no consequence to the person who now ad-

resses you, who has an equal opinion of all party men, and who never did belong, and never will, to any party, believing that the instant a man sets his foot in office his sentiments change, and his principle, if he ever had any, becomes subservient to his interest. Yet, I must except out of my general reason two men, the late Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, the former, if ever there was a man who had the welfare of his country at heart, even to the sacrifice of every personal consideration, was justly entitled to the distinction; and Mr. Pitt also, for his determined perseverance in the measures which he deemed beneficial to his country.—A RUINED OLD AMERICAN MERCHANT.—*April 7, 1808.*

VAILS.

SIR,—As a constant reader of your Register, I have observed with much satisfaction, that however our opinions on some few political occasions may have differed, I have always seen reason to applaud your manly assertions of the principles of truth, however unpalatable to some classes; and above all, you are intitled to the esteem of every honest man, for your endeavours to check those moral evils which have of late increased to an alarming height. This too you have done without any methodistical cant, which some persons neither wiser nor better than their neighbours, think it for their advantage to adopt. Without further preface then, and in the full confidence, if my sentiments appear just, that they will meet a portion of your attention; I will proceed to point out the approaching return of an intolerable evil, in various ways, which our forefathers saw cause to exert themselves in abolishing. I allude to the nuisance of vails, or rather extortions, the meaning of which appears to me to be comprised in the folly of the master and the exactions of the domestic; and which in these times have taken a fresh current, by the infamous connivance of persons in trade. Some circumstances which have come before my eyes, appear to me of a nature so contaminating to these classes of people, that I should (though but an humble one) acquit myself very ill as an individual, if I did not endeavour to apply the remedy, by an exposure of the disease.—Formerly, when the odious custom of vails existed, wages were not above one-seventh of the sums now generally paid. But to those low wages an inhospitable right was annexed, of exacting presents from those who partook of the cheer of the master's board. This practice after a time came to such a pitch, that a dinner at a gentleman's

house cost as much or more than a tavern bill; for one fellow brought a glove, another a hat, a third a stick, a fourth a great coat, and a fifth, if nothing else were left, would not hesitate to snatch the handkerchief, if it invitingly shewed a corner, from the unwitting stranger's pocket, purely for the disinterested satisfaction of returning it. This practice having become quite intolerable, some spirited gentlemen in spite of incendiary threats, and blood thirsty anonymous letters, did call meetings in their counties, and by general consent abolished the evil; and by way of remuneration raised their servant's wages, to their present high rate, which with the addition of board and lodging is more than equal to the pay of a subaltern officer in his Majesty's forces—whose life or limb may be every day required in the service of his country. This evil which appears to the master to be abolished, is to my certain knowledge again creeping in to some of the great houses of the nobility unknown to their hospitable owners. Few friends (however esteemed) choosing to incur the risk of being thought meddling or officious in the domestic affairs of another; and this fact being too certain to my own knowledge, I think it my duty to give it publicity.—Not content, however, with such means of filling their pockets, they are as with one accord, endeavouring to create a still more odious species of exaction, as in fact, it involves a breach both of trust and honesty, and the difficulty of discovery emboldens them so far, that it is the theme of discourse at their clubs, their hops, and their occasional orgies after their unsuspecting masters have retired to rest, or are absent from home.—When the period for the adjustments of the annual family accounts arrives, in too many instances, the upper servants make their demands for a per centage thereon; and, disgusting as it may seem, there are many tradesmen villainous enough to hold out baits for custom by a competition, in the extravagant amount of their bribes. Nay, Sir, the fact is scarcely attempted to be concealed, of which an instance occurred in my own family, an upper servant having given me warning forsooth, because I presumed to pay my own bills; stating, or rather mis-stating to me, that by his becoming the medium of payment, I should suffer no loss, and he would obtain a considerable advantage; an assertion so self-evidently absurd, that no one but a mere drivelling idiot could for one moment give credit to it. For, can common sense suffer one to believe that an honest tradesman can afford to sell goods to the master at a fair

price, where the butler or housekeeper is to partake of his profits, without sharing his labours, or experiencing his risks and possible losses.—This may be exemplified in the discourses of an eminent coal merchant and horse dealer, the former assuring me he had lost several customers, from resisting the shameful exaction of servants; who when they were not acceded to, put it and destroyed the best coals below, and sent nothing but the refuse to the parlour and the dining room.—The latter asserted that the high demands for horses, arose chiefly from the fees required by servants, who without a share of the booty, would abuse their horses, and get their customers away by various pretences; and he further assured me, that he had lost the disposal of a pair of carriage horses the day before, by refusing to add on to the amount demanded, the trifling sum of one fifth to be transferred by his means from the pocket of the master to that of the coachman.—Again, it is not uncommon where a liberal hospitality exists, for the head servant to keep a sort of open table for any casually acquaintance who may have forfeited his place or his character, or by the economy of the master have been placed upon board wages. For my part, I call such acts far worse than picking pockets; as it is blackened by breaches of trust and honesty; for, it is of little consequence which we are pilfered of, money or money's worth.—If more instances were wanting to prove the necessity of crushing these criminal and growing evils; many might be adduced, but that enough I think has been said to create disgust at the conduct of the pampered menial; and to excite a determination in the higher classes, to resist and repress such mal-practices; as a duty even to their servants, who from luxury and progressive acts of roguery and rapine, too frequently terminate existence by a criminal and disgraceful death on the gallows, or through the lenity of their prosecutors have their sentences mitigated, by being banished from their country as felons and malefactors. I cannot, however, quit this subject without attaching blame, and a very great share of it, to the absurd fashions of the day. For now a woman who condescends to regulate the household affairs of her husband's family, becomes absolutely a butt for satire and ridicule, to the ill-judging, but more numerous part of her sex, which it has been but too truly said is the severest test of truth. Nor are the masters of families to be spared from severe animadversion for taking, as is too constantly done, servants of indifferent characters, and in some instances without any characters what-

ever, an evil so great in its consequences, that it ought to be made actionable at common law, and punished as severely as a servant would be for obtaining a false character.—To you, Sir, whose time is now so usefully dedicated to the service of the public, some apology might seem necessary, were not the subject of my letter one of so much importance to the public. For I trust you will agree with me, that devising the means of repressing crimes is a duty we all owe in our several stations.—T. S.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES.—*President Jefferson's Message to the Congress, dated February 3, 1808.*

Having received an official communication of certain orders of the British government against maritime rights of neutrals, bearing date the 11th of November, 1807, I transmit them to Congress, as a further proof of the increasing dangers to our navigation and commerce, which led to the provident act of the present session, laying an embargo on our own vessels.

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RUSSIA.—*Declaration against Sweden, Feb. 10, 1808.*

Justly indignant at the violence which England has displayed towards the King of Denmark, the Emperor of Russia, faithful to his character and to his system of unceasing care for the interests of his Empire, notified to the King of Great Britain, that he could not remain insensible of so unjust and unexampled an aggression on a Sovereign connected with him by the ties of blood and friendship, and who was the most ancient Ally of Russia.—His Imperial Majesty informed the King of Sweden of this determination by a note, dated the 24th of September last, presented to the Swedish Ambassador.—An article of the treaty concluded in 1783, between the Empress Catharine and Gustavus III. and another in the treaty of 1800, between the late Emperor Paul and the present King of Sweden, contain the reciprocal and stipulated agreement to maintain the principle, that the Baltic is a close Sea, with the guarantee of its coasts against all acts of hostility, violence or vexations whatever; and further, to employ for this purpose all the means in the power of the respective contracting parties. His Imperial Majesty, referring to these treaties, considered himself not merely authorised, but bound, to call upon the King of Sweden for his co-operation against England.—His Swedish Majesty did not disavow the obligation imposed upon him by the treaties refer-

red to, but refused all co-operation until the French troops should be removed from the coasts, and the ports of Germany opened to English ships. But the question here was the checking of those aggressions which England had commenced, and by which all Europe was disturbed. The emperor demanded from the King of Sweden a co-operation founded on treaties; but his Swedish Majesty answered by proposing to delay the execution of the treaty to another period, and by troubling himself with the care of opening the Dutch ports, for England. In a word, with rendering himself of service to that England, against which measures of defence ought to have been taken. It would be difficult to find a more striking proof of partiality on the part of the King of Sweden towards Great Britain, than this which he has here given.—His Imperial Majesty, on the 16th of November, caused a second note to be delivered, in which his Swedish Majesty was informed of the rupture between Russia and England.—This note remained two months unanswered, and the answer which was transmitted on the 9th of January to his Majesty's Ministers, was to the same purport as the former.—The emperor is, however, far from regretting his moderation. He is, on the contrary, well pleased to recollect that he has employed every means that remained to him for bringing back his Swedish Majesty to the only system of policy, which is consistent with the interests of his States; but his Imperial Majesty owes it at least to his people, and to the security of his dominions, which is to a Sovereign the highest of all laws, no longer to leave the co-operation of Russia with Sweden a matter of doubt.—Informed that the Cabinet of St. James's, endeavouring to terrify Denmark into a concurrence with the interests of England threatened that Swedish troops should occupy Zealand, and that the possession of Norway should be guaranteed to the King of Sweden; assured also that his Swedish Majesty, while he left the Russian note unanswered, was secretly negotiating a treaty at London, his Imperial Majesty perceived that the interests of his empire would be very ill secured were he to permit his neighbour, the King of Sweden, at the commencement of a war between Russia and England, to disguise his well-known sentiments of attachment to the latter power, under the appearance of a pretended neutrality. His Imperial Majesty, therefore; cannot allow the relations of Sweden towards Russia to remain longer in a state of uncertainty. He cannot give his consent to such a neutrality.—His Swedish Majesty's being

therefore no longer doubtful, nothing remained for his Imperial Majesty but to resort to those means which Providence has placed in his hands, for no other purpose except that of giving protection and safety to his dominions; and he has deemed it right to notify this intention to the King of Sweden, and to all Europe.—Having thus acquitted himself of that duty, which the safety of his dominions require, his Imperial Majesty is ready to change the measures he is about to take, to measures of precaution only, if the King of Sweden will, without delay, join Russia and Denmark in shutting the Baltic against England until the conclusion of a maritime peace. He himself invites the king his brother-in-law, for the last time, and with all the feelings of real friendship, no longer to hesitate in fulfilling his obligations, and in embracing the only system of policy which is consistent with the interests of the Northern Powers. What has Sweden gained since her king attached himself to England?—Nothing could be more painful to his Imperial Majesty than to see a rupture take place between Sweden and Russia. But his Swedish Majesty has it still in his power to prevent this event by, without delay, resolving to adopt that course which can alone preserve a strict union and perfect harmony between the two States.

FINLAND:—*Proclamation to the Inhabitants of Finland; issued by the Russian General, Count Buxhöfden; dated Head Quarters, Fredericksham, Feb. 18, 1808*

It is with the utmost concern his Imperial Majesty, my most gracious master, finds himself necessitated to order his troops under my command to enter your country, good friends, and inhabitants of Swedish Finland.—His Imperial Majesty feels the more concerned to take this step, to which he is compelled by the transactions which have taken place in Sweden, as he still bears in mind the generous and friendly sentiments which the Fins displayed towards Russia in the last war, when the Swedish king engaged in an invasion of Finland, in a manner equally unexpected and unwarrantable.—His present Swedish Majesty, far from joining his Imperial Majesty in his exertions to restore the tranquillity of Europe, which alone can be effected by the coalition which so fortunately has been formed by the most powerful states, has on the contrary formed a closer alliance with the enemy of tranquillity and peace, whose oppressive system and unwarrantable conduct towards his Imperial Majesty and his nearest ally, his Imperial Majesty cannot by any means look upon with

indifference.—It is on this ground, in addition to what his Imperial Majesty owes to the security of his own dominions, that he finds himself necessitated to take your country under his protection, in order to serve to himself due satisfaction, in case his royal Swedish Majesty should persist in his design not to accept the just conditions of peace which have been tendered to him by his French Majesty, through the mediation of his Imperial Russian Majesty, in order to restore the blessings of peace, which are at all times the principal object of his Imperial Majesty's attention.—Good friends and men of Finland remain quiet and fear nought, we do not come to you as enemies, but as your friends and protectors, to render you more prosperous and happy, and to avert from you the calamities which, if war should become indispensable, must necessarily befall you.—Do not allow yourself to be seduced to take to arms, or to treat in a hostile manner the troops who are committed to my orders; should any one offend against this admonition, he must impute to himself the consequences of his conduct, while, on the other hand, those who meet his Imperial Majesty's paternal care for the welfare of this country, may rest assured of his powerful favour and protection.—And as it is his Imperial Majesty's will, that all the affairs in your country shall pursue their usual course, and be managed according to your ancient laws and customs, which are to remain undisturbed, as long as his troops remain in your country, all officers both civil and military, are herewith directed to conform themselves thereto: provided that no bad use be made of this indulgence, contrary to the good of the country.—Prompt payment shall be made for all provisions and refreshments required for the troops, and in order that you may still more be convinced of his Majesty's paternal solicitude for your welfare, he has ordered several magazines to be formed, in addition to those which are already established, out of which the most indigent inhabitants shall be supplied with necessaries, in common with his Majesty's troops.—Should circumstances arise to require an amicable discussion and deliberation, in that case you are directed to send your deputies, chosen in the usual manner, to the City of Abo, in order to deliberate upon the subject, and adopt such measures as the welfare of the country shall require.—It is his Imperial Majesty's pleasure, that from this moment Finland shall be considered and treated in the same manner as other conquered provinces of the Russian empire, which now enjoy happiness and peace under the mild government of his Im-

perial Majesty, and remain in full possession of the freedom of religion and worship, as well as of all its ancient rights and privileges. —The taxes payable to the crown remain in substance unaltered, and the pay of the public officers of every description continues likewise on its ancient footing.

SWEDEN.—*Declaration against Russia, 11 March, 1808.*

The first intimation his Majesty received of the hostile entrance of Russian troops into Finland on the 21st of February last, and of their public incitements to rebellion and revolt circulated in that province immediately afterwards, on behalf of his Imperial Russian Majesty, was by a telegraphic dispatch.—A breach of peace without a previous declaration of war, without a single article of complaint being preferred; a breach of peace emanating from treachery, and carried on by a traitor of his native country, * placed at the side of the Commander in Chief, is an event which has but few examples, and must at the first glance create detestation; but when this act is examined at the same time with what has lately occurred between the two countries; when contemplated in its forbidding deviation from those paths of truth and honour exemplified by his Ally, no feeling can then express, no name can compass the extent of such depravity; its features will remain without a parallel in history, filling up the deeds of iniquity heaped together in the present age. — At a time when his Imperial Russian Majesty, seemed to feel tenderly for oppressed princes and countries; at a time when he estimated the dangers which threatened all Europe, his Majesty, actuated by similar sentiments, was led into engagements with him, founded on the confidence he placed in him as a neighbour, an ally, and as an independent Monarch. The Emperor of Russia, in reference to the general welfare, had entered into useful engagements, had yet to demand of France the fulfilment of existing treaties, was possessed of power to support his own rights and those of all others concerned; his Majesty entered into an alliance with him, and is now attacked by him on the direct ground of having been his ally.—Never did a prince enter into an alliance with a more assured consciousness of the purity of its motives, as well as of its being inviolably kept. The Emperor had been personally insulted by the refusal of the French government to fulfil a concluded and sealed treaty; had been publicly defamed

by repeated insults levelled at his own person. The Russian nation had been no less insulted, being gazetted as savages and barbarians. † Thus every thing that is sacred to a government, was connected with the common interest. Was it then possible but to look upon as irrevocable, what the Emperor himself had declared, “that he would reject all conditions of peace, whether more or less advantageous, if they were not consistent with the glory of the Russian name; the security of the Empire; the sanctity of alliances; and the tranquillity and peace of all Europe.” ‡ —In what manner, and how far these great objects have been obtained by the Peace of Tilsit, contemporaries have already decided, and futurity will more clearly discover. The King, although at his post on the theatre of war, was, contrary to the express tenor of his convention with Russia, § neither informed of the Armistice, nor of the definitive negotiations, till the peace was concluded, having received advice of these transactions, accompanied with a cold and slight invitation to assist in the object of peace, || the King renewed his application for an armistice (which ought, no doubt, to have been stipulated in the peace of Tilsit), but received only evasive answers, and discovered at once the value of Russian co-operation. The King finding himself in consequence unable to defend his

† A people (the Russians) who from their barbarous customs and manners ought to create abhorrence amongst all civilized nations.—*Ordre du Jour. Vienne, le 25 Brumaire, An. 14 (14th November, 1805.)* —These savage bands, whose assistance shall for the last time, be called forth by European governments—25 *Bulletin de la grand armée, le 25 Brumaire, An. 14.* If the Greek religion be allowed once to spread itself between the Baltic and the Mediterranean seas, we shall soon see our provinces attacked by a heap of mad barbarians—proclamation, the head quarters, Warsaw, 20th Jan. 1807. Signed Napoleon Buonaparte.

‡ See the Russian Manifest of the 30th August, 1806.

§ Both the high contracting parties had engaged in the most powerful manner, that the hostilities being once commenced, they should not lay down their arms, or treat about any reconciliation with the French government without their mutual consent. The convention between Sweden and Russia, dated the 14th January, 1805.—Art. IX.

|| General Buderberg's letter to Baron de Wetterstedt, First Secretary for the foreign correspondence dated the 10th July, 1807,

* George Springporten,

German states any longer, was obliged to leave them to their subsequent fate. Having sustained this loss, originating in the desertion of Russia, his Majesty was again placed out of the theatre of war, and endeavoured to enjoy within his own territory that peace and quietness which its geographical situation seemed to ensure to him. Having faithfully acted up to his engagements towards Russia, his Majesty promised himself that notwithstanding the different system she had adopted, a just and equitable retrospect would be given to former occurrences. The King had supported the operations of Russia with his ships of war; had shared with the Emperor his military stores; had rejected and immediately communicated the offers made him by the French Government. ¶ Among others one that on condition of breaking with Russia while in the midst of the war, and when the Russian frontiers and her very capital were defenceless, Sweden should be put in possession of all the provinces lost during the reign of Charles XII, together with such further part of the Russian empire as his Majesty might determine. His Majesty stands on higher ground than to make a merit of having resisted temptations so mean and contemptible; but he is not without hopes that the aggregated censure due to a power thus spared in the hour of danger, will be proportioned to its oppressive conduct towards this kingdom. — The consequences of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, which were immediately suspected, and which the Russian Ministry have since acknowledged, began by degrees to unfold themselves. England's commercial monopoly, that ridiculous scarecrow, erected by the French government, in order to usurp to itself the continent, was also brought forward for the contemplation of the North, for the sake of extending, even to that part of the world, the oppression and misery which, from port to port, from state to state, Europe had been subjected to. No government is any longer left to its own light and experience; no people to their own lawful industry; no

¶ Promise of Norway given by General Bernadotte to a Swedish officer—a prisoner, Nov. 1806, respecting the extending of dominions of the french minister, Bourienne to Netzel the Chargé des Affaires the 14th November 1806. General Grandjean's representation to Colonel Baron Tavast, the 27th May, 1807, that Sween was to demand what territory she wished to have in order that she might counterbalance Russia, &c. &c.

middle class must be acknowledged between the vassal and the enemy. Peace signifies confederacy—confederacy, submission; and from paris must proceed the mandates which are to dictate both principles, laws, and ordinances, to the self-styled independant confederacy, while they promote only a lust for power, and violate what is most sacred in society and between societies.—Preparations were made in conformity at St. Peterburgh last Autumn, for a rupture with England, and they waited only for the proper season of the year to be able, with somewhat more security, to carry that measure into effect. A proposal was made to his Royal Majesty, in a note, dated the 6th of October, to assist agreeably to the convention made in 1780, in shutting the Baltic against foreign ships of war. His Majesty, on the 13th November, returned for answer that so long as the French government was in possession of so many harbours on the south side of the Baltic, and there exercised their system of exclusion, the Baltic could not be kept peaceable. His Majesty in consequence also requested that his Imperial Majesty would first endeavour to prevail on the French to quit those ports; and when the first-mentioned application was renewed on the 27th of the same month, as an objection grounded on the convention of 1780, his Majesty circumstantially declared on the 21st Jan. last, that by virtue of the convention made in the year 1801, between Russia and England, and to which his Majesty, at the pressing instance of Russia, and under her own guarantee, became a party, the previous armed neutrality had entirely ceased. That his majesty had then entered into direct engagements with England, in reference to that object, and which could not equitably be departed from, so long as the latter power, on her side, fulfilled her obligations. That at the same time that the armed neutrality was done away with, the stipulations grounded therein, respecting the shutting of the Baltic, became null and void, and which was the less applicable to existing circumstances, as the Danish naval force, then calculated upon, no longer was in being; not to mention that England had since that time, discovered the passage through the great Belt. But that of Sweden could not with her arms contribute to the protection of the Baltic, she would, on the other hand, take upon herself to obtain, by negotiation with England, that she should not send any ships of war into those seas, provided no other power made armaments there, or new hostilities should oblige her to come there as an as-

sistant—That Sweden should be called upon to serve Russia as outworks, because she had thought proper to provoke England; that Sweden should sacrifice her fleet and commerce as a defence for Cronstadt and Revel, was asking rather too much: yet immediately after these representations, Russia actually commenced her preparations for war on the frontiers of Finland. His Majesty continued, notwithstanding, to view them with calm forbearance; for as yet no specific complaints had been preferred, nor had any unconditional demands been made. The proposal (His Majesty had made) of in agreement to protect the Baltic, presented aspects of tranquillity and advantage to Russia, to all the North, which it would appear could not, but under great responsibility, be refused. The ports of Russia would hereby become more frequent than they had been since the commencement of the war, and might obtain an emulation in trade respecting their produce unknown for many years. Neighbourly friendship, commerce, repose after an unfortunate war, and some motives for applause after a still more unfortunate peace, such were the advantages to be derived from the proposals which the King made to the Emperor. They were made with a well grounded confidence in the concurrence of England, and his Majesty expected Russia's consent would have arrived much earlier than the dreaded English fleet could shew itself as an avenger in the Baltic. He pressed a speedy answer, and it was intended that the King's Ambassador should on the 15th of February, in a private audience with the Emperor, which was promised him, urge this important concern, when at once the communication of the embassy with Sweden was in a violent manner interrupted, and Russian troops entered Finland with the following proclamations: (Here follow the Russian proclamations, dated Frederiksham the 18th (6th) Feb. 1808. and Louisa, 10th (22d) Feb. 1808, already published). The declaration then concludes as follows:—Let every legal government, let every brave and honest warrior, every loyal subject, judge of this conduct: a treacherous invasion of a peaceful neighbour's country, preceded by manifestoes inviting to rebellion, are things at all times detestable, even in these latter times, otherwise so burthened with examples of violence and injustice. The Russian Empire, the ally of France, is not it would seem, powerful enough to abide upon the common terms of the law of nations, the resistance of a province left to defend itself on account of the season of the year.

It calls forth the aid of treachery and treason. The government expects to purchase the Finlanders *en masse*, under promises of liberty; but the commander of the army offers to purchase the soldiers individually, like slaves, in the market of St. Petersburg or Riga.—Ye youthful inhabitants of Finland, a people worthy of esteem; your King has, during the whole of his reign, paid attention to your instruction, to the cultivation and prosperity of your country. A faithless neighbour threatens to hurl you back to the state you were in in ages past, because your neighbourhood is become a reproach to him. His sword is brandished over your heads; his plundering hands are stretched towards your property; his forces approach your dwelling, and his promises and protestations have no other aim than to facilitate his access to you. Deeply grieved at the distresses inseparable from war, although conscious of in no wise having been the cause of it, your king rests assured that your hearts will remain unseduced and your courage unsubdued, till the time shall arrive when he can freely employ his whole force and that of his ally in protecting and revenging you.

SWEDEN. — *Proclamation, 14th March, 1808.*

Whereas the eastern frontiers of the kingdom have already been invaded by a Russian force; and whereas the western, southern, and northern frontiers are in danger of invasion: we are compelled by all the means in our power to defend our kingdom, and at the same time to avail ourselves, for its security, of the sacred duty imposed upon the king of Sweden, as well by the ancient fundamental laws of the country, as by the present form of government. That we may be the better able to oppose our enemies, we hereby command all unmarried and able young men, between the ages of 18 and 25 years, of what rank soever they may be, excepting such as have heretofore served as soldiers or seamen, to be ready whenever they may be called upon, to defend their country. In the mean time we order our commanders immediately to enrol all young men of the above description, in every parish throughout the kingdom, and transmit to us a statement thereof as speedily as possible, that we may, accordingly to the information given of the number in each district, issue orders for their organization as regular troops. All those whom these may concern are hereby enjoined to observance.—Given at our palace at Stockholm, this 14th day of March 1808.—GUSTAF ADOLPH.

Besides the above proclamation, there are several others of less moment: one dated March the 3d, prohibiting all travelling into Norway without a pass from the first secretary of state, which is to be granted only on account of especial business; and providing against the circulation of publications on the frontiers. Another proclamation prohibits on pain of death, all communication between the dominions of Sweden and Russia.

DENMARK:—*Declaration against Sweden, 29th February, 1808.*

The Danish government has with just impatience waited to see the effect of the efforts employed by the court of St. Petersburg for the purpose of recalling Sweden by the most friendly means, to those interests which are common to her with all the powers of the north, and to those principles which are the first bond of her connection with Russia and Denmark. These efforts having finally proved ineffectual, the Danish government finds itself placed in a position towards Sweden which will no longer allow its relations with that kingdom to remain uncertain. What these relations had become, it is indeed impossible to dissemble, after a perfidious aggression had suddenly forced Denmark from the path she had followed during a long series of years without the slightest deviation. All Europe has resounded with one cry of indignation at the crime committed by Great Britain against a neutral and peaceful state; and from all quarters has the Danish government received testimonies of the most lively interest in its cause. The court of Stockholm alone, notwithstanding the particular ties which united it with that of Copenhagen, observed a total silence, which it at length broke, only to prefer complaints the most unfounded and reproaches the most unjust, with respect to the inconveniences that had indirectly resulted to it, from the events of the war, as well as from the rigorous measures which the situation to which the Danish government has been most unexpectedly reduced, has imperiously required it to adopt, and which the chicane and endless vexations of Sweden have been little calculated to induce it to abandon. The Danish cabinet would have been extremely embarrassed to interpret the conduct on the part of a sovereign, whose interests, principles, and sentiments, it had regarded as being equally wounded by an act of atrocity, which has suddenly lighted the flames of war in the north, if it had not quickly seen cause to suppose, that the resolution taken by the king of Sweden under these circumstances was not merely that of indifference. The

extraordinary facility with which that monarch, several weeks before the reduction of Stralsund, had consented to the departure of the major part of the English forces in Pomerania (whither, as it should seem, they came with no other view than to await the opportunity of being conveyed to Zealand,) and the pains his Swedish majesty took to inform his people that this re-embarkation took place by virtue of a separate article of his convention with Great Britain, gave the first indications of a secret understanding at the expence of Denmark. These indications were very soon increased. The Danish government is not acquainted with the extent of the assistance which its enemy received in the ports of Sweden; but it has felt the consequences of that assistance in a manner the most lamentable to itself. It is easy to conceive the impression which has been produced upon the Danish nation by the relations of every kind, and the uninterrupted communications which the English found no difficulty in maintaining with Sweden.—No one could fail to remark how much Denmark was insulted by the pleasure which the king of Sweden appeared to take in repairing to the coast opposite to the Sound, and beholding personally all the injustice and outrage committed against a neighbouring country; by the caresses and numberless marks of distinction lavished upon the leaders of the English forces; by the honours which they, on their part, affected to render to the ally of their sovereign; and by the demonstrations of respect towards his Swedish majesty, to which the ships of war, violently seized from the port of Copenhagen, were not bound, on their passage along the Sound, under the cannon even of that fortress to which their salute was owing. However unfavourable an aspect the concurrence of these circumstances necessarily casts upon the dispositions of the King of Sweden towards the government of Denmark, that government cannot reproach itself with having gratuitously exaggerated those appearances, which the court of Stockholm, far from attempting to remove, wished to produce, nourish, and strengthen, as far as it was in its power. But these simple appearances were soon succeeded by facts. The government of England was the first to develop to Denmark the openly hostile disposition of his Swedish Majesty. Europe already knows the explanations occasioned between Denmark and Sweden by this denunciation. The King of Sweden, when called upon in the most frank and friendly manner to declare himself on this subject, was seen to endeavour eluding the necessity

of such a declaration; and when he was at length closely pressed, his Majesty gave an answer oblique, equivocal, and insulting. Nevertheless, as this answer appeared in some measure to give the lie to the government of England, the government of Denmark was contented with it for the moment, and thought it becoming to dissimulate its just resentments against Sweden, in the hope that, enlightened concerning her true interests, and reflecting on the consequences of her resolutions, she would at last end by yielding to the representations which the court of St. Petersburg had made, with as much tenderness as patience, in order to engage her to renounce her alliance with Great Britain, evidently become incompatible with the tranquillity of the North, and especially with the security of Denmark. The Danish government is but imperfectly acquainted with the nature and extent of the engagements which Sweden has entered into with England; whatever may be the object of them, and whatever their tendency, no one can better conceive or appreciate than itself the repugnance which his Swedish Majesty would feel in failing in any of the obligations he had contracted. But the Cabinet of Copenhagen is not uninformed that the Swedish government itself has admitted, that the term of its engagements recently expired; and after the Cabinet of St. James's had unmasked itself in the face of all Europe, it would have been insulting the Court of Stockholm to suppose that it would dare to concur in an attack upon the first bases of the security, prosperity, and dignity of the Powers of the North. These considerations could not be balanced by the trifling advantage of subsidies, with which the Cabinet of London shews itself ready at all times to purchase its allies, and whom it pretends to have then the right of treating as mercenaries.—The resolutions of the King of Sweden having, however, frustrated the last hopes of his neighbours, the Government of Denmark could no longer hesitate, on its part, to take those measures which its security, the general interest of the North, its attachment to Russia, and the nature of its engagements with that power, imperiously prescribe to it. At a moment when Zealand is threatened anew by the forces of England, to which the ports of Sweden serve as a point of re-union; when the enemy of the North has just assured himself of the dependence of the Court of Stockholm upon him for fresh pecuniary assistance: when the public declarations of the English Ministry sufficiently unfold the nature of the engagements still subsisting or renewed be-

tween the two allies, the Danish Government deems it right to prefer a state of open hostility to precarious and equivocal relations towards an enemy whose disposition is become more and more suspicious, and who, during a long period, could be considered only as a disguised enemy. His Majesty the King of Denmark declares consequently, that he adopts altogether the resolutions of Russia in respect to Sweden, and that he will not separate his cause from that of the Emperor Alexander, his august and faithful ally.

PRUSSIA. — *Declaration of the King of Prussia against Sweden, dated Königsberg, March 6, 1808.*

His Majesty the King of Prussia, our most gracious sovereign, has been solicited by both imperial courts of Paris and St. Petersburg, consistently with the system of the other powers of the Continent, and the declaration against England, to extend the same measures against Sweden, which have been taken against England, on account of her fresh alliance with that power. In imitation of the declaration issued by the Emperor of Russia on the 10th (22) of February. In this year, his majesty has accordingly broken off all relations with Sweden, and commands all in office under him, under the penalty of severe punishment, to restrain from all community or intercourse whatever with Sweden. In pursuance of this, from the present moment, and till farther orders, all Prussian harbours shall be utterly closed against Swedish vessels; Prussian vessels shall no longer be sent into Sweden, neither shall Swedish or neutral ships, or wares which came from Sweden, be admitted into Prussian harbours.

GEN. WHITELOCKE. — *Circular from the Commander in Chief to the Army, 21st March, 1808.*

At a general court-martial, of which general the right hon. Sir William Meadows, K.B. was president, held by virtue of his Majesty's special warrant, bearing date the 25th of January, 1808, at the royal hospital at Chelsea, on the 28th of the same month, and continued by adjournment until the 18th of March following, lieutenant-general Whitelocke was tried.

Sentence.

“ The court martial having duly considered the evidence given in support of the charges against the prisoner, lieutenant-general Whitelocke, his defence, and the evidence he has adduced, are of opinion, that he is guilty of the whole of the

" said charges, with the exception of that
 " part of the second charge which relates
 " to the order that the columns should be
 " unloaded, and that no firing should be
 " permitted on any account."—The court
 are anxious that it may be distinctly under-
 stood, that they attach no censure whatever
 to the precautions taken to prevent unnecessary
 firing during the advance of the troops to
 the proposed points of attack, and do there-
 fore acquit lieutenant-general Whitelock of
 that part of the said charge.—" The court
 " adjudge, that the said lieutenant-general
 " Whitelocke be cashiered, and declared to-
 " tally unfit and unworthy to serve his
 " Majesty in any military capacity what-
 " ever."

The king has been pleased to confirm the
 above sentence, and his Royal Highness the
 commander in chief has received his Ma-
 jesty's command to direct, that it shall be
 read at the head of every regiment in his
 service, and inserted in all regimental or-
 derly books, with a view of its becoming
 a lasting memorial of the fatal consequences
 to which officers expose themselves, who,
 in the discharge of the important duties con-
 fided to them, are deficient in that zeal,
 judgment, and personal exertion, which their
 Sovereign, and their country, have a right
 to expect from officers intrusted with high
 commands.—To his Majesty, who has ever
 taken a most lively interest in the wel-
 fare, the honour, and reputation of his
 troops, the recent failure of south America,
 has proved a subject of the most heartfelt
 regret; but it has been a great consolation
 to him, and his Majesty has commanded it
 to be intimated to the army, that after the
 most minute investigation, his Majesty finds
 ample cause for gratification in the intrep-
 idity and good conduct displayed by his
 troops, lately employed on that service,
 and particularly by those divisions of the
 army, which were personally engaged with
 the enemy in the town of Buenos Ayres, on
 the 5th of July, 1807; and his Majesty
 entertains no doubt, that had the exertions
 of his troops in South America been directed
 by the same skill and energy, which have
 so eminently distinguished his commanders
 in other quarters of the world, the result
 of the campaign would have proved equally
 glorious to themselves and beneficial to
 their country. By command of his Royal
 Highness the commander in chief.—HARRY
 CALVERT.—*Major-Gen. and Adj. Gen. of
 the forces.*

CITY OF LONDON.—*Petition to the House
 of Commons, March 25th 1808.*

Sheweth, that your petitioners have, dur-

ing a long course of public events, produc-
 tive of so many calamities, patiently sub-
 mitted to unexampled burthens, and are still
 ready to make such further sacrifices as may
 be necessary for maintaining the honour and
 independence of the realm.—That these bur-
 thens have been considerably augmented
 by gross abuses in the management and ex-
 penditure of the public money, and by a pro-
 fusion of sinecure places and pensions, which
 have not only greatly added to the sufferings
 of the people, but created a pernicious and
 dangerous influence, corrupting and under-
 mining the pure and free principles of the
 British constitution.—That after the enor-
 mous abuses brought to light by the various
 commissions of inquiry, it is a matter of
 deep concern to your petitioners, that the
 offenders thereby discovered have not been
 brought to justice, and those who so grossly
 misapplied the public money have hitherto
 escaped with impunity.—Your petitioners
 did therefore rely upon Parliament that speed-
 y and effectual measures would have been
 adopted to reform such abuses, and detect
 and punish the offenders in future.—That
 your petitioners viewed with much satisfac-
 tion the foundation of a committee of Finance
 and hailed the introduction into your hon.
 house of a bill to prevent the granting of
 places in reversion, as the first step towards
 these salutary reformatons. They beheld
 with increased satisfaction the measures
 taken by your honourable house, both during
 the late and present sessions of parliament,
 to carry the same into effect.—That it was
 with grief and disappointment they observed
 the views and intentions of your hon. house
 unhappily frustrated; and they have too
 much reason to apprehend, that the defeat
 of this measure has arisen from the baneful
 and predominating influence, which such
 abuses must necessarily create, and which
 this bill was intended to correct.—That it
 appears to your petitioners at all times es-
 sential, that rigid economy should be ob-
 served in the expenditure of the public
 money, and that no places or pensions should
 be bestowed but for real public services, more
 particularly so at the present moment, when
 it is declared, " that this country is at the
 very crisis of its fate," and the people are
 called upon for such unexampled sacrifices
 and exertions. They beg further to sug-
 gest to your hon. house the serious conse-
 quences likely to result, should a disposition
 be evinced by either branch of the legisla-
 ture at a period so awful and momentous,
 not to participate with the people in their
 dangers, sacrifices, and privations. They
 therefore pray your hon. house, not

to relax in your endeavours in carrying so necessary and beneficial a measure into effect, and causing inquiries to be made into the receipt, management and expenditure of the public money, adopting measures which may effectually guard against such abuses in future, and for abolishing all unnecessary places and pensions, as well in reversion as otherwise, as the best means of consolidating the strength of the empire, and calling forth the united energies and exertions of the people, at a time so necessary for the safety and security of his Majesty's dominions.

CITY OF LONDON.—*Petition to the House of Lords, March 25th 1808.*

Sheweth (after a repetition of the first five paragraphs in the Commons' petition),—That it was with grief and disappointment that they observed the views and intentions of their Representative in parliament unhappily frustrated by your lordships' rejection of this necessary and salutary measure, depriving the people, while labouring under such accumulated difficulties, of all hope of seeing any progress made in such great and acknowledged evils.—That they beg most seriously to impress upon your right hon. house, at a time when it is declared, "that this country is at the crisis of its fate," and the united exertions of all ranks are necessary to resist the dangers with which they are assailed, a disposition in either branch of the legislature to withhold from the people a redress of public grievances must be productive of most serious consequences, necessarily damp their ardour, and impede their exertions in the important struggle in which they are engaged.—They therefore pray your right hon. house to take these matters into consideration, and that your lordships will be pleased to adopt the speediest and most effectual measures for reforming all abuses in the receipt, management, and expenditure of the public money, and preventing such abuses in future, and for abolishing all unnecessary places and pensions as well in reversion as otherwise, as the best means of consolidating the strength of the Empire, and calling forth the united energies and exertions of the people, at a time so necessary for the safety and security of his Majesty's dominions.

CITY OF LONDON.—*Address to the King, March 25th, 1808.*

We your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal

Subjects, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled, humbly approach the throne with renewed assurances of our unshaken attachment to your Majesty's sacred person and government.—Your Majesty's faithful Citizens of London are truly sensible of the blessings which the people of this country enjoy in a peculiar manner, for whilst it has pleased the Almighty to permit the overthrow of many nations of Europe, we have the happiness yet to possess unimpaired our glorious constitution, to be governed by the mildest and most benevolent of sovereigns, and to be protected by good and wholesome laws wisely administered. To obtain these blessings our forefathers freely shed their blood; they are placed in our hand as a precious pledge, and we fondly hope that our children's children will enjoy the same to the latest posterity.—We are not unmindful, Sire, that by the preponderating influence of the government of France, almost every state upon the Continent has been compelled to unite in forming one vast and gigantic confederacy, whose efforts are solely directed to bring destruction upon your Majesty's dominions. We view this combination without dread, firmly relying upon a continuance of the divine protection, upon union amongst all ranks of your people, the extinction of party spirit (most essentially necessary at this very important crisis), upon the goodness of our cause, the valour and skill of your Majesty's fleets and armies, and on the vigour, firmness, and wisdom of your Majesty's councils.—With these aids, we doubt not your Majesty will confound and defeat the designs of our inveterate enemy, and in due time be enabled to conclude a peace, at once honourable, secure, and lasting.

THE KING'S ANSWER.

I thank you for your very loyal and dutiful address.—The assurances I receive from you of your unshaken attachment to my person and government, afford me the greatest satisfaction.—The example you have given to all ranks and descriptions of my people of union and public spirit, at this important crisis, cannot but produce the most beneficial consequences, in enabling me to resist effectually the powerful and extensive confederacy which the enemy has directed against my dominions, and ultimately to accomplish the great object of all my efforts—a secure and lasting peace.

"Nothing can be more mischievous to the community, generally speaking, than the turning of corn into spirituous liquors; and this evil would, at any rate, be lessened by the use of sugar instead of corn in the making of those liquors. Thus would our colonies be made to add to the quantity of food in the mother country; and to see such a measure opposed upon the ground of its injuring the growers of corn would be scandalous indeed; would be a shocking disgrace to the heads as well as to the hearts of the country gentlemen."—POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. XI. p. 35.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.—In the month of December 1806 (see the Parliamentary Debates, Vol. VIII. page 237), a committee was appointed to consider of the possibility of introducing sugar and molasses into use, in the distilleries and breweries. I never heard of any report, that was made by that committee; but, as will appear from the report of the debate, upon that occasion, some persons expressed their apprehension, that the measure, if adopted, would prove greatly *injurious to the growers of corn*. I was of a different opinion, and the reasons, upon which that difference was founded, were, at the time, stated in the Register of the 10th of January, 1807, Volume XI. p. 33, to which, as the means of sparing me some repetition, I beg leave to refer the reader.—The same committee, or a renewed one, have now made their report. It was laid before the House of Commons, on the 13th of this month; and, as appears from the statements in the newspapers (for I have not yet seen the authentic papers of the House, whence every thing of this sort is taken for insertion in my Parliamentary Debates), they recommend the passing of an act to suspend, for one year, by way of experiment, the use of corn in the distilleries, taking care, however, to authorize the Privy Council to take off the suspension, in case it should, upon trial, be found, that the measure produces a serious depression in the price of corn.—I do not recollect any measure to have been met by so apparently determined an opposition as this; and, though I am not on the side of the opposers, it does, I must confess, give me some little relief from that disgust, which I have, of late, experienced, to perceive that this opposition has nothing to do with party.—“Great and just alarm,” the opposers say, has been excited through the country by the proposition to introduce sugar instead of corn into the distilleries; because... because what? Because such a measure, “will, produce a glut in the corn market.” Thus, then, our

alarm has, all of a sudden, changed its nature; from an alarm at approaching *scarcity* of corn, it is become an alarm at approaching *superabundance* of corn!—Sir HENRY MILD MAY said, that “he thought it right to apprise the House, that the part of the report which went to prohibit the use of grain in distillation, though sanctioned by the opinions of a *majority* of the committee, had, by no means, its unanimous approbation. If any legislative measure should be proposed on the report, tending to carry that principle into effect, he gave notice that he should feel it his duty to oppose it. There was no sufficient public ground for such a measure, and it would be *extremely injurious to the barley counties*, one of which he had the honour to represent. He was confident that his constituents would give him instructions to oppose the proposition, and that they would petition against the measure.”—

MR. CHUTE, whom I have not heard before, since his election, “agreed with the hon. baronet. The landed interest was sufficiently depressed, and the influence of members whose consequence arose from trade was already sufficiently great, without striking a general blow at an extensive branch of the agriculture of the country. He should give his determined opposition to the measure.”—

Now, I should, if things were as they ought to be, call myself one of the constituents of Sir Henry Mildmay and Mr. Chute. I am, in fact, one of the persons, whom they are said more immediately to represent; and, as little things are great to little men, I dare say, that I feel as much anxiety for the prosperity of Hampshire as either of them; but, I can assure them, that they will receive no instructions from me to oppose the suggested measure, and will find me opposed to any petition, which the county may be stirred up to prefer against it.—It is agreed, on all hands, that the measure would be greatly beneficial to the West Indies, which are, at present, in a state of distress hardly to be

described. So far, therefore, if we think it wise to maintain the possession of those colonies, the measure is a good one. But, it is contended, that the measure would be injurious to the barley growers at home. Supposing that to be true, it would then, with me, be a question of degree merely. I should inquire, whether the injury to the barley growers would be more or less than the relief to the sugar growers; the latter being, in my opinion, full as much entitled to the protection of the government as the former. Yes, say the opposers of the measure, but there is this consideration; that the measure will not be injurious to the barley growers only, it will be injurious to the whole nation by discouraging the growth of corn. Make this out, gentlemen, and I am with you; but, at present, I am, for the reasons which I will now endeavour to submit to the reader, with brevity and clearness, of a different opinion.—After having heard, from all quarters, so much anxiety expressed, lest, from the shutting of the ports of the continent and of America against us, we should experience the horrors to be expected from a scarcity of corn; after having seen the pains taken by Mr. Young and Mr. Wakefield to impress us with a just idea of the magnitude of our annual importation of corn; it must, I think, appear to the reader to be a strange proposition, that danger of scarcity will arise from a want of a market for what we ourselves grow in this country. But, let us hear the arguments of Mr. Wakefield. He disapproves (see last Number, pages 605 to 608), of any legislative measure that would deprive the farmer of such markets as the distilleries; he says, that this discouragement will produce a fear of bad prices, and inadequate returns for labour and capital; that this fear once excited in the mind of the farmer, he will relax in his exertions to raise corn. He further says, that the distilleries, by causing more corn to be raised than is necessary for feeding the nation, enable us, in a season of scarcity, to take this superabundance and apply it to feeding purposes, and that, therefore, the distilleries operate as a national grainery.—There is something very plausible in this argument; but, I think, that, upon examination, it will appear to be more specious than solid; for, what does it mean but simply this: that, in order to induce the farmers of a nation, to grow more corn than is, upon an average, necessary for the consumption of the nation, a part of what they grow must be annually bought of them for the purpose of being *thrown away*; for the purpose of being gotten rid of without becoming human food, or suste-

nance? I shall be told, perhaps, that, used in the distilleries, corn does become human sustenance; for that, though it comes out in the shape of spirituous liquors, and, therefore, cannot very well be called food, yet that it causes less beer to be drunk and less food to be eaten, than would be drunk and eaten, if there were no spirituous liquors. I do not know, that my opponents *will* make use of this argument; but, if they should, it will be a very good answer to themselves; for, if the use of spirituous liquors produce a saving of beer and food, then the disuse of those liquors will produce an additional demand for corn, in the shape of beer and bread; and, if the use of spirituous liquors produce no such saving, we come back to my proposition, namely, that the corn used in the distilleries is, considered as human sustenance, *thrown away*; and, according to the idea of Mr. Wakefield, it is necessary for a nation to raise a certain proportion of corn annually to be thrown away, in order to secure the said nation from the horrid effects of casual scarcity. Used in the distilleries does corn become human sustenance? YES. Well then, the distilleries are *no grainery*, for, if you suspend them in a time of scarcity, the mouths that fed upon them must necessarily fall upon sustenance in some other shape. If the answer be NO; then is the corn used in distilleries *thrown away*, for, if you talk to me of the value which the farmer gets for it, I remind you, that that value must come out of the labour of those who consume the spirituous liquors. If the corn be thrown away, it is full as well to throw away sugar as corn; if spirituous liquors be human sustenance, then we draw it from our colonies in sugar: what is more, *we can have it in times of scarcity as well as in times of plenty*; and the West Indies become an inexhaustible grainery. It appears to me to be impossible for the most ingenious reasoner to get clear of this dilemma.—Before I proceed any farther, I will insert an article from the Morning Chronicle upon this subject. “Last night the Report was made from the Committee to whom it was referred to consider whether the distillery should be prevented from using grain; and, as we anticipated, they have given it as their opinions, that it would be advisable to make the experiment of prohibiting the distillation of spirits from grain for one year. There was, however, it seems, a division in the Committee on this point, and the Report itself made a sensible impression on the House; so that no motion, either for or against the adoption of the measure, can be formed.—We have

" felt it to be our duty to enter our feeble
 " protest against these most dangerous en-
 " croachments on the agriculture of the
 " country, which is surely of more value
 " towards its independence than all its colonies
 " both in the Eastern and Western
 " world. An experiment to sterilize the
 " country for one year—to interrupt the
 " routine of crops—to create a famine, per-
 " haps, in the kingdom. We trust in the
 " good sense of parliament, that we shall
 " have no such experiment.—It is to the
 " Distillery in particular that the northern
 " part of the kingdom looks in its culture of
 " barley for a market. Rob Scotland of this
 " resource, and four-fifths of its farmers
 " will be bankrupts: they cannot substitute
 " wheat for barley—their climate will not
 " ripen it; and the same argument may ap-
 " ply to a great proportion of the barley
 " lands in England.—This is a very dif-
 " ferent measure for stopping the distilling
 " of grain for a season of scarcity. In that
 " case, having a crop of barley in hand
 " when wheat is deficient, an act passes to
 " stop the distillery, so as to bring the whole
 " stock into use as a substitute for bread
 " corn—but here is a project to prevent the
 " growing of barley.—It might be entitled,
 " "a Bill to create a scarcity of Corn by
 " discouraging the growth thereof." Surely
 " there is no evil that can befall the country
 " equal to that which would flow from a
 " measure of this kind—and when it is re-
 " flected that we may be thrown entirely on
 " our own produce for subsistence, we shall
 " not be condemned to the trial of chimeri-
 " cal experiments, by which the course of
 " our husbandry is to be disturbed—and our
 " farmers are to be warned against sowing
 " the land!"—This article does little
 " more than dilute the argument of Mr.
 " Wakefield, namely, that the distilleries is
 " one great market for corn, take away this
 " market and you take away one of the most
 " powerful motives to the raising of corn,
 " whence will arise a diminished produce and
 " all the consequences of such a diminution,
 " amongst which is particularly mentioned the
 " ruin of the barley farmers.—Now, in the
 " first place, the quantity of barley used in the
 " distilleries of England and Scotland does not
 " exceed 300,000 quarters annually, the ave-
 " rage annual produce of about 70,000 acres of
 " land. And this is a market, the loss of which
 " is to spread ruin amongst the cultivators of
 " England and Scotland! It is to make bank-
 " rupts of four-fifths of the farmers of Scot-
 " land; it is to *sterilize* the land, and
 " *starve* the people; and that, too, by bringing
 " provisions into the country, or, at least,

something to supply the place of provisions,
 now thrown away!—Let us see, however,
 whether it be probable, that *less corn* would
 be raised on account of this measure. Wheat,
 we are told, could not be raised upon certain
 of the lands, which now bear crops of barley.
 But *oats* might, and grass would follow oats
 as well as barley. But, upon the supposi-
 tion, that the particular lands alluded to
 would bear nothing but barley, there are
 other lands, which now bear barley, and
 which would bear something else. Still, it
 must be confessed, that there would be one
 market lost; but, would no other market
 open? If you stop the distilleries will not the
 barley that they now consume go to the fat-
 ting of hogs and to various other purposes?
 The moment barley begins to be cheap, that
 moment it is given to hogs; and, if you ask
 me how the hog's flesh is to be disposed of;
 if you are still afraid, that the quantity of hu-
 man sustenance, in England and Scotland,
 will be too great; if you still dread a
 glutted market of provisions, there are the
West Indies, those very colonies, whom,
 you are afraid, the Americans will starve;
 who will give you, in times of plenty,
 sugar in exchange for your barley, made into
 pork, and from whom, in times of scarcity,
 you can, at any moment, withhold that
 pork. In calling *this* a granary, indeed,
 there would be something like reason and
 consistency.—But, the truth is, I believe,
 that no such exchange would be necessary to
 keep alive the motive for growing barley.
 It is, in a national point of view, completely
 irrational to speak of barley but as being
 an article of human sustenance; as a
 means of supporting human life; as, to
 use the common word, *subsistence*. Now,
 I think, it is a principle acknowledged
 upon all sides, that wherever there is
 subsistence there will be a *proportionate*
population, or, to use the words of Mr.
 MALTHUS (with whom I disagree as to
 the *checking of population*), "population al-
 ways treads close upon the heels of sub-
 sistence." If this be the case, then, where
 is the ground of alarm at throwing an addi-
 tional quantity of subsistence in upon the
 community? This doctrine of Mr. Mal-
 thus being sound (and common sense says
 that it must be so) there never can be a want
 of a market for any quantity of barley that
 we can grow. There may be a temporary
 fall of price; but the permanent effect of
 withholding corn from the distilleries, and
 supplying the place of it by the produce of
 colonies belonging to ourselves, must be,
 either that of producing an exportation of
 hog-meat, or of increasing our domestic po-

pulation, both causes being equally efficacious in preventing the discouragement and the decreased production and gains of the farmers.—Suppose the West Indies could supply us with barley enough for our distilleries, Mr. Wakefield would, if he were consistent, object to it, because, as he would say, the barley growers of England would be thereby discouraged. He would be of the same opinion with regard to Guernsey or Jersey; for the measure would still have precisely the same effect; and, upon the supposition that *new enclosures* tend to make an *increase* (which I think they do not) in the quantity of subsistence produced, he would, of course, also object to new enclosures, and, then, I should leave him to settle the point with Sir John Sinclair, and “the friends of agriculture,” who cry aloud and cease not for a *General Enclosure Bill*. This last argument was made use of by Mr. Perceval, to whom Mr. Windham replied, that in the case of new enclosures, the supply was, doubtless, increased, and the competition augmented; but, in the case contemplated, there would be an *exclusion* of one set of growers to the sole advantage of the other. I agree, that the immediate *advantage* will be solely upon the side of the colonies; but, this is no objection to a measure, provided *no injury* be sustained on the other side in consequence of that measure. “*Augmented competition*” is only another phrase for *decrease of price*; for, whether the market be wholly cut off, or only narrowed in its demand, though there may be a difference as to the degree, the principle continues the same; and, therefore, the seller has as good a right to complain of augmented competition as he has to complain of a total loss of the market. Pursuing this to an illustration: it is said, that the Scotch barley-grower will be injured, in consequence of this cutting off of a market for 300,000 quarters of barley, annually consumed in the distilleries; and that, as this measure is to be adopted after he has taken a long lease of his farm, he will not be able to pay his rent, and will become a bankrupt. This is to be the effect, we are told, of a loss of market. But, suppose, that the proposition of “the friends of agriculture” were adopted; suppose a *General Enclosure Bill* were passed, and suppose it were to answer the expected purpose, namely, that of causing an *increase of produce*. It would be a pitiful increase indeed, unless it exceeded 300,000 quarters of barley in a year; and, then, pray tell me, gentlemen, “friends of agriculture,” you, who, with Mr. Brand, are resolved to “oppose this mea-

sure in every stage,” whether the Scotch or the English barley-grower would not suffer as much from this increase of produce as from that loss of market, which, it is alledged, will be the effect of the measure now proposed?—As connected with a question like this, which embraces the general produce of the soil and the general interests of the nation, all the distinctions between barley-growers and wheat-growers are too trifling to be attended to. The kind as well as the amount of the produce will be regulated by the demand. The general market will tell the farmer what he is to sow, and the same infallible guide will tell the corn-dealer whether he is to send the fruit of the harvest.—Every argument made use of, with respect to the interests of the *cultivator*, applies, of course, to those of the *owner* of the soil; and, unless my reasoning be erroneous, neither can experience any permanent injury from the measure now in contemplation, while it is, upon all sides agreed, that the West India planters, so long and so severely oppressed by an accumulation of hardships, will therefrom derive considerable relief. Were there, indeed, any ground to apprehend, that the nation would experience an injury from this measure; were it a question between the West India planters and the people of England; I should say, (though it would grieve me to be put to the necessity) let the West India planters perish, rather than England be endangered by scarcity; but, as I am convinced, that the measure now proposed will be greatly beneficial to the former, without producing any, even the slightest, danger or injury to the latter, either temporary or permanent, I hope, that, in the approaching discussion and decision, enlarged views and public spirit will prevail over local and interested motives.

WOODCOCKS AND SNIPES.—It is whimsical enough, that these poor little birds should become a subject of discussion amongst grave politicians; yet, as a *law* is about to be passed relative to these birds, and as two gentlemen (whose letters I insert) have thought it worth their while to make the proposed regulation a matter of such serious notice, I think it right to submit an observation or two thereon.—To the correspondent, who ridicules the idea of debating about little birds, while we are threatened with invasion, one may answer by asking him how it happens, that *he*, who never wrote to me before, came to write to me now, if he thought the subject so very unimportant.—The other correspondent seems to view the matter in quite a different

light. He calls upon me, as "the champion of the just rights and liberties of the people," to interfere, "in order to preserve, for the middle and lower orders, who are to fight our battles, the liberty they have hitherto enjoyed, to follow the innocent amusement of killing Woodcocks and Snipes." Appealed to with so much solemnity, and anxious to preserve the good opinion of my correspondent, I shall give him my sentiments in the clearest manner that I am able.—In the first place, I must observe, that I am unacquainted with any right, which the making of Woodcocks and Snipes game is at all likely to abridge, as far, at least, as relates to any *amusements* of the people. The law, as it now stands, does, indeed, attach no penalty to the mere act of killing these birds, nor to the mere possession of them; but, I would ask this complainant, *where* the shooter is to find the birds? And, let the answer be what it may, unless the birds be found upon the shooter's *own land*, or land *rented* by him, he is liable to an action of trespass for even looking after the birds; and this liability arises, not from the statute, but from *the common law*. And, very wise and just is the law in this respect; for, is it not clear, that it would be impossible to have any thing worthy of the name of private property, if every man were at liberty to invade it, under the pretext of seeking after woodcocks and snipes or wild animals of any sort?—But, I shall be told, perhaps, that the contemplated law, will prevent unqualified persons from shooting woodcocks and snipes even by permission of the *owners or renters* of the land. To which I answer, that the prevention is already as complete as this dreaded law can possibly make it; for, to go a shooting woodcocks and snipes without spaniel, or game dog of some sort, is what no man thinks of; to be seen out with dog and gun the law takes as *proof* of being "in *pursuit of game*;" being in pursuit of game subjects the unqualified pursuer to the penalty of five pounds; and, as the same evidence is admitted with respect to the penalty in default of having taken out a game license, the unqualified person, who is found in pursuit of a snipe is *already* liable to all the law levelled against him, who is found in pursuit of a pheasant. How, then, can the unqualified part of the people suffer any abridgment of their *amusements* from the act now before parliament? Let us take an instance: you meet a man with dog and gun, beating along your meadow, or through your coppice. You ask for his *licence*. "I need none," says he, "I am in pursuit

"of snipes, or of woodcocks." But, if you inform against him, and prove that he was *out with dog and gun*, he is liable to the penalty of shooting without a licence; and, it is exactly the same with regard to the qualification.—The act, therefore, which is about to pass, will have no effect whatever in lessening the liberty to shoot or to hunt. Its effect will be to prevent the public *sale* of woodcocks and snipes. If the law pass, it will be a crime to *sell* these birds at all; and that will certainly be a check to the pursuing and the killing of them; but, then, observe, that those who kill these birds for *sale*, cannot be said to pursue them for "*amusement*." The fact is, that almost the whole of the woodcock and snipe market is supplied by gentlemen's game-keepers: a small share of the supply comes from the hands of mere poachers; and, in checking of the traffic of these descriptions of persons, it is not very easy to conceive how the liberties or the comforts of the "middle and lower orders of the people are likely to be abridged."—As to the game-laws, generally speaking, such a *quix* of a code surely never before existed in the world! A code, which gives to the son a privilege, founded upon the rank of his father, and which, at the same time, denies that privilege to the father himself. It is, in short, one mass of inconsistency and confusion; a ridiculous medley of feudal privileges and pecuniary preferences. Game, like other things, should be *private property*, the proof of proprietorship being that the animal was upon the land of the claimant at the time of its being taken, killed, or found for pursuit. This, together with the law or trespass, as it already exists, would be quite effectual in the preserving of game of all sorts; but, until this be the law, quarrelling, heartburnings, and acts of oppression, will and must be the consequence of the existence of those animals, which, as far as one can judge upon such a matter, were created for the recreation and pleasure of man.

CURATES' STIPEND BILL.—I do not absolutely retract what I said, last week, in favour of this bill; but, upon reading over its clauses (having before merely seen a general description of it), I feel much less interest as to its success, than I before felt.—The allowance fixed on for the curate is *one-fifth* of the annual produce of the living, together with the use, upon certain considerations, of the parsonage house and glebe, or part of the latter. The *Bishop* is to see this law enforced; but, there is nothing to *compel* him to cause it to be enforced; for, as to the *appeal*, which the poor

curate is allowed to make from the Bishop to the Archbishop, is it not a mockery to talk seriously of such a provision, especially when he is exposed to *costs*, if he fail in his appeal? In fact, the bill will place at the mere mercy of the Bishops, not only the property of the incumbent, but also that of the patron. In *this shape* the bill must be an evil in place of a good; but, if the law were imperative upon the bishops, it appears to me, that it would be attended with exceeding good effects.

AMERICAN MONIES.—The reader will remember, that I predicted, that the *monies* of the holders of American funds would come to England in *protested bills of exchange*; or, rather, in bills that would meet with a protest instead of payment. I have now before me a letter from a merchant, subscribed with his name and place of abode, informing me, that a bill, being, perhaps, the *first* remittance of the monies of a *great* and *notorious* fund-holder, the sum upwards of *seven thousand pounds*, has come to hand, and has actually been *protested*. I shall not publish names, and I need not; but, I will express my hearty wish, that every succeeding bill may meet with the same fate; and, that, of all the vast sum of monies, not as much as would purchase the insertion of a single puff paragraph in the Morning Chronicle may ever reach the hands of the greedy owner, who, were he begging his bread, would not merit a crust from an English hand.—The excuse, I hear, is, in these cases, that the *embargo* prevents ships from coming to bring the worth of the bills drawn upon England. But, *who* made the embargo? Who but the Americans themselves? What an impudent excuse! I, however, have no ground of complaint against the Americans, upon this score; for, if, from any supernatural cause, they should prove to be honest men, my readers may be led to doubt of my veracity.—What an impudent excuse! “I have barred up my shop door, and, therefore, cannot send you any goods in return for your monies.” What an impudent thing! But, it is good: very good, thus to see their flatterers and defenders punished by them.

MR. SCOTT'S LETTER.—This letter, which, in answer to A. B. C. (page 378 of the present volume) was to have been published last week, was, at the joint request of Lord Oxford and a common friend of the parties, withheld from publication. Mr. Scott has, as will be seen below, consented to withdraw the letter altogether; but, I think it a duty I owe to him to say, that the letter contained, as far as I am able to judge,

a full refutation of all the assertions and insinuations, contained in the letter of A. B. C. unaccompanied with an injurious reflection upon any person whatever.

Panton Square, April 21, 1808.

MR. SCOTT'S LETTER.

SIR,—As I understand my letter, announced for publication in your last paper, in answer to the anonymous letter of A. B. C., was suspended at the particular request of the Earl of Oxford, it is but justice to myself to observe, that the public being made any party to this business was not begun by me, and that, if I abstain from urging any further publication upon the subject, after all the means of injuring me have been exhausted, it must depend upon the conduct of other persons; and, if in vindicating myself, I may wound the feelings of those persons, which it is not in my nature wantonly to do, and which I can never do without wounding my own, they ought to consider a little the precept we have been all taught, “Do unto others, as you would have them do unto you.”—I am, &c.—JAMES SCOTT.—*Norfolk Street, April 20, 1808.*

MR. WAKEFIELD'S 3D. LETTER.

SIR,—Having in my last endeavoured to point out the only available resource left to the country, at the immediate moment of a scarcity, I am anxious to now call your attention to the causes which have made Great Britain an importing corn country. That we are so, I consider as an indisputable fact; a correspondent of yours however, quarrels with this assertion, because I have not brought my account of import and export down to the close of last year. After the holidays I will furnish you with the accounts of import and export for 1806 and 1807, as I am desirous to remove every doubt, which can be raised of the existence of these facts, upon which he justly says “my arguments depend.” But, whatever may be the accounts for the two last years, I wish it to be distinctly understood, that my fears, my anxieties, do not arise from a review of what has occurred in any one or two years, they arise from observing that for seventy years at one period, we were an exporting corn country, that we have not only ceased to export, but that we now actually import, and have imported for more than the last thirty years; not only so, but that the proportion of import has increased in an astonishing degree. This alteration is the fact upon which I rest every argument, every opinion which I have upon the subject; and whether (as your correspondent suggests) it has or has

not occurred in the course of a single year, the last if he pleases it, has nothing I think to do with the question. Before entering upon the subject of my present address, I will answer the other points relied upon in the letter which you have inserted in Saturday's Register. Your correspondent states a certain breadth of wheat grown every year in the kingdom, and an average produce upon this quantity of land, if this data are true, the whole produce is justly stated, and it would most amply feed all those who depend upon wheatear bread for subsistence, but it is necessary he should establish his data with as much precision as the Custom House books do the entries of corn inwards and outwards. It is very easy to suppose "fifty millions of acres to be in a state of cultivation," and to suppose "one half of them, are under the plough," but I want more than vague supposition. Especially as without taking up the pages of your Register in replying minutely to all parts of this calculation, its fallacy may be shewn by asking what has been done with the corn which has been imported in the course of the last thirty-five years. It has not been exported. This the Custom-house books prove. Has it been burnt? Has it been thrown into the sea? Or, has it in some shape or other been consumed by the people of England? If it has been consumed by the people, as beyond all doubt is the fact, then it is impossible for us to have been yearly growing more than we consume, and of course the supposititious account of land under the plough, and an annual surplus produce of wheat is erroneous. —The more I consider the principles of political economy, the more am I convinced of the truth of the statement of Sir James Stewart, that every man, every body of men, every nation is impelled to active exertion by the feelings of self interest. Now, has or has not, the interest of the British farmer been sufficiently attended to? Has the money price of his produce been allowed to keep pace with that of his expences? Has he been as well paid for investing his property in agriculture, as he would have been by investing it in any undertaking of manufactures or commerce. I have not myself any doubt, but that he has not been rewarded; I have not any doubt but that the price of grain does not pay the farmer, the use of his capital, his labour, and risk. Can any one doubt, but that if agriculture would have yielded equal or greater interest to the owner of a capital, than West Indian adventure, or foreign commerce, capitalists would have invested their property in the manufacture of corn; for a farmer is in truth, no other than

a manufacturer, and that also of the staple commodity of the country. Is this the case? Do we see large capitalists employing their money, devoting their time and attention to the growth of corn. No! Then what is the reason why they do not? It is because such undertakings do not answer their purpose, if they did there are no men who would be more eager to engage in farming speculations. It is however necessary before I proceed further, that I should establish this important and ruinous fact beyond all kind of dispute, for upon it the whole of my subsequent reasoning will be built, and depend a comparison of the laws of 1679, 1688, and 1706, and those of 1773 and 1791 will be nearly sufficient to convince you of this fact. By those of the first period a bounty was given upon the export of wheat till the price equalled 48s. per quarter. By those of the last period bounty ceased when wheat was 44s. the quarter!!! The money price of every article of manufacture and commerce has increased in price; in other words, the value of money has fallen. Yet, in the face of this acknowledged fact, it is expected that the money price of corn is to be stationary!! worse than stationary! decreasing!! But this is only a part of the evil, this is only some of these facts, which from the evidence I have to offer in support of the melancholy proposition which I laid down in the early part of my letter, for in addition to all the foregoing facts, it is necessary to take into full and serious consideration, the augmented and augmenting expences of the farmer, the money price of his produce has stood still, while every machine, every barn, every article of his dead stock, has advanced in proportion to the fall in the value of money. Rent has in the same proportion advanced upon him; so have the poor rates, so have taxes. At the suggestion of a committee of the House of Commons, the Board of Agriculture in the year 1804, sent circular letters throughout the kingdom, to ascertain the then expences of cultivation, and amount of produce. A similar inquiry had been made fourteen years before, and the result of a comparison between them is, that while the expences of the farmer have augmented in this short period, in the enormous proportion of thirtyone per cent. his produce has only increased six and half per cent. The two last items of his increased expenditure claim particular consideration, for as the poor rates are now levied they fall almost entirely upon the farmer. For rents or annual value being almost exclusively rated, every other species of capital escapes from contribution. And in the last

century this burthen has more than quintupled. As to taxes, that on horses employed in agriculture, is a direct tax upon the farmer, and upon him only; and as the income tax is now levied, that also is a direct tax upon him; for it is not a rate upon his income, but bears a fixed proportion to his rental, whether he gains or loses by his farm. Yet this is called a tax upon his income? The mercantile interest take better care of themselves, they have their averages and their allowances for bad debts, not so with the farmer, he has no allowances for bad seasons, no average is allowed him for variation of profit, from the fluctuation of price. Hence it appears to me, that it is but too certain the employment of capital and enterprise in farming, pays an infinitely less profit than their employment in any other pursuit or undertaking whatever. It remains then, to consider the best means of adding to the profits of the farmer, and thus by the certain, though gradual operation of the principle of self interest, to prompt him to a more perfect and extended cultivation. Tythes have often been urged as damping the ardour of farming enterprise, but some facts are on record, which warrant the conclusion, that at the most tythes have but a feeble and partial operation, they have been gathered in every period of our agricultural history during which a long course of farming prosperity has enriched the nation; and wherever a supposed cause has equally existed in two periods, the one prosperous, and the other calamitous, it does not seem the soundest reasoning to recur to it as the source of the change. I therefore, feel inclined to dismiss tythe from my consideration of the subject, as it tends to draw away the mind from that great and efficient cause, to which only the alteration can with any truth be attributed. I have already alluded to the poor rates and taxes, and concerning them I shall merely observe in addition, that their injurious operation has been within these thirty or forty years, for during the existence of the revolution corn laws, the poor rates scarcely doubled; but during the modern period, they have more than trebled, and the taxes I have named have been imposed within the last fifteen years. Inclosures merit particular consideration, if they should be forced upon the farmer, it will augment the evil of which I am complaining; but if only encouraged by means of facilitating the obtainment of inclosure bills, the bringing the waste lands into cultivation will not proceed faster than the joint prosperity of the farmer, and the country will warrant. Inclosures, however will rather be the effect of such

prosperity, than its positive parent, though afterwards they will have the effect of upholding and perpetuating it. I shall, therefore, postpone the further observations I propose to offer you upon them, until I have fully considered the difference between the revolution corn laws, and those of 1773 and 1791. In doing which I shall endeavour to convince you, that to this difference, and to this almost alone, should be attributed the danger to which the country is exposed, by not producing provisions equal to its consumption; but to avoid trespassing too much upon the pages of your Register, I will defer this subject to my next letter.—And am, Sir, yours, &c.—EDWARD WAKEFIELD.—*Duke Street, Westminster, April 18, 1808.*

ENCLOSURE BILL.

SIR,—I observed in your last Register, that you stated your objections to a general Enclosure Bill. It cannot but be admitted that the lands now enclosed might be cultivated so as to produce more than they now do. Farms might be better fenced, and better planted, and fallows altogether exploded. But, Mr. Cobbett, I beg you to consider that there are certain things necessary before a farm can be improved, viz. capital, knowledge, and industry. Numberless people now in possession of land, and likely to continue so, have not even one of these requisites. If an Enclosure Bill was passed, I presume that many master manufacturers, and those who have hitherto employed their capitals in foreign commerce, would turn their attention to the cultivation of land, which would surely be more beneficial to the country, than were they to live in idleness upon the interest of their money. It need not be said that they have not a sufficient knowledge of agriculture, as with the assistances now to be obtained, a man with capital and industry may soon become a tolerable good farmer. But, Sir, if the legislature was to go no farther, than to pass an act to enclose open field lands, what an immense difference this would soon make in the food and other articles brought to market; for these lands are from necessity cultivated in the very worst way. I ought to leave the discussion of this *important* subject to more able writers, I trust that Mr. Arthur Young and others will not let the matter rest. But I cannot help making one or two more remarks. You ask, "would a general enclosure cause more persons to be born and raised up?" Without doubt it would; but the tilling of more land would shortly create great abundance, and years would

elapse before the population could advance so as to occasion distress, from numbers bearing hard upon the necessities of life. You also say, "that it would cause no increase in the quantity of food raised." I cannot think you will continue to hold this opinion, when you consider that the lands now waste, by good management, would yield in the course of a few years, acre for acre nearly as much as the best lands in the country. Before you make up your mind completely upon this subject, I recommend it to you, Sir, to take a tour amongst the Mendip hills in Somersetshire, where I doubt not, if you inquire as to the state of that county previous to its enclosure, you will be satisfied of the advantages to be derived from the culture of wastes. But not to take up more of your time, I shall only add, that were a General Enclosure Bill to be passed, little advantage I think would accrue from the division of wastes into small portions; but, on the other hand, if divided into farms of from one to three hundred acres, the benefit to the nation would be beyond all calculation.—I am, Sir, &c.—M. H.—*March 14, 1808.*

WOODCOCKS AND SNIPES.

SIR,—However I may differ from you on certain political measures, I have ever considered you, as a true champion for the just rights and liberties of the people; and, under this impression, venture to offer you my sentiments, on the intention of ministers to comprehend in the list of game, woodcocks and snipes.—As a measure of revenue, it appears to me extremely absurd; for, as both woodcocks and snipes, are birds difficult to shoot, it cannot be supposed that a qualified person, who is a good shot, would restrict himself solely to those birds, when by taking a licence, he would have a much greater scope of amusement; and might easily repay himself the expence of it, by killing other game. As a proof of this, I know several gentlemen in my neighbourhood, whose servants in the space of one month, sell more hare skins alone, than would pay for a licence.—Was this boasted country (always depicted as overflowing with resources) in so desperate a situation, as to require the paltry augmentation which this measure could effect; would it not be better, to allow unqualified persons the liberty they have hitherto enjoyed, on paying a certain annual sum for this permission; say 2s. 6d. or even 5s. per annum; that this tax would be more productive, there cannot be a doubt; and it would also give more general satisfaction; the penalties for killing game would remain

in full force, and those found trespassing against them, could be equally punished. The markets would as usual be supplied with those birds, so that those persons, who had not leisure, or skill to procure them, might occasionally enjoy little dainties. But, it now appears, Mr. Cobbett, that such delicate morsels are not fitting for the middle and lower classes of Englishmen; yet those are the people who are to fight our battles; those are the people, who ground almost to dust by the tax gatherer, are called on in the same breath, to relinquish one of their few and innocent amusements, and to shed their last drop of blood in preserving inviolate, our *free* and most excellent constitution. It may be asserted, that many persons under pretence of shooting these birds destroy other game; and, it is therefore, necessary to put a stop to such practice by the law in question. To such persons I beg to answer, that in spite of this intended regulation, an unqualified *free* Englishman, will still be permitted to shoot *sparrows*; nay, more, ducks, &c. Therefore the same pretence will exist in full vigour, notwithstanding this new act of the legislature.—Where then, Mr. Cobbett, are we to look for the reasons of its adoption. Is it that our mobility, and rich commoners, are alone worthy of slaying and eating woodcocks and snipes; is it that at a late route of my Lady Pentwearles, there was a deficiency of those delicacies. Or, is it intended as a measure to reimburse the Treasury, for the grant so lately bestowed on the family of poor Lord Lake?—Not being an adept in the learned languages, many of your learned readers, may doubtless, criticise the subject, language, and style of this letter; should you, Sir, however, think it intelligible to the plainer part of your readers, and not altogether unworthy of your notice; you will oblige me by inserting it in your valuable Register.—I am, Sir, &c.—AN ENEMY TO OPPRESSION.

WOODCOCKS AND SNIPES.

SIR;—I beg leave to return you my sincere thanks for the very great pleasure I have often received from the reading your useful and entertaining paper, of which I am a pretty constant reader, and, in general, an admirer. I confess, that, esteeming you a man of great penetration and sound judgment, I felt some apprehension for the fate of my dear country, from your statement of its situation and circumstances; but, I am happy to inform you, my fears and apprehensions are all entirely done away by the circumstance of the chancellor of the exchequer having just now brought in a bill

to prevent the shooting of woodcocks and snipes as game. If some little Nimrod of a lordship had brought in such a bill at this time, it might have lessened my fears, but would not have removed them; but, when I see one so high in office amusing himself in a thing of such very little consequence, I feel perfectly at ease as to any danger of an invasion. Mr. Cobbett, I am not ambitious of appearing in print, and yet I could wish this letter to be published, to convince this upstart, self-created emperor, with what contempt we look upon his menaces; and that, whilst he is threatening us with invasion, subjugation, and all the horrors of extermination, we are smilingly contemplating the additional pleasure our sportsmen will enjoy in the next shooting season.—As I am not a man of learning, perhaps I may not know the true meaning of the word "patriot:" if I do, I can, with great truth, subscribe myself—A TRUE PATRIOT.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SWEDEN.—*Answer of Sweden to the Danish Declaration of War. Dated Stockholm, March 21, 1808.*

The court of Denmark had made an alliance with France, was prepared to receive French troops in its country, collected transport vessels in its port, fitted out all its ships in the road of Copenhagen, to cover a French expedition against Sweden, and then issued a declaration of war. Denmark accused Sweden of being the cause of this rupture, because she did not make her compliments of condolence on the loss of her fleet, because she would not co-operate to avenge that humiliation, and especially because she sought aid from England against such an aggression.—The relations of the king with his neighbouring power were those of a simple peace. There was neither alliance, nor any convention whatever which traced out for the two courts any common course for their political conduct; therefore when Sweden, Russia, and Prussia fought in conjunction against France, Denmark, under the shade of her neutrality, appeared the friend of all. The king witnessing this system, and convinced by some explanations, demanded in the course of the year 1805, of the impossibility of obtaining a change favourable to Sweden, could not entertain a hope that the naval force of Denmark could ever be useful to him; on the contrary, after the peace of Tilsit, he had every reason to fear that, by the suggestions of Russia and France, it might be one day turned against him. His majesty, therefore, thought it proper to observe a

profound silence relative to the events which passed in his vicinity last autumn, leaving to England and futurity to justify them.—It is due to truth, however, to declare, that the court of London did not invite Sweden to take part in this expedition, nor confided it to her till the moment of its being carried into execution. Therefore, the least movement was made in Sweden on this occasion. The English fleet arrived and departed without entering into any port of Sweden, and the auxiliary troops, embarked in Pomerania, were restored in virtue of a separate article in the convention concluded at London, relative to this object, on the 17th of June, 1807, when certainly there was as yet no reference to this expedition. The following is the article:—"It is fully understood, that, in case that unforeseen circumstances should render impracticable the object of this convention, or that his Britannic majesty should find it necessary to withdraw the said troops (the German legion) from Swedish Pomerania, the stipulation of this convention shall in no manner prevent his Britannic majesty from giving such orders as he may judge proper with respect to the ulterior disposition of these troops which are now placed under the orders of his Swedish majesty."—The court of London has since fully justified this enterprise, and the experience of every day justifies it. Numerous French armies remained in lower Saxony and over-awed the north. There were still nations to subjugate, ports to shut, and forces to direct against England. They were to penetrate at any rate: they would have acted in any case and under any pretence that might have offered. At present it is the expedition against the Danish fleet which is the rallying word of the whole league. What is remarkable is, that the Danish government, already beset by French troops, overpowered, impelled, and even paid by France, issues a declaration of war against Sweden, without daring even to name the power which forces it to act. It seeks with embarrassment grievances and reasons to appear to have had in this determination a will of its own. It cites the remonstrances of Sweden against the arrest of the Swedish mails as vexatious, while in its severity against English correspondence, it would not suffer it to pass according to treaty, and declares that it is imperiously obliged to take these measures. It pretends to know the thoughts of the king, and imagines them hostile, though for some months it had concerted an aggression upon Sweden. It pretends to reason on the in-

terests of the country, though it has abandoned its own interests, and even its existence, to a foreign influence. In fine, it reproaches Sweden with having provided for her defence by a subsidiary treaty, though itself is paid for an aggression; and then it pronounces, though indeed with a kind of timidity, the word mercenary, which the government that pays it had probably dictated to it.—It is proposed here to render to his Britannic majesty the most authentic solemn testimony, that in all his transactions with Sweden he never demanded offensive measures; nor required any thing that was not perfectly compatible with its tranquillity and independence. The most convincing proof of this is the promptitude with which his ministry acceded to the proposition of the king for the pacification of the Baltic, by a formal promise not to send thither any ships of war, but on conditions useful and honourable to all the north. Let the Danish government read in this proposition the complete refutation of the complaints of which the manifesto against Sweden is composed; and in the moments when it shall return itself, let it compare the state of things which the king has desired with that which France and Russia wish. Let all the allies of France read in this consent of England the difference between the connections which unite the two courts and those which enchain them, and let them pronounce on which side is to be found a due regard for particular interests, and a just moderation for the general good.—Denmark herself has been, during a long time, the object of this moderation, and did not cease to be so till she became absolutely dangerous. When the north was outraged by the devastation of lower Saxony, the oppression of the Hanseatic towns, what did she to avenge them? Sweden, England, and Russia made war for this object; but no one thought of forcing Denmark to take part in it. She was the ally of Russia, then, as well as at present; why did she not embrace her cause? What could she then allege for her tranquillity that Sweden cannot now allege? All this is explained by the single fact which she endeavours to conceal—that she is at present under the influence of the French government. Had England followed the principles of this enemy, she would not have waited the moment of her surrender to disarm her, she would have invaded her several years before; she would have guarded her, and all this with a view to the good of the north.—Her ancient alliance with Russia is made a pretext for this aggression, though all the world knows that it is merely defensive, and that it re-

mained suspended during the late wars with Russia, when perhaps that power might have claimed it. The court of Denmark, in order to justify its proceedings, hesitates not to make all kinds of assertions; dares to defend the injustice of Russia, and betrays a premeditated plot; and all this it does to conceal the chief, nay, only reason, which is—that Denmark is the ally of France.—But injustice and falsehood find their end; honour and truth will triumph in their turn. His majesty, relying on the justice of his cause, hopes, with conscious pride of reigning over a brave and loyal people, so often tried by dangers, and held up by the Almighty, that the same Providence will vouchsafe to bless his army, and restore to his subjects a safe and honourable peace, to the confusion of his enemies.

RUSSIA AND SWEDEN.—*Intercepted Correspondence, found upon the Person of the Russian Courier.*

The irruption of the Russian troops into Finland, and the incendiary proclamations circulated in the province, were already known to the king, though the minister of Russia, M. Alopeus, had not yet made any communication that could pave the way for such intelligence, and no couriers nor dispatches from the Swedish ambassador at Petersburg had arrived since those events.—Considering, therefore, that minister as deprived of his public quality by the insidious aggression of his court, as a dangerous enemy, by the revolutionary principles with which that aggression was accompanied, and as a hostage for the ambassador, whose liberty had in all probability been violated, his majesty ordered, on the 2d of March, that a military guard should be stationed with M. Alopeus.—This measure, which, in every other circumstance, would have been extremely repugnant to the king, has been fully justified by the event: a courier for Petersburg arrived at Scyneldskar on the 22d, and set out on the 28th of February by Tornea, for Stockholm, having been arrested on the 7th of March, a mile from Harnosand, with the following dispatches:

No. 1.—Sir; the baron de Stedingk has transmitted to me, on the 9th of Jan., an official note (of which I herewith send you a copy), in answer to mine of the 16th of Nov. Its contents not being more satisfactory than the preceding official communication of that ambassador, with respect to what an august master expected, (a) nothing more

(a) To what his imperial majesty had demanded—Yes—The pacification of the Bal-

was to be hoped from prolonging, in circumstances so pressing (*b*), a correspondence which has already lasted more than four months, and produced no result; the emperor has resolved to issue the declaration which you will find herewith, in order to ascertain definitively the resolutions of the court of Stockholm.—Though I shall transmit this declaration to baron Stedingk, the emperor directs you, Sir, to communicate it to the ministry of his Swedish majesty. You will observe to them on this occasion, that it still depends on the king to preserve good harmony between the two States (*c*). But that the most essential interests of Russia do not allow his imperial majesty to admit, in the present situation of affairs, the least doubt of the disposition of Sweden with regard to Russia (*d*).—I have the honour to be, &c.—COUNT NICOLAS DE ROMANZOFF. St. Petersburg, Feb. 5, (17) 1808.

To Mr. Alopeus.

tic sea; but to what he expected perhaps—No.—If he expected from Sweden what he had himself granted to France, the sacrifice of his interests and his independence.

(*b*) The fear of the English must have been very pressing; notwithstanding an extraordinary delay of the English mails, the answer of England arrived at Stockholm on the 16th of March, still a long time before a maritime expedition in the Gulf of Finland was physically possible. The court of Sweden acceded to the proposition, consented not to disturb the tranquility of the Baltic, if Sweden were left at peace.—Thus, there might still exist in the world a peaceful and happy corner: Russia would not permit it. It remains to be seen, whether her insidious invasions of Finland will protect her coasts from the English fleets.

(*c*) The Russian army must have entered Finland before the declaration could have been delivered, much more before the arrival of an answer. Yet have they still the impudence to talk of good harmony. What was expected from the king was in fact so illegal, so humiliating, that whoever knew the character of his majesty, could never expect that he would comply willingly. The prince Royal of Denmark has been highly extolled for having refused to treat with England, after hostilities; yet has this been proposed to the king. Contradictions, absurdities, and falsehood, are the ordinary attendants of injustice.

(*d*) There was already no doubt of the disposition of the king. Every thing was on the footing of peace till the 2d February, when the king sent for M. Alopeus to ask

No. II.—Copy of a Note from the Swedish Ambassador, Baron Stedingk, to the Minister, Count de Romanzoff, dated 9th (21st) of Jan. 1808.

The king having already communicated to the Court of St. Petersburg, in answer to the Note of the 24th Sept. (Oct. 6,) his opinion on the present position of the North, and the difficulty of applying it to the engagements of 1780, his majesty had some hope of gaining the assent of his imperial majesty, to the evidence of these statements. The slightest glance at the circumstances of that time and those of the present, seem sufficient to shew their immense disparity; and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg ought not to hesitate more than any other to pronounce on which side was the preponderance at that time, and on which side it is at present.—Russia, the principal support of the convention of 1780, was the first to abolish it in 1803. If it was at her invitation that Sweden acceded to the new system, under her auspices she was then reconciled to England; she, however, contracted direct engagements with that power, which, according to the rules of public morality, she thinks herself obliged to observe, while the other contracting party shall not infringe the engagement on its part.—The armed neutrality of 1780 being once abandoned, the shutting of the Baltic Sea, founded in the concert and common armaments which it stipulated, appeared the less to regard Sweden, as since the time of the last convention, there has existed in this respect neither concert nor even unity of principles, among the powers on the shore of this sea. And this shutting, which, at the time of the declaration, signified properly the defence of the Sound, is at present become much more difficult to be executed, since the English have found the passage of the Great Belt very practicable for ships of war, and still more since the Danish marine no longer exists.—In general, a change in the principles of neutrality adopted in the last instance, would not only be contrary to the subsisting engagements of the king, guaranteed by Russia herself. It would probably be of no effect by not producing any change in the principles of England during the war; it could only tend to occasion a rupture between the two states, useless to the ally of Russia, hurtful perhaps to herself, and certainly ruinous to Sweden. But with this attachment to his engagements,

him what was intended by the armaments of Russia on the frontiers? And informed him that he was obliged to place himself in a state of defence on his side.

the king is not insensible to the advantages of the pacification of the Baltic. It is possible that England might consent to the neutrality of that sea; that she might promise not to send thither any ships of war, if the measure adopted against British commerce, throughout almost all the coasts of the Baltic, did not provoke her armaments, or if new hostilities did not call on her to act as an auxiliary.—This is a point of view, at least, which appears to unite the commercial interests of the whole North; and which the court of St. Petersburg will, perhaps, find sufficiently important to merit its particular attention.—It is in these terms that the undersigned ambassador extraordinary of his majesty the king of Sweden has received orders to reply to the note which his excellency count Romanzoff has addressed, of the date 16-28 of November, and which he hastened to transmit to his court. He profits by this opportunity to renew to count Romanzoff the assurances of his high consideration.—St. Petersburg, 9-21 Jan. 1808.

No. III.—The emperor, justly indignant when he learned the violence which England had committed against the king of Denmark, faithful to his own character, and in the spirit of that constant solicitude which he feels for the preservation of the interests of his empire, informed the king of Great Britain that he could not remain insensible to this outrage, this unexampled spoliation, which England has permitted herself against a king, his relative, his friend, and the ancient ally of Russia (c).—His imperial majesty communicated this determination to the king of Sweden by a note, which was transmitted to his ambassador on the 24th of Sept., 1807.—A positive treaty, contracted in 1780, by the empress Catherine and the late king, Gustavus III., a second concluded in 1800 by the late emperor Paul and the king who reigns at present (f), contain-

(e) These sentiments of his imperial majesty towards relatives, friends, and allies, seem for a moment encouraging, as they are all titles applicable to the king only a few months ago, and which he has not since done any thing to forfeit.

(f) The sense of an article of a treaty has often been disputed, and its application contested; but never has a recent convention, formally concluded and ratified, been passed over in silence, to cite anterior engagements, evidently annulled by it; the cabinet of Petersburg refers to the convention of 1780 and 1800, concluded against England, and is silent with respect to that of 1801, concluded with her. The emperor returns ar-

ed the reciprocal and formal engagement to maintain the principle, that the Baltic is a close sea, and to guarantee that sea and its

bitrarily to the engagements of his two predecessors, tacitly invalidating those which he has contracted himself. The state of war in which his imperial majesty finds himself with England, naturally brought with it the abolition of any existing convention with that power. Sweden was not at all concerned in this war, that which was stipulated in 1801, between her and Russia on the one side, and between her and England on the other, might and ought equally subsist so long as the king was at peace with both powers.—By a simple decision, Russia might renounce the convention of 1801 with Sweden, for their very maritime convention was abolished, and things naturally returned to the state in which they were, previous to 1780, every one composing his system of neutrality according to his own principles of the law of nations.—By a double decision, at present Russia suppresses the convention last concluded, and re-establishes the two former, which are diametrically opposite to it; and finds a cause for war in the refusal of the king of Sweden to yield to this despotism. But let us see in what manner Russia wishes to re-establish the armed neutrality. Pretending that Sweden ought to exclude from the Baltic even English merchant ships, she reproaches her with having wished that the ports of Germany should be open to English commerce. The following is the separate article I. of this famous convention, and let any one judge whether count Romanzoff had read it:—"As his imperial
" majesty of all the Russias, and his majes-
" ty the king of Sweden, are always equal-
" ly interested in watching over the tran-
" quillity and safety of the Baltic sea, and
" protecting it from the troubles of war,
" and the cruising of privateers; a system
" the more just and natural, as all the pow-
" ers, the dominions of which surround it,
" enjoy a profound peace; they have mu-
" tually agreed to continue to maintain,
" that it is a close sea, incontestably such by
" its local situation, in which all nations
" may and ought to navigate in peace, and
" enjoy all the advantages of a perfect calm;
" and to take for that purpose all such mea-
" sures as may be proper to guarantee that
" sea and its coasts, from all hostilities,
" piracies, and acts of violence. They will
" likewise maintain the tranquillity of the
" North Sea, on their coasts, as far as cir-
" cumstances and the interest of their states
" shall render it necessary."

coasts from all hostility, violence, and vexation, employing for this purpose all the means which might be in their power. His imperial majesty, considering these two treaties, not only conceived himself entitled, but thought he had a right, to claim the co-operation of Sweden against England.—The king did not deny the engagements which have been referred to, but he refused all co-operation so long as the French armies should not be removed from the coasts of the Baltic, and the German ports be shut against British commerce. The object was to express the violence committed by England, and which had irritated all Europe. The emperor demanded of the king his co-operation, founded on these treaties, and that monarch proposed to him, in answer, to defer the execution of treaties to another period, and to employ himself at present in procuring to England the commerce of all the ports in Germany; in one word, to serve that same England, against whom the question was to take measures of defence. (*g*)—It is consequently difficult to prove more fully the partiality of the king of Sweden for the king of Great Britain than he has himself established it.—His imperial majesty caused a second note to be transmitted on the 10th of November, by which, stating to the king that he was about to break with England, he again claimed his co-operation. (*h*)—This note remained nearly two months without an answer, and that which was given, and transmitted to the ministers of his imperial majesty, on the 9th of this month, was similar to the preceding. (*i*)—The emperor, far from repenting of his moderation, reflects with pleasure, that he had hitherto employed all the means in his power in endeavours to recal his Swedish majesty to the only system which is suited to his states (*k*); but, in fine, he owes to his people, to the safety of his empire (*l*), which is his

supreme law, not to leave any longer the co-operation of Sweden with Russia and Denmark against England an undecided question.—The emperor being informed that the cabinet of St. James's, endeavouring to re-attach Denmark to its system by fear, had threatened that the king of Sweden should send troops into Zealand, in return for which the possession of Norway should be secured to him (*m*): the emperor learning, in like manner, that when the king left him without an answer, he was secretly treating for an alliance at London (*n*); his majesty found, that the interest of his empire would be very ill secured, if, when the struggle should commence between England and Russia, the king of Sweden, so near to his states, should veil for a time, under the appearance of a pretended neutrality, the sentiments of a known attachment to England. His imperial majesty could not leave in uncertainty the positions of Sweden with regard to Russia. He could not, by consequence, admit his neutrality.—The dispositions of the king being ascertained, nothing remained for his imperial majesty but to have recourse, without delay, to all the means which Providence had confided to him (*o*) for the security of his empire; and of this he informs (*p*) the king, and all Europe.—Acquitting himself thus of what the safety of his empire requires of him, the emperor is ready to convert the measures which he is about to take into a measure of prudence, if the king will join Russia and Denmark, in order to shut the Baltic against England till a maritime peace. He invites, for the last time, the king his brother-in-law, and with all the warmth of true friendship (*q*), no longer to hesitate to fulfil his engagements, and to adopt the only system which is adapt-

Cabinet of St. Petersburg as warding off from the ports of Russia all danger from the English fleet, that it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was some other fear by which it was impelled, perhaps that of the entrance of a French army into Russia.

(*m*) False report of Mr. Rist; and Mr. Canning, who has a copy of the conference, will prove that it was Mr. Rist who asked whether Sweden was to co-operate, and who took silence for an affirmative.

(*n*) The king had no other than defensive connections, and they were innocent, except in the eyes of the aggressor.

(*o*) See the proclamations in Finland.

(*p*) After the aggression.

(*q*) Troops having already entered, and proclamations been distributed in the country.

(*g*) This question does not regard Sweden, which was at peace with England.

(*h*) The armed neutrality no longer binding her, there was no other treaty, convention, or promise, by which she was bound.

(*i*) This note, which is given entire above, was, however, such, that count Romanzoff did not continue to cite a word of it, fearing to bring to mind the convention of 1801, and the conciliatory proposition of the king.

(*k*) According to the principles generally received, it was for the king himself to judge with respect to this.

(*l*) It is so improbable that the invasion of Finland could be really considered by the

ed to the interests of the powers of the north. What, indeed, has Sweden gained since its monarch has adhered to the interests of England? (r)—Nothing could afflict the emperor of Russia so much as to see Sweden and Russia disunited; and it still depends on his Swedish majesty to take, but immediately, such a part as may preserve the two states in an intimate alliance, and in perfect harmony. (s)

No. IV.—Sir; I have punctually received the different dispatches you have addressed to me, as well by the post as by the Field-Jäger Rattinsky, and latterly by the chamberlain, Cont de Pahlen. I render, Sir, all justice to your great activity and zeal for the service, and I shall do myself a real pleasure in appreciating them properly to the emperor. The rescript which you will find inclosed, and the insignia of the order of St. Vladimir, which his imperial majesty has deigned to confer upon you, will prove to you, that he is perfectly satisfied with the manner in which you have served him.—From the very sincere interest which I take in your concerns, I will also confide to you, that however brilliant the testimony of his favour, which the emperor has this day given to you, may be, his munificence to you will not be bounded by it. His majesty proposes also to add to your income, and I have reason to believe, that as soon as you arrive here you will obtain the rent of an estate (Arunda). The emperor has been very well satisfied with the lists of the Swedish fleets, which you have sent me, and I expect, with impatience, the accounts which you have promised me respecting the land forces and the interior of the country.—At the present moment, information of this kind is more necessary than ever, and you will yourself feel, Sir, what an important service you will render to his imperial majesty, in procuring the most exact accounts possible. If you should want proper opportunities for forwarding them, you will keep them by you, and bring them yourself, in case of your at any time quitting Sweden.—To judge from all appearances, it seems difficult to avoid a most complete rupture with that power; but till that takes place, you will remain at your post, and continue the same line of con-

(r) What has Russia gained since its monarch has adhered to the interests of France? What have Germany, Spain, and Italy gained?

(s) What would then become of the liberty of the Fins and the diet of Abo, which have been already promised in the name of the emperor?

duct you have hitherto observed; but it is proper that, without affecting to prepare for it, you should nevertheless hold yourself in readiness to depart the moment circumstances require it. In regard to the precautions necessary to be taken respecting your cyphers, and the archives of your mission, I cannot, without doubt, do better than trust to your own prudence. I shall not forward to Baron de Stedingk till some days after the departure of this courier; and as I directed you in my ostensible dispatch to communicate this declaration to the Swedish minister, I think it necessary to warn you, Sir, not to take this step before you have sent off your courier to M. de Lisakenwitsch, with the packet inclosed, to his address; and I think it will be proper to tell this courier the time to quit the Swedish frontiers.—It is, then, that you are to place the declaration in question in the hands of Baron De Chreunheim, and insist, with this minister, upon a definitive answer from the king, in order to send it us by the return of the same courier which I expedite, and which you will send back to me as soon as possible.—The experience of the past is a certain security to me, that, in the important commission with which you are at present charged, you will spare no pains to answer the confidence with which his majesty has so justly honoured you.—I have the honour to be,—COUNT NICHOLAS DE ROMANZOFF.—To M. d'Alopeus, Stockholm.

No. V.—Sir—Some persons think that Baron Armfeldt, little satisfied with the manner in which he is treated by the King of Sweden, may perhaps be disposed to quit entirely the court of Stockholm; as in reality he is not a Swede, but a native of Finland, he may perhaps be gained over, which, in the present situation of affairs, would be of great importance to us. On this account, before you quit Sweden, you will see the propriety of sounding the sentiments of M. Armfeldt.—If he should be inclined to be open with you, you will not neglect to discuss matters in detail; and, without entering into any positive obligation, you will confine yourself to the letting him see all the advantages which may most flatter his ambition. You will greatly oblige me, Sir, by immediately apprising me what may be the result of your proceeding on this subject (t). Knowing your experience in

(t) The whole of this is the excess of insolence. Baron d'Armfeldt may have been impatient of inactivity for a single moment; at a crisis so dangerous to his country. It is

business, (v) I need not observe to you how essential it is that this kind of negociation should be carried on in such a manner that you do not commit yourself, and in this I reckon entirely upon your prudence.—I have the honour to be, &c.—**LE COMTE NICOLAS DE ROMANZOFF.**—St. Petersburg, Feb. 5, 1808.

No. VI.—**SIR**—I sent you, in due course, copies of the two notes which I caused to be transmitted on the 24th September, and 10th November, to the Swedish ambassador, as well as his reply to the first. Herewith I transmit to you the one which he addressed to me on the 9th of January, also the second. You will see, Sir, that the contents of his note in no ways answers the immediate demands which our master has made to engage the king of Sweden to take measures in common with the three other northern powers, to defend the Baltic (u) against the attempts of England; his imperial majesty has, therefore, determined to make a declaration, in order to assure himself of the real disposition of his neighbour, the king of Sweden; you will receive, herewith, a copy of this declaration; I will not send it to baron de Stedingk until some days after the departure of this courier. In the mean time I will confidentially make it known to M. Le Baron de Blome; you will also communicate it to the minister of his Danish

false that he has either been ill-treated or discontented. "He is no subject of the king, since he is a native of Swedish Finland." What an inference, even before the war! "To gain him over will be an important acquisition: flatter his ambition"—(such is the language). You, Springporten, Knoring, Haselstrom—traitors of every description, now speak. Was it ever in the power of the emperor to alleviate your remorse by offices and emoluments? Could these protect you from the contempt and execration of every honest man, even in Russia itself?

(v) It is this very experience that justifies the measures of the king with regard to M. Alopeus.

(u) In all these places the guarantee of the Baltic has no sense, unless it means to secure Cronstadt and Revel from the fate of Copenhagen. Russia, the ally of England, is alone to have the privilege of summoning fleets into the Baltic, without a word being said of closing the passage; but no sooner does she quarrel with England, than she cries out for help to shut it.

majesty, and also the last note of the Swedish ambassador. You will observe, on this occasion, to M. Le Count de Bernstorff, that the emperor will take every measure in his power eventually to defend Denmark and to serve her cause. His imperial majesty rests in the firm hope, that this monarch will, on his part, press the king of Sweden to unite with them, and if he will not, that he will take part openly against him; that he will pursue, with activity, the preparations for war, proceed without loss of time in all the measures necessary relative to it, and that he will cordially join all his efforts to those of Russia. (u)—I have the honour to be.—**THE COUNT NICOLAS DE ROMANZOFF.**—St. Petersburg, Feb. 5, 1808.—To Mr. De Lisakewitsch, Copenhagen.

LOCAL MILITIA.—*Abstract of Lord Castlereagh's Local Militia Bill.*

The 1st enacting clause, empowers his Majesty to establish a local force for the defence of the realm.

The 2d, enacts, that the number of men enrolled under the act, shall not exceed such number as will, including the effective Yeomanry and Volunteers amount to ——— times (six times was the amount suggested by Lord Castlereagh,) the Militia quotas of such counties.

The 3d, that the deficiencies in the effective Volunteers shall be supplied by the Militia under the act.

The 4th, that the counties may be divided into divisions, in any case in which more than one regiment of Local Militia is ordered to be raised.

The 5th, extends the powers of Militia Acts to this Act.

The 6th, that men to be raised under this Act, shall be balloted from persons between the ages of ——— and ———, returned on the lists now existing, (from 18 to 35 years of age.)

The 7th, excuses persons of bodily inability.

The 8th, enacts, that no articulated clerk, or apprentice, nor any poor man who has more than one child born in wedlock, nor any person under the height of ——— shall, by reason thereof, be exempt from being balloted and serving under this Act, though they may be exempt from serving in the Militia. *To be continued.*

(u) All that has been done, the Danish monarchy has pressed, pronounced, &c. &c. There are few monarchies which possess so much frankness.

“ Were the countries, which have usually supplied us, in a state of independence and security; the prospect would be far from pleasing; but when we cast an anxious eye to the Baltic, the view becomes dreary indeed. Who can contemplate the consequences of a short crop, a mildew, or a wet harvest without horror?”—POLITICAL REGISTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR (continued from page 648).—When I wrote the article, here referred to, which was on Wednesday last, I had not seen any of the advertisements, which I have since seen, for meetings in several of the counties to agree upon petitions against the bill, which is about to be brought into parliament for the purpose of causing *Sugar* to be used in the distilleries instead of *Corn*. It was not till after my Register was gone to the press that I saw any of these advertisements; and, as I could easily perceive, that, against the effect of publications, flowing through so many channels, and at a rate so rapid, the Register would stand no chance of success, I thought it would be useful to write an address to the Freeholders of Hampshire upon the subject, which I did on Friday, and which address, as it applied to every part of the country, I caused to be inserted in as many newspapers as I could, giving it a fair chance against the advertisements and paragraphs, which those newspapers were circulating upon the other side of the question.—This Address I shall now insert here, and shall then submit to the reader such additional observations as appear to me likely to assist in the removing of that mist of error, whence the alarm of the land-owners and tithe-owners, and farmers seem to have proceeded.

TO THE FREEHOLDERS OF HAMPSHIRE.

“ GENTLEMEN,—As one of yourselves, I take the liberty to address you upon the subject of a bill intended to be shortly brought before parliament, the object of which is, to cause SUGAR to be used in the Distilleries of England and Scotland, instead of the CORN which is now therein used.—For many months past, gentlemen, there has existed a general alarm at the shutting of the foreign corn-ports. The argument has been this: we have long been in the habit of importing annually a large quantity of corn; this importation was necessary, otherwise it would not have been made; and the enemy having succeeded in closing the ports of the

Baltic against us, at the same time that the unjust and insolent demands of America leave us no ground whereon to depend upon a supply of corn from that country, it is evident, that, unless we can, in some way or other, add to the quantity of corn produced at home, we must, in proportion to the quantity of corn now imported, experience additional distress, if a year of scarcity should unhappily arrive. The truth of this conclusion every man admits, and the nation, with voice unanimous, exclaim, Let us, as we love our lives and hate the yoke of a conqueror, add to the quantity of the corn produced at home.—Now, gentlemen, one way of adding, in effect, to the quantity of any thing, is, to obtain some other thing capable of being made use of in its stead. Thus, if a man's turnips run short, he gives some cabages to his cattle, and does thereby, in fact, add to his quantity of turnips. Upon this plain principle the king's ministers have the intention of bringing forward the bill above described; and, it must, I should think, be evident to every man, that; if we bring sugar from our colonies to supply the place of the corn now used in the distilleries, there will be in the country so much more corn to be used in the way of food, which is the very effect that we are all so anxious to see produced, and to produce which effect the situation of our colonies and our commerce is, at this moment, acknowledged, on all hands, to be peculiarly favourable.—Evident, however, as these truths appear to me, and, as I think they will appear to you, a great clamour has, by some of the land-owners and corn-dealers, been raised against the intended bill; the alarm of these gentlemen having, all of a sudden, changed its nature; from a dread of a *scarcity* of corn, they have, in the twinkling of an eye, fallen into a dread of too great a *plenty* of corn; and some of them assert, that, if the intended bill should become a law, the *farmers* will become bankrupts, because, having lost one of the markets for their corn, their corn *will fall in price*, and they will not be able to pay their rents.—Gentlemen, any thing more groundless than this alarm, more unsound

than this reasoning, I do not remember to have met with in the course of my life. What! is *plenty* the farmer's ruin? Is *abundance* to be a source of national danger? Is *cheapness* of corn the people's curse? The farmer has poor-rates to pay as well as rent; and, you all well know, gentlemen, that he has more to pay in poor-rates when corn is dear than when corn is cheap; you know, in fact, that the amount of his poor-rates keeps in exact proportion to the price of corn; you know, also, that what is not given in times of scarcity to the labourer in increased poor-rates must be given him in increased wages; you know further, that, if the farmer sells his corn cheap, he fats his hogs cheap, he feeds his horses and cattle cheap, he keeps his servants cheap; and, indeed, you, who are farmers, well know, from bitter experience, that the greatest evil of your lives were the high prices of the years 1800 and 1801, an evil which you feel to this hour, and which you will feel for many years yet to come.—But, gentlemen, I beg you to consider the sweeping tendency of the principle, upon which the intended bill is objected to, which principle applies to all cases wherein an increase in the produce of corn takes place. According to this principle, to *improve the land already enclosed is an evil*, because such improvement will certainly add to the produce of the land; that increased produce will as certainly lower the price of corn (unless more mouths are found to eat it); to lower the price of corn is, according to the opposers of this bill, to ruin the farmer; and, therefore, if we admit this principle, to improve the land already enclosed is an evil. And, gentlemen, what shall, then, be said, of *new enclosures*? It is the general opinion, that new enclosures cause an addition to the quantity of corn produced; it is the opinion of many of those who oppose the bill, that the way to prevent scarcity in England and Scotland is to bring large tracts of waste lands into cultivation, because, they say, that the quantity of corn produced would thereby be made greater than it now is. Supposing this to be the case (and that no new mouths are created to eat such addition to the produce) the price of corn will certainly be lowered by the new enclosures; the lowering of the price of corn will here again, according to the opposers of the bill, ruin the farmer; and, therefore, upon their principle, those new enclosures, which they themselves represent as being necessary to the salvation of the country, would be a great national evil. The fight, however, in which the inconsistency of these gentlemen's conduct appears the most

clearly, is this, that, for a long series of years they have seen corn brought into England and Scotland from foreign countries, without having, in any one instance, complained against it, as likely to ruin the farmers. Now there is no foreign country that can send us any corn; but our lands in the West Indies are able to send us sugar that will supply the place of the corn that we used to get from foreign countries; and, observe, that we buy this sugar of our own countrymen, and pay them in flax and wool and iron and tin and copper, all the natural produce of our own soil, while the corn which we drew from foreign countries was, for the greater part, paid for in gold and silver; and yet, Gentlemen, strange it is to say, that the persons who oppose the intended Bill, who call themselves the friends of the farmers, who quietly suffered *eight hundred thousand* quarters of corn to be brought every year from foreign countries, would now fain persuade those same farmers, that they will be ruined by the bringing in of that which will supply the place of, at most, *three hundred thousand* quarters of corn, that being the full amount of what is used yearly in the distilleries. Nay, gentlemen, these same persons have no scruple to express their sorrow that the supply of foreign corn is cut off by the enemy, and their wishes that that supply may be again renewed; just as if 800,000 quarters of corn, brought from abroad, would not lower the price of our corn produced at home more than 300,000 thrown back from the distilleries; and yet, gentlemen, the opposers of the intended Bill call themselves the friends of the farmer. There may be some farmers so easily misled, so completely blinded, as to believe this, and may carry their folly so far as to be induced to join in a petition to parliament against a bill which they are told will make corn cheap; but, I trust that the farmers of Hampshire have too much good sense to be so deceived; and that, at any rate, if the petition, which is talked of, should be seriously proposed, we, the freeholders in general, shall not be so shamefully deficient in the duty we owe to ourselves, to the poor, and to our country, as to suffer it to be carried, without such an opposition on our part as shall convince the parliament, that it speaks not the sense of the county.—I am, &c. &c."

It was not until after this letter was written, that I was informed, that Mr. ARTHUR YOUNG was one of the persons, who had been examined by the committee that reported in favour of the intended bill, and that he expressed his decided opinion against the suffering of sugar to be made use of in

the distilleries. MR. WAKEFIELD, I understand, was also examined before the committee, and gave his opinion on the same side. —The readers of the Register will recollect, that my columns have, of late, been a good deal devoted to Mr. Young. To both these gentlemen, indeed; but, first to Mr. Young. I had given it as my opinion, that England (meaning the whole of the kingdom) might exist, in safety and greatness, *independent of commerce*. Amongst those who were of a different opinion, there were some who maintained, that we were unable to grow corn enough for our own consumption. I replied, that, if commerce ceased, there would be *more hands* to cultivate the land, and *not more mouths* to eat the corn. —Mr. Young, who was the most formidable of my opponents, took great pains to convince me, that, for years to come, we could not raise corn enough to feed ourselves. He showed, that we had been importing for many years last past, to the average amount of 2,000,000 of pounds sterling a year; he insisted, that there was no remedy but that of bringing the waste lands into cultivation by the means of a General Enclosure bill; and, he acknowledged that this must necessarily be a work of time. —In short, this was what he said: importation is now necessary; to put a stop to the necessity of importation you must augment your domestic produce; to augment your domestic produce you must enclose new lands, but this will be a work of time — Now, as Mr. Young desired to see more corn produced, and an importation, until more corn could be produced, I wonder (for I have not yet seen his evidence) what objection he could possibly have stated against the importation of sugar to supply the place of corn. Mr. Young tells us; indeed he proves to us, that our average import of corn, for the last twenty-six years has amounted to *two millions* sterling; what objection, then, could he have made against the importation of sugar, to supply the place of corn, to the amount of about *half a million* a year? He was alarmed at the shutting of all the foreign corn ports against us; and he is now alarmed, apparently in a greater degree, at the opening of a port in our own colonies for something that will supply the place of part of our corn. —MR. WAKEFIELD (see page 501) took the pains to furnish me with a statement of the importation of corn for many years past. "From 1800 to 1801," says he, "we have, on an average imported the enormous quantity of 1,447,500 quarters yearly," of *wheat* only, I believe, he means. Then he proceeds to a description

of the fearful dangers we have to apprehend from the stopping up of the foreign corn-ports: "For the last 40 years," says he, "we have been exchanging our gold and our silver for subsistence, and now a new order of things has arisen. It is now no longer a question of commercial policy; no longer a matter of profit and loss, whether the past system is to be pursued. However willing we may be to enrich other countries, to vivify the agriculture, and stimulate the industry of other nations, we shall not be permitted to purchase the agricultural produce of the continent. All the corn ports of Europe are closed, and all the wealth of these islands will be unable to purchase a supply of food from the continent. To such observations as I have been addressing you, I have not unfrequently heard it remarked, 'wheat is only about 70s. a quarter.' So much the worse on every account: the price is too low to stimulate an increasing and productive tillage; this low price deceives us into a dangerous security. Even suppose it to arise wholly from a bountiful season, and in nothing to result from the present corn laws, still by next August or Sept. it will be all consumed, and then a month's hard rain, or should mildew blight our crops in one week, what will be our prospect? how general will be the distress and pressure of scarcity? To what country can we look for aid? Upon import from America we cannot depend, even if we continue at peace with the United States. Thus, then, it appears to me, that a due consideration of the subject brings the painful conviction, that *we rely upon foreign import to an alarming and dangerous extent*; that from an export of six hundred thousand quarters of corn annually, we have gradually come to require an import of nearly a million and a half of quarters; that in years of scarcity *we depend upon foreign supply for nearly a fifth of our consumption*, and that in ordinary seasons we depend upon importation for a seventh part of our subsistence." —Now, what practical purpose could this gentleman possibly have in view, but that of impressing our minds with the persuasion, that we should be in great danger from the cutting off of the foreign supply of corn, and of stimulating us to an increase of our domestic production? And yet, he is now alarmed, he now feels *additional* alarm, because a measure is about to be adopted, that will introduce from our own colonies, annually, about a *fifth part* as much corn, in the shape of sugar, as was be-

fore introduced, from foreign states, in the shape of corn ! In my address, above inserted, I took the average annual importation at 800,000 quarters; but, it appears from Mr. Wakefield's statement, that it has been 1,447,500. of *wheat* only, during the last 6 years. Have the farmers been "ruined" thereby? Have they found any want of a market? Has not their corn borne a good price? Do they not drink wine? Do not their wives have their parties? Do not their daughters make a villainous noise upon the piano? Well, then, if they have survived and even become luxurious in their living, under this importation of 1,447,500 quarters of corn annually, can Mr. Wakefield really fear that they will be ruined now that 800,000 quarters are to be imported, in the shape of sugar, all the other channels of importation being completely stopped up?—Mr. Wakefield has another letter, which will be found inserted in the present number. When I saw his name at the bottom of it, I expected to meet with some satisfactory explanation upon the principal points of the subject; but, I must confess that I met with nothing but disappointment.—He divides his matter under *three heads*. He considers the proposed bill, 1st, as to the claims which the planter has to its benefits, at the expence of the farmer, upon the score of *right*; 2ndly, as it will affect the *revenue*, in which he apprehends that it will produce a defalcation; 3dly, as it will operate with respect to the *general interests of the nation*. The question of right is of no importance, until we have settled the point, that the bill will be injurious to the farmer, and which point, I think, must be settled in the negative. As to the revenue, if Mr. Wakefield will but suffer the sugar to be distilled, I will venture to answer for the government's taking care that the distillation shall cost enough in the way of taxes. It is, indeed, a subject of serious alarm, that a thousand or two of gallons of gin should reach the lips of hackney-coachmen, unhallowed by the touch of an exciseman's rule. Let Mr. Wakefield look at the body of tax-gatherers that this country supports. Would that Buonaparte could see them all, gentle and simple, noble and plebeian, drawn out upon Salisbury plain (for no other place could exhibit them at one view); for he must be something more than mortal not to be dismayed at the sight. What! when each man of this innumerable host is armed with the power of entering houses, prying into every corner, locking up rooms and vaults and cellars; clapping on

his seal, at the sight of which the owner trembles as if it were the seal of the Holy Inquisition. When this is the case; when every man's neighbour, servant, and child is invited to be a spy upon his actions, as far as relates to the evasion of taxes, is it possible, that a man like Mr. Wakefield should object to a measure, upon the ground of its being likely to relax the rigours of taxation? There is one objection coupled with this, which, however, is worthy of particular notice. The houses, &c. for distilling corn, Mr. Wakefield says, cost a large sum of money; the trade, as now carried on, requires a large capital; but, that a distillery for sugar will cost, comparatively, nothing; that, therefore, the introduction of sugar will render large capitals useless in the trade, and rivalry will reduce the profits to a bare subsistence. This would be an excellent objection for a *great* distiller to make in his *counting-house*, or in a whisper to his partner; but, I think, he would take special care to disguise it from the public, and more particularly from those who have to legislate for the general good, to whom, supposing them to have even a small share of very common sense, it must be evident, that the smaller the capital required to carry on a trade of any given magnitude, the greater the benefit to the state, in which that trade is carried on; and that, if the trade, which now gives *opulence* to a few, can be made to provide *subsistence* for many, it is, I think, a thing most ardently to be wished.—I now come to Mr. Wakefield's third head, under which I did expect to find something to the point: something in the way of direct answer to what the "learned" call the *argumentum ad hominem*, contained in my last Register and in my separate address; something to explain the apparent inconsistency of earnestly recommending an *augmentation of produce* one day, and the very next day expressing alarm at a measure that must, in effect, *augment the produce*; something to explain why no remonstrance was made against the importation of 1,447,500 quarters of corn annually; if the importation of the means of saving 800,000 quarters is to ruin the farmer; something to explain why Messrs. Wakefield and Young were so alarmed at the shutting of the foreign corn ports, if it be true that the importation of what will supply the place of corn ought not, upon any account, to be imported; something to explain why these gentlemen recommended new enclosures as the means of adding to the quantity of our corn if it be true that the trifling addition of 800,000 quarters a year take away the

motive to produce corn.—Mr. Wakefield does, indeed, at the close of his letter, announce his intention of treating more largely upon the effect of *enclosures* in his next, which he politely declines doing at present, lest he should occupy too much of my room; for which I thank him; but, I certainly should, upon this occasion, have been very glad if he had paid less regard to my convenience. In the mean while, however, and, as it were to stay my longing, he refers me to his sentiments (upon this part of the subject), contained in a *former* letter, which sentiments we will now examine. “*Inclosures*,” says he, “merit particular consideration. If they should be *forced* upon the farmer, it will augment the evil [the evil of cheap market] of which I am complaining; but if only *encouraged* by means of facilitating enclosure bills, bringing of the waste lands into cultivation will not proceed faster than the joint prosperity of the farmer and the country will warrant. *Inclosures*, however, will rather be the effect of prosperity, than its positive parent, though, afterwards they will have the effect of upholding and perpetuating it.” Now, though I do not understand this clearly, I may, I think, venture to assume, that Mr. Wakefield would wish to see *something* done in the way of enclosing; and, that he thinks, that enclosing more land would add to the quantity of corn produced. If this be his meaning, then I should be glad to know, why that addition, whatever it might be, would not injure the farmer in the same way that the introduction of sugar, to be used as corn, would injure him. If this be not his meaning; if he does not believe, that an addition to the quantity of enclosed land would make an addition to the corn produced, why enclose *at all*? At any rate, there is an essential difference between Mr. Wakefield and Mr. Young: one is for a very slow process in the way of enclosure, the other for a general law that would set all the adventurers and speculators at work in a moment. What Mr. Wakefield means by *forcing* enclosures upon the farmer, I really cannot comprehend; and, indeed, the whole of this passage appears to me, to betray evident signs of a want of clear and settled notions, in the mind, whence it proceeded. Mr. Wakefield was (see his letter, page 655, strenuously contending, that the prices of corn were *too low*. He was about to devise means for raising and keeping up the price of corn; but, it occurred to him, as it naturally must, that, as (according to the general supposition, which he appears

to have adopted) new enclosures would increase the quantity of corn already raised and would, of course, tend to bring the price still lower than it now is, it was necessary to guard against this objection; yet, he did not like to say, that enclosures were mischievous. He, therefore, endeavoured to steer a middle course; and, as it mostly happens in such cases, rendered himself perfectly unintelligible. There was, besides, another difficulty, which Mr. Wakefield fairly gave the go-by, namely, that of *improvement*; for, if, as he contends, the way to make corn *plenty* is to raise and to keep up the price of it; if *plenty* is to be produced only by *dearth* (good lord, what an idea!) then the way to have a superabundance is to put a total stop to danging and chalking and claying, and to manuring and improving in every way and degree!—In the letter, which I insert in another part of the present Number, Mr. Wakefield notices what was said by me, in the last Register, at page 644. He says, he thanks me for the idea of the corn used in the distilleries and breweries being *thrown away*. He is very welcome to it as far as it is mine; but, he will please to recollect, that I did not say a word about *breweries*, and that the *idea* was, in fact, his own, the *words* only belonging to me. He says, however, that I have imputed to him a meaning not his. Let us see if this be so. He had said, that, in order to provide against a time of scarcity, that is to say, against the evils attending a scanty crop, we must, in common years, produce more corn than we consume *in food*, and that the surplus must be used in distilleries. That is to say, said I, you-mean, that a part of the common crop must be bought of the farmer to be *thrown away*; for, *as food*, it must be thrown away, or it answers the purposes of food when it comes out of the still. I see no “fallacy.” And Mr. Wakefield allows, that, as food, the corn used in the distilleries is thrown away. The *farmer*, indeed, receives the value of it; but, that value must come out of the labour of the consumer of the spirituous liquors; and, by the *nation*, the corn is really thrown away, (upon the admission of Mr. Wakefield) who, if consistent, will certainly allow, that the throwing of it into the sea would answer all the purposes full as well. He was driven to this acknowledgement; because I had reminded him, that, if the hot liquors saved food, the mouth that fed upon them would, when the still ceased working, fall upon the corn in some other shape, and that, then, the still would certainly be no “granary” against a time of scarcity. He was, there-

fore driven to the other horn of the dilemma ; and I leave the reader to judge of the set of principles, which could lead this gentleman to conclude, that, in order to be provided against a year of scarcity, a certain portion of the produce of every common year must be thrown into the sea.—In answer to the narrow-viewed argument, that the *barley-farmer* would suffer greatly, I had said, that “the demand would regulate the production.” This Mr. Wakefield denies. He truly says, that this denial requires explanation, but, if I understand his explanation, it is by no means satisfactory. I said nothing about *bad* years or *good* years. I said, that, at all times, the demand would regulate the production, meaning, of course, upon an average of years. Is barley dearer than oats? A greater proportion of barley is sure to be sown the next year. Are oats dearer than barley (as is the case at present)? A similar effect is produced. Thus, the farmer is, and always will and must be, directed by the market; and thus there is, upon an average of years, sure to be a due proportion of every species of produce.—In another part of his letter, he supposes me incapable of forming a correct judgment upon this matter, because I am not a *practical farmer*; as if, in order to reason correctly upon the operations of self-interest, it were necessary to know how to manage an arable farm. But, I am told, that there are some lands, whereon barley is grown, that will not bear wheat. I noticed this before, and I said, that, if they would not bear wheat they would *always* bear oats, which may serve as an answer to Mr. Bell’s Messenger, who is very much alarmed at the prospect of destroying the *grass* which succeeds the barley, and which, it is well known, succeeds oats full as well as barley. Suppose, however, for argument’s sake, that there are some lands that will bear *no* corn but barley. It is a strange supposition; but, admit it for the sake of the argument. Let those perverse lands bear barley still, and let others, which now bear barley, and which are more accommodating in their nature, bear oats or wheat. If all Hampshire, for instance, were made up of the perverse lands, and all Surrey of the accommodating lands, I’ll warrant that the whole of the corn, when raised, would find its way very quickly to the precise spot where it was most wanted. It is nonsense, then; it is totally unworthy of a man of any mind to suffer himself to be led to dabble in such puddle-like arguments.—Let us now take one more view of Mr. Wakefield’s “*granary*” which is to arise from the *throwing away* of a certain

portion of the produce of every abundant, and even every common, year. “From the present state of the continent,” says he, towards the close of this, his last, letter, “we cannot import. This” (the corn thrown away through the distilleries) “is, therefore, our *only resource*. Take it away, and one of two things will follow, either this surplus quantity of food will no longer be grown, or a new population will arise to consume it; which ever happens the produce will not exceed the demand one *fair* year with another; and if, while we cannot import, we have neither an export to retain, nor a surplus luxurious consumption to convert into food, we are without resource, and exist at the *mercy* of the seasons.” This is the old argument, with the addition of the circumstance of a supposed increase of population as the consequence of an increase in the quantity of food.—But, let us examine a little more minutely into the effect of this supposed “granary.” Let us suppose a little nation growing a thousand quarters of corn annually, in fair years; that it contains a thousand people, and that each person eats annually a quarter of corn. Now, says Mr. Wakefield, I would have the nation, in fair years, raise an additional 500 quarters to throw away; so that, when a year of half-crop comes, each person should still have his quarter of corn. There may be difference in the degree, but the principle is the same.—This would, indeed, be setting the seasons at defiance; it would be to “take a bond of fate;” but, it would also be to set human nature at defiance; it would be to assume an absolute controul over physical and moral causes. Does Mr. Wakefield consider, that there would be labour required to produce the 500 quarters to be thrown away? Does he consider, that the land, for the purpose of raising these 500 quarters to be thrown away, would be worn bare?—The very worst effect that the opposers of the proposed measure anticipate, is a diminished produce. A diminished produce would surely be accompanied with a *rest* in the land; and *rested* is land enriched; and land enriched ready for the plough is the best possible resource. *One* year of short crop never yet was greatly distressing in this kingdom; it cannot, from the nature of things, be so; and, if there are rested fields always ready for the plough, there can be only one year of short crop at a time. It will, therefore, I think, be found, after all, that the only resource safely to be relied on, the only granary against a time of scarcity, lies in the bosom of the earth, and in that foresight, that intuitive wisdom, which

teaches the owners of corn to be slow in the supply, and the consumers to be sparing in the consumption.—If the 500 waste quarters, of the above-described little nation, compel the nation to use *all their land* (and this is what Mr. Wakefield wishes to see), the consequence will be, that there will be no *reserve* manure, no *rest* in the land, no *store* of the means of production; and, of course, no means of making up for any deficiency that may, from whatever cause, arise.—In adverting now, by way of conclusion, more immediately to the measure proposed, I cannot refrain from again observing upon the apathy of the landowners and the farmers while such a large *importation* was going on. If the West India planters had 300,000 quarters of corn to import, it would have required a good stock of assurance in any land-owner, or farmer, to have objected to the importation. Where, then, is the difference to them, whether the thing come in the shape of corn, or in the shape of sugar?—Since I began writing this article, that is to say, since yesterday, I have received a letter upon the subject from a gentleman of this county, who appears to be well acquainted with all its details. I insert his letter immediately after that of Mr. Wakefield, and, I am persuaded, that it cannot fail to produce an effect favourable to the measure proposed. Another gentleman thanks me for my address to the Freeholders, and says, that he is certain, that if the county were polled, there would be a majority in its favour of fifty to one. Another says, “nothing but the worst sort of selfishness, guided by extreme folly, could have suggested an opposition to a measure so obviously calculated to guard us against the dangers of scarcity without lessening the produce of the taxes.” A fourth, for whose opinion I have the highest respect, says that he perfectly agrees with me; and a fifth offers me, in case of another county election, his cordial support, if I choose to become a candidate; “for,” says he, “in this one address, you have done more service to the country than I recollect any other man to have done it.” As a mark of this gentleman’s approbation, which any man might be proud of, I receive his offer with thanks, while I assure him that my ambition does not lie that way; and, as a proof that my sentiments, upon this important subject, accord with his and with those of the other gentlemen, whom he names, I confess myself to have been highly gratified by the contents of his letter, which, had he not expressed his wishes to the contrary, I should certainly

have made public.—He asks, and well he may, “with what face the late ministers can oppose the intended bill?” With them the measure did, in fact, originate. They proposed, it is true, only to *permit* sugar to participate with corn in the distilleries; but, the principle is the same; for, either some sugar would have been used, or none. If none, then the measure would have been nugatory; if some, then, whatever was used would have thrown so much corn back upon the people to be consumed in food. I was, therefore, utterly astonished to see, that Mr. Windham, who, in general, reasons so correctly, had spoken as if he intended to oppose the bill, which opposition, supposing him to have approved of the proposition made while he was a minister, cannot be considered in any other light than that of *factions*.—The West Indians and their interests, though I think their interests as much entitled to attention as those of any other class of people, I leave entirely out of the question. I am contending for the general interests of England only; and, what a monstrous thing it is to hear the farmer (with the land owner at his back) say, let me have a *high price* for my corn; distil it; export it; throw it away; no matter what you do with it, so that it brings me a *high price*. There are, says he, hundreds of hogsheads of sugar, which are spoiling in the king’s warehouses; these, employed in the distilleries, would cause a saving of corn; but, such a use of them would *lower the price of my corn*, and, therefore, the man who proposes such a measure is an *enemy to the country*! Any assertion requiring so much assurance never, surely, was before heard of in the world.

SIR HOME POPHAM.—The reader will have born in mind, that, in the early part of the present session of parliament, Sir Francis Burdett having brought forward the subject of *Admiralty Droits*, it was asserted, by the ministers and their partizans, that all the money which, in this way, fell under the power of the Crown, was disposed of for the *public good*; and, it was particularly mentioned, that a very liberal share was, in all cases, granted by the Crown to the captors. In order to show, that this was not the fact, and that the money was, some times, at least, disposed of in an improper manner, MR. LUSHINGTON stated the instance of SIR HOME POPHAM, who received from the government £20,000, great part of the worth of a ship and cargo, which had been taken from his people by one of our cruisers, and which, as being engaged in a smuggling trade to the East Indies, had been condemned in

the Admiralty court.—Some explanation was attempted; but, the impression which Mr. Lushington's speech produced was by no means removed by any thing that was said on the other side. Sir Home Popham was present, and, though possessed of good talents and not deficient in boldness, he appeared, from the report of the debate, to make but a very poor apology for the grant that had been made to him, to say nothing about the extraordinary circumstances, which had led to the condemnation of the vessel and cargo, both of which he had claimed as his property.—The discussion was postponed, until certain papers, relative to the transaction, and which papers were then moved for, could be produced. These papers are now before the House of Commons, and the discussion will, I should suppose, take place in a few days.—The outlines of the story are as follow: in 1786, Sir Home Popham, who was then Mr. Popham and a Lieutenant in the navy, upon half pay, obtained leave from the Lords of the Admiralty to go to a Danish settlement, or factory, in the East Indies, for the purpose, as he stated, and still states, of gaining experience in his profession.—Instead of a Danish settlement in the East Indies, however, he went to Ostend, where he formed a trading connection, and thence he proceeded to the East Indies. The several ships he was in, and the numerous means made use of by him and his associates for the purpose of prosecuting their trade, it would be too tedious to enumerate here, and would, besides, be unfair, until the discussion be past.—In 1793, Mr. Popham, after having carried on a pretty constant trade between the East Indies and other parts of the world, returned to Europe; and, having put into Cronshaven Bay, in Ireland, was captured by the ship *Diadem*, upon the ground of being engaged in an illicit trade. From the *Diadem* he, by the means stated in the papers, got released. He then bore away for Ostend; but, on his way, came to off Hastings, where he landed a quantity of tea and of rhubarb. Proceeding on his voyage he was, however, captured by Capt. Mark Robinson, in what ship I do not now recollect. Mr. Popham left the ship and went to Ostend; but, when the ship and cargo were demanded, as good prize, by the captors, he put in his claim as proprietor of both, and asserted, that the trade, in which he had been engaged, was not illicit, and ought not to subject him to forfeiture.—The question, together with other questions growing out of it, took ten years to decide; but, in 1803, both ship

and cargo were condemned to the Crown.—Captain Robinson, in the prosecution of his claim, had now expended about £6000, which, of course, he had been compelled to advance, from time to time, during the ten years that the litigation lasted. Both parties applied to the Lords of the Treasury. Capt. Robinson, as captor, for a grant of the proceeds of the ship and cargo, and Mr. Popham, as owner, for the same proceeds. The expences of the law proceedings, incurred by the captors, are, in cases where the forfeiture is to the Crown, always first defrayed; but, it appears, that Captain Robinson did not obtain even a reimbursement for the whole of his expences, and, in quality of captor, not one single farthing; while Mr. Popham, now become Sir Home Popham (having been knighted by the Emperor Paul of Russia), obtained all the rest of the proceeds of ship and cargo, amounting to the sum of £20,000, or thereabouts.—But, there is something well worthy of notice, as to the time, when this grant was obtained.—A report upon the case was made by the king's proctor, in 1803; but, no grant then, when Mr. Addington was in power, took place. The matter lay dormant, until 1805, when Pitt and Lord Melville again got the ascendancy; and then, upon the same report, the grant was made, Sir Home Popham having, as the public cannot fail to remember, made himself very conspicuous as an opponent of Lord St. Vincent and the Addington administration.—Capt. Robinson, though he was of, probably, twenty years standing in the service, at the time the capture was made, and though he was remarkable, even in the English navy, for zeal, skill, and bravery, and whose father before him had lost a leg in the same service, in which he died an admiral; this gentleman has never since been able to get employed in the navy, and has thus lost the expected fruits of a life of honourable endeavours in the service of his country, while Sir Home Popham has, in repeated instances, been preferred to all others of the same rank in his profession.—When I saw a *party* attack upon Sir Home Popham, when I saw a court-martial organized, in so unusual a manner, for his trial, I felt a strong bias in his favour, especially as I perceived the ministers so shy in defending the attacks that were pointed against him. I thought, that a prejudice existed against him, in the service, on account of his superior skill and activity; and, I regarded it as extremely base, in the ministers, to sacrifice him to that prejudice. But, the facts, which Mr. Lushington has brought to light, have,

in this respect, changed my opinion. I can now perceive a sufficient reason for the shyness of the ministers, and for their withholding of those marks of distinction, which most people expected to see bestowed upon the captain of the fleet sent on the Danish expedition.——Nevertheless, I wish not to induce any one to prejudge the question. The discussion, the exposure of all the facts, must very soon take place, and then every man will be able to form his own judgment. All that I have a desire to do, in the mean while, is to apprize my readers of the importance of the subject, and to prepare them for an attentive observation as to what is said and done. The case of Capt. Robinson is extremely hard, and, I think, most persons will agree with me, that some means or other should be adopted for doing him justice.

When I said, last week, that *Mr. Scott's* letter had been witholden from publication by me, *at the request of Lord Oxford*, I should have observed, that the reasons, which his lordship gave for the request, were not at all connected with a wish to keep from the public an account of any part of the conduct of himself or any one of his family or friends.——*Since last week*, I have had an opportunity of hearing more about the whole matter than I had before heard; and, I think it right to say, that, if what I have now heard, be true (of which I have no doubt), I was, before, grossly deceived.

The intelligence from *America* will, of course, be a subject for the next Register, not forgetting the observations of the *Morning Chronicle* upon the excellent letter of *Mr. PICKERING*, who is one of the very best men in that country, and who was long the secretary of state under General Washington and *Mr. Adams*.

Botley, 28th April, 1808.

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MR. WAKEFIELD'S 4TH. LETTER.

SIR,——I also rejoice that the important questions, which are the subject of my correspondence with you, have "nothing to do with party;" and it is for this reason that the opposition to the relief proposed to be given to the West Indian planters, merits the more serious consideration. The alarm which has gone forth is general, I apprehend it to be just, you think it is unfounded, you think this measure will not produce the slightest danger or injury to the mother country, either temporary or permanent. I feel a reluctant conviction of the contrary, I view it as bad in principle, and destructive in effect. I say I do so with reluctance, because I am aware of the distressed condition of the West Indian planter, and I should be unwilling to refuse him a boon which he flatters himself will relieve his difficulties, could it be granted without great and lasting injury to the British empire.——As to the distinction between barley growers, and wheat growers, it is one in words, not in substance, and which I join you in disregarding. In order to meet the question fairly, I will divide it into three parts. 1st. As it affects the two immediate parties to the question; namely, the West Indian planters and their agents on the one hand; the British landed and farming interests on the other. 2dly. As it is likely to affect the revenue. 3dly. As it will affect the interests and prosperity of the empire; which last is the branch of the subject which presses most upon my mind, and which all parties, the supporters and the opposers of the measure, equally join in acknowledging to be of paramount consideration and importance.——The first question is rather one of justice than of policy. There are two classes or descriptions of producers, the sugar growers

and the corn growers; and in the mother country there exists a large but limited market for the produce of either of them, they both lay claim to the possessions and advantages of this market, which of them then is best entitled to it? If a length of possession amounting almost to prescription should give a title, *that* the British farmer has, and upon the faith of it he has engaged his capital, his habits, and his hopes in agricultural enterprise. Further, the market is in the mother country, in that country with which the farmer's interest, his very existence even, is identified, to *all* the taxes of which he contributes, and to the defence of which he is fixed. It is a market also created by the consumption of himself and connections.—What then, is the claim of the planter? Upon the prospect of this market, he has *never* been induced to invest his property in colonial adventure, and in no degree has he created it.—If, then, justice only is to be considered, the title of the farmer is to be preferred; but, here the planter puts in his claim upon other ground, he has recourse to the aid of those duties, which are said by ethical writers to be of imperfect obligation, and that which he cannot claim of right, he hopes to obtain from our compassion, he pleads “distress.” Is it temporary? Or, is it permanent? If temporary, relieve him by a parliamentary grant; if permanent, by bounties enable him to sell his coffee and his sugar so cheap that the mass of the people may drink coffee in the room of tea, at present coffee is a luxury only occasionally consumed by the middle, and never tasted by the lower classes of the community; for by the same absurd policy which had misled the country into an encouragement of the foreign farmer at the expence of the British corn grower, we have been encouraging the tea cultivation of China, in room of promoting the prosperity of our own colonies, by opening to them a large and profitable market. When the current of consumption shall be turned from tea in favour of coffee the bounty may with safety be gradually withdrawn, and even a duty levied, if those on tea are at the same time advanced in proportion. Still more absurd than this, however, is the admission of French brandies to jostle and drive West Indian rum from the spirit market. Why not prohibit the importation of brandy altogether? That this is possible, I will undertake to show, should it ever be in serious contemplation.—These measures I should think would be wiser policy, and more just, than to relieve the planter at the expence, and contrary to the rights of the farmer.—But you seem to put the

question of justice wholly aside, and to consider that of interest alone, placing the profit of the farmer in opposition to the distress of the planter; and in your mode of doing so, it does appear to me, that you do not meet the question fairly, for the distress of the planter is relative not positive; yet, you say, that supposing the injury apprehended by the farmer to be realized, still it would be with you “a question of degree” or comparison “merely,” that you would only inquire “whether the injury to the barley growers would be more or less than the relief to the sugar growers.” Surely, this is a strange argument, why should the British farmers be the only class selected for bearing the burthen of relieving the distress of the planter! If the planter needs, and is intitled to relief, (which I by no means deny) let the *whole* nation equally contribute towards it. The injury to the farming interest is both larger and more extensive than you seem aware. Barley is a grain consumed either as the food of hogs, &c. or in the manufacture of spirits and beer; but whether consumed in the one way or the other, depends entirely upon its quality, and so different is both the quality and the price, that it is almost similar to speaking of two distinct species of grain. When we speak of hog barley, and barley of prime quality, the latter is either purchased by the distilleries, or by the maltsters. Now, maltsters are a set of men of small capitals (many without any) who engage in malting on the speculation of credit from the factor on the one hand, and the excise for the duty on the other; and when he fails the excise sweeps away every thing by an extent, leaving the factor without any dividend on his debt. The distiller on the contrary, is at once a large buyer, and a sure payer. Take then from the farmer the custom of the distiller, and you do him or his factor a treble injury, you lessen the demand for his produce, you deprive him of the competition which exists between the two classes or descriptions of his customers, and you not only leave him at the mercy of the maltsters for the *price* of his barley, but you confine him to sell to a customer always uncertain in his payments, and often insolvent. In addition however to this loss, the peculiar state of the barley market requires consideration. You triumphantly dwell on the distilleries consuming only 300,000 qrs. of English barley, it is obvious that the market, the existence of which would be scarcely felt if supplied equally from all parts of the kingdom, would be of the first importance if the supply came only from a confined district; the subtraction of such a market would

be ruin to the particular district; now apply this obvious principle to the state of the barley market, the price of barley throughout the kingdom is regulated by the price at Mark Lane; and, it is a fact, that these 300,000 qrs. are nearly all sold there; it is not, therefore, the subtraction of 300,000 qrs. from the demand upon all the barley growers throughout the island, but it is the subtraction of 300,000 qrs. from the single limited and particular market of Mark Lane, the price of which, regulating the price of the rest of the kingdom, will cause the effect of taking away the consumption of the distilleries, to be felt all through the country to an extent of which you do not seem apprised. Had you ever been a practical farmer, you would never have said that "the kind as well as the amount of the produce will be regulated by the demand." This is the great and destructive error into which so many have fallen upon this subject, as relating to the farmers profit, demand can only vary the kind of his produce at the expence of the routine of his crops; and converting the order of his farm into confusion. If the routine of any course of cropping is to be interfered with, if any class of owners of land are to be told by the legislature, with what they shall cultivate their estates, the planter may as well be directed to change the object of his cultivation as the farmer. I do not suppose that any one will contend, that nothing but sugar can be grown in the West Indies. Though sugar may have been the most profitable crop, and indeed, when it is recollected that the planter is the complainant, surely this would be more equitable. And now, Sir, I will direct your attention to the way this proposed measure will affect the revenue of the country. While doing so, I shall in one instance, be under the necessity of adverting to my first head, and in this place to notice the loss which will be incurred by the distiller. As the distillery is at present conducted, it requires a very large capital to be invested in what is termed "the plant," which is buildings, utensils, and machinery. The plant of the distiller occupies by far the greater portion of his capital; but, if the legislature compels him to distil from sugar instead of grain, the consequence will be that the chief of this capital will become useless to him, for the sugar distillation may be carried on in almost any metal pot. Indeed, to use a very forcible expression which I heard from a large distiller lately, "every porridge-pot will be converted into a temporary still." Now, what will be the consequence of this to the distiller? It will have the effect of destroying

the value of his plant, and worse than that of destroying his trade altogether. The capital at present required to adventure in a distillery is very large, and the trade is, therefore, in few hands; but if sugar is to be used in the still, scarcely any capital will be required, and rivalryship will reduce the profits to a bare subsistence. Is this however all? No, we have not yet viewed but the beginning of the injury, the facility given to distilling will invite, absolutely invite the needy and the unprincipled to *illicit distillation*. Hence the ruin of the honest, lawful distiller, and an immense defalcation of the revenue. If, however, this measure be meant to include Ireland, the effect will be yet more glaring, and if it be *not*, then the relief to the planter will be *trifling*. Such is the state of the Irish distillery, and such the state of society there; that it is morally impossible to introduce this measure in the sister kingdom, unless you can first persuade the people to approve of it; the illicit distillation in Ireland is encouraged by the minority of that kingdom, in order to find a sale for their barlies, which are a more profitable crop to the Irish farmer than oats. If this is the case, when there is only a competition between the profit of one crop and another, we may well expect yet further opposition and evasion, when an attempt is made to deprive them of the market for their crop altogether. By the laws of Ireland, the revenue officer who discovers and seizes a private still, has a reward of ten pounds paid him by the government, and he receives a fine of fifty pounds from the parish in which the still is found. The law requires a certain portion of oats to be used in the distillation of whiskey, and the people of Ireland have taken a general aversion to whiskey drawn from oats. A tin still is in common use through that country, which costs but two guineas, and is worn out in about ten days. By the collusion between the illicit distiller, and the revenue officer, the still is scarcely ever seized till nearly worn out; and many instances have been discovered, where the reward has been shared between the owner and the officer. But, if this is already the case with the distillation from grain, what may not be expected if sugar be introduced; and if this should become the practice here, to what will our immense revenue from spirits be reduced? Why almost to a name—At length, Sir, I arrive at the third and last division of the subject; and have to inquire how the interest of the empire will be affected by the measure? I thank you for the idea of the corn used in the distilleries and breweries

being "thrown away." For if every species of agricultural produce convertible into food, which is consumed as a luxury, is to be considered as "thrown away," I accept of the term, and in this sense of it contend, that in order to secure the country from the danger and suffering of a scarcity, it is necessary either to *throw annually* "throw away" a large quantity of grain, or that we should export to such an extent. Deprive us of the export (whether by impolitic laws or the state of the political world, it matters not) and we must have recourse to the luxurious consumption of grain to secure us from the evils I apprehend. The fallacy upon which you have built your argument, in supposing me to contend "that in order to induce the farmers of a nation to grow more corn than is upon an average necessary for the consumption of the nation, a part of what they grow must be annually bought of them for the purpose of being thrown away." Now this, Sir, is not my proposition, I contend, that for a course of years we have not grown corn equal to our consumption; and I contend contrary to your statement, "that demand does not regulate the production of provisions." But this will require explanation. Let a country in consequence of the demand, grow one *fair* year with another, to the amount of its physical wants, and have neither export or luxurious consumption to the extent of this growth. Demand will regulate production and no further. For suppose a bad harvest, the demand is the same; but all the demand in the world will not make good the deficiency of the crop. And your fallacy consists in putting the chance of a bad year out of the question, now this chance should be *in* the question; it should be *present* to our view, we should *never* lose sight of it. It is the *hinge* upon which the argument turns. Instead, therefore, of the alarm being at approaching superabundance of corn, the real alarm which is felt by the country is, that the measure will deprive us of that resource, which in the day of famine and distress (greater far than that of the West Indian planter) will save us, or at least a large portion of the people from starving. For, Sir, from the present state of the continent we cannot import. This, therefore, is our *only* resource, we have no other, take it away, and the first week of autumn will give the nation dreadful experience of the truth of the arguments I am submitting to you. One of two things must follow the adoption of this measure of distilling wholly from sugar. Either this surplus quantity of corn will no longer be grown, or a new population will arise to consume it; which ever

happens the produce will not exceed the demand one *fair* year with another; and while we cannot import, if we have neither an export to retain, nor a surplus luxurious consumption to convert into food, we are without resource, and exist at the *mercy of the seasons*. Your idea of the West Indies becoming a market for the export of barley in the shape of pork, is not, I think, tenable; for if the planter has the least shadow of a claim to be relieved from the distress which he now suffers, he surely will have a *real* one not to be starved. Change the present order of things according to your proposal, with a view to relieve the *money* distress of the planter, and then on the first scarcity, will you deprive him of his supply of provisions, that supply upon which his very existence depends; this would be affording present aid at the expence of future destruction.—Fully agreeing with you and Mr. Malthus, that "population treads close upon the heels of production," I mean of that production which is consumed as food, I have ever felt anxious to encourage a distribution of some part of such production into channels of luxury, as thereby a demand is created, and a surplus produce gained, which is available at the moment of necessity, and till that perilous moment arrives, the tariff (if I may so express myself) of human life, is more high, a greater enjoyment is afforded to the people, and the public prosperity is advanced. Turn however this surplus production into food, population quickly follows; the condition of the people is not bettered, they are exposed to all the chances of bad seasons, and none of the ends of government are obtained; for I shall ever agree with the proposition, that "where a country is so extended and populous, that it can maintain its independence, and secure its prosperity; the further extension of its territory, and the increase of its population become secondary to the moral improvement and individual happiness of its inhabitants"—For my opinions concerning inclosures, I must refer you to my last letter, and shall subsequently enlarge upon the subject; but the length at which I have replied to your observations upon my correspondence with you, oblige me to postpone both that, and the consideration of the corn laws, which I promised.—I am, Sir, &c.—EDWARD WAKEFIELD.—*Duke Street, Westminster, April 25, 1808.*

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.

SIR,—As one of the class whom you have addressed in the provincial and London papers, I am desirous to thank you for devoting a part of your attention, and of

your last weekly sheet, to the question of substituting Sugar for Corn. I am willing to believe that the opposition of many to such substitution, is owing to their want of opportunity to learn, and rightly to understand, the chief circumstances, connected with the case; which (as far as they are of a practical nature) is not to be wondered at. It is well known to those who are the most concerned in the comparison, that a quarter of well made pale malt will afford as much vinous spirit as 1 cwt. 3 qr. or 190 lb. of good, and strong sugar. While raw, or unmalted, barley is no more than half as productive as the malt. Of the 300,000 quarters of barley consumed, annually, in the British distilleries 250,000 are malted, and 50,000 are used in a raw state. Hence, the quantity of sugar required to supply the use of 250,000 quarters of malt will be 437,500 cwt. and the substitute for 50,000 quarters of barley will be 43,750, the total whereof is 481,250 cwt. or 40,104 hogs-heads. The accumulated surplus of sugar in three years, (being the difference between the importations and the sales from the 1st January, 1804 to the 1st January, 1807) amounted, according to the parliamentary reports, to 1,434,609 cwt. which may be reckoned a supply for the distilleries for the three years, being 119,634 hogs-heads of 12 cwt. each.—This immense glut of sugar remained wholly useless, under locks in the king's warehouses in London or in the out ports, *because there was no demand for any part of it.* Consequently, the duties thereon, amounting to 2 millions sterling, were lost, to the revenue; and all the actual costs of the cultivation, and various expences in the plantations, with the freight and shipping charges to England, exceeding all together a further sum of £2,500,000 were lost in the same time, to the West-Indian proprietors.—With what face can the country gentlemen require that these two amounts of £4,500,000 or 1,500,000 annually should be so sunk and surrendered, and for what purpose? The average annual growth of barley, in this kingdom was, 20 years ago, estimated to be 3,500,000 quarters. There is more reason to think the quantity grown is increased than that it is diminished, within this period. And if such should be the case to the amount of 100,000 quarters only, yearly, it will follow, that the whole consumption, by the distillers, is no more than a twelfth part of the annual produce of this grain. What room, therefore, is there for alarm to the public interest? The same quantity of

barley would, doubtless, still be malted; because, in all probability, the consumption of beer would be somewhat increased. The distillers, it is true, would be under the necessity to advance the prices of their spirits. But, if the cost of such liquors was to be increased in a degree to lessen their consumption, would not this tend to national amendment? Would not the same money be expended in, and the same amount of duties (taken altogether) be paid for, a far more wholesome, because more nutritious, article?—It appears from the accounts at the Excise Office, that 3,250,000 quarters of barley are malted annually, on the average. The remainder of the growth (2, or 350,000) is required for seed, and the feeding of cattle. In some parts of the kingdom bread is, also, made with barley. Of the 3,250,000 quarters of malt, the common brewers use 2,250,000, or nine times as much as the distillers, and it would not be difficult to select a very few (say six) of the principal breweries in London, wherein as much malt is consumed, as in *all* the distilleries in the kingdom.—After all, I have no expectation that the measure will pass into a law. It is too late in the season for the substitution to have any effect, either way. The distillers are provided with large stocks; and should such an act, even, be assented to in the present session, it could be of no value; because there is reason to believe that, to make it passable, a clause would be introduced, empowering the privy council to stop the operation of the act, whenever it may be judged by them to be necessary. And every one must perceive how easily a plea may be found by the ministers, for the exercise of this power, as soon as the harvest is gathered. Whatever, however, may be the event in the matter, that can be said in excuse for the gross folly and injustice of those who, at the present momentous crisis, advocate in favour of an high price for corn; who have the assurance to recommend the throwing it away in the fabrication of an article, allowedly destructive of the health, and every way productive of distress to the chief consumers of this pernicious liquor; instead of promoting the application of the same corn to our necessary food?—I am, &c.—A HAMPSHIRE FREEHOLDER.—*April 27, 1808.*

CORN AGAINST SUGAR

SIR;—I have read your letter to the holders of Hampshire, as published in your Register, on the subject of introducing sugar instead of

Distilleries, with very great satisfaction, as they appear to me to contain undeniable truths. But in your statement of the annual importation of grain from the Continent of Europe, for a long series of years back, I think you are rather below the mark, when you make the average only 800,000 quarters, as I have been informed it has amounted to between 12 and 1400,000; however, whatever the quantity may be, we must now consider it out of the market, as we can receive no more from that quarter; and as the annual importation of grain shows very plainly that there is not as much corn grown in this country as is equal to our consumption, there will be a deficiency in the market equal to the amount of the importation. Now, Sir, we all know that the scarcity of any article at market will enhance the price of it, as a glut will reduce it. Is it not, therefore, very plain, that the deficiency I have mentioned must raise the price of corn, and if we should have war with America, the West Indies must be supplied with food from this country, which would increase the deficiency and raise the price still higher. If, therefore, the information which I have received be correct, that 1,200,000 quarters have annually been imported, and we add to that 300,000 more for the supply of the West Indies, it will produce a diminution of the quantity of corn in the market of 1,500,000 quarters; and if you take from the distilleries and throw into the market the quantity they use of 300,000 quarters, still there will be a deficiency of 1,200,000. Now, Mr. Cobbett, the question of real concern to the country ought to be, not whether we shall take the pitiful quantity used by the distilleries and throw into the market, but how so large a deficiency is to be made up? and that appears to me to be a question of every serious import under the present political circumstances of the times. For if after thirty years (for I am told we have been importing corn for so long a period) trial, it has been found, that we do not grow as much corn as we consume, (otherwise the importation would have ceased) our prospect of increasing our produce so as to be equal to our consumption is rather gloomy; and at any rate, as seed time is now past, we can look for no increase of produce for the present year. I was therefore astonished to find, by your letter to the Freeholders of Hampshire, that such a thing as a Petition against bringing into the market the trifling quantity of grain used in the distilleries, was likely to be set on foot; and I wish you may be right when, treating on this subject, you state in

your Register: "I do not recollect any measure to have been met by so apparently determined an opposition as this; and, though I am not on the side of the opposers, it does, I must confess, give me some little relief from that disgust which I have of late experienced, to perceive that this opposition has nothing to do with party," because I had imagined that there was not a farmer in Hampshire or anywhere else, but who would have been satisfied with the rise of price which the deficiency of corn in the market that I have stated, must necessarily produce, without the addition of the trifle that would arise to him from the quantity used in the distilleries, if left to himself, and not urged on by others possessing a factious or party spirit.—It has been alleged, that the distillation of grain ought to be encouraged as a measure stimulating the farmer to sow more lands, and a granary to be made use of in case of need. As to the first, let us first of all be convinced that this country can produce as much corn as the population can consume in food (which an experience of 30 years has not been able to do) before we throw away any part of it in making of spirits, which can be made as good, if not better, from sugar, of which we have an overflowing quantity at market; and as to the second, we are precisely in the predicament, when they allow that the grain in the distilleries is to be brought into the market for food, namely, when a scarcity demands it; which, I think, is very apparently our case at present. I have only one more question to ask you, Mr. Cobbett, when I will not trouble you further at present, and that is, besides the deficiency of grain already mentioned, if there should happen a blight or other injury to the crop now on the ground, where are we to look for a supply of food? or must this country be reduced to a state of famine?—*PRO-PATRIA.*—April 28, 1808.

AMERICAN STATES.

Believe me, Mr Cobbett, it is not without reluctance, I again press myself forward as a correspondent of yours. I do assure you, I would not have attempted a reply to the first letter of the "American Merchant of New Broad Street," had I not considered myself in possession of irresistible facts, to prove the fallacy of his statements. I say, Sir, I would not otherwise have attempted a reply, because I know, and knowing it, will confess, my incapacity to carry on a lettered warfare, where ingenuity of argument is to be the foundation stone—this I candidly admit, but I must in the same breath declare,

that *when I really think myself armed with proof*, no eloquence, however powerful, no rhetoric, however admirable, shall deter me from endeavouring to *rescue from unmerited censure*, those measures, which, in my opinion, are adopted for the preservation of the dignity, and the independence of England.—If I have *really* wounded the feelings of the “American merchant” (see his second letter as inserted in your Register p. 610.) in mistaking the principles which actuate him, positively, and truly, I do, from my very heart, beg his pardon, because, it is some relief to my mind, to find him disclaim with worthy indignation, *if actually felt*, those motives, which did in my opinion, *judging from his line of argument*, *glaringly* appear to *bias* him. Forgetting the *invidious* manner in which *he attempted* to insinuate, that personal hatred, and prejudice, were the incentives, that actuated *you*, *he* complains of *my* style of language, towards *him*, and then dexterously introduces, a forcible appeal, with respect to the liberty of the British press. God forbid, Sir, that I should attempt to tread, even as light as Gossamer, on that palladium of our freedom, that ancient fabric, which to use the words of an eminent advocate, “has been gradually reared, by the wisdom, and virtue, of our forefathers,” but, Sir, let me add, honor and patriotism forbid, that I should not strive with *honest* zeal, to vindicate, from misrepresentation, the justice of those measures, which *already*, in their effect, begin to make the haughty Emperor of France *feel*, that England yet has power to protect, her already too much insulted dignity. Pardon this digression, which, hurried on by the warmth of my feelings, I fear I may have too much lengthened.—I observe that your correspondent now acknowledges his error, with respect to premiums of insurance, through the year 1807. In my former letter, when speaking on this immediate subject, I mentioned, that independant of my own individual knowledge, I could produce leading under-writers in Lloyd’s Coffee-House, as evidence to the truth of my assertion, that premiums did advance in consequence of the Berlin decree. I have since learnt, that several most respectable gentlemen, have appeared at the bar of the House of Commons, and proved the fact. I likewise notice, that your correspondent does not doubt my assertion, as to premiums having advanced 100 per cent. in America, also in consequence of the same decree. If it were a principle of mine to dwell on my triumph over a fallen antagonist, here, Sir,

what an opportunity do I possess. I must not omit to acknowledge my error as to the period, when the Berlin decree was first known in this country, but at the same time, I put it to you, and every impartial man, whether this error, does, in the most distant manner, shake my assertion, as to premiums having advanced in consequence of the said decree?—The questions put to Buonaparté, by the President of the Court of Prize Causes, your correspondent calls *insidious*—What! the President dare to put insidious questions to his master? Oh, no, impossible.—Insidious, however, or not insidious, we heard of them in this country very early in the month of October. Your correspondent after conjecturing as to the probable period of their being known here, says, “but I cannot speak with absolute certainty to this point; the material thing is, that our Orders in Council were issued, before it was possible to know, whether America would protest against the enforcement of the Berlin decree, or not.” What! Sir; did not America virtually submit to the decree, by quietly paying for about two months, without any public remonstrance or protest whatever, on the part of the government, an advance of 100 per cent. in the premiums of insurance on voyages direct to England and Ireland? surely, nothing can be more palpably clear.—The extracts of letters I produced, to prove the execution of the Berlin decree, your correspondent says, only speak in general terms without naming place or ship; this is not quite fair; they expressly say, the Berlin decree had been positively acted upon at Antwerp; it is true, they do not give the name of the vessel mentioned, to have been cast away on the coast of France, and condemned; but when I state, on my solemn word of honor, that these extracts were taken from the letters of one of the most respectable merchants on the Continent, and who certainly would feel inclined to lessen, rather than to exaggerate the fact; I do confidently think that every impartial man, taking the context of the whole of the said extracts, will be of opinion, that the Berlin decree was acted upon, previous to the promulgation of the British Orders in Council.—I believe I have now noticed the leading observations, which the facts I adduced in my letter of 30th March, have drawn from the American merchant, and notwithstanding he has so ingeniously laboured to contradict them, I do maintain that they still stand firm and unshaken.—But a few words more Sir, and I take my final leave of your correspondent. He appears desirous to play on my expression of English

American merchant, by telling you that he really is an *English* American merchant, that he is much mistaken if I can make the same declaration. He is perfectly correct; I cannot designate myself an American merchant, but, I can assert, I am an *Englishman*, possessing a British heart, and British feelings, and it is that heart and those feelings, that have actuated me in repelling his accusations, as to the injustice of the British Orders in Council. Had I been born, either in Scotland, or Ireland, (the invidious contemptible distinction, I am forced to presume he means to make by using the word English) I can tell him, I should still have viewed his narrow-minded insinuation with the precise same sovereign disdain.—I am, &c. J.—*London, April 19, 1803.*

IRISH TITHES.

SIR.—In your Political Register of the 25th March, ult. I read with infinite pleasure a letter dated Dublin, ascribing to rack rents, and the neglect of and extortion committed by landlords on their tenants, the past and present miseries of this country; be *confidently assured* the writer has stated the fact fairly, and that the exceptions to his charge against our Irish squires are so few, as to leave this a general political truth, more capable of ascertainment, and more obvious to an impartial observer, than perhaps, any afforded by the annals of any country, as the cause of discontent and disloyalty. Our poor join their landlords and squires in their outcry against tithes, very naturally; these tithes are in addition to rack rents, and the poor flatter themselves they have found a weak point of attack, and that in all events, by the abolition of tithes much is gained. So far, I concur, and (limiting my reasoning on the tythe system) to the effect it has on the poor, sincerely wish they were abolished, and the clergy of all persuasions paid by the state. But, to say that tithes are the cause of the poverty, the heart breaking poverty, of the Irish cottager, is an absurdity too gross, a falsehood too stupid for the most violent and ignorant of our squires to shew his face to. Not one estated man in Ireland, in one hundred, has any just sense of the implied duty imposed on him as proprietor of land. He looks merely to the number of pounds, shillings, and pence he can extract from his tenantry; he requires neither good farm houses, timber, fencing or draining. Land contiguous to Dublin, is let at 20 guineas per acre, near most paltry towns from 8

to 12, and all over this unfortunate island, in proportion. The lands of our numerous absentees are let at the most destructively high rents, because they are let by an agent or attorney, who is valued and paid by his employer accordingly, and who makes what representation she pleases. No man ever hears in society, an estated gentleman say, “by such or such an event, my estate will be improved, my tenants made comfortable.” No! but, “I shall have such or such a rise, my estate *will* be worth so much more, &c.”

—These facts are disgustingly true and prominent to every human being who is not interested in denying them. I therefore, draw your attention to this most embarrassing political subject, not more on account of its importance than of its difficulty (a legislative interference being nearly impracticable), in the hope that your mind and some of your labours, may be directed towards it, and that it may become the subject of discussion in your Register, and set our fellow subjects in Great Britain to think, and reason, and communicate on this, the real state of Ireland, as deeply connected, nay, embracing their own prosperity and existence. Do not, I implore of you, Sir, and your correspondents, be led away from the consideration of this subject, by any the most distant idea or apprehension that you are mistaken in the fact. Build upon it, and be assured your foundation is good. Take this for granted; and apply your strong understanding and powers of representation, to draw to it the public attention, and to force our landed gentlemen to turn their views inward. If the fact be denied, thousands, tens of thousands will substantiate it, and the very investigation will lead to a beneficial result. I really think (without overrating the importance of my own country) no subject to which your attention in the course of your political life has been turned, is of more importance than this. You will necessarily among the enlightened and independent English find support and assistance, and gratitude and applause be your reward in—*IRELAND.—April 2, 1803.*

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates.

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"The withdrawing of 300,000 quarters of barley from the distilleries, being one-sixteenth of the whole quantity grown in the country, will have a great effect in lowering the price of that article, and, in the event of a failure in his crop, *how is the farmer to pay his rent and taxes?*..... If barley is dear, it is owing to the shortness of the last year's crop; if it had been more plentiful, and, of course cheaper, it would have been much better for the farmer in every respect..... The proposed prohibition, by depreciating the price of barley, will, in fact, lay a partial tax upon the farmer."

SIR ROBERT BUXTON's speech at the Norfolk meeting to petition against the intended Distillery bill.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR (continued from page 680).—This I do think one of the most important questions that I have ever known agitated, not merely as it concerns the interests of the West Indian planter and the English farmer, but as it concerns the nation in general, as it affects its resources, the means of its strength and safety.—I do not recollect so early, and apparently so determined an opposition to any measure proposed to parliament, and what renders the question the more interesting is, that the opposition appears, *at present*, to have nothing to do with party.—I have now before me, 1st. the speeches of the Norfolk corn men made at a meeting, called by the Sheriff, and held at the Shire-house at Norwich, on Thursday, the 28th of April; 2d, the Petition of the corn men in the town and neighbourhood of Royston, in the counties of Cambridge and Hertford; 3d, a copy of the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons upon the subject; and, 4th, a copy of the minutes of the evidence, given before the said committee by Mr. ARTHUR YOUNG, secretary to the Board of Agriculture.—I shall insert these in the order in which they stand, offering to my readers, upon each of them, such observations as occur to me, and as I think likely to be of public utility.

I. The meeting in Norfolk is stated to have been composed of the "landed interest;" but, if nothing contrary to the general interest had been intended, if, as is professed by some, a concern for the safety of the nation had been the motive of opposition, why were not the *freeholders* in general convened? It will appear, however, from the whole tenor of the proceedings, that misguided self-interest was, at this meeting, at least, the prevailing motive. I take the report from the Norfolk Chronicle of the 30th of April.—"SIR ROBERT BUXTON then addressed the meeting; he said that the measure which

"had been recommended by a Select Committee of the House of Commons, to prohibit the use of grain in the distilleries would prove injurious to the agriculture of the country, and to this country in particular. Norfolk and Suffolk exported more barley than all the rest of England, and of course we were more deeply interested in the subject than any other part of the kingdom. When he considered the immense load of taxes that was laid upon the land, he thought it a little hard that any measure should now be recommended that would operate to reduce the price of this staple commodity; but he more particularly objected to the principle of laying any restrictions on agriculture at all; when he had the honour of a seat in Parliament, he had freely expressed his opinion against all legislative interference whatever with the agriculture of the country; and he had always thought, that had it not been for the Corn Laws, which operated as a restriction upon agriculture, we should not have been under the necessity of importing corn from foreign countries. Greater restrictions would prejudice the sale of barley—the farmers would grow less—the withdrawing of 300,000 quarters from the distilleries, one-16th of the quantity stated to be grown in England (4,800,000 quarters), would have a great effect in lowering the price of that article, and in the event of a failure in his crop, how was the farmer to pay his rent and taxes? It appeared from a pamphlet by an old friend of his (sir Wm Young), that at the commencement of the French revolution, and when France ceased to receive sugar from their revolted colony, St. Domingo, the planters in our own islands began to cultivate new lands, and to such an extent as enabled them to send immense quantities of sugar to England; which, with the produce of the conquered colonies, had glutted the market, and

caused a great depreciation in the price of that commodity. But was it reasonable that the landed interest should be called upon to make good the speculations of the West India planters? Why was the agriculture of the country to be made the subject of experiment? If barley was dear, it was owing to the shortness of the last year's crop; if it had been more plentiful and of course cheaper, it would have been much better for the farmer in every respect. The proposed prohibition, by depreciating the price of barley, went in fact to lay a partial tax upon the farmer. —The measure in every point of view was the most injurious to the country that could possibly be conceived. He did not wish to mix politics with the question, but he had strong objections to the measure in a constitutional point of view: the discretionary power to be vested in the privy council he thought highly unconstitutional; it was to the legislature, to their representatives, and not to a privy council, that the landed interest was to look up for redress. With these impressions he should move some resolutions expressive of the sense of the country, and request the members to communicate to parliament the sentiments of their constituents on this important subject. He felt the utmost pleasure in saying, that no member had paid more attention, or rendered greater services to the agricultural interests of the country, than an hon. gent. (Mr. Coke). The resolutions, which appear in another part of this paper, were then read and unanimously adopted; and a committee was appointed from the gentlemen present, to act as circumstances should require. —Mr. PLUMETRE stated the motives which had induced him to sign the requisition; and then proceeded at considerable length to comment upon the report of the Select Committee, (for copies of which the meeting were indebted to Mr. Wm. Smith, M. P. who, aware how deeply many of his constituents were interested in the subject, had re-published it in the form of a pamphlet). That report, Mr. P. said, contained some inconsistencies and omissions, which he doubted not would be hereafter explained. He thought that all legislative interference with agricultural produce, operated to the detriment of the country; if the measure was bottomed on an apprehension of a scarcity, he should bow to the decision of the committee, but it would, in that case, be necessary to extend the

prohibition to Ireland, which the committee do not recommend. Mr. P. concluded by recommending to the attention of the gentlemen present, the New Encyclopædia, publishing in numbers, as containing a complete history of the Corn Laws.—Mr. COKE said, as a lover of agriculture he could not but express his best thanks to the high sheriff, for convening this meeting, and to the worthy baronet, who moved the resolutions. He had not had the good fortune to agree with him at all times; but on the present occasion he joined most heartily with him, in condemning this interference with the agriculture of the country. In 1798, when a similar application was made by the West India merchants, Mr. Pitt, who conceived the substitution of sugar instead of malt in the distilleries would be injurious both to the revenue as well as to agriculture, set his face against it; and about two years ago, when the application was renewed, he (Mr. Coke) wrote to a cabinet minister to know his sentiments on the subject, and to assure him that he should call the attention of his country to it; and do every thing in his power to oppose it. —Mr. Fox returned for answer, 'you may keep your county quiet;' and so the application again fell to the ground.—He admitted the distresses of the planters to be great, which were however in a great measure occasioned by their gambling speculations.—He could not admit that the present committee was fairly appointed; it was composed principally of West India planters and merchants; application was made to admit county members, but without success; and afterwards the members for the barley counties, but the chancellor of the exchequer would not hear of it.—With respect to the price of barley, had it not been for the failure of the pea crop, barley would not have been so dear. When he first knew Norfolk, all the western parts of the county grew nothing but rye; by superior husbandry it had become a wheat county, and he trusted that nothing would be done to discourage the growth of barley or to alter the regular system of Norfolk husbandry. It had been recommended to the farmers to use sugar and molasses for the fattening of cattle, but he did not think it would answer; if there was a prospect of it, he was certain that the intelligent men whom he had the honour of addressing would have made the experiment.

"Norfolk was the first barley county in the kingdom, and its yeomanry of the most respectable description, and they might be sure of his attention to their interests on all occasions. From a report which accidentally fell into his hands, it appeared that 90 years ago, five millions of people consumed more malt than nine millions do at this time; this he could not account for, but perhaps the brewers could; for John Bail was as fond of beer now as he was 90 years ago."—Suppose we begin our remarks with this last part of Mr. Coke's speech. It has nothing at all to do with the main question; but, it affords a good opportunity of questioning a popular opinion, which appears to me to be founded in error.—The report, of which Mr. Coke speaks, was, doubtless, the report of the evidence of Mr. Arthur Young, who stated, that, "by the return to the act of '41, Geo. III. it appears, that the number of the people in 1720, was 5,565,000, and that, in the period of that act, it was 9,343,578;" and yet, "that at the former period more malt was consumed than at the latter period."—Of the *utility* of this statement we shall, probably, have to speak bye-and-by; but, *where* did Mr. Young learn that the number was 5,565,000 in 1720? Not "by the return to the act;" or, at least, I never saw or heard of any such return; and I thought that all the returns to that act were in my possession. Mr. Young may have heard of a census, or numbering of the people, in England and Wales, previous to the year 1801; but I never did, and, I am of opinion, that he has now spoken from no better authority than that of GREGORY KING, who, indeed, was so minute and accurate a gentleman, that he included in his estimate the number of *rabbits* in England and Wales.—When the returns were made to the House of Commons, Mr. Chalmers and others looked back to Grégory's estimate, and triumphantly exclaimed, see how our population has increased! But, in viewing the strength of this kingdom as *relative* to that of the neighbouring nations (which was the object of Mr. Chalmers in particular), some attention should have been paid to what our old painstaking friend Gregory said about the population of *France*, which, at the epoch of his estimate, he stated at 12,000,000; and we now *know*, that, in the time of Necker, there were in France, 26,000,000 of people. So that, supposing Gregory's estimate to have been correct, the population of France had increased much more than the population of England, a fact which it never occur-

red to Mr. Chalmers to notice in his "estimate of the *relative* strength of Great Britain;" but, indeed, it was a fact that did by no means answer his purpose, which was to please Pitt, and one way of doing which was to persuade the nation that it was in a most thriving and flourishing state, while it was weighed down to the very earth with taxes, and had constantly in its bosom an immense army of tax-gatherers.—Now, as to the fact, my opinion is, that the population of England and Wales has *decreased* during the last hundred years. *London* has increased, but look at the distant counties; look at the hundreds of towns and villages, once considerable and now almost nothing; look at the large churches in places which now contain scarcely people enough to fill a large pew; but, above all, look at the ancient marks of the plough imprinted upon *millions* of acres of land which now bear scarcely a blade of grass. Let any man look at the sides of Old Winchester hill (near Warrford in this county;) let him look at the sides of the down near Twyford and Morestead, where the land, in order to enable the horses to go, was first mowed with the spade, and placed in the form of steps of a stair; let him proceed westward even to the land's end, observing the same all the way; and then let him say, what demand for food that must have been, which could have *driven* the cultivators of the land to such undertakings. All these lands are now uncultivated; and, I think, that this fact alone is quite sufficient to prove, that there is now less food required in the country than there formerly was; and, of course, that the population has diminished.—Returning from this digression, for which the reader must blame Mr. Coke, I come to that part of the speeches, which applies to the question before us. Upon what Sir ROBERT BUXFORD said it will not be necessary to say much, seeing that the worthy Baronet was kind enough to answer himself, as will be perceived by the sentences which I have taken for my motto. In one breath he tells us, that lowering the price of barley will disable the farmer to pay his rent and taxes; in the next breath, that if barley were cheaper, it would be much better for the farmer in every respect; in the third breath, that, by depreciating the price of barley, you lay a partial tax upon the farmer. This was pretty well, I think, for one single speech; and, if the committee, which was, it appears, appointed by the meeting "to act as circumstances might require," should but discover sagacity equal to Sir Robert, their affairs are, it must be confessed,

in a most promising way.—MR. PLUMPTRE said *nothing*, and MR. COKE seems to have spoken as an amateur rather than a practitioner. He took care, however, to say a great deal of himself, and seems to have been very anxious to cause it to be believed, that he is the main prop of the farming interest. “When,” says he, “about two years ago, an application to the effect of the present measure was made to the ministers, he wrote to Mr. Fox to assure him that he should call the attention of his county to it, and do every thing in his power to oppose it; that Mr. Fox returned for answer, *you may keep your county quiet*, and SO the application fell to the ground;” and SO, I trust it will not fall to the ground now; for, if the ministers are to be thus turned aside from doing what they are convinced is for the general good, there can be no term of reproach too severe to be bestowed upon them.—The distresses of the planters have, I allow, little to do with the question, which I confine merely to the general interests of England; but, what does Mr. Coke mean by asserting, that these distresses have arisen chiefly by the “*gambling speculations of the planters*?” The planters are no more gamblers, and, perhaps, not nearly so much, as the Norfolk farmers are. In the families of many of them, whose plantations have been for several generations; and their pursuits partake as little of the nature of gambling as do the pursuits of Mr. Coke. There have, of late years, been speculations enough in farming, speculations, too, bordering upon gambling; and yet Mr. Coke would not like to hear the accusation applied to himself and “his county.”

II. The following is a copy of the Petition to parliament from *the Owners and occupiers of land, residing in the town and neighbourhood of Haverhill*.—“That your petitioners are many of them owners, and the greater part of them occupiers of lands, in a district where barley is the principal article of produce, and where, from the great proportion of arable land, it is presumed more barley is cultivated yearly than in almost any other district of equal extent in this country.—That your petitioners find it extremely difficult, by their most laborious exertions, to obtain a remuneration, even in kindly seasons, proportionate to their labour, owing to the increased expense of every article necessary to husbandry, and the oppressive weight of rates and taxes, to which they are liable. That they have at all times cheerfully borne the full share of public burthens, in the hope that they

would have been enabled to procure a fair and reasonable profit from the produce of their land. But they have lately been very sensibly alarmed at the measure which they understand has been recommended by a committee of your honourable house, to whom it was referred to consider of the expediency of prohibiting the use of barley, malt, and other grain in the distilleries of British spirits, and of substituting sugar and molasses in their stead; a circumstance which cannot fail, as your petitioners most humbly insist, to depreciate in a very considerable degree those essential articles of subsistence, the growth of our own country, in favour of others (useful, indeed, in their nature, but of considerably less consequence), the produce of our own distant colonies; and your petitioners beg leave humbly to represent to this hon. house, that the depression of our own produce, for the benefit of our distant colonies, appears to your petitioners both impolitic and unjust. That such a plan, if adopted by the legislature of the country, and passed into a law, must be highly detrimental to the farmer, and throw a damp on the increasing spirit of agriculture (in the perfection of which the permanent security of the kingdom will be found to exist) at a time the most dangerous for such an experiment to be made; and that the landed interest, upon which the greatest proportion of the present taxes are thrown, will be still more depressed, and, of consequence, lose that equal weight in the scale of the country, to which at least it is entitled.—Your petitioners beg to urge to your hon. house as an unquestionable fact, that the growth of grain in this country must be proportionably diminished, by lessening the demand for it, whilst every extension of the market, will encourage and increase the growth, and thereby improve our internal resources, and lessen our dependance upon other countries: and that the present growth of grain has of late years been much increased, and is capable, by impartial legislative protection, of being rendered equal to the supply of every domestic market, that can be opened to it.—That a great proportion of your petitioners’ lands lie in a common field state, subject to the rights of sheepwalk, and to invariable rotations of cropping, and the depreciation of the value of their barley crop will therefore be more deeply injurious to them; and that, from the comparative poverty of the soil of a large part of this district, the crops are obtained by a

“ greater exertion, and a more expensive mode of farming, than in many other parts: your petitioners must, therefore, necessarily be more proportionably depressed by a decrease of the value of the crop. — Your petitioners, therefore, think it incumbent on them to lose no time most humbly to implore your honour, to take the circumstances of their case into your consideration, and that you will not permit a restriction, in its nature so injurious to your petitioners, and to the landed interest of the country in general, to pass into a law; and that you will afford them such relief in the premiums, as to your wisdom and justice shall seem to meet.” — There is nothing *new* in this petition, if we suppose it to have been of later date than the speeches of Sir Robert Buxton and Mr. Coke, otherwise that part is new, which speaks of the *heavy taxes* borne by the land-owners and farmers. Sir Robert spoke as if almost all the taxes fell upon the land. Almost the whole of the *poor-rates* certainly do fall *immediately* upon the land; but, are they not, *finally* paid by the *consumer* of the corn, after the same manner that the tax upon sugar and rum is paid by the consumer? A gallon of rum is brought into England, the importer pays, perhaps, ten shillings duty and five shillings in purchase money; but, if he sell it to me, do I not pay the duty? The corn is taxed by the overseer of the poor; the farmer pays him the tax, but do not I, who consume the corn, pay the tax in the end? — It is otherwise with the income, or property, tax. There the land owner has a decided advantage; for, his income, which he has *in perpetuity*, pays no higher rate of tax than the income of a carpenter or smith, whose income, and the existence of whose family, depend entirely upon his life, nay upon that very precarious thing, his *health*. Sir Robert Buxton has, we will say, five thousand pounds a year, derived from land; and, of course, he pays £500 a year income tax. A tradesman gains five thousand pounds a year by his trade, and he pays £500 a year income tax. But, Sir Robert's land is held in perpetuity; it is productive whether he be well or sick, and it descends to his heir after him; while the tradesman's gains may cease in a moment, are subject to a hundred casualties, and are, in fact, not worth above 3 or 4 years purchase, while Sir Robert's are worth 30 years purchase at the very least. In such a state of things the land owners, and especially the *great* land-owners, might, one would think, were it merely for decency's sake, abstain from complaining about the

partiality of taxation. — These petitioners state, that, “even in *kindly* seasons, they can hardly obtain a sufficient remuneration for their labour, owing to the high price of every article necessary to husbandry, and the oppressive weight of rates and taxes.” — What do they mean by “*kindly* seasons?” Do they mean plentiful years? Why, in plentiful years corn is *cheap*, and that, according to their apparent view of the matter, is a great injury to them, they being, in fact, petitioners for a *high price*! And, as to articles necessary to husbandry, the principal of which is *labour*, does it not, gentlemen, bear (taken together with the poor-rates) an exact proportion to the price of your corn? Do not *rents* also preserve this proportion, upon an average of years; and *must* not this be the case? Is it not so in the nature of things? And, upon any other supposition, would there not be some sense in the standing toast of the farmers: “*Cheap land and dear corn*?” — Mr. Young, too, talks, as we shall see by-and-by, about rates and taxes and expensive utensils and the many other *discouragements* to agriculture; but, when, a few weeks ago, Mr. Young was writing to me with a view to obtain a general enclosure bill, he agreed with Mr. Spence, *that there were more farmers than farms*, and that capital was every day more and more pressing forward to be employed in agriculture. The fact is so. It is notorious, that, if there be a farm to let, the owner is instantly beset with applicants for it. Is this a proof that farming yields little profit? Does this corroborate the idea of Mr. Wakefield (whom, by the bye, I should have been glad to hear from again), that “the farmer is *not* sufficiently rewarded for his labour and the use of his capital?”

III. The Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, recommending the use of Sugar instead of Corn, in the Distilleries, is very long; but, it will be sufficient for all the purposes of the discussion to insert the concluding part of it, which contains the result of their inquiries. — “It appears to your committee, that considerable quantities of wheat, flour, and oats, have been annually imported into Great Britain for some years past, while the export of those articles has been very trifling. The annual import and export of barley is very small. This furnishes a sufficient proof that we have of late years depended, in some degree, upon our foreign connections for a supply of food for the inhabitants of this country, and your committee are not informed of any circumstances at-

"tendant on the late crop that can diminish
 "the importance of that resource.—Your
 "committee taking into their most serious
 "consideration the state of our foreign re-
 "lations, and the consequent probability
 "that our usual supply of grain from for-
 "eign countries may fail us, are naturally
 "led to suggest measures of precaution
 "which may eventually ward off so great
 "an evil.—It appears that about 470,000
 "qrs. of grain are annually consumed by
 "the British distillers, and a greater quanti-
 "ty in Ireland, and that the importation of
 "corn into G. Britain from foreign parts,
 "exclusive of that from Ireland, has for 5
 "years past amounted to about 770,000 qrs.
 "Under the pressure of an actual scarcity,
 "there would be no hesitation in having
 "recourse to a stoppage of the distilleries.
 "Your committee therefore submit, that
 "the restriction of that trade to the use of
 "sugar for a limited time in G. Britain
 "only, (if the measure should be deemed
 "inadmissible as to Ireland) would be a
 "wise measure of precaution under our
 "present prospects. It would leave for the
 "food of the people 470,000 qrs. of grain,
 "a quantity greater than the importation of
 "ours in the last year.—Aware however,
 "that should any change of circumstances
 "open our communication with the rest of
 "the world, this measure might be render-
 "ed unnecessary in the view just stated—
 "aware that although in the event of a de-
 "ficient crop this year, the distress would
 "be greatly increased if accompanied by a
 "deficiency in our usual foreign supplies;
 "yet, that in the event of a superabundant
 "harvest, the proposed restriction might be
 "found very hurtful to the agricultural in-
 "terests of the Kingdom—aware that the
 "return of peace might relieve the West
 "India planters from their present distress,
 "and that probably some measures may be
 "devised which may alleviate that distress
 "before the period to which it is proposed
 "to limit this suspension shall be con-
 "cluded, your committee recommend in
 "the strongest manner, that any bill to be
 "brought in, in consequence of this Report,
 "should contain a clause granting a power
 "to the king in council, upon a sufficient
 "notice, to do away the suspension, and
 "allow the distillers to carry on their trade
 "in the accustomed manner.—When it
 "is considered how very small a portion of
 "the barley grown in this kingdom is con-
 "sumed by the distillers, it is scarcely pos-
 "sible to think that the proposed measure
 "itself can bear very hard upon the grow-
 "er. It is calculated that 1,200,000 acres

"are used for that purpose, of which about
 "10,000, or one-sixteenth, are sufficient to
 "grow the whole quantity from which the
 "spirits consumed in England are produced.
 "The quantity of barley and bere grown in
 "Scotland does not, in all probability, bear
 "a much less proportion to that consumed
 "in a similar manner. There are doubt-
 "less many parts of the country in which
 "the substitution of a different crop could
 "be attended with no disadvantage, and
 "might eventually be attended with profit.
 "In the most cultivated parts of Scotland,
 "in which a practical knowledge of agricul-
 "ture exists in as great perfection as any-
 "where, such a substitution has been found
 "actually to answer.—It is to be remark-
 "ed, that although it may be deemed dis-
 "advantageous to substitute any other
 "grain in the room of barley, yet that the
 "prices of grain mutually operate upon
 "each other, and that a rise or fall in the
 "price of any one kind must have a corre-
 "sponding influence on the prices of the
 "rest; and that any alarm which might be
 "created by this measure can only operate
 "prospectively as to next year's crop, from
 "an expectation that the same suspension
 "will again be resorted to.—Your com-
 "mittee trust, that on a full consideration
 "of the subject, all apprehension will be
 "done away by the power proposed to be
 "vested in the king and council. They are
 "sensible that they should not have fulfilled
 "the duties imposed on them by the house,
 "unless they proceed to consider every pos-
 "sible mode of relief for the proprietors of
 "West India estates; and they trust that
 "they shall be enabled to suggest measures
 "so permanently beneficial to that body, as
 "to render it unnecessary for them again to
 "apply for the interference of parliament,
 "when should the present anomalous state
 "of our foreign relations be protracted.—
 "Your committee are persuaded that the
 "permanent adoption of this measure would
 "be attended with great evils to the agricul-
 "ture of the country; they feel it incum-
 "bent on them to state, that nothing in the
 "evidence before them could induce a recom-
 "mendation to that effect; they concei-
 "ve that its frequent repetition would be
 "still more hurtful; and nothing but the
 "strong case so clearly made out by the
 "West India interest, coupled with the loss
 "of our trade with the countries from
 "whence we derived a great proportion of
 "our foreign supply, could prevail upon
 "them to advise even this slight temporary
 "interference (guarded as it is by the pro-
 "posed limitations) with an established

“ system of agriculture.—The peculiar
 “ situation of Ireland, the great difficulty of
 “ collecting the revenue on spirits there,
 “ the great prevalence of illegal distillation,
 “ and the fear that this measure, together
 “ with the popular preference for corn
 “ whiskey, might increase that trade to an
 “ unlimited amount, and interfere with any
 “ regulations that might be adopted for its
 “ suppression, prevent your committee from
 “ decidedly recommending the extension of
 “ this suspension to that country; but they
 “ are by no means prepared to assert that
 “ such regulations may not possibly be de-
 “ vised as to render its adoption there as
 “ practicable as in Great Britain. They are
 “ unwilling to express an opinion on this
 “ part of the question.—Your committee
 “ press upon the consideration of the house
 “ the severe loss that must be felt by the
 “ empire at large, and by no part of it more
 “ than by the landed interest, if some effi-
 “ cient remedy should not save the West
 “ India colonies from the disasters that await
 “ them.—When it is recollected that this
 “ country derives from them a net revenue
 “ on sugar of £3,000,000 annually, be-
 “ sides the duties on the other articles of
 “ their produce; that they take off manu-
 “ factures and produce of this country to
 “ the amount of £6,000,000 sterling, to
 “ which considerations must be added the
 “ shipping they employ, and the sailors
 “ bred in the trade; and that were the re-
 “ striction taken off that now impedes the
 “ export of corn to the colonies, they would
 “ import from hence, to the great advan-
 “ tage of the British landholder and mer-
 “ chant, a considerable proportion of what
 “ they now do from foreign parts; it is
 “ hoped that the house will think your com-
 “ mittee warranted, under the peculiar cir-
 “ cumstances of the times, in recommend-
 “ ing the suspension of the use of grain in
 “ the distilleries of G. Britain, and their re-
 “ striction to the use of sugar for one year,
 “ from the 1st of July, 1808, to the 1st of
 “ July, 1809, accompanied by the aforesaid
 “ discretionary power to be vested in his
 “ majesty.”—Mr. Coke complains of the
 “ composition of the committee, and says, that
 “ the *country gentlemen* (i thought, for my
 “ part, the race had been extinct) were ex-
 “ cluded from it, though it appears from the
 “ members present upon the 25th of March,
 “ that, out of 14 members, there were Sir
 “ Henry Mildmay, Mr. Lascelles, and Mr.
 “ Western. Whether there were any more
 “ great land-owners I do not know; for I
 “ know not the persons of most of the rest of
 “ the members present; but, I think, it is

quite clear, from this report, that the in-
 “ fluence of what Mr. Coke calls the landed
 “ interest did sufficiently prevail. Would to
 “ God that as great care were taken of the ge-
 “ neral interests of the nation, in many other
 “ cases that I could point out!

IV. The Evidence of Mr. ARTHUR
 YOUNG, Secretary to the Board of Agricul-
 ture, as it appears to have been the grand
 war-horse of the corn men, is worthy of
 particular attention. He was examined by
 the committee on the 21st, the 24th, and
 25th of March. The minutes of the exa-
 mination are too long to be inserted here en-
 tire; but, by leaving out those parts, which
 relate to the manner of cultivating land, to
 the particular interests of certain persons and
 districts, and to other matters of mere detail,
 we shall find room for all that has connec-
 tion with the great points under discussion.
 —But, before I proceed to quote, I must
 beg the reader to bear in mind, that he has
 been addressed by Mr. Young through the
 pages of some recent numbers of my *Register*.
 His letters will be found in the present
 volume, at pages 288, 375, 568; and a few
 words will suffice for their history. I had,
 in several previous numbers, contended, that
 England was capable of maintaining herself
 independent of all foreign commerce. Mr.
 Young, in his first letter, endeavoured to
 convince me of the contrary, and referred to
 his experience to prove, that, without fore-
 ign commerce, even our agriculture could
 not flourish. In the same letter he noticed
 an assertion of mine, that, in years of the
 greatest known scarcity, we had not imported
 more than enough provisions for one
 week; and he entered into a very minute
 account of our imports of grain, with the
 view of convincing me, that we did, in a
 great measure, depend upon foreign com-
 merce for an adequate supply of food. In
 his second letter (page 375) he took occasion
 to point out the remedy; that is to say, an
 addition to be made to the food of the coun-
 try by the enclosing of the wastelands, under
 the operation of a general enclosure bill. In
 answer to this letter, I stated (see p. 305) se-
 veral objections to a measure of this sort, and
 asked, besides, what good it would do, see-
 ing that “ the friends of agriculture” com-
 plained corn was already *too cheap*? Mr.
 Young, at page 568, made an attempt to an-
 swer this question: how far he succeeded
 the reader has seen; but, at any rate, he still
 persisted, that our prospects of future supply
 were very gloomy, and that the only effec-
 tual remedy lay in a measure of general en-
 closure. It must be obvious to every one,
 that such a measure, if adopted, would be

slow in its operation. My opinion is, that it would *never* have the proposed effect, and I need give no other reasons than those stated in the article above referred to, and which Mr. Young has not, in my opinion, refuted, or shaken in the smallest degree. But, be this as it may, there can be no doubt upon this point, that, to obtain an additional supply of food from lands now lying waste must be a *work of time*, to say nothing about the seed required for them, and the labour which must be *withdrawn* from the lands already enclosed and under cultivation. Nevertheless, let this be conceded too. Let the supposition be adopted, that this seed and this labour, so withdrawn, would leave the other lands just as they were, and even suppose, that, in the ensuing year, the new enclosures would give us an addition to our food; let us suppose all this, still the fact is, that there *is* no such measure of general enclosure. We are not, at the present moment, to trouble ourselves with what *might*, what *may*, or what *will* be; but, we all know, that there *is* no general enclosure bill; that there *is* no such thing as that which Mr. Young insisted was our *only* resource against the dangers, nay the horrors, of a non-importation of food. Well, then, who would not have expected to find Mr. Young amongst the most strenuous of the advocates for an importation of corn in the form of sugar? Who would not have expected to hear him, who was so alarmed at the stoppage of the importation of 800,000 quarters of corn annually, congratulate me and my readers, that the ministers had found out a way of saving the consumption of 300,000 quarters annually, by causing sugar to be used in the distilleries? "Ministers," says he (p 377), "best know where corn is to be had; to me it seems just as probable to procure it from the Moon as from Prussia or Poland. Were a short crop, or a week's mildew, to arrive, we should see the two houses called together; committees appointed; examinations, proceedings, proclamations issued; harangues pronounced; substitutes recommended; the volunteers in activity; government alarmed, and Buonaparte delighted." Well, Sir, the ministers have found corn, and that, too, without going to the Moon; and, are you not pleased at the lucky discovery? Not at all, it seems; and you now dread, not "a short crop or a week's mildew," but a *glutted market*! And still; ay, still you cry for *more corn*, through the means of a general enclosure bill! This really is enough to addle one's brain. In Sir Robert Buxton or any of the amateurs, who assem-

ble to *drink* success to agriculture, such palpable inconsistency might be turned off with a laugh; but it is painful to see a gentleman of great and acknowledged talents, and of experience, as to such matters, surpassing that of, perhaps, any other man living, thus hampered by the influence of a more than sectarian bigotry to one particular pursuit.—Let us now proceed to the extracts from the minutes, beginning with the examination of the 21st of March.—
 "Q. What, in your opinion, would be the effects upon the agriculture of the country of the prohibition to use the usual sorts of grain in the distilleries of G. Britain and Ireland? A. I conceive, that the effect would be injurious to the agriculture of the kingdom, exactly in proportion to the quantity removed from demand in the market.—Q. Is that quantity so considerable as to make the barley grower look to the distillery as a source of considerable influence on the price of the article? A. Undoubtedly, no report could spread through the kingdom, relative to any stoppage in the distillery, which would not *immediately sink the price of barley* in my apprehension.—Q. You have stated, in your first answer, that the exclusion of grain from the distilleries, would be injurious to the agriculture of the country; do you mean that it would be so under the limitation of one year, or do you connect with that limitation a continued exclusion afterwards? A. The stoppage of the distillery for one year, next October, I conceive, would affect the quantity of barley sown the following spring; relative to any after effect, it would depend upon the circumstances I alluded to before.—
 "Q. You have stated, that the report of such exclusion being spread about the country, would be injurious to the agriculture of the country? A. Merely by sinking the price.—Q. Has such report circulated already? A. I really do not know. I have been in town ever since this committee sat, or was expected to sit.—Q. Has the price fallen? A. No, not that I know of.—Q. Is there any reason to expect it will *immediately fall*? A. I stated the crop to be a short one, and consequently *there is little likelihood of the price falling with a short crop*, speaking only at the present time, and so late in the season as the month of March.—There needs no comment upon this. The answers do, in fact, answer themselves. It is strange, though, that Mr. Young, who holds constant correspondence with every

part of the country, and who, I believe, superintends the publishing of a monthly agricultural report, should have wanted information as to this important fact, merely because he had been *in town*. But, when he was asked, if the price was *expected* to fall, he seems to have been fully aware of the danger of being a prophet *before the event*. There was, last year, a short crop of barley then, it seems, and yet Mr. Young, in another part of his evidence, says that the price of barley is now too low; and then, again, he says that he wants new enclosures, in order that *more corn* might be raised, to prepare us against a day of scarcity!—The examination goes on:—

—“Q. Supposing the average quantity of corn imported into this country can be justly computed at more than 800,000 quarters, what injury then, arises to the market, by a decrease in the demand to the amount of 300,000 quarters used in the distilleries at the time when we conceive the importation is nearly, if not totally stopped? A. The agriculture of the kingdom having been greatly depressed by the regular importation of 800,000 quarters, it would seem of all other remedies the most extraordinary, to take from the demand, such as it is, that of 300,000 quarters, or any other given quantity. It seems to be an addition of *one evil to another*.”—Here we see Mr. Young alarmed at a new evil. A *diminished demand*, not a diminished supply, is now the spectre that haunts his imagination. This has been observed on before, but, it cannot be too often presented to the reader. The motto to my last sheet (in which I omitted to put the name of Mr. Young) was, as will be seen, extracted from one of his letters. His letters all tended to one point, namely, that of causing it to be believed, that England, as her agriculture now stands, is, upon an average of years, unable to provide for her own subsistence. Is it not monstrous then, to hear him now declare, that the introduction of 300,000 quarters of corn, in the shape of sugar, is an *evil*? But, we are now going to hear him say, that the country can provide for its wants, not only without any importation in any shape, but without any new enclosures.—“Q. Do you suppose, that the evil of the decrease of the demand of 300,000 quarters, can be equal to the evil of the import of 800,000 quarters? A. Certainly not.—Q. Do you suppose that all the land in cultivation throughout England, would be able to supply that quantity? A. CERTAINLY, without

“the hesitation of a moment.—Q. Without breaking up pasture? A. It would be a very great benefit to break up pasture. A great deal of bad pasture remains so, for want of encouragement to plough it, and if that enormous import was cut off, all such bad pastures would immediately be under the plough.—Q. What would be the consequence of it to the grazing of the country? A. The grazing of the country does not depend upon bad pastures, but upon good, and landlords would certainly take care that good grass should be supplied.—Q. Would not the diminution of the quantity of pasture land, raise the price of butcher’s meat, butter, and cheese? A. It would lessen the price; for there can be no question at all, but that the clover and turnips upon such pastures, so broken up, would produce much more of those articles, than the whole pasture did before.—Q. Would this expedient avail much, supposing the foreign supply of G. Britain suddenly cut off? A. If such change occurred in the month of June, it certainly could have no effect till the season of putting crops in return again.—Q. You have stated, that a great deal of pasture remains unploughed, because it is not worth while to plough it: could it be profitably brought into a course of corn crops, unless there were a considerable increase in the price of corn? A. Undoubtedly not, or the expectation of a better price.”—Now, he first states, that our average importation has been 800,000 quarters of corn; this quantity, together with what we grew, he says was necessary to us, and he adds that he knows not where the ministers are to find it. But, say the committee, do you suppose, that our lands already enclosed and under cultivation, would be able to supply the quantity of corn which we have been accustomed to import? “*Certainly*,” says he, “without the hesitation of a moment.” It follows, then, I think, that Mr. Spence and I were right, when we asserted (what Mr. Young contradicted) that we could exist independent of commerce, and that there was no necessity for that general enclosure bill, which he represented as the only preventive of the horrors of starvation. “Aye,” will he say, “but not too fast. I say the lands in cultivation are able to supply us; but, I mean under another mode of cultivation than the present.” Why, so I said, Mr. Young, when I objected to the project of a general enclosure bill; and you, at the close of a passage, in which you give your reasons

for believing that little or no improvement in the cultivation of lands already enclosed can be expected, thus emphatically observe, that, "speaking generally, land, *already occupied*, is no more at our disposition *than land in the Moon*." (See page 574). Well, then, Sir, the land already enclosed is *not*, according to your statement made to me and my readers, "*able to supply*" the 800,000 quarters, heretofore supplied from abroad; and, what you say afterwards about the breaking up of pasture will avail you nothing in removing the inconsistency, unless you can show us, that you have now discovered a way of putting at our disposition "*lands in the Moon*."—On the latter part of this extract, I only beg the reader to observe, that the breaking up of pasture is to render corn, butcher's meat, butter, and cheese, *more abundant*, and to *lessen the price of them*, and the farmer is to be induced to break up pastures, by an *increase, or expected increase in prices*. Respect for Mr. Young's talents and zeal restrains me; but, really, this is almost too much to hear.—The Examination of the 24th of March, which led to the question of enclosures was as follows;—*Q.* Do you apprehend under the present circumstances of the face of Europe, there is any very alarming danger of a redundancy of grain in the market? *A.* I do not conceive that at present, there is any appearance of it.—*Q.* Do you not apprehend there is a possibility of a great distress from the non-importation of oats? *A.* There certainly may be a great probability of some distress for want of various sorts of corn for a time, but I conceive, that supposing importation was, from the state of Europe, cut off, that the evil would speedily be corrected, by such an encouragement to the agriculture of the kingdom, as would soon produce a redundancy.—*Q.* Must not that last as long as the ports of Europe continue shut against us, or till there are some great improvements in agriculture? *A.* Certainly.—*Q.* Do you conceive, that any immediate, or temporary inconvenience would follow from a diminution of the quantity brought to market in the ensuing year, to the amount of about 1,000,000 of quarters? *A.* Such an inconvenience certainly might happen without a doubt.—*Q.* What is the nature of that inconvenience? *A.* It would greatly depend upon what the ensuing crop should prove. The inconvenience would be very serious indeed if we had a failure

"in the crop.—*Q.* Do you think that if the consumption of grain were to continue as at present, and the import from every part of the world, Ireland excepted, were to cease for the next 12 or 18 months, that the price of grain would rise within that period to a degree that would be distressing to the population of these kingdoms? *A.* Undoubtedly the price might rise to such a degree, but it still would be dependent, in a great measure, on what the crop was of course.—*Q.* I am told that the average crop! *A.* Inconvenient result even if we had an average crop, because, if we look back for the years, we have had a very considerable importation, and yet the crops have been not far from average crops."—Here he is got completely into the subjective mood. He does not conceive, that at present, there is any alarming danger from a redundancy of corn; he thinks there may be a great probability of some distress from the stoppage of the foreign corn-ports, but is confident the evil would speedily be corrected by such encouragement to the agriculture of these kingdoms as would produce a redundancy. And this, reader, was the gentleman who so frightened you, and, almost frightened me, with his anticipation of "a short crop or a week's mildew!" Nay, he said (see p. 572) "Prevent the want of importation before we hear one word of the calamity of producing too much corn." He would not hear one word; no, not one word of this, until we had so improved our agriculture, as to prevent the want of importation. Have we so improved it, Sir? Why, then, do you talk of injury to agriculture from the want of demand? You had recommended a general enclosure bill: "what for?" said I, "to get more corn?" "That, according to the complaints of the country gentlemen, (for the sentiment never was mine, observe) would be an evil, as they say that corn is now too cheap." To this your answer, just quoted, was given; to this you answered, "prevent the want of importation before we hear one word of the calamity of producing too much corn." So say I; but, you, it seems, are, now, not only hearing, but saying, a good many words about the "calamity of producing too much corn," before any thing has been done to prevent the want of importation.—To proceed: he admits, that a temporary inconvenience might happen, if the demand of next year should exceed the supply to the amount of about one million of quarters; and that, if

the corn-ports were to continue shut for 12 or 18 months longer, the price *might* rise to a distressing degree, but that much would depend upon the crop; nay, he is candid enough to admit, that, if the crop were an average one, inconvenience *might* arise, and well he might make this admission, after having, with all his great powers of statement, imprinted upon our minds the fact, that, upon an average of many years, we imported 800,000 quarters! But, is it not charming to see how calm, how composed, how serene, Mr. Young is become upon the score of a probable want of corn? I congratulate him upon the change, which will also, I hope, help to keep me in countenance; for, one of my correspondents treated me almost as an unfeeling ruffian, because I seemed to write upon the subject in cold blood. He told me *every body else* was alarmed, and he particularly cited Mr. Arthur Young, from whose authority, he said, there was no appeal.—We now come to the grand point respecting the effect, which a general enclosure would have upon the market, and the difference between that effect and the effect of the substitution of sugar for corn, in the distilleries. The committee seem here to have made their last grasp at the eel, and, I think, the reader will agree with me, that, with the help of my little sharp-pointed holders, they fairly caught him.

—Q Does a letter on the produce and consumption of this country signed “Arthur Young,” and published in COBBETT’S REGISTER of the 5th of March, contain your sentiments on that subject? A. It does.—Q. I there read, “that there is a degree of precariousness in the national resources that ought to make a deep impression on the minds of those in whose hands the safety of the kingdom is placed, to find that our consumption of wheat in a year of moderate plenty exceeds the produce by more than £1,050,000, accompanied as it is by a population admitted on all hands to be increasing, must, surely, be admitted as a just cause of apprehension. Were the countries which have usually supplied us in a state of independence and security, the prospect would be far more pleasing, but when we cast an anxious eye to the ports of the Baltic, the view becomes dreary indeed.”—Was that case written under apprehensions of an over loaded market, or of a famished population? A. A famished population is a very strong term, but certainly it was written under apprehensions that a severe scarcity might en-

sue.—Q. Do you consider that the present state of the country, and doubtful reliance that is to be put in foreign markets, calls for a prompt adoption of the remedy against scarcity which you have proposed, viz. the encouragement of potatoes, and the cultivation of the waste lands? A. I certainly do, and I think that every hour that is lost, is much to be regretted.—Q. You have stated, that the exclusion of grain from the distillery, would injure agriculture by lowering the price of grain. Do you mean, that this effect would be produced, by the additional quantity that would be thus thrown on the market? A. Not by the additional quantity thrown on the market, but by the demand for the quantity already in market being withdrawn.—Q. Do you mean, that the proportion of demand would thereby become less than the proportion of supply? A. Certainly, as far as the quantity amounts to that is consumed by the distillery.—Q. Would not the same effect upon this proportion be occasioned, if, (the consumption remaining the same) an additional supply of equal amount were to be brought into the market? A. Certainly, I conceive it would.—Q. In what respect, then, will the effect on the market, which is produced by *raising* the consumption of a given quantity of corn, differ from that which is produced by introducing into the market an equal quantity in addition to the former supply by cultivating the waste lands? A. The culture of the waste lands would not have a great effect on the immediate production of BARLEY. The great effect would be, on the potatoes, and on the food of cattle and on the production of other grain, but probably least of all on barley. If the culture was principally to increase the production of barley, it would operate *exactly in the manner the hon. member alludes to*, saving the consumption of the people employed on such cultivation.—Q. Would the consumption of grain by the people of England be immediately extended by the cultivation of the waste lands? A. Certainly not.—Now, observe, the consumption, he says, of the people of England would *not* be extended by the cultivation of the waste lands. He had told me this before, and he saw the Register in the examiner’s hand. Well; 1st he says, the mouths would not be increased by the cultivation of the waste lands; 2d, that the quantity of corn produced would, by that cultivation, be increased; 3d, that the demand would be

dininished, and the price reduced of course, by the exclusion of corn from the distilleries; 4th, that the same effect would be produced if an additional supply of corn were brought into the market. These four propositions Mr. Young has here, in his answers, clearly and undeniably stated or assented to; and, these propositions admitted, it inevitably follows, that, if to introduce sugar into the distilleries be injurious to agriculture and the landed interest, and tends to rob the nation of a granary in times of dearth, so is the enclosure of waste lands injurious to agriculture and the landed interest, and tends to rob the nation of a granary in times of dearth. And, how does Mr. Young endeavour to escape from this inference; from this logical self-holder? He is asked, "in *what respect*, then, does the effect "of the culture of waste lands differ "from that of the introduction of sugar "to supply the place of corn?" What is his answer to this question? Why, that "the culture of waste lands would "not have a *great* effect in the *immediate* "introduction of BARLEY." Of barley, Sir! Why, we were not talking of barley alone; nor were *you* talking of barley alone, when you were describing the probable horrid effects of a scarcity, and calling upon us to cultivate the waste lands, in order to prevent those effects. But, to leave no room for cavil, to do away all pretence for continuing the dispute upon this point, either you were, in your letters to me, talking of barley alone, or you were not. If you were not, then the above inference remains indisputable; and, if you were talking of barley alone, then we want no inference at all, for we have your own express acknowledgement, in your last answer but one, in these words: "If "the culture of the waste lands was *principally* to increase the production of barley, "it would operate exactly in the manner "the honourable gentleman alludes to;" that is to say, it would produce the *same effect* as the introduction of sugar into the distilleries; and, that is to say, according to your present opinion, the culture of the waste lands would be injurious to agriculture and the landed interest, and would tend to rob the nation of a granary in times of dearth; which opinion is directly opposed, to all that, upon this matter, you have heretofore given as the result of your maturest thoughts, and have endeavoured to inculcate in the minds of all descriptions of persons.—I have now to beg the reader's pardon for having so long trespassed upon

his patience; but, the subject appeared to me to be of extreme importance to the nation at large; and, as Mr. Young is evidently the oracle of the country gentlemen, and of all the patrons of high prices of corn, it seemed to me necessary to show, that, either he is a gentleman of very unsettled opinions, or is carried away by a misguided zeal for the interest of that particular class of the community amongst whom he has had the greatest intercourse, and with whom he has long been an object of admiration and respect.—As to the measure proposed, there, surely, cannot be a doubt of its receiving the sanction of parliament. *Petitioners* indeed! *Petitioners* for a high price of corn! The freeholders of Rosshire have, it seems, petitioned for high prices, while it is *in evidence*, that an alarming scarcity exists in that county; and which state of things is not confined to Rosshire alone; yet, are the other counties of Scotland also petitioners against sugar, thanks to the instigation of those who would starve the people, if they could thereby fill their own pockets. But, is the sober and sensible part of the kingdom to *sit quietly*, and suffer, as a correspondent asks, a question of this extreme magnitude to be decided by the clamours of misguided avarice? If so, we deserve, not only to be *flogged*; but famine ought to complete what the lash has begun.

Bottley, May 6.

A LETTER FROM THE HON. TIMOTHY PICKERING, A SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS, AND SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER GEN. WASHINGTON, EXHIBITING TO HIS CONSTITUENTS A VIEW OF THE IMMINENT DANGER OF AN UNNECESSARY AND RUINOUS WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN: ADDRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES SULLIVAN, GOVERNOR OF THE SAID STATE.—*Dated City of Washington, Feb. 10, 1808.*

SIR;—In the even current of ordinary times, an address from a senator in congress to his constituents might be dispensed with. In such times, the proceedings of the executive and legislature of the United States, exhibited in their public acts, might be sufficient. But the present singular condition of our country, when its most interesting concerns, wrapt up in mystery, excite universal alarm, requires me to be no longer silent. Perhaps I am liable to censure, at such a crisis, for not sooner presenting, to you and them, such a view of our national affairs as my official situation has placed in my power. I now address it to you, Sir, as

the proper organ of communication to the legislature.—The attainment of truth is ever desirable: and I cannot permit myself to doubt that the statement I now make must be acceptable to all who have an agency in directing the affairs, and who are guardians of the interests of our commonwealth, which so materially depend on the measures of the government of the nation. At the same time, I am aware of the jealousy, with which, in these unhappy days of party dissensions, my communications may, by some of my constituents, be received. Of this I will not complain: while I earnestly wish the same jealousy to be extended towards all public men. Yet I may claim some share of attention and credit—that share which is due to the man who defies the world to point, in the whole course of a long and public life, at one instance of deception, at a single departure from truth.—The embargo demands the first notice. For perhaps no act of the national government has ever produced so much solicitude, or spread such universal alarm. Because all naturally conclude, that a measure pregnant with incalculable mischief to all classes of our fellow-citizens, would not have been proposed by the president, and adopted by congress, but for causes deeply affecting the interests and safety of the nation. It must have been under the influence of this opinion that the legislative bodies of some states have expressed their approbation of the embargo, either explicitly or by implication.—The following were all the papers laid by the president before congress, as the grounds of the embargo.—1. The proclamation of the king of G. Britain requiring the return of his subjects, the seamen especially, from foreign countries, to aid, in this hour of peculiar danger, in the defence of their own. But it being an acknowledged principle that every nation has a right to the service of its subjects in time of war, that proclamation could not furnish the slightest ground for an embargo.—2. The extract of a letter from the grand judge Regnier to the French attorney general for the council of prizes. This contained a partial interpretation of the imperial blockading decree of Nov. 21, 1866. This decree, indeed, and its interpretation, present flagrant violations of our neutral rights, and of the existing treaty between the United States and France; but still, the execution of that decree could not (from the small number of French cruisers) extensively interrupt our trade. These two papers were public.—3. The letter from our minister, Mr. Armstrong, to Mr. Champagny, the French minister of foreign affairs: and—4. Mr. Cham-

pagny's answer. Both these ought, in form or substance, also to have been made public. The latter would have furnished to our nation some idea of the views and expectations of France. But both were withdrawn by the president, to be deposited among other executive secrets: while neither presented any new ground to justify an embargo.—In the senate, these papers were referred to a committee. The committee quickly reported a bill for laying an embargo, agreeably to the president's proposal. This was read a 1st, a 2d, and a 3d time, and passed; and all in the short compass of about 4 hours! A little time was repeatedly asked, to obtain further information, and to consider a measure of such moment, of such universal concern: but these requests were denied. We were hurried into the passage of the bill, as if there was danger of its being rejected, if we were allowed time to obtain further information, and deliberately consider the subject. For to that time our vessels were freely sailing on foreign voyages; and in a national point of view, the departure of half a dozen or a dozen more, while we were inquiring into the necessity or expediency of the embargo, was of little moment. Or if the danger to our vessels, seamen, and merchandise, had been so extreme as not to admit of one day's delay, ought not that extreme danger to have been exhibited to congress? The constitution which requires the president "to give to congress information of the state of the union," certainly meant not partial, but complete information on the subject of a communication, so far as he possessed it. And when it enjoins him "to recommend to their consideration such measures as he should judge necessary and expedient," it was certainly intended that those recommendations should be bottomed on information communicated, not on facts withheld, and locked up in the executive cabinet. Had the public safety been at stake, or any great public good been presented to our view, but which would be lost by a moment's delay, there would have been some apology for dispatch, though none for acting without due information. In truth, the measure appeared to me then, as it still does, and as it appears to the public, without a sufficient motive, without a legitimate object. Hence the general inquiry—"For what is the embargo laid?" And I challenge any man, not in the secret of the executive, to tell. I know, Sir, that the president said the papers above-mentioned "shewed that great and increasing dangers threatened our vessels, our seamen, and our merchandise:" but I also know that they exhibited no new dan-

gers; none of which our merchants and seamen had not been well apprized. The British proclamation had many days before been published in the newspapers [the copy laid before us by the president had been cut out of a newspaper]; and so had the substance, if not the words of Regnier's letter. Yet they had excited little concern among merchants and seamen, the preservation of whose persons and property was the professed object of the president's recommendation of an embargo. The merchants and seamen could accurately estimate the dangers of continuing their commercial operations; of which dangers, indeed, the actual premiums of insurance were a satisfactory gauge. Those premiums had very little increased: by the British proclamation not a cent: and by the French decree so little as not to stop commercial enterprizes. The great number of vessels loading or laded, and prepared for sea; the exertions every where made, on the first rumour of the embargo, to dispatch them, demonstrate the president's dangers to be imaginary, to have been assumed. Or if great and real dangers, unknown to commercial men, were impending, or sure to fall, how desirable was it to have had them officially declared and published. This would have produced a voluntary embargo, and prevented every complaint. Besides, the dangers clearly defined and understood, the public mind would not have been disquieted with imaginary fears, the more tormenting, because uncertain.—It is true that considerable numbers of vessels were collected in our ports, and many held in suspense; not, however, from any new dangers which appeared, but from the mysterious conduct of our affairs after the attack on the Chesapeake, and from the painful apprehensions that the course the president was pursuing would terminate in war. The National Intelligencer, usually considered as the executive newspaper, gave the alarm, and it was echoed through the U. States. War, probable or inevitable war, was the constant theme of the newspapers, and of the conversations, as was reported, of persons supposed to be informed of executive designs. Yet amid this din of war, no adequate preparations were seen making to meet it. The order to detach a hundred thousand militia to fight the British navy (for there was no appearance of an enemy in any other shape) was so completely absurd, as to excite, with men of common sense, no other emotion than ridicule. Not the shadow of a reason that could operate on the mind of a man of common understanding can be offered in its justification. The refusal of the British offi-

cer to receive the frigate Chesapeake as a prize, when tendered by her commander, is a demonstration that the attack upon her was exclusively for the purpose of taking their deserters, and not intended as the commencement of a war between the two nations. The president knew that the British had no invading army to land on our shores; and the detached militia would be useless, except against land forces. Why then was this order for the militia given? The nature of the case, and the actual state of things, authorize the inference, that its immediate, if not its only object, was to increase the public alarm, to aggravate the public resentment against G. Britain, to excite a war pulse: and in the height of this artificial fever of the public mind, which was to be made known in G. Britain, to renew the demands on her government, in the poor expectation of extorting, in that state of things, concessions of points which she had always considered as her rights, and which at all times, and under all circumstances, she had uniformly refused to relinquish. The result of the subsequent negotiation at London has shown how utterly unfounded was the president's expectation, how perfectly useless all this bluster of war. While no well-informed man doubted that the British government would make suitable reparation for the attack on the Chesapeake. The president himself, in his proclamation, had placed the affair on that footing. "A rupture between the two nations," said he, "is equally opposed to the interest of both, as it is to assurances of the most friendly dispositions on the part of the British government, in the midst of which this outrage was committed. In this light the subject cannot but present itself to that government, and strengthen the motives to an honourable reparation for the wrong which has been done." And it is now well known that such reparation might have been promptly obtained in London, had the president's instructions to Mr. Monroe been compatible with such an adjustment. He was required not to negotiate on this single transient act (which when once adjusted was for ever settled) but in connection with another claim of long standing, and, to say the least, of doubtful right; to wit, the exemption from impressment of British seamen found on board American merchant vessels. To remedy the evil arising from its exercise, by which our own citizens were sometimes impressed, the attention of our government, under every administration, had been earnestly engaged; but no practicable plan has yet been contrived; while no man who regards the truth, will question

the disposition of the British government to adopt any arrangements that will secure to G. Britain the services of her own subjects. And now, when the unexampled situation of that country, left alone to maintain the conflict with France, and her numerous dependent states, left alone to withstand the power which menaces the liberties of the world, rendered the aid of all her subjects more than ever needful; there was no reasonable ground to expect that she would yield the right to take them when found on board the merchant vessels of any nation. Thus to insist on her yielding this point, and inseparably to connect it with the affair of the Chesapeake, was tantamount to a determination not to negotiate at all.—I write, Sir, with freedom; for the times are too perilous to allow those who are placed in high and responsible situations to be silent or reserved. The peace and safety of our country are suspended on a thread. The course we have seen pursued leads on to war—to war with G. Britain—a war absolutely without necessity—a war which, whether disastrous or successful, must bring misery and ruin to the U. States; misery by the destruction of our navigation and commerce (perhaps also of our fairest seaport towns and cities) the loss of markets for our produce, the want of foreign goods and manufactures, and the other evils incident to a state of war; and ruin, by the loss of our liberty and independence. For if, with the aid of our arms, G. Britain were subdued, from that moment, though flattered perhaps with the name of allies, we should become the provinces of France. This is a result so obvious, that I must crave your pardon for noticing it. Some advocates of executive measures admit it. They acknowledge that the navy of Britain is our shield against the overwhelming power of France. Why then do they persist in a course of conduct tending to a rupture with G. Britain?—Will it be believed that it is principally, or solely, to procure inviolability to the merchant flag of the U. States? In other words, to protect all seamen (British subjects, as well as our own citizens) on board our merchant vessels? It is a fact that this has been made the greatest obstacle to an amicable settlement with G. Britain. Yet, I repeat, it is perfectly well known that she desires to obtain only her own subjects; and that American citizens, impressed by mistake, are delivered up on duly authenticated proof. The evil we complain of arises from the impossibility of always distinguishing the persons of two nations who a few years since were one people, who exhibit the same manners, speak

the same language, and possess similar features. But seeing that we seldom hear complaints in the great navigating states, how happens there to be such extreme sympathy for American seamen at Washington? Especially in gentlemen from the interior states, which have no seamen, or from those Atlantic states whose native seamen bear a very small proportion to those of New England? In fact, the causes of complaint are much fewer than are pretended. They rarely occur in the States whose seamen are chiefly natives. The first merchant in the United States, in answering my late inquiry about British impressments, says, "since the Chesapeake affair we have had no complaint. I cannot find one single instance where they have taken one man out of a merchant vessel. I have had more than twenty vessels arrived in that time, without one instance of a man being taken by them. Three Swedes were taken out by a French frigate. I have made inquiry of all the masters that have arrived in this vicinity, and cannot find any complaints against the British cruisers."—Can gentlemen of known hostility to foreign commerce in our own vessels—who are even willing to annihilate it (and such there are)—can these gentlemen plead the cause of our seamen, because they really wish to protect them? Can those desire to protect our seamen, who, by laying an unnecessary embargo, expose them by thousands to starve or beg?—One gentleman has said (and I believe he does not stand alone) that sooner than admit the principle that G. Britain had a right to take her own subjects from our merchant vessels, he would abandon commerce altogether! To what will every man in New-England and of the other navigating states, ascribe such a sentiment? A sentiment which, to prevent the temporary loss of 5 men by impress, would reduce fifty thousand to beggary? But for the embargo, thousands depending on the ordinary operations of commerce, would now be employed. Even under the restraints of the orders of the British government, retaliating the French imperial decree, very large portions of the world remain open to the commerce of the U. States. We may yet pursue our trade with the British dominions, in every part of the globe; with Africa, with China, and with the colonies of France, Spain, and Holland. And let me ask, whether, in the midst of a profound peace, when the powers of Europe possessing colonies, would, as formerly, confine the trade with them to their own bottoms, or admit us, as foreigners, only under great limitations, we could

enjoy a commerce, much more extensive, than is practicable at this moment, if the embargo were not in the way? Why then should it be continued? Why rather was it ever laid? Can those be legitimate reasons for the embargo which are concealed from Congress at the moment when they are required to impose it? Are the reasons to be found in the dispatches from Paris? These have been moved for; and the motion was quashed by the advocates for the embargo. Why are these dispatches withheld by the executive? Why, when all classes of citizens anxiously inquire "for what is the embargo laid?" is a satisfactory answer denied? Why is not congress made acquainted with the actual situation of the U. States in relation to France. Why, in this dangerous crisis are Mr. Armstrong's letters to the secretary of state absolutely withheld, so that a line of them cannot be seen? Did they contain no information of the demands and intentions of the French Emperor? Did the *Revenge* sail from England to France, and there wait three or four weeks for dispatches of no importance? If so, why, regardless of the public solicitude, are their contents so carefully concealed? If really unimportant, what harm can arise from telling congress and the nation, officially, that they contain nothing of moment to the safety, the liberty, the honour, or the interests of the U. States? On the contrary, are they so closely locked up because they will not bear the light? Would their disclosure rouse the spirit of the people, still slumbering in blind confidence in the executive? Has the French Emperor declared that he will have no neutrals? Has he required that our ports, like those of his vassal states in Europe, be shut against British commerce? Is the embargo a substitute, a milder form of compliance with that harsh demand, which, if exhibited in its naked and insulting aspect, the American spirit might yet resent? Are we still to be kept profoundly ignorant of the declarations and avowed designs of the French Emperor, although these may strike at our liberty and independence? And in the mean time, are we, by a thousand irritations, by cherishing prejudices, and by exciting fresh resentments, to be drawn gradually into a war with G. Britain? Why, amidst the extreme anxiety of the public mind, is it still kept on the rack of fearful expectation, by the president's portentous silence respecting his

French dispatches? In this concealment there is danger. In this concealment must be wrapt up the real cause of the embargo. On any other supposition it is inexplicable.

—I am alarmed, Sir, at this perilous state of things; I cannot repress my suspicions, or forbear thus to exhibit to you the grounds on which they rest. The people are advised to repose implicit confidence in the national government: in that unbounded confidence lies our danger. Armed with that confidence, the executive may procure the adoption of measures which may overwhelm us with ruin, as surely as if he had an army at his heels. By false policy, or by inordinate tears, our country may be betrayed and subjugated to France, as surely as by corruption.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S Parliamentary History OF ENGLAND,

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COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"Were the countries, which have usually supplied us, in a state of independence and security, the prospect would be far from pleasing; but, when we cast an anxious eye to the Baltic, the view becomes dreary indeed. Who can contemplate the consequences of a short crop, a mildew, or a wet harvest without horror?" — MR. ARTHUR YOUNG.
 "If the West Indies could supply us with 300,000 quarters of corn, I, for one, would object to its being brought into this country." — MR. WAKEFIELD.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.—(Concluded from p. 727).—This subject has been fairly exhausted; but, as I have, in the present Number, a letter from MR. YOUNG (which did not reach me here, till Saturday last), and also a letter from MR. WAKEFIELD, the two great advocates for a high price of corn; and, as there are some few passages in those letters, which contain new matter, or matter, at least, in a new shape, I shall notice these; but, as I shall abstain from bringing forward any new argument myself, I shall in this Number close the discussion, lest, by continuing the dispute, we should, for want of novelty in fair argument, fall into sophistry and cavilling.—First, then, with respect to Mr. Young. This gentleman, having in his eye the law of retaliation, employs against me the *argumentum ad hominem*, as the "learned" call it, or, as the unlearned would call it, the *argument against the man*. Referring to page 643 of the present volume, he finds me saying, that, "supposing the measure to be injurious to the barley-grower, I should then inquire, whether the injury to the barley grower would be more or less than the relief to the sugar-grower; the latter being, in my opinion, full as much entitled to the protection of the government as the former." He congratulates me upon this *change*, as he is pleased to call it; is rejoiced to find that I have ceased to cry "perish commerce," and the like. But, pray, Sir, in what does this supposed *change* consist? Did I ever say that any particular set of men were less entitled to the protection of the government than any other set of men? Did I ever say this, or give it to be understood, in any way whatever? I have said, indeed, that the attention of the government ought to be always directed, in a more especial manner, to the internal prosperity of the country; I have reprobated

ted the running after riches, or supposed riches and resources, out of the country; I have said, that colonies added little or nothing to the strength of the country; but, did I ever recommend the withdrawing of the protection of government from those who are already settled in the colonies? Have I not, on the contrary, frequently endeavoured to turn the public attention to the miserable state of our colonies in the West Indies, and implored the ministers to do something for their relief? This *change*, then, is not to be found in my writings, or my sentiments, and exists only in the imagination of Mr. Young. I am an advocate for domestic improvement; for the doing of that which shall render us independent of commerce, that is to say, independent of foreign nations. I am decidedly of opinion, that, starting from the present moment, we might be so independent as to corn as well as to every thing else. But, I have always admitted, and so has Mr. Spence, that a temporary embarrassment might, and would, arise from transferring three or four hundred thousand pair of hands from the shuttle to the plough; and, though I am satisfied, that we could dispense even with sugar, I never said, that sugar was not a necessary article; but, on the contrary, said that it was, but, that this particular article *was always at our command*, making a distinction between this sort of commerce and that which can, at any time, be taken from us. At any rate, we *have* the sugar. The sugar is spoiling for want of being used. Commerce *has* brought us this sugar; and though I wish all commerce were annihilated, is that any reason why I am to object to this sugar being used, more especially when I am informed that it will cause a saving of corn? Though I wish the Royal Exchange and the Bank and all the rest of it were put an end to, is that any reason why I should not think that the merchant and banker are as much entitled to the pro

tection of the government as the farmer? Let colonies cease with all my heart. Nay, let sugar go, rather than let all remain as it is; but, let not the sugar, which we have, rot in the king's store-houses, from the fear of its being used producing a fall in the price of corn.—In the page before referred to, I had said: "You assert, that the measure will be injurious, not only to the barley growers, but, *to the nation at large.* Make this out, gentlemen, and I am with you." In answer to this, Mr. Young says, "we have made it out before the committee." To which I might reply, that the committee have, *then*, made a false report to the House; for, as will be seen, from the extract of the Report contained in the last Register, the committee recommended the adoption of the measure; either, therefore, you did not make out your position before the committee, or the committee were too dull to understand you, or they have recommended a measure that they believe will be injurious to the whole nation. I rather choose, however, to reply by a reference to Mr. Young's own evidence, as stated in my last Register. That evidence is before the reader; and to the reader I will leave the decision of the question, whether it was made out before the committee, that the measure proposed would be injurious to the whole nation?—But, while Mr. Young is contending, that the whole nation will be injured, it is odd enough, that he should now, as he did before the committee, take so much pains to separate the barley-growers from all other people. I had said, in page 648, "as connected with a question like this, which embraces the general produce of the soil, and the general interests of the nation, all the distinctions between barley-growers are too trifling to be attended to." "This," says Mr. Young, "I utterly deny." And then he goes on in a dissertation of detail about *cropping*; good heavens! as if the nation had any thing to do with cropping. As if, when the question of scarcity or plenty is agitated, the nation had any thing to do with this or that sort of crop. *Human sustenance* is the thing of which we want to secure a provision; corn is the main commodity of this sustenance; and, therefore, it is of *corn* in general, and not of barley in particular, which we must speak, and respecting which we must reason, if we mean to arrive at a just conclusion.—Mr. Young, who was, probably, writing this his defence of his evidence at the very moment when I was, last week, commenting upon that evidence, says that

our contrasting of his arguments in favour of enclosures with his arguments against the use of sugar in the distilleries, "is one of the convenient results of *confounding corn and barley.*" Why, Sir, that is your own fault, if it be a fault; for, it was you and those who take the same side with you, who chose to make the question a general one. It was you who chose to represent the measure proposed, as a measure that would tend to augment the evils of "a short crop or a week's mildew;" while some few of you called it a measure for "discouraging the growth of corn;" a measure for "the creating of scarcity;" a measure "to make the farmers bankrupts;" a measure, "a bill," said a writer in the *Morning Chronicle*, "which should be entitled, a bill to create a scarcity of *corn*, by discouraging the growth thereof." You were, probably, aware, that, if you confined yourselves to the injury (real or supposed) which the barley-growers would sustain, no very great public interest would be excited; you must, indeed, have clearly perceived, that it would be thought of little consequence, whether the few persons, whose chief profits arise from the growing of barley, suffered a small diminution in the quantity of wine, which they now notoriously drink by the two bottles a day; and, therefore (for the conclusion is too obvious to require qualification), you chose to speak of the measure as one that would have a general effect; as one that would endanger the common prosperity, and even the *safety* of the nation. After this, after we had thus been compelled by yourselves to combat you upon the general ground of human food, it does seem a little hard that we should be accused of *confounding* corn with barley. But, Sir, as to "the *convenient result*," with respect to the contrast above mentioned, the state in which your arguments were placed required no new convenience, on the part of your opponents; for, as I have shewn, I think, at the close of my last week's article, it was quite impossible to take those arguments in any way which would not lead them to defeat each other.—You ask me, Sir, if I am willing, that the people should be taxed a million a year to make up for the loss, which the revenue will sustain by the distillation of sugar. No, "without the hesitation of a moment;" for, I would, if I could have my will, lop off expenses, or rather shameful waste of the public money to more than that amount. But, this is not your meaning. Well, then, Sir, I would full as willingly see the people pay a million

in taxes as a million in price of corn, kept up by a restrictive statute; and, you have not heard me say one word in favour of the restrictive part of the proposed measure; for, my opinion is, that there should be no restriction. Let sugar come to the still, loaded with no heavier duty than barley is loaded with, and let them run a fair race. But, if a law exist to prohibit the use of sugar in the distilleries, or if duties are laid amounting to such prohibition; then is the price of corn kept up by statute, and then are the people taxed in their loaf to the amount of whatever money the government raises from corn through the means of keeping sugar from the distilleries. Besides, Sir, taking the question as one of mere revenue. I should suppose, that the sugar, which now lies rotting in the storehouses, has, as yet, paid no duties; and that, of course, the drawing of it forth will cause duties to be paid upon it. At any rate, the committee, who seem not to have lost sight of revenue, and who, as you say, were occupied, with great zeal, solely in discovering *truth*, have given it as their opinion, that the revenue will experience no diminution from the adoption of the measure proposed; so that an objection, upon this ground, cannot fairly be considered as of any great weight.—Mr. Young is quite ready to grant the West India planters *relief* out of the *taxes*. So am not I. I am for suffering no company, or set of men, to come to the purse of the nation, to come and knock at the door of the labourer, and say, contribute towards making up to me the losses I have sustained in my calling, and to support me in that opulence which I have hitherto enjoyed. When the common tradesman fails, though from the effects of war or any national measure, which he could not have averted, he descends to the rank of journeyman, without any one proposing to relieve him out of the taxes. When a farmer is ruined by the rot amongst his sheep; or by the united effects of the kill-calf and the glanders, he becomes a labourer, and the taxes remain untouched by him. This is not only the lot of man, but it is right that it should be so; for, otherwise, who would rise early and eat the bread of carefulness, seeing how easy a matter it is to ascribe to misfortune what is the effect of negligence, extravagance, or avariciousness? Nothing but the deepest of political corruption, rendered familiar to the minds of a nation, can ever make it listen with patience to a principle so unnatural, so abominable, as that upon which *relief* of this sort is proposed. No. I would rather see the West Indians ten thousand times more impoverished than they are, than see

them buying boroughs, in order to secure votes for the minister of the day, in return for the grants made to them out of the public money. The West Indians have plenty of sugar. All they ask, is, to be suffered to make this into the drinks, which we now make out of corn. And as good a right they have to this (as long as the colonial system exists) as the Norfolk farmer has to sell his barley. We *compel* them, observe, to purchase all their wearing apparel, their tools, and their household goods, from us. We *compel* them to bring the produce of their lands to the mother country; and, would she not be a pretty sort of mother, if she were to say to them, your produce, which is to pay for the goods that I have made you buy of me, shall lie here and rot, lest the use of it should lessen the gains of those, who have derived a profit from selling food to the persons employed upon making the goods which you have bought? Commend me to such a mother, if you wish the child to revolt, even at the hazard of its own existence!—MR. WAKEFIELD'S letter contains little more than a repetition, under a new form, of his former arguments, yet there are some few points which ought not to pass unnoticed, particularly as he takes occasion to speak in praise of the opinions of Mr. Young.—He says, that *he* never expressed his sorrow at the foreign supply of corn being cut off. Mr. Young expressed his *alarm* at it, and Mr. Wakefield's letters were calculated to shew the reasonableness of that alarm, by giving us details of the large average importation. In answer to my observation, that we heard no out-cry against the importation of 800,000 quarters of corn annually, he says, that there was an opposition to that importation; that there have been reports and petitions against it; but, *last year*, for instance, how came we to hear nothing against it? The cry has been raised all of a sudden; and that, too, at a moment when the country had, by these very gentlemen, just been alarmed for its *safety*, in case of a short crop. Well, but what was the object of Mr. Wakefield, in giving us an account of our average imports? He says, to induce those who had the power to make such laws or regulations as should insure to the farmer a *better price* for his corn. How? By the way of *premium*, paid out of the taxes? That would have been too absurd. How then? By allowing an EXPORT? Good Lord! Whither? To what country, except to the West Indies. But, this, surely, is jesting. In answer, however, to my observation, that if the West Indies could supply us with 800,000 qrs. of corn, in

kind, in place of supplying us with it in the shape of sugar, there would have been no objection to it, he says: "I for one, "would have objected." That's boldly said, at the moment when Mr. Young was terrifying me out of my wits with the anticipation of "a short crop or a week's mill-dew;" but, it is fairly said, and it is consistent; though Mr. Wakefield will, I am sure, allow, that he has said this from hard necessity and not from choice. I endeavoured to keep up the drooping spirits of my readers by telling them, that the same cause which kept corn from coming into the country would bring hands from those pestiferous prisons, the manufactories, to raise more corn in the country; but, Mr. Young said, no. "We must have a general enclosure bill; for the lands now in cultivation are no more at our disposition than lands in the moon." Why did not Mr. Wakefield fly to my Register at that moment of distress? Why did he not, when some of my correspondents were accusing me of a want of feeling for my fellow-creatures, come boldly forward, and say, that if there were 300,000 quarters of corn in one of our colonies, he would, for one, object to its being imported? Why did he not throw his shield between me and Mr. A. B. (or Alexander Baring) of the Morning Chronicle, who had like to have crushed me with the threat, that we should, in future, get no corn from America? I laughed at the threat, to be sure; but I, though not apt to be daunted by popular opinion, had never the boldness to assert, that, when all the other corn ports in the world were shut against us, I would object to the importation of 300,000 quarters of corn, if I could find it in one of our own colonies. To this, however, I repeat it, Mr. Wakefield has been driven. The importation of 300,000 quarters of corn would, he could not deny, have precisely the same effect upon the farmer here as the importation of sugar to supply the place of that quantity of corn; and, as he had made up his mind to the rejection of the former, he was compelled to reject the latter. Hushed, then, be all your fears, ye scarcity alarmists! For here is a gentleman, who has made the means of national subsistence his study; who has collected together an account of the resources and wants of the country; who was one of the persons selected by the committee of the House of Commons to furnish them with information and opinions; and he tells you in so many words, that, if, at this moment, there were 300,000 quarters of

corn to spare in Jamaica, or Antigua, he would not, if he could have his will, suffer the said corn to be brought into England!—In answer to my question, "what difference would there be between importing 300,000 qrs. of corn from the West Indies and importing sugar to supply the place of that quantity of corn?" Mr. Wakefield says, "there would be this material difference, we could have the corn to eat, and not distill it." Very true; but, this is no answer to me. I did not ask what difference it would be to the nation, but what difference it would be to the farmer; what difference it would make in the corn market; what difference it would make as to the inducement to raise corn, that being the point at issue.—Mr. Wakefield, in pursuance of his laudable resolution to be consistent, and profiting, perhaps, from the cruel embarrassment of Mr. Young, speaks with becoming diffidence of the effect of *new enclosures*, and even of *improvements*, though, as the reader has, doubtless, observed, he is as fond of "cropping" as any other member of the agricultural clubs. "According to my idea," says he, "of enclosures and improvements, they will not operate against the chances of the seasons, unless the additional produce of them be exported, or luxuriously consumed at home." Well, then, unless we had added to the distilleries, or set about an exportation, or thrown corn into the rivers, Mr. Young's notion of security from scarcity to arise from new-enclosures was shockingly erroneous. "Who shall decide when these agricultural doctors disagree?" This discussion, if it has no other effect, will, I should think, set at rest the question about a general enclosure bill. I am a decided opponent of new enclosures, until we have more hands to till the land; and, I must confess, that I jumped for joy to find that Mr. Young had given his opinion against the distillation from sugar; because, without hearing his reasons, I was certain that none could be used which would not equally well apply against new-enclosures, supposing such enclosures to add to the quantity of corn now produced in the country.—Mr. Wakefield persists in his notion of a granary to arise out of a surplus produce; and, therefore, let us take a parting view of this same granary.—I had, in my last, put a case of a little nation consuming 1000 quarters of corn annually, growing 1,500 and exporting 500, which, in case of a half crop, would always leave the quantity to be eaten the same. But, I asked, where the *labour*, and *fertility* (which, indeed, is only another name for

labour) were to come from? I said, that this would, indeed, be to "*set the seasons at defiance; to take a bond of fate.*" "Yes," says Mr. Wakefield, "and that is precisely what I wish to do." But, Sir, do take the pains to think a little further upon this matter; and, then, I am strongly disposed to think, that you will not again assert, that such a theory "is reducible to practice." In the first place, you will allow, I suppose, that, if a nation export half as much corn as it raises, that nation must receive some articles of real value and utility in return. Well, then, if it cease, from whatever cause, to export its corn, there must be a cessation in the receipt of those articles, whence, it is evident, that very great distress must arise; and, observe, that, as this receipt would be *entirely* dependent upon the seasons, there could be very little comfort or solidity in any business supported by such a traffic. Besides, though it does not appear to have occurred to you, that the importation of corn might happen to be stopped by other causes than those of a scarcity at home, yet, you have only to open your eyes to perceive, that, if we had, previous to last year, been a nation exporting half as much as we consumed, we should, at this hour, have been so glutted with corn as to cause much of the land, now in cultivation, to lie fallow. How would you have found out a remedy for this? You must, then, actually have thrown the corn into the sea; for, as to distilling it, there would, from such an operation, have been liquor enough for the people to swim in; and, if you let it rot, it would turn to manure, and that would only add to the evil by producing more corn. This was a case that you do not seem to have foreseen, and yet you might, if you had but looked to America, which, at this moment presents you an example of the practice of that delightful theory, which has, it seems, taken possession of your mind. America fears no scarcity of corn, but she feels a real scarcity of shirts and coats and stockings and blankets and sugar and coffee and of many other things, almost as necessary as corn, even to the support of life. Do you not hear the wailings of the Americans, at the end of a two-month's embargo? What would be their situation at the end of a year? One third part of the produce of the land being annually exported (for that, I should think, was much about the proportion), a stoppage of the export necessarily throws a great number of persons out of employment; and, in such a state of things, this is attended with peculiar disadvantage; for, it is easy for manufacturers or artisans

to turn their hands to agriculture, but it is next to impossible for agriculturists to turn their hands to arts and manufactures. Hence the distress, described in the letter of Mr. Pickering, now felt in America; and hence the commotions, the confiscations, and the pillage, which, if the embargo long continue, will inevitably ensue. And yet, there is plenty of corn, Mr. Wakefield; and yet America has realized to your hand that delightful theory, of which you seem so enamoured.—By this time, Sir, I think you must begin to doubt of the facility of "setting the seasons at defiance, and taking a bond of fate." A nation may be so situated as to be able to set the seasons at defiance with respect to corn; but, clothing is as necessary to life as food is; and, with respect to both, the seasons are not to be set at defiance by any nation that is not the absolute mistress of all other nations. America is sure to have more corn than is necessary for her consumption; and, as this granary arises from a stoppage of export, that stoppage may be made when she pleases, but it may also be made when she does not please; it is dependent upon the will of other nations, as to its duration as well as its commencement, and, it does really appear to me, that this sort of dependence is the most dangerous that can possibly exist, with the sole exception of a total dependence upon an import of corn.—For these reasons I stand by my opinion before expressed, that, the only granary, safely to be relied on, is in the bosom of the earth, and in that intuitive wisdom, which teaches the seller to be tardy in the supply, and the consumer to be sparing in the consumption. As for England, I am no more afraid of her experiencing a scarcity of corn than I am of her experiencing a scarcity of rain. There may be, and will be, occasionally, short crops and high prices; but, the evil is not of long duration, and it only tends to quicken our industry, to teach us frugality, and to remind us of that dependence, which we partake in common with all other living creatures. Far be it from me to hold out the idea, that a distillation from sugar instead of corn will prevent, or at all tend to prevent, a scarcity of corn in England and Scotland. It would be a shame indeed for me to pretend to entertain such a notion, when I know, that, for this kingdom, 300,000 quarters of barley scarcely is enough food for one single meal, out of the 1,095 meals which we eat in a year. It is truly a drop in the bucket: it is, considered as a preventive of scarcity, nothing. I have let fall no word, that would lead the reader to suppose, that it was my opinion,

that the nation would derive any degree of security against scarcity from the adoption of the proposed measure; but, I know, that to the West Indians, the advantage would be very great, and they have a just claim to a share of the market, to which they are *compelled* to bring their produce; and, on the other hand, in proportion as the measure would be inefficacious as a preventive of scarcity, it would be little injurious to the farmer. All the farmers together supply us with 1,095 meals of victuals in a year, and, surely, they need not be alarmed, that the West Indians are about to be allowed to supply us with one single breakfast, and that, too, only at the rate of about 4d. a head! Men talk about *millions* very glibly; but, the longer I live the more firm does my conviction become, that there are few minds, comparatively speaking, capable of fully embracing the idea, else we should not hear them talk of a granary to feed millions of people. Stop the distilleries, what have you? A breakfast at 4d. $\frac{1}{2}$ a head; and this, supposing the doctrine to be sound, is the mighty resource the distilleries afford us! Three hundred thousand quarters of corn make a huge heap of sacks; but, after all, I repeat, that it is but one breakfast for twelve millions of people. And this is to spread ruin amongst the farmers! This is the cause of all this alarm and petitioning and speech-making and these endless non-describable fooleries!—Here I put an end to what I have to say upon this subject, which was of the greatest importance as relative to the West India planters, and also as it became connected with the agitation of facts and principles relating to national subsistence. If either or both of the gentlemen, upon whose letters I have been commenting, think it necessary to publish any thing by way of *explanation* of what they have already advanced, I shall gladly insert it; but, as to any thing further, I am sure it will not be expected. I have no desire to have the *last word*; and, unless upon the debate which may take place in parliament, I shall certainly not write, at this time, any thing more upon the subject.—Just as I was about to send off the above, I received a letter from a gentleman in Essex, who expresses his regret and surprize at seeing me take that side of this question which I have taken. “You know,” says he, “full well, how much favour has always been shewn to the *monied* and *commercial* interest, at the expence of that interest, which you have always looked up to as the salvation of the country.”—I am very sorry to differ in opinion from this most respectable person, and I assure

him, that his frankly telling me of what he considers as my errors, or my faults, so far from requiring an apology, merits and receives my thanks. But, in the present case, I really cannot see that I am siding with a monied or commercial interest. The sugarcane planter is only an agriculturalist of another description; and, I wish not to encourage him at the “*expence*” of any one. All my partialities are on the side of the landowners and land-tillers of England. If I had thought that their interests were likely to receive injury from the proposed measure, I will not assert, that my mind would have been free from an undue bias; but, after having given to the subject all the attention I am capable of, I am convinced that this will not, and *cannot*, be the case. It sometimes happens, that one is prepossessed by conversation upon a subject. One gets committed upon certain points, either by hasty declaration, or by tacit admission. To this subject my mind came like a sheet of blank paper; for, until I had begun writing my article, which appeared in the Register of the 23rd of April, I had never spoken nor heard a word relating to the propriety or impropriety of the intended bill; and, until I had finished it and sent it to the press, I had spoken with no person except Mr. Wakefield; and it was not likely that I should imbibe from him any impression in favour of the bill. Indeed, until the morning of the day, on which that article was written, I had never even read Mr. Wakefield’s letter against the bill, which letter appeared in print on the Saturday preceding; and, it was not until I saw the article in the Morning Chronicle, that I thought of looking particularly into the letter. That article appeared to me to contain such wild doctrine, that I was tempted to notice it; when I came to look at the debate, in the House of Commons, there appeared to be a necessity for doing it without loss of time. After my article was written, I saw, for the first time, an account of meetings in the counties, to prepare petitions against the proposed bill; and, as it was then too late to make an addition to what I had said, in the Register, I wrote my letter to the Hampshire freeholders, and immediately sent it off for insertion in the Salisbury Journal and in several other newspapers. So little was I in the knowledge of what had passed, that, until after this letter was written, I did not know that Mr. Young had been examined before the committee. Never, therefore, was any man’s conduct more free from undue bias than mine was upon this occasion. I saw what I regarded as a popular delusion likely to prevail, and I did all in my power to

prevent it. The reader will easily suppose, that there must be a few persons, at least, with whom I might have some influence as far as opinion goes; but, to only one person have I written a word upon the matter; to no one have I spoken; and my wish now is, that, if I am in error, the opinions of my opponents may prevail in the approaching discussion and decision; but, then, it is also my wish, that *clamour* may be completely set at defiance.

LOCAL MILITIA.—This is about the twentieth scheme for raising such a force within the kingdom as shall be able to defend it in case of invasion; whether it will succeed better than any of the former time will very soon enable us to judge. As to the number of the men to be raised, that point is not yet fixed, and, perhaps, it will be left to the option of the ministers. The outline of the plan is this: a certain number of men, to be ballotted from the militia lists, are to be assembled a certain number of days in every year, in order to be drilled, and to be held in readiness to march in case of invasion. They are to be placed under the command of officers appointed by the king; while assembled, or called out, they are to be made subject to all the provisions of the mutiny act; and, of course, may be *flogged* in pursuance of the judgment of officers appointed by the king. This would be no more than what is done in case of the present militia; but, this new scheme allows of *no substitutes*. All those who are balloted for this militia are either to pay a *fine*, or to *serve in person*; and, every man who pays the fine is obliged to *swear*, that he does not derive the means of so doing from any other source than *that of his own private purse*. The words of the clause are these: "That every person liable to the payment of any fine under this act, for not appearing to be enrolled in the Local Militia, who shall refuse to declare upon oath, that he hath not, directly or indirectly, by any policy, premium, or promise of any premium, or by any engagement insured himself against such fine, or any part thereof; and, that no person or persons, hath, or have, directly, or indirectly, undertaken, or engaged, or promised, in any way, to indemnify him therefrom, or from any part thereof, or to repay to him, or to any person or persons in his behalf, or for his use, benefit, or advantage, the said fine, or any part thereof; shall, in every such case, forfeit the amount of such fine, and be *compelled personally to serve* in the said Local Militia for the full term of *— years*."—Upon this bill Sir FRANCIS BURGESS is,

by the newspapers, reported to have spoken as follows: "He said, that there was a time when the army was undisciplined, and the nation savage—when social order was trampled under foot—when liberty was another name for licentiousness; at such a time alone, could a measure like the present be offered to the nation without insult! But now, the moment when civilization was at its *acme*—when England boasted her generosity and her spirit, he could not describe the indignant sensation which he felt at beholding the minister of the day dare to stigmatize the representatives of the people by offering such a measure for their adoption, it required audacity to propose what folly only could imagine efficient, that the reluctant conscripts of our oppressed population should be marshalled under the scourge of tyranny, and presented to the nation as her defence. What! did the noble Lord suppose that the people would endure, or the army bend beneath, the sanguinary, remorseless, and ferocious despotism, which even slaves would turn upon? Did he suppose that the lash of tyranny—the insult of the contumely, and scorn of over-whelming power—the *foedum signum vitutis*," would be suffered by a people with impunity! He was far from wishing to indulge in declamation; but he thought, that, at a moment like the present, when our very existence was at stake, all hands and hearts should form a common bulwark round their common treasure, strong from its union, and invincible in its resistance!—(he *ar, hear.*) —But, he added, when you want men for your defence, offer them a post-fit for men to enter on; when you propose a military code, let it be fit for Englishmen and freemen. He was not disposed to thank the noble lord for his ingenuity nor could he consider it creditable, however characteristic. The features of the offspring intuitively bespeak the parent as with the appearance of the fasces must be associated the idea of the halberd. Atrocious measures must be expected in age from him whose youth had been familiarized to executions; and when the author of this bill had wrung the heart-strings of his own country, little delicacy could be expected from him for the disguised feelings of another. That insatiation, however, was amazing, which disdained to benefit by the lesson of experience; and he thought the fate of such levies as this bill proposed to raise, ought to have acted as a sufficient admonition. We had

“ seen the power of France pass over them
 “ on the continent; we had seen her ruler
 “ by such means, receive the homage of
 “ humiliated Europe, and still we perse-
 “ vered! What folly, what wonderful in-
 “ fatuation! Sir, if we wish for the pre-
 “ servation of our country, let us raise
 “ our physical force in her defence,
 “ let us animate an armed population
 “ in her support, courageous from their
 “ cause, and disciplined by their val-
 “ lour. It is time for us to think of provid-
 “ ing some effectual domestic force against
 “ contingencies. France may not always re-
 “ main inferior to us on the ocean, and the
 “ time may come when Britain must de-
 “ pend, for her safety and liberty, on the
 “ valour, spirit, and discipline of her na-
 “ tion. Does the noble lord suppose that
 “ coal, iron, and wages will provide for such an
 “ event? It is hard to make the supposition;
 “ the salvation of the country depends on the
 “ unanimity of the people, and that unanim-
 “ ity can only be produced by con-
 “ ciliation. From that cause alone shall we
 “ be able to date our existence and pros-
 “ perity. But, alas! let me not talk of
 “ prosperity; every thing I see in this
 “ unhappy land, assures me of her down-
 “ fall; each succeeding year produces a
 “ change of ministry, and each change
 “ of ministry a change of measures!
 “ Thus, plans are proposed, decided on,
 “ and rejected! The indecision of this
 “ government, contrasted by the blind ob-
 “ stinacy of the next, and both outdone by
 “ the nick-named vigour of the following!
 “ Distraction in our councils and impotence
 “ in our ministers, while military executioners
 “ are daring to fix the badge of servitude on
 “ the people! Alas! how deplorably do I
 “ feel at the sight of the journeyman politi-
 “ cians opposite; feeble is the hope of
 “ England, if such is her dependence!—
 “ Sir, such are my sentiments on this bill,
 “ and on our present situation:—they are
 “ the result of observation, and of the in-
 “ struction which I have gleaned from those
 “ pure and venerable authors, which even
 “ the new morality has not taught me to
 “ despise. He concluded by declaring, that
 “ in every stage he should oppose the bill.”
 “—This report (which I copy from Bell’s
 “ Weekly Messenger) differs from that, which
 “ has been given in the Courier; in which lat-
 “ ter paper, it is stated, that Sir Francis said,
 “ that he never would consent to a measure,
 “ that would make the English people a *flogged*
 “ nation. This phrase the hiring editor made
 “ the subject of a long and virulent invective
 “ against the person, from whom it proceeded.

He says, “ If we are to be called a *flogged*
 “ nation, because men are flogged who
 “ violate the military law, we may be called
 “ a *hanged* nation, because men are hanged
 “ who violate the law against treason.” To
 “ what shall we ascribe the use of such miser-
 “ able sophistry? To a want of capacity to
 “ discriminate, or to downright baseness of
 “ nature? To one or the other it must be as-
 “ cribed; and let the editor of the Courier
 “ take his choice.—When men commit the
 “ crime of treason, they are *choosers* of their
 “ crime. They are not, by the very nature of
 “ the situation in which they are placed by
 “ compulsion, daily and hourly exposed to the
 “ commission of the crime, for which they are
 “ punished. The reverse will be the case
 “ in the Local Militia. Suppose, for in-
 “ stance, a man to be addicted to *drink to*
 “ *excess*. That is a crime punished by flogging
 “ under the mutiny act; to flogging, then,
 “ with the Local Militia man be daily exposed,
 “ if he be addicted to drink; but, this crime
 “ is not his own act, as in the case of treason;
 “ it is made a crime in him by those who have
 “ compelled him to become a Local Militia
 “ man. Again; the law of treason operates
 “ generally; it reaches the prince as well as
 “ the labourer; but, the law of flogging
 “ reaches not the officers, reaches not those,
 “ who are to sit in judgment and who are in-
 “ vested with the power of execution.—So
 “ much for the wretched sophistry, by which
 “ a hireling pen has attempted to defend this
 “ measure.—But, it is said, that Sir Francis’s
 “ objection would equally well apply to the
 “ present militia and to the troops of the line.
 “ So it would, if his objection were to a scheme,
 “ which would allow of *substitution*. This
 “ scheme allows of none. A fine from a
 “ man’s own purse is the only thing that can
 “ (supposing no *false swearing* to take place)
 “ save him from personal service; and, as it
 “ is evident that one half, or, perhaps, four-
 “ fifths, of the men ballotted will be unable to
 “ pay the fine out of their own purse, it follows,
 “ of course, that all these will (unless in the
 “ case excepted) yield *personal service upon*
 “ *compulsion*. Indeed, to obtain this object
 “ is the very essence of the scheme. Now,
 “ in the line, or in the present militia, the
 “ case is different. Into these the men *choose*
 “ to enter; for, though a man may be ballot-
 “ ted into the latter; yet, if he does not choose
 “ to serve in person, there are means of avoid-
 “ ing it, and, if he will not use those means,
 “ he, at any rate, gives the preference to per-
 “ sonal service. But this scheme reduces
 “ about four-fifths of the able men of the
 “ country to a choice between taking a false
 “ oath, and exposing their backs to the lash,

laid on in virtue of the judgment of a description of persons, who are themselves exempted from corporal punishment.— Lord Castlereagh appears to have been very angry indeed, at this measure having been denominated a *conscription*. But, in what does it differ from a conscription, except in the case of the *rich*? Napoleon orders a certain number of young men to be ballotted, and to be made soldiers of at once. Lord Castlereagh orders ten young men from a parish, suppose, and he admits of a fine by way of *exemption* from personal service; but, he takes care that seven out of the ten *shall not be able to pay the fine themselves, and that nobody else shall pay it for them*. I will take a fine, says he, in lieu of service; but, you shall not have the means of getting the fine, without exposing yourselves to the chance of having your ears cropped off for perjury. Upon the rich, therefore, this measure, this brilliant scheme, is a *tax*; upon the poor it is a *conscription*; and, it is unequal, it is partial, it is unjust; because it prohibits one description of persons from purchasing exemption from personal servitude, which it permits it in another description; and, it throws the pain and the burden of defence upon those who have nothing but their persons to defend.—In its operation it will be attended with all sorts of hardships and vexations. The rich will fine. That will be a trifle; but it will be a most odious way of collecting a revenue. The poor will, to their last shilling, fine too. They will sell their goods, and the goods of many will be sold for one. Where this cannot be done, wages will be anticipated to the utmost penny. Ruinous debts will be contracted. Any thing to avoid a compulsory exposure to the lash. Many, however, *must* render personal service; but, wherever the money can be raised, wherever an indemnity can be provided, Lord Castlereagh may be assured, that the *oath* will have very little weight; and, I am really surprized, that a person, who has had such extensive experience, should have placed much reliance upon a check of this sort.—But, only think of the disgrace, the infamy, which is thus marked upon the front of the nation, by an act to prevent men from *insuring* themselves against the *misfortune of becoming liable to assist in the defence of their country*! Against fire, against thunder, and lightning, against foundering at sea, against death, we insure; and (oh, everlasting shame!) such is the situation of our country, that it now stands confessed in a bill before the parlia-

ment, and is thus proclaimed to the world, that we, in like manner, insure against the probable misfortune of being called upon to defend our native land! What is the reason of this? Why does the government doubt of the people's readiness to defend the country? It is the people's country, and *what is the reason* that it is necessary to pass a law to *compel* them to defend it? Do they not love the country? And, if so, *why* do they not? It matters not, my lord, you may talk and scheme as long as you please; but, be you assured, that, if the hour of real danger comes, there is no power upon earth that can *make* the people defend that which they do not love; and, if they love the country, they will defend it without any making. Let all the people be armed. Give them their neighbours and friends, their natural leaders, to instruct and direct them; make them *feel* that what they have to preserve is worth the hazard of their lives; and, I'll engage that you shall need neither fines nor conscriptions.—Upon the continent of Europe, we have seen government after government fail before the arms of France, and yet there was no want of soldiers. The French were everywhere met by men forced into the service. We heard of amazing armies, of immense magazines, of endless trains of artillery; but, in a moment all disappeared. The plunderer came, away fled the defenders, and down came the government. The people of Italy and Austria, Prussia, Holland, and Brunswick were not all *fools* to be sure. They were *able* to beat the French ten times told; and *why* were they not *willing*? Yet, we are still forcing the people of England to defend their country. We seem determined not to profit from the experience of the continent of Europe.—I am for arming *the whole* of the people; for, as to any ill use that they may make of their arms, I answer in the words which I once heard used by Mr. Windham, “the business is theirs, and, if they will not defend the country in our way, they must defend it in their own way.” Indeed, it is as absurd to pass a *law* to make the people love, as to pass a law to make them defend their country. A law, or a code to induce them to defend it; to organize them for that purpose, may be wise and necessary; but a law to *compel* a whole people, under heavy pains and penalties, not excepting bodily punishment, to defend themselves, is something monstrously unnatural; and to make them, in an hour of real danger, risk their lives in defending others, and not themselves, is impossible.—*Hypocrisy Per-*

sonified, the Lazarus-looking saint, and the big-bagged loan-jobber, may hug themselves at the thought, that the people are to be forced to defend them and their Jewish kin; but, I should hope, that the ministers, amongst whom there are some men of sharp faculties, at least, will perceive, while yet there is time, that there is no reliance to be placed on men dragged to the ranks under the dread of pains and penalties.

N. B. In the last Register, "moved with a spade," in page 710, should have been "moved with a spade."

Bottley, 12th May, 1808.

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OF

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DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

Sir, — Considering the importance, at this time, of a right system of national defence, I certainly should not have suffered more than a month to have elapsed since the date of my last, ere I had resumed the sub-

ject, had not every moment of my time been either occupied by business, or lost to the purposes of utility by indisposition. In my late enumeration of the population of the states now confederated against us, under the guidance of Buonaparte, I was guilty of an oversight in the omission of Turkey, the addition of whose people, and other minor corrections of the census, on the authority of Pinkerton's geography, will be found to swell the confederacy to full 140 millions of people, capable of furnishing above 23 millions of fighting men; that is to say, soldiers and sailors. That the proportion of the latter, must already be sufficient, with a due admixture of marines and other landsmen, (according to the practice of all martial navies) to man a very large fleet, will not be doubted when we take a review of the maritime possessions of our enemies, from the White Sea to the Black Sea inclusive; and when we recollect how many, from one extremity to the other of that immense line of coast, subsist by following the occupations of fishermen; and when we farther advert to the coasting trade of all those petty maritime states, which are usually overlooked when we speak of the naval powers of Europe.—And when, Sir, we likewise turn our attention from the men, who are the soul, to the timber, iron, hemp and tar, which compose the body of a navy; we are to keep in mind what are our own remaining resources, and what are those of our enemy. We know how much has been said and projected about our building ships of war in the East Indies—a blessed dependence! It was also at the time stated, that large quantities of timber had been purchased by England in Dalmatia, and was ready felled, when the events of the war defeated our contract; and it is now understood that Mr. Bentham, well known for his former employment as a shipwright and a general in Russia, as well as for a later patronage of the English admiralty as a mechanician, was lately building ships for us within the dominions of the Emperor Alexander, where of course those ships will now remain to augment the navy of our enemies. Such circumstances do not prove to us that the government of this country has been sufficiently provident respecting a home-growth of ship timber; and they certainly add to the apprehension, that we may ere long (if the present confederacy against us shall continue) see our enemy greatly out-number us in ships of war, even to the extent they please; as they are in possession of all the continental forests of Europe (those of now-invaded Sweden alone excepted); and, moreover, are masters of countries abound-

ing with iron, hemp, and tar.—I am not, Sir, one who is afraid of a war with America, if it shall be necessary to the maintenance of our rights, and shall be rightly conducted; but still we are to consider the effect which a war with America must have, if it shall be raging while our country is to be the object of concerted invasions at a variety of points. Such an additional war must create a demand for additional exertions on our part: and must occupy a considerable number of our ships and seamen, and would probably, also, in its consequences, find employment for a material portion of our land force. If the morality of the bulk of the American people, and the good faith of the government be such as you describe them to be, and especially if you be correct in your idea of the peculiar hatred they bear to England, it might not be very surprising if, while they were even at peace with us, they should readily give into the schemes of our arch enemy, so far as to pour into his ports if possible, a great quantity of their shipping, on the eve of a projected invasion of England or Ireland; but should we be at war with America, we could little doubt that he would bend the force of his genius to render the American shipping available to the utmost, to his grand object of effecting our destruction. Considering the natural impossibility of hermetically sealing up all the ports great and small of a vast line of coast, and at all seasons, whether the nights be long or short, light or dark, serene or tempestuous; especially when all this should be a task in addition to the blockading already imposed upon us; it must be evident that an American war, besides drawing aside from their present objects a considerable part of our cruisers, must administer to the enemy's means of invading us, in the proportion in which American ships could get safe into his ports; and we are not to forget, that our blockade of those ports which are the rendezvous of his ships of war, would not close the intermediate and inferior harbours against the merchant shipping of America.—Seeing, then, such prospects before us, and not knowing how soon the line of battle of our navy, independent of contributing to the defence of our island, may have to fight for its own ascendant, or even existence; nor how much the smaller ships may be occupied in all the distant parts of the world; nor what new draughts from our land force may be required for our foreign services in every quarter; ought we not, if we would neither cripple our distant exertions, nor bring ruin on our dependencies, nor hazard the conquest of our country, so to provide for our

national security—if there be a natural possibility of so doing—that we should have nothing to fear, although not a ship nor a regular soldier should be kept at home for our defence? * When I offer it as my opinion, that we have such means, those who have duly and deeply contemplated the martial branch of the English constitution, may have no difficulty in believing the fact; although it must be confessed, that no one in modern times has yet produced a plan in detail, for a complete organization of our *posse comitatus*. Such a plan in detail must necessarily be voluminous; it must include arrangements for having all our youth perfected in arms and tactics before they shall reach eighteen years of age, and with regard to the great mass of the fighting men of the community, its annual classification by age, and other renewals of rolls for preserving a perpetual harmony between nature and military science; as well as a variety of subordinate provisions whereby the ordinary intercourse of society should remain uninterrupted, even within sight of an invading enemy, and all other parts of the country be in perfect tranquillity, must unavoidably contain much matter; but principles once clearly laid down for our government, regulations, in all their parts and sections, divisions and subdivisions, branches and ramifications, would follow in course without producing confusion, disorder, or obscurity; in short, the matter in a well digested system, may, like a column in an army, be of any length, and yet perfectly manageable.—It is now, Sir, nine years since I submitted to the public, in 'an appeal, civil and military, on the English constitution,' an outline of such a system, naturally and necessarily growing out of the principles of the *posse comitatus*, as we find it in our common law, and discover it to be an integral part of that constitution, coeval with, and essential to, our liberties; and, although the press, especially of late, has since teemed with plans and projects of defence, I have not seen occasion to depart from a single principle therein laid down; nor have I discovered that I over-rated the *posse comitatus* (equally adaptable to the arms and tactics of any age) when I therein observed "it is "without any rhetorical figure, the cheap

* Not meant to apply to artillerymen; for, although a certain proportion should even be exclusively attached to the *posse comitatus*, they must be regular soldiers, as their education is a work of time. It is not, however, necessary they should be subject to the same articles of war, as those by which the standing army are governed.

"defence of nations; while, in extinguishing jealousy, in banishing fear, in assuring internal tranquillity, and annihilating external danger, it holds a glorious pre-eminence over every other military system of human invention." Having thus endeavoured to diffuse a knowledge of the right principles of defence, and sketched an outline; and foreseeing as I thought the growing dangers of our country, it was my hope that some enlightened minister, or some able statesman in parliament, would have taken upon him the task of giving the picture the necessary light and shade; or, in other words, that he would have given the system a complete practical form and substance, in a statute for "restoring to full vigour and energy" the "disgracefully neglected" *posse comitatus* *. Considering that, since that time, two other editions of the military part of the work have been published, under the title of 'England's Ægis, or the Military Energies of the Constitution,' in which, although to the last of those editions large additions were made, for illustrating the principles, the work still remains a mere outline, I shall not be thought chargeable with any impatience to obtrude upon the public a finished plan, with all the necessary details and minutiae for effecting that restoration. Knowing the system to be founded on, or rather a part of, the constitution, I could not divest myself of the hope, that, as our danger should grow more and more terrific, some public man of eminence, either in or out of place, would sooner or later, before our ruin should be irrevocably sealed, resort to the energies of that constitution for our deliverance. In this hope, the work has been very little advertised, but has been sent to two entire cabinets of his Majesty's ministers, the last and the present; besides individuals of a prior cabinet, and, last summer, it was likewise sent to the general officers about the person of the King, to the commander in chief, and to his Majesty himself. Whatever, therefore, may be the event, from a war of invasion raging in the bowels of our country, while the system of the constitution, explained in the Ægis, shall not have been resorted to, no blame would attach on him who had laboured to recommend it. But the day may possibly come, when those who have pretended to defend us on principles that go directly to overthrow the constitution, and which principles, if not resisted, must as effectually subvert the true

government of our country, and destroy our liberties, as could possibly be done by the most successful French invasion. The day, I say, may come, when such persons shall have to answer for their system; and their own personal defence in that day will not gain strength, when it shall appear that, even in a military view, their systems are, and must necessarily be, glaring weakness, confusion, and imbecility, in comparison of that which the common law and constitution imperatively enjoin, and which they take upon them positively to reject. Accident has prevented my yet seeing the present bill of Lord Castlereagh; but if the newspapers truly describe its contents, it is only an additional feature in a system which, to my humble understanding, is greatly adding to the rapidity with which our country seems to be advancing to its ruin.—Considering, Sir, the supremely awful situation of our state at this extraordinary crisis, and considering the great variety of systems of defence, and defensive suggestions, which the patriotism of individuals has brought forth, would it have disparaged the reputation of that minister, would it have lessened our estimation of his zeal in the public service, or have made on our minds an impression unfavourable to his wisdom and virtue, had he, at the very commencement of the present session of parliament, moved for a committee of defence, to have examined all that public spirit, or legal learning, or military genius, had offered to the legislature through the medium of the press; and to have reported on what principles, as most constitutional, and most effectual, a system of national defence ought to be founded? And, had the noble lord, on succeeding in his motion, likewise made it his public declaration, that, on receiving within a certain number of days a letter from the author of any work on defence, expressing a wish for a particular member of the House being added to the committee, he would move for the same, I incline to think the admiration of such conduct would have been universal; equally preparing the public for an approval of the system of defence that should have resulted, and for zeal and unanimity in its execution. And when we know that gentlemen of talents and learning, militia and regular officers of experience, generals of reputation, and members of both houses of parliament, have contributed their quotas of knowledge and system towards our defence, it should seem to have been desirable that all such parties should, in the first concoction of a great national plan, have had the means of rendering their suggestions as available as possible for the public safety.—

* Sir William Jones. See the Legal Mode of Suppressing Riots; with a Plan for National Defence, p. 10.

With regard, Sir, to that system which I conceive to be enjoined—imperatively enjoined—by the common law and constitution, and at the same time infinitely the most effectual of any in a military view, I ought perhaps, on reflection, to take blame to myself, for giving nothing more than a display of its principles, a general sketch of its provisions, and a demonstration of its efficacy; how clearly soever it might appear to my own mind, that enough had been said for enabling a statesman thence to furnish a complete plan of defence, in all its details and minutiae of regulation. But as none are so deaf as those who do not choose to hear; nor so difficult to persuade, as those who are determined not to understand; so such persons no doubt are ready to say, 'There is a wide difference between the most correct theory and useful practice,—between the most perfect abstract and a real substance;' and they may be equally ready to ask, 'why, if he could, did he not produce a practical plan complete in all its parts?'—To such a question it might be sufficient to answer, that those charged with our defence did not desire such a plan. But the writer may farther observe, he did not think it incumbent upon him unnecessarily to put either himself or his readers to the expence of that which, how necessary soever in a law, was not necessary in a book recommending such a law. —He now, however, trusts, that a truly constitutional system of defence will at last be shortly proposed in parliament; a system in which nothing will be omitted through party bias, nor any thing perverted from a factious sacrifice of the public good to private ends. The respect which all profess for the constitution will, it is hoped, obtain for such a system a candid examination on the part of the public: and, great soever as the power of a minister may be, yet to a decided public opinion that power must bend.—As a supplement to the observations in my last, relative to Sweden and the Baltic, I beg leave to add what follows:—I hope Sir Samuel Auchmuty has been consulted on the objects of the expedition now said to be proceeding to the Baltic, to aid the King of Sweden, both in the defence of his own dominions, and the conquest of Norway; and that the information respecting one of the causes of failure in the late expedition against Buenos Ayres, which ministers have received, has not been lost upon them. The following extract from the defence of General Whitelocke, is highly instructive. "It had been conceived, that the dissatisfaction which had been excited in South America, by the restrictive jea-

lousy of the Spanish government, had rendered that country ripe for revolt from the parent state. It was never conceived that such a rooted antipathy could exist against us as their deliverers," [why deliverers?] "as to justify the assertion that we had not, when we arrived in America, one single friend in the whole country; little was it conceived that the whole population were originally hostile to us; still less that they had become hostile from any thing that had occurred in the capture of Buenos Ayres, or while we retained possession of it. The able officer who commanded at Monte Video, had discovered the reverse of this to be true, that they were equally inimical to us and their own government; and on a disorder arising, in which the viceroy was said to have been made prisoner by his own people, Sir Samuel Auchmuty wrote to those who possessed the supreme government in Buenos Ayres, making them an offer of British protection. His letter was answered by General Liniers, the Audienza, and the Cabildo, all of whom treated his offer with indignation and contempt; and in this sentiment Sir Samuel Auchmuty found the whole population to partake, who had been influenced against the English by every species of exaggeration and falsehood" [together, I fear, with a mixture of truth]. "The natives of the country were indeed disposed to follow the steps of the North Americans, and to erect an independent state. If we could promise them independence, they would instantly revolt against their government; but, though nothing but independence would perfectly satisfy them, they would prefer our government, either to their present anarchy or the Spanish yoke, provided we would promise not to give up the country to Spain at the peace; but, until such a promise was made, we must expect to find them open or secret enemies." —Now, Sir, are the Swedes, or Danes, or Norwegians more in love with despotic government, more calculated for slaves, than the mongrel Spaniards of South America? And do we not in this mirror see, that if the youthful Gustavus (who I am assured is extremely unpopular with his subjects on account of the despotism introduced into the government by his family, and adhered to by himself) shall have any taste for true glory, or shall know how to render his reign secure and prosperous, and to place his throne on an immoveable basis, he will begin the present campaign with completely restoring to Sweden its ancient liberty, and

Presenting it with a suitable constitution of Government, for giving that liberty permanence to the end of time. By such an act alone, accompanied by an invitation to the Norwegians and Zealanders, to take shelter under his protecting wing, with a *promise never to give them up again at a peace*, he and his ally would, it is reasonable to suppose, be received "*as their deliverers*," and his power be so consolidated, he might thenceforth set at defiance all the efforts of Russia and France to disturb his repose. Sweden, so enlarged by its ruler's wisdom, and so strengthened by its liberty, could no longer have any thing to bear from the greatest mercenary armies which could be sent against it; but if the Swedes are to continue political slaves, and their king an unrelenting despot, neither the gulf of Bosnia, nor all the rivers which run into it, nor all the armies the government can raise and pay, even with English subsidies, can long preserve the Swedish throne, if Napoleon now, (as before observed) at the head of 140 millions of people, capable of furnishing 23 millions of fighting men, have decreed its downfall. And from the complexion of the policy which the ministers of England shall pursue, and the advice they shall offer Gustavus towards the defence of Sweden, we doubtless may draw instructive conclusions, touching the complexion of *their policy*, and the nature of *their system* for the defence of England.—We have seen that had English statesmen acted on English principles, as friends to human liberty, the worst general ever set at the head of an army might, without firing a shot, have severed from the Spanish monarchy, by a single act, the vast province of Buenos Ayres; and little doubt is to be entertained that the example of that vice royalty shaking off its chains would have been soon followed by Peru and Mexico; opening to their deliverers every possible advantage of commercial intercourse, while it must materially weaken the European confederacy against us. As the same moral causes are in our favour in the north as were in the south, it remains to be seen, whether our ruling statesmen have any taste for gaining the hearts of whole nations, by respecting their rights and consulting their inclinations; or prefer the expense, and trouble, and hazard, attendant on violating their rights, insulting their understandings, and exciting their hatred. They ought not to forget the national hatred which subsists between the Swedes and the Danes. By the means proposed this might soon be melted into a mutual affection; but, if fire and sword are to be the only arguments for

gaining Norway, we are not to calculate upon an easy conquest, we may rather expect a counterpart of what happened where the Danes made a descent on Sweden in 1710, while the king was in the hands of the Turks at Bender. The Danes "invaded the province of Scania, took Helsingbourg, ravaged the neighbouring coasts, and extended their levies of contributions a great way into the country." Sweden was so exhausted of regular troops, that only 8000 could be collected. To these were joined 12,000 peasants, the greater part of whom "came in their linen frocks, having at their girdles pistols tied with cords." They set upon the Danes whom they defeated with great slaughter. "Two regiments of these peasants, hastily armed, cut to pieces the king of Denmark's regiment of guards, of whom only ten men were left alive." The Danes fled under the cannon of Helsingbourg, and within five days after the battle had quitted Sweden; * and the reason assigned for this heroism of the Swedish peasantry is, that "these, forming an order in the state, regarded themselves as *citizens*." The shadow of liberty left Sweden by Charles XII. was totally annihilated by the late king, who, for so doing, was stabbed by Ankerstrom. If Gustavus adheres to his father's principles, he cannot have his people's hearts. If made of the same materials as the other fallen despots of Europe, he has nothing to expect but a similar fate, nor would deserve a better: but if, indeed, he has wisdom and virtue, and deserve an immovable throne, an enlargement of dominion, and a glorious reign, they are likely to await him.—I remain, Sir, &c.—J. CARTWRIGHT.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.

SIR,—I shall preface my application for a place in your Register by observing, that it is not my wish to interfere as your auxiliary in your present controversy with Messrs. Young and Wakefield. That controversy cannot be placed in better hands. It is really amusing to observe the condescension with which they notice your inferior progress in the mystery of agriculture, and the confusion of ideas into which they are insensibly wandering, while they forget that a bad practical farmer, if he be a good practical logician, may sometimes prove a very inconvenient antagonist. My intention is solely to combat an assertion lately used (if the reports in the paper be true) by a worthy baronet at a Norfolk county meeting, and

* Voltaire's Hist. of ditto, xii. B. 5.

which he may possibly have picked up in some pamphlet on the West Indian question, or perhaps in the Edinburgh Review of October last, wherein it is very clearly stated, and supported by much dexterity of argument.—“It appears to us” (say these reviewers p. 156) “*perfectly manifest*,—that “the radical evil is a general glut of produce, “at least of the great staple, sugar and “rum, in the whole market of the world; “that the West Indian colonies grow *much more than the whole world can consume*, “and consequently that the prices must fall, “and a large proportion of the commodity “remain unsaleable AT ANY PRICE, until “the supply shall be contracted.” Again they tell us, p. 163: “The true remedy for the “evil is only to be found in *diminishing the growth of sugar*. Many of the estates “which produce bad sugars must be given “up; and many planters will be ruined whose “property is mortgaged. This will be a “severe remedy, but it will be a radical “one.” And again, p. 165, “Unfortunately “things are brought to such a state, that “the sacrifice of many persons is the only “means of re-establishing the general welfare.” Some little degree of indifference to the ruin of the colonists is indeed tempered, in the original, by a string of reflexions on the subject of the slave trade, tending to mitigate any inordinate compassion that we might possibly feel for the few or many persons sacrificed; but the assertion that this sacrifice is necessary is distinctly expressed; and I do as distinctly contend that it is utterly false and absurd.—I apprehend, Sir, that our sugar colonies differ from the *counties* which compose the United Kingdom only in this, that they are more distant from the seat of government; the moral connexions of laws, language, and interests, are the same; their white population being wholly kept up by emigrants from hence, all of whom are stimulated by the hope of returning to their natural home. I further conceive, that the utility of such settlements consists solely in their affording the means of employment to adventurers, whose industry cannot be usefully employed at home, and who are thus enabled to raise either food, or the raw material of manufactures, for the supply of the mother country. This the several colonies have done, and their sugar has contributed, in a much greater degree than is usually supposed, to feed, and thus to increase the population and cultivation of Europe. It is only inasmuch as they have done and continue to do this, that we have any immediate interest in relieving their present distress,

“or any motive, exclusive of compassion or curiosity, for inquiring what mode of relief will produce the greatest effect with the least inconvenience to ourselves. That sugar enters, to a large amount, into the food of all, excepting the very lowest classes of our labourers, might be inferred from the enormous quantities of tea, or of infusions bearing that name, and sweetened with sugar, which have been admitted to the breakfasts of the manufacturing poor; but we have better because more direct evidence. The quantity of sugar retained for home consumption, on an average of the 4 last years, viz. 1804, 5, 6, and 7, was 2,639,638 cwt. Now, Sir, you know that, from the time of the commencement of the American war, or thereabouts, this country, which had formerly exported corn to a large amount, began to import considerable quantities for its own consumption, and that the annual average of foreign corn now required for the supply of this demand is 800,000 quarters. Such is your own statement of our wants, and I believe it to be authentic; and it may be presumed that the weight of this corn, even if it were all wheat, would not exceed 3,200,000 cwt.; allowing 4 cwt. to each quarter, it follows, that our consumption of food in the shape of sugar is equal, in point of mere *weight*, to at least three quarters of our consumption of food in the shape of foreign corn, or to the annual sustenance (if a calculation of the Edinburgh reviewers can be trusted) of about 639,000 persons. Not one particle of this sugar was consumed in distilleries, but was fairly and honestly eaten or swallowed with water by the inhabitants of these kingdoms, and purchased by them at double the price of bread, taking that at 3d. a pound (13d. the quartern loaf) and the sugar at 6d., a price which is below the average cost of that article during the three years. Further, the increasing taste for this species of food is evinced by a comparison of the consumption just noticed with that of the years 1781, 2, 3, 4, and 5, which amounted to no more than 1,422,024 cwt. so that the augmented demand is 1,214,634 cwt. equal to the weight of 303,658 quarters of wheat. You will observe, Mr. Cobbett, that I attribute to sugar no superiority of nutritive power, because its efficacy in the distilleries or breweries is not conclusive on this head, and we can derive no knowledge from comparative experiments; but, in thus comparing corn and sugar, weight for weight, there can be no fallacy; and every pound of sugar must have acted as a substitute for at least a pound of grain, or for a corresponding quantity of meat, or fish, or potatoes,

or other articles used as sustenance : and consequently the colonists must have always been in competition with the farmers who supply the national market with provisions ; they must have produced exactly the same effect, and probably would have produced it in the same degree as the foreign importer of corn, had they been placed on an equally advantageous footing. The foreign cultivator, whether neutral or hostile, sends his grain to the British market loaded only with the expense of freight, insurance, and trader's commission, which united charges may perhaps only place him on a level with the British grower ; whereas the planter's sugar is further loaded with a duty of 3d. per pound, and consequently, however it may be in request, is rendered too costly for the consumption of a very numerous but needy class of purchasers. I only mention this, here, for the purpose of shewing a fallacy in the argument of the Edinburgh reviewers. Instead of saying that the colonists have increased their produce beyond the demand of the whole world, they ought to say no more than that the sugar grown exceeds the quantity which the consumers are willing or perhaps able to buy, at a given price. But they maintain that it would be *unsaleable at any price*. What ? If these self-elected professors of political economy are so pampered that the taste of sugar cannot gratify them, do they really suppose that the oats or barley, or oats or potatoes, which form the sole food of so many millions of our countrymen would not become more nourishing and palatable by the admixture of this article ? Would the labouring classes in Scotland refuse to purchase, by *any* portion of their labour, a participation of a species of food which ranks amongst the luxuries of the richest tables ? Is it not, in point of fact, consumed by all who can afford to consume it ? That the price and not the quantity produced the glut of *our* market (for there was no other,) and that the supply of all the colonies, whether British, French, Dutch, Spanish, &c. was inadequate to the supply of *the world*, was sufficiently proved during the peace of Amiens, during which, exportation entirely removed it. The actual redundancy, which has resulted, partly from the capture of many foreign colonies, partly from our refusal to admit the Americans on the usual footing to our colonial markets, but more especially from the policy of the French government, which has gradually excluded us from all the markets of Europe, is now diminishing and will soon disappear. It will disappear, I trust, before it shall have ruined

quite so many planters as the Edinburgh critics had devoted to destruction, because a *glut of food* is sure to be removed by increased consumption. That consumption has been checked by taxation carried to excess, an excess proved by the total unproductiveness of the duty imposed by Lord Henry Petty, but the temporary sacrifice of the planter's whole profits has again revived it. His distress has been severe but our advantage has been proportionate to it. I shall, with your permission, Mr. Cobbett, take an early opportunity of reverting to this part of the subject, but in the meantime I contend, that the diminution of culture, which the Scotch reviewers recommend as a *radical remedy*, would only complete the destruction of our colonists, because it is impossible, under the growing wants of our revenue, that they should be permitted to indemnify themselves for their losses by that increase of price which might result from a diminished produce ; and that with respect to us, such a measure would be merely a diminution of the national magazine of provisions. —I am, &c. S. H.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.

(Mr. Arthur Young's 4th Letter.)

SIR,—I did not conceive that any circumstance could so soon have induced me to trespass by another letter on the patience of your readers ; but your late paper, in defence of the sugar proposition, renders it somewhat incumbent on me to support, as well as I am able, the evidence I gave in three examinations before the committee of the house of commons ; for my opinions there delivered were most erroneous, if yours be just.—Before I enter on the question, permit me to congratulate you on what seems to be the dawn of a change in your political ideas. In various papers, under the motto of "*Pe-rish Commerce*," you appeared to hold the commerce of the kingdom in such contempt, that the Royal Exchange began to shake to its foundations ; and you were disposed to represent, with Mr. Spence, internal consumption as the only origin, support, and proof of wealth : the tea of the east, the sugar of the west, the tobacco of the north, were given to the winds ; and we were called upon to give up the use of such luxuries. But in this late exertion of your genius such sentiments do not appear ; on the contrary, the commerce of the west assumes a far different importance ; for you expressly declare,—“ if the injury to the barley growers were proved, I should inquire, whether the injury to the barley growers would be more or less than the relief to the sugar

"growers; the latter being, in my opinion, "full as much entitled to the protection of "government as the former? P. 613." Here is at least a liberality of sentiment which will please the merchants of the Exchange, much more than it will the freeholders of Hampshire.—In the support of weak positions, there is too often a lust in the exertion of great talents, which on many occasions has done no slight mischief to the cause of truth: hence the arguments of sophistry, in tissues so dexterously intertwined, that though common sense, at the first blush, feels the fallacy, yet to unravel the web of error may demand ingenuity as great as the talent that produced it. Hence the glaring paradoxes that have disgraced the pages of genius: a Rousseau could contend that man should crawl on his hands and not walk erect on his feet; a Monboddo discovers the imperfection of the species in our want of tails; and a Berkley could assure a man, who knocked his head against a post, that he was under the greatest of errors, that matter has no existence, and the post to be found nowhere but in his own brain. A philosopher could deny the possibility of motion; walking across the room was a better reply than a logical discussion. And you, Sir, have had ingenuity enough, not quite to escape this foible. You are far enough removed from such gross attempts as I have quoted, which I presume to mention only to shew that very great men, from feeling a confidence in their powers, are too apt to overlook those difficulties which would preserve inferior minds from such rashness. For not to speak of your agreement with Mr. Spence in some of his extraordinary positions, the paper before me affords a notable instance; for though on the first reading of it I felt that error was at the bottom of the reasoning, yet so ingeniously have you wrapt it in a profusion of arguments, carrying the similitude of truth, that the understanding of the reader, though not convinced, is perplexed with subtleties, upon the very points that ought to be the most luminous and convincing. Political economists and common sense tell us, that if a large portion of a demand be withdrawn from a market, price must fall; that a fall of price discourages production, and that eventual scarcity will be the consequence. These combinations are plain and self-evident; the degree in which they operate will vary with circumstances, and in a case of failing produce, the pressure felt will cer-

tainly be proportioned to the abundance of the crop. Now, Sir, a considerable portion of your paper is employed in stating a train of consequences that militate with these first principles of political economy: they are erroneous, or you are wrong.—For, Sir, what is the grand object of your reasoning? But to prove that an immense demand for barley may be withdrawn from the market, and yet the farmer not suffer; this is the position, turn and twist it as you please. Your imagination is on the stretch to fix absurdities and contradictions on the agriculturists: we may be bad reasoners, but that will not convert paradox into truth.—You seem to think that you have bereft us of our faculties, by the cunning question:—*Is the produce of the distillery, food? or is it not food? If it is not food, the barley is thrown away; if it is food, the West-Indies will give it.* I care not what you make it, while I know it causes a demand in the farmer's market, and that if you stop it you deprive him of that demand. Malt spirits are certainly not food; but 2,264,000 pounds weight of beef, added to the flesh of lean oxen, unquestionably is food, and such food as the West-Indies cannot give; for it is upon evidence, that sugar wash without grains will not fatten. But though malt spirits be not food they are a commodity necessary in the consumption of the people; and I leave to your subtlety to prove, that the manufacture of such a commodity is throwing the raw material away. Such an argument might make some figure in a pa-negyric on French brandy, but sinks to nothing in a question of British farming. Your argument is to the full as applicable to the brewery as to the distillery. Is beer (relative to the question of scarcity) food, or is it not food? If it is not food, it is barley thrown away; if it is food, the West-Indies will give it; and this supposition touches our case more nearly than at first meets the eye; for your correspondent, X. X., Vol. II. p. 26, whose letter you commend, expressly joins both these modes of consuming sugar as highly desirable to the planter, and not at all detrimental to the nation at large. Bravo, X. X! that is a home thrust, indeed: and I must advise you, Mr. Cobbett, when you address the Hampshire freeholders, to explain this matter fully: illuminate their dark minds, and convince them that the loss of a demand for 300,000 quarters of barley is so trifling a

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business, that your friends meditate the further deprivation of three millions of quarters more. And this without doing them the smallest injury!—Much error has crept into this discussion from speaking generally of *corn*, and not particularly of *barley*, and you have made no small use of this mistake. You say—"As connected with a question like this, which embraces the general produce of the soil and the general interests of the nation, all the distinction between barley-growers and wheat-growers is too trifling to be attended to." P. 648. This I utterly deny; and we have only to compare the two products under a very few circumstances, in order to shew that they must be considered as separate and distinct. Ninety years ago five millions of people consumed more malt than paid excise than nine millions do at present. Has the consumption of wheat been arrested in this manner? Does wheat pay a duty of 34s. 8d. per quarter? The import of wheat is immense, of barley scarcely any. Of all white corn barley is the most peculiar in demanding a suitable soil. On new improvements, by breaking up waste lands, it is the last grain sown and in many such cases not sown at all. To consider, therefore, wheat and barley without a due distinction between them, would lead to nothing but nonsense and confusion: and has led to such stuff as talking of the substitution of spring-wheat, of oats, and of hemp: all, or either of which crops, may, and would do, to a certain degree, in some instances, but on the true barley soil must be rejected in all. A single contrast will shew the truth of this opinion: superabundance of barley, proportioned to demand, sinks the price: with a similar abundance of wheat, import lessens, but price remains the same. Is not this a distinction sufficient to decide the question? The low prices of wheat which we have seen were caused by a great import; the low prices of barley, by legislative burthens. Hence therefore, Mr. Cobbett, we have a right to claim your support: for you say:—"Make it out that it will be injurious to the culture of corn in general, and I am with you," p. 643. We have made out by a great variety of information before the committee, that the barley growers would be deeply injured, that the clover would suffer, and the wheat also, besides the more general injury resulting in a thousand different ways, from any circumstance tending to impoverish the cultivator of the soil. The reference which has been made to substituted crops, to feeding pigs, to jumbling all sorts of corn together in the inquiry, and

the question whether or not distillation of food:—all these objects are well enough to play with, after admitting the leading principles which govern the inquiry: but you should first settle the point, whether withdrawing demand does not sink the price. This question should be met, and not shifted to a dependent chain of eventual suppositions: thus, should pork be very dear, give barley to pigs; if the soil suits, sow cats; if rich, sow hemp: if scarcity comes, make breed: but multiply such *ifs* as long as you please, they may all turn out no better than moon-shine. Barley may be abundant, pork cheap, peace with Russia, and hemp a drug. The distillery, Sir, is worth a hundred thousand such *ifs*. The measure is not to extend to Ireland, and yet you tell us we may send our barley in the shape of pork to the West Indies!!! Ireland distilling malt, and England sugar, and which, thank you, will send out pork or beef? Such exceptions and exemptions are hostile to every idea of a real union. You leave the Irish barley growers safe, and lay your manacles on those of England.—You triumph greatly upon the imaginary contraband in those, who having declared the danger of scarcity, now are apprehensive of a superabundance of corn, and as if they feared a glut in the corn market. Our only apprehension of superabundance was eventual scarcity. You cannot reduce the price of any one product so low, that the farmer will not be paid for producing it, without scarcity being the consequence; and yet such a reduction of price will mark what you may call a glut in the market. In this, therefore, we are guilty not of the smallest contradiction, but have been influenced by principles admitted on a thousand other occasions to be sound and just.—You do not approve Mr. Wakefield's most accurate idea of the distillery being a public magazine of barley, applicable to other uses if wanted. The same idea has often been applied to the export of wheat with the bounty; if having a surplus of any article of produce you do not get rid of it, it re-gorges in the market, sinks the price, and discourages the cultivation; but, as with wheat for exportation and barley for distillation, if either be wanted for bread at home, you stop, what, in such case would be a misapplication, and the command of the grain at once proves the fact, that you have indeed a *granary* to resort to. I think it was Hume, who represented manufactures as a store-house of labour for the public; war formerly threw hands out of employment, and then they were ready for the

ranks of the army. The granary and the store-house rest on the same principle. Yet, Sir, you pronounce Mr. Wakefield's granary idea, as nothing more than buying corn in order to throw it away. Did our ancestors, when, by the first of William and Mary, they prohibited the import of French brandy and established the English distillery (as the preamble of the act declares, for the encouragement of *consumption and tillage*), did they think any thing thrown away that encouraged tillage? Did they not rather prove themselves to be guided by principles extremely different from those which instigated the exertions of your pen in defence of the West Indian project?—The questions asked in the committee, and several of your observations, unite in supporting a notion that there would be no difference between the measure now proposed of withdrawing a demand from the market, and the proposal of the agriculturists to enclose and cultivate wastelands: such new cultivation, it is asserted, would pour fresh corn into the market, and that would have the effect of sinking the price, as much as stopping the distillery. But, Sir, such a position is one of the convenient results of confounding the terms *corn* and *barley*. If such cultivation should, after supplying itself, pour 300,000 quarters of barley, at a short period, into the market, your conclusion would be perfectly just; but it would not of necessity follow, that any such results would be the case.—Wastes situated on a soil peculiarly fitted for barley (like many on the sands of Norfolk and Suffolk) would after some years certainly produce that grain; but the great mass of our wastes are not adapted to it. Oats, rye, wheat, potatoes, turnips, and grass seeds, are the main articles in such cultivation. Potatoes and wheat to lessen, and, if possible, do away the enormous import of foreign wheat; and oats to diminish, or annihilate, a similar foreign supply. Let any candid man determine, whether our demand for such cultivation, is any contradiction to a wish to preserve to our farmers the markets of the distillers for their barley.—You mention a committee being appointed on the distillery in December, 1806, adding, that you never heard of any report made by that committee. Such a report was made and printed, and you will thank me for presenting you with an extract from it.—“The use of sugar or molasses in the distilleries appears to be impossible, unless that of grain is excluded. To Ireland and Scotland it could not be extended, without a complete revision of all the laws enacted for

“the security of the revenue on the distillation of spirits. By no regulation could the use of sugar be permitted in the distilleries, even to the total prohibition of the use of grain, except to the loss of the revenue of about £115,000 annually, provided the distiller using sugar was enabled to carry on his trade with the same advantages he now possesses from using grain. Upon spirits made from molasses the loss would be still greater, because the duty on molasses wash at present is higher than that upon the wash from sugar; and it would be necessary, as appears from Mr. Jackson's evidence, that both should be reduced to an equal and lower rate. If the wash duty were reduced below its present rate, a bounty would thereby be given on the use of sugar. It is not, however, in the contemplation of the committee to recommend, at the present moment, the exclusion of grain from the distilleries, and the use of sugar mixed with grain exposes the revenue to considerable and inadmissible risk.—For the purpose of inducing the distiller to use sugar at all, it should appear that part, if not the whole of the customs duty on sugar, must be drawn back.”—“The different rates of duty on the articles used in the distilleries, and the different modes of collecting those duties in the three parts of the United Kingdom, constitute, in the present state of things, a difficulty almost insuperable.”—(Report, ordered to be printed February 17th, 1807.)—“I presume it is not intended to extend the use of sugar to Ireland and to Scotland. I see almost insuperable difficulties to the use of sugar in the distilleries in Scotland, and from the little I know of Ireland, I should conceive it very objectionable there.” (Ibid. Examination of Wm. Jackson, Esq.)—“May I be permitted to ask, if you, Mr. Cobbett, are prepared to admit the people to be taxed above £100,000 per annum, in order that sugar may be substituted for barley? I add, to the unquestionable injury of our farmers? And I beg you, Sir, to note the difficulties that stared the committee in the face, and produced this report only a year ago. If in so short a period they are made to disappear, I leave to the freeholders of England to judge, whether they have not as much reason to expect that another year will extend the proposition to the brewery, as they could have had last year to see it so soon revived for the distillery, after the report of a committee, who found nothing but difficulties in the execution of the mea-

sure.—I beg, Mr. Cobbett, that you would not conceive I ever meant to say one word against the legislature granting relief to the distresses of the West-Indies; I have no doubt at all of the propriety of such a measure, and mean only to contend, that the relief should come from the nation at large, and not at the expense of any particular class in it: least of all, of the producers of a grain, higher taxed perhaps than any other commodity, equally important, on this globe, —Now, Sir, in answer to all I have said, I know it may be replied, that the measure is a mere experiment, and subject to repeal by an order of council. This refers the matter to the judgment of the administration for the time being, and nothing can be fairer than my asking whether there has, for one moment, existed in the last forty years an administration, who, relative to corn of all sorts, have had any other object than to keep the price as low as possible? The tillage of the kingdom received a fatal blow in 1773. In the ten years preceding that period we exported 2 millions of quarters; in the ten years following we imported 8 millions of quarters; for 20 years following 1773 the price was so low (the result of importation) that the plough was discouraged. Barley, within a few years, was at 18s. and 20s. a quarter, in our eastern counties. I beg to ask, what administration then did for us? And yet it was an act of their own, that so reduced the price. To tell us, therefore, that this measure is an experiment, and that government *may* give relief, is to feed us with a very thin diet indeed: whipt syllabub has cream and sugar in it, and water is an wholesome beverage, but the police of corn in England is framed (to use a farming expression), to starve a lark. What has been, *may* be, is saying too little; what has been uniformly for 40 years, *will* be.—There is one passage in your paper with which I am particularly pleased: it is that wherein you liberally and candidly admit, that party has had no share in this discussion. The remark is perfectly true, and it is much to your honour to have made it. Give me leave, Sir, to add, that I could not contemplate the transactions of the committee-room without delight. When and where did the sun ever shine upon a country that exhibited such a spectacle? Planters and merchants, agents and revenue officers, landlords and their plain tenants, nay even dabblers in political economy, all listened to with patience and candour, as if but one motive animated every bosom,—a wish to ascertain the truth. What a spectacle! and whence has it arisen, but from the beneficent providence of a

Deity that has poured out on this happy country the unexhausted blessings of matured freedom. Who that lives in such a kingdom but must draw in gratitude to heaven with the very air he breathes? And thee! bold destroyer of the world's repose, that strivest to sweep from its basis the noblest monument of felicity that human efforts ever reared, thy restless energies, dreadful as they are, will still, unaided by ourselves, be vain.—Let Britons be true to their God, their king, their country, and themselves, and, that unseen, but mighty Hand, which has rendered us the envy of the world, will, with infinite wisdom, protect what infinite goodness bestows.—I have the honour to be, &c. &c.—ARTHUR YOUNG —Bradfield-hall, 27th April, 1808.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.

(Mr. Wakefield's 5th Letter.)

SIR,——It was not my intention, in my letter of the 14th of March, to state the average import of 1,447,500 quarters of corn to be *only of wheat*, that import consists of various species of grain; and the difference between my amount, and that spoken of in the report of the committee, arises from my account being the import into Great Britain, from which has been subtracted the import from Ireland; leaving the balance of import into the United Kingdom as stated in the report.—It is of little if any consequence to our arguments, as they do not depend upon the details of the import, but upon the single undisputed fact, that this country does import a considerable proportion of its food.—Having corrected this error, I will proceed to notice the observations you have made in the last Register; and in doing so, I shall nearly follow the order you have adopted. And first, Sir, permit me to cite your admission, that “unless we can *in some way or other* add to the quantity of corn produced at home, we must in proportion to the quantity of corn now imported experience additional distress, if a year of scarcity should unhappily arrive.”—The truth of this proposition is indeed undeniable, and between us all argument would be at an end were it not for the “*some way or other*”; and the omission of one word in the next sentence, for I think the way in which this addition is obtained is very important; and, instead of stating without qualification, that we must add to the quantity of corn produced at home, I should say, we must add to the surplus quantity, for if we grow no more than we consume, what are we to do “if a year of scarcity should unhappily arrive”? Suppose we could double our present growth of

provisions, where would be greater security against dearth, if at the same time our *necessary* consumption also doubled? Our *necessary* consumption we cannot lessen, but at the expense of comfort, of national content, of health; in one word, at the expense and hazard of diminishing the national prosperity. This being the case we should endeavour to create or obtain some new bank to draw upon, and I can discover only three securities against the chances of the seasons; the means of import and export which may be stopped, or a luxurious consumption as to import; the pressure of famine may compel it, but wretched is the policy which leads a country to depend upon such a resource; and ruinous is the necessity which tempts us to make use of it. A large export is of all resources the best, it is a resource always available, and while not wanted enriches the country, and advances the cultivation of the land. At present we have not the power to import, this forms our *present* danger; because, if "a year of scarcity should arrive" we cannot obtain foreign aid; we must now at all events, hazards, and consequences depend upon ourselves, upon our internal means. Now, Sir, what are they? We have no export to stop. What resource then have we? I say we have an available and certain one in a large luxurious consumption; you would waste this before the period of necessity arrives, I would husband it until the last extremity. You say, the distilleries, &c. &c. consume it. I say the existence of the market creates it; take away this market as you recommend from the fear of consumption when produced—and, I say, looking a little further forward than the present hour, you prevent the production of the very resource which we both agree the country will probably stand in need of in a short time. This part of the question is narrowed to this point; does the existence of a market of demand, for any article whatever, act as the means of creating or consuming it? With confidence I answer, it is the means, the only means of creating what you want.—I agree with you in your instance of "a little nation growing a thousand quarters of corn annually, and containing a thousand inhabitants." And I am gratified in discovering, that you at length acknowledge, that for such a nation to raise *half as much again as it consumes*, would be "to set the seasons at defiance," and "to take a bond of fate." It is the very thing for which I am contending. It is the very policy I recommend: you also confess the security and benefit which would follow, but you doubt if it is possible to reduce the theory to prac-

tice; of the excellence of the theory you are as much convinced as I am, you doubt only of its practicability, and your doubts are of two sorts. First. That there would be labour required to produce the surplus corn. Second. That by such production the land would be worn bare. The greatest error into which politicians are apt to fall, is that of considering things positively, rather than relatively. It is common to say "a large population makes a nation powerful." It does no such thing. It is a large disposable population that fills the ranks of an army, and mans the ships of a fleet. If no one produced more of food, clothing, and other articles than his own necessities required him to consume, where would be found that disposable population whose labours augment the national wealth, and by which the state is defended? But the truth is, the labour of one man engaged in the cultivation of the earth, is capable of producing sufficient to support several persons. How then shall those other persons be employed, part of them in manufactures and commerce, part in the public service, and part I should wish to see engaged in raising a surplus of food over and above our *necessary* consumption? But, Sir, when raised what are we to do with it? It is of too perishable a nature to be stored up, and we have no export for it. Could we store up grain as we do manufactures, we should not need (as it affects existence) either exports or a luxurious consumption, as a security against a year of scarcity. Therefore, instead of that part of the population which is not required to be employed in the production of the necessary food of the people, being all devoted to objects of manufacturing and commercial pursuit, and to national defence, I wish to see a small portion engaged in producing a surplus of food, and which surplus production can *only* be obtained by offering a market for it when produced. Having no export there does not exist any other market than an internal luxurious consumption. Yet, of this the planter is seeking to deprive the farmer, and the nation is called upon to prefer gain to security. But to your second objection, that by such production the land would be worn bare; permit me, Sir, to appeal to the knowledge of old and experienced cultivators for the affirmative of the following position, that no land is so productive as that which is in a constant course of good husbandry. "Rested land;" that is to say, neglected land, is not "land enriched," nor is it "ready for the plough." If by "rested" you do not mean neglected land, then labour must be bestowed upon it. But this will

not be done unless a profit follow, and how can a profit follow unless the land is in a course of cropping? Besides, experience of our present luxurious consumption is conclusive proof, that this theory is practicable; and if it is, you own it will enable us "to set the seasons at defiance," and "to take a bond of fate." The great advantages and security to be derived from raising a surplus production in common years, will be yet further shown by examining your observation, that "one year of short crop never yet" was greatly distressing; in this kingdom "it cannot from the nature of things be so," and if there are rested fields always ready "for the plough, there can be only one year" of short crop at a time." This observation may well be considered in two ways. First, by admitting its truth for the purpose of the argument; and then, by showing wherein its fallacy consists. Now, Sir, admitting your observation to be true, what is the consequence? Why, that according to your argument we are to bear the distress (such as it is) of a year of scarcity in the first instance, and hope for plenty in a subsequently more extended agriculture. But, according to mine, the relief is at hand; we have not to wait a day at any time, the distilleries may be prohibited the use of grain, and thus instantaneous relief may be obtained. Anticipate this resource now, prohibit the use of grain in the distilleries, and so either reduce production, or augment necessary consumption to the amount of grain so used, and the result is, the resource *when wanted*, will have been *anticipated*, it will have been *wasted*, and in the moment of necessity we shall look for it in vain, and curse the cupidity which has mislead us to exhaust for the sake of profit, a resource which should have been husbanded for the sake of subsistence. But independent of this argument, founded upon an admission of the truth of your observation, I deny its truth, for "one year of short crop" is not only distressing, but amounts almost to famine to a large portion of the community. The bad harvest of 1799 produced a scarcity in 1800, in 1798, and 1799, the price of wheat had averaged at 58s. 10d. the quarter; but in 1800 the price averaged at 118s. 7d. the quarter. I am aware that to the *whole* community the deficiency of the crop was not felt in any proportion to the advance of price, but amongst the lower classes it was so felt. Though the advance of price only deprived the middle and higher orders of some comfort and more luxuries, it deprived the lower of many meals; the lower classes felt their necessary consumption unprovided

for in nearly the same proportion as the difference of price; the next year another short crop occurred, and the price advanced to 118s. 3d. the quarter, and then the distress mounted higher, not so much from the increase of 4s. 6d. the quarter, as from the previous impoverishment of the lowest of the middle class. I think, then, that it follows from this reference to *fact*, that one year of short crop does produce great distress. I have not, however, done with this observation, for I have another objection to make. I have already denied (and that from knowledge gained by personal experience) that "rested fields" are always, or indeed, *ever* ready for the plough; and, I say more, that out of the regular course of cropping no land can be properly said to be "ready for the plough." The true question between us is, however, this. Ought or ought not a nation to grow annually more than its necessary consumption? Both you and myself think it ought so to do, and even the friends of a provision import, will in the present state of things agree that this ought to be done. Now, how can this surplus production be obtained? I contend that it can only be obtained by finding a market for it when produced; and, unless an export, or to use other words, a foreign market can be found, there cannot in the nature of things be any other demand offered to the grower than that of a large internal luxurious consumption. Now we have no other luxurious consumption than the distilleries and the breweries, over which an instantaneous command can be held. If your argument is good for any thing, it is good to the extent of prohibiting the use of malt in the *brewery* of beer. But the glaring impolicy, (glaring in its extent—the principle is the same whether distillery or brewery) of this application of the same principle to the breweries, which is proposed to be applied to the distilleries, has deterred the planter from seeking to oust the farmer from this part of his market, and so to deprive the country of this part of its resource against the season of scarcity and distress. But, inasmuch as beer is more necessary, and less a luxury than spirits, in the same proportion it is right to husband the resource of the distillery, that in the period of dearth the greater luxury may be sacrificed before the lesser one is made to give way to the pressure of distress.—(No part of the subject more pointedly shews the fallacy of the principle than this, carry your principle on—*confine* the farmer to *only* use his barley for the food of hogs. And need I ask, if his interest will not point out to him, not to create, not to produce that which he cannot

sell?—Far from expressing sorrow that the supply of foreign grain is cut off by the enemy, I have throughout my correspondence with you, lamented and reprobated the shallow, weak, and ruinous policy, which has led the country to prefer import to export; to encourage the first rather than the last, to depend upon foreign aid instead of internal resource. You, indeed, speak with confidence of the silence of the landed interest during the last thirty years, in which import has taken place and increased. But, surely, Sir, you have forgotten the opposition to the act of 1791, and the county meetings, the county petitions, and the corn committee of 1804; and that parliament was detained in order to pass a law pursuant to the recommendation of that committee. Was this no alarm? No opposition? Surely this was neither silence nor acquiescence. No, Sir; every one acquainted with the principles which generate and guide public prosperity, foresaw the dangerous consequences in this change of our agricultural policy. Many years back, Colonel Dirom was roused by the prospect of the dangers to which the country was exposed by it, to undertake his admirable “*Essay on the Corn Laws.*” And above thirty years since, Mr. Young, to whose well-earned and extended fame, my praise cannot add, raised a warning voice against it; and ere long, sad and suffering experience will prove the truth of their predictions.—With regard to my remarks relative to the loss of the distillers, I must beg you will recollect, that I urged it under the twofold view of injustice to him, and loss to the revenue. Has he not been encouraged to invest his capital in his plant, in consequence of the legislatures having imposed duties amounting to a prohibition of distilling from sugar and molasses? The encouragement on the faith of which the distiller acted, was no “secret,” it was never “whispered” amongst the trade, it was an open, avowed, public, and long standing agreement between the distiller and the government; and so I observe, that the sugar committee consider it, for they recommend the distilling from sugar should be confined to the present malt distilleries; that is to say, to those who on the faith of parliament have invested their property in a plant, adapted to the malt distillery. Far then from the distiller “whispering his fears to his partner,” if this destructive measure is pursued, he will have a fair and well-grounded right to apply to parliament, to either make good to him the loss of his plant, or to follow the recommendation of the committee.—As to the revenue, I still retain my former opinion, which in-

deed, you do not endeavour to impugn, for your remarks are against all taxation, instead of tending to shew that the revenue will not suffer. And, indeed, your “*Hampshire correspondent*” shews an additional loss in this respect, for he says, as much spirit may be obtained from 1,435,000 cwt. of sugar, as from 900,000 quarters of grain or malt; and that this quantity of sugar costs £2,000,000 and pays £2,500,000 to the revenue. Now the present price of barley is under 50s the quarter, which is only £2,250,000, so that the whole of the duty upon sugar must be drawn back, to which must also be added the loss of the duty upon the malt consumed in the distilleries.—But, Sir, you ask me, “what is the difference between an import in the shape of sugar, and one in the shape of corn?” and then say, that “if it was proposed to import 300,000 qrs of corn from the colonies, it would not be objected to.” For one I should certainly object, and that, because I consider *all* import of provisions to be bad policy, injurious to the farmer, and dangerous to the safety of the country. There is, however, an *essential* difference between an import of sugar and one of corn. If the West indies could supply us with 300,000 qrs. of corn, and such import were consumed in the distilleries, or any other surplus consumption, *then* when the season of scarcity arrived, it would be an available resource, for we could stop the distillery and eat the corn; but by stopping the distilleries we cannot convert sugar into food. Besides, Sir, suffer me to advert to the idea upon which you so much dwell, that corn used in the distilleries must be considered for all the purposes of the present argument, as corn “thrown into the sea.” Pray what is this sugar to be? If a luxurious consumption of corn, is “corn thrown away,” is not a similar consumption of sugar thrown away; the one thrown away to encourage the British farmer, and insure the nation against the chances of the season; the other to profit the planter? So that, if there is any “absurdity” in my idea of so consuming a portion of the farmer’s produce, there is the same absurdity in your pleading for a similar consumption of the planter’s, with this difference however, that the utmost good to the planter is to save him a money loss, that the benefit to the country by my proposal is extending agricultural and national security.—I purposely put off the discussion of the policy of inclosures and improvement, which have in many respects, though not in all, the same consequences; because, as I stated in my former letter, I considered them “rather to be the effect of prosperity, than its

positive parent." In your view of the subject, you only regard the increase of quantity operating upon price; now, you should likewise consider, that the farmer's profit is regulated by two other circumstances besides that of price; by his expenses, and by the quantity of his produce. If, then, the expenses of the cultivator do not increase in the same proportion as the quantity of produce, he will still derive benefit, although the price should fall in proportion to the augmentation of that produce. But, Sir, according to my idea of inclosures and improvements, they will not operate as a security against the chances of the seasons, unless the additional produce of them be either exported, or luxuriously consumed in common years. They are a great and extensive gain to a nation in other ways, they are equivalent to an extension of territory, and they increase the number of the people; and these internal colonies, if I may be allowed the expression, require no additional care or expense in their defence, while they open a new, profitable, and increasing market to the produce and manufactures of every part of the empire; for, if all the waste lands were cultivated and peopled, our consumption of other things would be proportionably increased. Thus, Sir, it appears to me that an import of corn is an uncertain and ruinous resource, that in the present state of things we cannot even expect momentary relief from it, and that in order to secure the nation against the chances of the seasons, we ought to annually produce more than our necessary consumption; that to obtain this surplus produce a market must be found, and that such market can *only* be found in either an export or a luxurious consumption. Give to the farmer an export, and I, for one, readily consent to give the planter the market of luxurious consumption; but, until the joyous and prosperous times of a corn export shall arrive, our internal market of luxurious consumption should be secured to the cultivator, and every exertion called forth in order to increase and extend this market, instead of permitting it to be encroached upon by any description of persons whatever — I am, Sir, &c.—EDWARD WAKEFIELD.—*Duke Street, Westminster, May 6, 1808.*

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.

SIR,—When a genius and experience like yours, adopts, with no inconsiderable pertinacity, any particular tenet, it becomes the novice to pause before he ventures an opposition. To say, therefore, that the proposed measure of government for prohibiting the use of corn in distilleries will

be pernicious, is not my intention; my wish at present is, that previous to the entering into any detail respecting the quantity of corn and sugar on hand, or the relative loss which the suspension of the use of either in any way will contribute to the proprietor, the principle upon which sugar is to be consumed, and corn to be prohibited, or the converse, should be clearly comprehended. I confess, Sir, that if this has already been done, I must apologize for my dullness in not having discovered it; and yet that you should have immersed into the confusion of particulars before you had established principles, is so dissonant to your habits on all former occasions, that I can scarcely persuade myself that you have departed from so wholesome a plan in discussing the present important topic. Perhaps you will excuse me, Mr. Cobbett, if I venture to state my sentiments in regard to principles, in deference to which, all argument I should insist, must be founded. In the first place, Sir, I presume it to be an established axiom, that all articles of manufacture, or merchandise do, of themselves, find a level in respect of their value; and that any artificial interposition, whether legislative or otherwise, is generally, if not always, more injurious than beneficial. The manufacturer of hardware will not remain in the continued occupation of his trade, if he finds that the profits upon the article he vends produce a bare subsistence, while those arising from farming, support a luxurious table; and I conjecture that whenever from accident that should be the case, the number of manufacturers would diminish, whilst the farmers would experience a proportionate increase, until their respective articles of merchandise should produce an equal advantage in the sale. The consequence of this axiom is, I am disposed to believe, this: that all articles of merchandise, whether of corn or metals, will be sold at such a profit as may be considered fair and reasonable. That in average years of sale this must be so, there can be little doubt. Now these axioms are so clear, that there requires no ghost to impart the discovery, and I should probably have passed over these preliminary data, but for the expressions which have escaped your pen, and which have rather astonished me: I mean that passage of your address where you deride the idea that may be entertained, lest corn should be sold too *cheap*. Now if "*cheap*" has any solid meaning attached to it, it must be a relative one, and must of necessity imply, that corn either is at present, or has been heretofore, sold at a profit which ought *not* to have

been made; that in fact, the farmer's has been a more lucrative trade than any other: that this, however, cannot be from the data I have before laid down, is quite clear, and were I addressing myself to any one but a man whose principles, independence, and repeated integrity have uniformly claimed my admiration, and I am persuaded will always justify my esteem, I should be disposed to say, that he had made an attempt to prop a weak and falling system by an unmanly appeal to the prejudices of the weak and inconsiderate many. From what I have already noticed, it must be of necessity deduced, that all tradesmen and manufacturers will obtain for the commodities they vend a *fair* profit, and that this profit will not be greater with one class than another, but as nearly as can be on an average, the same. To produce, however, this equality of profit, it is apparent that no tradesman or manufacturer will ever possess a greater quantity of the merchandise in which he deals, than he finds to be vendible, because otherwise his profits would be reduced by a stagnant capital, from which no advantage would be derived. Now it appears to me, that the interests of society do not require that any merchant should keep by him any quantity of merchandise beyond the ordinary demand, *except* with respect to the article of CORN; and here an exception arises which is clear, palpable, and rational to the understanding. Almost all other articles of merchandise depend, in respect of their plenitude, upon human industry; but the supply of corn depends in a great measure upon the temperature of seasons; and it, passeth the foresight and understanding of the most skillful, to prevent the ravage and destruction of an unpropitious summer. But in almost all other species of merchandise, the scarcity may be either dispensed with, or accommodated by a succedaneum; but not so with corn; human existence depends upon the abundance of the supply of this esculent, and for any continuation of time, no discovery of man can anticipate or prevent the calamities of an insufficiency. It is quite manifest and unquestionable therefore, that there should be always on hand a considerable greater quantity of corn than can be consumed by the ordinary demand for food; but by whom is this quantity to be raised? By whom kept to alleviate, or rather preclude the miseries of squalid famine? Are we to look for it in the granaries of our patriots? Will the farmers hoard it? Does each individual, with a cautious prudence, like the ant, accumulate it for a

season of scarcity? How then is this superabundance to be preserved?—The means have been discovered—the superabundance* finds a market in the distilleries—what is the beneficial consequence resulting from this?—Why the season of scarcity arrives; the use of the distilleries is suspended, and the proportion of corn intended for *that* market, is turned into the current, that with a well-timed supply, will support the hero and the less-valiant, the philosopher and the tyro; and the impending gloom is dispelled by the invigorating rays of a genial sun. When the reverse of the picture is considered, and we behold desponding and hopeless countenances; when we see the purple hue of youth precipitated into the sombre mask of wrinkled age, the flushed glow of humanity may be excused, if it betrays any considerable jealousy at any purposed political regulation, which may prematurely occasion the reality of the misfortune, from which we shrink with horror, even in a visionary contemplation. I find I have been guilty of a digression; but I will now resume the subject, which is nearly concluded. If it be necessary that this superfluity of corn should exist, and if it cannot exist without a market, which in years of plenty will take it off the hands of the farmer, where is that market to be found, if the use of distilleries should be suspended?—The prohibiting the consumption of the still will, I admit, produce the consequence which you seem, Sir, to approve, namely, *cheapness* in the price; but in *intelligible* language, this word “cheapness” must be construed, injury to the farmer; because if the present price only yields a fair profit in relation to other vendible commodities, a less price, or cheapness, must be a reduction below a fair profit, and the consequence will be, upon the data before laid down, that the farmer will exchange the superabundant production of corn for the growth or manufacture of a commodity that will yield in its sale an increased profit. These are the principles, Sir, that I was anxious to have clearly understood; and if you feel that they are founded in candour and truth, I am persuaded you will adopt them in the investigation of the momentous question, whether it be wise and prudent to prohibit the distillation from corn, and adopt the use of sugar?—I am, &c.—W. F. S.—
Lincoln's Inn, Monday, May 2, 1808.

* By superabundance I uniformly mean the surplus after satisfying the demand for food.

WOODCOCKS AND SNIPES.

SIR:—As the sentiments which are delivered by you upon political subjects have always great weight, and in general deservedly so with the public, I am anxious to remove the ill impressions which the communications on woodcocks and snipes, which was inserted by you, has very likely produced.—Notwithstanding you and one of your correspondents have treated this matter slightly, I conceive that it is entitled to serious consideration. I object to making woodcocks and snipes game, for all the reasons which may be adduced against the game laws; but as their injustice is not called in question at present, it would be irrelevant to state those reasons.—I think that it will not be denied, that animals of every description, as well those which are denominated game as the others, were given to all mankind; and, therefore, to restrict in any manner whatever, when the common good does not require it, a person from doing with them what he chuses, is an unjust violation of his natural rights: then, does the public welfare require that a large majority of mankind should be excluded from killing woodcocks and snipes, by making those animals game?—The only reason which has been urged by the advocates of the game laws in their favour, which appears to me to deserve much attention, does not apply to woodcocks and snipes. That reason is, that those animals, which are now included in the game laws, would very soon be all destroyed, if every person were permitted to kill them at his pleasure. Without combating this argument, but which I think I could do with success, it will be sufficient for my purpose to state, that no such apprehensions need be entertained on account of woodcocks and snipes, since a fresh supply of them arrives every year, and if they are not *destroyed*, they will all *go away* early in the spring.—It has been stated by you, that you do not know any right which will be abridged by the making of woodcocks and snipes game, as far as relates to any amusement of the people; from which observation I infer that your opinion is, that the people have no right at present so to amuse themselves. Now, although it cannot be denied that to go upon the land of another person, upon any pretence whatever, without the leave of the owner, is contrary to law, and subjects the offender to an action of trespass, yet it never was intended that the law should be enforced in such cases as going upon the land for the purpose of killing woodcocks and snipes, where no substantial injury is com-

mitted; and the law, to guard against such vexatious proceedings, whenever damages for trespass are awarded by a jury to a less amount than 40s., makes the plaintiff pay his own costs of suit, unless notice has been given to the defendant not to come upon the land. Besides, consent is always *virtually* given in such cases, and I should not expect to have an action brought against me merely for shooting woodcocks and snipes, sooner than for cutting a twig from a hedge, or taking up a stone which lay under my foot in a path. But who would scruple to do those acts, or think that he acted wrong in doing them, although, in *strictness of law*, he committed a trespass? When there is an intention to do an injury upon the land, it is a wrongful act; when there is no such intention, it is not so. Birds of every description, which are not what the law terms reclaimed, that is, made tame, or secured from escaping, are the property of the public, and the public have, properly speaking, a right to look for them upon the private land of any individual, if by so doing, they do not commit any real injury on it, although, in strictness of law, a trespass may be committed. If a stranger left open a gate between a field of yours, in which there was a flock of sheep grazing, and a field of your neighbour's, in which there was a crop of turnips intended for seed, in consequence whereof the sheep entered the turnip field, and were doing great damage, and you passed by and saw them in the act, should you scruple to go in and drive them out, although you in strictness of law, did commit a trespass by so doing? This shews that it not only is not always wrong, but that it is *meritorious* in some cases to commit trespasses.—You appear to think, that the owner of land has a right to go upon it in pursuit of game when there is a tenant in possession of it without trespassing; but I apprehend that this is not the case, unless a *reservation* is made of the right.—You also state, that unqualified persons are already prevented from shooting woodcocks and snipes, with the consent of the person in possession of the land, as completely as this dreaded law can make them; if this is so, the law must be passed merely from wantonness, and on that account ought to be rejected; for laws wantonly passed, are certainly tyrannical and unjust; it is shewing the rod unnecessarily. But I do not think that this proposed law will not form an additional obstacle to the shooting of woodcocks and snipes, by unqualified persons. Your reasoning is this: “to go a shooting woodcocks and snipes without a spaniel, or dog of some sort, is

what no body thinks of;" (yet I myself have many times done it) "to be seen out with dog and gun, the law takes as proof of being in pursuit of game; being in pursuit of game, subjects the unequalled pursuer to the penalty of five pounds," &c. &c. Now, I always understood, that whether the defendant was in pursuit of game or not, was a fact to be collected, in all cases, by the evidence produced; for I do not know of any act of parliament which presumes, that a person being out with a dog and gun, without any other evidence being adduced, is in pursuit of game, and subjects him to the penalty. Then, what jury, or what justice of the peace, would say that a person was in pursuit of game, who was found sporting with a dog and gun in places where woodcocks and snipes, particularly the latter, are generally found, those places not being the resorts of game? I also object to the contemplated act, because the people will be thereby deprived of the practical knowledge of the use of fire-arms. If, as it ought to be, the government of this country is founded on the affections of the people, the motives for the use of fire-arms by them should be as numerous as possible; then every peasant would be a soldier trained to arms, prepared to defend his country in the hour of necessity. But, it has been the policy of this country, an odious policy, which had its foundation in tyranny (and to which Blackstone thinks the game laws owe their origin and chief support), to prevent the people from being acquainted with the use of fire-arms. I hope that this measure has not that object in view. For these reasons I think, that the proposed act to include woodcocks and snipes in the game laws, if passed, will unnecessarily deprive the people of one of their most manly, healthful, and rational amusements, and unnecessarily take away one of their few remaining natural rights. But I hope that the ministers of this country have profited better by the dreadful example which has been afforded them, by those tyrannical governments of Europe, who have brought destruction upon themselves by their unjust violation of the rights of the people.—R. R.—30th April, 1808.

A LETTER FROM THE HON. TIMOTHY PICKERING, A SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS, AND SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER GEN. WASHINGTON, EXHIBITING TO HIS CONSTITUENTS A VIEW OF THE IMMINENT DANGER OF AN UNNECESSARY AND RUINOUS WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN:

ADDRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES SULLIVAN, GOVERNOR OF THE SAID STATE.—*Dated City of Washington, Feb. 16, 1808.*

(*Concluded from page 736*)

I trust, Sir, any one who knows me, will charge it to vanity when I say, that I have some knowledge of public men and of public affairs: and on that knowledge, and with solemnity, I declare to you, that I have no confidence in the wisdom or correctness of our public measures: that our country is in imminent danger: that it is essential to the public safety that the blind confidence in our rulers should cease: that the state legislatures should know the facts and reasons on which important general laws are founded; and especially that those states whose farms are on the ocean, and whose harvests are gathered in every sea, should immediately and seriously consider how to preserve them. In all the branches of government, commercial information is wanting; and in "this desert," called a city, that want cannot be supplied. Nothing but the sense of the commercial states, clearly and emphatically expressed, will save them from ruin.—Are our thousands of ships and vessels to rot in our harbours? Are our 60,000 seamen and fishermen to be deprived of employment, and, with their families, reduced to want and beggary? Are our hundreds of thousands of farmers to be compelled to suffer their millions in surplus produce to perish on their hands; that the president may make an experiment on our patience and forbitude, and on the towering pride, the boundless ambition and unyielding perseverance of the conqueror of Europe? Sir, I have reason to believe that the president contemplates the continuance of the embargo, until the French Emperor repeals his decrees violating as well his treaty with the U. States, as every neutral right; and until Britain thereupon recalls her retaliating orders. By that time we may have neither ships nor seamen: and that is precisely the point to which some men wish to reduce us. To see the improvidence of this project (to call it by no harsher name, and without adverting to ulterior views) let us look back to former years.—Notwithstanding the well-founded complaints of some individuals, and the murmurs of others; notwithstanding the frequent executive declarations of maritime aggressions committed by G. Britain; notwithstanding the outrageous decrees of France and Spain, and the wanton spoliations practised and executed by their cruizers and tribunals, of which we sometimes hear a faint whisper;—the com-

merce of the U. States has hitherto prospered beyond all example. Our citizens have accumulated wealth; and the public revenue, annually increasing, has been the president's annual boast.—These facts demonstrate, that although G. Britain, with her thousand ships of war, could have destroyed our commerce, she has really done it no essential injury; and that the other belligerents heretofore restrained by some regard to national law, and limited by the small number of their cruisers, have not inflicted upon it any deep wound. Yet in this full tide of success, our commerce is suddenly arrested: an alarm of war is raised: fearful apprehensions are excited: the merchants, in particular, thrown into a state of consternation, are advised, by a voluntary embargo, to keep their vessels at home. And what is the cause of this mighty but mischievous alarm? We know it in its whole extent. It was the unauthorized attack of a British naval officer on the American frigate *Chesapeake*, to search for and take some deserters known to have been received on board, who had been often demanded, and as often refused to be delivered up. As was expected by all considerate men, and by the president himself (as I have before observed) the British government, on the first information of the unfortunate event (and without waiting for application) disavowed the act of its officer—disclaimed the principle of searching national armed vessels—and declared its readiness to make suitable reparation, as soon as the state of the case should be fully known—Under such circumstances, who can justify this alarm of war? An alarm which greatly disquieted the public mind, and occasioned an interruption of commerce extremely injurious to our merchants and sea-faring citizens—I will close this long letter by stating all the existing pretences (for there are no causes for a war with G. Britain).—1. The British ships of war, agreeably to a right claimed and exercised for ages—a right claimed and exercised during the whole of the administration of Washington, of Adams, and of Jefferson; continue to take some of the British seamen found on board our merchant vessels, and with them a small number of ours, from the impossibility of always distinguishing Englishmen from citizens of the U. States. On this point our government well know that G. Britain is perfectly willing to adopt any arrangement that can be devised, which will secure to her service the seamen who are her own subjects, and at the same time exempt ours from impressment.—2. The merchant vessels of France, Spain, and Holland, be-

ing driven from the ocean, or destroyed, the commerce of those countries with one another, and with their colonies, could no longer be carried on by themselves. Here the vessels of neutral nations came in to their aid, and carried on nearly the whole commerce of those nations. With their seamen thus liberated from the merchant service, those nations, in the present and preceding wars, were enabled to man their ships of war; and their neutral vessels and seamen supplying their places, became in fact, though not in name, auxiliaries in war. The commerce of those nations, without one armed ship on the sea appropriated for its protection, was intended thus to be secured under neutral flags, while the merchant vessels of G. Britain, with its numerous armed ships to guard them, were exposed to occasional captures. Such a course of things G. Britain has resisted, not in the present only, but in former wars; at least as far back as that of 1756. And she has claimed and maintained a right to impose on this commerce some limits and restraints, because it was a commerce which was denied by those nations to neutrals in time of peace; because it was a commerce of immense value to the subjects of her enemies; and because it filled their treasuries with money, to enable them to carry on their wars with G. Britain.—3. The third, and only remaining pretence for war with G. Britain, is the unfortunate affair of the *Chesapeake*; which having been already stated and explained, I will only remark here, that it is not to be believed that the British government, after being defeated, as before mentioned, in its endeavours to make reparation in London for the wrong done by its servant, would have sent hither a special envoy to give honourable satisfaction, but from its sincere desire to close this wound, if our own government would suffer it to be healed.—Permit me now to ask, what man, impartially viewing the subject, will have the boldness to say that there exists any cause for plunging the U. States into a war with G. Britain? Who that respects his reputation as a man of common discernment, will say it? Who that regards the interests and welfare of his country will say it? Who then can justify, who can find an excuse for a course of conduct which has brought our country into its present state of alarm, embarrassment, and distress? For myself, Sir, I must declare the opinion, that no free country was ever before so causelessly, and so blindly, thrown from the height of prosperity, and plunged into a state of dreadful anxiety and suffering. But from this degraded and wretched

situation it is not yet too late to escape. Let the dispatches from our minister in France be no longer concealed. Let the president perform the duty required of him by the Constitution, by giving to Congress full information of the state of the union in respect to foreign nations. Above all, let him unfold our actual situation with France. Let him tell us what are the demands and proposals of her ruler. Had these been honourable to the U. States, would not the president have been eager to disclose them? That they are of an entirely different nature, that they are dishonourable, that they are ruinous to our commercial interests, and dangerous to our liberty and independence, we are left to infer.—I hope, Sir, that the nature and magnitude of the subject will furnish a sufficient apology for the length and style of this letter. Perhaps some may deem it presumptuous thus to question the correctness of the proceedings of our government. A strong sense of duty, and distressing apprehensions of national ruin, have forced the task upon me. To some, the sentiments which, in the sincerity of my heart, I have expressed, may give offence; for often nothing offends so much as truth. Yet I do not desire to offend any man. But when I see the dangerous extent of executive influence; when I see the great council of the nation called on to enact laws deeply affecting the interests of all classes of citizens, without adequate information of the reasons of that call; when I observe the deceptive glosses with which the mischiefs of the embargo are attempted to be palliated, and posterior events adduced as reasons to justify the measure; when I know that the risks of continuing their commercial pursuits against all known dangers can and will be more accurately calculated by our merchants than by our government; when, if any new dangers to commerce were impending, of which our merchants were uninformed, but of which the government obtained the knowledge through its minister at Paris, or elsewhere, it was plainly the duty of the executive to make those dangers known to Congress and the nation; and since if so made known, the merchants and sea-faring citizens would for their own interests and safety, have taken due precautions to guard against them; and as it hence appears certain that an embargo was not necessary to the safety of "our seamen, our vessels, or our merchandize:"—when, Sir, I see and consider these things, and their evil tendency; in a word, when I observe a course of proceeding which to me appears calculated to mislead the public mind to public ruin, I

cannot be silent. Regardless, therefore, of personal consequences, I have undertaken to communicate these details, with the view to dissipate dangerous illusions, to give to my constituents correct information, to excite inquiry, and to rouse that vigilant jealousy which is characteristic of republicans, and essential to the preservation of their rights, their liberties, and their independence.—I have the honour to be, very respectfully, Sir, your obedient servant,
TIMOTHY PICKERING.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

(Concluded from p. 672.)

LOCAL MILITIA.—*Abstract of Lord Castlereagh's Local Militia Bill.*

The 9th, that persons shall not be exempt by having found substitutes or paid fines in the militia.

The 10th, prescribes the form of oath to be taken.

The 11th, imposes penalty on persons not appearing after being so ballotted; the fine to be proportioned to the amount of the income; the payment of such fine to exempt such person from being ballotted for ——— years.

The 12th, enacts, that a person claiming exemption upon payment of the smaller fine, shall sign a declaration of the amount of his income.

The 13th, on engaging to serve without pay in volunteer corps, part of the fine to be remitted.

The 14th, inflicts a penalty on such persons on being returned non-effective.

The 15th, persons refusing to swear that they have not insured against fine, to forfeit the amount.

The 16th, Quakers not to be enrolled, but to pay certain fines according to the property of such persons.

The 17th, enacts, that where the persons voluntarily enrolling themselves shall amount to the number to be enrolled by ballot under any apportionment in any such parish, then no ballot shall take place in such parish.

The 18th, gives a bounty to persons enrolling themselves voluntarily.

The 19th, enacts, volunteer corps may transfer themselves into local militia.

The 20th, volunteers to swear that they have no other bounty.

The 21st, allowances for necessaries.

The 22d, persons serving to be entitled to such exemptions as the volunteers now have.

The 23d, persons insuring for providing substitutes, or volunteers, subject to penalty.

The 24th, prescribes the mode of officering the corps.

The 25th, relates to the training and exercising for a certain number of days.

The 26th, enacts, that in case of invasion, the corps may be embodied and marched to any part of Great Britain.

The 27th, while training or embodied, to be under the military act and articles of war.

The 28th, entitles to the same privileges and allowances as other militia forces.

The 29th, provides that men may enlist into the army, navy, or marines, except during periods of exercise. Vacancies by enlisting to be supplied.

The 30th, levies fines for men deficient.

The 31st, provides that two thirds of the fines shall be returned when the men are found.

The remainder of the clauses, nine in number, relate to the assessments for men deficient, the providing for payment of bounties, the collecting of fines, &c.

SWEDEN.—*Proclamation of General Armfeldt, on entering Norway.*

Inhabitants of Norway.—The Danish government has declared war against Sweden, without any cause or provocation on her part; it has crowned the calamities that afflicted the North, and spontaneously submitted to a foreign yoke. The Swedish troops, therefore, enter your country according to the laws of war, in order to prevent hostilities from being committed in their own country. But the laws of war are carried into execution only by soldiers; the peaceful inhabitants of the towns and country, if they excite no disturbances, shall enjoy tranquillity and protection.—The Swedish soldiers, celebrated for order and discipline, respect the personal safety and property of the unarmed; and should Providence bless his majesty's arms, the army under my command, so far from proving hurtful to your different trades, shall open your ports to commerce and importation: quicken your industry; and secure in the North an asylum for loyalty and honour.—**AUGUSTUS MAURICE ARMFELDT.**

SWEDEN.—*The King of Sweden's Proclamation on the Rupture of the Intercourse with Prussia. Dated Stockholm Castle, April 5th, 1808.*

We, Gustavus Adolphus, by the grace of God, King of Sweden, of the Goths and Vandals, &c. unto all our true and loyal subjects, greeting:—We herewith graciously make known to you, that his majesty, the King of Prussia, has declared to us that all kind of intercourse between his dominions and Sweden is suspended; and that in

consequence thereof all trade and navigation to Swedish ports is prohibited under service penalties; and that further, all Prussian harbours are shut up against all Swedish ships.—This proceeding has not by any means been occasioned on our part; the said government, reduced by French tyranny, affords a fresh proof of the oppression to which all states must submit, that entertain any connection with the French government. An unfortunate lassitude, which prevented Prussia from resisting in due time, has brought her to the distressed situation in which she is now placed—groaning under the domination of France, which still occupies a considerable part of the remains of that monarchy with a numerous army, notwithstanding the conclusion of peace.—We commend you all and severally to the merciful protection of Almighty God.—**GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.**

SPAIN.—*From the Madrid Gazette Extraordinary. Order of April 2.—French Army.*

Soldiers.—The general business of Sweden has retarded for some days the arrival of the Emperor, but the combined armies of France and Russia are already on their march towards Stockholm, where they will unite, and the Emperor will lose no time in putting himself at the head of his armies in Spain; it is necessary then, that you should put yourselves in a state to appear before his Majesty, and to merit his approbation. General Reboisiere will order cartridges immediately for the infantry to fire with. The Grand Duke hopes to inform his Majesty of the good conduct of his troops, and also hopes to have to praise them in all respects. Soldiers, I see with pleasure the good order and discipline that is among you, and above all, the harmony that exists between the French and Spanish armies; I am filled with satisfaction. The Spanish nation is deserving of all the best wishes and good will of the French army, as on their part, they do not cease to give us proof of their love and affection. This morning, a soldier who had been condemned to punishment, was about to be delivered over to the hands of justice; but the inhabitants of Madrid have interceded for his pardon, which has been granted; but this must be the last instance. Soldiers, redouble your friendship with the inhabitants, and cement more and more the friendship that ought to unite us.—**JOAQUIN**, general in chief of the staff. **AUG. BILLIARD.**—*Madrid, April 2, 1808.*

SPAIN.—*Madrid Gazette Extraordinary.*—*Proc omation for the better Discipline of the French Troops—ordered by the Grand Duke of Berg to be printed for public notice. Dated Madrid, March 27, 1808.*

Soldiers—You are not about to enter the capital of a friendly power; I recommend to you the best discipline, the best order, and the best friendship with its inhabitants. It is a nation to which we are allied, and which ought to find in the French Army a true friend. And recollect the good treatment you have already experienced in the provinces through which we have traversed.—Soldiers—I hope this recommendation will be sufficient, and for which I am guaranteed by the good conduct which you have already observed; but if I find any individual forgetting that he is a Frenchman, he shall be punished; and any excess shall be severely punished in consequence of that which I shall order.—That any officer committing any crime, or neglecting his duty, shall be deprived of his commission and be delivered over to a military commission, for justice.—All soldiers found guilty of robbing, concealing, or of violation, shall be shot.—Any serjeant or soldier, convicted of abusing or ill-treating the inhabitants, shall be delivered over to the rigor of the laws; if of murder to be shot.—Any serjeant or soldier found drunk in the streets, shall be condemned to eight days' confinement in the stocks, and the serjeant be sent into the ranks.—All serjeants or soldiers found in the streets after the beating of the retreat—two days imprisonment.—Generals, chiefs of regiments, and commanders of the French Army in Madrid—each of you will see, as far as it concerns you, that these orders are punctually executed, and that they be read at the head of every company.—JOAQUIN, lieutenant-general commander of the Vanguard of the French army, of the troops cantoned at Madrid.

(Countersigned) EM. GROUCHY.

BRAZIL TRADE.—*Circular Letter from the Portuguese Ambassador to Officers commanding Portuguese or British Vessels of War off Cape Frio, or to the Commanders of the Fortresses of Lage and Santa Cruz and Conditions for the Admission into the Brazils of such Cotton Goods of British Manufacture as were not heretofore imported into Portugal.*

Please to communicate to the bearer of this letter,—captain of the ship—the orders which you may have received from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, for the admis-

sion and ports of discharge for the ships freighted with the goods specified in this license.—In the event of no such orders being at Cape Frio, I request the commanders of the fortresses of Lage and St. Cruz to ask for the same royal orders through the secretary of state's office of the proper department, and communicate them to the bearer.

Conditions.—1st.—That all merchants wishing to export cotton goods of British manufacture to the Brazil, without waiting for the regulations of his Royal Highness, whether in Portuguese or British ships, should be obliged to take a licence from the Privy Council to proceed to Cape Frio, and there to wait his Royal Highness's further instructions, as to their port of discharge, to which alone they must give bond to go.—2dly.—That every master and every shipper will give a bond equal to the value of the cargo, at this Custom House, for the due delivery at the Custom-House of the port of discharge ordered by his Royal Highness.—3dly.—That every master and shipper will bind themselves to pay at the Custom-House of such port of discharge, the same duties that were paid in Portugal upon woollen, or in lieu thereof, such as may have been already established by his Royal-Highness the Prince Regent upon cotton goods of British manufacture.—4thly.—According to your offer, and to ascertain that no India goods are exported thither, the manifest of said cargo sworn and authenticated as usual at the Custom-House, will be signed by the agent and consul general, Mr. John Charles Lucena, and by me.—5thly.—On these conditions, which contain all that fair trade can wish for at present, I will most willingly provide every captain with a licence to proceed under the above arrangement, and in case no orders are found at Cape Frio, to proceed as directed on the cover of my licence.—P. S. I need not say, that upon your application, with the licence of the Privy Council, &c. &c. the manifest will be signed by men and my licence delivered immediately, without the least expence to any of the concerned.

SICILY.—*From the London Gazette, April 12.*

The Gazette contains two dispatches from Major-General Sherbrooke, commanding his Majesty's troops in Sicily. The first, dated the 8th Feb states the surrender of Reggio to the French on the 3d, and that four Sicilian gun-boats had fallen into the enemy's possession; and also confirms the

loss of the *Delight* sloop of war, which in endeavouring to recover the gun boats got on shore on the Calabrian coast, on the 30th Jan. and it being found impossible to get her off she was burnt. On this occasion Capt. Handfield, with several of his ship's company, was killed, and Capt. Secombe, of the *Glatton*, who was on board the *Delight*, was dangerously wounded, and died on the 3d Feb.—The second dispatch is dated the 23d Feb. and incloses the following report from lieut-Col. Robertson, the commandant of Scylla Castle, stating the evacuation of that place.—General S. adds his highest approbation of the conduct of that officer and the officers and men serving under him in the castle, and of the naval officers and seamen employed to bring away the garrison.

Messina, Feb. 18, 1809.

SIR.—In obedience to your orders, I have the honour to report the particulars of what occurred since the first appearance of the enemy before Scylla.—After being invested by Gen. Regnier's army during seven weeks, and battered for six days by fourteen pieces of heavy ordnance, the little castle of Scylla has fallen into his hands: But I have the heartfelt satisfaction to add, that not one of the gallant garrison placed under my orders has become his prisoner.—In the latter end of Dec. the arrival of troops and ordnance stores at Seminara left me no room to doubt the enemy's intention of besieging Scylla, and parties of the peasantry were accordingly sent out to render the passes of Solano impracticable, and to create obstacles to this advance, by cuts across the various paths which lead from the heights of Milia down to Scylla. This work, as well as the levelling of fences, &c. proceeded rapidly and effectually under the direction of captain Nicholas, Assistant Quarter-Master-General; when upon the 31st of December, the advanced workmen and the out-posts of the *masse* were driven in by three French battalions and a detachment of cavalry, under gen. Millet, which took post upon the heights above; and on the following day Regnier brought up two more battalions, and spreading his out-posts to Favezzina, Bagnara, &c. completed the investment of the town. At this time the garrison of the castle consisted of two hundred British, and from four to five hundred *masse* occupied the town.—The enemy's troops were now incessantly employed in forming the roads necessary for bringing his

heavy ordnance from Seminara, while we laboured to render the approach to Scylla difficult, and harassed the French by constant attacks on his out-posts with parties of the *masse*, and occasionally with boats. In some of these partial actions the enemy suffered severely; particularly in a night attack at Bagnara, where the *voltigeurs* of the 23d Light Infantry were cut to pieces.—Owing to these checks, the French were retarded until the 6th of Feb. when they descended the heights in force, and came within a distant range of our guns; and from this day they honoured our little castle with all the detailed precautions of a regular siege, in covering his approaches and communications. The skirmishes between the enemy and the *masse* became very serious: the latter displayed great gallantry; and enjoying the support of the castle's guns, obliged the French to purchase their advance with heavy loss; but on the 9th, were obliged to yield to the numbers of the enemy, who assailed the town on all sides: our guns, however, covered their retreat; and I had the satisfaction of sending off these brave peasants to Messina without leaving a man in the enemy's hands.—The force which General Regnier had brought to besiege Scylla consisted of a body of cavalry, the 23d light infantry, 1st. 62d. and 101st. of the line, in all about 6,000 men; with five 24 pounders, five eighteens, and four mortars besides field-pieces.—On the morning of the 11th he opened his batteries directing his efforts to the destruction of our upper works, and the disabling of our guns; while under cover of this fire, he laboured to establish two breaching batteries, at 3 and 40 yards distance. It was not, however, till the 14th that our parapet and guns were rendered useless; nor till then did the slaughter abate to which their parties were exposed from our grape and shells.—From this time our defence was confined to musketry, as our guns lay buried under the ruins of the parapet, and the close fire from five 24 pounders became incessant. In the meantime we discovered him attempting to mine the right bastion upon which he continued at work for three nights, but I apprehend without the expected success.—In the night of the 15th, the French pushed round the foot of the rock, with the intention of destroying the Sea staircase, but we happily discovered them, and beat them off with the slaughter to which their desperate situation exposed them.

To be continued.

In the memorable Act, which may be called the written constitution of England, passed in the first year of the reign of William and Mary, and entitled "an Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and settling the Succession of the Crown," it is declared, "THAT THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT OUGHT TO BE FREE."

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

WESTMINSTER ELECTION.—Whatever some men might think of the politics of Sir Francis Burdett; however the public might be divided in their wishes as to the result of the election, however divided in their feelings as to the success of the efforts of the persons who proposed Sir Francis; still, as to the *manner* of conducting the election, from the opening to the close, there was but one sentiment, and that was, that it was an instance of obedience to the constitution, which had not been witnessed for many years past, and which, if independence of mind and public spirit were not extinct in England, must become an example to the electors of other places and districts. "This is, indeed, an instance of strict observance of the law; this is, indeed, the practice of the English constitution; this is, indeed, a free election; and, if all members were thus elected, we should hear no more of that jobbing, which is now the disgrace and the curse of the country." Except amongst the mere venal; except amongst those who will approve of nothing that does not favour their views of plunder; except amongst those, to whom no one can have the face to deny the title of public robber, this was the universal sentiment, relative to the whole of those memorable transactions, which led to the seating of Sir Francis Burdett in the House of Commons, as one of the members for the city and liberties of Westminster.—It was, therefore, not without a good deal of surprize, that the public saw an attempt made, by the High Bailiff of Westminster, to make the member, so elected, and who had never been what is called a *candidate*, who had never even *offered* himself for the suffrages of the electors, *pay* for his election. This person applied to Sir Francis for what he termed his *share* of the expences of erecting hustings, keeping poll-books, dinners for himself and assistants, and many other things too numerous to mention, amounting to a sum, which, if the demand had been acquiesced in, would have gone nearly to ruin

a man, who had had no more than his three hundred pounds a year (the income necessary for qualification), and who had had a family to maintain; so that, supposing such a demand to be legal, the law would, in fact, have ordained a punishment, and a most cruel punishment too, for an obedience to the law itself. We have so long been accustomed to look upon seats in parliament as a benefit to the holder; we have so long seen men struggle for this sort of possession with more eagerness and at greater risk than they struggle for almost any other sort of possession; we have, for so long time, been accustomed to see seats in the House of Commons openly offered for sale, by public advertisement, and offers to purchase, made in the like public manner; our minds have been so long familiarized to this set of ideas, that it appears, at last, to have become a settled notion, that a seat in the House of Commons is a valuable acquisition, and, of course, that the possessor, or occupier, *ought to pay for it*. But, all this is in direct hostility to the letter as well as the spirit of those statutes and those usages, which constitute what is called, *the constitution* of England, according to which a seat in the House of Commons is *no benefit*, but exacts from the person placed in it, certain *duties* which he is *obliged*, under heavy penalties, to perform; and, therefore, a man, according to the English constitution, can no more be compelled to pay the expenses attending his election to serve as member of parliament (provided he does not, by his own act, agree for such payment), any more than he can be compelled to pay the expenses, which may attend his being elected to serve as constable or tythingman or churchwarden or even as juryman. There is, preparatory to an election, a *writ*, or *command*, issued by the king, to the electors of such a place, or district, to elect one or more members to *serve* in parliament. When this command is fulfilled, another command is issued to, and served upon, the person or persons elected, who are, in this second writ, *commanded* to give their personal attendance in the Parliament

House; and, the law is, that the place for which a man is chosen, shall *pay him*, at a certain rate, for his attendance. All this concurs in the notion, that a seat in parliament imposes a burthensome duty, instead of being a possession of emolument. If the person chosen, refuse to give his attendance, in obedience to the writ; or, if he neglect to attend, no matter from what motive, he is liable to be punished, even to *fine and imprisonment*. Where, then, can be the justice in making a man *pay* for being elected, unless he has made, of himself, or by his authority, some compact to that effect:—

Having thus opened the subject, which is one that will, I trust, receive a full discussion amongst *the people*, at least, I shall now insert what was said relating to it, in the House of Commons, on the 11th instant, as I find it reported in the *Courier* newspaper of the 12th.—“SIR FRANCIS BURDETT had waited till he saw the house in a sufficient state of attendance, before he stated how he was circumstanced with respect to a transaction, which in his view of it involved a breach of the privileges of that house. It would be necessary for him, in order to explain the situation in which he stood, to state to the house a transaction which had taken place in one of the courts below. It was well known, that at the last election for the city of Westminster, the electors had nominated him as one of the candidates without his knowing any thing of the fact; and it was only towards the close of the election, he was made acquainted with it. The electors claimed to be exempt from paying any part of the expense of that election, and the High Bailiff of Westminster had brought an action against him as one of the candidates, to recover a proportion of the expense of taking the election. Though there was no law to authorise such a demand, nor any custom to sanction the practice, though it was well known that he had not taken any share or portion in the conduct or direction of that election, yet, without any proof of the existence of law or custom to sanction the demand, the learned judge in the court below had thought proper to direct the jury to find a verdict against him, *merely because he had taken his seat*. This was the reason delivered by that learned judge to the jury, why he had incurred the expenses for which the action was brought. Now, as to his taking his seat, that was not voluntary on his part, as he had done it in compliance with the writ, and any individual who may be

elected, was compellable to attend and do his duty in that house. Yet the learned judge had held that the circumstance of his having taken his seat had rendered him liable to expenses incurred in taking the election. *He was yet to learn what benefit it was to an individual to sit in that house, if he came there to discharge his duty with integrity*: and he was therefore surprised to hear any learned judge say, according to the law, as it is at present, that a seat in that house was any other than a burthen upon the individual elected to that situation. He was not, however, surprised to find that learned judge consider a seat in that house a benefit, as it was a stepping-stone to the bench. But he had not expected that a judge upon the bench would lay it down, that an individual for yielding obedience to the writ, had incurred a penalty for doing what, if he had not done, would have made him liable to the censure of that house. A person who had a duty imposed on him ought to be suffered to do it *without impediment*: but this was an involuntary act upon his part, and ought not, according to any constitutional law, and he hoped that all such law was not altogether forgotten, to subject him to any such penalty. It was said in Lord Raymond's Reports, that judges did not understand the laws of parliament. The matter was of small moment to him, it was even an object of perfect indifference, but it was of material importance to the Electors of Westminster, and to the privileges of that house. He did not make it a subject of *complaint*. What he mentioned the transaction for was, to know *whether he was to comply with the demand that would be made upon him, in consequence of the decision of the court below*. He applied but for the *advice* of the house, in order, that, by his silently submitting to that decision, the privilege of that house should not suffer any breach in his person.”—“THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER did not know how to address the house on this occasion; indeed, he felt he should apologize for offering himself, as there was no motion before them. He trusted, however, that the house would allow him to state what occurred to him in the view he at present had of the case; and from every attention that he could give to the statement of the honourable baronet, it did not appear to him to be a case in which the house could interfere. If the hon. baronet was right in his conception of the law, respecting

“ the misdirection of the learned judge, he
 “ had been very ill advised by his counsel,
 “ not to apply for a review of the whole
 “ case, *by a motion for a new trial, or by a*
 “ *bill of exceptions.* As he apprehended
 “ the case, the action had been brought
 “ against the hon. baronet for the use which
 “ he or his agents had made of certain
 “ erections for hustings, and the facts went
 “ to be decided upon to a jury. The direc-
 “ tion of a judge *might be right or might be*
 “ *wrong*, but in either case that house was
 “ not the proper tribunal in which to have
 “ the proceedings of the court below re-
 “ viewed. The course of practice in the
 “ administration of law, was in such cases
 “ either to proceed by motion to the court
 “ out of which the record issued for a new
 “ trial, or by a bill of exceptions; and if ei-
 “ ther of these had been resorted to by the
 “ hon. baronet and not been successful,
 “ *there would be no relief for him.* It was
 “ not for him to say whether or not the di-
 “ rection of the learned judge was correct;
 “ but the jury had no doubt decided upon the
 “ evidence produced to them of the use made
 “ of the erections by the agents of the hon.
 “ baronet. That was his view of the subject;
 “ but it would remain for the hon. baronet
 “ to decide what course he should pursue
 “ to attain any object he may have in con-
 “ templation.”—“ MR. CURWEN vindicated
 “ the learned judge from the imputation of
 “ having obtained his present exalted station
 “ by any party services, and contended that
 “ his elevation was altogether owing to his
 “ transcendent talents; as an abler or more
 “ upright judge had never sat upon the
 “ bench.”—“ THE SPEAKER did not know
 “ that he was not bound, upon an applica-
 “ tion of this description to the house, to
 “ state what occurred to him upon the
 “ subject. Undoubtedly, as he understood
 “ the matter, the hon. member had offered
 “ himself to the house with *perfect regula-*
 “ *rity*, on a transaction which appeared to
 “ him to amount to a breach of their privi-
 “ leges. The hon. baronet in taking this
 “ course *had done his duty*, and it was a
 “ grave question he had submitted to their
 “ consideration, so far as it regarded a breach
 “ of the privileges of that house, and affect-
 “ ed the character of an eminent person in
 “ a high judicial office. If he (the Speak-
 “ er) had had *any notice* of such an applica-
 “ tion; if he had but the slightest intima-
 “ tion of the intention of the hon. baronet,
 “ he would have endeavoured to be better
 “ prepared to satisfy his inquiry. At pre-
 “ sent he had to apologise to the house, if
 “ he should not be able to give that satisfac-

“ tion which on such a question was to be
 “ desired. The house could not be pre-
 “ pared in this instance to give advice to the
 “ hon. baronet. What he would recom-
 “ mend was, that he should wait, till *some*
 “ *practical consequence* should result from
 “ the decision of the court below, and if he
 “ should conceive that consequence to be a
 “ breach of the privilege of the house, he
 “ could not too soon bring it under the view
 “ of the house, nor could the house too
 “ soon proceed to take it into consideration.”
 “ —After a few words from Sir F. Bur-
 “ dett, disclaiming the having brought the
 “ question forward as a *complaint*, his ob-
 “ ject having been to obtain *advice* from
 “ the house, the matter was allowed to rest
 “ there.”—And there, I think, it will
 “ rest for a long time; for, I am persuaded,
 “ that the good sense of the High Bailiff of
 “ Westminster, joined, as it doubtless will be,
 “ by the advice of judicious friends, will not
 “ suffer him to push his demand to a seizure of
 “ goods and chattels.—If the shape and
 “ manner, in which Sir Francis brought this
 “ subject forward were conspicuously judi-
 “ cious, the speech of the Speaker was not less
 “ so. He seems to have done precisely as
 “ much as he ought to have done, and not a
 “ tittle too much. The mere *decision* of the
 “ court below was not enough for the House
 “ to act upon: there wanted the carrying of
 “ that decision into effect, in order to enable
 “ the House to come to some determination as
 “ to the remedy. To *punish* a member for
 “ having *yielded obedience to the law* which
 “ compels him to take his seat, would certainly
 “ be a matter fit for parliamentary discussion
 “ and decision; but, the punishment cannot
 “ be said to be inflicted, in this case, until Sir
 “ Francis has been actually forced to pay the
 “ money, or until it has been taken from him,
 “ in his goods and chattels. Until that hap-
 “ pens, he has experienced no punishment;
 “ for, as to the expenses of defending the ac-
 “ tion, supposing them to have been incurred
 “ and defrayed by him (which is not, I be-
 “ lieve, the case), it was his own voluntary act.
 “ But, foreseeing what was likely to take
 “ place; foreseeing, that, in the regular course
 “ of legal proceedings, he should be soon call-
 “ ed upon to pay the amount of the sum ad-
 “ judged against him, it certainly became him
 “ to apply to the House for *advice* as to the
 “ manner in which he should act, when the
 “ call was made upon him for the money, see-
 “ ing that the House, in its watchfulness over
 “ its honour and purity, might punish him for
 “ having done a thing, which would argue,
 “ that it was utterly impossible to take a seat
 “ therein, without the aid of the ready mo-

ney.—Mr. Perceval says, that a *new trial* should have been applied for; and, that, if that were refused, “*there would be no relief.*” A new trial has been applied for, and refused; or, at least, so I have read in the newspapers; and, of course, according to Mr. Perceval’s opinion, Sir Francis, and every other man in his situation, has no relief; and, every man, upon whom the electors of any place may think proper to impose the duty of representing them in parliament, is *certain* to incur a punishment. If he refuse obedience to the king’s command to attend in parliament, the House will punish him, and *must* punish him, if they do their duty, and they may punish him by both *fine* and *imprisonment*, and continue to do so repeatedly, until he does obey the king’s command. If, on the other hand, he obey the command, the returning officer punishes him by making him pay a bill of expenses; for, observe, that, if Sir Francis’s statement be correct, the merely taking the seat, that is to say, the obeying of the king’s command, is, of itself, to be considered as proof, that he owes the amount of those expenses. Nay, he may, if this be law, be punished *both ways*. First, for having disobeyed the king’s command, and, then, the moment he does obey it, for having obeyed it.—I shall be told, may be, that the House would not, in fact, have been thus severe; and, that the persons, who generally therein agitate questions, would have scorned to utter a word of complaint against Sir Francis, if he had not entered the House till doomsday. This may, possibly, be true enough; but, then, what would become of the representation of Westminster? “Oh!” exclaim a thousand eager voices, “I would, with all my soul have supplied his place, and would have paid the High Bailiff, dinners and all, without saying one single word about the matter.” I believe, gentlemen, that, for once in your lives, you speak the truth. But, there is still a difficulty; for, how will you find the means of convincing the electors of Westminster, that you will not, or would not, if in your power, endeavour, nay take care, to *lick yourselves whole again*? When I was at HONITON, the electors of that place told me, in plain English, that a member, who pledged himself to take nothing from the government, did not suit them; for that, they knew too much of mankind to suppose, that, except in very peculiar cases, men would expend their money without a reliance upon a reimbursement, and even upon a profitable return; “which,” said they, “is verified in your conduct; for you will not ex-

pend a penny to moisten a poor man’s lips “this hot weather.” I endeavoured to shew them, that whatever they received, in this way, they were, in the end, compelled to refund with more than Jew-like interest. For that, the amount of the candidate’s reimbursement exceeding his expenditure, it followed, upon their own principles, that the people must be the loser. “For instance,” said I, “the gentleman, to whom you are now going to give your votes, will receive, in consequence of your suffrages, £3,000 a year. That, in four years, amounts to £12,000, and, according to your own statement, he purchases your votes, or rather, to soften the thing, he gives you, after you have voted, about £2,000. So that, you must be the losers by the amount of “£10,000 at every election.” “No,” answered they; “for the £12,000 is divided amongst all the nation, and the “£2,000 amongst only about 400 of us.” “But,” replied I, “if the electors of every other place act upon your principle, then you must bear a share of the loss sustained upon the whole.” “Aye,” rejoined they, “but there are but few electors in the whole; and, therefore, however the whole nation may lose, we, who have the voting for members of parliament, *gain.*” “So, then,” concluded I, “the advantage is reserved solely for those who are ready to perjure themselves; this, according to you, is the birth-right of Englishmen; that there are amongst them, some who are ready to take bribes and false oaths, and that the rest of the people are to be taxed by them, and for their advantage.” Being thus penned up, they told me, that I was a methodist parson, and that I might go and preach to the devil; for that they should remain staunch to their religion, and their parson, who, in fact, was one of the most violent clamourers for my opponent.—Very different are the principles, by which I know the electors of Westminster, or, at least, a great majority of them, to be actuated. They want no pay for voting: they do not desire to thrive by the distresses and miseries of the nation at large; they desire representatives, who will seek no emolument from the national purse; and, of course, they desire that those representatives should be loaded with no burthen but merely that of the duties imposed upon them.—Surely, nothing was ever more reasonable than this; nothing, considering the general state of the representation, more praise-worthy; yet have the beastly hirelings of the press not failed

to give to this proceeding, on the part of Sir Francis Burdett, the character of *faction*. Of faction! What, is it factious to maintain, or to endeavour to maintain, the undeniable principles of that constitution, for the preservation of which we are called upon to spend our "last shilling, and to shed our last drop of blood?" Not a day passes over our heads but we are reminded of the excellence of this constitution, and of the shame and infamy and misery which would speedily follow its destruction. Agreed! Perfectly agreed! And what does Sir Francis Burdett ask, but the *practice* of this very constitution; being, doubtless, of fixed opinion, that, if laws are not observed, they are, in fact, destroyed, as to all their good purposes, and that they insensibly become instruments of deception and oppression; that they cast forth darkness and misery, instead of light and happiness?—It being evident, that, generally speaking, men pursue first their private interests, it follows, that, if men expend money for the purpose of obtaining seats in parliament, they have it in view to get a large profit by such expenditure, and will, of course, use the means of securing such profit. The *kind* of profit may differ. Some may prefer baubles to hard solid cash; but, the effect, as to the nation, will be pretty nearly the same, in the end. And, this being the case, it is quite clear, that whoever wishes to see a corrupt House of Commons, will surely be an advocate for *expensive* elections. —One thing surprized me not a little, and that was, that the *Whigs*, the famous advocates for PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, did not say one word, when Sir Francis called upon the whole House for advice. They had, formerly, prepared very elaborate schemes for the causing of elections to be *free*; and, one would have expected it was not, certainly, too much to expect; that, when they saw, that there had been one free election in England, one *really* free election, they would have found some means or other of edging in a word in approbation of it, even if they had abstained from saying any thing upon the subject of that *advice* which the Baronet was so anxious to obtain. But, alas! they had, in the fatal interim, been in power themselves. They themselves had tasted of the honey; and, which was of more weight in the influencing of their conduct, they hoped, though in vain I believe, to taste of it again. —The newspapers, some of them, speak of Sir Francis Burdett's conduct as *malicious*, and take care, by hook or by crook, to bring in the name of *Despard*. Just as if the sense

and reason of the nation were to be silenced by the use of this name; just as if it had anything to do with the High Bailiff of Westminster suing Sir Francis Burdett for the expenses of taking the election. And, as to *malice*, was there any malice in his asking the *advice* of the Honourable House? He did no more. If the House advised him to pay the demand; if they advised him to submit to be punished for having obeyed the king's command, in taking his seat, why there it was; he would have paid the money; for he made no *complaint*, and said that the payment was a matter of perfect indifference to him. I should suppose, that the Honourable House would have considered it as a compliment to its wisdom, to have its advice asked upon such a matter, particularly as Sir Francis stated, that it was purely from tenderness for the honour of the Honourable House, and from a fear of incurring their displeasure, that he had asked their advice. But, there are some men, whom nothing will please. Censure them, and they call you abusive; pay a compliment to their feelings, and they say you are malicious.

POPULATION.—In another part of this sheet will be found a Post Script from Mr. Arthur Young, from which I perceive, and with unfeigned sorrow, that that gentleman is very angry with me, who certainly never intended to give him any offence.—I said, in the passage, to which he alludes (see page 709 of this volume), that I knew of no return to the population act, which could enable Mr. Young to state what was the population of England and Wales in the year 1720. It appears, from what he now says, that there was a *calculation* made upon the subject, by a Mr. RICKMAN, who was appointed to collect and make an abstract of the parochial returns; and it is, it seems, upon this calculation that Mr. Young makes his statement. The act required, that the several rectors, vicars, curates, &c. &c. should make out returns, 1st, of the number of inhabited houses and families, and uninhabited houses; 2d, of the total number of persons, exclusive of soldiers and sailors; 3rd, of the number of persons employed in trade, manufactures, or handicraft; 4th, of the number of baptisms and burials, at stated periods, from 1700 to 1800; and 5th, of the number of marriages in each year, from 1754 downwards to 1800. From these returns Mr. Rickman made up what is called the Population abstract; but, the abstract contained the answers to the first, second, and third questions only. There has since, it appears, been something else made out by Mr. Rickman,

upon the answers to the 4th and 5th questions; but, I must see those answers before I can form any judgment as to the probability of Mr. Rickman's being able to make a calculation upon them. I should think, from what I have seen and what I have heard, that it is quite impossible to obtain, except in some cases, correct answers to the fourth and fifth questions; and, if there had not been some very great difficulty attending it, how comes it that Mr. Rickman did not include those answers in his general abstract? If the parish books had been kept in such a way as to enable the Rector, &c. to make out the answers *at all*, those answers could have been made out much sooner than the answers to the former questions. But, my opinion is, that the answers to the 4th and 5th questions could not be made out, except in the way of guess, for any period farther back than forty or fifty years. Then comes the *calculation*; and though the principle of that calculation may be fair enough, yet, when we consider, how those religious sects have gradually diminished, who neither buried nor baptised in the Church of England, it is evident that the materials for such a calculation must be very defective. In short, I look upon such a calculation to *prove* nothing, especially when I consider the motive by which the employers of Mr. Rickman were actuated in the whole of the undertaking. — My decayed towns and villages; my large churches and handfuls of parishioners; and my down-sides, once cultivated with such surprizing labour and pains, and now, to the amount of millions of acres, lying uncultivated; all these arguments, Mr. Young says, have been long ago refuted by him. I should, without the least affectation, be much obliged to him for a reference to the particular part of his useful works, where the refutation is to be found; for, at present, I am thoroughly convinced, that this country was once much more populous than it now is. How is it possible to account for the existence of a church capable of containing a thousand people, in a place where the habitations now consist of a farm house or two and a few miserable huts, scarcely fit for men to dwell in? How is it possible to account for this in any other way than that of a decrease in the population? — I still am of opinion, however, that the question of population had nothing at all to do with that of *corn and sugar*; for, if it did appear, that, in proportion to the population, more malt was made formerly than is now made, what would be the evident cause? why, that *wine* is now drunk even

by the farmers themselves; and that the labouring man, who used to drink beer, has now, by the excise-laws, been driven to the well or the pump. It is, in almost all cases, the *many* who make the consumption as well as the creation of things. To be sure we now see some huge breweries, which have arisen out of the Walpolian system (for ever accursed!); but we do not consider, that a *million* of little breweries have been annihilated. Now you will not find a man, who lives by his daily labour, brew his own beer; formerly it was as rare to meet with one who did not. This is the great cause of a falling off in the quantity of malt made in England. There is not so much beer drunk by those who formerly drank beer. That the population has been increasing since the Revolution is probable; the long and bloody struggles, and the uncertainty of property, from about 1645 to 1680, must have greatly diminished the population of the country; but, my arguments of the large churches, &c., apply to a former period, and were used merely for the purpose of shewing, that the land of England is capable of supporting a much greater number of persons than it now has to support. — A correspondent (I. T.), whose letter will be found in another part of this sheet, brings me back, for a moment to the corn and sugar question. I think I know the hand-writing; and, if I am right in that respect, I look upon this letter as no bad proof of my having, in my endeavours as to this matter, been successful; for, the writer tells me, that I have convinced *him*, and I know him to be a truly independent man; a man who has no particular interests at stake, on the one side or on the other; a man accustomed to reason accurately, and to decide with great deliberation and care; the man, of all men whom I know in the world, whose judgment I would wish, upon any question whatever, to have upon my side; because I know, that, to great talents and wisdom, he joins an impartiality which no consideration can warp. — I, as well as he, could have wished, and, indeed, now wish, to see the intended bill merely a bill of *permission*. Restrictions upon trade are, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, impolitic, and not unfrequently unjust; and, I am of opinion, that it would be much better for the West-India Planters now to open a competition to them, and leave their sugar (*unloaded with previous duties*) to vie with the barley. With great deference to I. T., I must, however, say, that I think it carrying the notion of an *ex post facto* law a little too far, to apply it to a case like this. *Particular* interests must

be made to give way to the *general* good. There can be no doubt that the particular interests of the distillers would suffer from the stoppage of their trade, in times of scarcity; but, such a measure would certainly be proper, and could not, reasonably, be complained of as an *ex post facto* law.—There are, I hear, petitions coming forward in favour of the intended measure; so that the House will find the subject ready discussed to their hands. This premature discussion is, however, the work of the barley-growers. They began it, and they have, I think, deprived themselves of that chance of success, which want of time for thought would have given them. Nothing, surely, was ever more indecent than the opposition which they commenced. The report was not printed until ten days after they began to call meetings and to condemn the measure. It was, therefore, *impossible* for them to be acquainted with the evidence, upon which the committee had made its report to the House; and yet they, in terms the most unqualified, set up a clamorous condemnation.—There has been, I perceive, a meeting of *Yeomen* farmers, at Winchester, consisting, certainly, of very respectable men, as far as the list of names at the bottom of the advertisement, enables me to judge; but, it is with no small satisfaction that I understand, that Sir Henry Mildmay was not present. It is no derogation from his character to say, that I believe him to have spoken against the measure, without full consideration; and, I shall be very glad to see, that time has altered his opinion, and has induced him to retract an error, into which any man might have fallen. As to his *colleague*, what he may happen to do is, with me at least, a matter of very little importance.—The meeting at Winchester was someagely attended as to excite very little interest. It was, in all probability, suggested by some businessless attorney, on the preceding market-day, as the means of insuring to himself, for once in his life-time, a good hearty dinner of roast-beef and plumb-pudding, at which, in compensation for his vigils, he might half burst himself with the juice of the grape, in drinking success to the consumption of barley. Great care was taken (by officious and *faithful* brother Scut, I suppose) to mention the *dinner* in calling the meeting; and, as the most moving piece of eloquence, this mention was reserved for the close. The truth is, that this meeting, like most others of the kind, appears to have been a mere apology for a dinner; and, if I am reminded, that the gentlemen, attending it, are at all times

able to have a great market dinner, I answer, that though they, doubtless, are, quite able to bear the expense, yet, they are not always able to find out an excuse for it that will satisfy themselves, and, which is of infinitely greater importance, that will satisfy their wives, who are very much addicted to reckon such expenses as so much subtracted from those enjoyments, of which *they* are justly entitled to a share.—As a farmer's frolic, therefore; as a little truantship from the dominion of the petticoat, the thing was, perhaps, excuseable, and brother Scut might have merit in the invention; but, if he carried the jest so far as to patch up, from ten times borrowed resolutions, a manifesto against an intended act of parliament, then he exposed his clients to the contempt of their more sober and sensible neighbours.—Of this description are, I dare say, almost the whole of the meetings we have read of, in the several counties. It is the large farmers only who assemble; large farmers do not work themselves; they love a jovial dinner; they keep brave horses to ride; and a day of frolic beyond the animadversion of the petticoat, is a day snatched from fate. This is the light, in which I, were I a member of parliament, should view these manifestoes. I should trace them to their first causes; I should see the attorney, or his clerk, copying them from old newspapers; and, of course, should be very careful how I regarded them as containing the real sentiments of even the persons by whom they were subscribed.

MR. PALMER.—After much talking about, this gentleman's case is again before parliament; and it must give satisfaction to every lover of fair dealing to see that justice, or something like justice, is, at last, to be done him. The short view of his case is this:—He was the author of that excellent plan of conducting the post-office of the kingdom, which is admired by all those who have considered it, and the advantages of which to the nation have been immense, in all the ways, in which an establishment of this sort can be advantageous to a nation.—If his plan succeeded, he was to be remunerated accordingly, than which nothing could be more fair. The clear revenue of the post-office was, before, comparatively, a trifle. If it rose, in consequence of the adoption of his plan, to a certain amount, he was to receive a certain per centage upon that overplus. But, at the same time, it was agreed, that Mr. Palmer should be an officer in the post-office, under the post-master general, and that he should assist in carrying his plan into effect; for the filling

of which office he was to receive a salary. —Thus he began with the public. He entered upon his office, and the post-office revenue speedily attained the amount which gave him a per centage. But, sometime previous to the year 1799, he was *dismissed* from his office, on account of alledged misbehaviour; and, upon demanding his per centage, was told, that he had failed in that part of his bargain, which obliged him to assist in carrying his plan into execution; that, therefore, the bargain became void; that he had no claim to the per centage; and that, of course, he had only to accept of what the minister (who had dismissed him) chose to give him. Such was the decision of Pitt; and I need hardly say, that it was also the decision of one of his Houses of Commons. —The claim has now been revived. Mr. George Rose is opposed to this intended *waste of the public money!* And he and his right trusty and well-beloved Mr. Charles Long (Mr. Thomas Steele is not in the House now, I believe,) reprobate the claim; insist, that the salary and per centage were to be inseparable; and, of course, that Mr. Palmer could claim no per centage, unless he kept his office. —I say that such was *not* the bargain; and the proof is this, that Mr. Palmer was certainly in his senses, and that no man in his senses would voluntarily have made a bargain, which could be binding only upon himself. He was to have a great reward for a great public service; but, as it was in the *absolute power* of the other contracting party to *dismiss him at any moment*, it is evident, that, if the claim to the per centage was to cease along with the possession of the office, he could not have a moment's security for his reward. It is an abuse of words to call such a thing a *bargain*; and though a sharp lawyer might get a man to set his hand to it, that must be a villainous court of equity, in which it would not be overset. —Mr. Palmer *might* misbehave himself in his office, though I do not believe he did, and I think his dismissal is no bad presumptive proof of it. But, we all know how many ways there are, in which a man may offend a minister or a minister's jackall; and we all know, that if such be the case, he is pretty sure to be dismissed from any office that he may hold, *during that minister's pleasure*. Is it, therefore, probable, that Mr. Palmer, or any other man with an understanding above that of an oyster or periwinkle, would have made the bargain here spoken of? If Pitt had said to him in plain terms: "You shall have so much money for your invention, *while you continue in such an office*; but, mark

me; *I will turn you out of that office whenever I please*;" if this had been said to Mr. Palmer; or, if he had thought that the agreement could possibly have been made to receive this construction, can any one imagine that he would have communicated his invention to the government? Can any one believe, that a man would have thus employed his own talents and merits for the purpose of making himself one of the vilest dependents that ever existed upon the face of the earth? —But, the House of Commons, in 1799, rejected this claim, and there is no *new evidence*, says Mr. Long, in support of it. Mr. Rose says, that the question was decided in the House, in 1799, by a majority of 112 to 28; and, that, if the House now grant the prayer of Mr. Palmer, it "*will shake its honour and character more than any thing within his recollection*." Good God! Let the House look to it then; for, but, it is useless to proceed: the reader's recollection will fill up the chasm. —This was Pitt's way. When once he had got the House to do any thing, he used to tell them that they were eternally blasted if they did not stick to it, and even follow it up. I well remember how he used to call for votes upon the sole ground of their having already voted in the same spirit; and to tell them, almost in so many words, that they were a parcel of inconsistent fellows if they boggled at it for a single moment. —But, Mr. Rose, this is *another* parliament. The walls are the same; the literal house is the same; but the figurative house is another, and I wish I could say a very different one. True, a House of Commons did reject the claim of Mr. Palmer; and a House of Commons did pass a bill of attainder against Russel and Sidney, but another House of Commons repealed that bill of attainder, and were not afraid of their honour and character being shaken by the act. —It is clear; it wants no proof, no evidence to support the fact, that Mr. Palmer never could mean to make his hoped-for and expected reward depend upon his continuance in office, or, in other words, upon the mere whim of the minister of the day, let him be who he might. Besides, what was he to be in office for? Why, to assist in carrying his plan into execution; to assist in making the plan succeed. Well, then, the plan *did* succeed; the public are, and long have been, in possession of its immense benefits; so that there appears to be not the shadow of an objection to the claim of the per centage, and this, as far as I understand, is all that is intended to be granted. —I wish the Pitts and the Longs and the Roses had been as

stout in their resistance of other claims. There are £20,000 gone to Dr. Jenner, and *for what*, let the people of Ringwood say. There have been, I believe, a hundred thousand pounds granted to the negro civilizers of Sierra Leone; and, away goes the scheme in smoke. But here is a scheme which was sensible and practicable. It has been tried; it has succeeded: its benefits have been enjoyed for a series of years; they are still enjoyed, and will be enjoyed for ages to come. Here would be a fit object for national liberality; but, Mr. Palmer asks for none; he only asks for his own; he merely demands that which is unjustly detained from him; and, if he is to receive no redress from the parliament, from whom is he to receive it, and who will ever trust the nation again? It is odd enough, that, when sinecure places are the topic, the persons who oppose this claim are amongst the foremost to talk of the sacredness of national bargains. Never mind the *amount*, say they, the place has been granted, and the nation must abide by the grant. Tell them of the enormous amount of the Marquis of Buckingham's place: no matter, say they, he has the place, and he must receive the revenue of it, be it what it may. Two years of that place is worth all Mr. Palmer's claim for ten years. The fact is, I dare say, that they found Mr. Palmer what they call, in their Whitehall slang, an *intractable man*. The man had merit; he could not help knowing that; and he was incapable of truckling to pompous ignorance. This, I'll engage, was his only sin; but, it was a thumper; it was a sin never to be forgiven. It is from such causes that the public affairs are so frequently mismanaged. To be capable of managing them argues the possession of talents and spirit; and who, that possesses talents and spirit, will quietly submit to the control of that stupidity and arrogance, which will frequently bear sway where the qualifications for office are such as I need not describe. — Mr. Bankes, who, it appears, opposes this claim, did not, any more than Mr. Rose or Mr. Long or Mr. Sturges, oppose the vote of 40,000*l.* to pay the debts of Pitt. Nay, *no one* opposed it, though, if Sir Francis Burdett had been in the House, I trust, he would have opposed it. Was that forty thousand pounds as well merited as the 60,000*l.* now to be paid to Mr. Palmer? There is not a just man in the kingdom but will answer, NO. This, Mr. Bankes' calls an *extravagant* demand; but, it is not the mere amount of any demand that makes it extravagant. The demand of a guinea for a pound of beef is

more extravagant than the demand of twenty guineas for the half of an ox. Mr. Palmer asks for no more than his due, agreeably to the undenied terms of what he says is a contract. Disprove the contract, and he is entitled to nothing; but, if the contract be recognised, the demand cannot be extravagant. There is, too, in the present case, this peculiar circumstance, that you acknowledge to have *gained* by the contract; and, that it is only *his share of the gains* that Mr. Palmer demands. Had the nation *lost* by the contract; or, had the gain been matter of doubt, there might have been some room for shuffle. It would have been disgraceful, indeed; it would have been abhorrent from the character of Englishmen, amongst whom the sacredness of pecuniary engagements is inculcated in the common and emphatical phrase: "a bargain is a bargain." Still, however, there would have been room for some men to shuffle; but, in the present case, I am almost ready to say, that I would defy an American to find out a pretext for shuffling.

Botley, 19th May, 1808.

POSTSCRIPT FROM MR. A. YOUNG

SIR.—In your observations on Mr. Coke's speech to the Norfolk meeting you have this passage.—"Where did Mr. Young learn that the number was 5,565,000 in 1720? Not "by the return to the act," or, at least, I never saw or heard of such return. I am of opinion, that he has now spoken from no better authority than that of Gregory King, who, indeed was so minute and accurate a gentleman that he included in his estimate the number of rabbits in England and Wales."—Now, Mr. Cobbett, what right could you have to accuse me of so offensive a want of respect to the committee as to state a matter of information as derived from specific authority, which, so far from having foundation, was built only on the vague guesses of a political speculator? Sir, I did not merit this injurious supposition. You have no occasion to go back to Gregory King, because, if you will put on your spectacles when you next examine the population report on the return to the 41st of the King, you will find a table of progressive state of population from 1700 to 1801. But if you knew of this document and rejected it, I leave you to settle that matter with Mr. Rickman; I certainly accept his authority in decided preference to your cases to prove our depopulation; your ruined towns—your large churches—your marks of the plough—your down sides

and all your other proofs of decline in numbers (most of which were urged by Dr Price and Mr. Jackson and were refuted by me more than thirty years ago; the returns to the population act have sufficiently proved who was right) these methods of depressing a fair adversary, (than whom no man more admires your talents) rarely answer longer than for a moment;—the triumph is short;—and you will certainly admit that I did not produce to the committee the authority of a writer who mistook rabbits for women. Although you are ready to declare that the singular fact I produced has nothing to do with the main question, you must permit me to think very differently. It ought to convince the legislature that barley is the last object upon which to make *experiments*; that depressing consumption is not the way to encourage production; these truths, so obvious to plain understandings, are denied, Sir, by the evident tendency of all you have written on this business of the distillery. I am, &c.—ARTHUR YOUNG.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.

SIR,—I am a constant reader of your excellent Political Register, and a great admirer of the powerful reasons, and your clear and strong manner of stating them, with which you generally support your opinions; and, for the most part, I accede to those opinions. And I have accordingly had great pleasure in reading your reflections on the measure now in parliament, for permitting the sugar-planters of our West India islands to distil, for the use of the inhabitants of Great Britain, the great quantities of sugar they have lately been imported into England, and which they cannot otherwise dispose of to their advantage. Your reasonings upon this subject convinced me that this permission ought to be granted to them; but they did not thoroughly convince me that the bill that is now in parliament, ought, in its present form, to pass; because, I understand that this bill does not only grant a *permission* to the sugar planters to distill their sugars, but *prohibits* the growers of barley from distilling their corn: and this I thought rather hard upon them, as it was depriving them by an *ex post facto* law (excuse the expression borrowed from the Latin language, as I don't know how so readily to express the matter in plain English,) of the liberty of employing their corn in the manner in which they might have intended to employ it when they sowed it in their fields. In general I have an aversion to restrictions and prohibitions; and especially to such as are unexpected and contrary to the views that the persons who are

the objects of them, might justly and reasonably have entertained with respect to the use of their property, as this prohibition to the corn growers seemed to be. And I somewhat wondered that you had not, in your former discussions of this subject, expressed your disapprobation of this prohibition. But, now I perceive, by your yesterday's Register, that you agree with me in this sentiment; and, therefore, I now earnestly and confidently hope, that your arguments will have the effect of procuring success to the present bill for the relief of the poor sugar planters, without that prohibitory clause against the corn growers. For the planters are really in great distress, and justly entitled to the attention and compassion of government, by all practicable and reasonable methods; and are, as you rightly observe, the subjects of the crown as much as the inhabitants and natives of Great Britain itself. And the arguments of Mr. Arthur Young and Mr. Wakefield, against the intended permission to the sugar planters, when unaccompanied with the prohibition to the corn growers, appear to me to have been thoroughly refuted and overthrown by the answers you have given them.—I remain your obedient servant,—I. T.—*May 15, 1808.*

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.

SIR,—I have read with much pleasure, your very excellent address to the Freeholders of Hampshire, and I think the country highly indebted to you, for the clear elucidation of the subject therein given. There is, however, one part of your statement (in which Mr. Wakefield appears to acquiesce) not quite correct. You assume that the corn used in the distilleries is, *as food* “thrown away.” This is not the fact, for of the 470,000 qrs. of grain used (as the Report of the Committee states) in the British distilleries, there remain after the extract is made 300,000 qrs. of grains. There is also a very considerable quantity of wash left after the spirit is drawn from the extract of the corn. These grains and wash are used in the feeding of cattle, which must otherwise be fattened on corn. This statement however, so far as it goes diminishes the value of the distilleries as a granary. For if grain be prohibited in the manufacture of spirits, there must still be a quantity of corn used either for feeding cattle or making bread to supply that deficiency of food occasioned by the want of the refuse of the corn distilleries. In estimating the value of three quarters of grains (the refuse after the extract is made), to be equal in the production of food to one quarter of barley, I think I am rather under

the mark. Upon this supposition, however, in case the distilleries should be compelled to use sugar instead of corn, 100,000 qrs. of barley would be required for producing that food which is now supplied from the distilleries.—I must say, Mr. Cobbett, that before so general and determined an opposition to this measure had been raised throughout the country, it would have been but decent to have waited till the report of the committee, and the evidence given before it, had been printed, in order that the principles, on which the prohibition of corn in the distilleries is recommended, might have been calmly considered and fairly discussed. The report and the appendix are now before me, and if any reliance whatever is to be placed on the opinion of Mr. Arthur Young and Mr. Wakefield (the great champions of the agricultural interest), the prohibition of the use of corn in the distilleries is a measure not only fit and proper in itself, but such as the ministers of the country are bound to do all in their power to carry into effect. On Mr. Young being asked, “Q. Under the probable circumstances of the country with respect to the supply of foreign grain, can we look forward to the effects of a short crop or mildew, or a wet harvest without apprehension? A. *Not without great apprehension.*” In fact, the whole tenor of his answers, upon which you have so ably commented in the Register of last week, proves the great distress this country would suffer in the event of a short crop, and even with a plentiful harvest there would be a deficiency in the usual supply equal to the amount of the importation. Mr. Wakefield after stating the average annual importation from 1800 to 1806, to be 1,447,500 qrs., was asked, “Do you conceive that we are likely to have a supply equal to the average of the last five years, in the present state of Europe? A. Knowing the ports of the Baltic to be shut against us, I should say, certainly not. I know that the importations from America have been very trifling indeed. Q. Must you not then apprehend that there will be a great scarcity of grain in the market? A. The present prices of wheat best speak the contrary fact at this moment: *but if a short harvest was to take place next year, the coming-in year, I should think the country in an alarming state indeed.*” Now, Sir, having before us this evidence from two of the best practical agriculturists in the country, shut out as we are from the whole continent of Europe, and excluded from all commerce with America, having in addition to all this, our own West India co-

lonies to supply from the growth of this country, can any unbiassed man hesitate for one moment, as to the propriety of bringing into consumption as food 370,000 qrs. of grain, (for I take it for granted that 100,000 qrs. would be still required for feeding cattle) especially, too, when it is recollected that the king in council will be enabled to put an end to the prohibition of the distilleries whenever the interests of the farmer shall require it? It appears to me, that very serious consequences may be the result of our not availing ourselves of every mean of increasing the food to be used in this country; and, I cannot but hope that the patriotism of the landed interest, will induce it to withdraw its opposition to a measure so just in itself, and, under the present political circumstances of Europe, so necessary to our welfare.—I am, &c.—Z.—May 12, 1808.

CROWN LANDS.

SIR,——The present disposal of the “crown lands,” would certainly be worth investigation, and I much wish that the public attention should be directed to the subject.—I am surrounded by a valuable portion of them, which have been leased for so many years back to the representatives of an opulent family in the neighbourhood, as to be considered at this day a part of their own property. This family, of course, is enabled to return the members; for the crown lands and houses are judiciously stocked at an under rent with *free and independent electors*, as I understand they usually are in cities by the leading men.—I sincerely hope that an immediate resumption of these grants may be made. First, that the benevolence of the king, which might be directed to more deserving objects, should not be intercepted and turned to unconstitutional purposes by the *middlemen*. Or, secondly, that in these times of difficulty, the government should draw the *full value* of its estates, now by no means the case, and which can only be fairly ascertained by a public auction. And, finally, because, by the destruction of this source of undue influence, the first stone would be thrown into the chasm which yawns between the honest voter, and the independent candidate.—UTOPIAN.—May 12, 1808.

LIVERPOOL PETITION.

DISTILLATION FROM SUGAR.—*To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled, the humble Petition of the Gentlemen, Clergy, Merchants,*

and other Inhabitants of the Town of Liverpool :

Sheweth, That this town essentially depends for the supply of bread to its numerous inhabitants, and a large and populous district in the interior of the county of Lancaster upon importations of corn and flour from other parts, and that a large proportion of such supply has heretofore been derived from foreign countries.—That of late, in consequence of the unhappy situation of the Continent of Europe, and the embargo which has taken place in the United States of America, the importation of foreign corn and flour has ceased, and the prices of these articles have advanced considerably, and are still advancing, while at the same time from the stagnation of trade, and the consequent want of employment and depreciation of wages, the labouring classes of the people are become less able to purchase those necessities of life at a high rate, or even more reasonable rates, as fully appears by the report lately made of evidence taken before a committee of your honourable house, ordered to be printed on the 12th of April last, on the petition of certain cotton manufacturers and journeymen cotton weavers living in this county.—That from the united operation of these circumstances your petitioners have been and continue apprehensive of much distress amongst the poor in this populous town and county; and it was with peculiar satisfaction that they observed, in a late report of a committee of your honourable house, the recommendation of what your petitioners humbly deem a wise measure of precaution loudly called for by the existing situation of the country; namely, the suspension of the use of grain in the distilleries of the kingdom, and the restriction of them to the use of sugar for a limited period.—That in proportion to the satisfaction of your petitioners in so well-timed a recommendation, is their regret in perceiving that meetings have been held in some parts of the country for the purpose of obtaining petitions to your honourable house, against the measure in question, as calculated to injure the farmers and discourage agriculture.—That your petitioners humbly contend that this measure cannot produce those effects, as it appears by the report of your committee, that on an average of the last five years the importation of foreign corn into Great Britain, has not been less than seven hundred and seventy thousand quarters per annum, which must of course have found a consumption, but which can no longer be imported; while the quantity of corn used in the distilleries of the United Kingdom does not ex-

ceed seven hundred and eighty thousand quarters, and therefore the corn to be excluded from the distilleries by the proposed measure, supposing it to extend to Ireland as well as Great Britain, will only supply the place of the quantity hitherto imported from foreign parts.—That in addition to this usual foreign supply (of which a large proportion has been received at Liverpool), there has been imported into this place from Ireland, on an average of the last five years, two hundred and forty two thousand five hundred and twenty-five quarters of corn, flour, and oatmeal, per annum; that during the period now past of the present year, this usual supply has been greatly diminished, and in place of a continuance thereof, at this time, orders for the purchase of considerable quantities of wheat and oats have been received by merchants in Liverpool, from millers and others in Ireland, at unlimited prices, to be shipped from hence for the supply of districts in that part of the United Kingdom, where scarcity appears to be apprehended.—That large supplies of corn are annually received at Liverpool from Scotland, that these supplies during the present year have been much less than usual, owing to the deficiency of the last crop in several quarters in that part of the United Kingdom, all which tends to enhance still more the price of bread here, already too high for the labouring poor generally to afford, and particularly the manufacturing poor, from the present want of employment, and consequent depreciation of wages.—That if any insuperable obstacles should prevent this restriction from being extended to Ireland, it appears there would then be a deficiency of three hundred thousand quarters of foreign supply, to be provided for, if possible, by an extended cultivation of the soil of the United Kingdom, in order to meet the usual consumption of the country, without taking into the account the extraordinary supplies of corn, flour, and bread, which, in the present situation of affairs must inevitably be wanted by the British West India Colonies from the United Kingdom, as well as that our allies the Swedes, being deprived of their usual supply of bread corn from the opposite shores of the Baltic, and their own growth being generally inadequate to their ordinary consumption, may at this time be compelled to resort to this country for supplies of barley, which when mixed with rye is, as your petitioners are informed, used for bread in times of scarcity in Sweden.—That in the opinion of your petitioners, the prices of corn are likely to continue high, though they trust that the adoption of this

measure will prevent them from becoming exorbitant. That the advantage of exorbitant prices even to the farmers is very questionable, experience having shewn that they terminate eventually in uncommon depreciation, while, in the meantime, the evils that ensue to the public at large are unquestionably great; and your petitioners feel assured that your honourable house will deem the good of the whole to be preferred to a doubtful interest of one class of the people, however numerous and respectable; a class, moreover, which being protected, by a special act of the legislature, from the injurious effects of an excessive depreciation of the prices of corn in times of plenty, by bounties on its exportation, payable out of the public revenue, ought, at other times, in fairness and justice, to submit cheerfully to such measures as may be necessary to guard the public against the contrary extreme of exorbitant prices, particularly in the present peculiar situation of the country, and unprecedented state of the continent of Europe.—That with regard to the local interests of any particular districts in which barley may be chiefly cultivated, your petitioners humbly conceive they have a still less claim to be put into competition with a measure of general advantage; but your petitioners are of opinion, that even the local interests of the barley counties are now likely to be materially affected by the proposed measure, for though barley is the grain chiefly used in the English distilleries, and though it appears there are some lands in this kingdom where no substitute for the crops of that grain can be resorted to without injury to the farmer; yet, on the other hand, it appears there are also lands on which barley is grown where oats would prove an advantageous substitute; and when your petitioners consider, that, of the quantity of barley annually produced in England, only one sixteenth part, or thereabouts, has been consumed in the distilleries, they cannot doubt that such a change of culture might take place as would prevent barley from being reduced below its proportionable price compared with other grain, or if it should for a time be somewhat lower than its just proportion, it would soon, in the opinion of your petitioners, find a more extended consumption as bread corn, the effect of which must inevitably be to raise it to its natural level; in confirmation of which, your petitioners are enabled to state to your honourable house, that of late, in consequence of the advance in wheat and oats, as well as the reduction of wages, the lower classes in this county have begun to

have recourse to barley bread, which they are not accustomed to use except in times of scarcity and comparative dearth of other sorts of grain.—That your petitioners conceive that the confining of the operation of the measure in question to a single year, with a power vested in his majesty in council to put an end to it within that period, if necessary, would be so guarded a proceeding, as under all the circumstances of the case, cannot reasonably excite in the minds of those concerned the least feeling of alarm or apprehension.—That although your petitioners are anxious to recommend the proposed measure to your honourable house, on grounds of general benefit, without reference to any partial interests, yet they cannot be insensible of its tendency to afford relief to the West India colonies, in their present distressed situation, which have been shewn to have peculiar claims on the consideration of the legislature, and which, in the apprehension of your petitioners, affords a strong additional argument in favour of this measure, more especially as the preservation of the colonies from the ruin which threatens them, is confessedly an object of the first national importance, as it appears the article of sugar alone pays an annual duty of above three millions to the country, that the manufactured goods exported annually to these colonies have exceeded six millions in value, and that this trade is one of the principal remaining nurseries for our seamen, and of employment for our shipping.—Your petitioners therefore pray that your honourable house will pass an act to suspend the use of grain in the distilleries of Great Britain and Ireland, and to confine them to the use of sugar for one year from the 1st day of July next, subject to a discretionary power to be vested in the king in council, upon a sufficient notice, to do away the suspension, and allow the distilleries to carry on their trade in the accustomed manner.—And your petitioners will ever pray, &c.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Report from Lieut. Col. Robertson, Commandant of Scylla Castle.—(Concluded from page 800.)

The fire from the breaching batteries had been variously directed till the evening of the 16th, when they bent their undivided fury against the left bastion with such success, that the breach would probably have been practicable by the following evening. It was under these circumstances that I received your orders to evacuate the castle, and have the great satis-

faction of reporting, that we accomplished this yesterday morning, in full view of the enemy, and without leaving an individual behind. The approach of the boats from Faro gave the French full intimation of our design, but the tempestuous state of the weather obliged us to seize the short opportunity of an hour's lull.—Every battery poured its utmost fire upon the castle, and subsequently upon the boats; while infantry with field pieces tried the breach on either side.—The garrison was drawn off in succession, and the embarkation effected with the greatest order, notwithstanding the tremendous fire of grape, shells, &c. Our loss in the operation was small; and before we were a musket-shot distant, the French were in the fort.—The masterly arrangement of the transport boats and man of war launchers upon this occasion, does high honour to Capt. Trollope, of his majesty's ship *Electra*, who personally superintended this service; and the conduct of the officers and men under him was marked with all the coolness and dexterity of British seamen. I regret to add, that one of them was killed in the operation, and ten wounded, some of them dangerously. The uniform good conduct of the garrison which I have had the good fortune to command, demands my warmest gratitude; and their intrepid spirit during the siege is hardly more commendable than the zeal with which they went through the fatigues that preceded it.—The detachment of the Royal Artillery was highly conspicuous; the excellence of their gunnery was proved by the severe losses which the enemy has sustained; and I cannot too strongly express my sense of the skill and indefatigable zeal which Lieut. Dunn has displayed throughout the siege.—I feel highly indebted to the exertions of Capt. Cruikshanks of the 62d, Jordan of the 27th, and Pringle of the 21st, as well as to the officers and men under them.—From Lieut. Dickons, of the engineers, I received every assistance; and my adjutant, Lieut. Hadfield, of the 35th, has been throughout indefatigably zealous.—I cannot, conclude, Sir, without expressing my particular thanks to Capt. Nicholas, Assistant Quarter-Master General, whose abilities and activity rendered him eminently useful. And I have the satisfaction of reflecting, that the support I have received from all ranks has enabled me to sell Scylla dear; and that General Regnier has obtained possession of this little heap of ruins with the loss of several hundreds of his best troops.—The return of our killed and wounded is annexed. We have

lost some gallant men; but considering the weight of the enemy's fire, the number is by no means great.—I have the honour to be, &c.—G. D. ROBERTSON, Lieut. Colonel. Commandant Scylla Castle.

To Maj. Gen. Sherbrooke, commanding his British Majesty's troops in Sicily.

Return of the killed and wounded of the detachments forming the British garrison of the Castle of Scylla, in Calabria, from the 4th to the 17th of Feb. 1808; viz.—Royal Artillery, 3 gunners killed: 1 bombardier, 8 gunners wounded.—27th Reg. 1st bat. 3 rank and file killed, 14 rank and file wounded.—68th Reg. 3 rank and file killed, 6 rank and file wounded.—62d Reg. 2 rank and file killed, 2 rank and file wounded.—Total, 3 gunners, 8 rank and file killed; 1 bombardier, 8 gunners, 22 rank and file wounded.

(Signed) J. CAMPBELL, Brig. Gen. Adjutant-General.

RUSSIA.—*Declaration published at St. Petersburg, March 16, 1808, in consequence of the Arrest of the Russian Ambassador at Stockholm.*

The emperor has informed all the cabinets of Europe and his own subjects of his constant endeavours to enforce his rights grounded on subsisting treaties with Sweden, and to obtain by virtue thereof the co-operation of his Swedish majesty against England. After having pursued these measures for several months, his imperial majesty was concerned to find that while he was endeavouring to preserve a good understanding between Russia and Sweden the latter preferred the friendship of England his enemy.—His imperial majesty has not concealed from the king of Sweden, or all Europe, that the welfare of his people required of him to employ all the means which Providence has bestowed on him for the safety and welfare of his empire.—Faithful to his system of moderation, his majesty declared to the king of Sweden his readiness to convert the step which he had reluctantly taken, into a mere measure of prudence, if the king would immediately, and without delay, perform his engagements, and co-operate with him and the king of Denmark to shut the Baltic against the English fleets.—The silence observed by the king of Sweden, the accounts given in public papers of the conclusion of a treaty, by which subsidies, a fleet, and part of the land forces of Great Britain were placed at the disposal of that monarch; in short every thing bespoke the real sentiments of that prince with regard to Russia; every thing clearly shewed, that his imperial majesty

could not expect any favourable change of the sentiments of the king of Sweden, and that it was time for his imperial majesty to secure his subjects against the evils which had been secretly planned against them. His majesty was accordingly compelled to alter the character of his measure.—He has received intelligence that his ambassador in Stockholm on the 20th of February (3 March) was put in a state of arrest by the king's order, that all the persons belonging to the Russian embassy were also confined in one house, by his command, that the said monarch had even proceeded so far as to order all the papers and letters of the embassy to be taken under seal, and the whole mission to be guarded by the military; his majesty has therefore to complain of an act of violence committed against his prerogative and the dignity of his crown, which concerns all other powers as well as himself. The diplomatic body, resident in Stockholm, was so perfectly sensible of the truth of this assertion, that it immediately protested against an act of violence unprecedented in Europe, with the exception of Turkey.—The emperor might use reprisals, but he has preferred to direct his ministers to increase the attention which they have always paid to the Swedish ambassador who is still in Petersburg, and to take care, that, should he chuse to take his departure from hence, he may not experience any difficulty or unpleasant proceedings on his journey.—His imperial majesty hereby informs all European powers, that, from this moment, he considers the former Swedish Finland, which his troops have not been able to subdue, but in consequence of several actions, as a province conquered by his arms, and that he incorporates it for ever with his empire. His majesty expects that Providence will continue to bless his arms in this war, and assist him to remove the evil from the frontier of his empire, to which the enemies of Russia endeavour to expose him.

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PORTUGAL.—*Proclamation by General Junot. Dated April 5, 1808.*

The general in chief of the army of Portugal, understanding that many soldiers and inhabitants of the kingdom of Portugal have suffered themselves to be deluded by false proclamations, published by the English, to procure soldiers, of which the British squadron is so much in need, and wishing to prevent the misery of those who may hereafter become the victims of the perfidious insinuations of the commanders of that squadron, it is decreed:—1. That all communication between the kingdom of Portugal and the ves-

sels belonging to the English squadron, be expressly prohibited: and that should any vessel or boat, of any description, approach the coast throughout all Portugal, under any pretext whatever, (even with a flag of truce,) it is ordered, that all officers commanding batteries or forts, do fire on them; any officer who shall suffer a vessel or boat to approach the shore, shall be tried by a court martial and broke.—II. Any individual detected in endeavouring to get on board an English vessel under any pretext whatever, shall be brought before a military committee, and condemned to six months imprisonment, or to death, according to the case.—III. Any master or owner of a boat, or other individual, who shall be proved to have facilitated the passage of any person to the English squadron, shall be brought before a military committee, and tried as an accomplice with the enemy, and as an instigator and spy, and be punished with death.—IV. Any individual, convicted of exciting the soldiers of the French and Portuguese army to desertion to any power whatever, will be punished by death as a crimp traitor.—V. Any person who shall give information of a master of a boat having conducted any one to the English squadron, or any person using endeavours to get there, through the intervention of a crimp or spy, on the fact being proved, shall receive as a reward the boat and one hundred cruzados for any individual, or two hundred for a crimp or spy.—VI. All the property of those who have quitted Portugal up to this moment, and are gone off to the enemy's squadron, shall be sequestered, if they do not return before the 20th instant. The magistrates in each department will examine the respective inhabitants, and take a list of those persons who have fled, and transmit the same to the intendant general of the police.—VII. The French military penal code from this day will be put in execution against the Portuguese army, agreeable to which every deserter on being arrested will be punished with death.—VIII. The secretary of state, the commanders of the French, Spanish, and Portuguese armies, all magistrates and justices of every description, are charged with the execution of this decree, throughout the kingdom, and to make the same generally known; any boats found without a copy of this edict, shall be seized and sold for the benefit of the captor. (Signed)—JUNOT.

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SWEDEN.—*The King of Sweden's Proclamation on the Rupture of the Intercourse with Prussia. Dated Stockholm Castle, April 5, 1808.*

We, Gustavus Adolphus, by the grace of God, King of Sweden, of the Goths and Vandals, &c. unto all our true and loyal subjects, greeting:—We herewith graciously make known to you, that his majesty, the king of Prussia, has declared to us that all kind of intercourse between his dominions and Sweden is suspended, and that in consequence thereof all trade and navigation to Swedish ports is prohibited under severe penalties; and that further, all Prussian harbours are shut up against all Swedish ships.—This proceeding has not by any means been occasioned on our part; the said government, reduced by French tyranny, affords a fresh proof of the oppression to which all states must submit, that entertain any connection with the French government. An unfortunate lassitude, which prevented Prussia from resisting in due time, has brought her to the distressed situation in which she is now placed—groaning under the domination of France, which still occupies a considerable part of the remains of that monarchy with a numerous army, notwithstanding the conclusion of peace. We commend you all and severally to the merciful protection of Almighty God.—GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

Proclamation of General Armfeldt on entering Norway.

Inhabitants of Norway.—The Danish government has declared war against Sweden without any cause or provocation on her part, and has increased the calamities which affected the North, and spontaneously submitted to a foreign yoke. The Swedish troops therefore enter your country according to the laws of war, and in order to prevent hostilities from being committed on their own country. But the laws of war are carried into execution only by soldiers. The principal inhabitants of the towns and country, if they excite no disturbances, shall enjoy tranquillity and protection.—The Swedish soldier, celebrated for order and discipline, respects the personal safety and property of the unarmed; and, should Providence bless his majesty's arms, the army under my command, so far from proving hurtful to your different trades, shall open your ports to commerce and importation, quicken your industry, and secure in the North an asylum for loyalty and honour.—AUGUSTUS MAURICE ARMFELDT.

DUTCH BUDGET.—*A Committee of the Council of State, consisting of M. M. Van Leyden, Van Westharendrecht Cuypus, and Heinlopen, brought on the 9th instant, to the Legislative Body, the following Message, relating to the Finances, and in the Sitting of yesterday the Projet of a Decree, proposed in the Message, was adopted.*—Dated, Utrecht, March 30.

The King to the Legislative Body;—“Gentlemen;—We have charged a committee of our council of state to present to you a projet of a law relative to the finances of this year.—At the commencement of your present session, we expressed on our part a strong desire to adopt a definitive and permanent system with respect to the finances, but since the 28th of November, affairs have not been ameliorated, and we have been under the indispensable necessity of provisionally shutting our ports. This extreme and painful measure ought to ensure to us compensation, to which we have so much title, and affords an irrefragable proof of the sincerity and constancy of our efforts in the common cause. Thus we must postpone all idea of a definitive and permanent system until a maritime peace, when alone it will be possible to reduce our expenditure to the amount of our revenue.”—It then goes on to state, that the expenditure for 1807 had been 78,000,000 florins, and the revenues only 55,000,000, leaving a deficit of 23,000,000, exclusive of previous arrears. To meet these a loan of 40,000,000 had been negotiated, which produced 38,000,000; the 15,000,000, after providing for the deficit, was applied to the payment of arrears. The estimate of expenditure for 1808 is 74,000,000, whilst the revenue is not estimated to produce more than 50,000,000.—It is said in this part of the Message, “We cannot dispense with maintaining in a good state the squadrons of the Texel and the Meuse. We announce with pleasure to the Legislative Body, that as the price of our efforts France has expressly engaged to procure the restoration of our colonies, and particularly those of Guiana.”—To meet the deficit of the present year a sort of forced assessment is proposed, which was adopted by the Legislative Body, by which those paying it are to become creditors of the state to the amount required. This is resorted to instead of a loan.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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[PRICE 10d.]

" Undoubtedly, no report could spread through the kingdom, relative to any stoppage in the Distillery, which would not immediately SINK the price of barley."—MR. ARTHUR YOUNG'S Evidence before the Committee.

" The price of barley has RISEN in consequence of the sitting of the Committee, and the discussion of the intended measure for stopping the distilleries."—MR. COKE, MR. FOSTER, MR. POKSONAY, SIR

" HENRY MILDMAY, &c. &c. Speeches in the House of Commons.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.—This question, after having gone through a pretty good discussion out of doors, has, at last, come before the House of Commons, upon a motion of LORD BINNING, made on Thursday, the 19th instant, to refer the report of the select committee to a committee of the whole House.—Upon this motion the House, after a long debate, divided; for it 122, against it 108; of course, there was a majority of 14 for going into the Committee.—This subject, owing to the principles that it involves, is of great and singular public importance; and, owing to the discussion having been conducted free from considerations of party, that discussion is worthy of the attention of the public. It must be interesting, too, to hear what has been said in parliament upon a matter respecting which so much has been said elsewhere; and therefore I shall here insert an account of the debate, as I find it given in the newspapers; for, though the report of the speeches will not be found here nearly so full nor so correct as it will be found in the regular Parliamentary Debates, yet, the substance of the greater part of what was said may be collected, and it is necessary that whatever observations present themselves to me should, to answer any useful purpose, be made without delay.—" LORD BINNING rose pursuant to the notice he had given some time ago, to make a motion on the subject of the Distilleries. Previous to moving that the house should go into a committee, he would explain the nature of the Resolutions he meant to offer in that committee, and the nature and causes of the changes made in those Resolutions since he had first announced them. The topics involved in the Report were important and momentous, and the highest authorities differed among themselves upon the principal points. The committee was appointed in the first instance to consider of the means of affording relief to the

West India proprietors and merchants, and the order, under which the committee assembled, directed the committee to inquire, whether the most immediate and effectual means of relief would not be to confine the Distilleries to the use of Sugar and Molasses alone. In the course of this inquiry, it became necessary to ascertain how far the agriculture of the country would be affected by such a restriction, and this investigation led to the knowledge of facts, which established the wisdom and necessity of the restriction, exclusive of all consideration whatsoever of the interests of the West India Islands. It was impossible to separate the two questions; but this he would say, that neither he nor the committee could have recommended the Resolutions they had done, if the interest of the country, distinct from those of the West India proprietors, had not, in the opinion of the committee, rendered such measures necessary. The committee finding that this country was generally dependent for a sufficient supply of corn and flour upon foreign countries, and that this supply was cut off in the present state of Europe, without any prospect of a sufficient resource in the last year's crop of this country, thought it right as a precaution against famine to stop the distillation from corn, with a view to a more ample and satisfactory supply of sustenance for the people. Here the noble lord went into a statement of the quantity of corn imported into G. Britain annually, and contended, that the saving, by the prohibition of the Distilleries, would be 470,000 qrs, which would cover more than half the deficiency created by the stoppage of importation, and more than the whole importation of oats. Under these circumstances it seemed right to suspend the distillation from corn, with a discretionary power to the privy council, to extend or to put an end to the restriction as circumstances may require. This was the substance of

“ the Resolutions of the committee, resolutions which they never would have come to on account of the West India merchants, if the circumstances of the times had not rendered them necessary with a view to the general interests of the country. He argued on the principle, that the distress of one class of the community ought not to be remedied by burthening another class. But he denied the application of the principle in the present instance. The sufferings of the West India merchants were great; but the relief here proposed went directly to remedy the distress present or eventual of the country, and relieved the distress of the West India proprietors only collaterally. G. Britain imported annually on an average 770,000 qrs. of grain from foreign countries. From some of these countries importation was now impossible. From America, in consequence of the embargo, corn could not now be received, and there was no prospect of the impediment being speedily removed. The supply of last harvest was not sufficiently abundant to have a surplus fund that might be relied on. The stock on hand was far short of the probable demand. In the south of England the crop was abundant, in other parts it was not. The crop of wheat was in general good, the crop of barley was short, and that of pulse good for nothing. [Here the noble lord cited the evidence of the witnesses before the committee, beginning with Mr. A. Young, in order to establish that the general crop of last year was short, and the supply in the country insufficient.] The stoppage of distillation from grain would be adequate to the importation of 470,000 qrs. In the present circumstances it seemed essential to divert so large a supply from luxury to necessity. It was objected to the measure, that it laid down a bad precedent, tending to encourage the perpetual interference of parliament in such cases. But the circumstances of the present case were peculiar, and unless the same identical circumstances existed, the precedent could not apply. It was said the quantity of grain to be sown next year would be diminished by the stoppage. But the quantity to be sown depended on the prices, and the present prices were far from being low. Instead of falling, they had risen since the present measure had been announced. Here the noble lord cited accounts of prices sent to him, which shewed a continued rise in the price of corn in the last two weeks. In Scotland in particular, the accounts stated that the

“ distillers had determined to stop whether there was a provision to that effect or not. If the business could have been conveniently gone into last night, he was prepared to offer a resolution for restricting distillation from corn for 12 months from July 1, 1808; with permission to the king and council to do away that restriction whenever an abundant crop should render it advisable or safe so to do. Understanding, however, that a number of the most formidable opponents of the measure might be conciliated by delay and representation, and that substantial good might be done with less difficulty by affording the means of private arrangement, he had put off his motion till this day. This was the sole cause of the delay, which was entirely distinct from ministerial motives. The object of attaining the same good with unanimity, was with him most important. He had therefore made the adjournment from yesterday, and he had also made some changes in the Resolutions he intended to propose, which he had reason to think would render them more generally acceptable. It had been objected by the Irish gentlemen, that the Report of the Committee, by proposing to prohibit the importation of Irish spirits into England, went to a violation of the articles of union. As nothing could be further from his wish, than to interfere with this compact in the slightest degree, this prohibition was to be now omitted. The first Resolution he meant now to propose, was, that after the 1st of July, and thence to the 1st of Oct. next, all distillation from corn, grain, flour, meal, potatoes, and bran, should cease throughout the United Kingdom; and 2dly, that it should be lawful for his majesty in council, after the 1st Sept. to continue the restriction till 40 days after the commencement of the next session of parliament. Thus, if the ensuing harvest should be a good one, the restriction might expire at once; if it should not, his majesty might continue the restraint till parliament should provide such remedy as its wisdom may think fit. It was intended also to reduce the duty on wash made from sugar. These provisions, it was proposed, should be extended to Ireland. But as his information on the state of that part of the United Kingdom was not so complete, he would leave the details of the arrangements, so far as Ireland was concerned, to be afterwards settled and explained. He understood, however, that government had received information from Ireland,

“ stating it to be advisable to stop the distilleries at present. If after the ensuing harvest Ireland had a superabundance, this country or Scotland could not fail to afford a vent for that surplus. With respect to the West India part of the measure, he did not think it right now to enter into details. The committee continued to employ itself sedulously on devising the means of remedying the distresses under which the West India interest unhappily laboured. The distress of the West India interest was urgent, undeniable, and severe. Many who had been till lately opulent, were now in a state of distress, and the most wealthy were in curtailed circumstances. The supplies sent out to work the estates were still as expensive as ever. The present distress of the West India interest arose, not from wild speculation, but from the shutting of the continental market, a mischief which England had brought on the colonies, and was therefore in a particular degree called upon to relieve and remedy. The question now before the house was, however, purely a British question. The relief to the West India interest was merely incidental to the primary object of providing a security against the apprehension of scarcity in G. Britain. That this relief to the West India interest could be incidentally introduced, was a great additional recommendation of the measure he intended to propose. If the restriction was necessary as a measure of precaution, it could not too soon be carried into effect. If it was not, the dispute could not be too soon put to rest. He moved that the report be referred to a committee of the whole house, and he anticipated from the moderation and the good sense of the gentlemen present, that the wishes of the committee would be carried into effect.”—

“ MR. COKE (of Norfolk) agreed that this question ought to be set at rest. He was sorry to observe a practice of suspending the statute of Wm. and Mary, which was the best security of the agriculture of this country, by affording the means of disposing of the surplus produce. The breweries and distilleries took off this surplus. If their use of corn was stopped, the demand must be lessened, the price must fall, and the growth and supply must of course be diminished. The landed gentlemen did not seek to maintain corn at the highest possible price. All they sought was a sure sale and a saving price, without which the land would not be cultivated. The price this year was low till this com-

“ mittee had commenced its inquiries. It had recently risen in consequence of the agitation produced by the investigation of the committee. The report itself allowed, that every permanent interference with the present established system of agriculture was injurious; and it expressed great reluctance at adopting even a temporary restraint. [Here the hon. gent. entered into a detail of the management of barley farms.] In this species of culture, and that of wheat, an increase of one-fourth had taken place within 15 years. The importation had proportionably diminished, and the fluctuation of the price of corn had materially lessened. The measure went to check the established system and do away the progressive improvement. With respect to the West India planters, he doubted whether they stood in need of relief. The demand for sugars had lately increased so much as to create an advance of 6s. per cwt. on one article. This demand had arisen from exportation. The distress of the West India planters had no claim upon parliament any more than that of any other class of men,—the Staffordshire potters for instance. A proposition of the same nature as the present had been brought forward in Mr. Pitt's time. But it was found the revenue would suffer materially from it, and it was given up. Was the chancellor of the exchequer prepared to say this measure would not hurt the revenue, or was he prepared with a remedy for the defalcation? The land was already sufficiently burthened with land-tax, property-tax, and tythes, and it might be expected that gentlemen would not go out of their way to burthen it, for the West India planters. He was sure the West India interest was at the bottom of this measure; for till their distress was represented as so severe, this measure was never thought of. He had no objection to the stoppage of the use of grain in the distilleries, if it should be necessary. The government ought to have the discretion to impose or to remove this restriction when corn should come to a certain price indicative of scarcity or of abundance.”—“ SIR W. CURTIS avowed himself a friend to the agricultural interests of the country, and denied that they were at all injured by the present measure, the policy of which was more than adequate to counteract every other objection.”—“ SIR JOHN SINCLAIR said that he might have less objection than he had to the present measure, if he could be assured that it was

“founded upon a system of general policy, and not local interest; for he was there not as a man locally interested by the views of any particular place, or any one set of men, but as one of the members of parliament for the United Kingdom, and as such he could not see any advantage to be derived from the substitution proposed, but did apprehend a great deal of mischief. The hon. baronet then adverted to the great advantage that resulted to the revenue from the grain distillery, and asked, whether with all this profit from the landholders, besides the property tax and others, it was a wise or a just measure to throw any obstacle in the way of the cultivation of land, and to diminish its produce? With respect to the sugar distillery, great as the injury would be to the landed interest, this boon would be productive of very little advantage to the growers of sugar. The high price of barley and other grain in Scotland was partly owing to the great quantities that had been bought and distilled there, from an apprehension of this prohibition of distillation from grain. As to what had been said about the advantage which this prohibition would prove to the people, he observed, that he was of a totally different opinion, and in this he was supported by very high authority on the subject. As to the stoppage of foreign importation, he hoped that we might soon have an opportunity of importing from America, as we already might from our own colonies in the north of that continent. But besides this, the measure might be made use of as a precedent for interference with the production of corn, a thing which it was most important to guard against. If any rational plan of relief could be proposed for the West India interests, he would gladly concur in it. But he could not consent that they should thus be relieved at the expense of a particular class of the community. The apprehension of such a measure as this had excited the greatest alarm throughout the country; and it was important in every point of view that it should not receive the sanction of the legislature.”—“Mr. CORNWALLIS gave credit to the noble lord, for the manner in which he had brought it forward; but asked how he had come to change his opinion, and swerve from the Report in one day? However, he would not argue from the Report, but take the proposition as it now stood. With respect to the lodging these discretionary powers in the crown, he thought that this system was attended

“with very bad effects, and he was by no means fond of the idea of encouraging the practice. In order to shew that the country might be sufficiently supplied with grain, he adverted to the excellent effects that had resulted from Mr. Western’s act by the increase of agriculture. He was a wise minister that assented to that act, and resisted the clamour raised against it at the time. Though the immediate effect of that might have been to raise the price of corn, yet the ultimate effect was to render it cheaper, as it enabled the landholder to raise corn upon those acres upon which none could otherwise have been produced. He mentioned, as another reason, the improvement in the breed of cattle, by which in Scotland, and other places, double the quantity of meat was produced, with the same quantity of animal provisions, so that much less land was necessary for pasture, and more was left for the production of grain, of which the prices had never before been so regular. In Devon, and other places in the neighbourhood, more grain had been stored up than ever had been known at any former period; and the present rise in the price of grain was owing to the alarm of the distillers, who had been buying up, and distilling as much of it as possible, from an apprehension of this measure. Still, however, if the proposition had come from the chancellor of the exchequer, or any responsible minister of the crown, he would not have been so much inclined to persist in objecting to a discretionary power of stopping the distillation from grain, if the circumstances of the country should require it, without reference to the case of the West India planters. But as the proposition came from the noble lord it must be considered as founded on the Report of the committee, which had been appointed for the specific purpose of examining what method of relief could be adopted for the planters. If this discretionary power was required with the view of affording such relief, and not solely to be directed by the circumstances of the country, abstracted from this consideration, the interests of agriculture must be shaken to the centre, without much benefit to the colonies. If, by the contest in which we were engaged, many should be turned from commercial to agricultural pursuits, it would be such a source of strength to the country, that so far from its proving fatal to us, we might come out of it in a better condition than before. He mentioned as a proof of this

“ the great improvement that had taken place in the agricultural system of Norfolk, by which every 7th acre was employed in raising winter food for cattle—in other places not more than the one-hundredth. If the same plan should be adopted in other places, a sufficient quantity of meat would be produced to afford half a pound of meat a day to 10 millions of people.”——“ MR. MARRYATT could not agree with those who thought that the interests of the West India planters were to be thrown entirely out of consideration, and maintained that a case of the utmost distress had been made out by them. When the account of the American embargo arrived, he, along with others, as a deputation from the West India committee, waited on the chancellor of the exchequer to ask, whether government would consent that the restrictions on the exportation of corn to the colonies would be taken off? And upon this being refused, it was suggested that sugar might be substituted for grain in the distilleries, as this would be only relieving them, with the money that was sent to be paid to foreigners for corn. It ought to be remembered that in former committees on this subject, the plan went to the breweries and to the distillation of molasses; at present it went no farther than the distilleries and distillation from sugar; so that the measure was much simplified, and the financial difficulties in a great measure got rid of. It ought also to be kept in view, that the committee still continued its labours, and had a report in forwardness pointing out a permanent plan of relief, by which any recourse to this measure in future would be rendered unnecessary. He denied that the system of agriculture would be deranged, for the crop of this year was in the ground, and before the next year's crop could come in, the measure would have answered its purpose, and of course cease. He also denied that the general interests of the country would be at all injured, since the quantity of corn thrown into the market would be so much less than what had been commonly imported. The hon. baronet opposite had not sufficiently distinguished between the effects of a temporary and a permanent measure. He allowed that if the plan was to be permanent, it would be injurious, but no such thing was in contemplation. If agriculture had increased, the population must have kept pace with it, for the importations had not been at all diminished; and in the pre-

“ sent circumstances of the country we ought not to trust entirely to a future harvest for making up the supply before derived from foreign countries. While the colonies take goods from the mother country to the value of 6 millions, while they paid 9 millions to the revenue, and while the trade employed 20,000 seamen, sugar had for the last 3 years been selling at a price insufficient to support the expense of cultivation. He referred to the official papers in the Report, in order to shew the mistake of those who imagined that too much sugar was raised. The glut had been occasioned by the stoppage of the foreign market, and the admission of the sugar of the captured colonies into the home market, contrary to the good faith on which our own colonists had rested. He further contended, that there was no intention here to relieve one class at the expense of another. The landholders were in possession of an advantage which the fortune of war had given them, and they ought, out of that advantage, to allow something to other subjects of the empire, on whose interests the war had produced an effect so injurious.”——“ GENERAL GASCOYNE had understood that the question had been postponed yesterday, with a view to some compromise, but what that was he was yet to learn, for he saw from the agricultural gentlemen nothing but the most pointed opposition. But he should like to know by whom that compromise was made, or who authorised it? The committee was no party to such a compromise, and the hon. member for Norfolk had shewn no inclination to come into the noble lord's proposition. But after all the delusion, and all the clamour that had been excited on this subject, it appeared, after all, from what the noble lord said, that the question was to be discussed without reference to the relief of the sugar planters! What had the committee been appointed for but to consider of a mode of affording them relief? And was he now to abstain from stating their distresses? The advocates of the high price of provisions refused any relief to the planters till a scarcity should take place, when they would humanely permit them to share the profits they derived from the distress of the country. If the planters were to be relieved only by the calamity of the country, he wished they might be long without relief. It had been said that the colonies were well represented in parliament. How did that appear? There never was any objection to

" profit by the high duties imposed on their
 " produce. They were valuable as a sub-
 " ject of taxation; but when they became a
 " subject of legislation, then they were de-
 " graded as well as injured, as in the in-
 " stance of the bill that passed two years ago.
 " After stating the impossibility that the co-
 " lonies could keep up the competition in
 " the foreign market with the Americans,
 " who supplied the enemy with the sugar
 " of their own colonies, the hon. gen. ad-
 " verted to the opinion of the representative
 " of the county of Norfolk, that the sitting
 " of the committee had raised the price
 " of grain. He affirmed, on the contrary,
 " that had it not been for the sitting of the
 " committee, the price would have been dou-
 " ble (*a loud laugh*)—he meant of course,
 " that the rise would have been double. The
 " distress of the colonies was not only severe,
 " but urgent, and the admission of grain in-
 " to the distilleries was the only mode of ear-
 " ly relief, and if this was denied at the
 " end of the session, all the previous proceed-
 " ings could only be considered as a tub
 " thrown out to amuse the planters."
 " —Mr. CHUTE did not intend, when
 " he came into the house, to have said
 " any thing, but had resolved to leave the
 " discussion to those who could do the sub-
 " ject so much more justice. But he
 " could not avoid taking notice of the as-
 " persions which had been cast on the coun-
 " try gentlemen by the general under the
 " gallery—a thing the less to be surprised at
 " as coming from an avowed advocate of the
 " slave trade. The opposition to this mea-
 " sure, he observed, was founded on the
 " clearest and most solid principles, and he
 " most conscientiously joined in it. Trade
 " might suffer for a time, without any great
 " loss to the community, or affecting in a
 " material degree the general interests. But
 " it was far otherwise with agriculture:
 " when that was injured the whole country
 " must be injured with it. Nothing, there-
 " fore, ought to come into competition
 " with this great national object. This
 " measure, if passed, would derange the
 " agricultural system, and change the whole
 " method of cropping. The agricultural
 " interests ought not surely to pay for the
 " speculations of the colonists. On these
 " grounds he would oppose the measure.
 " With respect to the imputations of the ge-
 " neral under the gallery, he would leave
 " it to others to give him a detailed answer."
 " —Mr. JAMES FITZGERALD would con-
 " sider the case on the evidence in the Re-
 " port, where it was recommended not to
 " extend the measure to Ireland—and yet

" the noble lord, by his Resolutions, propo-
 " sed to apply it to the whole of the United
 " Kingdom. Many, he said, were not
 " aware to what extent the Resolutions
 " would go. It was to one paragraph in the
 " Report that he wished particularly to call
 " the attention of the house. He then read
 " the paragraph that stated the reasons for
 " not applying the measure to Ireland; and
 " observed, that in this the committee were
 " unanimous, and yet the noble lord came
 " forward and proposed, that the measure
 " should extend to Ireland, without men-
 " tioning any ground for this alteration,
 " Though gentlemen had been almost put
 " to the torture in order to extract evidence
 " from them that the measure might be ap-
 " plied to Ireland, yet the result was against
 " it. He would oppose the Speaker's leaving
 " the chair."—"THE CHANCELLOR of the
 " EXCHEQUER observed, that gentlemen
 " had alluded to a compromise. He was
 " not aware of any such compromise, nor
 " had his noble friend, as far as he under-
 " stood him, affirmed that any had taken
 " place. If there had been any compro-
 " mise, and any discredit attached to it, the
 " hon. general had certainly shewn that he
 " was no party to it, and that none of the
 " discredit would rest with him. He under-
 " stood his noble friend to have said, that
 " he had postponed his resolutions on the
 " former day, from an idea, arising from
 " the nature of the objections, that a trial
 " ought to be made whether the propositions
 " might not be so framed as to conciliate
 " gentlemen on both sides. But he certain-
 " ly had no recollection that his noble friend
 " pretended that he could compromise the
 " matter, or had he any authority to do so.
 " The hon. general had charged his noble
 " friend with having left the distress of the
 " sugar planters out of the question, though
 " the committee had been expressly appoint-
 " ed to devise a plan for their relief. He
 " did not think that his noble friend had de-
 " parted from the character or spirit of the
 " Report, for the measure was there recom-
 " mended only with a view to the diminish-
 " ed supply of corn, and a power was ac-
 " cordingly recommended to be vested in
 " the crown, to stop the suspension when
 " the continuance of it should be inconve-
 " nient or injurious to the agricultural in-
 " rests, and not desirable with a view to pre-
 " vent a scarcity of food. If his noble
 " friend then felt that a notion prevailed,
 " that the design was to remunerate the
 " sugar planters, and to sacrifice the landed
 " to the West-India interest, was it not ex-
 " pedient that the thing should be placed on

its true ground, and that it should be stated, that, independent of the West-India interest, there were good reasons for the adoption of such a measure? That was his view of the subject, and the view of his noble friend, who had kept strictly to the spirit of the Report. The hon. general was, however, indignant at the delay, and said, that from the 1st of July to the 1st of Oct., the distilleries would be stopped at any rate. But his noble friend here again had only followed the spirit of the committee's recommendation, for the committee had proposed, that the suspension should commence from the 1st of July and continue till July the following year, still leaving a discretionary power with the crown. The proposition of his noble friend, that the distillation from sugar should commence on the 1st of July, and continue till Oct., with a discretionary power in the crown to continue it still further, till 30 days after the meeting of the next session of parliament, was in substance exactly correspondent to the Report. (Gen. Gascoyne said across the table, that he had understood that the sugar was not to be substituted between July and Oct., except in a case of scarcity). That, indeed, would have afforded some ground for the hon. general's objection, but his noble friend had expressly stated that sugar was to be substituted, and the hon. general might recollect that he had mentioned his intention of proposing a reduction of the duty on sugar wash, in order to enable the distilleries to employ sugar with advantage. Another reason for desiring an interval was to consider how the difficulty, with respect to Ireland, could be got over. The hon. gent. (Mr. Fitzgerald) who had expressed himself so strongly with regard to a recommendation of the committee, which he considered as an attempt to violate the act of union, was hardly reasonable in his objection to a compromise, by which that difficulty was done away, and the Resolution proposed in such a shape as made it a common question with respect to both countries. That this rendered the proposition more difficult he allowed; but when both countries were united, and the trade in grain perfectly free between them, it appeared that there was no step that could be taken to save the grain here that did not equally apply to Ireland. When there was abundance or scarcity in one country, they would be equally felt in the other. If the prices here were high, they must likewise be

high there, and *vice versa*, so that the same measure of precaution ought to apply to both. If this had been solely a competition of interests, there was no question the landed interest ought to have the preference; but when another interest might be promoted without prejudice to the landed interest, surely the proposition could not be rejected, merely because a measure, expedient in itself, might happen to afford relief to the sugar planters. He agreed, therefore, that the question ought not to be argued on ground of relief to the West India planters; although that was not to be thrown out of consideration entirely. He then put it to the judgment of the house, though fortunately there was not at present a scarcity, yet, in the deficiency of the means of supply, and the badness of the crop, under the apprehension of a possibly scarcity, and the foreign ports shut against us, whether it was not wise to provide beforehand against the effects of these threatening appearances? Those who put the question on the general principle, did not argue fairly; for the present was different from ordinary cases, and hence the hon. baronet's (Sir J. Sinclair) arguments, though they might apply very much to former times, did not at all apply to our present situation. We had been an exporting, we are now an importing, nation. The right hon. gent. then adverted to the evidence of Mr. Arthur Young, and others, and contended that the case was clearly made out, that the crop was deficient, and that it was expedient to adopt some such measure as the present. He denied that the high price could possibly result from the agitation of this question. The effect of that must have been quite of a contrary description. The cause was the scarcity in Scotland, and the different crops in other places. It would be improper to bring the measure into operation sooner than the 1st of July, as the distillers ought to have time to dispose of that grain which they had in such a state that it could be applied to no other purpose. He stated that the crop of potatoes had failed in Ireland, and that by the effect of this proposition the people there would have other food cheaper. The measure ought always to be considered as a temporary one. He admitted that it was his duty to take care of the revenue, and that this was an important consideration. But he believed that the revenue would not suffer materially, and that the difficulty of the collection in Ireland might

“ be got over. He hoped, upon the whole, “ that those gentlemen who objected to the “ quarter from which the proposition came, “ would dismiss from their minds, in considering the subject, every thing except “ its real merits. This was the proper view “ of it, and he hoped that no strenuous opposition would be persisted in.”—“ MR. “ PONSEY declared, that if he had not “ read the resolutions proposed by the noble “ lord, he would have voted for the motion “ of going into the committee; but the “ reading of these resolutions was sufficient to satisfy his mind as to the propriety of an opposite course. The gentlemen on the other side, he observed, had taken quite different routes to recommend the measure of the noble lord. One had pleaded for it as necessary to relieve the West India merchants, while another contended that it was called for in order to guard against scarcity. To shew that the latter ground was erroneous, the right hon. gent. entered into a comparative statement of the prices of corn, at various periods, particularly in Ireland; and he also quoted several passages from the evidence taken before the committee to prove that this ground was quite untenable. As to the relief of the West India merchants, he was as anxious for it as any man, but to the mode now proposed, he strongly objected; and, in particular, because he did not think this mode could be effective.”—“ SRA. WELLESLEY asserted, that the people of Ireland, and especially in the north, were very much distressed for provisions, which distress would, he maintained, render a measure of this nature necessary, whatever might be the state of the West India merchants.”—“ COL. MONTGOMERY stated, that the scarcity of the potatoe crops in that part of Ireland with which he was acquainted, had been such last year as to afford scarcely enough to spare for the ordinary cultivation or seed. The consequence therefore was to produce a proportionable scarcity of corn, which he thought the measure under consideration calculated to alleviate, if not to remedy; therefore he should vote for it.”—“ SIR JOHN NEWPORT was surprized at the statement, that the north of Ireland had recently experienced any material want of provisions, as the price of corn had not been for several months at all fluctuating, at one of the preatest ports for the export of that article in Ireland; he meant Waterford. If any scarcity existed in the north, he naturally concluded that such scarcity would have affected

“ the price of corn at Waterford. He generally deprecated the interposition of “ the legislature upon subjects of this nature. He thought such interposition, in “ almost every instance, extremely noxious. “ Indeed, experience had proved that nothing but imperious necessity could excuse it. To such interposition he believed it was owing that this country was “ not able to grow sufficient food for “ its population as it formerly did. “ From the enactment of Mr. Parnell’s “ act to the present, the interposition he deprecated was found injurious. As to “ the rise which had recently taken place “ in the prices of sugar and corn, it appeared to him to proceed from the speculations likely to arise out of the existence of “ a committee upon this subject.”—“ MR. FOSTER stated, in the most unequivocal terms, that he meant to vote in opposition to his colleagues. His reasons were: in the 1st place, he thought it to be contrary to all acknowledged maxims of agriculture to say, that we should prevent the use of grain in one of its regular channels, merely for the benefit of the West India colonists; and in the 2d place, if there were any ground for such a prohibition, it ought to be shewn that the necessity of adopting such a measure arose from the dearth or scarcity of grain, or some just cause for the apprehension that such a case was likely to happen. The corn of the country was by the wisest and most experienced politicians left in general to find its own level in the market, by the usual means of competition among the dealers. When there was a bad harvest, and the price of grain advanced much higher than usual, there were always persons ready to import from foreign markets, and thus keep down the price whilst they promoted their own interests. But it never could be the interest of any state to be disregarding of the interests of the farmer, and not to leave him some opening to dispose of the surplus of his crop. These opportunities were first, in the sale at the breweries and distilleries, and secondly, by exportation. He believed that this was the first time in the English history, except in a time of scarcity, or the apprehension of such an event, that ever the legislature attempted thus to tamper with the agricultural interests of the nation. Besides that, he could not believe that it was capable of affording any substantial relief to the West India merchants or planters; and if the house once adopted such a measure, and left such a precedent

on their Journals, it was impossible to say to what extent the mischief might be carried hereafter. Gentlemen might say what they pleased in that house upon the subject, but their words would have no effect upon the country at large; and the precedent would appear upon their Journals without their arguments in support of the measure, so that hereafter it might be made use of, but on slighter grounds even than those on which the present proposition stood. Agriculture was a business that required most extraordinary steadiness, more than almost any other pursuits that mankind were engaged in; and if the farmers were left without four years steadiness in the law that was to govern them, there would be no market, comparatively speaking, for a redundant crop, and no resource in time of scarcity. In Ireland there was no steadiness in the law upon this head until the year 1784. The law was at that time fixed; and almost ever since they have been able to send considerable supplies of grain annually to England. In every point of view that he could look upon the present subject, it left so strong an impression of its impolicy on his mind, that he felt himself bound to vote against the Speaker's leaving the chair."—"MR. WINDHAM declared that the principles laid down by the right hon. gent. who had just sat down, and by another right hon. gentleman (Mr. Ponsonby) need only be heard, to carry conviction to the mind of any dispassionate man. The committee, however, had been instructed to consider of the best means of affording relief to the West India planters, and to consider of that subject only, as it was imagined at least; but all of a sudden, and most conveniently it seems for the wishes of the gentlemen on the other side (all but the chancellor of the exchequer for Ireland), the idea of a scarcity in the country darts upon their mind, something like Bayes's army in disguise, and gives a new turn to their proceedings. Really, whilst there was such vacillation of opinion, such unsteadiness among their councils, there was little or no hope left for confidence in future. And, in fact, if there was any thing like a scarcity in the country, the very words of ministers that night were calculated to spread an alarm and add to the necessity."—"LORD CASTLEREAGH argued at considerable length, to prove that barley and oats were at present nearly double the price which they were sold at in the years 1795 and 1800, in London, and in some parts

of Ireland they were treble the price that they were in these two years of remarkable scarcity."—"MR. JOHN SMITH did not think the measure went far enough."—"SIR H. MILDMAY thought it necessary to controvert the assertions of the noble lord (Castlereagh), in order to prevent the effect of any unfounded alarm in the country, which might be the consequence of his calculations if they were not disproved."—"It was easy to foresee, that very little of what was *new* could possibly be said upon the subject of this debate; and, accordingly, there does not appear, from this report, to have been one argument made use of, which had not before been run to the very lees. There are, however, some assertions and remarks that deserve to be particularly noticed. Mr. Coke said, that "there had been an increase of one-fourth in the produce of wheat within the last fourteen years." This was meant, I suppose, to shew that the land was capable of supplying all the wants of the people, without the aid of West India produce to be used in the distilleries. But, unfortunately for Mr. Coke, it is a fact not to be denied, that, during the last fourteen years, during the progress of this astonishing increase, the nation has been increasing its imports of corn, and that it has experienced more distress from scarcity than during a whole century preceding. If such be the effect of Mr. Coke's increase, or, if his increase does not prevent such effect, what is the use of it? And to what end have those numerous clubs of wise men been formed, who watch over the agricultural concerns of the country, and one of which clubs, consisting of hard-working farmers (poor fellows!), voted a cup, or a vase, of gold, to be presented to this very Mr. Coke, and of which he accepted? A man of great ambition and small talent will always be, if he be *rich*, at the head of something or other. He will always find flatterers amongst either knaves or fools; and, if he cannot purchase flattery from the high, he will continue to descend, till his means meet with a commodity suited to their extent.—Mr. Coke spoke about the taxes which the land had to pay; the poor rates, the property tax. I have, in my last Register but one, shewn the decided advantage which the land-owner has, with respect to the property tax, over the annuitant, the life-holder, the merchant, the tradesman, the lawyer, the doctor, the parson, and every body else except the king, whose money in the funds the Whig ministry exempted from the operation of the property tax. With regard to the poor rates, I have shewn that they fall, as they ought to fall,

upon the *consumers* of the corn, and not upon the cultivator, any more than the paper tax falls upon the paper-makers, or than the stamp tax falls upon the printers of newspapers. But, Mr. Coke went a little further; and counted amongst the *hardships*, which the cultivators of the land had to endure, the existence of *tithes*. To be sure this was paying the *petitioning* clergy in their own coin. I have perceived, that many of the clergy are amongst the *advocates for high prices*. At one of the meetings, a *Reverend* Mr. Somebody was *in the chair*; and, it was resolved, of course, that the admission of sugar into the distilleries would *lessen the value of tithes*. But, here comes Mr. Coke and tells us, that the existence of tithes is itself one of the *hardships* upon the farmer; one of the checks to cultivation; one of the causes of scarcity; and, of course, one of the things to be got rid of as soon as possible. I should like to see this *Reverend* petitioner and Mr. Coke face to face, each with his manifesto in his hand. As to the "*hardship*" it wants no proving, that tithes are no more a hardship than rent is; that the claim of the clergy to the tithes is as good as Mr. Coke's claim to his rent, and of much greater antiquity; that neither the owner of the land nor the cultivator of the land has any just complaint upon this score; and that, as to tithes being a *check to cultivation*, they have existed for a thousand years, and Mr. Young and Mr. Wakefield have amply proved, that for many years, at no very remote period, England was constantly an *exporting* country. Tithes were no check to cultivation then, and why should they be so considered now? There have been, in all times, and under all our forms of religious worship, men who grudged to pay the parson, and these same men grudged, be assured, to pay the landlord, the only difference being that they found the hierarchy more easy to be defrauded than the 'Squirearchy. A robber seldom is so soon tempted to attack the strong as he is to attack the weak. This is the only reason that I can discover, why a clamour is not set up against rents as well as against tithes; and, this reason becomes conclusive, when we observe, which is universally the case, that where the tithes are inappropriate, where they do not belong to the clergy, the collection of them excites no visible discontent. The grey coats pay to one another most cheerfully; but, the moment the black coat puts in its claim, though the claim has no fair foundation except in the black coat, a clamour is set up about hardship and oppression. "*Country gentlemen*," indeed! Are those worthy

of that honourable appellation, who join in this clamour; a clamour flying in the face of our most ancient laws and usages, and also in the face of reason and of justice? The tithes, generally speaking, were set apart by the ancient proprietors of the soil for the maintenance of an order of persons, whose lives should be devoted to the service of the whole of each parish, poor as well as rich. They do not *belong* to those who are now owners or renters of land. They belong to the whole parish, and are put into the hands of one person, that that person may be enabled to devote his time and talents to the teaching of the ignorant, and the comforting of the afflicted. This, then, is an establishment, which, one would think, "*the country gentlemen*" would vie with each other in cherishing; but, since these clubs of cultivators have been formed in the country, since this new and heretofore unthought of sect has arisen, it has become the fashion to regard as an evil every thing that appears to deduct from the immediate gains of the cultivator. Tithes have this appearance, indeed, to those only whose reasoning faculties are smothered by the little details of cultivation; but, such is the appearance to them, and as their views are confined to the gains of the cultivator, they cry out, of course, against tithes.—Mr. Coke will say, perhaps, that he does not wish to rob the church and the landless of any portion of their patrimony. He would only *commute* the tithes. But, he would, doubtless, cause the cultivator to *pay less* on account of tithes, than he now pays; for, unless that were the effect, what sense is there in his complaint? And if that were the effect, the church and poor, let the manner be what it might, would experience a robbery.—To a liberal mind, there appears, at the first blush, something so unnatural in this clamour, when coming from the mouths of gentlemen, that room is left for nothing but astonishment. A little reflection, however, shews us, that such persons, having their minds bent solely upon the profits immediately derivable from their lands, cannot bear the idea of a participator. They see clearly enough, that in all the profits of the *farmer* they share; but, they cannot so easily see, that they derive a benefit from the prosperity of the clergy, whom they look upon as joint landlords with themselves, and of whose partnership they are, in proportion to the value they set upon the concern, anxious to get rid.—This anxiety has been fruitful in its invention of arguments; one of which is, that tithes are a discouragement to *improvements*, and that, at any rate, new enclosures should, for some years, at least, be

tithe free. For what? That the capital may be brought from titheable lands, and applied to lands not titheable? In short, that the church and poor may be *cheated*, since they cannot yet be openly *robbed*. The same argument applies to all *improvements*; and you see it frequently stated by writers of creditable talents, that it is *unjust*, that the clergy should come and take the tenth of what is produced by *manure* which the farmer has purchased; just as if those who endowed the several churches with the tenth of the produce of their land; who left, or who sold, their land with that charge upon it; just as if the meaning of these persons was, that the parson's claim should be confined to the tenth of what the land would produce in its *natural state*! As if the tithe were not to be collected upon the capital of the farmer; and, as if the poor farmer, who is unable to manure his land, ought to pay, per acre, as much in tithe as the rich farmer, who is able to manure his land so as to make it produce five times as much! Is there any justice; is there any reason; is there any common sense in this? And, could notions so preposterous ever have been engendered but in minds absorbed in the contemplation of the means of insuring immediate and undivided gain? — I was vexed, though, I must confess, not much surprized, to perceive, that the observation of Mr. Coke, respecting tithes, escaped unnoticed in the house, where there were so many persons, whose duty it was to have noticed it; and who might have so triumphantly coupled this complaint with the others that he was making. For a thousand years these tithes have been collected; it is allowed, by the agricultural clu-bbists themselves, that, during part of that time, the land of England has produced so abundantly as to enable the country largely to export corn; it is notorious, that, under the existence of these tithes, this nation has wonderfully flourished, and increased in power; that, from a mere nothing, from a mere island of savages (and she was little better at the time when tithes were first settled), she has become one of the most powerful and most polished nations in the world, leaving all others far behind in the general prevalence of science, and, what is still more, in the wisdom of her civil institutions and in the morality of her people. And yet, we are now, all of a sudden, to be told, that we cannot prosper, unless tithes be abolished; a new sect of cultivators arise, and have the assurance to tell us, that, unless we do away the law of tithes, this most ancient law of English property, England can no longer

prosper! And, observe, this they tell us, too, almost in the same breath, that they tell us, that there are "*more farmers than farms*," and that, wherever there is land to be had, there is sure to be a press of capital for its cultivation. — When I have been listening to these complaints against tithes, it has often occurred to me to ask, how it happens, that the laws relating to *manorial* rights remain uncomplained of? Quit rents and fines and heriots are certainly as objectionable as tithes; they are frequently a *real* bar to improvement on the part of the immediate holder; and *all the duties* attached to these rights have, in reality, long ago ceased to be performed. But, these rights are, for the most part, rights of the *'Squirearchy*; and, therefore, it is, that we hear no complaint against them. — These remarks about tithes have, it is true, little to do with the question before us; but, I could not suffer the observation of Mr. Coke to pass unnoticed; and having shewn the groundlessness of his complaint upon this score, may be of service in inducing the reader to examine into the nature of his other complaints. The principle, upon which these agricultural mania men appear to proceed is this: that, as corn is the staff of life, they, who are engaged in the raising of corn, ought to be looked upon as the only part of the community entitled to the protection of the government. They are pleased, modest gentlemen, to regard the properties of the soil and of the climate, and even the blessings of Providence, as the production of their own personal merits. They tell us, that they "*feed the nation*;" and, really, they do seem to consider the rest of us in a light somewhat resembling that of their cattle. But, let them remember, that, if the *land* is exclusively theirs, the air is not, nor the sunshine, nor the rain; and, if they tell us, that the land is *theirs*, we can and ought to tell them, that the air is ours, who are the decided majority. — SIR JOHN SINCLAIR's speech affords another instance of the everlasting self-contradiction, into which the corn party fall. In answer to the argument, that the stoppage of importation might produce a scarcity, unless the distilleries were stopped, Sir John said: "that he *hoped*, that we "*might soon have an importation from America*, as we already might from *our own colonies* in the North of America." — First, as to the *facts*. Mr. Arthur Young has said, in his letters to me, that, as to America, what she can supply us with is scarcely worth naming. And, where did Sir John learn, that "*our own colonies* in the North of America were capable of

"doing any thing in this way?" Nova Scotia imports great part of its flour, Indian meal and corn, and even meat, from the United States. So does Newfoundland. New Brunswick cannot send us two ship load of flour in a year; and Canada not ten ship load. All our North American colonies put together are unable to supply themselves with a sufficiency of food. Their whole annual produce, leaving nothing for themselves, would not feed London and Westminster for one day. But, now to the reasoning: why, Sir John, do you *hope* that we shall soon have corn from America? And, what is the difference, Sir John, whether we get corn from America or Sugar from the West Indies to supply the place of corn? I mean, Sir John, what is the difference to the English or Scotch corn-grower? I am very much deceived, Sir John, if you, even with the aid of that magic *straw-pen*, which you sent to Lisle, for the purpose of signing the treaty that was about to be made between England and France, could explain this difference to the satisfaction of any man of common sense. Do you hope for corn from America, because you *know* that it cannot come from thence? From America; from our own colonies in America; *from any place but that which is ready to send us it!* Mr. Wakefield very consistently says, that, if the West Indies could send us corn, he would not let it come; but, you, Sir John, insist, that the importation of sugar to supply the place of corn, would be injurious to the farmers, and yet you hope soon to see corn itself imported from America.—Mr. CURWEN said, that, if the war turned us from commerce to agriculture, it would be a great benefit to the country. Agreed; but, let the thing take place; and, in the meanwhile let us rejoice, that all the alarms of the agricultural clubs have ceased. Don't alarm the people, says Sir Henry Mildmay (who sent his *tenants* to the Winchester meeting, though he had the decency to keep away himself), with a cry of scarcity. There is no signs of approaching scarcity, says Mr. Coke. The scarcity in the Highlands of Scotland (that plentiful country) was temporary, says Sir John Sinclair. There are plenty of potatoes in Ireland, says Sir John Newport. And, do pray observe, reader, that they *all* say, to a man, that the sitting of the committee, in place of *lowering* the price of barley, has *raised* the price. Pray look at my motto once more, and ask yourself then, when we shall hope to see an end of these shocking contradictions?—In those letters of Mr. Young, to which I so frequently referred in my Register of the

7th instant, that gentleman used the utmost of his endeavours to *alarm* us; but, *then*, his object was to obtain what he regarded as advantages to agriculture. "The Baltic is shut up; America cannot supply us; the ministers may find corn in the moon, perhaps, but I know not where it is to come from in this lower world; we have 'till now imported to the amount of two millions sterling a year; one-seventh part of our food has come from abroad; make haste to do something to get more corn; the effect of a short crop or a week's mildew cannot be contemplated without terror; make haste, then, to get more corn; I do not know very well what to recommend, but make haste, pass a general enclosure bill, let us raise potatoes, get substitutes, I am all in a sweat, taxes, poor-rates, tithes, it is for parliament to decide, but, for heaven's sake, let them dispatch!" Well, the ministers find out a substitute for 300,000 quarters of corn, at once. Here is this substitute already in our hands; and now, behold this gentleman, who was in such a terrible taking to get substitutes; whose very soul was harrowed up at the thought of a short crop, or a week's mildew, knits me up his mouth, and says, that we do not want any substitutes; and that, though the *last year's* crop was a *short* one, corn is still *too cheap* to pay the farmer for growing it; and, so, like the people in the Critic, they say one and all.—Mr. MARRYATT gave the public, or me, at least, a piece of information, of which I was not in possession before. The West India colonies were, it is notorious, supplied with great part of their food from the United States of America. Upon the news of the embargo being laid in America, a deputation of the West India merchants waited upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer to ask if corn might be permitted to be sent from this country to the West Indies?" "No," was the answer. "We want all our corn at home," and more too, seeing that the foreign corn "ports are closed,"—"Well then," said the West Indians, "let us bring our sugar here" to be distilled, and to save some of your "corn. Nay, we have got some sugar *here now*, spoiling in your store-houses; "let that be distilled in place of corn." Nothing could be more reasonable; and would not that minister have deserved a horsewhip, if not a halter, who should have turned a deaf ear to the application, for fear of offending the proprietors of the land? Are you afraid of scarcity, Mr. Young? the West Indies have now in the stores substitutes for 300,000 quarters of corn. Are you afraid of a glut, Mr. Young? The West Indies have a demand for twice 300,000

quarters of corn. And yet, you will not let their sugar be distilled. Both ways, or either way, they are ready to accommodate you; and yet you turn from them with disdain, though you are, at the same time, filled with apprehensions.—MR. CHUTE's speech was a very wise one. He asserted, that the opposition to the measure was grounded on the clearest and most solid principles; but, he left those principles to be stated and their solidity to be proved *by others*.—There is one way, which strikes me here, of increasing the quantity of corn, without having recourse to the West Indies, and that is by *cutting down the measure*; but, I shall leave this method to be developed and explained by others.—MR. FOSTER said, that, "when there was a bad harvest, 'people were always ready to import, and thus keep down the price.'" If applicable to any thing, this must have been in answer to some one who stated his apprehensions of scarcity; and, if so, it might have been put to Mr. Foster, *whence* those people were *now* to import? Good Lord! when shall we hear an end of these arguments, or, rather, of these shifts and turns?—I have now done with this debate, and should here put an end to my observations, for the present, had I not seen, from the debate of the 23rd instant (which ended with a division, in which the measure had a majority of 36 in its favour), that this has, at last been made a *party* question.—"MR. BARHAM," in the debate here referred to, "observed, with surprise, 'that this was made a sort of 'party question by gentlemen with whom he commonly acted. They seemed to think it would be of consequence for them to beat ministers, even in a question like this. But did they really suppose, that a failure in this measure would cause ministers to change their situations, or would enable them (the opposition) to change theirs? It unquestionably would have no such effect. They would, for the moment, become the dupes of a set of men who uniformly voted against them; who were then laughing in their sleeves at their credulity; and who the moment they had gained their end would skip over to the other side, and by their more than sedulous and obsequious attendance on the will of ministers, during the remainder of the session, would endeavour to atone for their desertion in this single instance, which was dictated solely by motives of self-interest. There was one thing, however, connected with this subject, to which he wished to call the attention of the house, and of his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby). Last night he

"had received a letter, at least the letter was addressed to him, in the same way as it had been usual to send letters on parliamentary business, conceived in different shades of earnestness, according to the urgency of the subject. *In this letter his attendance was particularly and earnestly requested in the house of commons this day, when the sugar business would come forward; and an early division take place.*" He mentioned this circumstance, conscious as he was that the letter was in the same hand-writing as usual, that his right hon. friend might have an opportunity of explaining the matter. If any person had presumed to practice an imposture, and to hold out the recommendation of a particular measure, where no such recommendation was intended, he considered it to be a most unwarrantable and unjustifiable act."—The effect would be precisely that which Mr. Barham describes; and, besides, the *outs*, from this endeavour to take advantage of the division amongst their opponents, would, if the measure were rejected, incur the general hatred of the country, in a greater degree than that in which it is now felt towards them; for, whatever the few may say, whatever clamour they have been able to raise, the country in general is for the measure, and the prevalent opinion is, that the opposition of the land-owners arises solely from a desire to keep up the price of corn, and, of course to keep up their rents; for, I'll warrant them not to join in the farmers' toast: "Cheap land and dear corn."—I certainly do not recollect an opposition so manifestly founded in self-interest as this opposition has been. The *outs* know well, that, for the votes they have gained upon this occasion, they have to thank mere selfishness; and yet their miserable partizans of the press are endeavouring to give to the thing an air of party triumph.—MR. PERCEVAL said, in the debate last referred to, that "he was much surprized to find the measure so strenuously opposed by some gentlemen, who, even during the present session, had applied to him under the *'apprehensions of impending scarcity.'*" Aye! but that application, I suppose, was accompanied with some agricultural proposition. They wanted to terrify him into a general inclosure bill, a commutation of tithes, or some such fancied good to the owners and cultivators of the land. When they found, that the ministry were to be scared into nothing of this sort, their alarming efforts ceased; and when they found, that a remedy other than that which they would have proposed, had been discovered,

then they opposed it, as a matter of course. —I trust, that the measure will be carried, not because I think it will be useful as a *preventive of scarcity*, for, I have stated, and any man may satisfy himself of the fact, that the food, which will thereby be saved (exclusive of that which now comes out of the distilleries in food, that is to say, in food for cows and hogs) will amount to no more than 4½d. worth in a year to each individual; but, in proportion as the saving of food will be small, will also be small the pretended injury to the farmer and the landowner, while the advantage will be very great to the suffering West India planter; and besides, there will be this peculiar advantage as to *revenue*, that, though a time of scarcity should arise, the revenue from the distilleries will continue to be received in the same manner as if no scarcity existed. I would rather have a *permission* than a *restriction*; but, then, sugar must be released from all *previous* duties. It must start fairly with the barley, or else the permission is nothing. —I perceive, that almost all the newspapers are against the proposed measure; no bad proof of its justice and policy; for, in no one instance do I recollect them to have been unanimous except in favour of some gross error, or delusion. They have often failed; and, I am deceived, if they will not fail now. The trial is between the plain good sense of the country at large and the sophistications of the selfish few. The former has, upon this occasion, had a pretty fair chance, and I have no doubt of its ultimately prevailing. The agriculturalists are become a sect; a combination; an affiliation of clubs; they act in concert, and they are spread all over the country. They have a multitude of scribblers amongst them. They are *schemers* by profession. Their connection with the press is very extensive. All the provincial papers are at their nod. Therefore, if they should be beaten in a contest with the poor, inert, divided West Indians, there will no doubt remain of the badness of their cause. My opinion is, that the agriculturalists have expended, in paragraphs, advertisements, meetings, and the like, in order to carry their point, half as much money as a year's corn, used in the distilleries, is worth; while the West Indians have made scarcely a single effort of the kind. Indeed, they have it not in their power. They have been ruined, absolutely ruined, by the hard measure dealt them by the mother country. They have little more left than the remembrance of those fortunes, which they once enjoyed, and which had descended to them from their ancestors. Mr. Coke, in his agricultural pride, chooses

to consider the West Indians as mere speculators; nay, as gambling dealers; but, in what do they differ from him? They are land-owners as well as he; and, as to their slaves, of whom Mr. Chute spoke, I wish with all my heart, that the labourers of Norfolk were fed as well as the labourers in the West Indies, though, if the thing *can be*, I shall certainly be glad to see the blacks as free, in every respect, as the whites. At any rate, it is most unjust and most unmanly to rip up this grievance now. That black slavery exists is not the fault of the West Indians. The fault was that of the mother country, who established the system; and who cannot with justice complain of its existence, without doing it away at once, and *making a full* compensation to the owners of the slaves. Is Mr. Chute ready to contribute his share towards carrying into effect a measure of this sort? If he is not, why does he couple the subject of negro-slavery with that of the distillation of sugar? —There never was, as far as my observation and recollection serve me, any set of people so ill treated by any government, as the West Indians have been treated by this government. First, they are compelled to purchase all their clothing, and all their manufactures of every description, from the mother country; and, except a little rum and molasses, that they are allowed to exchange with the Americans for food and lumber (which the mother country cannot supply them with), they are compelled to bring the whole of their produce to the mother country, and that, too, in ships belonging to the mother country, while they are, at the same time, compelled to maintain their own internal governments, civil and military, and to have and to pay such governors and officers as the mother country chooses to send to rule them. *Hither* they are compelled to bring their sugar; here they have to pay for their clothing and their household goods; and yet, even at a time, when it is avowed that we are in great danger from a probable scarcity of corn; when it is in evidence, before a committee of the House of Commons, that the last crop was a short one, and that scarcity actually exists in some parts of the kingdom; even at such a time, there is a formidable opposition to the admission of sugar into that sort of manufacture, where it will act as a substitute for corn. —It is now found out by those who joined in abusing me for the doctrine, that *commerce* is of comparatively little value to England. Well, then, let the West Indians go whithersoever they please with their goods; let them sell them to those who are willing to fetch them away

and to supply them with clothing and other manufactures in return. This would be fair enough ; but, to hold them in a tenfold chain of prohibitions, and, at the same time, to treat them as outcasts, is abominably unjust ; it is to set at defiance that fundamental maxim, that maxim which is the basis of civil society, namely, that where protection is not yielded, there no allegiance is due.—Mr. Coke asked, what claim the West Indians had to relief better than the Silk Weavers, or persons engaged in any other declining trade ? It is not *relief*, that the West Indians, in this measure, ask. They ask for a fair competition for their produce, in that country, to which they are compelled to bring it. If the silk-weavers could offer their wares to be used instead of corn, there would be no objection at all to give them the permission ; to let silk start fairly with corn. But, there is another point, in which the analogy is deficient. Who is it that suffers principally from the decay in the silk trade ? Those who pay the *poor rates*. The labourers in silk are thrown for maintenance upon the nation at large ; but the labourers in sugar are to be maintained still, whether they work or not, wholly by the proprietors of the sugar estates. The silk-weavers are relieved, and Mr. Coke contributes towards their relief without grumbling ; but, he sets his face against any measure of relief to the West Indians. The war throws the silk-weavers out of employment, and they, as they ought to do, come to the nation at large, and are relieved ; but, the West India plantations are impoverished by the war too, and we will neither relieve them, nor suffer them to relieve themselves by doing what they would be able to do, namely, carry, or send, their produce to other countries. The silk-weaver may sell his goods *if he can* ; he may do what he pleases with them ; but, the West Indians must bring their goods lither, whether there be a market for them or not. And, will any man of common discernment and common candour say that the cases are parallel ? Will he say that there is any resemblance at all between them ? And will any just man deny, that the West Indians are peculiarly entitled to the protection of that government, which holds them and their concerns in such strict and unrelenting subjection ?—This hard treatment, however, and all this harsh language, towards the West Indians, is not seen in its proper light, 'till compared with that silent acquiescence, which Mr. Coke and his brother "Country Gentlemen," give to all the lavish grants made to the *East Indians*. He has sitted quietly and seen *three millions*

granted to the East India Company, while he ought to know, that that Company is indebted *seven millions* to this abused nation ; and he will now, I warrant it, say nothing to oppose a measure, which, as every man of common information must perceive, will lead to the making of the nation answerable for all the thirty or forty millions of debt, which that Company has contracted. If that Company had had sugar to offer us as a substitute for corn, what praises should we have heard the base newspapers bestow upon "our " empire in the East !" The "Country Gentlemen" would not have moved a tongue. If they had dared to do it, the thunder from Leadenhall street would soon have reduced them to silence. Mr. Coke thinks nothing of seeing the whole nation taxed to support these *real* speculators ; and even to pay their *pension list*, which amounts to a great many thousands in a year. Was there ever such a thing as this heard, or dreamt of, before ? A Company of Merchants having a national debt and a pension list, and calling upon the nation to defray the expense ? Yet, against this Mr. Coke says not one word, though he talks about the taxes that oppress agriculture ; just as if the land did not pay part, at least, of the enormous sums granted to the East India Company.—But, the cause of this difference is, that the East Indians act in a body ; they have their Court of Directors ; they take care to expend the money we give them in such a way as to have friends in the right place ; they have the daily press under their control, in consequence of the use of those means, which they know so well how to employ.—This subject is now exhausted. I think, one may defy the ingenuity of man to find out any thing new to be said upon it. Some miserable cavil, or some precious absurdity, unworthy of notice, may still make its appearance ; but, on one side or the other, the mind of the nation is made up ; and, therefore, though with anxious wishes for its success, I shall leave the measure to its fate.

CURATES' BILL.—This bill has now passed the House of Commons ; and, though it does not guard against the *possible* negligence, or which is worse, partiality of the Bishops, it will have some effect in the way of correcting the evil and the scandal of non-residence. But, I perceive, that it takes no notice of curates under *lay-improvements*. These livings are in the hands of private persons ; but, I see no reason why they should not be made to contribute towards the maintenance of the curates, who reside upon them. The College of Maynooth has friends in abundance, and,

apparently, very zealous friends; and, a provision is talked of for the chaplains of the navy; but, not a word is said about curates under lay-impropriators. I hope, that these gentlemen will be considered, upon some future occasion; and not only them but *their parishioners*; for, if the church be of *use*, it is the parishioners who are the greatest sufferers in the misapplication of means for supporting that church.

WESTMINSTER ELECTION. —On Monday, the 23d instant, the anniversary of Sir Francis Burdett's election for Westminster was celebrated at the Crown and Anchor Tavern in that city. —The newspapers have given an account of the proceedings, and particularly of a speech made by the Baronet himself, in which speech he strenuously insists upon the necessity of restoring the House of Commons to what it formerly was, and what the laws and usages, which comprize what is called the constitution (if it be not a mere sound), require that that House should now be; that is to say, an assemblage of gentlemen, freely elected by the people, the real objects of their choice, and the faithful guardians of their property and their liberties. In his opinion respecting this necessity, every day's observation convinces me that Sir Francis Burdett is right; and, I am persuaded, that, if the nation were polled, leaving out those who have an interest in corruption, there would appear a majority of a thousand to one in favour of the reform, which he recommends, and which, in their better days, had been recommended by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Wilberforce. —Look well at the evils we endure, and that we apprehend. Trace them back to their cause; and you will find them all meeting at this one point: a House of Commons elected as it now is. I have at this moment before my eyes, an article in the Morning Chronicle, strongly and truly stating the encroachments upon the liberty of every man, which must take place, if the new assessed tax bill pass. Well, it will pass, nevertheless; and what is the cause? So of every other such measure. —Sir Francis well observed, that, in the present state of things, it was in vain to wish for pure and upright ministers; for, that it would be impossible for them to act according to the dictates of their own minds. A minister may desire to do that which is for the good of the country; he may have an anxious desire to promote its happiness (and, his errors aside, I do think that Mr. Perceval is such a man): but, before he can stir an inch he has the feelings and interests of the

borough mongers to consult; he has party to counteract and faction to mollify. How much more at his ease must such a man feel; what a load would be removed from his mind, if he could step into a House of Commons, freely chosen, and having no object in view but that of agreeing to what they thought good, and opposing what they thought bad? A House of Commons, in which there would be no strife for office or emolument, and in which nine times out of ten truth would prevail. —Whoever takes time to contemplate the situation of a minister of the king, at the present day, must perceive, that those hours and those talents, which ought to be devoted to the service of the country; to giving the king wholesome advice; to the receiving of information; to the forming of plans; to the performing, in short, of all his great and numerous duties; those hours and those talents will be found all taken up in preparing for, and carrying on, battles in the House of Commons, in order to insure success in which battles (and success *must* be insured), those means must be made use of which are ruinous to the country. —From one evil to another we gradually have come, 'till, at last, it is a question, whether we shall be the conquered slaves of France, or not. If we are not, the prevention must finally come from the will of the people at large; it being quite farcical to talk of defending a people without their own voluntary co-operation. And, to have this will, there must be a motive in the people. They must be convinced, not by paragraphs in the *Courier* about "our glorious constitution," but by their *feeling*, that they have real liberty and happiness to contend for; for unless they have this conviction, it is infatuation bordering upon insanity to expect them to lift a hand in their country's defence. —Whether such a change, as Sir Francis Burdett describes, will ever take place may be a question; but, unless it does, all the schemes of defence will, when the hour of real danger comes, prove ineffectual. They will, indeed, be worse than nothing; and we shall fall without even a desire to stand, as has been the case with so many other kingdoms. —The people of Westminster, however, will have done *their* part. If England be enslaved, the fault will not be theirs. But, they *alone* can do little. There must be a corresponding spirit through the country at large; and there will be, unless England be doomed to add to the long list of the conquests of Napoleon.

Botley, May 26, 1803.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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When William Pitt became minister of England, the interest of the national debt (paid annually out of the taxes) amounted to something more than nine millions of pounds sterling; and, at the close of his administration, it amounted to more than twenty-five millions of pounds sterling. During his administration, he added five-fold to the assessed taxes; he created the income tax; and, by what is called the land-tax redemption act, he made that tax perpetual, and caused the alienation for ever of a considerable part of the property of the church. It was proved before a committee of the House of Commons, that, upon one occasion, he lent, without legal authority, and without the knowledge of his colleagues in office, forty thousand pounds of the public money, free of interest, to two men, who were at the time, members of the House of Commons. During his administration France became mistress of all the continent of Europe, Russia and Sweden excepted. During the year after he became minister (1785), the money paid, on account of the poor, in England and Wales, amounted to 2,004,238 pounds; and, during the year 1803 (two years before the end of his career), the money, for the same purpose, amounted to 4,267,965 pounds. During his administration, the act of "Habeas Corpus," or personal safety act, was suspended for several years together.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

WESTMINSTER ELECTION.—In another part of this sheet will be found the Report, which was made to the electors of Westminster, on the 23d of May, by the committee, who conducted the election in favour of Sir Francis Burdett. This report is worthy of particular attention, especially as being a faithful and ably written history of the manner, in which, for many years past, the electors of Westminster have been treated by the different factions, into whose hands they were inveigled. This was a view, which I had often wished to see taken of the subject. It has now been done; and how humiliating is the reflection, that, for the last half century, the people of Westminster, so perfectly independent, and so well able to judge as to their own interests, should, until now, have had no more to do in the choosing of their representatives, than they had in choosing the Aunils of Hindostan! Nay, the thing was worse than a nullity; much worse; because the electors were made to put on a shew of exercising their will; to assume the garb of freedom; and even to boast of that freedom and of their franchises, while they were, in fact, the miserable, the degraded, the despicable and the despised, tools of a few individuals, who were contending solely for the precedence in obtaining power, and, through the means of power, plunder. Really, when one looks back to the contests of the Wrays and the Hoods and the Foxes; when one reads the large volume, in which the Devonshires and some other great families make so conspicuous a figure, one is almost ashamed of one's countrymen and one's country. Yet, that which succeeded these contests was, perhaps, still more disgraceful to this the first city in the kingdom. The

warring factions, tired of the strife, and wishing to spare their purses, came to a sort of compromise that rendered an election for Westminster much such another affair as an election for Ryegate, or any other double-patroned borough. The Whigs nominated one member, and the minister of the day the other member; and, from these nominations no one ever thought of appealing any more than a soldier thinks of appealing from the word of command. That, from such a state, the people of Westminster should, all at once, have become what they now are is truly surprising. They were very nearly entrapped by Mr. Sheridan's tears over the dead body of Mr. Fox; and, owing to want of time for thinking, they were once more in the hands of the great families, in the person of Lord Percy. But, the dissolution of parliament, which succeeded, came while their shame and remorse were yet alive; and, though, owing to some of the most villainous tricks that ever were played, they did not succeed in seating the man of their choice in the House of Commons, yet, by the spirit which they had previously discovered, Lord Percy was induced to withdraw his pretensions, and, they laid the foundation for certain success at another opportunity, with which the manœuvres of faction soon furnished them. At this last election, though a good deal embarrassed by certain events, upon which it would be useless now to dwell, they acted with promptitude and wisdom. They seemed to have formed a resolution to prove to their former enslavers, that they knew, not only what was their own interest, but also the way to take care of it. The committee appointed to arrange the mode of proceeding were all men of the class of mere electors; there was no great man, or

would be great man, who had any share in the business from the beginning to the end ; and, as if to give the lie to the opinion, that, without a head, the people are nothing, all the papers, which proceeded from this committee bore the stamp of talent far superior to that which was discovered on the side of those, who opposed them.—There is, of late years, at least, no instance to be found of so strict an obedience to the constitution. The people of Westminster proved, that they understood what the constitution really was. It is astonishing, that any one should be found, with impudence sufficient to censure their proceedings ; and, they have the consolation to know, that by none but by the cankered corrupt, those proceedings have been censured.—In one thing, however, they have failed. They wished to establish the principle, that *no expence* should fall upon the persons, elected members of parliament. But, the High Bailiff's bill, made against their member, has been ordered to be paid by a decision, in the court of king's bench, and the House of Commons, after having the affair fully represented to them, have *declined to interfere*. This subject was last before them on the 25th of May, when they were informed, that, owing to a decision of the court of king's bench, an execution was in the house of one of their members to compel him to pay for being elected, though he had not been a candidate, and though he had had neither act nor part in carrying on the election. The whigs were as silent as little fishes ; but, it was truly admirable to observe how the *lawyers* all agreed in the necessity of abstaining from meddling with what had been settled in " a court of justice."—" Sir A. Pigott declared himself to be perfectly satisfied this was not a case in which the house could interfere. It was a proceeding in the regular course of justice. If the action in this case could have been entertained at all, it must have been on the ground that it arose out of a *contract*. The act which allowed the expences of erecting hustings, &c. in the case of counties, did not extend to boroughs ; yet even there candidates might agree that for their accommodation, or that of their voters during a contest of 14 or 15 days, hustings should be erected, the expence of which could not reasonably be expected to fall on the High Bailiff. The action, therefore, could only be on the *contract so supposed to be entered into*, and could of course have no relation to the election, so as to make it a matter of privilege to be taken up by that house. This must

be a question either of fact or of law, and in either case it might have been brought before the court, by demurrer, or by bill of exceptions, so as to have made the ground of it appear on record. It behoved those who had the legal means of defence in their own hands to go before the judge in a regular manner. If they omitted to do so, it was not for that house to interpose. If the house should be of opinion that it would be improper that a candidate should be on any account at the expense of erecting hustings, let it be made the subject of a prospective regulation. But as that was not the case at present, this must be like any other suit founded on a covenant, the effect of which must be construed by the Jury."—So, here we are to have another *law* (more glorious work for the lawyers !) or, a member of parliament is liable to be made to pay the expences of an election, in which he has, neither directly nor indirectly, taken any part.—But, what did Sir Arthur mean by a "*contract* ?" There was no contract, on the part of Sir Francis Burdett ; and, his goods and chattels were seized upon a judgment, founded on a presumption that there was a contract, which presumption was supported solely upon the evidence of his having taken his seat.—What had he to do with your "*demurrer*," or your "*bill of exceptions* ?" These argue a *law-suit*, and, must a man be scourged with a law-suit, if he refuse to pay a large sum of money for having been elected without his request, and even without his knowledge ?—Sir Arthur seems to think nothing of the punishment of a law-suit. All that a man has to do, when he receives the king's command to attend in parliament, is, one would think, to attend and to do his duty there ; and, if his house be forcibly entered and his goods seized, in consequence of such attendance, is it not for the house to interfere ? Is he, at the suit of any body, to be harassed with the trouble and expences of law, because he has taken his seat ?—Mr. LEXCESTER, (don't you remember him, reader, in the committee about Pitt's loan to Boyd and Bentfield ?) this gentleman, who is an old acquaintance of ours, said, that the person, who had been *held to be the agent* of Sir Francis, had refused to pay the High Bailiff, and yet this same person, day after day, asked, obtained, and availed himself of the *advantage* of seats for the check-clerks, inspectors, &c. who were to attend to the honourable Baronet's *interests* in the election." This is a mistake, Sir. It was the interests of the people, which

those clerks and inspectors had to attend to; and, the plain question is, are the people to be made to pay for giving their votes? Sir Francis Burdett employed no agent; he gave no one authority to act in his name; he was elected without his knowledge; and, must he be made to pay for having taken his seat? And, is it no breach of the privileges of the house, that one of its members is harrassed with an execution merely because he has been elected a member of the house? —MR. BRAGGE said the house could not entertain the question, because the charge of the judge had not been entered on the record. But, here again, a law-suit, the scourge, the fire and brimstone of a law-suit, is coolly contemplated. Do you mean to say, then, that a man cannot take his seat in the House of Commons, in consequence of the free choice of the people, without exposing himself to what is infinitely worse than being maimed as Sir John Coventry was? It appears to me, that it should be so clearly and so generally understood, that a member of parliament is to pay no money on account of his election, that a suit against him, on such account, would be received in the same way as a suit against him for having black hair. It was the people, who went and demanded to vote for Sir Francis Burdett, and demanded also, that their votes should be registered, in the same books with the votes of others; and, were they, or any of them, for this cause, to be deemed the *agents* of Sir Francis Burdett? —THE SPEAKER said, “after what had passed, in allusion to him, it was necessary for him to put the honourable baronet right, as to what he had stated on a former night. What he had said was, that, when any *practical inconvenience* did arise, if the honourable baronet continued to think, that it involved a question of privilege, he should, in that event, lose no time in applying to the house. He had no hesitation in saying, that if any judge should recommend to a jury what could be construed into a breach of the privileges of that house, it was the duty of the house to resist, and to guide their course according to circumstances. As there was no motion before the house, he should only suggest two different modes of proceeding, both of which had been adopted in the reign of Charles the Second. One was in the case of Judge Weston, where an impeachment was ordered, and the other, in the same reign, where that measure not being deemed necessary, the matter was allowed to drop without any farther discussion. Those

who thought the present a case of the most serious nature, would probably be of opinion, that the former of these was the preferable mode of proceeding; while others again might be inclined to think that the latter was the most desirable way of disposing of the present question. He had stated what were the modes of proceeding, and it was for the house to say, whether in this case the more or less serious mode ought to be adopted.” —“Sir FRANCIS BURDETT said, the sources from whence he derived his information as to the recommendation of the judge, were *the notes of the short hand writer employed to take down the trial, and the information of his counsel.* He esteemed these as affording him sufficient foundation for bringing the matter before the house. The only thing he had submitted to the house was the instruction of the judge; *that the circumstance of his taking his seat, a thing which was incumbent on him, was such an approval and ratification of the proceedings had during the election, as must subject him in the expense of the hustings.* He felt himself by no means interested in the fate of this discussion. He esteemed it to be the cause of the house, and, if he had taken a bill of exceptions, or adopted any other mode of setting aside the verdict than that which he now used, in submitting the case to the consideration of the house, he should have conceived that he subjected himself to a severe censure for his conduct. He now *left it to the house to determine* as they thought proper.” —Here the matter dropped, and that, too, without one word from the reforming Whigs; except, indeed, from Sir Arthur Pigott, who was decidedly against any interference on the part of the house. So that it is now settled, that a man may be made to pay for a part, at least, of the expenses of an election, at which he may have been nominated and chosen without his consent; and even against his will. This is a newly discovered feature in “our glorious constitution.” Nay, whether chosen, or not, he may be made to pay, unless the *taking of the seat* be the act which renders him liable. Suppose Sir Francis Burdett had been out-poll'd by the brewer or by the late Treasurer of the Navy. Why should he not have been made to pay in that case, as well as in this case? For, the hustings and the books would have been as much used by him then, as they have been now; and, this being the case, a little knot of electors have, at any time, the power of half-ruining any man, of little fortune, against whom they

may have a spite. They have nothing to do but to nominate him at Westminster, and demand a poll in his favour, to make him liable to a share of the High Bailiff's charges. Was there ever any thing so monstrous as this heard of before? Is this the constitution of England? Is it this that we are called upon to pay and to bleed for?—Some people say, that it is hard, that the expense should fall upon the High Bailiff; but, those persons are, surely, not informed, that the High Bailiff's is a very lucrative office; that he derives his emoluments out of the pockets of the people of Westminster; and that he *lays* his office, not of those people, but of the Dean and Chapter of Westminster. To take the elections, in the city, is one of the *duties* attached to the High Bailiff's office; it is one of the purposes for which emoluments are given him; and, if he pays so much to the Dean and Chapter as not to leave him a sufficiency to defray the expenses of taking elections, the fault is his, or that of the Dean and Chapter, and by no means that of the people, who have an undoubted right to come and vote for their representatives free of all expense, and free of expense to those representatives also; for, it is evident, that, if the representative be loaded with expense, it must be injurious to the constituent. But, this is the state, into which all is now got. Offices are spoken of as things to produce money; and, accordingly, they are bought and sold. The *duties* are left out of the consideration; or, when required to be performed, are to be paid for, just in the same way as if there were no salary, or income, attached to the office.—All that now remains for the people of Westminster to do, is to resist the claim of the High Bailiff at every election. It would, perhaps, be advisable for the members chosen to await the regular process for *compelling* them to take their seats; and, after that, to see what the court of king's bench will do. In the meanwhile, it would not be amiss, if the committee for the last election were to ascertain the annual amount of the High Bailiff's emoluments; the several sources from which they are derived; the price which he pays for his office; the uses to which the money is applied; and the original intention of the grant of such emoluments. Such an inquiry will be of great use; it will lead us back to former times and usages, and will enable us to hold up the constitution to the faces of those, who are so vehemently calling upon us to maintain it. This is the way to fight them. "You want us to spend our last shilling, " and to shed our last drop of blood, in

" maintaining the constitution, do you?
" Well, *here it is*; this is it; and, this
" we are ready to maintain against all its
" enemies, beginning with those whom we
" *know* to have assailed it."—"Aye, you
" perverse dogs," say they, "we know
" you are; but, that is not what *we* mean.
" We want you to spend your last shilling
" and to shed your last drop in defending
" what we call the constitution; that is to
" say, us and our power and our numerous
" and immense emoluments."—It is, however, quite useless to write, or to talk much, about these things. We all of us understand one another very well. The resolution, upon both sides, has, long ago, been formed. Time alone can produce any change; but, in the meanwhile, on one side all is fear, and, on the other hope. or, at least, the absence of fear, it being impossible to discover any ground for apprehension.

PITT'S BIRTH DAY.—The 28th of May was, it seems, the day, which gave this man to the world, and it appears from a publication in the Courier news-paper of the 30th, that the anniversary of his birth was celebrated on that day, at the Merchant Taylor's Hall, in the city of London. I have read over the long list of the persons, who are said to have been present, and I do not see the name of one single person, who is not, in himself, or his relations, a receiver of the public money, in one shape or in another; I do not see the name of one single independent gentleman; I do not see the name of any one person, to whom, as a member of parliament, I would give my vote. This was as it should be; and the proceedings, at the dinner, were perfectly in character.—Upon the cloth being removed, a *psalm* was sung, "*Not unto us, " not unto us, O Lord, &c. &c.*" by a set of hired singers, in exact imitation of the proceedings of the "diverting vagabonds," who, from the play-houses and the stews, assembled to celebrate the triumph of Mr. Sheridan and Sir Samuel Hood at Westminster, and which triumph, I would have these imitators recollect, was but of very short duration.—Next followed a lying *Ode*, from the editor of a news-paper; a precious specimen of doggerel, but admirably adapted to the subject and to the audience. The composer seemed to be perfectly aware of the motives of the festival, and, therefore, he took care to say, that; "not envy's self
" can say this noble train, their rites with
" *sordid* ends profane." This was by way of anticipation; but, Mr. QUIN may doggerel his eyes out, before he will get any

man of common sense to believe him. Such men well know the real motives of this meeting; and they know, that they are sordidness itself; they know, that to celebrate the birth-day of Pitt, is to inculcate the praise of a squandering of the people's earnings upon those who do not labour; they know, that this festival was intended, by the mass of those who assisted at it, to brazen out the acts by which they had been enriched at the public expence.—After the "Ode" came forth MR. FITZGERALD with a recitation of some still worse doggerel of his, which has long been kicked about the bookseller's shops, and serving occasionally for a shade to their windows, under the title of "An independent tribute to the memory of Mr. Pitt." This effusion of independence comes from a man, who has, I believe, for many years, been in the Stamp Office, or in some other office, under the minister of the day, and during his pleasure. This gentleman holds the pen of a ready writer. He is always at it. No matter what the subject, so that it be but auspicious to his little interests, and, as the wise Duke said, "scribble, scribble, scribble." Let there be but a dinner toward, and you are sure to hear of this Mr. Fitzgerald and his odes. Two or three years ago, the newspaper people used to let us see his odes; but, of late, they have had the prudence merely to tell us about them. The Courier says not a word in praise of this "independent tribute," whence I should suppose, that, in spite of the poet's indefatigable exertions, he is, at last, not very rich, and that he finds, to his severe mortification, that, while he is obliged to give praise upon mere speculation, and upon very long credit, at best, he is unable to obtain it except upon condition of high price and prompt payment. Since I discovered, that authors paid reviewers for suffering them to review their own books, I have ceased to look into the London reviews; but, at the time when I did, this son of doggerel appeared to be in close connection with the reviewers; and, accordingly, accounts of his insignificant performances made, frequently, a great figure in those works, which the dupes about the country look upon as the standard of taste.—What a life this poor man must lead! Continually upon the watch for some occasion of paying his court to those who have the power of adding to his salary. Continually battering his dull brains for some new tag, as a conveyance for his disgusting panegyrick. Of all the slaves on earth the most wretched must surely be a slave in rhyme!—The "independent tribute"

being finished, the "*principles of Pitt*" were toasted, with a wish that they might continue to inspire the councils of Great Britain, which was followed by the tune of "*Britons strike home.*" Astonishing impudence! As if the public could fail to know, that it was during his administration, that France became mistress of the continent of Europe, and that England became, what she now is, a country besieged. These very people will tell you, that the situation of the country is such, that your only hope is, to be able to escape being conquered by France. Into this situation we have, it is notorious, been brought during the prevalence of the principles of Pitt; and yet these people have the impudence and insolence to tell the world, that they glory in those principles, and that they wish them still to be acted upon.—Aye, but they do not mean these principles. They mean the principles upon which the people have been loaded with taxes and themselves loaded with wealth. The principles, upon which the enormous grants of money have been made, and upon which the hundreds, who could be ramed, have been permitted to fatten.—There appears to have been something of a mixture of masquerade at this festival; for, there is a speech given (and which I am now about to insert), under the name of "the Lord Chancellor," which never could have come from any man, being a real Lord Chancellor of England.—"The LORD CHANCELLOR, whose feelings were so strongly affected, that it was with great difficulty he addressed the company, said, that he lamented most bitterly the loss, which the nation and mankind had sustained in the death of Mr. Pitt, and he would offer up his prayers to a gracious Providence that this loss might be supplied by raising up some distinguished character by the superiority of whose genius and virtue the protection of the human race might be secured. His poor endeavours he should constantly exert for the benefit of his country; he was happy in the confidence of his sovereign, and he revered that august prince, because he knew that he valued the liberties of those over whom he was appointed to reign. He (lord Eldon) was not only the political friend of the eminent statesman whose birth-day they were now celebrating, but he was the private friend of his heart, and he could not advert to the deprivation he had suffered without the most poignant grief. Happy would it have been for him, had he himself been the precursor of the associate of his bosom in the vale of death."

“ will, (said his lordship), as far as my endeavours can go, live in allegiance, if I may so express myself, to the memory of that great man; and why will I do so? Because by so doing I shall act in the way which I conceive to be most consistent with the interests, the happiness, and the liberties of the people of Great Britain. In all the experience which I have had of the views and conduct of my deceased and lamented friend, I have ever seen that in no moment he neglected the good of the state, but always felt the most vigilant and jealous anxiety for the well-being of all ranks and conditions of men.”

—No: I will not, for a moment, suppose, that this was uttered by a Lord Chancellor of England. It must have come from some Methodist preacher, dressed up in a big wig and gown. The *Courier* relates, that “upon the close of this speech, the company began to retire;” and, well they might. The benediction was all that was wanted after this prayer for “all ranks and conditions of men.” Associate of his bosom in the vale of death, indeed! What miserable, what disgusting stuff! What wretched humbug! No: the present Lord Chancellor would not get drunk; and, I am very sure, that, sober, he never would have thus exposed himself to laughter.—One of the motives, and the principal one, amongst the instigators of this festival, doubtless was, the embarrassment and mortification of their political opponents, who have dropped the celebration of the birth-day of their hero, chiefly, perhaps, because they are not enough united to keep it up. But, why did they not join the others? Why not go and sing *Non Nobis Domine* “in a superior style?” Why not go and clap the ode of Mr Quin, and the “independent tribute” of Mr Fitzgerald? Why not “offer up their prayers to a gracious Providence,” that another Pitt might arise “for the protection of the human race?” Why not all this? They joined these commemorating set in voting away forty thousand pounds of the people’s money to pay Pitt’s debts, and that, too, upon the score of his public services. Why, then, should they not join in celebrating his birth day. When it had been made clearly appear, that Pitt, without any authority, and without the consent or knowledge of even his colleagues in office, had lent without interest forty thousand pounds of the public money to two men, who had, at that time, seats in the House of Commons, the Whigs, instead of what the people expected, proposed a bill of indemnity for him. Why not celebrate his birth-day, then. Why

pout and slink away? Why not go on as they were going? From the moment they themselves came into power, they became the eulogists, the open, the avowed, imitators of Pitt, of whom, upon all occasions, they spoke as of a great and virtuous minister. Why skulk, then? Why not brazen a thing out in a birth-day celebration? And, if they could not get their heads in, at Merchant Taylor’s Hall, why not have a meeting elsewhere? This faction is the most completely embarrassed and baffled of any one that the country ever saw. Eagerness to grasp at power and pelf made them join with, and truckle to, the Grenvilles. The condition imposed upon them evidently was, that they should praise Pitt, and avow their intention to imitate his conduct as far as possible. This has been to them the abundant source of inconsistencies and disgrace; and it will continue to flow during the remainder of their political lives.—At the birth-day dinner, one toast was, “The Spanish nation, and success to the efforts of its people against the tyranny of Buonaparté.” So, here we are in love with the Spaniards, after having seized their frigates without a declaration of war, and made two attempts at seizing their territory in South America: “The tyranny of Buonaparté;” aye, and the tyranny of any body else. Tyranny is not more tyranny for being exercised by Buonaparté. Our compassion for oppressed people seems to lie dormant always, until those people get into the clutches of Buonaparté. For my part, I can see no difference in being oppressed and robbed by him and in being oppressed and robbed by others. What is it to the Spaniards, if they are to be slaves, whether they be his slaves, or the slaves of the Prince of Peace, or of a set of tyrants, raised up amongst themselves? The newspapers have, of late, entertained us with accounts of the ideology of the king of Spain, of the baseness of the heir apparent, and of the rascality of the ministers, who, by mere dint of impudence and profligacy obtained the power of oppressing the people. What do these birth-day people want, then? Do they want the people of Spain to continue under the old system? Can they conceive any tyranny more galling than that which is exercised by notorious rogues in the name of a slaving ideot? What do they want? Do they want to see a revolution take place, and a new kind of government set up? Hardly; yet, it is difficult to say what else they can want. Napoleon will not fail, I dare say, to keep a pretty tight hand over the Spaniards; but, the question is, can the people

of Spain be *more oppressed* than they now are? This is not the question for us, relative to Spain: for, it may suit us for the Spaniards to continue slaves under their present rulers rather than be free (if that were likely to be the case) under Napoleon. But, it is the question, and the *only* question, for the people of Spain; and, whatever may be the wishes of the birth-day gentry, they may be assured, that, if the people of Spain feel that they *cannot change for the worse*, they will make no resistance against the French. When mere life is all that a man has left to preserve; when the government has proceeded, inch by inch, till he has stripped him to the skin; when bare existence is all that he can call his own, it is too much to expect him to hazard that, to place that in immediate and imminent danger, lest the object of his allegiance should be changed. Being satisfied that nothing worse can come, he will naturally wish for a change; because in any change, be it what it may, the chances are in his favour. This is as plain, and the conclusion as infallible, as that of the result of any question in the rule of three. It *must* be so, and it will be so, in spite of all the toasts and all the psalms and all the prayers, of the Pittites and their underlings. — It appears to me, that there is another, and a very sufficient reason, for a people, who, like the Spaniards, are held in slavery by their domestic tyrants, wishing to exchange that tyranny for the tyranny of a man like Napoleon. Men find an apology to themselves for quietly submitting to the commands of a great conqueror and immense armies. It is evident to all the world, in such a case, that resistance is vain; and, therefore, there is no disgrace in submission. But, to submit to a band of tame intriguing rogues, who, under the names of law and justice, so completely immesh the people as to make one half of them the spies upon, and the plunderers and hangmen of the other half, is an infamy that man cannot bear with any degree of patience. When things are come to this pass, resistance is full as vain here as in the other case; but the fact is not so evident to the world; and the slave cannot make to himself the same apology. Any nation, however numerous, wise, and brave, may be conquered and enslaved by a superior foreign force, and may be well entitled to the compassion and respect of the world; but, a nation which is enslaved by domestic tyrants, which does, in fact, enslave itself, is, and ought to be, an object of universal contempt. It is, therefore, quite natural, that men should be, as we have recently seen them, in so many instances, ready to

exchange a domestic for a foreign tyranny, even supposing that they are *sure*, that the latter will be as severe as the former. — I have often been amused by the earnest exhortations of the Courier and the Morning Post, addressed to the inhabitants of countries about to be invaded by Napoleon, calling upon them, “in the sacred name of *liberty*,” to come forth and be chopped down to the last man, rather than suffer their country to be plundered by the French. Alas! poor fellows, if they could have read these disinterested exhortations, they would not have been able to understand one word of them. To talk to them about liberty and property is like talking to the African about frost and snow. If they had known the meaning of the words, their answer would have been: “Why man, we have no liberty to preserve, we are already plundered to the very skin; and we defy the French to plunder any body but those who now plunder us, and who insult us into the bargain.” If the Morning Post could have received an answer from some of these people, how foolish its editor would have looked. The people, who were about to be invaded by the French, were full as good judges of their situation and interests as the Morning Post was. They well knew that they *could* not be plundered; or they would have fought to keep out the plunderer. The thing speaks for itself. We all will do much to guard our own possessions. The most cowardly of mankind will scratch and bite those who come to take away their food and raiment; and, therefore, when a populous nation suffers itself to be overrun by a foreign enemy, we may be assured, that the people in general of that nation do not think that that enemy will, or can, do them any harm. There is a sort of intuitive reasoning, which leads people to conclude, that the enemy, be he what he may, will not take away people's food, nor make the land barren. The Morning Post reasons in a different way. It supposes all the world made for the use of England; that, any longer than a country can be of use to England it cannot be considered as any other than base and infamous; and, of course, that, when it is overrun by the French, it is become base and infamous, and may as well be annihilated at once. But, so reason not the people of other countries. They consult their own happiness; and, if they think they shall be happier under the dominion of the French than they now are, though we may regret this opinion of theirs, we can have no right to abuse them for acting upon it. — One more toast, and then I

shall take my leave of this festival: "*The present administration, and success to their measures.*" This toast, the historian tells us, was drunk with enthusiasm, approaching to indications of madness, and the applause, the "tumult" of which it is quite impossible for him to describe, continued for near a quarter of an hour; upon which one may exclaim with honest Casca, "what a deal of foul breath was there uttered!" It must have been amusing to the ministers (who were almost all present, observe) to see this strife of sycophancy; to see the candidates for sharing in the taxes placing their reliance upon the strength of their lungs; to observe all their various tricks to attract attention, and to catch a promising glance from the dispensers of favour. And, then, if one could have followed them to their several abodes; to have heard them, in their half-drunken moments of bliss; blab out their sanguine expectations; tell of the nod received from one great man, the smile from another, and the squeeze from a third; hold consultation upon the purport of half-uttered phrases; estimate the value of monosyllables and winks of the eye; and then, again, to have seen them, as the fumes of the liquor evaporated, relapse into the doubts and fears that accompanied them to the festival of venality; if one could have witnessed this, then might one have exclaimed, thus, O, Pitt! by such men, and in such a manner, ought the hour of thy birth ever to be commemorated!

Botley, 2d June, 1808.

REPORT MADE TO THE ELECTORS OF WESTMINSTER, ON THE 23D OF MAY, 1808, BY THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONDUCT THE ELECTION IN FAVOUR OF SIR FRANCIS BURDETT.

That when your Committee had the pleasure of meeting their constituents on the 29th of June, 1807, they were not prepared to make a regular Report of the principles and motives which governed their conduct during the late election; their time had been taken up in exciting the Electors to assert their independence, and in giving effect to the means by which their glorious triumph was to be celebrated.—Your Committee think it necessary to take a rapid survey of the former and present state of the Representation of Westminster; that you may distinctly see, what has been attained by the energy you displayed when acting for yourselves; that you may ascertain what yet remains to be done, and what are the means by which it may be effected.—It will not be necessary to remind this Meeting of the con-

tests carried on in Westminster by the Whig and Tory factions, in the early part of the present reign, much less of those carried on by the Pitts and Dundasses on the one hand, and the Foxites on the other, in the years 1784 and 1788. These last must be in the memory of most of us, and the facts relating to them are, as they have been described by an eloquent and inflexible patriot, "sufficiently notorious, and more than sufficiently infamous." But, it may not be unnecessary to observe, that the enormous expence at which these contests were carried on was too great even for the princes, lords, and placemen of the respective factions. This expence, together with the acknowledged utter impossibility of obtaining any legal decision on the merits of the return, induced the leaders of both Factions, who never coalesce but to deprive the people of their rights, jointly to issue their decree to prevent any thing like a free choice at any future Election in Westminster. The name of one person in each faction was to be inserted in the return, and these men were unblushingly to be called Representatives of the People.—One public-spirited individual was found, however, to offer himself as an instrument in the hands of the people in the year 1790, to destroy the effect of the mandates of their new tyrants. This attempt, though not successful, was not without beneficial consequences; and "more principle was infused into the public mind in seventeen days, than the Factions had been able to destroy in more than seventeen years." The attempt was renewed in 1796, and was countenanced by a far greater number of suffrages. The Factions were more fully exposed, and the people became less inattentive to the fate of their country.—From that period to the death of Mr. Fox, the seats for Westminster continued at the disposal of the Factions; but, it is not to be doubted, that the seeds of public spirit, which were scattered with no sparing hand in 1790 and 1796, have contributed to produce the glorious event which we are now met to celebrate.—The death of Mr. Fox forms an æra in the representation for Westminster. The people had seen with disgust another coalition of men, who "had been long contending for the plunder, the government, and the patronage of the country." They had seen these men unite and seize the reins of government; and they had seen, too, every profession in favour of Reform, or the Rights of the people, sacrificed at the shrine of place, or surrendered to the arbitrary principles of Tory Grenvilles by apostate Whigs.—The leaders of the Factions appeared far more solicitous

to fix a successor to Mr. Fox's vacant place in the cabinet, than to appoint one to fill his seat as representative for Westminster, and the abused, and disgusted electors, became indifferent spectators of the scene. This general apathy gave rise to various professions of service: men of any character, men of no character and of infamous character, talked of offering themselves as candidates. But these political adventurers fled before the heir of the powerful House of Northumberland. Earl Percy became the successor to Fox. But he came not to the contest at the General Election which took place immediately afterwards. At this election the feelings of the electors were excited by the most generous motives. A desire to protect and support the proscribed. A man was presented to them, who with the countenance of the Whig faction, when out of place, had brought serious Charges against a supposed Indian delinquent. These Charges he persevered in: but such perseverance no longer suited the Whigs. They were now in place, and one condition of their being so, appeared to be, that the accused should be screened, not from conviction only, but also from inquiry. That the exertions of the electors were not on that occasion successful, was owing partly to the coalition of the candidates supported by the respective Factions, and partly by the arts of those prostituted Election Intriguers employed by one of them. Fortunately for the country, that parliament had a speedy and sudden death. *The King "appealed to what was called the Sense of His people,"* and nobly, and gloriously did you answer that appeal.—At all the Elections for Westminster which have passed before our eyes, houses have been voted for which were empty, or inhabited by women, or foreigners, or by that description of people who are worse than useless, the bane of every free state, those who, for their own private ends, affect to think their suffrage unnecessary, and those who having too much virtue to vote against their conviction, have not sufficient firmness to do so against their interest.—To remedy these evils a plan is under the consideration of your committee. They are not without hope that these mischiefs may, in a great degree, be parried, if not entirely overthrown. And they have no doubt, that in carrying such a plan into execution, they shall receive that liberal support which has characterized the Electors of Westminster. You will now perceive what yet remains to be done. You have a foothold, and never forget the proposition of the great Archimedes, that had he a place "to rest upon, he would move the world." You

have possessed yourselves of one seat, it was yours: attain the other—it is equally your right. But never relinquish that which you have so honourably recovered. Nobly defend, what you have so bravely won.—The recent events which have taken place in the Court of King's Bench, call upon your Committee to state to you explicitly the Facts relating to that part of the subject; in order that the false impressions which have gone forth, countenanced by high authority, may not continue on your minds or that of the public. And to this part of the report, your committee request your particular attention.—In consequence of the Resolutions passed at this house the 4th of May, 1807, one of which declares, "*That it would be to the immortal honour of the City of Westminster, and afford a great and glorious example to the Electors of the United Kingdom, that you should return Sir Francis Basset to Parliament, free from every sacrifice and expense to himself, upon independent principles, consonant to the genuine spirit of the constitution of England, which declares that "elections shall be free and without corruption."*—Your committee determined, as one mean to reduce the expense, to put the legality of the claims of the high bailiff to the test. For this purpose, they announced to him on the night before the commencement of the election, that some electors intended to offer their votes to Sir F. Basset. The high bailiff then demanded that they should enter into an engagement to pay the expenses he usually charged. This was temporarily refused. He then said "he would not receive the poll:" but, on a little reflection, added, "Do not take this for a definitive answer, let it stand over till the morning." In the morning he found he must take the poll, and he agreed to do so, "reserving his rights." Whatever his rights might be your committee were willing should be reserved, but they were determined not to sacrifice yours by entering into his terms. They then desired that check clerks, &c. might be admitted to the hustings; which he refused, unless the agreement were signed. Your committee replied, "that if he granted such admissions to candidates who agreed to pay his charges, and refused them to you who resisted his illegal demand, he would be guilty of gross partiality in the execution of his office, which would subject him to deprivation and imprisonment. Under the terrors of Newgate, then, he gave those admissions which the lord chief justice has called a favour accepted by your committee, and which he said

implied a consent to pay a proportion of the expense for erecting the hustings. The high bailiff did, indeed, observe, "that he knew Sir Francis Burdett to be a man of honour, and that he was sure he would pay him." To this it was replied, "that Sir F. B. was ignorant of his intended nomination: that he knew nothing of the Committee, that he had nothing to do with them, nor they with him, and that the high bailiff might depend upon it, Sir F. B. would not pay him one farthing." And this is the reply which it has been contended proves the speaker to be the agent of Sir F. B. And, if he was not the agent, then, it is said, this protest is nugatory and useless; and it is still more absurdly contended, that Sir F. B. became a candidate eight months after he had been elected and returned. And, by what act think you? Why, by taking his seat in that house to which you had sent him as your servant, against his nomination repeatedly expressed, and to attend his duty in which he might have been forcibly carried by the serjeant at arms. For this act, a verdict has under the direction of the judge in an action brought by the high bailiff, been given against Sir F. B. for a proportion of the charge for erecting hustings, and of another charge imposed by law specifically on candidates on't.—That Sir F. B. was not a candidate *express* or *implied*, has been abundantly shewn by what has been stated, by his own declarations, and by the Addresses and Resolutions of your committee, before and since and during the election.—Your committee conceived, that they had taken every possible precaution to avoid implicating Sir F. B. in any of their acts, by not having the slightest communication with him directly or indirectly, and, it therefore, never occurred to them, that any action would be brought against him on that account. Sir F. B. too, with that delicacy which belongs to his character, did not, as it was in a great measure a pecuniary subject, announce the commencement of the action to your committee; and your committee had not a proper opportunity of giving that assistance which otherwise might have been done, as to the facts of the case on the trial. You are acquainted with the result.—Though your committee had much reason to be satisfied, that the unfounded claims of the high bailiff, —claims so injurious to the fair freedom of election,—had been very materially reduced; yet they were greatly disappointed that the important principle for which they had been contending had not been decided; and they, therefore, requested Sir F. B. to move for a new trial,—which has been refused by the

court.—It has now become the imperious duty of your Committee, to carry into full and complete effect the Resolutions of the 4th of May, and their repeated declarations during the election, that it should be conducted free of every expense to Sir F. B.—And, let the final issue be what it may, your committee will not suffer Sir F. B. to spend one shilling of his own money in the discharge of his duty to you and to our country.—Your committee now present you with an Account of the Expenses they have incurred, and the Subscriptions intrusted to their hands: assuring you, that every thing has been conducted on their part with the most rigid economy.

Amount of expenses during the election	£780	14	4
Amount of the chairing, procession, and presenting the car, &c. to Sir F. B.	515	8	2
Advertisements and printing to this day	53	5	0
Incidental and law expenses in moving for a new trial....	30	3	6
	£1409	11	0
By subscriptions	1260	13	0
Pamphlets sold	31	4	9
	1291	17	9
Balance against the treasurer. £117	13	3	

Not including the yet unascertained expense of the action with the high bailiff.—Your Committee have great satisfaction in observing, that the conduct adopted by the Electors of Westminster, has excited the attention of the country, and afford the best hopes, that, on a future occasion, it will be imitated by the electors in other parts of the kingdom.—You have attacked corruption in its strong hold; you have reduced and possessed yourselves of one of the principal fortresses of the enemy. Upon the first occasion you will again take the field:—if you again conquer—if the people of this country follow up the example you have set them, and they should fortunately succeed—they will confound the treasons of your domestic enemies, and England will bid defiance to any foreign foe; although he may have attained the dominion of all the earth besides.—(Signed) By order of the Committee,—SAMUEL BROOKS, Chairman.—*London, May 23, 1808.*

CURATES' BILL.

SIR,—The open attacks of the rector's

against their curates, is manifested in Berkshire, and the sneaking attempts of those in Suffolk and Norfolk, without daring to give their signatures to advertisements, issued after many *private* calls and underhand manoeuvres, de mand from every man of honour and candour, a manly and decisive notice—Those who are not of the clergy at all, are now called upon to manifest their sentiments. Has the *state* no interest in the disposition of clerical property? Is the *patron* age of men who hold property in various counties to be bartered by connivance, and the state to be forbidden from every inquiry and every protection of the ministry? Then let the establishment fall, as fall it must if unaided by the wisdom of parliament. Clerical proprietors of tithes *may wish* to legislate for their curates; but, surely, a little modesty will induce them to submit to legislators in parliament, and not advertise for meetings and petitions against the Stipendiary Curates' Bill, lest the principal *laymen* should counteract their advertisements, by offering their disinterested greatness, to shelter the unprotected and unenvied curates, and by calling them together by advertisement, make inquiry into the decimal arithmetic whereby their salaries are adjusted. A conversation last week upon the increase of servants' wages, excited from a rector this odd reply, "Port wine is now an hundred pounds per pipe, and I have been forced to advance my first footman to thirty-five pounds per annum rather than part with him;" when this same rector told his curate a few days before, that he must agree at twenty-five pounds per annum, and *no fees*, (and preach every Sunday!!)—The salary of the curates wants to be as unequivocally known to parliament, as the salary of its navy or army subalterns, and no objection arises to a clerical annual list, beyond what may be objected to a navy or army list.—(The bookseller would be well paid, and their names and addresses may be easily obtained, as every archdeacon, as well as every bishop, has a copy of the return in his own department.) The seven ill favoured and lean fleshed kine, as some rectors fear, would devour the seven well-favoured and fat-fleshed; and themselves be obliged to diminish the wages of the pampered menial, at whose insulting hands the curate receives his £25, with a remark upon his own better pay!—With an *appearance of fairness*, it is advanced, that a small living can only afford a small stipend to a curate. *True!* if the incumbent be not a pluralist, and depend upon his small preferment only, for his comforts. But in many cases the small living is (only)

held to pay the keep of an extra horse or servant, or for local convenience; and then, surely, all consideration is due to the officiating minister, and the size of the preferment is not then the *only* proper standard for the stipend of the curate. The question ought not to be between rectors and curates any longer. It is a question between the *state* and the *clergy*. There is an establishment of which kings and queens are the nursing fathers and the nursing mothers. Curates are the efficient troops. Parsonage houses are their proper barracks. Whatever the state judges to be serviceable to the cause must and ought to be adopted. Nothing can be more contemptible than the pitiful and avaricious attempt to cry down the proceedings of government, by an association of either rectors or curates against the wisdom of the legislature. The curates of some parishes have not had a guinea from their rectors these many years, and have lived upon the scrapings of low fees, till they grind the poor to maintain themselves. These things ought not to be. The glorying of such rectors over their curates is not good, though they should be enabled to *don* with their appeal the ears of the upper house, who may not consider that every parishioner upon their estates is interested in the fate of the bill, inasmuch as the needy curate is an object of compassion and benevolence to the congregation in which he preaches.—Yours, &c.—C. D.—*May 27, 1808.*

SECOND REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON
THE DISTILLATION OF SUGAR AND MOLLASSES.—*Ordered to be printed 31st May, 1808.*

The committee appointed to enquire, and report, how far, and under what circumstances, it may be practicable and expedient to confine the distilleries of the United Kingdom to the use of Sugar and Molasses only; and also what other provision can be made for the relief of the growers of sugar in the British West India Colonies; and to report the same, with their observations and opinion thereupon, from time to time, to the House:—and who were empowered to report the minutes of the evidence taken before them;

Have, pursuant to the order of the house, further examined the matters to them referred; and have come to the following Report. Your committee after having presented their First Report, lost no time in prosecuting the enquiries pointed out to them, in the order by which they were constituted; conceiving that if by legislative

encouragement an increased consumption of rum could be created, material relief would be afforded to the planter, enabling him to diminish the quantity of the inferior sugars now imported, by converting a portion of them into that spirit, their first attention was directed to the most eligible means of accomplishing this object.—Understanding that an extensive trade in foreign spirits is carried on under the protection of licences from the privy council, and of neutral flags, and that thereby a great encouragement is given to a staple commodity of the enemy, while a proportionate discouragement is thrown in the way of the consumption of West India rum, your committee called before them several persons concerned in the continental trade, with a view to ascertain the fact, and to learn the manner in which the traffic is carried on; and also two gentlemen connected with the boards of customs and excise, fully capable of informing them, whether any loss would accrue to the revenue by prohibiting or discouraging the importation of foreign spirits in future; and how that loss might be compensated, should any such be expected to arise.—It appears, that foreign brandy and Geneva are among the enumerated articles, the importation of which is permitted by the general war order of the king in council. The expenses of freight and insurance however are too heavy, and the risk of seizure by our cruisers, and condemnation in our prize courts, is too great to allow the trade to be carried on with any prospect of advantage under the authority of such a general order. The merchants of this country therefore apply to the privy council for particular licences; which being granted, neutral vessels are chartered, by which under these licences a trade is securely carried on, which otherwise would not exist. The ships proceed in ballast for the hostile port, taking with them neither British manufactures nor colonial produce, which would render them liable to confiscation. They bring back foreign spirits, wine, and fruit, but neither raw silk, nor any other article useful to the British manufacturer. Those cargoes are chiefly paid for by bills of exchange. As this trade affords great encouragement to one of the chief staples of the enemy, without promoting in the smallest degree the welfare of the shipping, manufacturing, or colonial interests of this country, it is evidently the policy, as we are led to believe it is the practice of the French government, to connive at its continuance, and to protect it. The sound policy of this country would seem to require the prohibition or discouragement

of a trade, in which the advantage is reaped by the enemy; particularly as by so doing the produce of our own colonies, and spirits the manufacture of our own country, would replace those so withdrawn from the market.—It appears that the quantity of foreign spirits for which duty was paid in the last year, was 2,101,187 gallons, and that the gross amount of the duty was £1,336,973. The duty of customs and excise per gallon, on foreign spirits, is 10s. 1½d.: on rum, 11s. 2½d. and the excise duty on British spirits, exclusive of the malt duty, is 7s. 2½d. It would seem that a bare substitution of a consumption of the same quantity of spirits at a lower duty, would occasion a certain loss to the revenue. Mr. Jackson calculates that loss at £786,000 per annum; and presuming only on a bare substitution of quantity, thinks, that in order to prevent any deficit, and at the same time to preserve the present difference between the duties on rum and British spirits, an addition of 2s. 8d. per gallon on each of these articles would be required. But such additional duty, in the opinion of your committee, could not be imposed without considerable danger of permanently diminishing the consumption of those articles.—As the flavour of foreign geneva is well imitated in this country, and as brandy can be made strongly resembling the foreign spirit, it is impossible to believe that rum alone would be substituted in the room of any quantity of those spirits, which the recommendation of this report might withdraw from the market. Should the consumption of rum however be increased by the amount of one-third of the foreign spirits which paid duty last year, that increase would rise to 700,000 gallons. The advantage gained by the West Indian interest would not stop here; as a demand for an additional quantity of British brandy would create a market for a proportionate quantity of sugar and molasses, those being the materials from which the best imitation of foreign brandy can be produced. It is proper to mention, that the present embargo in the ports of the United States will throw a large quantity of rum on the market of the mother country, which affords an additional inducement to your committee to recommend any measure likely to increase the home consumption of that spirit.—The re-exportation from this country of the brandy brought in on licence, is not considerable; the North of Europe being chiefly supplied by the prize spirits. No duty is retained on the re-export to Europe except the war duty of 12 and $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the customs, or about 1 $\frac{1}{8}$ per gallon; to which the act enforcing the late

orders in council has added a duty of 8d. per gallon. In some instances it may be exported duty free. This trade has enjoyed these advantages only since the introduction of the warehousing system; as, before that period, rum alone could be exported without duty; the consequence is, that rum must have lost what the other spirit gained in the export trade.—The most obvious mode of preventing the importation and use of foreign spirits, would be by a law of direct prohibition. Mr. Frewin states, that the difficulty of preventing smuggling would not be rendered greater than at present, even by a total prohibition of the trade; and Mr. Jackson thinks that the contraband trade might be more effectually checked under a change of system, than by adhering to the present mode of granting licences and imposing high duties. But in case it should be deemed more expedient to adopt the mode of laying on a high additional duty, the revenue might receive its compensation for the diminished consumption of foreign spirits, in part by the increased consumption of British made or colonial spirits, which at a lower price would more than replace the quantity of that diminished importation, and in part by the increased amount of the duty on that reduced quantity of foreign spirits, which would even under these circumstances continue to be consumed. Actuated by these considerations, your committee recommend, either that the importation and use of foreign spirits should be prohibited during the war, or that the duties of customs and excise on all such spirits imported should be greatly increased; and in the latter case, they also submit that it would be highly expedient to lay a heavy duty on their re-exportation to any part of the world.—Your committee conceiving that the greatest encouragement which could be given to the consumption of rum, would be to equalize the duties on that article and British spirits, examined several witnesses with a view to ascertain the probable effects of such a measure. The evidence shews, that very great relief would thus be afforded to the planter; but it is objected, on the part of the distillers, that they could not stand the competition, and that material injury, if not entire ruin to their trade, would be the consequence. If so, permanent injury would also be done to the market for grain, which is now afforded by the distilleries. Your committee therefore refrain from recommending the equalization of the duties on rum and British spirits, to the consideration of the house.—Your committee are proceeding in the examination of other matters, which they conceive to be in-

cluded in the order of the house, and hope to be enabled shortly to lay a third report on your table. They are induced to present this report separately, not only because it relates to a separate and distinct object, but also, that no time may be lost in acting upon the recommendation contained in it.

NEW ANNUITY PLAN.

The following are the Resolutions moved by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 13th of May last, when he opened his Plan for granting Annuities:—

1. That it would tend to a more speedy and efficient reduction of the national debt, and would at the same time be of material accommodation and convenience to the public, if every proprietor of three per cent. consolidated or reduced bank annuities were at liberty to exchange, with the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, such bank annuities for a life annuity during the continuance of a single life, to be named by such proprietor; or for a life annuity during the continuance of the lives of two persons to be named by such proprietor, and of the life of the longer liver of such two nominees.—2. That, in order to give effect to the foregoing resolution, every proprietor of 3 per cent. consolidated or reduced bank annuities, who shall be desirous of exchanging any such bank annuities for a life annuity on the continuance of a single life, shall, on transferring to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt any such bank annuities, be entitled, during the continuance of his or her life, or of the life of some other person to be named by him or her, to receive (under such regulations as Parliament may deem it expedient to adopt) for every £100 of such bank annuities, and so in proportion for any greater sum than £100 of such annuities, transferred to the said commissioners, a life annuity of such annual amount, according to the age of the nominee, and the average price of such bank annuities on the nearest open day preceding the day of the transfer thereof, as is specified in the following table. [This table is printing].—3. That, in order to give further effect to the foregoing resolution, every proprietor of £3 per cent. consolidated or reduced bank annuities, who shall be desirous of exchanging any such bank annuities for a life annuity in the continuance of the lives of two persons, to be named by such proprietor (of whom such proprietor may be one) and the life of the longer liver of them, shall on transferring to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt any such bank annuities, be

entitled, during the continuance of such two lives, and of the life of the longer liver of them, to receive (under such regulations as parliament may deem it expedient to adopt) for every £100 of such bank annuities, and so in proportion for any greater sum than £100 of such annuities, transferred to the said commissioners, a life annuity of such annual amount, according to the respective ages of such two nominees and the average price of such bank annuities on the nearest open day preceding the day of the transfer thereof, as is specified in the following tables.—[These tables are printing.]

—4. That no person shall be admitted to be a nominee, either for the grant of an annuity for the continuance of a single life, or for the grant of an annuity for the continuance of two lives and of the longer liver of them, who shall be under the age of thirty-five years.—5. That the dividends payable in respect of the bank annuities, which shall be transferred to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, in exchange for life annuities, shall be received by the said commissioners, and shall constitute a part of the funds applicable to the reduction of the national debt; and that out of the said funds applicable to the reduction of the national debt, the said commissioners shall pay the respective life annuities granted in exchange for such bank annuities during the continuance of the respective lives for which the same shall be payable; and that the said respective life annuities shall be payable half yearly at the bank of England, on the same days on which the dividends on the stock transferred for the purchase thereof, may be payable in every year; and the first payment of every annuity shall commence on the same day on which the first dividend on the bank annuities so transferred shall be payable to the said commissioners; and that upon the death of any single nominee, or of the survivor of any two joint nominees, a sum equal to one-fourth part of the annuity dependant upon his or her life shall be paid to the persons entitled to such annuity, or his or her executors or administrators, as the case may be, provided the same shall be claimed within two years after the death of such single or surviving nominee; and that the annual sum payable for every such life annuity so ceasing as aforesaid, shall thenceforth revert to and constitute part of the funds applicable to the reduction of the national debt.—6. That for the purpose of ascertaining the effect of the measure proposed in the foregoing resolutions, with refer-

ence to the redemption of the public debt, a separate account shall be kept half yearly, by the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt of all bank annuities which shall have been transferred to them for the purchase of any life annuities, and of the dividends receivable by them in respect thereof, up to the period of such account; distinguishing therein so much of the said bank annuities as shall have been transferred in the course of the next immediately preceding half-year.—Also, a half yearly account of the amount of all the life annuities granted by them up to the period of such account, distinguishing therein the amount of the life annuities which shall have been granted in the course of the next immediately preceding half-year; and also of the amount of all the annual sums which, up to the period of the said account, shall by reason of the deaths of nominees have reverted to the funds applicable to the reduction of the national debt, distinguishing therein the amount of such annual sums as shall have so reverted in the course of the next immediately preceding half-year, together with an account of the amount of life annuities then payable; and that in every such account shall be specified the excess in the whole amount of all the life annuities then before granted above the amount of the dividends receivable in respect of all the bank annuities then before transferred for the purchase of life annuities; and also the excess (if any) in the amount of the life annuities then payable above the amount of such dividends.—And that a separate account shall also be kept half yearly of the capital stock, which, up to the period of such account, shall have been redeemed by the application of the annual sums which shall from time to time have so reverted to the said funds by reason of the death of nominees, and by the application of the accumulated dividends of the capital stock redeemed thereby.—Also, an account of the whole amount of £3 per cent capital stock, which, up to the period of such account would have been redeemed by the excesses in the amount of the life annuities from time to time payable by the said commissioners above the amount of the dividends from time to time receivable by them, in respect to the Bank annuities transferred for the purchase of such life annuities, in case such excesses had been immediately applied in the redemption of £3 per cent stock in the manner prescribed by the laws now in force for the reduction of the national debt.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SWEDEN.—*The King of Sweden's Proclamation, touching the Levy-en-masse, dated Stockholm, 14th of March, 1808*

We, Gustavus Adolphus, make known, that as the eastern frontiers of the kingdom are already attacked by the enemy, and those in the west and north are likewise threatened, we feel ourselves called upon to make the utmost exertions for the defence of our invaded country. For this purpose, and in order that we may be able to raise a sufficient force to attack the enemy, it is our will that all young men from 18 to 25 years, both inclusive, of whatever rank or condition they may be, who have not enlisted in the regular army of militia, or navy, shall hold themselves in readiness to take up arms for the defence of our native land, and assemble at such places as shall be pointed out to them at a moment's notice.

REVOLUTION IN SPAIN.—*From the French official paper the Moniteur.* The article wherein the Moniteur announces this important intelligence, is dated Bayonne, May 11, 1808, and is as follows:—

“By a treaty concluded between the emperor Napoleon and king Charles, and which has been acceded to by the prince of the Asturias, and the infants don Carlos, don Francisco, and don Antonio, who compose the whole of the members of the house of Spain, all the existing differences have been adjusted. We are still ignorant of the conditions of the treaty. According to the constitution of our government, it cannot be made public till it has been communicated to the senate. But we perceive by the proclamation of the king of Spain, and that of the prince of Asturias, that the emperor Napoleon is clothed with all the rights of the house of Spain. King Charles, queen Louisa Maria, queen Maria Louisa, and the infant don Francisco, dine to-day with the emperor, and set off to-morrow for Bourdeaux. They will make this journey in four days, and will repair to Fontainebleau, whence they will go to Compiègne. It is believed that this residence has been destined by his majesty to king Charles, that he may spend the remainder of his days there. The prince of Asturias, the infant don Carlos, and the infant don Antonio, spent the evening yesterday with their majesties the emperor and empress. They will spend two days at Bourdeaux, and will afterwards proceed to Valency, whence it is probable they will go to Navarre. It is believed that his majesty has ceded to them

that superb domain, and the forest appertaining to it.—It is said that many Spaniards of distinction are on the road to Bayonne, where, it appears that the emperor is about to hold a general junta. It is presumed, that he will be occupied, not only in regulating the succession to the throne, but also in fixing certain ameliorations which all good Spaniards call for. Every thing is entirely tranquil in Spain. Things are on the best footing there.”

To the above article were joined, a mandate from king Charles to the junta of the government, announcing the nomination of the grand duke of Berg, lieutenant-gen. of the kingdom, and a proclamation addressed to the Spaniards, both dated on the 4th of May; a proclamation of the 5th of May, from the junta to the inhabitants of Madrid; a circular (proclamation) sent on the 6th by the inquisition to all the tribunals of the kingdom; and, finally, a letter from the king to the supreme council of Castile, and to the council of the inquisition. The first three of these pieces are to the tenor following:—

To the Supreme Junta of the Government.
—Having judged it expedient to give the same direction to all the forces of our kingdom, in order to maintain security of property and public tranquillity against enemies, as well exterior as interior, we have thought it fit to nominate our cousin, the grand duke of Berg, lieutenant-general of the kingdom, who, at the same time, commands the troops of our ally, the emperor of the French. We command the council of Castile, and the captains-general and governors of our provinces, to obey his orders. In the same quality he shall preside over the junta of the government. Given at Bayonne, at the imperial palace, stiled the palace of the government, May 4, 1808. (Signed) I, THE KING.

Proclamation.—Spaniards! My beloved subjects, perfidious men seek to mislead you. They would put arms into your hands against the French troops; they seek alike to arm you against the French, and the French against you. The sacking of all Spain, calamities of every kind, would be the result. The spirit of faction, the sad effects of which I have already felt, is still in motion. In the midst of these important and critical circumstances, I am occupied in concerting with my ally, the emperor of the French, all that concerns your welfare. Beware of listening to the enemies of it. All those, who speak to you against France, thirst for your blood; they are either the enemies of your nation, or agents of England, who are busily avail-

ing themselves of circumstances, and whose intrigues would involve the loss of your colonies, the separation of your provinces, or a series of years of trouble and calamity for your country.—Spaniards! trust to my experience, and obey that authority which I hold from God and my fathers; follow my example, and think that in the position in which you stand, there is no prosperity and safety for Spaniards, but in the friendship of the great emperor, our ally. Given at Bayonne, from the imperial palace, stiled palace of the government, May 4, 1, THE KING.

The Supreme Junta to the Inhabitants of Madrid.—Inhabitants of Madrid, your tranquillity will be from henceforth unalterable. You will owe it to the loyalty of your own character; but it will be still more assured to you by the confidence, which is inspired by the laws, and by the prudence of zealous magistrates, to whom their execution is committed. It is in this conviction that the supreme junta of government proclaims, that in obedience to the dictate of humanity, the allied army has suppressed the military commission, established only for one day, as a necessary, though severe measure, which would not have been established, but for the perverseness of some individuals; that from henceforth every inhabitant, whatsoever may be his rank, who shall have given cause for being seized by the French troops, provided he has not borne arms against them, shall be immediately given over to his proper judges, and tried by them. And even in the only excepted case, viz. that of having borne arms against the French troops, a judge nominated by the competent tribunal of the nation shall always assist in regulating the whole of the process against the accused, till the sentence is pronounced. No countryman domiciliated in the town, or stranger shall be molested on account of the peculiarity of his dress; and still less the ecclesiastics. The carriers employed in bringing provisions to the town, shall henceforward be subject to no vexation, or detention of their carriages or mules. Every individual who shall have just complaints to make, on addressing himself to the judge of police, may rest assured, that he will, on the same day, obtain full justice and reparation, for whatever damage he may have sustained.—As to the muleteers, who are likewise employed in bringing provisions to town, and who generally stay there a few days, only one half of their cattle shall in future be put in requisition, even under the

most urgent necessity, and in no case shall they be detained longer than three or four days, for which they shall be paid at the prices already given out. Orders shall be given at those gates of the town, where carriers have suffered arbitrary detentions, in order to be searched and stripped of their arms, that this abuse be in future prevented. But it is also necessary to repeat the order against introducing fire-arms, or other prohibited weapons into the city; they ought always to be deposited at the gate. Given at the palace, by order of the supreme junta of government, May 5, 1808. The Comte CASA VALENCIA, secretary.

ROME.—*Circular Letter addressed by the Pope, through his Secretary of State. Dated April, 1808.*

His holiness, our master, has commanded his secretary of state, cardinal Doria Pamsili, to make known to your eminence, that his heart has been penetrated with the most poignant grief, on being informed of the order given by the French general to so many members of the sacred college, to quit Rome within three days. His holiness, who clearly sees that this measure tends to overthrow the empire of the church, since those members are removed from his person who are necessary to the direction of his affairs, and at last his minister, his vicar, cannot in conscience permit this departure. He prohibits, therefore, every one upon his oath of obedience to remove from Rome, unless absolutely compelled by force, and his holiness foreseeing this case, that after having torn your eminence from his bosom, you might be left at a certain distance from Rome, is of opinion that you should not continue your journey, unless compulsion should be used, to the place designated to you, in order that it may be a matter of public notoriety that your removal from the head of the church has not been voluntarily, but from compulsion. The virtues of all the individuals who have received the order to depart, alone support the afflicted soul of his holiness, and are a pledge to him, that, according to his example, they will support these persecutions with patience, and that the sentiments of the sacred college far from being weakened, will be strengthened.

(Though this piece had been sent to the Cardinals before their departure, it did not prevent some of them from going voluntarily to the places pointed out to them.)

" Nothing *conceded* to America by Great Britain can be *imputed to fear*. She will only rise in dignity by the mudness and moderation of her councils."—A. B.'s letters in the M. Chronicle, Dec. 1807.
 " Was there ever any thing so impudent as this! It *must be imputed to fear*, because it could be imputed to nothing else."—Register, Vol. XII, p. 909.
 " Nothing can be obtained from the British government, upon any point, *which is not extorted by necessity*."—Mr. Munroe's letter to Mr. Madison. See below.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.—If ever vanity received a wholesome check, such a check has been experienced by this vainest of all vain nations. Of late, little has been said here about the dispute with America. The subject, with much party effort, and much stir amongst the merchants immediately interested in the American trade, was kept alive, and tolerably active, for about a month; but, since that, it has died away, by degrees, till, at last, the people in general *hardly know, whether the dispute be terminated or not*; while, at the very same time, the people of America are, by this dispute, thrown into a state of confusion, and almost of revolution. I wish it were possible to enable the people of America to see and observe us, at this time. It would certainly cure them of their vanity, if any thing could. They are all in a bustle and an uproar about the embargo and the other measures adopted to punish England; while the people here, in general, do not know any thing of the nature of those measures, and, indeed, do not know that any measures of the kind have been adopted. The Americans are counting the days and the hours 'till they hear the result of their extraordinary embassies; we seem not to expect any news from America, and not to pay any attention to it when it comes. The newspapers of the two countries present the contrast in the most striking light. These of America are filled, almost wholly filled, with publications respecting the dispute with England; with discussions upon this or that point connected with it; with vehement attacks upon England, on the one side, and with a defence of her, on the other side; with speeches of members of parliament, relating to the dispute; with extracts of pamphlets, and even with extracts from English newspapers. There is nothing of all this in our newspapers, who scarcely afford a column a month to American affairs, and who, even upon the return of Mr. Rose, have not thought it worth while to make the subject a prominent one; a certain proof, that the nation in general feel great indifference as to

every thing connected with America. This is very provoking, to be sure. "What!" (will the conceited American say) "Do you consider, that the population of the United States is now equal to that of England and Wales?" Very likely; but, as Voltaire is made to say to the friar: "Yes: we are all men, my friend; but there are different sorts of men." America is, at this moment, acting the part of the goat that knocked his brains out against the horns of the bull, without being able to disturb the grazing of the latter.—In another part of this double number I have inserted, as far as I had room (and shall insert the remainder as soon as possible), the official papers, relating to the dispute with America; that is to say, since that dispute was made to assume a new shape, in consequence of the attack upon the Chesapeake frigate.—These documents begin with the first Letter from Mr. Madison (the American Secretary of State) to Mr. Munroe, then their envoy in England; then comes the Correspondence between Mr. Munroe and Mr. Canning, interspersed with the Letters, in which Mr. Munroe, from time to time, gave his government an account of what was doing in England, and how the negotiation was going on. Next come the Letters, which passed between Mr. Rose and Mr. Madison; and, last of all, a letter from Mr. Erskine to Mr. Madison, informing him officially of the Orders in Council, which had been issued in England.—These Papers will speak for themselves, of course; but, as I am not by any means, certain, that they will be generally read, and, as I have no where seen any brief history of the dispute, I will here attempt to give it, submitting a remark here and there, as I proceed.—An account of the attack upon the American frigate, the Chesapeake, will be found in the Register, Vol. XII. p. 181. The attack took place late in June, 1807, and, as will be seen by the papers now inserted, Mr. Munroe received the first intelligence of it from Mr. Canning, late in the month of July. The latter, foreseeing that advantage would be

taken of this event to couple the attack upon the Chesapeake with the old and undjusted dispute about searching for seamen on board of merchant ships, took the earliest opportunity of stating to Mr. Munroe, that it would be necessary to take great care not to mingle the discussions relating to the Chesapeake with discussions upon any other topic. In this Mr. Munroe could not but agree, seeing that he was *the first* to say that the affair of the frigate ought to be kept distinct; and, he appeared to be quite tranquil, not apprehending that there would arise any considerable difficulty in the way of an amicable arrangement. Having, however, taken a very short time to consider of the matter, he, without waiting for instructions, or even for official information of the event, writes to Mr. Canning in a very high tone; the affair grows, all at once, into vast importance; and, one can easily perceive, that, in the interim, he has been spurred up to what he himself did not, at first, dream of. Mr. Canning, who displays talents that almost any man might envy, very properly notices this change of tone, as calculated to excite some degree of surprize, and as being no very good sign; but, he takes care, in a mild manner, to let Mr. Munroe perceive very clearly, that he has little to hope for from the effect of fear. Soon after this comes the letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Munroe, who chooses to begin the negotiation by *conferences* with Mr. Canning, rather than by a written correspondence, and that this choice was not without a very sufficient motive we shall, by and by, perceive. Having obtained this point, he, in his first interview, stated the reparation, which his government expected; namely, first, "that the men taken from on board the Chesapeake, should be restored to it; second, that the officers, who had committed the aggression, should be exemplarily punished; third, that the practice of impressment from merchant vessels should be suppressed; and, lastly, that the reparation, consisting of those several acts, should be announced to the American government through the medium of a special mission."—Set a beggar on horse-back, says the old proverb, and he'll ride to the Devil. Was there ever any thing so insolent as this before heard of? What! give up our deserters to them; set these men at liberty; punish Captains Douglas and Humphreys and Admiral Berkeley; give up our right of searching for our own seamen on board of their merchant ships, thereby giving our navy a stab to the very heart; and, to send a special representative of the King to announce all this to Thomas

Jefferson! I am not fit for a diplomatist; for, I should ever aimly have tried, at least, to knock the man down, who should have made to me such a proposition.—Mr. Canning resisted this abominable demand, and insisted, particularly, that the affair of the Chesapeake, should be kept, as a subject of negotiation, distinct from all other points in dispute; and, thus the conference ended.—Directly afterwards Mr. Munroe presented a Note, in which he demanded the reparation; but, as will be seen by a reference to the Note itself, he confined his express demand to a suppression of our searching merchant ships for deserters, omitting the other acts required of us, for the reasons which he gives to Mr. Madison, thus: "As it had not been in my power to come to any agreement with Mr. Canning on the general subject of impressment from merchant vessels, I considered it my duty to combine it with the affair of the Chesapeake, in the paper which I presented to him to claim reparation for the outrage. I thought it best, however, to omit the other acts, of which it was desired that the reparation should consist, as it seemed probable, that a specification of each circumstance, in the note, would increase the indisposition of the ministry to accommodate, and give it support with the nation, in a complete rejection of the demand. I expressed myself, therefore, in regard to the other acts, in general and conciliatory terms."—It must have greatly surprized Mr. Madison to find, that a precaution like this was necessary. He, modest man, expected that the ministers would have the whole nation join in a cry against them, if they hesitated one moment in yielding to the demands of our excellent customers across the Atlantic. He and Mr. Jefferson thought, what they had often said, that America might live well without a communication with England; but, that England could not live at all without a communication with America.—But, though Mr. Munroe suppressed the demand of those "other acts," in his note, he obtained an interview with Mr. Canning, to say, that they were merely omitted for the present, but would, of course, be expected. This was all in vain, however; for Mr. Canning, finding the American government resolved to come to no settlement, which should not include a surrender of our right to search their merchant vessels for our seamen, positively refused to negotiate upon the affair of the Chesapeake, except as entirely distinct from all other matters in dispute. Thus, the negotiation was brought to an end in England; and Mr. Munroe soon

afterwards set off for America.—Let us now compare *dates* a little. Mr. Madison's letter to Mr. Munroe, containing the instructions to make high demands, was written on the 6th of July. The peace of Tilsit was made on the 7th of that month; but, for, at least, two months previous, the affairs of the allies had been in so desperate a way as to leave no doubt at all, that the result would be, peace on Napoleon's own terms, and, of course, a combination of the Northern powers against England. Indeed, this was, in the Register of the 13th of June, stated as a conjecture, upon the subject. It was, therefore, with this view of the state of Europe, and of the critical state of England, before his eyes, that Mr. Jefferson, the just and wise Mr. Jefferson, ordered his Envoy to make the demand above stated. But, before the demand reached England, that is to say, the latter end of August, Mr. Munroe had been able to discover, that the events upon the continent of Europe, after having been a nine days' wonder, had set people to thinking, and that reflection had taught them, that there was no real ground of alarm.—When Mr. Munroe wrote his first note to Mr. Canning, the merchants of Liverpool and other places had begun to clamour in favour of America; but, before the second was written, the public mind had been enlightened upon the subject, and, the clamours of those merchants, who had begun to dictate to the government in a high strain, were changed into miserable wailings. His second note was written on the 7th of September. I beg the reader to look back to the Register of the 5th of that month; and, he will be able, I believe, to discover a very sufficient cause for Mr. Munroe's having softened his tone. If he will look, particularly at page 366 of Vol. XII. he will not be at all surprized, that Mr. Munroe should be anxious to keep his humiliating demands out of an official note, which he must know the ministers might have been called upon to publish.—The negotiation, if it may be so called, carried on by Mr. Munroe and Mr. Canning, began late in July, and closed early in October; and, it is really worth while for any one, who has the leisure; to read the correspondence in company with my articles, in the Register, written during the same period. It would be still better worth while, if we could see the *whole* of Mr. Munroe's letters to Mr. Madison, especially where he talks about those, in this country, *who are disposed for producing a war with America*. "Such," says he, "in his letter of the 4th of August, "is the state of this country, at the present "crisis, that it is impossible to foresee what

"will be its course of conduct towards the
"U. States. There has been at all times
"since the commencement of the present
"war, a *strong party* here for extending its
"ravages to them. This party is composed
"of the ship owners, the *navy*, the East and
"West India merchants, and several politi-
"cal characters of great consideration in the
"state. So powerful is this combination,
"that it is most certain that nothing can be
"obtained of the government on any point,
"but what may be *extorted by necessity*.
"The disasters to the *north* ought to inspire
"moderation; but with respect to the
"northern powers, it seems to have pro-
"duced directly the opposite effect. A fleet
"of about 25 sail of the line, with a suit-
"able number of frigates, &c. and above
"20,000 men has been lately equipped, and
"sent to the Baltic, as it is said, to take pos-
"session of the Danish and Russian navies.
"This measure is imputed to an understand-
"ing which it is supposed has been esta-
"blished between the cabinets of Russia
"and Paris by the late peace, and which has
"for its object a concert of measures for the
"purpose of attempting to force on this
"country a *maritime code*, more favourable
"to neutral nations."—So, this "*strong
party*" included the *navy*, did it, Mr. Mun-
roe? That is a pretty stout limb of a party,
I must confess. But, are you sure, Mr. Ma-
dison, that Mr. Munroe, in none of his let-
ters, said any thing about that "*wicked ras-
cal Cobbett*," as your ruffian-like editors of
newspapers now call me? Are you quite
sure, that he did not tell you, that I had been
the most formidable enemy he had had to
encounter? You do, indeed, let your poor
foolish citizens hear Mr. Munroe's com-
plaints against the English newspapers; but,
you keep from them what he says against
me in particular. I will tell you, then, Sir,
that I have been credibly informed, that *you*
have said, that, had it not been for me, the
government of England would have acceded
to your demands. You have been deceived,
for Mr. Canning knew what the state and the
temper of America were; though, I must
say, that I verily believe, that he, as well as
others, in this country, who possess similar
knowledge, derived it chiefly from me.
"How poor a thing may do a noble ser-
vice!" I have, it must be confessed, pretty
well rubbed the varnish off you. In other
countries you may still pass for sterling; but
here, in England (the only country that I
care about), you will, for the time to come,
go for no more than your worth.—"A
party," indeed! A war party against Ame-
rica! I think I know as much of parties and

of political sentiments as Mr. Munroe did; and, I never knew a single man express his desire to see a war with America. But, here again is an instance of the delusion of vanity. The American minister expected to see England, under the then circumstances, fall down at his feet; and, when he found the contrary, he could ascribe it to nothing short of a *combination*; the influence of a *party*. To have said, that *the nation* was hostile to further concessions, would have been to acknowledge, that England was not terrified out of its wits at the sound of American hostility; and that would not have answered the purpose. It was, therefore, necessary to pick up "a *party*;" a combination; something out of the common way; something almost supernatural. "Nothing can be obtained from the government, upon any point, but what may be extorted by *necessity*." This was *always* their opinion of us; this is what they always said; and, every thing they obtained, they always thanked their own power for, and not our disposition to contribute. I told A. B. (most likely Alexander Baring) of the Morning Chronicle, that every concession, on our part, would be ascribed to our fears; that, one concession would, of course, lead to the demand of another; and, that, therefore, it was as well to stop at once, unless we meant to go on until we had not a ship or a seaman left. The truth of this is now proved by the sentiments of Mr. Munroe, expressed in confidence to his government. His government thought we were *down*. "She is down," said one of their judges, in the year 1785; "she is in her last agonies, and we have nothing to do but to seize her by the throat, and rid the world of her at once." This was a *judge*. The Chief-Justice of the State of South Carolina. He was not singular in his taste. She was not down, however. She has stood ever since; and, the embargoed nation feels her power still. No; Mr. Munroe. It was no "party" that took up the cudgels against America, though there was a party who took them up for her. There were the whole of the Whigs for her; the whole of the American merchants; and several hired writers, amongst whom were the Edinburgh Reviewers; but, to all these was opposed the sense of the unsold part of the nation; and, if you have got the better of your national vanity, you would have said to Mr. Madison: "I find, Sir, that we have played with the mouse till we have lost it. This nation, who ate so easily enjoled, and whom we have cajoled so long, when once they do get their slow-motioned eyes open, are remarkably clear-sighted, I per-

ceive; and, I have further perceived, that, if their pliancy is of long duration, they, in the end, pay it off in stubbornness. You and I were deceived in our hopes of taking advantage of what we looked upon as their disasters in the North of Europe; for they have taken it into their heads, that it is precisely under such circumstances, that they ought to concede nothing to any body. Besides, Sir, I must tell you, that though we think ourselves a great nation, we are not, in Europe, viewed in that light. The nations, in this quarter of the world, regard us as something but little better than a race of half-civilized people, settled promiscuously along an extended and defenceless coast; and when I talk of our *navy* and of *going to war*, though they do not actually laugh in my face, I can clearly perceive, that they laugh at me the moment my back is turned. Then again, as to their commerce with us, which, you know, we used to think they must instantly perish for the want of; would you believe it, I do not find them at all alarmed upon the subject; they have, I understand, but about 300,000 persons (men, women, and children) employed in matters connected with all their foreign commerce put together; and there are, amongst their public writers, men who maintain, that their commerce with us is injurious, instead of being beneficial, to them; for that their wool and iron and copper and tin and linen is much more useful than our tobacco, or any other thing that we send them. You and I used to contrast the vast extent of our dominions with the pitiful compass of theirs, and used to be impatient for the day when we should surpass them in population. My impatience, upon this score, is considerably abated; for, "lord, Sir," as SCARUS says in the play, "these are clearly another sort of people than we." You and I used to wonder how it could be that such a little island should be suffered to lord it over the ocean, and remain, in other respects, so powerful. But, dear friend, if you were to come here you would cease to wonder at this; for, you cannot imagine what quantities of horses and cattle and sheep and corn and houses and goods and implements and clothing, you cannot imagine what quantities of every thing, which constitutes national strength, the industry of this people has collected from the surface and extracted from the bowels of the earth. When I first came hither, I used to laugh at their rivers; and, I was highly diverted

“ to see “ Father Thames,” as their poets
 “ call it, “ rolling his majestic flood,” not
 “ half so large as one of the smallest of our
 “ *creaks*, and not much larger than what we
 “ call a *run of water*. But, when I came
 “ to consider, that mere water was neither
 “ wealth nor strength, and when I saw that
 “ there were more valuable things floated
 “ upon this little run of water than upon all
 “ our immense rivers put together, it did, I
 “ confess, give a new turn to my thoughts.
 “ This is indeed a very small country,
 “ but it is all life and strength. It is full
 “ of those things which come to the aid of
 “ the personal strength of man; and, all this
 “ mass of strength is so manageable, is so
 “ easily wielded, that it almost seems as if the
 “ people had the country upon their backs.
 “ They are, too, so patient in their pursuits;
 “ so constant, so steady, in their labour;
 “ the same calling and the same habits and
 “ the same character descend from father to
 “ son, and for several succeeding genera-
 “ tions. Our rascals, you know, are
 “ everlastingly *shaking* about from place
 “ to place, in search of new shops or new
 “ lands, so that, except amongst the Quakers
 “ and some of the Yankees, our population
 “ is in a continual state of swarming. But,
 “ in this country, my dear Madison, it is
 “ not the lords alone who have any thing
 “ hereditary about them. Here are heredi-
 “ tary shoemakers and taylor and black-
 “ smiths and wheelwrights, who, for many
 “ generations have lived under the same
 “ roof. Our farmers, you know, are all
 “ speculators; all aiming at fortunes; all
 “ trying to get rich at a heat; but, here,
 “ though country-banking and agricultural
 “ societies have done something towards cor-
 “ rupting the manners of the farmers, a fair
 “ proportion of them still retain the sim-
 “ plicity of their forefathers, content with
 “ a bare competence, and desiring nothing
 “ more than those forefathers enjoyed. In
 “ their athletic sports, the people of this
 “ country are exemplary indeed. They
 “ scorn to take advantage of one another
 “ even in the moments of their greatest
 “ eagerness and anger. They never kick
 “ and scratch and bite, as the people do in
 “ your and my country; and, as to gouging
 “ out one another's eyes, they are by no
 “ means to be made believe that the thing
 “ is practised except amongst cannibals,
 “ though you and I know that it is very
 “ common amongst most excellent citizens;
 “ in what we call the most enlightened
 “ country in the world. But, what would
 “ surprise you most of all, my dear friend,
 “ is the honesty and fair dealing of the

“ common people in England, which ap-
 “ pears to be instinctive. Here men take
 “ one another's word for half as much as
 “ they are worth in the world. I am afraid
 “ you will think me romancing, but, I as-
 “ sure you, that it is very common for a
 “ man to offer another a thing for sale, and
 “ having promised to hold to his offer for a
 “ certain time, to keep his promise, though
 “ he should be offered twice the sum in the
 “ meanwhile. I am informed, that there
 “ are many farmers, who send their money
 “ to great fairs at a distance, by the hands
 “ of dealers, to purchase them cattle and
 “ sheep, and that there are no bills or re-
 “ ceipts pass between any of the parties,
 “ and that the former knows nothing at all
 “ of the seller, and, what will amaze you is,
 “ that the dealer, who is generally a poor
 “ man that tramps it to the fair, continues
 “ poor to the end of his days. Only, my
 “ dear Madison, think of the value of this
 “ integrity, this confidence between man
 “ and man! One man, and that man too in
 “ a low state of life, performs the business,
 “ which, were it not for this confidence,
 “ would take many men, for several days,
 “ from their homes and concerns. The
 “ like of this is unknown in any other
 “ country that I am acquainted with; and
 “ this quality, working in various unseen
 “ ways, is one of the great bulwarks of the
 “ nation. In short, my dear friend, I have
 “ been in England long enough to have all
 “ the prejudices, engendered by our revolu-
 “ tion, removed. The character of Eng-
 “ lishman is an object of my envy; but, I
 “ would confess this to no human being
 “ but you, who, a truly honest man your-
 “ self, would, had you been in my situation,
 “ have experienced a conversion like mine.”
 “—This, Mr. Munroe, or something like
 this, is what you would have said, if you
 had spoken from the bottom of your heart.
 You are not one of those silly creatures,
 who have come to England for the sake of
 strutting about with lords and ladies; and
 who, after having obtained visitors by paying
 their way with gold, and having found, that,
 “ no longer pipe no longer dance,” have
 returned home in disappointment and dis-
 gust. You are a gentleman in fortune as
 well as in mind; and, whatever you may
 say of us, you must *think* us the best people
 that you have yet seen, and must feel some
 degree of pride, that this is the country
 whence your forefathers sprang. Let us hope,
 then, that you will use your influence for
 the purpose of repressing that incessant de-
 sire, which prevails in your country, to do
 that which shall tend to humble England.

Be assured, that the people of this country now understand the whole of all the points in dispute; and that, let who will be ministers, they will not dare to make the concessions which you have demanded. You will be able to "extort" nothing from our necessities. There is no "party" that can, or that would if they could, lend you their assistance. For the sake of worrying one another, in their disgraceful struggles for place, they may side with you in appearance, and, I am pretty confident that the last ministry you had nearly cajoled to do it in earnest; but *now* there is no party, there is no one man of any character in the whole nation, who would become an advocate for your claims. — The subsequent part of the proceedings are of less importance. When the ministers found, that the American government was determined not to settle the affair of the Chesapeake, unless the settlement included a renunciation, on our part, of the right of searching their merchant vessels for our deserters, they resolved upon sending a special envoy to offer atonement for the attack upon the Chesapeake, but not to permit him to negotiate upon any other point whatever; and, at the same time, they issued a proclamation, in which the king declared, that he never would give up the right in question. It is, therefore, probable, that the negotiation between Mr. Rose and Mr. Madison would, if it had been commenced, have soon been broken off; but, it was, as the reader will perceive, prevented from beginning by the refusal of the American government to rescind their hostile proclamation, which our ministers justly considered as an act of *retaliation*, and the rescinding of which they admitted as a step previous to their tendering any reparation at all. This demand was refused, and, of course, Mr. Rose came back as he went. — The reader will perceive, that the Americans *now* choose to represent the hostile proclamation, not as an act of *retaliation*, but as an act of *precaution*. As if they were afraid, that we should send in our ships to burn their towns! Believe them who will; for my part, the contrary is evident to me; and, so it at first was to them; for they, in all their negotiations, called it an act of *retaliation*. See the proclamation itself in page 219 of Vol. VII. and say whether it be an act of mere *precaution*. It was the mildest measure they could adopt, Mr. Madison says; and I say it was the harshest, because they had it not in their power to injure or annoy us in any other way. It was the worst they could do. It was not a blow, for a blow they were un-

able to deal us; but it was spitting in our faces. It was, too, a measure still in existence, at the time when Mr. Rose arrived in America; and, therefore, to have offered reparation, until it was rescinded, would have been disgraceful to us in the highest degree. It would have been begging pardon with a cane suspended over our shoulder. It would have been going one step further than the late ministers, who entered upon a negotiation touching the right of search, while the Americans had a non-importation act passed for the avowed purpose of compelling us to give up that right, and kept suspended over our heads ready to be put in execution, in case we refused to accede to the terms proposed. — The result of this negotiation, or rather, the total failure of it, proves the truth of what I told the ministers from the first; that is, that every step in the way of concession, would but cause the difficulties to thicken. If they had stood firm upon the ground of *maritime dominion*, there would have been a loud out-cry for a few weeks; but what would the Americans have done *more than they have done now*? They have now done their worst, and they could have done no more. There would have been an end, for ever, of all claims and disputes about searching ships. And, to this it must come at last. In *reality* it is so now. We do exercise an absolute maritime dominion. We must exercise it, or we cannot remain independent of France. It would, therefore, be better to do it, at once, avowedly, and not encumber the thing with *Orders in Council*, and other trappings, which only serve to rob the principle of its simplicity and dignity. The alarm of Mr. Alexander Baring and his brother wisacre, Mr. Roscoe, that the open avowal of such a principle will rouse and unite the world against us, is curious enough, at a moment when all the world is actually so roused and united. America is as much our enemy as she *can* be. Nothing can possibly make her more so. She would declare war, but she dare not. There is no fear of "throwing her into the arms" of France." She is there already as much as she can be. Our ships of war keep the two dear friends asunder. What the revolution of Spain may do, by placing the countries, joining the United States, under the immediate controul of France, I know not. If the Americans were not such miserable slaves to their envy and hatred of England; this event would, at once, produce an alliance offensive and defensive between us and them; but, I am of opinion, that it will produce no such effect, until severe suffering (which is in store for them) shall have

taught them justice and modesty. The Floridas are inhabited by Spaniards; Louisiana by Spaniards and Frenchmen; the key of the Mississippi is in their hands. Without the aid of England, it is impossible for the Southern and Western States of the American union to maintain themselves against France, if attacked by her; and, to avoid being attacked there is but one way, that is, by doing what Napoleon shall command; in other words, yield to him without resistance.—What a fine field would, by this revolution in Spain, be opened for a grand co-operation of England and America, were it not for the rancour of the leaders in the latter country! The way for them to proceed is so plain, that it needs not to be pointed out. How natural, how glorious, would such a co-operation be! But, it is not for us to endeavour to hasten it. The first motions towards it must come from the other side; and they will not come, 'till the people, the *real* people of America, shall rouse themselves, trample under foot the slaves of France, and resolve to act for their own interests. This event can be at no great distance. They know what French armies are. They, *personally*, hate the French; and, when once they have them in their neighbourhood, they will begin seriously to think of their means of defence. Drive them from the continent of North America they must; or they must themselves become subjects of France. There is no other alternative. They cannot drive them away without the aid of England; and the giving of that aid will naturally and necessarily lead to a connection, which may have a wonderful effect in the world. But, it cannot too often be repeated, that the first movements towards such a connection, *must not be made by us*.

SPAIN.—The several papers, containing the history of the revolution, which now seems to be completed in Spain, shall follow, in the Register, those relating to the dispute with America. In the mean while, the event itself furnishes but few topics for observation, nothing having taken place but what might have been naturally expected. When I was, in my last Register, observing upon the toasts of Mr. Blackburn and his Pitt-dinner associates, I little thought, that there was, in the post office, the news-paper which contained the intelligence, that what I anticipated had actually taken place. "The *people* of Spain," indeed! There was no such thing as a people in Spain. There were some millions of animals, walking about upon two legs each; but, they were, in a political point of view, no more

than so many head of cattle. Gregory King's rabbits were beings of an order rather superior to them. What folly, to suppose that such creatures would make a stand in defence of their country. And, *for what*? What could they possibly lose? How could they possibly become more wretched, or more degraded? The Courier reminds us, that MURAT is the son of a little ale-house keeper. Well, and what then? Is he an idiot, or a poor rascally, cowardly debauchee? Lord Nelson was the son of a country parson; and, yet it appeared that he had a good sort of blood flowing in his veins. A wise and brave man, particularly if he be a soldier (by sea or land, I mean, of course), may, at all times, bid defiance to heraldry. It is only the insignificant, that need be anxious about their descent. Is it not better for a nation to be under the sway of the gallant son of an alehouse-keeper than of a king's son, who is known through the world for a stinking coward? Before the Courier tells us any more about the ale-house-keeper's son, I should like for him to refer us to some youths of royal descent, who have discovered discretion and courage equal to Murat, who appears to me to be one of the most able as well as most valient of those, who have been raised up for the purpose of chastising the cruel and cowardly oppressors of nations. We have, in this case of Spain, the contrast completely before us. We see, at one view, those who have been put down and those who have been raised up; and, let the reader say, whom he would prefer to be under, Murat or the king, or prince, of Spain, seeing that the oppression of the former cannot be more complete than that of the latter.—There is one view of subjects of this sort, that such writers as the editor of the Courier never take. There lies the continent of Europe before us. Twenty years ago, it consisted of nations, governed by kings and princes and nobles of ancient families, who were supported, in the exercise of their authority, by laws and usages and habits of the growth of centuries upon centuries. They and their authority, with exceptions too trifling to mention, are now destroyed; and, in their stead, we see men, who, at the time when the change began to work, were totally unknown to the world at large, and almost to their next-door neighbours. What must these kings and princes and nobles have been? And what must have been the nature of their governments? The cause has been said to be the perverseness of the people, stimulated by artful men. But, how came there to be matter for those artful men to work

upon? And, by what magic of rhetoric did those artful men persuade the people of so many nations, that the sway of obscure, nay, of as yet unknown, individuals, would be preferable to that of those dignified persons, whom, for ages, their ancestors had obeyed? MALLÉ DU PAN endeavored to defend the nobles of France against the charge of having *deserted* their country; but, what did all his arguments prove? Why, that the people so hated them, that they could not remain. It is very true, that the people may be deceived, that a tumult may be excited against a good king, or a good nobility; but, this cannot be general, and of long duration, especially when there is *no leader*, as was the case in France. But, supposing it possible for a nation to be so completely blinded, and to act so strangely as to pull down their government, without the aid of a leader, and that, too, without any just cause; still the *example* of that nation would naturally be an object of terror. Not so has it been in this case. The other nations of the continent have followed the example of France; and, from any facts that reach us, it does not appear, that they repent of it. Besides, supposing the whole change to have been a work of ignorance and wickedness; still, we have to call upon the ancient rulers as being answerable for that ignorance and that wickedness; for, they had the power, and to them it belonged to teach their people wisdom and virtue. Therefore, puzzle about as long as we please amongst details of causes and effects, there has been a struggle of "ale-house keepers' sons" against the kings and princes and nobles of the continent of Europe, and the former have decidedly beaten the latter, have driven them from their thrones and authorities, and have put themselves in their stead. Such being the fact, it is quite useless to complain of the taste of the people; it is nonsense to complain of it; the Courier may as well rail against the climate of the several nations, governed by ale-house keepers' sons. The thing is *done*. The doom of the kings and princes and nobles of the continent of Europe is irrevocable.—There is one circumstance, in the events of this Spanish revolution, which is well worthy of attention; and that is, that the old king, to the very last, boasts, in all his public acts, of the fidelity and affection of his loving subjects; the son, for the few days that he is upon the throne, does the same; and, in all the proclamations from the officers of state, generals, &c. the king is spoken of as being "the father of his people," and as being an object of more than

filial affection. Nay, when the young king is upon his route to Bayonne (never more to return to Spain), he is escorted amidst the huzzas of the people, who, we are told, contended for the honour of having him tarry a few minutes amongst them. Still more: while this very journey is performing, there is a royal *birth day* celebrated, and we are told of those who came to the court to pay their gratulations upon the "*happy occasion*." Such is the stuff which what is, now-a-days, called *loyalty* is made of! The state trickery, the humbug, of reciprocal affection was, you see, kept up to the last moment. I dare say, that there were poets, of all sizes, at work in singing the virtues of the royal family, till they crossed the frontier; that the parasites of the play-houses were straining their hired throats to *God save the king*; that the venal wretches, assembled at taverns, were drinking *loyal* toasts; and, that the writers of paragraphs and of court-news were trumpeting forth the praises, and rejoicing at the health and spirits, of a "*beloved monarch and his amiable consort*," who had so long reigned over a happy "and grateful people." Away, in a moment, as quick as lightning, is gone all this despicable cant: all this state flummery. The king of Spain will now, for the first time in his life, hear the truth; and, which is a still more pleasing reflection, his late subjects will now dare to say what they think of him and his family. What a delightful thing it must be to behold millions of men, having, all at once, their lips unlocked! Relieved from the galling restraint of silence, while they hear fools and knaves enlogized as the most wise and virtuous of men! I know of nothing more provoking; nothing more painful; nothing that can render life more intolerable; than to be obliged to hear conceited tools, greedy profligates, and bragging cowards, praised to the skies, and to be compelled to hold one's tongue. It does not signify to talk, for, to be released from this heart-burning restraint the soul of man must earnestly desire.—As to the effect which this revolution will produce, with respect to England, it cannot, I should think, except in the single case of America, above spoken of, be material; for, whether the Bourbons were set upon the throne or not, the French, now that they have, *for the present*, settled the north, would have gone southward. There is a talk of expeditions to Spain and to South America; but *why* they should have been thought advisable merely on account of the revolution in Spain, there

does not appear to me any solid reason. There may, possibly, be something done, in the way of getting a surrender of Spanish ships of war; but, the country must be safe enough against any attack of ours, in a short time; and, I should think, that a siege of Gibraltar would naturally follow. Much more than I am afraid of that, however, I am afraid of expeditions to *South America*, where the troops and the people are already under the guidance of French officers, where every attempt would be attended with dreadful slaughter, and where, if we succeeded, success would be followed by an insupportable burden, making a deduction from our strength of every description. As if we were *too strong* at home, the ministers are now urgently called upon to send forth, and to waste, our strength, in those distant countries. The project recommended is to make the people *independent*. What good would that do us, and what harm would it do Napoleon? Were there an independent nation formed in Mexico or Peru, it needs no spirit of prophesy to tell, that the West India islands would soon belong to that nation. It is the dream of some, that we are to have *alliances* with these new nations. If we had them, they would prove a new curse to us; and, as to the supplying of those nations with goods, what can we do more in that way than we now do?—One thing is to be observed, that this revolution in Spain will assuredly cause a protraction of the war. The new sovereignty will be too green, for this year or two to come, to make a decent figure in a treaty of peace. Such a nation is not to be settled again in peace. There must be a sufficient time for men's ears to become accustomed to the new sounds, before peace can be thought of. "HIS MOST CATHOLIC MAJESTY" will probably, have made way for "JOACHIM I;" but, we shall be ashamed to adopt it just yet; and, this, joined to the natural desire, that Napoleon must, for some time, have to keep the continent in war, will certainly put off the hour of peace. We may, therefore, unless some *accident* befall us, count upon another five or six years of war. I think, that the conqueror has by no means done with Austria or Russia or Prussia; and, I am, in short, persuaded, that he will dispossess every ancient royal family upon the continent of Europe, that, perhaps, of Sweden excepted. Out of this opinion arises, very naturally, great alarm in my mind as to where we shall look for *wives* for our royal family. This is a very grave subject, rea-

der; for, you are, I hope, seriously impressed with the necessity of our having persons of illustrious descent for our queens and princesses. To marry into the Buonaparte family would be shocking; but, what shall we do if all the continent of Europe be stocked with nothing else? While Europe was in its former state, so happily were we situated in this respect, that the most agreeable of connections were formed, and yet all was kept, by one means or another, in the family. But, I will pursue these reflections no further, at present, trusting that some civilian, accustomed to *Delicate Investigations*, will favour me with a line or two, in order to tranquillize my mind. —I cannot close this article without once more recurring to the adulatory language and conduct of the people in Spain to a king just about to be dethroned, and in whose defence not a single sword was drawn. A paragraph, dated Madrid, April 17th, says: "king Ferdinand has commenced his journey to meet Napoleon. On the 12th of this month, he entered Burgos in a magnificent equipage constructed for the purpose at the charge of that city, and drawn by sixty men, attired in the ancient Spanish costume. The city of Victoria, and many others, intreated that the ILLUSTRIOUS and BELOVED traveller would visit them in his progress. To all these petitions he answered in the most condescending terms" —This puts one so much in mind of what one has read elsewhere, and about other persons, that it cannot fail to awaken a train of interesting thoughts. "*Illustrious and beloved traveller*"! Vile slaves! Detestable hypocrites! You hated him, and he despised you. This is, I suppose, what is called *loyal* language? Miserable will be the king, who, in an hour of danger, shall look for defenders amongst flatterers! All the kings that have been pulled down have been represented to us as being adored by their subjects. Will kings and princes never take warning? Will they never profit from experience? Will they go on believing in none but their parasites?

Bottley, 9th June, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES.—The following Papers were communicated to the Congress, by President Jefferson, on the 22d of March, 1808.—They are all the principal Official Letters, which have been written upon the subject of the dispute now existing between England and the American States.—They begin with

MR. MADISON'S (*American Secretary of State*), to MR. MUNROE (*the American Minister in London*) and embracing the *Correspondence between Mr. Monroe and Mr. CANNING (the English Secretary of State)*, conclude with the *correspondence between Mr. ROSE (the English special Envoy to America) and Mr. Madison.*

MR. MADISON TO MR. MUNROE, JULY 6, 1807.

Sir,—The documents herewith enclosed, from No. 1 to No. 9 inclusive, explain the hostile attack, with the insulting pretext for it, lately committed near the capes of Virginia by the British ships of war *Leopard*, on the American frigate *Chesapeake*, No. 10 is a copy of the proclamation issued by the president, interdicting in consequence of that outrage the use of our waters and every other accommodation to all British armed ships. This enormity is not a subject for discussion. The immunity of a national ship of war from every species and purpose of search on the high seas, has never been contested by any nation. G. Britain would be second to none in resenting such a violation of her rights and such an insult on her flag. She may bring the case to the test of her own feelings, by supposing that instead of the customary demand of our mariners serving compulsively even on board her ships of war, opportunities had been seized for rescuing them, in like manner, whenever the superiority of force or the chance of surprise might be possessed by our ships of war.—But the present case is marked by circumstances which give it a peculiar die. The seamen taken from the *Chesapeake* had been ascertained to be native citizens of the U. States, and this fact was made known to the bearer of the demand, and doubtless communicated by him to his commander previous to the commencement of the attack. It is a fact also, affirmed by two of the men, with every appearance of truth, that they had been impressed from American vessels into the British frigate, from which they escaped, and by the third, that having been impressed from a British merchant ship, he had accepted the recruiting bounty under that duress and with a view to alleviate his situation, till he could escape to his own country; and that the attack was made during a period of negotiation, and in the midst of friendly assurances from the British government.—The printed papers herewith sent, will enable you to judge of the spirit which has been roused by the occasion. It pervades the whole community—is abolishing the distinctions of party—and, regarding only the indignity offered to the

sovereignty and flag of the nation, and the blood of citizens so wantonly and wickedly shed, demands in the loudest tone an honorable reparation.—With this demand you are charged by the president. The tenor of his proclamation will be your guide in reminding the British government of the uniform proofs given by the U. States, of their disposition to maintain faithfully every friendly relation; of the multiplied infractions of their rights by British naval commanders on our coasts and in our harbors; of the inefficacy of reiterated appeals to the justice and friendship of that government; and of the moderation on the part of the U. States, which reiterated disappointments had not extinguished; till at length no alternative is left, but a voluntary satisfaction on the part of G. Britain, or a resort to means depending on the U. States alone.—The nature and extent of the satisfaction ought to be suggested to the British government, not less by a sense of its own honor than by justice to that of the U. States. A formal disavowal of the deed, and restoration of the four seamen to the ship from which they were taken, are things of course, and indispensable. As a security for the future, an entire abolition of impressments from vessels under the flag of the U. States, if not already arranged, is also to make an indispensable part of the satisfaction. The abolition must be on terms compatible with the instructions to yourself and Mr. Pickney on this subject; and, if possible, without the authorised rejection from the service of the U. States of British seamen who have not been two years in it. Should it be impossible to avoid this concession on the part of the U. States, it ought, as of itself more than a reasonable price for future security, to extend the reparation due for the past.—But beyond these indispensable conditions, the U. States have a right to expect every solemnity of form and every other ingredient of retribution and respect which according to usage and the sentiments of mankind, are proper in the strongest cases of insult to the rights and sovereignty of a nation. And the British government is to be apprized of the importance of a full compliance with this expectation to the thorough healing of the wound which has been made on the feelings of the American nation.—Should it be alleged as a ground for declining or diminishing the satisfaction in this case, that the U. States have themselves taken it by the interdict contained in the proclamation, the answer will be obvious. The interdict is a measure, not of reparation, but of precaution, and would besides be amply justified

by recurrences prior to the extraordinary outrage in question.—The exclusion of all armed ships whatever from our waters, is in fact so much required by the vexations and dangers to our peace experienced from their visits, that the president makes it a special part of the charge to you, to avoid laying the U. States under any species of restraint from adopting that remedy. Being extended to all belligerent nations none of them could of right complain, and with the less reason, as the policy of most nations has limited the admission of foreign ships of war into their ports, to such numbers as being inferior to the naval force of the country, could be readily made to respect its authority and laws.—As it may be useful, in enforcing the justice of the present demand, to bring into view applicable cases, especially where G. Britain has been the complaining party, I refer you to the ground taken and the language held by her, in those of Falkland's island and Nootka Sound, notwithstanding the assertion by Spain in both cases, that the real right was in her, and the possessory only in G. Britain. These cases will be found in the Annual Registers for 1771, and 1790, and in the parliamentary debates for those years. In the latter you will find also, two cases referred to, in one of which the French king sent an ambassador extraordinary to the king of Sardinia, in the most public and solemn manner with an apology for an infringement of his territorial rights in the pursuit of a smuggler and murderer. In the other case, an ambassador extraordinary was sent by the British government to the court of Portugal, with an apology for the pursuit and destruction, by admiral Boscawen, of certain French ships on the coasts of this last kingdom. Many other cases, more or less analogous, may doubtless be found; see, particularly, the reparation by France to G. Britain, for the attack on Turk's island in 1764, as related in the Annual Register, and in Smollet's continuation of Hume, vol. 10; the proceedings in the case of an English merchantman, which suffered much in her crew and otherwise, from the fire of certain Spanish xebecs cruising in the Mediterranean; and the execution of the lieutenant of a privateer, for firing a gun into a Venetian merchantman, which killed the captain, as stated in the Annual Register for 1781, page 94. The case of an affront offered to a Russian ambassador in the reign of queen Ann, though less analogous, shews, in a general view, the solemnity with which reparation is made, for insults having immediate relation to the sovereignty of a nation.

—Although the principle which was out-

ged in the proceedings against the American frigate is independent of the question concerning the allegiance of the seamen taken from her, the fact that they were citizens of the U. States, and not British subjects, may have such an influence on the feelings of all, and perhaps on the opinions of some unacquainted with the laws and usages of nations, that it has been thought proper to seek more regular proofs of their national character than were deemed sufficient in the first instance. These proofs will be added by this conveyance, if obtained in time, if not by the first that succeeds.—The president has an evident right to expect from the British government, not only an ample reparation to the U. States, in this case, but that it will be decided without difficulty or delay. Should this expectation fail, and above all, should reparation be refused, it will be incumbent on you to take proper measures for hastening home, according to the degree of urgency, all American vessels remaining in British ports; using for the purpose, the mode least likely to awaken the attention of the British government. Where there may be no ground to distrust the prudence or fidelity of consuls, they will probably be found the fittest vehicles for your intimations. It will be particularly requisite to communicate to our public ships in the Mediterranean the state of appearances, if it be such as ought to influence their movements.—All negotiation with the British government on other subjects, will of course be suspended until satisfaction on this be so pledged and arranged as to render negotiation on honorable. Whatever may be the result or the prospect, you will please to forward to us the earliest information.—The scope of the proclamation will signify to you that the president has yielded to the presumption that the hostile act of the British commander did not pursue the intentions of his government. It is not indeed easy to suppose that so rash and so critical a step should have originated with the admiral, but it is still more difficult to believe, that such orders were prescribed by any government, under circumstances such as existed between G. Britain and the U. States.—Calculations founded on dates, are also strongly opposed to the supposition, that the orders in question could have been transmitted from England. In the same scale, are to be put the apparent and declared persuasion of the British representative, Mr. Erskine, that no orders of a hostile spirit, could have been issued or authorised by his government; and the coincidence of this assurance with the amicable professions of Mr.

Canning, the organ of the new administration, as stated in the dispatch of April 22d, from yourself and Mr. Pinckney.—Proceeding on these considerations, the president has inferred that the justice and honor of the British government will readily make the atonement required : and in that expectation, he has forborne an immediate call of congress ; notwithstanding the strong wish which has been manifested by many, that measures depending on their authority, should without delay be adopted. The motives to this forbearance, have at the same time been strengthened by the policy of avoiding a course which might stimulate the British cruisers, in this quarter, to arrest our ships and seamen now arriving and shortly expected in great numbers from all quarters. It is probable however that the legislature will be convened in time to receive the answer of the British government on the subject of this dispatch, or even sooner, if the conduct of the British squadron here, or other occurrences, should require immediate measures beyond the authority of the executive.—In order to give the more expedition and security to the present dispatch, a public armed vessel, the *Revenge*, is specially employed ; and doctor Bullus is made the bearer, who was on board the *Chesapeake*, on his way to a consulate in the Mediterranean, and will be able to detail and explain circumstances which may possibly become interesting in the course of your communications with the British government.—The vessel, after depositing doctor Bullus at a British port, will proceed with dispatches to a French port, but will return to England with a view to bring the result of your transactions with the British government. The trip to France will afford you and Mr. Pinckney a favorable opportunity of communicating with our ministers at Paris, who being instructed to regulate their conduct on the present occasion by the advices they may receive from you, will need every explanation that can throw light on the probable turn and issue of things with G. Britain.

MR. CANNING TO MR. MUNROE, JULY 25, 1807.

Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Mr. Munroe ; and with sentiments of the deepest regret, hastens to inform him that intelligence has just been received of a transaction which has taken place off the coast of America, between a ship of war of his majesty, and a frigate belonging to the U. States, the result of which has been the loss of some lives on board of the American frigate.

—The particulars of this transaction and the grounds of the justification of the British officer, and of the admiral under whose orders he acted, Mr. C. is not at present able to communicate to Mr. Munroe.—If Mr. Munroe should have received any accounts of it, Mr. C. trusts that he will lose no time in communicating them to Mr. C.—But whatever the real merits and character of the transaction may turn out to be, Mr. C. could not forbear expressing without delay the sincere concern and sorrow which he feels at its unfortunate result ; and assuring the American minister, both from himself and on the behalf of his majesty's government, that if the British officers should prove to have been culpable, the most prompt and effectual reparation shall be afforded to the government of the U. States.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. CANNING, JULY 27, 1807.

Mr. Munroe presents his compliments to Mr. Canning, and is much obliged to him for the information communicated in his note of Saturday. Mr. M. has heard with extreme regret the account it contains of a rencontre between a British ship of war and an American frigate off the coast of the U. States. He has no knowledge of the subject except what Mr. C.'s note has furnished, but will not fail to communicate the earliest intelligence which he may receive of an event so deeply to be lamented. Mr. M. derives in the mean time much satisfaction from the friendly assurance of Mr. C. that this unfortunate occurrence was not authorised by his majesty's government, and that suitable reparation will be made for the injury, if on enquiry the British officer shall be found the aggressor.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. CANNING, JULY 29, 1807.

Sir ;—Although I have no instruction from my government on the subject, it is my duty to request the attention of his Britannic majesty's government to the late aggression on the sovereignty of the U. States, of a very extraordinary nature. The circumstances of the transaction are too distinctly marked to leave any doubt of the extent of the outrage, or of the reparation which it obviously claims. By accounts which are entitled to full confidence, it appears that on the 23d of June last, his majesty's ship *Leopard* attacked an American frigate off the coast of the U. States, with a view to assert and enforce the unfounded and most unjustifiable pretension to search for deserters, and after having killed and wounded a number

ber of her men, entered on board and carried away, forcibly, several of the crew. The conduct of the British officer, which in itself forms an act of complete hostility, is rendered more reprehensible from the consideration that just before this aggression he held a station within the jurisdiction of the U. States, in the waters of the Chesapeake, where, while he enjoyed the rights of hospitality, he projected this attack against the ship of a neutral power, whose commander relying on the good faith of his majesty's government, and the friendly relations subsisting between G. Britain and the U. States, could not have suspected the design. I might state other examples of great indignity and outrage, many of which are of recent dates, to which the U. States have been exposed off their coast, and even within several of their harbours, from the British squadron; but it is improper to mingle them with the present more serious cause of complaint. I have called your attention to this subject, in full confidence that his majesty's government will see in the act complained of, a flagrant abuse of its own authority, and that it will not hesitate to enable me to communicate to my government without delay, a frank disavowal of the principle on which it was made, and its assurance that the officer who is responsible for it, shall suffer the punishment which so unexampled an aggression on the sovereignty of a neutral nation justly deserves.

MR. CANNING TO MR. MUNROE, AUGUST 3, 1807.

Sir;—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your official note of the 29th ult. which I have lost no time in laying before the king.—As the statement of the transaction to which this note refers, is not brought forward either by the authority of the government of the U. States, or with any precise knowledge of the facts on which it is founded, it might have been sufficient for me to express to you, his majesty's readiness to take the whole of the circumstances of the case, when fully disclosed, into his consideration, and to make reparation for any alleged injury to the sovereignty of the U. States, whenever it should be clearly shewn that such injury has been actually sustained, and that such reparation is really due.—Of the existence of such a disposition on the part of the British government, you, sir, cannot be ignorant: I have already assured you of it, though in an unofficial form, by the letter which I addressed to you on the first receipt of the intelligence of this unfortunate transaction: and I may perhaps be permitted to express my surprise, after such an assurance, at the

tone of that representation which I have just had the honor to receive from you.—But the earnest desire of his majesty to evince, in the most satisfactory manner, the principles of justice and moderation, by which he is uniformly actuated, has not permitted him to hesitate in commanding me to assure you, that his majesty neither does, nor has at any time, maintained the pretension of a right to search ships of war, in the national service of any state, for deserters.—If therefore the statement in your note, should prove to be correct, and to contain all the circumstances of the case, upon which complaint is intended to be made, and if it shall appear that the act of his majesty's officers rested on no other grounds than the simple and unqualified assertion of the pretension above referred to, his majesty has no difficulty in disavowing that act, and will have no difficulty in manifesting his displeasure at the conduct of his officers.—With respect to the other causes of complaint [whatever they may be] which are hinted at in your note, I perfectly agree with you, in the sentiment which you express, as to the propriety of not involving them in a question, which is of itself of sufficient importance to claim a separate and most serious consideration.—I have only to lament, that the same sentiment did not induce you to abstain from alluding to these subjects, on an occasion which you were, yourself, of opinion, was not favorable for pursuing the discussion of them.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. MADISON, AUGUST 4, 1807.

Sir;—I avail myself of the opportunity afforded by Mr. Biddle, to communicate to you a copy of a correspondence, and the substance of a conference between Mr. Canning and myself, relative to the late aggression on the grace and sovereignty of the U. States, by the British ship *Leopard*, in an attack on the Chesapeake, off the capes of Virginia.—Mr. Canning's private letter of July 25, which gave the first intelligence of the occurrence, left it doubtful whether the British officers had been culpable in it, and as I knew how very reprehensible their conduct had been on our coast, on many other occasions, and to what height the sensibility of our citizens had been excited by it, I thought it not improbable that something might have occurred to divide the blame between the parties. It was under that impression that my answer was written. On the next day the leading features of the transaction were presented to the public through the medium of the gazettes, which were taken from private accounts received

directly from Halifax, by a vessel which had been dispatched by admiral Berkley with the official one. By these it was evident that the British officer was completely the aggressor, in an outrage of great enormity, attended with circumstances which increased the offence. It was understood likewise from good authority, that the official intelligence which the government had received, corresponded with and confirmed the other accounts already before the public.

—On full consideration of these circumstances, I concluded that it would be highly improper for me to leave the affair on the ground on which Mr. Canning had placed it. I could see no other motive in him to obtain farther information relative to the transaction, than for the purpose of ascertaining whether the men said to be deserters, and for whom the attack was made, were American citizens or British subjects; to which it was impossible for me to give any countenance.—I thought it indispensable therefore to call on the government to disavow the principle and to engage such other reparation to the U. States, as their injured honor obviously required. It appeared to me, that any delay in taking that step, which depended on an abstract principle, and required no argument to illustrate, or facts to support it, would have a tendency to weaken a claim which was unquestionable, and to countenance the idea that it would not be supported with suitable energy.—I had, before the knowledge of this event, obtained the appointment of an interview with Mr. Canning on other business, to take place on the 29th ult. We met according to the appointment; I observed, in opening the conference, that although the topics which had brought us together, were important, the late occurrence at the entrance of the Chesapeake, had in a great measure put them out of sight. He expressed his regret that such an event, which would at all times furnish cause of concern, should have happened at the present time. He asked if the men in question were American citizens, or British subjects? I replied that that was a point which could not come into view in the case: that it was one which according as the fact might be, would make the cause more or less popular, in either country, but could not affect the principle: that on principle, a ship of war protected all the people on board, and could not be entered to be searched for deserters, or for any purpose, without violating the sovereignty of the nation whose flag she bore; that in the present case I had been assured, that the men were American citi-

zens, and that the British minister at Washington had been made acquainted with it. He said little on the subject, but by the tendency of what he did say, seemed to imply that his government could not lose sight of the consideration above alluded to, nor indeed did he admit by any thing that escaped him, that the abstract principle itself would not be insisted on. His remarks however were generally of a conciliatory and friendly character; without pledging himself on any point, he seemed desirous to satisfy me, that no new orders had been issued by the present ministry to the commandant of the British squadron at Halifax. I observed, that as the notes which had passed between us, were informal, and on a very limited view of the subject, on my part, it would be proper for me, now, that the circumstances were better known, to present him an official note on it; he admitted the propriety of it.—I then drew Mr. Canning's attention to the subjects on which I had asked the interview; being the case of the *Impetueux*, captain Love's correspondence, the conduct of capt. Douglas, and of the British squadron generally on our coast. I observed that I had heretofore postponed any official communication on these points, from a desire to connect them with the greater objects depending between our governments, and of course, from motives the most friendly:—that I brought them to his view at this time, in consequence of Mr. Pinckney and myself having commenced other business, as he knew had been done, he promised to attend to them.—On the 29th July, I wrote Mr. Canning the note which I had promised him in the late interview: I addressed it in terms which I thought suitable to the occasion, observing to state in it, that I took the step from a sense of duty, applicable to my station as the resident minister, and without authority from my government: I considered the act as that of the British officer, in which the government had no agency, was not bound to support, and which it would be honorable for it to disavow. I flattered myself that some advantage might arise from the measure, and that under the circumstance in which it was taken, no injury possibly could. His reply is dated on the 3d inst. which though addressed in rather a harsh tone, may be considered as conceding essentially the point desired. It is my intention to say nothing more to him on the subject, 'till I hear from you, and in the mean time to observe the most conciliatory conduct that circumstances will admit.—Such is the state of this country, at the present crisis, that it is impossible

to foresee what will be its course of conduct towards the U. States. There has been at all times since the commencement of the present war, a strong party here for extending its ravages to them. This party is composed of the ship owners, the navy, the East and West India merchants, and several political characters of great consideration in the state. So powerful is this combination, that it is most certain that nothing can be obtained of the government on any point, but what may be extorted by necessity. The disasters to the north ought to inspire moderation, but with respect to the northern powers, it seems to have produced directly the opposite effect. A fleet of about 25 ships of the line, with a suitable number of frigates, &c. and above 20,000 men, has been lately equipped, and sent to the Baltic, as it is said, to take possession of the Danish and Russian navies. This measure is imputed to an understanding which it is supposed has been established between the cabinets of Russia and Paris by the late peace, and which has for its object a concert of measures for the purpose of attempting to force on this country a maritime code, more favorable to neutral nations. The motive assigned for the expedition, is that of taking possession of the Danish fleet, to keep it out of the hands of the French; that the Russian fleet is one of the objects is not so generally believed, though perhaps not less probable.—Mr. Pinckney and myself have taken the first step in our business. We will write you in a few days the state of it. You may be assured that we shall do every thing in our power to promote, in the mode most likely to succeed, the object of our instructions, and the interests of our country. Want of time prevents my going into further detail.

MR. CANNING TO MR. MUNROZ, AUGUST 8, 1807.

SIR;—Having received from his majesty's minister in America, an unofficial printed paper, purporting to be a copy of a proclamation of the president of the U. States, I have to request that you will be pleased to acquaint me, whether you have received any communication from your government which enables you to pronounce if such paper be authentic?—In the event of your being empowered to admit its authenticity, I have farther to request of you, that you will inform me whether you are also authorized to announce it to be the intention of the government of the U. States to carry into effect the measures stated in the proclamation of the president, without requiring, or

waiting for, any explanation, on the part of the British government, with respect to the late unfortunate transaction, upon which the determination to resort to these measures is professed to be founded?

MR. MUNROZ TO MR. CANNING, AUGUST 9, 1807.

SIR;—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of yesterday, and should not hesitate to communicate the information which you have desired, if I possessed it; but as I have not heard from my government on the subject of the unfortunate occurrence alluded to, it is not in my power to state to you any thing on the part of my government respecting it. I have no doubt that I shall be instructed in a very few days, to make a communication to his majesty's government, on that highly interesting event, in which I shall be enabled to furnish a full and just view of all the circumstances attending it. As soon as I receive instructions I shall hasten to apprise you of it.

MR. MUNROZ TO MR. MADISON, AUGUST 14, 1807.

SIR;—I had the honour to transmit you with my letter of the 14th inst. a copy of a correspondence with Mr. Canning, relative to the late aggression in the case of the Chesapeake frigate. You will receive with this a copy of a more recent one on the same subject.—Mr. C.'s queries in his last note, I was led to consider as preparatory to an embargo on American vessels. I could not conceive why he should request information of me, whether the president's proclamation was authentic, and when it would be carried into effect, if it was not intended to found some measure on my reply of an unfriendly nature. The information desired was not necessary to remove any doubts of his government on the points to which it applied, or to enable it to do justice to the U. States, in regard to the aggression of which they complained. The presumption that an embargo was intended gained strength from the circumstance that most of the gazettes had recommended, and that the public mind seemed to be essentially prepared for it. It was my most earnest wish to prevent, as far as in my power, so unjust and pernicious a procedure. As the measure contemplated, whatever it might be, seemed to be suspended for my answer, I was extremely solicitous, by the manner, to deprive this government of all pretext for any measure of the kind alluded to. By replying generally that I had no instructions from my go-

verment, and could state nothing on its part respecting the late occurrence, I avoided giving a direct answer to Mr. C.'s queries; and by drawing his attention to the application which it was to be presumed would soon be made on the part of my government, on that subject, I endeavoured to show more strongly the impolicy and injustice which would stamp any such measure on the part of G. Britain in the present stage.—No step has yet been taken by this government of an official character, towards the U. States; and on the communication which Mr. C. has made to the House of Commons, on the subject, I returned my last note, which you will find in the gazettes sent, I am persuaded that things will remain in the state in which they are, till your dispatch is received. I trust that a disposition exists to make such reparation on the point in question, as will be satisfactory to the U. States, and that it will be practicable and not difficult to preserve the friendly relations subsisting between the two countries. The party, however, in favour of war, consisting of the combined interest in a line I in my list, is strong and active, so that it is impossible to foresee the result.

MR. MONROE TO MR. CANNING, SEPTEMBER 7, 1807.

Sir:—By the order of my government it is my duty to request your attention to the aggression lately committed on the peace and sovereignty of the U. States, by his Britannic majesty's ship of war *Leopard*, in an attack on an American frigate, the *Chesapeake*, off the capes of Virginia. The object of this communication is to obtain of his majesty's government a suitable reparation for that outrage, and such an arrangement of the great interest which is connected with it, as will place the future relations of the two powers on a solid foundation of peace and friendship.—In bringing this subject again to the view of his majesty's government, it is unnecessary to dwell on circumstances which are already so well known to you. By the documents which I have the honour to transmit you, it is shown that while the outrage was unprovoked and unexpected on one side, there was nothing to extenuate it on the other. The commander of his majesty's squadron on the coast of the U. States, appears to have acted on a presumption that he possessed the power to make war, and to decide on the causes of war. It will be difficult to explain the conduct of that officer on any other principle; and equally so to find an example of an aggression marked with such high indignity

and injustice to a friendly power.—The pretext of this aggression could not fail to heighten the sense of injury which the act itself was so signally calculated to excite. My government was taught to infer from it, that there was no limit to a pretension which had already produced so much mischief, and against which so many remonstrances had been presented, in its application to merchant vessels. But I find with great satisfaction that this pretension forms no topic for discussion between us in respect to ships of war; and I trust that the just and enlightened policy which produced the decision in one instance, will surmount the obstacle which has hitherto embarrassed it in the other.—The national character of the men who were taken thus violently from on board the *Chesapeake*, makes no part of the question. It is impossible that it should come into view in estimating the injury which the U. States have received. The outrage involves a great and uncontested principle, which ought not, in any view, to be affected by appealing to national sensibilities on either side. I have however the honour to transmit you documents which will, I presume, satisfy you that they were American citizens.—With respect to the reparation which my government ought to receive for this outrage it will only be necessary to appeal to those sentiments which G. Britain would be sure to indulge, under like circumstances: to that sensibility to national honour, which has distinguished so many epochs of her history.—It will be recollected that the injury which in itself was great, was much aggravated by the circumstances which attended it; that the peaceful relations of the U. States were violated, and their unsuspecting confidence surprized. But I forbear to recite details which it is painful to contemplate. You will, I am persuaded, be satisfied, that in every light in which the subject can be seen, the honour of my government and of the whole nation has been greatly outraged by the aggression, and that it becomes the honour of his majesty's government to make a distinguished reparation for it.—In presenting, in this friendly manner, this important subject to the consideration of his majesty's government, I am particularly instructed to request its attention to the great cause to which this, and so many other injuries of a like kind may be traced; the impressment of men from the merchant vessels of the U. States. In many essential circumstances the objections which are applicable to impressments from ships of war, are equally applicable to those from merchant vessels. To the individuals who suffer by

the practice, the injury is the same in either case. Their claim on their government for protection is in both cases equal: every maxim of public law, and private right, which is violated in one, is equally violated in the other. The relation of the belligerent to the neutral power, extends to certain objects only, and is defined in each by known laws. Beyond that limit, the rights of the neutral are sacred, and cannot be encroached on without violence and injustice. Is there a question of contraband; is the vessel destined to a blockaded port in violation of established principles; or does she contain enemy's property; the greatest extent to which the maritime law is carried by any nation? In these cases, she is conducted to port for trial; the parties are heard by an impartial and responsible tribunal, and are heard again by appeal if they desire it. Are any of the passengers on board the neutral vessel in the naval or military service of the enemy? If such are found they are made prisoners, but as prisoners they have rights which the opposite belligerent is bound to respect. This practice however looks to other objects than are here recited. It involves no question of belligerent on one side, and of neutral on the other. It pursues the vessel of a friend for an unlawful purpose, which it executes in a manner equally unlawful. Every commercial vessel of the U. States that navigates the ocean, is liable to be invaded by it, and not an individual on board any of them is secure while the practice is maintained. It sets up every officer of his majesty's navy as a judge, from whose decision there is no appeal. It makes him a judge, not of property, which is held more sacred, nor of the liberty of his fellow subjects only, however great the trust, and liable to abuse on the main ocean, but of that of the citizens of another power, whose rights as a nation, are trampled on by the decision: a decision, in rendering which, every rule of evidence is violated, as it puts the proof of innocence on the accused; and is further highly objectionable, as there is too much reason to believe that it has been often guided more by the fitness of the party for service, than any other circumstance. The distressing examples of this system of aggression, as it has affected individuals, on a scale of vast extent, it is unnecessary to recount here. They may be easily imagined. Voluminous documents which prove them, are in the possession of both governments.—It is possible that this practice may in certain

cases, and under certain circumstances, have been extended to the vessels of other powers; but with them there was an infallible criterion to prevent error. It would be easy to distinguish between an Englishman and a Spaniard, an Italian, or a Swede: and the clear and irresistible evidence of his national character, and perhaps of his desertion, would establish the British claim to the individual, and reconcile the nation into whose service he had entered to his surrender. But the very circumstances which would constitute an infallible criterion in those cases, would be sure to produce endless error in the other. Who is so skilful in physiognomy as to distinguish between an American and an Englishman, especially among those whose profession and whose sea terms are the same? It is evident that this practice as applied to a foreign nation, to any great extent, has grown out of the American revolution, and that it is impossible for the U. States not to see in it the assertion of a claim which is utterly incompatible with that great event. When the character of this claim, and the pernicious tendency of the practice, are maturely weighed, it must furnish cause for surprize, that some just and friendly arrangement, has not long since been adopted, to prevent the evils incident to it.—My government is aware that his majesty's government has also an interest of importance to attend to, in this delicate concern—and I am instructed to state, on its part, that the best disposition exists to provide for it. The U. States are far from desiring to profit of a resource which does not belong to them, especially to the prejudice of a friendly power. In securing them against a practice, which is found to be so highly injurious to their dearest rights, and most valuable interests, every suitable provision will be made to give equal security to those of G. Britain. On this point I am authorized to enter into such an engagement as will I am persuaded, be adequate to the object.—This great interest of impressment, has been blended in all its relations, as you will perceive, by no act of the U. States. Its connection with the late disastrous incident has been produced by an extraordinary act of violence, of which they were the victims only. That act, which exhibits the pretension in its widest range, has become identified with the general practice in the feelings and sympathies of the nation, and in the sentiment of the government. I trust therefore, that his majesty's government will be equally disposed to take

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up the whole subject at this time, and in making the reparation which the particular injury claims, provide a remedy for the whole evil. My government looks to this complete adjustment with confidence as being indispensably necessary to heal the deep wound which has been inflicted on the national honour of the U. States by so great and unjustifiable an outrage.—I avail myself, with great satisfaction, of the opportunity which this communication affords, to acknowledge the prompt assurance which you gave me of the disposition of his majesty's government, to make a suitable reparation to the government of the U. States for the injury, of which, by its order, it is now my duty to complain; and for the frank disavowal of the pretension on which it was founded. I hastened to transmit copies of those documents to my government, by whom, I trust, they are by this time received.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. CANNING,
SEPT. 9, 1807.

Mr. Munroe presents his compliments to Mr. Canning, and has the honour to inform him that he called at his office yesterday, for the purpose of making some remarks on the subject treated in the note which he addressed, on the 7th. inst. to Mr. C. Mr. M. regrets that he had not the pleasure of seeing Mr. C. at that time, and requests that he will be so good as to give him an interview to-morrow, at such hour as may be most convenient to him. Mr. M. will be happy to attend Mr. C. in the country, should it be more agreeable to Mr. C. to receive him there.

MR. CANNING TO MR. MUNROE,
SEPT. 9, 1807.

Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Mr. Monroe; and will be happy to have the honour of seeing him at the foreign office to-morrow at twelve o'clock. Mr. C. has but this moment received Mr. M.'s note.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. MADISON,
SEPT. 16, 1807.

Sir,—I had the honour to receive your letter of July 6th by Dr. Bullis on the 31st ult. and did not lose a moment in entering on the business communicated to me by it, in the manner which seemed most likely to obtain success. The details shall be communicated to you in my next dispatch. All that I can state at present is, that the whole subject has been placed fully before this government in as strong an appeal to its interest and judgment as I could make; and that as a week has elapsed since my official note was pre-

sent, I am in daily expectation of receiving its decision on it. The moment is in many views very favourable to a satisfactory result, but still is not in my power, from any thing that has occurred, to speak with confidence of it. The joint negotiation committed to Mr. Pinckney and myself, was suspended by the intelligence of the affair with our frigate, and has never been revived since. That intelligence reached this about a week after Mr. Purviance, so that we had only been able with the utmost diligence, to take the preliminary step of presenting to Mr. Canning, in conformity to our instructions, a project, and of explaining to him in the most minute and comprehensive manner that we could, every circumstance appertaining to it. No answer was given to our communication; the suspension therefore of the negotiation was imputable to Mr. Canning; had he answered our communication and proposed to proceed in our negotiation, it would have become a question for the commission to have decided, how far it would have been proper under existing circumstances to comply with the invitation; his silence however relieved us from that dilemma. Permit me to present to you, Mr. Jos. A. Smith of South Carolina, and to refer you to him for much information, of a general nature, on the subject of our affairs with this country. Having been long in Europe, and visited almost every part; he possesses great information of the political state of its several powers, especially of Russia, from whose sovereign he received very distinguished marks of attention. In much communication which I have had with Mr. Smith for a year past, I have found him to be animated with strong sentiments of patriotism towards his country, and as he has expressed a desire of being personally known to the president, and yourself, I have been happy to promote his object, by giving him this introduction.

MR. CANNING TO MR. MUNROE,
SEPT. 23, 1807.

Sir—I have laid before the king my master, the letter which I had the honour to receive from you, on the 8th of this month. Before I proceed to observe upon that part of it which relates more immediately to the question now at issue between our two governments, I am commanded, in the first instance, to express the surprise which is felt at the total omission of a subject, upon which, I had already been commanded to apply to you for information: the proclamation purported to have been issued by the president of the U. States. Of this paper,

when I last addressed you upon it, you professed not to have any knowledge, beyond what the ordinary channels of public information afforded, nor any authority to declare it to be authentic. I feel it an indispensable duty to renew my inquiry on this subject. The answer which I may receive from you is by no means unimportant to the settlement of the discussion which has arisen from the encounter between the *Leopard* and the *Chesapeake*. The whole of the question arising out of that transaction, is, in fact, no other than a question as to the amount of reparation due by his majesty for the unauthorized act of his officer: and you will, therefore, readily perceive that, in so far as the government of the U. States have thought proper to take that reparation into their own hands, and to resort to measures of retaliation previously to any direct application to the British government, or to the British minister in America, for redress: in so far the British government is entitled to take such measures into account, and to consider them in the estimate of reparation which is acknowledged to have been originally due. The total exclusion of all ships of war belonging to one of the two belligerent parties, while the ships of war of the other were protected by the harbours of the neutral power, would furnish no light ground of complaint against that neutral, if considered in any other point of view, than as a measure of retaliation for a previous injury: and, so considered, it cannot but be necessary to take it into account in the adjustment of the original dispute. I am, therefore, distinctly to repeat the inquiry, whether you are now enabled to declare, sir, that the proclamation is to be considered as the authentic act of your government? And, if so, I am further to inquire, whether you are authorised to notify the intention of your government to withdraw that proclamation, on the knowledge of his majesty's disavowal of the act which occasioned its publication. The light in which you are directed to represent admiral Berkley's conduct, and the description which you give of the character of the measure imputed to him—that "he acted" "as if he had the power to make war, and" "to decide the causes of war;" sufficiently evince the necessity of comprehending in this discussion, all the circumstances which have led to, or have followed the action with the *Chesapeake*. Undoubtedly the attack upon a national ship of war, is an attack of hostility, and the very essence of the charge against admiral Berkley as you represent it, is the having taken upon himself to commit an act of hostility without the

previous authority of his government. The provocation which may have led to such an act, without such previous authority, if it cannot justify, may possibly extenuate it: as the steps which have been taken in reprisal though they cannot alter the character of the original act, may and do materially affect every question concerning the reparation claimed for it. On this ground it is, that, while I am commanded to repeat to you (what you consider as so satisfactory) that the general and unqualified pretensions to search ships of war for deserters, is not asserted by this country, I am precluded from concurring in the inference, "that therefore" "the national character of the men who" "were violently taken from on board the" "*Chesapeake*, makes no part of the present" "question." If the right to search ships of war for deserters is not insisted upon by this country, it is not because the employment and the detention of British mariners on board the national ships of any state are considered as less injurious towards G. Britain than their employment on board merchant vessels (a proposition which would be manifestly absurd:) it is not intended to allow that the sailors of G. Britain may be justly employed, against her consent, in foreign ships of war; but merely that redress is, in that case, to be sought for by government from government; and not to be summarily enforced by the unauthorized officer of any of his majesty's ships of war. It follows from this reasoning, that not only the "national character" of the men taken out of the *Chesapeake* is matter for consideration; but that the reparation to be made by the British government to that of the U. States, would depend, among other circumstances, on the question whether an act, which the British government would be justified in considering as an act of hostility, had been committed by the government of the U. States (in refusing to discharge the British seamen in their national service) previously to commission of an act of hostility of an officer of his majesty.—The act of the British officer would still be an unauthorized act, and as such liable to complaint and disapprobation; but the case, as between government and government, would be materially varied.—At the same time that I offer to you this explanation of the principles upon which his majesty has authorized me to discuss with you the subject of your representation, and that I renew to you the assurances of the disposition to conduct the discussion in the most amicable form, and to bring it to a conclusion satisfactory to the honour and to the feelings of

both countries; it is matter of regret that you should have been instructed to annex to the demand of reparation for the attack of the *Leopard* upon the *Chesapeake*, any proposition whatever respecting the search for British seamen in merchant vessels; a subject, which is wholly unconnected with the case of the *Leopard* and the *Chesapeake*, and which can only tend to complicate and embarrass a discussion, in itself of sufficient delicacy and importance.

—In stating the grounds upon which your government expect with confidence that “the whole subject of impressment shall be taken up at this time,” and that in making the reparation which is claimed for the particular injury alleged to have been sustained by the U. States, in the late unfortunate transaction off the coasts of Virginia, “a remedy shall be provided for the whole evil,” you appear to have been directed to assume that this act of violence (such as you describe it) is the natural and almost necessary result of the practice of impressment of British seamen from the merchant vessels of other states; and to represent the particular transaction and the general question of impressment, as “identified in the feelings and sympathies of your nation, as well as in the sentiment of your government.”—With every attention due to the feelings of the people of the U. States, I am sure you will readily allow that those feelings cannot properly be considered as affecting the merits of the case.—The first ebullitions of national sensibility may very naturally have communicated an impulse to the proceedings of the American government: but it cannot be expected, that they should guide the deliberate opinions and conduct of the government with which you have to treat. I would further observe to you that your government cannot reasonably claim any advantage in argument from the expressed sense of its own people, unless it be prepared at the same time to take upon itself a responsibility (which there is no desire of attributing to it) for the outrage and indecency, with which upon the late occasion, that expression has in too many instances been accompanied. It is better for temperate reasoning, and assuredly it is more advantageous for the government of the United States, that the consideration of popular feelings should be wholly omitted in this discussion.—The right and the practice of which you are instructed to complain, as irreconcilable with justice, and intolerable on all their parts, have been exercised by G. Britain from the earliest ages of the British naval power, even without any quali-

fication or exception in favour of national ships of war.—The grounds upon which such a distinction has been admitted in latter times, and upon which, for the course of nearly a century, the crown has forbore to instruct the commanders of its ships of war, to search foreign ships of war for deserters, I have already had the honour to explain to you:—And you will have perceived that those grounds are wholly inapplicable to ships in the merchant service.—That a foreign power will not, knowingly, retain in its national service, mariners natural born subjects of his majesty, who have been recalled by public proclamation, may be regarded as a presumption arising out of the hostile nature of the act, and out of the probable consequences to which such an act of hostility must lead. But with respect to merchant vessels, there is no such presumption. When mariners subjects of his majesty, are employed in the private service of foreign individuals, under private civil contracts, the king's subjects, and the foreign individuals with whom they serve, enter into engagements inconsistent with the duty of his majesty's subjects towards him: but to those engagements the government of the foreign nation has not made itself a party. In such cases, the species of redress which the practice of all times has admitted and sanctioned, is that of taking those subjects at sea, out of the service of such foreign individuals; and sending them to the discharge of that previous and paramount duty which they owe to their sovereign and to their country.—That the exercise of this right involves some of the dearest interests of G. Britain, your government is ready to acknowledge, and has accordingly authorized you to propose certain regulations, which you apprehend would be equivalent in their effect for the preservation of the interests concerned.—There will be no indisposition here to entertain, at a proper time, the discussion of such proposed regulations. But when you recollect that many proposals to this effect have already been brought forward, and have been found wholly inadmissible: when you have, yourself, recently had occasion to experience the difficulty of framing any satisfactory arrangement upon the subject: with all the anxiety which is properly felt by both government for the speedy adjustment of the difference between them, and for the “healing of that deep wound” which you state to have been inflicted on “the national honour of the United States;” surely it is not well advised to make the termination of that difference, and the healing that wound, dependent wholly on

the complete success of an attempt which has already been made so often, and which has hitherto uniformly failed.—Your own reasoning shows, that you are aware of the more than ordinary difficulty which must attend any arrangement for the prevention of desertion between two nations whose similarity of manners and habits, and whose identity of language, interpose so many impediments to the discrimination of “national character.”—To these circumstances and not (as you almost seem to insinuate) to any peculiar harshness towards the U. States, it is owing, that the exercise of this right, as with respect to them, is necessarily more frequent, than with respect to any other nation; and is felt by them to be more rigid and vexatious. But these circumstances cannot furnish an argument for the suspension of the exercise of the right with respect to America; unless it be contended, that multiplicity of frauds and difficulty of detection are reasons against suspicion or motives for acquiescence.—As little foundation is there for the complaint that the practice has grown out of the recognition of American independence; and that the character of that event is affected by its continuance.—It is needless to repeat that these rights existed in their fullest force, for ages previous to the establishment of the U. States as an independent government: and it would be difficult to contend that the recognition of that independence can have operated any change in this respect; unless it can be shown that in acknowledging the government of the U. States, G. Britain virtually abdicated her own rights as a naval power: or unless there were any express stipulations, by which the ancient and prescriptive usages of G. Britain, founded in the soundest principles of natural law, though still enforced against other independent nations of the world, were to be suspended whenever they might come in contact with the interests or the feelings of the American people.—I would now recall your attention to the consideration of the question respecting the late transaction between the Leopard and the Chesapeake; which till the receipt of your letter, I imagine to be the only question actually in discussion between us, and in consideration of the delicacy and pressing importance of which, we had by common consent, waved the consideration of all other matters pending between our two governments.—Into the discussion of this question I am prepared to enter: with what disposition, on the part of his majesty's government, to consult the feelings and the honour of the U. States, it is not necessary for me here to declare—for you have

yourself done justice to the sincerity of that disposition.—The difficulties in the way of such adjustment are already smoothed, by the disavowal voluntarily offered, at the very outset of the discussion, of the general and unqualified pretension to search ships of war for deserters. There remained only to ascertain the facts of the particular case and to proportion the reparation to the wrong.—Is the British government now to understand, that you, sir, are not authorized to enter into this question separately and distinctly; without having obtained, as a preliminary concession, the consent of this country to enter into discussion with respect to the practice of searching merchant vessels for deserters?—Whether any arrangement can be devised by which this practice may admit of modification, without prejudice to the essential rights and interests of G. Britain, is a question which I have already said the British government may, at a proper season, be ready to entertain: but whether the consent of G. Britain to the entering into such discussion shall be extorted as the price of an amicable adjustment, as the condition of being admitted to make honourable reparation for an injury, is a question of quite a different sort, and one which can be answered no otherwise than by an unqualified refusal.—I earnestly recommend to you, therefore, to consider whether the instructions which you have received from your government, may not leave you at liberty to come to an adjustment of the case of the Leopard and the Chesapeake, independently of the other question with which it appears to have been unnecessarily connected.—If your instructions leave you no discretion, I cannot press you to act in contradiction to them. In that case there can be no advantage in pursuing a discussion which you are not authorized to conclude: and I shall have only to regret that the disposition of his majesty to terminate that difference amicably and satisfactorily is for the present rendered unavailing.—In that case, his majesty in pursuance of the disposition of which he has given such signal proofs, will lose no time in sending a minister to America, furnished with necessary instructions and powers for bringing this unfortunate dispute to a conclusion consistent with the harmony subsisting between G. Britain and the U. States, but in order to avoid the inconvenience which has arisen, from the mixture of your instructions, that minister will not be empowered to entertain as connected with this subject, any proposition respecting the search of merchant vessels.—It will, however, be far more satisfactory to his majesty to learn, that upon

reconsideration, you think yourself authorized to separate the two questions.——I hope you will allow me to express, at the same time, the sincere pleasure which I should feel in having to treat with you, sir, personally, for the re-establishment of a good understanding between our two countries.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. CANNING, SEPT. 30, 1807.

SIR,——I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 23d of this month, and shall transmit it without delay to my government.——I perceive by it, with great regret, that his Britannic majesty's government is not disposed to enter into an arrangement at this time, of all the differences that have arisen between our governments, respecting the impressment of seamen from American vessels by British cruizers; that it is willing to look to one object only, the late aggression, and provide for it, while the other is left to depend on future adjustment. My government had presumed that his majesty's government would have seen in the recent and greater injury, a strong motive for bringing the whole subject into one view, and providing for it at the same time. The excesses of the latter outrage could not fail to revive in the mind of the suffering party, a high sense of former injuries, and it was reasonable to infer that the great injustice inseparable from the practice, of which the incident furnished so striking an example, would have produced between our governments the most prompt and friendly co-operation in the means of suppressing it. That the U. States have suffered a greater injury by a recent occurrence, than they had done before, cannot be a good reason, and ought not to be a motive for delaying redress of the others, especially when it is considered that they were already in a train of amicable accommodation and arrangement. Since, however, you inform me that his majesty's government is unwilling to take up the subject in a combined view, it is unnecessary for me to press it.—You ask whether I am authorized to separate this latter incident from the general practice, and to treat it as a distinct topic? On this point I have to state, that my instructions, which are explicit, enjoin me to consider the whole of this class of injuries as an entire subject; and indeed so intimately are they connected in their nature, that it seems to be difficult, if not impossible, to separate them for any useful purpose to either party. My government being sincerely desirous to place the relations of the two powers on the solid basis of permanent friendship, is satisfied, as well by what has

occurred in the general practice, as by the more awful admonition derived from the late incident, that that can only be done with effect, by mounting to the source of the evil, and providing an adequate remedy for it. In pursuing this great object it is my duty to repeat, that my government does not seek to confine the remedy proposed to the injuries which the U. States have suffered, and continue to suffer, but is desirous to extend it to those also which are complained of by G. Britain. Experience has shewn that both parties complain of injuries, though certainly of a very different character and less urgent nature. How much more advisable then is it not, in every view, for them to enter into an arrangement which shall provide an adequate remedy for their respective injuries; which shall bind the honour of each government to do what is just and right in respect to the other, and enlist the feelings of each nation on its side, than to suffer things to remain longer in their present state? How much more advantageous would not such an arrangement be likely to prove to G. Britain, in the particular object which she has in view, than her adherence to a practice which rejects a mean which could not fail to be more productive; a practice which cannot be maintained in principle; which leads by immutable causes, that ought to inspire different sentiments in the parties to each other, to great and constant abuse, and which is also considered by the U. States as subversive of their rights and degrading to their character as an independent power.—So much I have thought it proper to state, in order to place in a just light, the conduct of my government on the present occasion, on this great and very interesting subject of impressment. Well knowing its desire to cultivate the most friendly relations with G. Britain, on just and honourable conditions, it would be highly improper that any doubt should be suffered to exist on that point.—You inform me that his majesty has determined, in case my instructions do not permit me to separate the late aggression from the general practice of impressment, to transfer the business to the U. S. by committing it to a minister who shall be sent there with full powers to conclude it. To that measure I am far from being disposed to raise any obstacle, and shall immediately apprise my government of the decision to adopt it. Under such circumstances, I perfectly agree with you in the opinion, that it would be useless to pursue a discussion, which it would be impossible for me to bring to a satisfactory conclusion.—It is still my duty to give the explanation which you have desired, of the

motives which induced the president to adopt the measures announced in his proclamation, of the 2d July last. However great the injury which the U. S. had received by the aggression complained of, it is just that it should be shewn that the president did not lose sight in those measures of the friendly relations subsisting between the two powers. When the hostile nature of the attack on the Chesapeake, is taken into view, and the general conduct of the British squadron within the waters of the U. States, before and after the attack, I am persuaded that there was no limit to which the president would not have been justified in going, which he might have thought essential to the honour and safety of the nation. Before the attack, the British squadron had violated the jurisdiction of the U. S. by the impressment of men within it, whom the commander had refused to surrender; and after the attack the attitude which he assumed continued to be of a very menacing and hostile character. An act of hostility, it must be admitted, justifies any act of a like nature towards the party who commits it. The president, however, did not believe that his majesty's government had authorised the conduct of the British squadron, and his measures were evidently founded on that belief. They were marked by no circumstance of hostility, or of retaliation towards G. Britain; but were intended simply to preserve order within the jurisdiction of the U. S., to which end the removal of the British squadron without their limits became indispensable. After the acts of violence which had been committed by that squadron, it was impossible that it should remain longer there without increasing the irritation and widening the breach between the two nations, which it was the earnest object of the president to prevent. There certainly existed no desire of giving a preference in favour of the ships of war of one belligerent party to those of another. Before this aggression, it is well known, that his Britannic majesty's ships lay within the waters of the Chesapeake, and enjoyed all the advantages of the most favoured nation; it cannot therefore be doubted that my government will be ready to restore them to the same situation, as soon as it can be done consistently with the honour and rights of the U. S.—I cannot conclude this communication without expressing my earnest hope, that the differences, which have unhappily arisen between our governments, may soon be settled, on conditions honourable and satisfactory to both parties. To have co-operated with you in the accomplishment of so great and useful a work, would have been highly grati-

fying to me. The disposition which you have brought to the discussion, and the sentiments which you communicated on the principal transaction, when the first intelligence of it was received, have inspired me with great confidence, that we should soon have been able to bring it to such a conclusion. To have been a party to it, would have terminated my mission to his majesty in the mode which I have long and sincerely desired.

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MR. MUNROE TO MR. MADISON, OCT. 10, 1807.

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit you, by Doctor Bullus, a copy of my correspondence with Mr. Canning, on the subject which was committed to my care, by your letter of the 6th of July last. You will find by it, that the pressure which has been made on this government, in obedience to the instruction contained in that letter, has terminated in a decision to send a minister to the U. S., to adjust the business there. What the powers of that minister will be; whether it is intended to confine them to the sole object of reparation for the special outrage, or to extend them, in case the proposed separation of that from the general topic of impressment is admitted, to the latter object, it is not in my power to state. Mr. Canning has given me no information on that head in conference, and his note is not explicit on it. It states, that the minister who shall be sent to the U. S., to bring the dispute relative to the attack on the Chesapeake to a conclusion, shall not be empowered to entertain, as connected with that subject, any proposition respecting the search of merchant vessels—a presumption is authorised by those terms, that the minister will have power to treat on the general topic after the special one is arranged. But it is possible that that presumption may have been raised for some other purpose, or that the terms which excited it, were introduced merely to convey the idea that the mission should be confined to the special object.—In the discharge of this delicate and important trust, I thought that I should be able, more effectually, to promote its object, by opening the subject to Mr. Canning in conference than by an official note. As the attitude taken by my government, which was evidently supported by the whole nation, was of a very impressive nature, it seemed probable from the feverish state of the public mind here, in regard to us, that a tone of conciliation which would not weaken the pressure, would be more likely to succeed in obtaining the reparation desired, than an official

and peremptory demand. Under this impression, I had several conferences with Mr. Canning, the substance of which, in each, I will endeavour to state with precision. A knowledge of what passed in these interviews, in aid of that which is afforded by the correspondence, will enable you to form the most correct idea of the object of the proposed mission, that present circumstances will admit of.—The first interview, was on the 3d of Sept. as soon as it could be obtained, after the receipt of your letter of July 6th, which was on the 30th of Aug. I informed Mr. Canning, that as I wished the discussion in which we were about to enter, to terminate amicably and honourably to both our governments; I had asked the interview, for the purpose of promoting that desirable end; that by explaining to each other fully, in friendly conference, the views of our respective governments relative to the late aggression, I was persuaded that it would be more easy for us to arrange the business, to the satisfaction of both parties, than by any other mode which we could pursue. He expressed his sensibility to that which I had chosen, and his readiness to concur in it; I then stated in detail, in explicit terms, the reparation which my government thought the U. S. entitled to, and expected that they should receive, for the injury and indignity offered by the late aggression; that the men taken from the frigate should be restored to it; that the officers who had committed the aggression should be exemplarily punished; that the practice of impressment from merchant vessels should be suppressed; and that the reparation consisting of those several acts should be announced to our government, through the medium of a special mission, a solemnity which the extraordinary nature of the aggression particularly required. I observed that as the aggression and the principle on which it was founded, had been frankly disavowed as soon as known, by his government, I was persuaded that there could be no serious objection on its part, to any of the acts which it was desired should constitute the proposed reparation: that to the first act, the restoration of the men, there could doubtless be none, as the least that could be done, after such an outrage, would be to replace the U. S. as far as it might be practicable, on the ground they held before the injury was received: that the punishment of the officers followed, as a necessary consequence, to the disavowal of the act: that the suppression of the practice of impressment from merchant vessels had been made indispensable by the late aggression, for reasons which were sufficiently well known to him.

I stated to him that the mode in which it was desired that the reparation should be made, by a special mission, was that which had been adopted by other powers, and by G. Britain herself, for injuries less severe than the one alluded to, of which I gave him the examples furnished me in your letter of July 6th. Mr. Canning took a note of what I had stated, and made some general remarks on the whole subject, which were intended to give his view of it, on each point, but without compromising himself in a positive manner on any one. He said that, by the proclamation of the president, and the seizure and detention of some men who had landed on the coast to procure water, the government seemed to have taken redress into its own hands; he complained of the difference which he said had been made between France and England, by restoring deserters to the vessels of the former, and not the latter: he insisted that the late aggression was an act different in all respects from the former practice, and ought not to be connected with it, as it shewed a disposition to make a particular incident, in which they were in the wrong, instrumental to an accommodation in a case where his government held a different doctrine. I urged in reply, that the proclamation could not be considered as an act of hostility or retaliation for injuries, though the aggression had provoked and would have justified any the strongest act of reprisal, but as a mere measure of police, which had become indispensable for the preservation of order within the limits of the U. S.; I informed him that the men who had landed from the squadron, in defiance of the proclamation, and of the law on which it was founded, had been restored to it: that with respect to the other point in difference, said to be made in the case of deserters from British and French ships, I was unacquainted with the fact, but was satisfied, if the statement was correct, that the difference was imputable to the local authorities, and not to the national government, because as the U. S. were not bound by treaty to restore deserters from the service of either nation, it was not presumable that their government would interfere in the business. I observed, however, that if such a preference had been given, there was a natural and justifiable cause for it, proceeding from the conduct of the squadrons of France and England, on the coast of the U. S., and on the main ocean, it being a well known fact that the former did not maintain as a right or adopt in practice the doctrine of the latter, to impress seamen from our merchant vessels. I then discussed at length, and urged with great earnestness

the justice and policy of his terminating at this time all the differences which had arisen between our governments from this cause, by an arrangement which should suppress the practice on the part of G. Britain, and remedy the evil of which she complained.—In aid of those reasons which were applicable to the merits of the question, I urged the example given by the late ministry, in the paper of Nov. 8th, presented to Mr. Pinckney and myself, by the British commissioners, which had, as I thought, laid the foundation of such an arrangement. I stated that as it was stipulated by that paper, that the negotiation should be kept open for the purpose of arranging this great interest, without prejudice to the rights of either power, it was fairly to be understood as the sense of both parties, that our rights were to be respected, till that arrangement was concluded; whence it would follow that the same effect would be produced in practice, as if it had been provided for by treaty. I relied on this paper and the construction which I thought it admitted, with which, however, the practice had since in no degree corresponded, to shew the extent to which the former ministry had gone in meeting the just views of our government, and thereby to prove that the present ministry in improving that ground had nothing to apprehend from the preceding one. Mr. Canning admitted that the view which I had taken of this paper derived much support from its contents, and the time and circumstances under which it was presented, but persisted in his desire to keep the subjects separate. I proposed, as an expedient to get rid of his objection, that we should take up and arrange both points informally, in which case provided it was done in a manner to be obligatory, I offered to frame my note which should demand reparation for the outrage, in general terms, so as that it should not appear by official document, that the subjects had any connection in the negotiation. I urged that unless it was intended to make no provision against impressment from merchant vessels, I could see no objection to his meeting me on that ground, as after what had passed, it was impossible to take up either subject without having the other in view, and equally so to devise any mode which should keep them more completely separate, than that which I proposed. Mr. Canning still adhered to his doctrine of having nothing to do with impressment from merchant vessels, till the affair of the *Chesapeake* was disposed of, after which he professed his willingness to proceed to the other object. In this manner the conference ended, without hav-

ing produced the arrangement which I had hoped from it. Mr. Canning's conduct was in all other respects conciliatory.—My note to Mr. C. was founded on the result of this conference. As it had not been in my power to come to any agreement with him on the general subject of impressment from merchant vessels, I considered it my duty to combine it with the affair of the *Chesapeake*, in the paper which I presented him to claim reparation for the outrage. I thought it best, however, to omit the other acts, of which it was desired that the reparation should consist. It seemed probable that a specification of each circumstance, in the note, would increase the indisposition of the ministry to accommodate, and give it support with the nation, in a complete rejection of the demand. I expressed myself therefore in regard to the other acts, in general and conciliatory terms, but with all the force in my power. The details had been communicated to Mr. C. in conference too recently to be forgotten. Still it was just that no improper inference should be drawn from the omission of them. To prevent it, I obtained an interview of Mr. C. immediately after my note was presented, in which, after reminding him of the omission alluded to, the motive to which I presumed he could not mistake, I added that my object in asking the interview had been to repeat to him informally, what I had stated in the former one, the other acts of which my government expected that reparation should consist. In this interview nothing occurred without the limit of the special object for which it had been obtained. Mr. C. did not lead the conversation to any other topic, and I could not invite it.—Mr. C.'s answer to my note was delayed more than a fortnight. Having refused to treat the subject in connection, and intimated in plain terms that if I was not authorised to separate them, it would be useless to prolong the discussion, I thought it improper to press it. My reply was equally explicit, so that with it the negotiation ended. The measure which he announced, as being determined on by the king, in case I could not agree to the separation, is completely the act of his government. You will observe that it is announced in a form which precludes in a great degree, the idea of its being adopted at my suggestion, as an act of reparation, and in a tone of decision which seemed equally to preclude my holding any communication with him on it.—My mission being thus brought to an end, has afforded an opportunity for me to return to the U. S., as I have long desired. Nothing but the great interest which I take in the welfare

of my country, and my earnest desire to give all the aid in my power to the present administration, in support of the principles of our most excellent constitution, would have detained me here so long. In the present state, however, it is not possible, if in any it would be, for me to render any service by a longer continuance here. As soon, therefore, as I had answered Mr. C's note, I communicated to him my intention to return, and requested that he would be so good as to obtain for me an audience of the king for the purpose of taking my leave of him. This was granted on the 7th of this month, in which I renewed the assurance of the sincere desire of my government, to preserve the most friendly relation between the U. S. and G. Britain, which sentiment was reciprocated by his majesty. Mr. Pinckney succeeds me by an arrangement with Mr. Canning, which will appear in the enclosed copy of my correspondence with him, and which I have full confidence the president will approve. I regret that in transferring the business into his hands, I do not leave him altogether free from difficulty.

Now follows the Correspondence between Mr. MADISON and Mr. G. H. ROSE, who was sent to America, upon the failure of the negotiation with Mr. Munroe, in October, as above seen.

MR. ROSE TO MR. MADISON, JANUARY 26, 1808.

Sir,—Having had the honour to state to you, that I am expressly precluded by my instructions from entering upon any negotiation for the adjustment of the differences arising from the encounter of his Majesty's ship *Leopard*, and the frigate of the U. States, the *Chesapeake*, as long as the proclamation of the president of the U. S., of the 2d July, 1807, shall be in force, I beg leave to offer you such farther explanation of the nature of that condition, as appears to me calculated to place the motives under which it has been enjoined to me thus to bring it forward in their true light.—In whatever spirit that instrument was issued, it is sufficiently obvious, that it has been productive of considerable prejudice to his majesty's interests as confided to his military and other servants in the U. S., to the honour of his flag, and to the privileges of his ministers accredited to the American government. From the operation of this proclamation have unavoidably resulted effects of retaliation and self assumed redress, which might be held to affect materially the question of the reparation due to the U. S., especially in as much as its execution has

been persevered in after the knowledge of his majesty's early, unequivocal, and unsolicited disavowal of the unauthorized act of admiral Berkeley, his disclaiming of the pretension exhibited by that officer to search the national ships of a friendly power for deserters, and the assurances of prompt and effectual reparation, all communicated without loss of time, to the minister of the U. S. in London, so as not to leave a doubt as to his majesty's just and amicable intentions. But his maj., making every allowance for the irritation which was excited, and the misapprehensions which existed, has authorized me to proceed in the negotiation upon the sole discontinuance of measures of so inimical a tendency.—You are aware, sir, that any delay which may have arisen in the adjustment of the present differences, is not imputable to an intention of procrastination on the part of his majesty's government: on the contrary, its anxiety to terminate as expeditiously as possible the discussion of a matter so interesting to both nations, has been evinced by the communication made by Mr. secretary Canning, to Mr. Munroe, before the minister of the U. S. was even informed of the encounter, and now by the promptitude with which it has dispatched a special mission to this country for that express purpose.—I can have no difficulty in stating anew to you, with respect to the provisions of my instructions, calculated as they are to ensure an honourable adjustment of the important point in question, and to remove the impressions which the late cause of difference may have excited in the minds of this nation, that I am authorized to express my conviction, that they are such as will enable me to terminate the negotiations amicably and satisfactorily.—Having learnt from you, sir, that it is solely as a measure of precaution, the provisions of the proclamation are now enforced, I must persuade myself that a due consideration of his majesty's conduct in this transaction, will remove as well any misapprehensions which may have been entertained respecting his majesty's dispositions towards the U. S. as the grounds upon which that enforcement rests, and the more so, as it has long been a matter of notoriety that the orders issued to the officers of his majesty's navy, in his proclamation of 15th Oct. 1807, afford ample security that no attempt can be made to assert a pretension, which his maj. from the first disavowed.—I may add, that if his maj. has not commanded me to enter into a discussion of the other causes of complaint, stated to arise from the conduct of his naval commanders in these seas, prior to the en-

counter of the Leopard and the Chesapeake, it was because it had been deemed improper to mingle them, whatever may be their merits, with the present matter so much more interesting and important in its nature; an opinion, originally and distinctly expressed by Mr. Munroe, and assented to by Mr. sec. Canning. But if upon this more recent and more weighty matter of discussion upon which the proclamation mainly and materially rests, his majesty's amicable intentions are unequivocally evinced, it is sufficiently clear, that no hostile disposition can be supposed to exist on his part, nor can any views be attributed to his government, such as, requiring to be counteracted by measures of precaution, could be deducted from transactions which preceded that encounter.—In offering these elucidations, I should observe that the view in which I have brought forward the preliminary, which I have specified, is neither as to demand, concession or redress, as for a wrong committed: into such, the claim of a discontinuance of hostile provisions cannot be constructed; but it is simply to require a cessation of enactments injurious in their effects, and which, if persisted in, especially after these explanations, must evince a spirit of hostility, under which his maj. could not authorize the prosecution of the present negotiation, either consistently with his own honour, or with any well founded expectation of the renewal of duration of that good understanding between the two countries, which is equally the interest of both to foster and to ameliorate.

MR. MADISON TO MR. ROSE, MARCH 5,
1808.

Sir;—I have had the honor to receive and lay before the president, your letter of the 26th Jan. in which you state, that you are "expressly precluded by your instructions from entering upon any negotiation for the adjustment of the differences arising from the encounter of his Britannic majesty's ship Leopard, and the frigate of the U. States, the Chesapeake, as long as the proclamation of the president of the 2d of July, 1807, shall be in force."—This demand, sir, might justly suggest the simple answer, that before the proclamation of the president could become a subject of consideration, satisfaction should be made for the acknowledged aggression which preceded it. This is evidently agreeable to the order of time, to the order of reason, and, it may be added, to the order of usage, as maintained by G. Britain, whenever in analogous cases, she has been the complaining party.

—But as you have subjoined to the preliminary demand, certain explanations, with a view doubtless to obviate such an answer, it will best accord with the candor of the president, to meet them with such a review of the whole subject, as will present the solid grounds on which he regards such a demand as inadmissible.—I begin with the occurrences from which the proclamation of July 2d, resulted. These are in general terms referred to, by the instrument itself. A more particular notice of the most important of them, will here be in place.—Passing over them, the habitual but minor irregularities of his Britannic majesty's ships of war, in making the hospitalities of our ports subservient to the annoyance of our trade, both outward and inward, a practice not only contrary to the principles of public law, but expressly contrary to British ordinances enforced during maritime wars, to which she bore a neutral relation, I am constrained, unwelcome as the task is, to call your attention to the following more prominent instances:—In the summer of 1804, the British frigate the *Cambrian*, with other cruisers in company, entered the harbour of New York. The commander, capt. Bradley, in violation of the port laws, relating both to health and revenue, caused a merchant vessel, just arrived, and confessedly within the limits and under the authority of the U. States, to be boarded by persons under his command, who, after resisting the officers of the port, in the legal exercise of their functions, actually impressed and carried off a number of seamen and passengers into the service of the ships of war. On an appeal to his voluntary respect for the laws, he first failed to give up the offender to justice, and finally repelled the officer charged with the regular process for the purpose.—This procedure was not only a flagrant insult to the sovereignty of the nation, but an infraction of its neutrality also, which did not permit a belligerent ship thus to augment its force within the neutral territory.—To finish the scene, this commander went so far as to declare, in an official letter, to the minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, and by him communicated to this government, that he considered his ship, whilst lying in the harbour of New York, as having dominion around her, within the distance of her buoys.—All these circumstances were duly made known to the British government in just expectation of honorable reparation. None has ever been offered. Capt. Bradley was advanced from his frigate to the command of a ship of the line.—At a subsequent period, several British frigates under the command of capt. Whitby,

of the *Leander*, pursuing the practice of vexing the inward and outward trade of our ports, and hovering for that purpose about the entrance of that of New York, closed a series of irregularities, with an attempt to arrest a coasting vessel, on board of which an American citizen was killed by a cannon ball which entered the vessel, whilst within less than a mile from the shore.—The blood of a citizen thus murdered, in a trade from one to another port of his own country, and within the sanctuary of its territorial jurisdiction, could not fail to arouse the sensibility of the public, and to make a solemn appeal to the justice of the British government. The case was presented moreover to that government by this, in the accent which it required; and with due confidence that the offender would receive the exemplary punishment which he deserved. That there might be no failure of legal proof of a fact sufficiently notorious of itself, unexceptionable witnesses to establish it, were sent to G. Britain at the expense of the U. States.—Capt. Whitby was notwithstanding, honorably acquitted; no animadversion took place on any other officer belonging to the squadron; nor has any apology or explanation been made since the trial was over, as a conciliatory offering to the disappointment of this country at such a result.—A case of another character occurred in Sept. 1806. The *Impeuneux*, a French ship of 74 guns, when aground within a few hundred yards of the shore of North Carolina, and therefore visibly within the territorial jurisdiction and hospitable protection of the U. States, was fired upon, boarded, and burnt, from three British ships of war under the command of capt. Douglas. Having completed this outrage on the sovereignty and neutrality of the U. States, the British commander felt no scruple in proceeding thence, into the waters near Norfolk, nor in the midst of the hospitalities enjoyed by him, to add to what had passed, a refusal to discharge from his ships, impressed citizens of the U. States, not denied to be such, on the plea, that the government of the U. States had refused to surrender to the demand of admiral Berkley, certain seamen alleged to be British deserters; a demand which it is well understood, your government disclaims any right to make.—It would be very superfluous to dwell on the features which mark this aggravated insult. But I must be permitted to remind you, that in so serious a light was a similar violation of neutral territory, by the destruction of certain French ships on the coast of Portugal, by a British squadron under the command of admiral Boscawen, regarded by the court of G. Britain that a minister ex-

traordinary was dispatched for the express purpose of expiating the aggression on sovereignty of a friendly power.—Lastly presents itself, the attack by the British ship of war, *Leopard*, on the American frigate *Chesapeake*, a case too familiar in all its circumstances to need a recital of any part of them. It is sufficient to remark that the conclusive evidence, which this event added to that which had preceded, of the uncontrolled excesses of the British naval commanders in insulting our sovereignty and abusing our hospitality, determined the president to extend to all British armed ships, the precaution heretofore applied to a few by name, of interdicting to them the use and privileges of our harbours and waters.—This was done by his proclamation of July 2, 1807, referring to the series of occurrences, ending with the aggression on the frigate *Chesapeake*, as the considerations requiring it. And if the apprehension from the licentious spirit of the British naval commanders, thus developed and uncontrolled, which led to this measure of precaution, could need other justification than was afforded by what had passed, it would be amply found in the subsequent conduct of the ships under the command of the same captain Douglas.—This officer, neither admonished by reflexions on the crisis produced by the attack on the *Chesapeake*, nor controlled by respect for the law of nations or the laws of the land, did not cease within our waters to bring to, by firing at vessels pursuing their course of trade; and in the same spirit which had displayed itself in the recent outrage committed upon the American frigate, he not only indulged himself in hostile threats, and indications of a hostile approach to Norfolk, but actually obstructed our citizens in the ordinary communication between that and neighbouring places. His proceedings constituted in fact, a blockade of the port, and as real an invasion of the country, according to the extent of his force, as if troops had been debarked, and the town besieged on the land side.—Was it possible for the chief magistrate of a nation, who felt for its rights and its honour, to do less than interpose some measure of precaution, at least against the repetition of enormities which had been so long uncontrolled by the government whose officers had committed them, and which had at last taken the exorbitant shape of hostility and of insult seen in the attack on the frigate *Chesapeake*? Candor will pronounce that less could not be done; and it will as readily admit that the proclamation comprising that measure, could not have breathed a more temperate spirit, nor spoken in a more be-

coming tone. How far it has received from those, whose intrusions it prohibited, the respect due to the national authority, or been made the occasion of new indignities, needs no explanation.—The president having interposed this precautionary interdict, lost no time in instructing the minister plenipotentiary of the U. States to represent to the British government the signal aggression which had been committed on their sovereignty and their flag, and to require the satisfaction due for it; indulging the expectation that his Britannic majesty would at once perceive it to be the truest magnanimity, as well as the strictest justice, to offer that prompt and full expiation of an acknowledged wrong which would re-establish and improve, both in fact and in feeling, the state of things which it had violated.—This expectation was considered as not only honourable to the sentiments of his majesty, but was supported by known examples, in which, being the complaining party, he had required and obtained, as a preliminary to any counter complaints whatever, a precise replacement of things, in every practicable circumstance, in their pre-existing situation.—Thus in 1764, Bermudians and other British subjects, who had according to annual custom take possession of Turk's island for the season of making salt, having been forcibly removed with their vessels and effects by a French detachment from the island of St. Domingo, to which Turk's island was alledged to be an appurtenance, the British ambassador at Paris in pursuance of instructions from his government, demanded as a satisfaction for the violence committed, that the proceedings should be disavowed, the intention of acquitting Turk's island disclaimed, orders given for the immediate abandonment of it on the part of the French, every thing restored to the condition in which it was at the time of the aggression, and reparation made of the damages which any British subjects should be found to have sustained according to an estimation to be settled between the governors of St. Domingo and Jamaica. A compliance with the whole of this demand was the result.—Again in 1789, certain English merchants having opened a trade at Nootka Sound, on the north west coast of America, and attempted a settlement at that place, the Spaniards, who had long claimed that part of the world as their exclusive property, dispatched a frigate from Mexico, which captured the two English vessels engaged in the trade, and broke up the settlement on the coast.—The Spanish government was the first to complain, in this case, of the in-

trusions committed by the British merchants. The British government, however, demanded that the vessels taken by the Spanish frigate, should be restored, and adequate satisfaction granted previous to any other discussion.—This demand prevailed; the Spanish government agreeing to make full restoration of the captured vessels, and to indemnify the parties interested in them for the losses sustained. They restored also the buildings and tracts of land, of which the British subjects had been dispossessed. The British however, soon gave proof of the little value they set on the possession, by a voluntary dereliction, under which it has since remained.—The case which will be noted last, though of a date prior to the case of Nootka Sound, is that of Falkland's Islands. These islands lie about 100 leagues eastward of the Straights of Magellan. The title of them had been a subject of controversy among several of the maritime nations of Europe. From the position of the islands, and other circumstances, the pretension of Spain bore an advantageous comparison with those of her competitors.—In 1770, the British took possession of Port Egmont, in one of the islands, the Spaniards being at that time in possession of another part, and protesting against a settlement by the British. The protest being without effect, ships, and troops were sent from Buenos Ayres, by the governor of that place, which forcibly dispossessed and drove off the British settlers.—The British government looking entirely to the dispossession by force, demanded as a specific condition of preserving harmony between the two courts, not only the disavowal of the Spanish proceedings; but that the affairs of that settlement should be immediately restored to the precise state in which they were previous to the act of dispossession. The Spanish government made some difficulties; requiring particularly a disavowal on the part of G. Britain, of the conduct of her officer, at Falkland's Islands, which, it was alledged, gave occasion to the steps taken by the Spanish governor; and proposing an adjustment by mutual stipulations in the ordinary form.—The reply was, that the moderation of his Britannic majesty having limited his demand to the smallest reparation he could accept for the injury done, nothing was left for discussion but the mode of carrying the disavowal and restitution into execution; reparation losing its value if it be conditional, and to be obtained by any stipulation whatever from the party injured.—The Spanish government yielded. The violent proceedings of its of-

ficers were disavowed. The fort, the port, and every thing else were agreed to be immediately restored to the precise situation which had been disturbed; and duplicates of orders issued for the purpose to the Spanish officers, were delivered into the hands of one of the British principal secretaries of state. Here again it is to be remarked, that satisfaction having been made for the forcible dispossession, the islands lost their importance in the eyes of the British government, were in a short time finally evacuated, and Port Egmont remains with every other part of them in the hands of Spain.—Could stronger pledges have been given, than are here found, that an honorable and instant reparation would be made in a case, differing no otherwise from those recited, than as it furnished to the same monarch of a great nation, an opportunity to prove, that adhering always to the same immutable principle, he was as ready to do right to others, as to require it for himself.—Returning to the instructions given to the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at London, I am to observe, that the president thought it just and expedient to insert, as a necessary ingredient in the adjustment of the outrage committed on the American frigate, a security against the future practice of British naval commanders, in impressing from merchant vessels of the U. States on the high seas, such of their crews as they might undertake to denominate British subjects.—To this association of the two subjects, the president was determined, 1st. by his regarding both as resting on kindred principles, the immunity of private ships, with the known exceptions made by the law of nations, being as well established as that of public ships; and there being no pretext for including in these exceptions the impressment (if it could be freed from its enormous and notorious abuses) of the subjects of a belligerent, by the officers of that belligerent. The rights of a belligerent, against the ships of a neutral nation, accrue merely from the relation of the neutral to the other belligerent, as in conveying to him contraband of war, or in supplying a blockaded port.—The claim of a belligerent to search for and seize on board neutral vessels on the high seas, persons under his allegiance, does not therefore rest on any belligerent right under the law of nations, but on a prerogative derived from municipal law; and involves the extravagant supposition, that one nation has a right to execute at all times and in all cases, its municipal laws and regulations, on board the ships of another nation, not being within its terri-

torial limits.—The president was led to the same determination, 2dly by his desire of converting a particular incident, into an occasion for removing another and more extensive source of danger to the harmony of the two countries: and, 3dly, by his persuasion that the liberality of the propositions authorised with this view, would not fail to induce the ready concurrence of his Britannic majesty; and that the more extensive source of irritation and perplexity being removed, a satisfactory adjustment of the particular incident would be the less difficult. The president still thinks that such would have been the tendency of the mode for which he had provided; and he cannot therefore but regret that the door was shut against the experiment, by the peremptory refusal of Mr. Canning to admit it into discussion, even in the most informal manner, as was suggested by Mr. Munroe.—The president felt the greater regret, as the step he had taken towards a more enlarged and lasting accommodation became thus a bar to the adjustment of the particular and recent aggression which had been committed against the U. States. He found however an alleviation, in the signified purpose of his Britannic majesty, to charge with this adjustment a special mission to the U. States, which, restricted as it was, seemed to indicate a disposition from which a liberal and conciliatory arrangement of one great object at least might be confidently expected.—In this confidence, your arrival was awaited with every friendly solicitude; and our first interview having opened the way, by an acquiescence in the separation of the two cases insisted on by his Britannic majesty, notwithstanding the strong ground on which they had been united by the president, it was not to be doubted that a tender of the satisfaction claimed by the U. States, for a distinguished and an acknowledged insult, by one of his officers, would immediately follow.—It was not, therefore, without a very painful surprize, that the error of this expectation was discovered. Instead of the satisfaction due from the original aggression, it was announced that the first step towards the adjustment must proceed from the party injured; and your letter now before me, formally repeats, that as long as the proclamation of the president, which issued on the 2d July, 1807, shall be in force, it will be an insuperable obstacle to a negotiation, even on the subject of the aggression which preceded it; in other words, that the proclamation must be put out of force, before an adjustment of the aggression can be taken into discussion.—

In explaining the grounds of this extraordinary demand, it is alledged to be supported by the consideration that the proceeding and pretension of the offending officer has been disavowed : that general assurances are given of a disposition and intention in his Britannic majesty to make satisfaction ; that a special minister was dispatched with promptitude for the purpose of carrying into effect this disposition : and that you have a personal conviction that the particular terms, which you are not at liberty previously to disclose, will be deemed by the U. States satisfactory.—With respect to the disavowal, it would be unjust not to regard it as a proof of candour and amity towards the U. States, and as some presage of the voluntary reparation which it implied to be due. But the disavowal can be the less confounded with the reparation itself ; since it was sufficiently required by the respect which G. Britain owed to her own honour ; it being impossible that an enlightened government, had hostility been meditated, would have commenced it in such a manner and in the midst of existing professions of peace and friendship. She owed it also to consistency with a disavowal on a former occasion, in which the pretension had been enforced by a British squadron, against the sloop of war *Baltimore*, belonging to the U. States ; and finally to the interest which G. Britain has, more than any other nation, in disclaiming a principle which would expose her superior number of ships of war, to so many indignities from inferior navies.—As little can the general assurances that reparation would be made, claim a return which could properly follow the actual reparation only. They cannot amount to more than a disposition, or at most a promise, to do what the aggressor may deem a fulfilment of his obligation. They do not prove even a disposition to do what may be satisfactory to the injured party, who cannot have less than an equal right to decide on the sufficiency of the redress.—In dispatching a special minister for the purpose of adjusting the differences, the U. States ought cheerfully to acknowledge all the proof it affords on the part of his Britannic majesty, of his pacific views towards them, and of his respect for their friendship. But whilst they could not, under any circumstances, allow to the measure more than a certain participation in an honourable reparation, it is to be recollected that the avowed and primary object of the mission was to substitute for the more extended adjustment proposed by the U. States, at London, a separation of the subjects as preferred

by his Britannic majesty ; and you well know, Sir, how fully this object was accomplished.

—With respect to the personal conviction which you have expressed, that the terms which you decline to disclose, would be satisfactory to the U. States, it is incumbent on me to observe, that with the highest respect for your judgment, and the most perfect confidence in your sincerity, an inseparable objection manifestly lies, to the acceptance of a personal and unexplained opinion, in place of a disclosure which would enable this government to exercise its own judgment in a case affecting so essentially its honour and its rights. Such a course of proceeding would be without example ; and there can be no hazard in saying, that one will never be afforded by a government which respects itself as much as yours justly does ; and therefore can never be reasonably expected from one which respects itself as much as this has a right to do.—I forbear, Sir, to enlarge on the intrinsic incongruity of the expedient proposed.—But I must be allowed to remark, as an additional admonition of the singular and mortifying perplexity in which a compliance might involve the president, that there are in the letter of Mr. Canning, communicating to Mr. Munroe, the special mission to the U. States, pregnant indications that other questions and conditions may have been contemplated, which would be found utterly irreconcilable with the sentiments of this nation.—If neither any nor all of these considerations can sustain the preliminary demand made in your communication, it remains to be seen whether such a demand rests with greater advantage on the more precise ground on which you finally seem to place it.—The proclamation is considered as a hostile measure, and a discontinuance of it, as due to the discontinuance of the aggression which led to it.—It has been sufficiently shewn that the proclamation, as appears on the face of it, was produced by a train of occurrences terminating in the attack on the American frigate, and not by this last alone. To a demand, therefore, that the proclamation be revoked, it would be perfectly fair to oppose a demand that redress be first given for the numerous irregularities which preceded the aggression on the American frigate, as well as for this particular aggression, and that effectual controul be interposed against repetitions of them. And as no such redress has been given for the past, notwithstanding the lapse of time which has taken place, nor any such security for the future, notwithstanding the undiminished reasonableness of it,

it follows, that a continuance of the proclamation would be consistent with an entire discontinuance of one only of the occurrences from which it proceeded.—But it is not necessary to avail the argument of this view of the case, although of itself entirely conclusive. Had the proclamation been founded on the single aggression committed on the Chesapeake, and were it admitted that the discontinuance of that aggression merely, gave a claim to the discontinuance of the proclamation, the claim would be defeated, by the incontestable fact, that that aggression has not been discontinued. It has never ceased to exist; and is in existence at this moment. Need I remind you, Sir, that the seizure and appropriation of the seamen belonging to the crew of the Chesapeake, entered into the very essence of that aggression; that with an exception of the victim to a trial, forbidden by the most solemn considerations, and greatly aggravating the guilt of its author, the seamen in question are still retained, and consequently that the aggression, if in no other respect, is by that act alone continued and in force?—If the views which have been taken of the subject have the justness which they claim, they will have shewn that on no ground whatever can an annulment of the proclamation of July 2d be reasonably required, as a preliminary to the negotiation with which you are charged. On the contrary, it clearly results, from a recurrence to the causes and object of the proclamation, that, as was at first intimated, the strongest sanctions of Great Britain herself would support the demand, that previous to a discussion of the proclamation, due satisfaction should be made to the U. States; that this satisfaction ought to extend to all the wrongs which preceded and produced that act; and that even limiting the merits of the question to the single relation of the proclamation to the wrong committed in the attack on the American frigate, and deciding the question on the principle that a discontinuance of the latter, required of right a discontinuance of the former, nothing appears that does not leave such a preliminary destitute of every foundation which could be assumed for it.—

With a right to draw this conclusion, the president might have instructed me to close this communication, with the reply stated in the beginning of it; and perhaps in taking this course, he would only have consulted a sensibility, to which most governments would, in such a case, have yielded.

But adhering to the moderation by which he has been invariably guided, and anxious to rescue the two nations from the circumstances, under which an abortive issue to your mission necessarily places them, he has authorised me in the event of your disclosing the terms of reparation which you believe will be satisfactory, and on its appearing that they are so, to consider this evidence of the justness of his Britannic majesty as a pledge for an effectual interposition with respect to all the abuses against a recurrence of which the proclamation was meant to provide, and to proceed to concert with you a revocation of that act bearing the same date with the act of reparation to which the U. States are entitled. — I am not unaware, Sir, that according to the view which you appear to have taken of your instructions, such a course of proceeding has not been contemplated by them. It is possible, nevertheless, that a re-examination, in a spirit, in which I am well persuaded it will be made, may discover them to be not inflexible to a proposition, in so high a degree liberal and conciliatory. In every event, the president will have manifested his willingness to meet your government on a ground of accommodation, which spares to its feelings, however mis-applied he may deem them, every concession, not essentially due to those which must be equally respected, and consequently will have demonstrated that the very ineligible posture given to so important a subject in the relations of the two countries, by the unsuccessful termination of your mission, can be referred to no other source than the vigorous restrictions under which it was to be executed.—I make no apology, Sir, for the long interval between the date of your letter and that under which I write. It is rendered unnecessary by your knowledge of the circumstances to which the delay is to be ascribed.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S Parliamentary History OF ENGLAND.

The Fourth Volume of the above Work, comprising the Period from the Restoration in the year 1663, to the Revolution in the year 1688; will be ready for delivery on Saturday, the 25th instant.—On the same day will be published, the Tenth Volume of "Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates."

"Give the people something to fight for, and you need have recourse to no coercive means to make them fight."—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT'S Speech upon the Local Militia Bill.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPAIN.—The news from Spain is, I am afraid, too good to be true; but, if it be true; if the people are really making a stand against France, it is a most glorious circumstance, and is a fine illustration of Sir Francis Burdett's doctrine, that the people need never be *compelled* to fight; need never be *driven* to take up arms; need never be flogged to the work, provided they feel, that the cause is their own. Not a hand was raised to defend the authority of either the king or the prince; but, the moment they were safely gone, the people appear to have felt a return of their ancient character, and a desire to be great and free. The "accursed thing was removed from the camp," and the happy effects were speedily experienced. It will, indeed, be an interesting event, if the Spaniards, with an abdicated throne, should rescue their country from the fangs of the French; or, if they should make any thing like a respectable stand against them; and, the thing is possible; for, though an immense army will be poured in upon them, a nation so populous and so large as Spain is not very soon over-run. To get rid of Napoleon and of their own stupid tyrant too will, indeed, be a glorious achievement; but, I am afraid, it is something too glorious to hope for.—Our ministers seem to be using great promptitude in giving them assistance. I hope, that no vile miscreant will whisper in their ear, that they ought to be cautious; that this is not the cause of kings; and, that it is better to suffer Napoleon to triumph than to let the world see, that the people of any country are adequate to their own defence. I hope that no vile selfish miscreant will give such advice; but, really, I have my fears, that, when time has been taken for canvassing the subject, to reflect on the probable consequences of giving liberty to the people of Spain, or, of aiding them in the undertaking of revising their liberties; I really have my fears, that when time has been taken for this, we shall perceive an abatement of that zeal, which, at present, appears to be operating in their behalf. I know, that there are men, who, though they hate Napoleon, because they are afraid of him, would see him conquer

and enslave the people of Spain, rather than see that people free. With such persons there is nothing so formidable, nothing so horrible, nothing so diabolical, as freedom enjoyed by the people. To them, Napoleon is an object of hatred, not as an enslaver of nations, but as an overturner of authorities and a plunderer of the rich. If they lose their power of living upon the labour of the people, that is all they dread; and, as there is a chance of their enjoying their plunder under Napoleon, they would, upon all occasions, prefer his sway to such a revolution as should effectually protect the people against all plunderings what-soever. Let us hope, however, that no such miscreants will find their way to the ear of our ministers, upon this occasion; and, if they should, let us hope, that their advice will be rejected.—To assist the people of Spain (such assistance being uncoupled with any condition as to the internal government of the country), I, for my part, would grudge nothing; and, I believe, that the whole country has the same feeling. It is certainly, if we go seriously to work, in our power to do much. We have the complete command of the sea. In Spain there are many sea-ports. We can supply the Spaniards with an abundance of arms and ammunition. We can send them artillery, and excellent artillery officers, and some good engineers. We can spare them a small army of soldiers; and, in short, we can put it in their power to beat the French. But, then, it will require great frankness on our part; and, above all, an explicit declaration, that we will, at no time and in no manner, interfere in the internal concerns of Spain; but, that the people shall be left to their own free choice as to all matters relating to their own government. This is, however, what, I am afraid, we shall not do. Any thing that we *do* will, we shall see, be filled with *reservations*, and with doctrines about *loyalty* and *religion*; and, that being the case, the Spaniards will have no confidence in us. We shall, I am afraid, talk about their king being *held in captivity*; and, if we do, the people of Spain will treat us just as the people of France did. Napoleon is become a sort of general protector of crowned heads. It is not his interest to see,

any where, a change in favour of the liberties of the people; and his interest agrees but too well, in this respect, with the inclinations of most of the governments, which he attacks, and which the people will not defend against him, merely because it is impossible for him to make their lot worse than it is. — The *Courier* newspaper tells us, that the country feels unusual anxiety for the “patriots” of Spain. This print is quite enthusiastic in their cause. I wish it may not soon receive a *comper*. I wish it may not hear a voice, saying: “What are you about, *Courier*? Do you know how dangerous it is to talk of *patriots*? Do you consider that the people of Spain are acting for their own preservation, and not for the exclusive benefit of a base, corrupt, and greedy set of courtiers? Do you reflect, that, if they succeed, bribery and corruption will be starved in Spain? And, have you duly weighed the natural consequences of an example, which would convince the world, that a king may abdicate his throne, that he and all his family may be taken into exile, and that, yet, the country may be defended, its liberties restored, and its honour and greatness asserted? Pray, consider, what a contrast this event will make when compared with what has happened in those countries, where the kings and princes have *remained*; and where the struggle (such as it was) has been made *for them*. In the power of Napoleon there is, to be sure, great danger; but, my dear *Courier*, that power, were it ten times as great as it is, would not be an object of a thousandth part so much dread, as the success of a people, who should, at once, defend themselves against him, and annihilate domestic bribery, corruption, and oppression.” It will grieve me to see this damper applied to the *Courier*, who, having its eye fixed upon Napoleon’s power, now talks so cheerily about “the *patriots* of Spain;” but, I must confess, that I am greatly afraid of it; for, to wish success to the people of Spain is to wish destruction to bribery and sycophancy and prebulation, than all which, to the heart of the *Courier*, nothing appears to be more congenial. — If Napoleon were baffled in Spain, there is no telling to what that might lead. The ultimate consequence might be the deliverance of Europe. I mean the “real deliverance,” and not a mere exchange of despoticisms. The effect in America would be wonderful; though I should be greatly surprised, if, in the United States, the government, the present ageing faction, were not decidedly hostile to the Spaniards,

that faction being French at heart, and nothing but French — There is, it is said, an envoy in London, from the Spanish patriots, the *VISCOUNT MATEROSA*, who has been fully accredited by our ministers; so that, it would seem, that there are occasions, when to be patriots is no sin. — All this is delightful, if we do not change our minds; but, I have great fears upon that score. I have great fears, that there are, in this country, several men, who, rather than see the Spaniards really free, would see them exterminated, and Buonaparté marching in triumph over the land stained with their blood. I will not *name* these men; but, I wish my words to be remembered, and most sincerely wish the correctness of my opinion may not become too evident, before many months have passed over our heads. — Mr. Sheridan has, I see, given notice of a motion upon the subject of Spain, which motion is to be made, it seems, to-morrow, and, as I shall not, in this sheet, have an opportunity of noticing the debate, I will here make a remark or two upon what was said relative to the *propriety of making any motion at all*. Mr. Perceval “could not see what good “could arise from the agitation of such a “subject;” and Mr. Whitbread thought, “that the moment was so critical, that “every matter of the kind should be left “entirely and exclusively to the discretion “of the *executive power*.” For what? I can see no reason for that at all. Let the communication with Spain be carried on by, or through, the king; but, at the most critical of all times, shall the parliament disperse, and express not one single sentiment relative to Spain? They are allowed, God bless them, to send up to the king as many addresses as they please, upon any and upon every occasion; but, they are not to whisper a word by way of advice. — Nothing can be more proper than a resolution passed by the parliament, expressive of their joy at what is *reported* has taken place in Spain, and of their earnest hope, that no means within our power will be neglected to give success to the arms of the people of that country, so basely abandoned, so shamefully sold, by their rulers. — Into such a resolution might be wrought the sentiment of the parliament respecting the *principle* upon which aid should be afforded to the Spaniards; which would operate as a check upon those, who might be tempted to carry on war for the Spaniards, upon the vile principle that it was carried on for the royalist French. — The motion will do good, at any rate, and I do not think it is *possible* that it should do any harm. If it make the

ministers declare themselves bent upon endeavouring to give *real* freedom to the people of Spain, the declaration may tend to keep them firm; and, if it discover the fact, that the ministers are about to play the old game of Pitt and Dundas, the sooner the people of Spain know it, the better it is.—The world as yet, know nothing of the feeling of any part of our government, towards the cause of the Spaniards. We ourselves know nothing of it. It is a news that has been received, be true, there ought, before now, to have been a congratulation pass between the king and the parliament. Mr. Sheridan, in answer to Mr. Whitbread, said, that "he felt the urgency of the business," and was, therefore, resolved not to leave "it to the slow and skulking hesitation of the ministers." Nobly resolved! if you do but stick to it. A skulking hesitation, indeed! What should have prevented them from declaring their intentions before now? What danger could there possibly have been in their avowing themselves the friends of the people of Spain? It appears to me to be one of those cases, in which disguise could not possibly be of any service, supposing the views of the ministers to have been what they ought.—We ask them to divulge no secrets. We do not ask them how, or when, they are going to aid the Spaniards. All we want to know, is, that they heartily wish success to the *people* of Spain. We want to be assured, that there are no lurking stipulations about *royalty* in contemplation; no design whatever to seize upon the treasures of Spain; and, in spite of all they can do, Mr. Sheridan's motion will bring forth that which will discover their intentions in the gross.

Cow-Pox.—This experiment, which has cost the nation twenty thousand pounds, or more, to Dr. Jenner, is now, it seems, to have an act of parliament to give it currency. Mr. Rose has brought in a bill for the purpose of "establishing a central institution in London for the distribution of the cow-pox matter," which bill, in all appearance, will pass; and thus this disgusting and degrading remedy will cost the nation another four or five thousand pounds annually, though it has been clearly proved not to have answered the purpose intended. This, however, I regard as cheap, when compared to the menace of MR. FULLER, who, in a late debate proposed a *compulsory* law upon the subject. He took up the old idea of Mr. Wilberforce, who was for a law to prevent parents from having their children inoculated with the small pox matter, unless they chose to send them to pest-houses, or

to some place at a considerable distance from any other habitations. This cruel and tyrannical proposition I opposed at the time; and I am happy to perceive, that it is now universally exploded, except by the deluded few, who have been weak enough to enrol themselves in a sort of conservation in favour of the cow-pox matter.—I should like to have heard Dr. Jenner's statement of the circumstances at Ringwood, when, as he says, it is evident, that the failure arose "from the use of *improper matter*." That many persons, who had been inoculated with the cow-pox, caught the small pox, and died, at Ringwood, is a fact that even "the *loyal* "*Jennerian Society*" cannot deny; and, this being the case, what man, in his senses, will put any faith in the efficacy of the cow-pox, as a preventive of the small pox? The thing is done. It *has failed*, and it is in vain to endeavour to prop up its reputation; for, in a few years, it will become proverbial as a humbug.—The pretext of *spurious matter* is the weakest defence that ever was set up; because, it is evident, that such will always be the excuse. The methodist pike, who told his shoal of gudgeons, that, *if they had faith*, they might jump into a chalk pit without so much as straining their ankles, answered all their reproaches with saying, that their broken bones were owing to their own sin in not having faith, and referred, for proof, to one amongst them, who had accidentally escaped unurt. All that catch the small pox and die, have been cow-poxed with spurious matter, and all who have not yet caught the small pox, after the cow-pox operation, have had the pure matter; and so it will be, to be sure, to the end of the chapter.—*Who* is to collect this "genuine matter", and *whence* is it to come? Who shall tell whether he inoculate with the cow-pox or with king's evil? Or with many other disorders, one of which I will not name, but which I do hope, that fathers and mothers, who have given their children that greatest of blessings, a pure stream of blood, will not forget, when they are about to cause that blood to be impregnated with matter taken from the ulcerous bodies of others. The small pox is liable to no such fatal consequence. The disorder is so well known as never to be mistaken; and, as to the *risk*, what is a little risk of *death*, compared with a great risk of that which must render life a continual burden?—I am glad, however, to perceive, that the ministers took care to intimate their decided hostility to any law for propagating the cow-pox by *force*, by the aid of *pains* and *penalties*. This being the case, I care little about Mr.

Rose and his cow-pox institution. Those, who choose to have their children's blood impregnated from that shop, will be at liberty so to do; and those who wish to avoid it, may. This is all right; though it may be very foolish indeed to make laws upon such a subject. I think, we may thank the events at Ringwood for this ministerial protest against compulsory measures. It would have been curious enough to see people paying penalties for being so obstinate as not to consult their own health, or that of their children!—The present application to parliament is a pretty good proof, that the project is beginning to be blown upon. “The Royal Jennerian Society” want funds. The subscribers have fallen off; and so application to the public purse is become necessary. Why have the subscribers fallen off? Their humanity has not waxed cold, to be sure. It were slander, indeed, to suppose that. But, I suspect, that their faith has waxed cold; and, when that is the case, zeal soon slackens its operations, more especially when those operations consist chiefly in the expenditure of money.—Some persons will, perhaps, blame me for thus exciting alarm in the minds of parents, who have applied the cow-pox to their children. But, they who are really alarmed, will perceive that the remedy is at hand, and will not fail to apply it; and, besides, it is for me to look to the future as well as to the past.

POST-CHAISE WORK.—This seems an odd title to an article under the head of *politics*; but, it will be found, I think, that certain proceedings, relative to the price of posting, involve principles of great moment, in politics. The reader will have observed, that, for sometime past, there has been an advertisement in the news-papers, purporting, that certain “*Noblemen and Gentlemen*” met occasionally, at the St. Albans Tavern, for the purpose of concerting measures to keep down the price of posting.—I was, when I first saw this advertisement, tempted to notice it; and, I cannot now delay to do it, seeing what has passed, upon the subject, in the House of Commons.—On the tenth instant, “Mr. Sheridan rose pursuant to notice, to move for leave to bring in a bill to amend the acts relating to licences. His object, was to make it obligatory on the magistrates to assign a reason whenever they took away a licence, or refused to grant one. He adverted to the recent meetings of members of both houses of parliament, at the St. Albans Cock-horse, with a view to prevent the rise in the price of postage; and the remedy proposed by the member for Sussex,

“by the refusal of a licence on the part of the magistrates, to any innkeeper raising the price of postage. He moved for leave to bring in a bill to amend the act of the 32d of the king, on the subject of licences.—Mr. Fuller said, it was evident that there were many persons at the meetings at the St. Albans Tavern, who were not members of both houses of parliament, for the right hon. Gent. could have heard the statement he had just made of his proposition, only from the unfair understanding of a post-horse-master looking for the high prices. What he had stated, was, that the only mode of obtaining remedy was by encouraging competition. But in cases of gross abuse in remote places, where there was no room for competition, he allowed he suggested the propriety of the magistrates taking away the licence, and he cited the precedent of a licence taken away from an Inn-keeper who charged a French ambassador going out of the country, 150l. for a breakfast. It was fit the magistrates should have such a discretion in cases of gross abuse, and to subject them to assign reasons would be to subject them to the lash of the Court of King’s Bench, and the recovery of penalties by the criminal publican.”—As to the subject of this motion, this annual lure of Mr. Sheridan to the publicans of Westminster, it is hardly worthy of notice, there being only a few sot-pot fools in that city, who do not clearly see to the bottom of it. But, it here comes out, in the shape of an acknowledged fact, that it was suggested, by a member of parliament, to the “noblemen and gentlemen,” at the St. Albans Tavern, to use their power (pledged in their hands, as magistrates) for the purpose of punishing inn-keepers, for charging them at what they deem too high a rate for carrying them about the country; to punish men for asking such or such a price for their work and the use of their chattels; and, this fact I deem a most disgraceful one to both the head and the heart of the parties proposing and entertaining the measure.—It matters little whether the price of posting be exorbitant, or reasonable; though, from any calculation that I can make, I think it reasonable; and, my wonder always has been, how the inn-keepers, in the part of England that I am most acquainted with, can perform it at so cheap a rate as they do. The proof that it cannot be performed cheaper, leaving a proper profit to the inn-keeper, is that it is not performed cheaper; for, if a larger profit were derived from

capital employed in posting, than from capital employed in any other way, the certain consequence would be, that *more* capital would flow into the posting trade, and thus would the profits of that trade be speedily reduced to the general level of the profits of other trades. If the rise, which is now contemplated, or which has taken place in the rate of posting, leave the inn-keeper a greater profit than can be acquired from the selling of plumbs and sugar and candles, for instance, do the St. Albans wisacres suppose that there will be no grocers that will turn inn-keepers? Do they suppose, sensible "noblemen and "gentlemen," that nobody will be tempted to get a share of these immense profits; and, that the present inn-keepers will continue in the enjoyment of a monopoly of gain, when that gain is open to all the world? Do they suppose, cunning "noblemen and gentlemen," that the whole of the people, having capital to employ, will be blind to these enormous profits, or that there is some unknown cause which will arrest capital in its natural current towards this particular calling? Mr. Fuller says, indeed, that the best remedy is "*the encouraging of competition*;" but, as he did not point out the best *manner* of doing that, I will for him, and that is, by giving some one *more than the present inn-keeper demands*. If he tell me, that the remedy would then be worse than the disease, my answer is, that, from the very nature of things, it must be the only way of *encouraging* a competition. Let us try this empty talk by the test of practice. Suppose Mr. Fuller, together with all the noblemen and gentlemen in the county of Sussex, were to set about their remedy, as far as applied to the road from Chichester to London. How would they go to work? *How* would they *encourage* competition? It is easy to talk about it, but how would they *do* it? Why, to be sure, in this way: they would ride in the chaises of those who would convey them at a cheaper rate than that at which the present inn-keepers will convey them. So that, incomparable conjurers, they would *encourage* capital to come into the posting trade by offering it a profit *less* than that, which now exists, which does not induce it to come of its own accord, and which they, by their very talk of *encouragement*, acknowledge to be insufficient to induce it to come. Most people, when they have a desire to bring additional labour to a particular point, or to draw additional capital to any particular business, offer *greater* wages and *greater*

profits than were before given or derived; but, this new set of coalesced conjurers, act upon a principle precisely the contrary, and yet, they talk as gravely about their schemes as if they were founded in nature and in reason, and as if they would, as a thing of course, receive the assent of the public in general. But, great self conceit is a never-failing characteristic of imbecility of mind. What do these "noblemen and "gentlemen," what does Mr. Fuller, for instance, imagine that post-horse keepers should see in his face, to induce them to employ a losing or a dead capital in drawing his body about the country? It is not, good man, for the *honour*, but for the *profit* of your custom, that they bow and scrape and smile and cringe and run and bawl at your approach. About *you* they care no more than they do about the dirt upon your boots. It is your *money* that they have a respect and an affection for; and, if you should attempt to carry your encouraging project into practice, the first question that will be asked you will be, what money you will advance for the purpose; what *addition* you will make to the rate of posting at which the present inn-keepers carry you; how much you will give *more* than is given by other people?—Will you build new inns for the purpose of encouragement? Do, and let them for a fourth part of what they cost you; and even then your purpose would not be effected. You would, probably, be carried three pence a mile cheaper than by the old inn-keepers; but, my good Mr. Fuller, there is a difference in the *quality* of posting, as well as in the quality of beer. The brewer, if you compel him to sell his beer at three pence a pot will get just as much profit as he does when he sells it at six pence a pot. Water costs him nothing; with this he lowers his beer to the price that he gets for it. *Time* is the great ingredient in the hands of the posting trade, and that, were they stinted in their price, they must, and would, call to their aid. From seven miles an hour they would come down to five; instead of a neat tight chaise, you would have to commit your person to an old rattling, jingling, crazy thing, that might let you drop upon the side of that break-neck hill between Midhurst and Haslemere, which, to say nothing of the hindrance and injury that the affairs of the nation and of the cow-pox matter society might experience, would far outweigh the amount of the few additional pounds which you lay out, during the year, in expeditions and safe posting. —If any one can doubt that such would be the effect

of an "encouragement" such as Mr. Fuller proposes, he has only to travel, for a few days, in those parts of the country, where the inn-keepers have few post-chaise customers. Here, the price is the same as upon the great roads; but, from the want of constant employment for the horses, drivers, and chaises, all these the owner is obliged to keep of an inferior quality; the consequence of which is, that travelling is much slower, much less comfortable, and much more dangerous. Ten times for every mile-stone are the landlord, the driver, the chaise, and the poor horses abused; but, if the traveller would but take one moment to reflect, he would clearly perceive, that the fault was the want of a price sufficiently high to enable the former to provide and keep all the latter of a better quality.—So that, it appears to me, that, if the office of a justice of the peace could be perverted to the base purpose of extorting from the inn-keepers a part of the money due to them for their posting-work, they would very soon right themselves by *lowering the quality* of their commodity. Therefore, the only *practicable* scheme seems to be this: for the justices of each district to insist upon having *their own* posting done at a cheap rate, and to leave the inn-keepers to get as much as they can from every body else. This would be very rascally; it would be an infamous abuse of power; and, it is, I am persuaded, what very few justices of the peace would be guilty of, if they could with impunity. But, it is what might be done; it is practicable; there is sense in it; while, in the other scheme, there is nothing but what is senseless; nothing but what must have issued from a head without brains, or whatever else it is that enables the owner to reflect and to reason.—The power given to the justices to refuse, to grant, or to renew, licences to public houses, was given for the purpose of being a check to *disorder* and *immorality*, and, they were to be spared the trouble and vexation of any process for having exercised this power, because, proof being so difficult to obtain, they would, if expected to sanction for their conduct, be always disinclined to do their duty in this respect. But, would it not be an abominable act, to make use of this power for the purpose of fixing a maximum upon the work of post-horses and drivers? For the purpose of causing themselves and their friends to be carried about the country at the expense of other people? It is sufficient to state the proposition to expose it to universal reprobation.—As to the meeting at the St. Albans, too, does it not furnish a very

decent example? Will these "noblemen" and gentlemen" attempt to shoot deluded people, if, upon any future occasion, they should meet for the purpose of fixing a maximum upon bread or meat? Bread and meat are full as necessary to them as posting is to these "noblemen and gentlemen," and the inn-keeper has as good a right to fix his price, to ask what he thinks the worth of his commodity, as the baker and butcher have to ask what they think the worth of theirs. It would be curious enough to hear a man, upon his trial for a riot, justify himself upon the example of "the noblemen and gentlemen" at the St. Albans Tavern; and, would it not, Mr. Fuller, be very hard to hang or whip the poor unfortunate brother?—It was a mercy, that some wiseacre did not propose to pass an act of parliament for keeping down the rate of posting. We should have heard of a great demand for dog-horses; for nothing else would have made its appearance before a post-chaise. There would have been quite a new system of posting regulations introduced; there would have been charges for luggage; there would have been charges for fire; there would have been something to make up for the low price of posting; or else, the chaises must have been drawn by live carrion driven by a wretch that might have been suspected of having dropped from a gibbet.—No, no; pray, Mr. Fuller, let such matters alone. You may be deeply versed in what relates to the cow-pox matter, of which society, I perceive (from a letter of yours, inserted in the Morning Chronicle of the 6th instant, between an Amphitheatre and a Lottery puff), you are chosen the vice president; but, as far as I am able to judge from your proceedings at the St. Albans Tavern, your mind is unused to entertain questions relating to profits and prices. I have, for my part, always thought the lot of the innkeeper a very hard one. I supposed him, one way or another, to get money; but, then I considered what a slave he was; how he was obliged to receive every farthing of his due as a favour, what respect he was obliged to assume for thousands of persons, whom he must have despised; how submissive he was obliged to be to the humours and important airs of many, who, he must have been pretty certain, never were in a chaise before in their lives; and with what complaisance he was obliged to answer to the surly, brutish growl of many an old swoln glutton or sot, who, stripped of his wealth, must have been more disgusting than the dead dogs or cats in the kennel. A man so occupied I cannot grudge great profits. The night-

man earns, perhaps, a guinea in six hours; but, who would not rather be a carpenter at half-a-crown a day? When, therefore, Sir, you are again engaged in a calculation of the gains of the inn-keeper, pray do not forget to make a large deduction on account of his slavery.

AMERICAN STATES.—The following “toasts and sentiments, selected from various celebrations of the 4th of July, in different parts of the United States,” I extract from an American newspaper of last year, in order to give the reader a specimen of the means that are made use of, in that country, to keep alive a hatred of England; and to enable him to judge of the probability that there is of gaining the friendship of such a people by concession and by wheedling. “The charter of our independence—the eagle this day proclaims that the blot of the Leopard upon it, shall be expiated by the remorse or *blood of the lion*.—Great Britain; ‘the voice of our brother’s blood crieth from the ground.’—May that powerful appeal to justice and vengeance not be disregarded by any true American, and we shall again teach those *robbers* (like their countrymen Burgoyne and Cornwallis) to march to the tune of Yankee Doodle.—The *royal assassins* of Britain, Whitby and Humphreys—worthy servants of a worthy master; may the *gallows prove their end*, and the execration of a free people their epitaph.—The memory of our gallant tars lately *assassinated* on board the frigate Chesapeake, by the treacherous, cowardly, sanguinary ruffians of Britain; when the executive gives the signal we shall be found at our post ready to avenge their murder.—May the heart never beat nor the soul never feel, who would not remember the murder of our citizens on board the Chesapeake.—The manufactories of the United States, we have improved beyond our most sanguine expectation, we will show the haughty Britons that Americans can do better without their cloth than they can without *our flour*.—Law; written and plain rules for freemen, common sense and common honesty to interpret them, and the knife to the root of that *hideous excrescence called common law of England*, servilely adopted by an American bench.”—This is the “*mild and unoffending people*,” of whom Mr. Senator Mitchell spoke, as the reader some time ago saw in the extract, which I made from his speech. The utmost endeavours of the ablest describer could not give us the means of judging of the temper of the Americans

so well as this little extract does. This is the sort of language they have always held towards us, at times when their injustice and insolence have brought down upon them the exercise of our power; and, at other times, they have always spoken of us as a nation of the basest of cowards. So that, in their mouths, we have always been murderers or poltroons.—But, what do the vain and stupid wretches mean by murder committed by Capt. Humphreys? They talk of *treachery* too. Why, did he not send word to their commander, that, unless the men were given up, the frigate would be attacked? And was it not a frigate of 14 guns against a ship of 50 guns? Where, then, was the treachery, or the murder? We shall, by-and-by, I suppose, be told, that Lord Nelson committed horrid murder, in the bay of Trafalgar. This is the way of saucy boys: give them the horse-whip, and they stun the street with cries of murder.—The vain fools, you see, have the conceit, that we live upon “their *flour*.” I have proved, that, when all the ports were open, we did not import, upon an average of years, more than enough to find us in food for *one week* in each year, supposing the corn imported to be worth (as Mr. Young states it) two millions sterling annually; and, as to the part, of these imports, that came from America, Mr. Young describes it as not being worthy of notice. His words are these: “to expect bread from America, would be to look for it from a country whence it never came, except in quantities perfectly insignificant, when compared with the magnitude of our demand.” I wish the fools in America had been, in time, possessed of this truth. It certainly would have made them less insolent. Yet, it would have been very difficult to make them believe the fact. They see great numbers of barrels of flour shipped off from their several ports; and, as it is flattering to their vanity to believe, that they feed all the world; that all the nations upon earth are, in some sort, at their mercy, they would not be easily persuaded to the contrary.—Are the fools not mad? They have fallen out with the *Common Law of England*! They want “a knife to the root of this *hideous excrescence*!” They are mad. Raving mad. Why, the foolish beasts, what law have they but the common law of England? One of the clauses in each of their written constitutions was, that “the Common Law of England should be the Common Law of America.” Where would they, if “a knife” were put to this “*excrescence*,” look for *principles*, whereon to decide in

any case, either of property or of crime? They are mad.—What would become of the trial by jury and all the rights and privileges attached to it? They are mad. What pretty work it would be to lay all property at the mercy of a new set of lawgivers, appointed to form a *written code* to meet all the diversity of circumstances, which must arise in the hundreds of cases, that would, in the course of a few years, be brought forward for decision! They are stark staring mad.—It is curious enough to observe, however, that, at the very moment, that they are representing it as a shame for a nation, so *fierce* they are, to admit the use of the common law of England; while they are (as has always been their practice) speaking of them as the *only* free people in the world; it is curious to observe, that, while this is going forward in one column of their newspaper, they are, in another, complaining of the tyranny, under which they themselves live. The same paper, which contained the above extracts, also contained the following paragraph, relative to the conduct of MACKEN, the Governor of Pennsylvania.

“The protection of the laws is completely taken away in regard to one party, and as far as they can be persecuted and hunted down by law, they are sure of being victims. It ours a government of *equal laws*? Is this a government of the *people*? What sort of a constitution must that be, which admits of such excuses, and tolerates such abuses? There surely must be something rotten at the root; and although we may get rid of such an encumbrance as McKean by impeachment, the root of the evil still will remain, and a governor of evil propensities, may inflict the same wounds upon society. Is it just, is it equitable, can it be justified by any rational principle, that one man, one family, or a sect of quids, should be above the law, and that another portion of the community should not only be subject to its penalties, but be made the victims of its obscurity and its tyranny? And yet such is the present state of society.—McKean the governor of poor unfortunate Pennsylvania, has declared, that he would transmit the constitution unimpaired to his successor. That constitution requires of him, that he shall *see the laws faithfully executed*, and he is sworn to the performance of his duty. How are the laws executed? His son, the attorney general, proved the court to send for one citizen from Lancaster to answer to an indictment, while he permits one of his creatures, who has been indicted for up-

wards of six weeks, to roam at large under his nose.—What a faithful executor of our laws! How unstained and unbroken will not the constitution descend to McKean's successor! How fruitful are not our laws of protection, and how rigorously are they not made to embrace crime! How blessed are not the people of Pennsylvania with such a governor, such an attorney general, such a noble family, and such a virtuous host of officers manumitted in the McKean laboratory!—Well done! Out with it!—But, is this, then, the blessed effects of your written constitutions? And, yet do you want to set more pettifoggers to work to make more codes for you?—This Mackean is, to be sure, all they say of him. There was not such a man figured, even during the worst times of the French revolution. He was born to be a tyrant, of which character he has all the qualities in the highest perfection. My malediction upon the Pennsylvanians was, “may Mackean live to the age of Me-*thusalem*!” and, the best of it is, that the tyrant, as it wearied of persecuting one party, has now, it appears, fallen upon, and stuck his poisonous old fangs into, the other party, that party who were guilty of most shocking crimes in order to raise him to the Governor's chair. His principal object has been to fatten his son, and relations upon the taxes. With this in view, he turned out of place all the persons of the party at first opposed to him; but, many of the best offices being in the hands of his own party, it was next necessary to quarrel with that party, and, of course, to play off, as he now appears to be doing, the other party against them. The party last-mentioned are delighted at this opportunity of glutting their revenge: and, thus Mackean, with perfect safety, persecutes them alternately, or, rather, as the legend relates of the devil, he sits sniggering to himself, while the two gangs of sinners, whom he has set by the ears, abuse and rob and murder one another.—The Americans are truly a miserable people. It is quite impossible for people to have a common chance of happiness amidst such continual strife; strife which is found to exist in every village, though it contain but half a dozen houses, or huts. Some pettifogger is sure to put his poisonous paw into every man's mess. The most despicable scoundrels contrive to set good neighbours at war with each other. There is no such thing as *justice* in the legal decisions, except by mere chance. Half the country is annually perjured. It is an abuse of words to talk of the *liberties* of the people, in a

country where there is no public morality. Where contracts and oaths are made but to be broken, neither property nor person can be safe.

Bolley, June 16, 1808.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary History OF ENGLAND.

The Fourth Volume of the above Work, comprising the Period from the Restoration in the year 1660, to the Revolution in the year 1688; will be ready for delivery on Saturday, the 25th instant.—On the same day will be published, the Tenth Volume of "Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates."

. All communications for the "Parliamentary Debates," if sent in due time, shall be carefully attended to

ROMAN CATHOLIC PETITION.

The following is an authentic Report of the Speech of the BISHOP of NORWICH in the House of Lords on the 27th of May last, as it will be given in "Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates."

"My Lords;—I rise, for the first time in my life, to address your lordships, and I rise with unaffected reluctance; not because I entertain the smallest doubt, respecting either the expediency, the policy, or the justice of the measure now under consideration; but, because, to a person in my situation, it must be exceedingly painful, (however firmly persuaded he may be in his own mind) to find himself impelled by a sense of duty, to maintain an opinion, directly the reverse of which is supported by so many wise and good men who belong to the same profession, and who sit upon the same bench with him. Important occasions however, sometimes arise, on which an individual may be called upon to avow his own sentiments explicitly and unequivocally, without any deference to the judgment of others. Such an occasion I conceive the present to be, and shall without further apology trouble your lordships with a few remarks.—I have considered, with all the care and attention, of which I am capable, the various arguments which are urged against the Petition, in favour of the Catholics of Ireland, which has, this day, for the second time, been presented and supported by the noble baron on the other side of the house, with his usual abilities, and at the same time, with that well

known regard for the real interest of the Established Church, for its peace, its security, its honour, and its prosperity, which forms, and has always formed so distinguished a part in the character of that noble lord.

—These objections, my lords, numerous as they are said to be, may all of them I think, be reduced under four heads. In the first place, it is asserted, or rather strongly insinuated, that the religious tenets of the Catholics, are of such a nature as, *per se*, to exclude those who hold them from the civil, and military situations, to which they aspire. It is next said, that if this were not the case, these situations are matters of favour, not of right, and therefore, the Catholics have no just cause to complain that they are excluded from them. In the third place, we are told, that if it were admitted, that the measure were, abstractedly considered, just and right; it would be highly inexpedient, to repeal statutes, which were passed with much deliberation; and are considered by many, as the bulwarks of the constitution, in church and state. And, lastly, there are some, who contend, that if there were no other objection, the words of the Coronation Oath present an insuperable bar to the claims of the Catholics. I shall not detain your lordships long in the examination of these objections, because they have been repeatedly discussed, and, as it appears to me, very satisfactorily refuted, by far abler men, both in this house and out of it.—With respect to the religious tenets of the Catholics of the present day, it is not a little singular, my lords, that we will not allow them to know what their own religious tenets really are. We call upon them for their Creed, upon some very important points: and they give it to us without reserve; but, instead of believing what they say, we refer them, with an air of controversial triumph, to the Councils of Constance, or of Trent, to the Fourth Lateran Council, or to the Council of Trent. In vain they most explicitly, and most solemnly aver, that they hold no tenet whatsoever, incompatible with their duties, either as men, or as subjects, or in any way hurtful to the government under which they live. In vain they publish Declarations upon Declaration, in all of which they most unequivocally disavow those highly exceptionable tenets which are imputed to them: and not only do they disavow, but they express their abhorrence of them. In vain they confirm these Declarations by an Oath—an Oath, my lords, framed by ourselves, drawn up with all possible care, and caution, and couched in terms, as strong as language affords. In addition to these ample securities,

for the principles and practice of this numerous and loyal class of our fellow subjects and fellow christians. A great statesman, now unhappily no more, caused to be transmitted a string of very important Queries, to the principal Catholic Universities abroad; for the purpose of ascertaining, with precision, the sentiments of the Catholic Clergy, respecting the real nature and extent of the Papal Power, and some other weighty points. The answers returned to these Queries, by those learned bodies, appeared to me at the time, as they do now, perfectly satisfactory, and in the same light they were considered by most dispassionate men. Notwithstanding all this, a concealed jealousy of Catholics still lurks about, by far, too many of us; a jealousy in my opinion, as unworthy of a frank and enlightened people, as it is injurious and cruel towards those who are the objects of it: for surely, my lords, if there be one position more incontrovertibly true than another, it is this: if an individual, or a body of men, will give to the government under which they live such a security upon oath, as that government itself prescribes;—if, moreover, they maintain no opinions destructive of moral obligation, or subversive of civil society: their speculative opinions of a religious nature, can never, with justice or with reason, be urged as excluding them from Civil and Military situations. The Catholics, my lords, give this security; and having given it, the legislature itself has declared, that they ought to be considered “as good and loyal subjects;” as such, therefore, in my view of the subject, they are unquestionably entitled to the privileges which they claim. When I speak of merely speculative opinions of Religion, I wish to be understood as meaning such opinions as begin in the understanding, and rest there, and have no practical influence whatsoever upon our conduct in life. With this limitation, I am not sensible that there is any fallacy in the argument which I have made use of; if there be any, I shall be happy to have it pointed out; as I cannot possibly have any motive in view but what from my heart, I believe to be the truth.—Should an unfortunate and deep rooted prejudice prevail so far, as to make us say, decidedly and openly, that we will not believe a Catholic even upon his oath, there is an end, my lords, of the discussion at once; but the argument, if argument it can be called, proves a great deal too much; and for this plain reason: no obligation more binding than that of an appeal to the Supreme Being by an oath, has hitherto been devised in civil society;—he, therefore, who can justly be supposed capable of setting at

nought such an obligation, upon any pretence whatsoever, is not only unworthy of the privileges here contended for, but he is unfit for all social intercourse of every kind—*Vetabo sub iisdem sit tralibus*—Harsh, and horrid, as the expression must sound in your lordships ears, he ought to be exterminated from the face of the earth; or at least he should be banished for life to Botany Bay; and even when arrived there he should be driven back into the sea;—for there is no den of thieves, no gang of robbers, no banditti so thoroughly profligate, and at the same time so devoid of common understanding, as to admit that man a member of their community, upon whose fidelity to his engagements no reliance can be placed even for a single hour.—I come now to the second Objection; my answer to which will be very short. Civil and Military Appointments, are it seems, matters of favour, not of right, and therefore the Catholics have no just cause to complain that they are excluded from them. I can hardly, my lords, conceive any man in earnest who regards this distinction as applicable to the present case, because no one pleads for an abstract right to these situations, but for a capacity of holding them: no one contends for the absolute possession of civil, and military offices, but for equal eligibility to them, and having endeavoured to prove, that all men are equally eligible, who give to the government under which they live, such a security, upon oath, for their conduct as subjects, as that government itself prescribes, and who maintain no opinions destructive of moral obligation or subversive of civil society, I shall only add here, that they are so considered to be, in almost all the governments of Europe and over the whole continent of America: and I should be sorry to see England the last to follow so good an example. “But it is inexpedient,” we are told, “to repeal statutes, which were passed with much deliberation, and are considered by many as the bulwarks of the constitution in church and state.” How long, my lords, it may be thought expedient, or necessary, that the remaining part of these restrictive disqualifying statutes should be enforced against the catholics, or at what precise period their operation shall end, is a question not for a divine, but for statesmen and lawyers to decide. I may however be permitted to observe, that under any government, however free, though peculiar circumstances may perhaps call for statutes of a very strict, and even of a very severe nature, for a limited period of time, yet no wise statesman would, I

imagine, wish those statutes to remain unrepealed, a moment after the circumstances which occasioned them cease to exist. Those who are acquainted with the history of the statutes here alluded to, and of the times, in which they passed, will anticipate my application of this remark: the application of it is indeed, made for me, by a very eminent lawyer, and a very cordial friend to the Ecclesiastical, as well as to the Civil Constitution of this realm. This able writer observes, more than once in his Commentaries, that “whenever the period shall arrive, when the power of the Pope is weak and insignificant, and there is no Pretender to the throne, that then will be the time to grant full indulgence to the catholics.” That time, my lords, is now come; there is no Pretender to the throne; and with respect to the Papal Power, not a single person present, apprehends, I am thoroughly persuaded, any danger from it;—in truth that once gigantic power—*magni stat nominis umbra*—and nothing more. Where, then, can be the objection to granting the Petition of the Catholics of Ireland? A Petition founded on the immutable principles of reason and of justice; a Petition also which worldly policy loudly calls upon us to accede to in the present very serious crisis—a crisis which demands the union of the wise and brave of every description and of every denomination; that cordial union, I mean, which is most assuredly the best support, and indeed the only secure bulwark of every government upon earth. It is unnecessary to add, that an union of this kind, can be obtained only by confidence and conciliation: but, if worldly policy did not thus loudly call upon us, a principle of gratitude should lead us to pay all the attention in our power to these numerous loyal and respectable petitioners, to whom we are in a great measure indebted, for the noblest monument of wisdom and beneficence combined, which modern times have seen: I mean the union of Ireland with England, an union, which without their cordial co-operation, could never have been effected.—In reply to these observations, which appear to me to carry some weight with them; there are who maintain, that if there were no other objection the words of the Coronation Oath present an insuperable bar to the claims of the Catholics of Ireland. Of all the arguments, my lords, which either principle or prejudice has suggested, or which imagination has started, there is not one, which appears to me to rest upon so weak a foundation, as that which is built upon the words of the coronation oath. This oath, as your

lordships well know, underwent some alteration at the period of the Revolution in 1688, at which period, that great prince, William the Third, entered into the following solemn Engagement when he ascended the throne of this kingdom:—“I will maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel, and the reformed protestant church established by law; and I will preserve to the bishops and clergy of this realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges, as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or to any of them.”—If, my lords, even intelligent and honest men, were not sometimes disposed to adopt any mode of reasoning, however weak, which coincides with their preconceived ideas upon a subject, it would be no easy matter to find out, upon what principle of fair construction, the words which I have just repeated from the coronation oath, can be thought to militate against the claims of the Catholics of Ireland. It will not, I trust, be said, for I am sure it cannot be proved, that it is either repugnant to the “laws of God,” or, to the unconfined and benevolent tendency of the gospel, or to those liberal and enlightened principles, upon which the Reformation was founded; to admit to situations of honour, or of profit in the state, men of talents and of virtue, to whom no objection can possibly be made, but their speculative opinions of merely a religious nature; nor can I conceive in what manner “the rights and privileges of the bishops and clergy of this realm, or of the churches committed to their charge,” can be affected by granting civil and military appointments, to men, cordially devoted to the civil constitution, and who have solemnly declared upon oath, that it is neither their intention, nor their wish, to injure or disturb the ecclesiastical. For my own part, my lords, as an individual clergyman of the church of England, sincerely attached to the established church and proud of the situation which I hold in it, I should be exceedingly sorry, if I could think for a moment, that I possessed any rights, or privileges, incompatible with the just claims of so many excellent subjects and conscientious fellow-christians. Be it however admitted, my Lords, that the words of the coronation oath, will bear the construction which has been put upon them, I wish to ask, where was the objection drawn from this oath, when, in 1782, so many indulgencies were wisely and justly granted to the catholics of Ireland? Indulgencies precisely of the same kind, though differing in degree, from those which are now petitioned for.

—But, I forbear to push this argument any further; various considerations restrain me: and perhaps enough has been said, to prove, that the words of the coronation oath, have been unadvisedly and inconclusively brought forward, during the discussion of that important question, which has engaged the attention of the public for more than three years. I will now detain your Lordships no longer: indeed, I should not have presumed to intrude so long upon your patience, had I not thought it incumbent upon me, to assign the best reasons in my power, for differing so widely from those around me, whose judgment I respect, though I cannot implicitly bow to it, against the clearest conviction of my understanding and the best feelings of my heart."

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Mr. Rose's Ultimatum, dated Washington, March 17, 1808.*

SIR,—Being deeply impressed with the sense of his majesty's anxiety, that full effect should be given to those views of justice and moderation, by which his conduct has been regulated through the whole of the unfortunate transaction whence the present differences have arisen; and of the disappointment with which he would learn the frustration of his just and equitable purposes, I have felt it incumbent upon me, upon the receipt of the letter which you did me the honour to address to me on the 5th instant, to apply anew to this matter the most ample and serious consideration. It is with the most painful sensations of regret, that I find myself, on the result of it, under the necessity of declining to enter into the terms of negotiation which, by direction of the President of the United States, you therein offer. I do not feel myself competent, in the present instance, to depart from those instructions which I stated in my letter of the 26th of Jan. last, and which preclude me from acceding to the condition thus proposed.—I should add, that I am absolutely prohibited from entering upon matters unconnected with the specific object I am authorised to discuss, much less can I thus give any pledge concerning them. The condition suggested, moreover, leads to the direct inference that the proclamation of the President of the U. States of the 2d of July, 1807, is maintained either as an equivalent for reparation for the time being, or as a compulsion to make it.—It is with the most profound regret, that I feel myself under the necessity of declaring that I am unable to act upon the terms thus proposed; as it becomes my duty to inform you, in conformity to my instructions, that

on the rejection of the demand stated in my former letter, on the part of his majesty, my mission is terminated. And his majesty's government, in providing me with those instructions, did not conceive that after the declaration of his sentiments respecting the affair of the Chesapeake was made known to the government, the state of any transactions pending or unterminated between the two nations, could justify the perseverance in the enforcement of the president's proclamation. I can exercise no discretion on this point.—As on a former occasion I detailed, though minutely, the motives for that demand, on the part of his majesty, which I with so much concern learn to be deemed inadmissible by the government of the U. States; I should here abstain from any exposition of them which visibly can have no further effect upon the negotiation, if I did not deem it essential that they should not be left under any misapprehension which I might be able to remove. I shall, therefore, take a short review of the transaction which has given rise to these discussions, in order the more correctly to determine the soundness of the principles upon which this demand is made.—Certain deserters from his majesty's navy, many of them his natural-born subjects, having entered into the service of the U. States, were repeatedly and fruitlessly demanded by the British officers, of the recruiting officers of the U. States; but were retained in their new service. As it was a matter of notoriety that several of these deserters were on board the frigate of the U. States, the Chesapeake, they were demanded of that frigate on the high seas, by his majesty's ship Leopard, and all knowledge of their presence on board being denied, she was attacked, and four of them, one avowedly a native Englishman, were taken out of her. Without being deterred by the consideration of how far circumstances, hostile in their nature, had provoked, though they undoubtedly by no means justified, this act of the British officer, his majesty's government directed that a positive disavowal of the rights of search asserted in this case, and of the act of the British officer, as being authorised, and a promise of reparation, should be conveyed to the American minister in London, before he had made any representation by order of the U. States.—This disavowal, made on the 2d of Aug. last, was transmitted by him to his government, before the 6th of that month; but before Mr. Munroe had received his orders to demand reparation, his majesty learnt, with what surprise it is needless to dwell upon, that the president of the U. States had interdicted, by proclamation bearing date the

2d of July, 1807, the entry of all their ports to the whole of his navy; this surprise was certainly increased, when in the letter delivered by that minister to require redress for the wrong, although it went into details unconnected with it, not only no concern was expressed on the part of the U. States, at having felt themselves compelled to enact measures of so much injury and indignity towards a friendly power, but no mention was made of the causes of such measures being resorted to, or even of the fact of their having been adopted. In addition to the embarrassment arising from these circumstances, and the insufficiency of the explanations subsequently given to Mr. Canning, the introduction of a subject foreign to that of the complaint, became the main impediment to the success of the discussion which took place in London. When I had the honour to open the negotiation with you, Sir, as I had learnt that the proclamation was still in force, it became my duty, conformably to my instructions, to require its recall, as a preliminary to further discussion; had it not been in force, I was not ordered to have taken it into consideration in the adjustment of reparation; and it was considered as hardly possible that it should not have been recalled immediately upon the knowledge of his majesty's disavowal of the attack upon the Chesapeake, as an unauthorised act. But his majesty could not suffer the negotiation to be carried on, in his behalf, under an interdict, which, even if justifiable in the first moments of irritation, cannot be continued after the declaration of his majesty's sentiments upon the transaction, except in the spirit of hostility.—It might have been fairly contended, that in the first instance, the exercise of an act of power, before reparation was refused or unduly protracted, was incompatible with the purposes and essence of pacific negotiation, and with a demand of redress through that channel; but such have been his majesty's conciliatory views, that this argument has not been insisted on, although it might now be the more forcibly urged, as it appears that the government of the U. States was from the first sensible that, even had hostility been meditated by the British government, it would not have commenced it in such a manner. But the exception taken is to the enforcement continued up to the present time, of measures highly unfriendly in their tendency, persisted in, not only after the disavowal in question, the promise of the proffer of suitable reparation, and the renewed assurances of his majesty's amicable dispositions, but after security has been given in a public instrument

bearing date of the 16th of Oct. 1807, that the claim to the seizure of deserters from the national ships of other powers, cannot again be brought forward by his majesty's naval officers, it is unnecessary to dwell upon the injury and indignity to which his majesty's service is exposed, both as touching the freedom and security of correspondence of his agents, and accredited ministers in the U. States, or as resulting from a measure, which, in time of war, excludes the whole of his navy from all their ports; which ports are completely open to the fleets of his enemies. It will be sufficient to observe, that even where exemptions from it are granted, they are made subject to such conditions, that of the three last British ships of war, which have entered these ports upon public business, two of them, his majesty's ship *Statira*, having on board a minister sent out for the adjustment of the present differences and a schooner bearing dispatches, in consequence of their inability to procure pilots, were obliged to enter their waters without such assistance, and were exposed to considerable danger. Great Britain, by the forms established, could repair the wrongs committed, even to the satisfaction of the U. States, no otherwise than by the channel of negotiation; yet she avowed distinctly, that wrong was committed, and that she was ready to make reparation; it cannot therefore be contended, that the unavoidable delay of actual reparation subjected her to the imputation of persisting in an aggression, which was disclaimed from the first; if this is true, however much she will regret any impediment in the adjustment of a difference in which the feelings of this nation are so materially interested, can she, consistently with a due care of her own honour and interests, allow it to be concluded on her part under an adherence to a conduct, which has a decided character of enmity in the proceedings held towards her by the other party?—I know not in what view the perseverance in the president's proclamation, up to this moment, can be considered, but in that of a measure of retaliation; or of self-assumed reparation; or of a measure intended to compel reparation; unless it be that which, if I rightly understand you define it to be, a measure of precaution.—If, when a wrong is committed, retaliation is instantly resorted to by the injured party, the door to pacific adjustment is closed, and the means of reconciliation precluded. The right to demand reparation is incompatible with the assumption of it.—When parties are in a state of mutual hostility, they are so far on a footing, and as such they may treat. But a party dis-

claiming every unfriendly intention and giving unequivocal proofs of an amicable disposition, cannot be expected to treat with another, whose conduct towards it has the direct effects of actual hostility. If then, the enforcement of the president's proclamation, up to the present moment, is a measure of self-assumed reparation, it is directly repugnant to the spirit and fact of amicable negotiation; if it is a measure to compel reparation, it is equally so; and by the perseverance in it, G. Britain is dispensed with the duty of proffering redress. But if it is a measure of precaution, in order to secure reparation, or in order to compel it, it falls under the objections I have stated. It is a precaution adopted as a guard against acts of violence apprehended on the part of his majesty's naval officers, it surely can be considered as being as effectual a security as that arising from the renewed assurances of his majesty's friendly disposition, which imply a due observance of the rights of nations with which Great Britain is in amity, by all persons holding authority under his majesty's government from the disavowal of the pretension of the search of national ships, and from the further assurance of that disavowal, given in his majesty's proclamation of the 16th of Oct. last. Neither under these concurrent circumstances can the plea of necessity be maintained; and if such a proceeding has not the plea of necessity, it assumes the character of aggression. If these concurrent securities against such an apprehension have any value, the necessity no longer exists; if they have no value, negotiation cannot be attempted, as the basis upon which rests the mutual confidence of the two parties would be wholly wanting.—From the moment after the unfortunate affair of the Chesapeake, that his majesty's naval commanders in these waters had ascertained that they were safe from the effervescences of that popular fury under which the most glaring outrages were committed, and by which they were naturally led to the supposition that they were objects of particular hostility, and that a state of war against them, requiring precautions on their part, had commenced, no conduct has been imputed to them, which could indicate the necessity of maintaining in force the president's proclamation.—Since that time such of those officers as have been necessitated by the circumstances of the war to remain in these waters, have held no communication with the shore, except in an instance too trifling to dwell upon, and instantly disavowed by the commanding officer; and they have acquiesced quietly in various privations, highly prejudicial to the service

they were upon, and in consequence of an interdict, which had they been regardless of their duties towards a state in amity with their sovereign, and had they not carefully repressed the feelings its tone and language had a direct tendency to provoke in them, would have rather excited than averted the evils it was stated to be intended to prevent; were they regardful of these duties it was unnecessary. Had they felt themselves obliged completely to evacuate the waters of the U. States, especially while an enemy's squadron was harboured in them, they could have done it; but under the admission of hostile compulsion, and under such compulsion carried into full effect, his majesty could not have dissembled the extent of the injury received.—In the several cases adduced, in which G. Britain required certain preliminaries, previously to entering into negotiation, she regulated her conduct by the same principles to which she now adheres; and refused, whilst no hostility was exhibited on her part, to treat with powers, whose proceedings denoted it towards her; and who maintained their right in what they had assumed.—From the consideration thus afforded, I trust that neither the order of reason, or that of usage, are in contradiction to the demand I have urged, nor am I aware how the order of time opposes the revocation in the first instance of that act, which affects injuriously one of the parties, and is still avowed by the other.—The subject is thus presented to you, Sir, in the light in which it was natural that it should offer itself to his majesty's government. It certainly conceived the president's proclamation to rest chiefly and most materially upon the attack made upon the frigate of the U. States, the Chesapeake, by his majesty's ship Leopard, although other topics were adduced as accessaries. In this apprehension it may be held to have been sufficiently warranted by the precise time at which, and the circumstances under which it was issued, and by its whole context; and the more so as the impulse under which, it was drawn up appears to have been so sudden as to have precluded a due examination of all the grounds of allegation contained in it. And here I beg leave to assure you, that with respect to the spirit and tone of that instrument, it would be highly satisfactory to me, if I could feel myself justified in expressing, on the part of his majesty, any degree of coincidence with the opinions you have announced, or when thus appealed to, and making every allowance for the irritation of the moment, I could dissemble the extreme surprise experienced by G. Britain that the government of a friendly na-

tion, even before an amicable demand of reparation was made, and yet meaning to make that demand, should have issued an edict, directing measures of injury very disproportionate to what it knew was an unauthorised offence, and both in its terms and its purport so injurious to the government to which that demand was to be addressed, and tending to call forth in both nations the feelings under which a friendly adjustment would be the most difficult. But if, as I learn from you, Sir, the proclamation rests substantially upon other causes, it is then peculiarly to be regretted, that, together with the demand for redress made in Sept. last, the government of the U. States did not think fit to offer a negotiation or an explanation of so momentous a measure, or to declare that its recall must be more or less connected with the adjustment of other alledged wrongs. Neither did it think necessary to return any answer to the remonstrance given in by his majesty's envoy at Washington, on the 13th July, 1807, in which he represented "that he considered that interdiction to be so unfriendly in its object, and so injurious in its consequences to his majesty's interests, that he could not refrain from expressing the most sincere regret, that it ever should have been issued, and most earnestly deprecating its being enforced."—It could not be supposed that a circumstance of so great weight could be overlooked by his majesty's government, in determining the line of conduct to be held in the negotiation; and as little could it be expected to pass it over, when on the failure of the discussion with Mr. Munroe, it directed a special mission to be sent to the U. States. It had the less reason to imagine that any other grievances could be connected with that, for the adjustment of which I am empowered to negotiate, as Mr. Munroe in his letter to Mr. Canning of the 29th of July last, had stated with respect to other subjects of remonstrance, that it was improper to mingle them with the present more serious cause of complaint; an opinion to which Mr. Canning declared his perfect assent in his letter to that minister of the 2d of the subsequent month; so that this act was left as single and distinct, to be singly and distinctly considered. His majesty's government therefore could not, consistently with any view of the subject then before it, or indeed with the just object of my mission, direct or empower me to enter upon matters not connected with that of the Chesapeake; and they could with the less propriety do it, as in order to render the adjustment of differences of such a nature the more easy and the more conspicuous, the ministers charged especially with

such offices, have been, with few exceptions, restricted to the precise affair to be negotiated. With respect therefore to those other causes of complaint, upon which you inform me that the president's proclamation rests, I cannot be furnished with documents enabling me either to admit or to controvert those statements of grievance, foreign to the attack upon that ship, contained in your letter, or authorized to discuss the matters themselves. I shall therefore not allow myself to offer such comments as my personal knowledge of some of those transactions suggest to me, although their tendency would materially affect both the marked manner in which these transactions are portrayed, and the disadvantageous lights in which his majesty's government is represented to have acted respecting them.—I am moreover led to the persuasion that my government will be the more easily able to rescue itself from inculcation by the inferences arising from passages in Mr. Munroe's letters to Mr. Secretary Canning, of the 29th of Sept. last, that the differences unhappily subsisting between the two nations were in a train of adjustment.—If his majesty has not permitted me to enter into the discussion of the search of neutral merchant ships for British seamen, together with the adjustment of the amount of reparation for the attack upon the Chesapeake, it was in no wise with a view of precluding the further agitation of that question at a suitable time; but it was that the negotiation might be relieved from the embarrassment arising from the connexion of the present matter with the one so foreign to it, and as it was but too well known, so difficult to be adjusted, of a right distinctly disclaimed, with one which G. Britain has at all time asserted, of enforcing her claim to the services of her natural-born subjects, when found on board merchant vessels of other nations; a claim which she founds in that principle of universal law, which gives to the state the right of requiring the aid and assistance of her native citizens. The recurrence, therefore, to that course of negotiation, which had been originally settled between Mr. Secretary Canning and Mr. Munroe, and which had alone been broken in upon by the orders subsequently received by that minister, can only be considered as a resumption of that course of things which G. Britain strenuously contended there was no ground to depart from. I may observe that this purpose might have been effected without the intervention of a special minister.—It will be in your recollection, Sir, that in our first interview, I stated the condition which makes the subject of the present let-

ter, before I was informed by you that the president of the U. States would consent to the separation of the two subjects.—I had trusted that the exposition which I added to my letter of the 25th of Jan., to the verbal explanation I had before offered, of the grounds of his majesty's demand, was both in its purport, and in the terms in which it was couched, such as to prevent a suspicion that they were in their intention derogatory to the honour, or calculated to wound the just sensibility of the nation. I may add, that such a supposition could not be reconciled with the various sensible and unequivocal demonstrations of his majesty's good faith and anxiety, that this transaction should be brought to an amicable termination, which were exhibited even prior to any remonstrances on the part, or by order of the government. The other topics, which I felt myself authorized to advance in that letter, in illustration of that amicable disposition on the part of the king, were brought forward from the conviction I entertained that they must be of a nature to be satisfactory to this government, and therefore such as it was particularly my duty to enforce, but not with a view to rest upon them the right to advance the claim which I have stated. I may here remark, it is obvious that far from requiring that the first step towards an arrangement of reparation should be taken by the U. States, G. Britain has already made them openly and distinctly: they are indubitable testimony, to the respect borne and decidedly marked by G. Britain, to the ties of amity subsisting between the two nations, and of her cordial desire to maintain them unimpaired: and as such alone they were urged.—As his majesty would have derived sincere satisfaction from the evidence of corresponding feelings on the part of the U. States, so it would be the more painful for me to dwell upon a series of insults and menaces, which without any provocation or warlike preparation on the part of G. Britain, have been for months accumulated upon her through the U. States, and but too frequently from quarters whose authority necessarily and powerfully commanded attention.—I ought perhaps to apologize for adverting to an incidental expression in your letter, if I did not think it right to remove any ambiguity respecting the nature of the claim which G. Britain maintained to her seamen, native citizens of the realm, who have deserted from her service to that of other powers: it is, that on demand they shall be discharged forthwith, and conse-

quently, they shall instantly be freed from their newly contracted obligations.—Before I close this letter, allow me to state to you, Sir, that I have felt it my duty to transmit to his majesty's government, the exposition contained in your letter of the 5th inst. of the various demands on the honour and good faith of G. Britain, on which the complaint is made, that satisfaction has not been afforded to the U. States, and on which, conjointly with the affair of the Chesapeake, you informed me that the proclamation of the president of the U. States of the 2d of July, 1807, is founded. It will be for his majesty's government to determine, on the part of G. Britain, whether any and what obligations remain to be fulfilled by her—whether any denial or such protraction of redress have occurred on her part, as to render necessary or justifiable the perseverance in an error, which, when not necessary or justifiable, betrays a character of aggression? And whether on the result of these considerations, the present negotiation can be resumed on the part of his majesty, with a due regard for his own honour, or with a prospect of a more successful termination.—I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) G. H. ROBE.

FRANCE AND AMERICA.—*Letter of M. Champagny, to Gen. Armstrong, dated Paris, Jan. 15, 1808.*

Sir,—The different notes which you have done me the honour to address to me have been laid before his Majesty.—The proceedings of England towards all governments are so contrary to the law of nations, and to all the rules constantly observed even among enemies, that no recourse against this power is any longer to be found in the ordinary means of repression. In order to annul her, it is become necessary to turn against her the arms which she makes use of herself; and if transient inconveniences result therefrom, it is to her alone they are to be imputed. Since England respects no laws, how could they be respected with regard to her? The maritime laws which she violates, ought they still to be a protection to her? And if some powers tolerate the infractions committed on their independence, could they have the right to require, that France alone should restrain herself within limits which her enemy has every where overleaped?—The United States, more than any other power, have to complain of the aggressions of England.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"There is a point of trial, beyond which neither loyalty nor patriotism will support a man, and that point is, the moral conviction that no change, that can possibly take place, will make his life more miserable than it is; for, what is it, that men labour and fight for? Consider the question well, and you shall find, that all the motives come, at last, to two only; namely to *gain*, or to *preserve*. Now, it is contrary to all reason and to common sense, that a man should venture his life to defend and to preserve that which he must naturally hate."—NEDHAM'S Essay on Government.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—This is a subject, which, let the event be what it may, must be deeply interesting to every man who reflects; and, as I took occasion to observe in my last Register, I think, nothing could be more proper than such a discussion and decision, in parliament, as would have been a pledge to the people of Spain, and to the world, that the intention of England was to assist that people in recovering and establishing their liberties, and that, for that assistance, nothing was to be demanded. But, when Mr. *Sheridan* was stated to be the motion-maker, that was to be expected, which has taken place; namely, a miserable fetch at popularity, a shew of being above party considerations, and, not unlikely, the sowing the seeds of a profitable job. This is a pretty use to make of the cause of the Spanish patriots!—The motion of Mr. *Sheridan* (which was made on the 15th instant) was prefaced by a speech, the equal of which for nothingness, I never read in my life. I must insert it; for, to give an adequate description of it is impossible.—“Mr. Speaker,—However I may regret that the proposition which I had the honour of giving notice that it was my intention to bring forward this evening, has been postponed until this late hour, and that the intention of the house must be considerably exhausted by the discussion which has just terminated, yet, Sir, I still think it right to submit to their consideration, the important subject which was the object of that notice. I cannot conceal that a kind of negotiation has been carrying on between my right hon. friend opposite and myself, in the course of which my right hon. friend expressed his wish that I would put off my motion for this evening, because the distinguished persons who have lately come over to England to represent to the British government the state and disposition of their native country are at this very moment partaking

“the hospitality of his mansion. Sir, I allow that this was a strong reason on the part of my right hon. friend for desiring a postponement of this business; for I believe, with all my right hon. friend's public spirit and enthusiasm, that he has no very great inclination to lose a good dinner—(laugh). But as my right hon friend has detached a very able general (the secretary of state for Ireland) to represent him at his house, I feel less reluctant at thus intruding on his patience, and shall therefore proceed, only expressing my hope, that the gallant baronet may soon be detached on a more serious service; that he may soon be sent into Spain to represent in that country the enthusiasm of England in her cause—(Hear, hear!).—In the first place, sir, I wish to correct an idea which has gone abroad, that I entertained the folly, the presumption, the ill judgment, and the bad taste, of intending to teach his majesty's ministers how to conduct themselves in the existing circumstances. All I desire, sir, is to win the attention of the house to the present situation of Spain. Having communicated the tenor of my motion on a former evening to my right hon. friend opposite, and my intention not having been disapproved by my right hon. friend, I own I was surprised to find that his right hon. and learned colleague imagined that my motion would tend to embarrass his majesty's government. After the communication to which I have alluded, I expected that he would give me credit for having no such object in view. On the other hand, I experienced something like rebuke from my hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread), who seemed to think that I was going to bring forward a motion which was to save administration from all responsibility on the subject. Now really, sir, this was a most unfortunate outset on my part. I meant to do neither the one thing nor the other. And here I must say, that although no man living more

“ highly respects the political probity and
 “ ability of my hon. friend, as well as the
 “ estimable qualities of his private character,
 “ yet when he gets up to rebuke me for do-
 “ ing that which appears to me to be my
 “ duty, I am free to confess, while I ap-
 “ plaud his judgment—his understanding—
 “ the deliberation with which he decides on
 “ questions of importance—that if there be
 “ any one point in his character on which I
 “ should not be disposed to dwell with the
 “ greatest satisfaction, it would be his de-
 “ ference to the opinion of others, or his
 “ doubt with respect to his own—(*a*
 “ *laugh*).—I am placed, sir, in this dilem-
 “ ma; that while my hon. friend accuses
 “ me of a disposition to cover administra-
 “ tion, the right hon. and learned gent.
 “ opposite suspects me of an intention to do
 “ it all the mischief in my power. Sir, I
 “ may be wrong—I am far from wishing
 “ ministers to embark in any rash and ro-
 “ mantic enterprise in favour of Spain;
 “ but, sir, if the enthusiasm, and anima-
 “ tion, which now exists in a part of Spain,
 “ should spread over the whole of that coun-
 “ try, I am convinced that since the first
 “ burst of the French revolution, there never
 “ existed so happy an opportunity and
 “ occasion for Great Britain to strike a bold
 “ stroke for the rescue of the world.—
 “ (*Hear, hear, hear!*)—But, sir, it is said,
 “ “ if you do not distrust the administration,
 “ why discuss this subject in parliament?”
 “ Sir, I will tell you why. I am disposed to
 “ trust administration. But I wish to de-
 “ mand two things; I wish first to declare,
 “ that, in my opinion, we must not deal in
 “ dribblets; we must do much or nothing.
 “ Why do I make this declaration? Be-
 “ cause no cabinet which has hitherto exis-
 “ ted in this country—not even excepting
 “ that with which I had the honour of being
 “ connected, has pursued simply and
 “ plainly one clear and distinct object.
 “ Instead of striking at the core of the evil,
 “ the administrations of this country have
 “ hitherto contented themselves with nib-
 “ bling at the rind. In the censure, I
 “ must not include an hon. friend near
 “ me, nor Mr. Burke, they would have
 “ proceeded directly and completely to
 “ the object which they had in view, or
 “ they would not have advanced to it a
 “ step. But with these exceptions
 “ the ministers of England have pursued a
 “ petty policy; they have gone about
 “ tickling sugar islands, and neglecting all
 “ that was dignified and all that was con-
 “ sistent to the true understood interests
 “ of their country. I wish therefore, Sir,

“ to let Spain know, that the conduct
 “ which we have pursued we will not per-
 “ sever in, but that we are resolved fairly
 “ and fully to stand up for the salvation of
 “ Europe. The next demand I have to
 “ make Sir, is, that if a cooperation with
 “ Spain be expedient, it should be an
 “ effectual co-operation. I repeat, that I
 “ am far from prompting his majesty's go-
 “ vernment to engage in any rash romantic
 “ enterprise; but, Sir, if upon ascertain-
 “ ing the state of the popular mind, in
 “ Spain, they find it is warmed by a patri-
 “ otic and enthusiastic ardour, then, Sir, all
 “ I ask is, that that feeling should be met
 “ here with corresponding energy and
 “ enthusiasm. Buonaparte has hitherto run
 “ a most victorious race. Hitherto he has
 “ had to contend against princes without
 “ dignity, and ministers without wisdom.
 “ He has fought against countries in which
 “ the people have been indifferent as to
 “ his success; he has yet to learn what
 “ it is to fight against a country in which
 “ the people are animated with one spirit
 “ to resist him—(*Hear, hear*). So far,
 “ Sir, from bringing forward a motion
 “ prematurely to embarrass his majesty's
 “ government, I solemnly declare, that,
 “ if the opportunity to which I have alluded
 “ of a vigorous interference on the part of
 “ England should arise, the present Ad-
 “ ministration shall have from me as cordial
 “ and as sincere support as if the man
 “ whom I most loved were restored to life
 “ and power. Is this a vain discussion?
 “ Let those who think so look at the pre-
 “ sent state of Europe. Will not the ani-
 “ mation of the Spanish mind be excited
 “ by the knowledge that their cause is
 “ espoused, not by ministers alone, but by
 “ the Parliament, and the people of
 “ England? If there be a disposition in
 “ Spain to resent the insults and injuries,
 “ too enormous to be described by lan-
 “ guage, which they have endured from
 “ the tyrant of the earth, will not that dis-
 “ position be roused to the most sublime
 “ exertion by the assurance that their efforts
 “ will be cordially aided by a great and
 “ powerful nation? Sir, I think this a
 “ most important crisis. Never was any
 “ thing so brave, so generous, so noble as
 “ the conduct of the Asturians. They
 “ have magnanimously avowed their hos-
 “ tility to France—they have declared war
 “ against Buonaparte—they have no retreat
 “ —they are resolved to conquer, or to
 “ perish in the grave of the honour and
 “ the independence of their country. It
 “ is that the British government may ad-

"vance to their assistance with a firmer step, and with a bolder mien, that I have been anxious to afford this opportunity to the British Parliament, of expressing the feelings which they entertain on the occasion. I move, Sir, that an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to direct that there be laid before this House, copies of such proclamations as have been received by his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and which have been issued since the arrival of the French army at Madrid; whether by the Spanish Government, the French Commander in Chief, or by persons since claiming to act on behalf of the Spanish nation."—So, here, after all, is a motion for laying before the parliament, papers which are in the possession of all the world, and which the mover *must* have known, that the government could not possess in an official form. But, it was clearly his intention not to make any motion that should be any thing more than mere smoke; a mere pretence for making a mob-catching speech, and, at the same time, to pay his court to the ministers.—I wonder who it was that uttered the "*laugh*," at the empty stuff about the "good dinner" and the "able general?" It must have been some stupid beast in the gallery; for, it were, indeed, a slander to suppose that any member of the honourable and right honourable corps below; that any lawgiver; that any guardian of the public purse; that any senator, should have been moved to laughter by such wretched attempts at wit, by such worse than guard-room or even green-room ribaldry. This was a pretty way to go to work to convince the patriots in Spain, that the English parliament *sympathized* with them. When a man sympathizes with another, who is in imminent danger, he cannot be much in a humour to jest. Any motion, relative to the affairs of Spain, should have been introduced with seriousness and earnestness, with as much life and force as you please, but with no jesting, no rabble-amusing jokes.—And, then, the long preface about the "honourable friend," the palpable fishing for a compliment, discovered the selfishness of the real object in view; and would, if the people of Spain could have heard it, have made them despair of any aid from a parliament, in which they appeared to have only *such* friends. The preface to the matter surpasses, in bulk, the matter itself. The speech is all whet and no cut. It is merely flummery. There is nothing of *sentiment*, or

principle, contained in it; and, as will be seen, Mr. Canning's answer was, as might have been expected, equally unmeaning.—Mr. Secretary Canning replied nearly as follows: "Mr. Speaker, I am disposed to give every credit to my right hon. friend for his motives in agitating this subject, and I can assure him, that he is very much mistaken if he imagines that it was intended to check or rebuke him by any thing that was said on a recent evening from this side of the House. At that time, although I was in possession of my right hon. friend's communication, my right hon. friend near me was not so. Sir, I could very easily shew my right hon. friend, that it is impossible to produce the papers for which he has moved: some, because they have not reached his Majesty's Government in an authenticated form; others, because they are not accurately described in the motion; and all, because if we were in possession of the information which they contain, it would be highly improvident in us, at the present moment, to communicate that information to the world. (*Hear, hear, hear.*) While I state this, however, Sir, I hope my right hon. friend will not misunderstand me so much as to suppose that I impute to him any blame for this proceeding, or that I undervalue the pledge which he has given us of his support in any plan of active operations which it may be deemed advisable to adopt with respect to Spain; the more especially when it is considered, that in that pledge may be implied the support of those persons with whom my right hon. friend is accustomed to act in parliament, and of whose body he is so eminent and distinguished a member. Sir, I should have been far from charging my right hon. friend with blame, even had he gone so far as to chalk out to his majesty's ministers the line of conduct that in his opinion it would be expedient for them to pursue. From this he has abstained. Indisposed as I should have been to censure my right hon. friend, had he proceeded to that extent, I cannot but feel that his speech, moderate as it has been, calls for such a general disclosure of the sentiments of his majesty's ministers as cannot be made without hazard, without a dishonourable compromise, and without exciting expectations which may never be realised. It is, therefore, Sir, I declared to the house and to the country, that his majesty's ministers see with as deep and lively an interest as my right hon. friend, he noble struggle which a part of the Spanish

nation is now making to resist the un-
 exemplified atrocity of France, and to pre-
 serve the independence of their country ;
 and that there exists the strongest dispo-
 sition on the part of the British Govern-
 ment to afford every practicable aid in a
 contest so magnanimous. In endeavour-
 ing to afford this aid, Sir, it will never
 occur to us to consider that a state of war
 exists between Spain and Great Britain.
 —(Hear, hear, hear!) We shall pro-
 ceed upon the principle, that any nation
 of Europe that starts up with a determi-
 nation to oppose a power which, whether
 professing insidious peace or declaring
 open war, is the common enemy of all
 nations, whatever may be the existing
 political relations of that nation with
 Great Britain, becomes instantly our es-
 sential ally. In that event his majesty's
 ministers will have three objects in view.
 The first to direct the united efforts of
 the two countries against the common
 foe ; the second to direct those efforts in
 a way which shall be most beneficial to
 the new ally ; the third, to direct them
 in a manner conducive to peculiarly Bri-
 tish interests. But, Sir, of those objects,
 the last will be out of the question, as
 compared with the other two. These are
 the sentiments with which his majesty's
 government are inspired. To the mea-
 sures which these sentiments may dictate,
 they confidently look for the support
 of parliament and of the country. It
 cannot, sir, be expected that I should say
 whether we think the crisis arrived, or
 whether we anticipate its speedy ap-
 proach, when the sentiments which I
 have described must be called into action.
 It is sufficient that I have stated what we
 feel, and what we intend. (Hear, hear,
 hear!)—For these reasons, sir, which I
 have before-mentioned, I am compelled
 to dissent from my right hon. friend's mo-
 tion.—What is there here that is like-
 ly to inspire the Spanish patriots with confi-
 dence? “To direct their efforts in a way
 the most beneficial to the new ally.”
 Aye, but there is nothing to guide us in our
 conjectures as to *what the ministers think*
will be the most beneficial to that new ally.
 They may look upon a restoration of the
 monarchy, in the persons of those who gave
 up the sword of FRANCIS I., the most bene-
 ficial to the patriots of Spain. They may in-
 tend to exact, as the price of the aid to be
 given, that there shall be no essential change
 in the government, the ranks, and orders,
 in Spain ; and, were I a Spaniard, rather
 than receive their aid upon such conditions,

I would, after using all the means in my own
 power to keep them out, admit Napoleon
 and his government. To be sure, the mi-
 nisters were not pressed for a declaration.
 Mr. Sheridan took care that his motion
 should not be an annoyance to them. But,
 though not pressed, they should have made
 an explicit declaration, that they would by
 no means, and in no manner whatever,
 attempt to dictate to the people of Spain, as
 to the choice of their future government.
 If it were proper to interfere at all, it would
 be merely in the way of advice, and this
 might be very well, and, perhaps, very pro-
 perly, conveyed in a proclamation. Why
 should there be any skulking upon the sub-
 ject? Why not issue a proclamation, at
 once, declaring, that the people of Spain
 shall have all the aid that England can give
 them in shaking off the yoke of both sorts
 of tyranny? In such a proclamation, a
 hope might be expressed, that (in case of
 success) the Spaniards would not be so fool-
 ish as to suffer themselves to be cajoled into
 the adoption of a sort of government, which,
 under the names of law and liberty, would
 strip them of almost their very skins, or,
 which would be worse, would make them
 strip one another; would make them
 mulet, pillage, rob, whip, gag, imprison,
 and ruin one another. The Spaniards might,
 in such a proclamation, be reminded, that
 a state, like that here described, would be,
 beyond comparison, more painful and dis-
 graceful, than that of a people, living under
 a simple despotism, devoid of the hypocriti-
 cal disguise of liberty and law. They might
 be warned not to suffer themselves to become
 the partisans of political adventurers, who
 would use them merely as instruments in
 obtaining the means of robbing them with
 impunity, and who, though engaged in a
 continual strife against each other, hating
 each other more than monks, would yet,
 whenever occasion served, join like a band
 of brothers, against the people ; to oppress,
 grind, and insult whom they would regard as
 an object in the furtherance of which all party
 animosities ought to be laid aside. The
 Spaniards might well have been warned to
 shun this, the greatest of all political evils,
 the most complete of all disgraces, the in-
 famy of infamies. Against suffering a sys-
 tem of domestic plunder to be established
 the people of Spain might, in a proclama-
 tion of our king, have been cautioned ;
 against suffering to grow up a numerous
 order in the state, to be kept in idleness, to
 be fed, to be rattened, to be pampered in all
 manner of vices, by means drawn from the
 labour of the industrious and from the inge-

nity of the ingenious; against suffering bribery and corruption to worm themselves into their new government, whatever its form might be, till, at last, they got the power of putting almost to death every one who would dare to say, that they ought not to exist; against becoming spies upon each other; against being made the tools of intriguers and tyrants; against being induced, for the lucre of those tyrants, to harass and kill one another; against, in short, every thing which is held in abhorrence by a good constitution. Like, for instance, that of England. This would have been a wholesome lesson to inculcate in the minds of the Spaniards; who might, further, have been advised, if they did choose any one man to be at the head of their government, to take special care, to choose a man of sense, and of *real* virtue, whatever might be his origin, or his former rank; and to take a cobbler of this description, in preference to a prince, who should be a notorious fool, or profligate, or, perhaps, both. And, then, as to their army, they might have been most urgently exhorted not to put it under the command of any one who had discovered a mind fitted for nothing but low and pitiful arrangements and pursuits; such men, whatever their rank in the army, being evidently made for tailors or hair-dressers. The commanders, particularly in times of such importance, should all be men of great wisdom, and should be so regarded by the whole nation. There will, of course, be no bribery and corruption, in Spain, at first, and, therefore, commands in the army will not be bestowed upon silly boobies, by way of bribe to their fathers, or other relations; and, I trust, that mothers and wives and sisters and she-cousins and kept-mistresses will have very little to do in the appointing of generals and other officers. But, above all things, the Spanish patriots should be advised to take care not to appoint for the commander of their army, a notorious stinking coward, a fellow the history of whose campaigns would be the reverse of the old proverb, and whose motto might be, "one pair of heels is worth two pair of heads." If such a man, such a winged-heeled gentleman, such a beaten thing, should be to be found in their country, they may make a kennel-sweeper of him; but, if they suffer him to be the commander of their army, they will be, and they ought to be, conquered and enslaved for ever. No, no: the Spaniards, if they are bent upon resistance, have no real war to carry on; some real fighting; no field-day, no sham-fights: no drill-work; and, if they have not a

commander of wisdom, talents, courage, and character, their chance is but very small indeed.—All this might, I think, have been said, in a proclamation, issued, at this time; but, no attempt should be made to interfere in any internal regulations, which the Spanish patriots may choose to adopt. That is their own affair. Experience has taught them what their late government was; it should be left entirely to themselves, either to take it again, or to reject it; and, upon this point in particular, I am extremely anxious, that our government should be explicit.—There was, the other day, a sentiment dropped, as it were accidentally, in the *Morning Post*, that rather alarmed me, which was this: that, if we succeeded in our assistance to drive the French out of Spain, the Spanish part of the family of Bourbon must become strongly attached to this country. This is a very ugly sentiment, and very alarming, if we suppose the editor not to have acted, in this instance, without authority; for, if we are to make war for the king or prince of Spain, we shall assuredly fail; and that, too, without exciting sorrow in the breast of any man who thinks rightly upon the subject. The royal family of Spain, after having, for so many years, wallowed in ease and luxury at the expense of the people of that country, make not a single effort to defend it; no, nor even to defend the titles, under which they had exercised their authority, and had drawn from the labour of the people the means of supporting so voluptuous a life. Upon the first summons, they surrender. In order to prevent hazard to their lives, and to secure the enjoyment of luxuries to the end of their days, they resign their titles and dignities; they, in fact, sell the people of Spain to Buonaparté for the purpose of providing a maintenance for themselves: and, the last use they make of the name of *king*, is, to command the people to obey their enemies; that is to say, to become slaves to a new master without resistance. This is, I think, the most like the transfer of an estate, together with the cattle upon it, of any thing that I have yet heard of. To endeavour to induce the people of Spain to shed their blood for the sake of this family would be an act of unparalleled insolence. I hope, therefore, the newspaper, to which I have referred, uttered the sentiment, upon which I have been remarking, without authority.—There is an attempt made to make us believe, that the prince of Asturias did issue a proclamation, calling upon the people of Spain to resist the French. But, why did he not *stay to help*? This is a poor shift

for the purpose of screening him and his family from odium. There is nothing that can be pleaded in excuse for his conduct. He *must* be a miserable coward. But, such is the natural consequence of a luxurious and profligate life. The man, whose time is spent amongst drunkards and harlots and players and musicians, naturally and necessarily becomes base, in every sense in which the word can be taken. Such society would degrade the highest spirit that ever man was born with; and hence it is, that, when a nation becomes generally effeminate, it touches upon the verge of its fall, from which it can be saved only by some great convulsion, which, though it never fails to produce great suffering, does, at the same time, draw forth great talents. If this latter should be the case in Spain, that nation will be again great in the world; but, if no convulsion takes place, there will be merely a change of masters.—To return, for a moment, to the speeches in parliament; it was curious to observe the coquetry between Mr. Sheridan and the ministers, to whom he offered his support. *His support!* They must have laughed heartily at this, when they got home. Lord Castlereagh contrasted “the *noble warmth*” of Mr. Sheridan’s patriotism with the coldness of some others of his party. Aye, my lord, but what of warmth did *you* utter? You said nothing at all about the cause of *the people* of Spain. Against Napoleon you said enough; but, nothing for *the people of Spain*. Not a word. What call was there, then, for any pledge to support you, or your intended measures?—And, since we are upon that topic, why blame Buonaparté in this outrageous manner? Did we never before hear of invading and overrunning and conquering states which had not offended the conqueror? Is this the first time that we ever heard of sovereign princes being dethroned by those with whom they were in alliance, and to whom they had given no just cause of offence? Why, if the royal family of Spain had been carried away by force, had been shut up in a dungeon, and had, at the end of a short time, been murdered, we might, I think, recollect, without much trouble, instances to match such proceedings. Napoleon has not, that I know, actually *robbed* the Spaniards; he has not sent armed men to beat them up in the night, and to take their money and jewels from them; nor has he, in the indulgence of mere caprice, shot any of them to death. Till he does this, he does not come up to certain base tyrants that we have heard and read of. It is, to be sure, an abominable act of profligacy to pre-

tend, that the Spanish royal family really wished to give up their kingdom to him. To produce the old king’s act of abdication; to produce treaties made with him; to produce any act of his in proof of Napoleon’s rightful possession of Spain, is abominably impudent. But, if we reflect a little, we shall find him to be nothing more than a clumsy imitator at this work. He has not to boast of the original invention; nor can he, until he shall have caused the whole of the royal family to be murdered, while, at the same time, he has been professing a tender regard for their safety, put forward any claim to an equality with his teachers in the noble science.—Therefore, I could wish honourable gentlemen to moderate their expressions of censure against the Emperor of France; or, at least, that if, upon searching history, they find other conquerors, who have been infinitely more base in assuming the sovereignty of independent and unoffending states, they will spare for them some portion of their virtuous abhorrence.—As to the probability of the people of Spain succeeding in driving out the French, I should fear that it was very weak indeed. The emperor has had time to concert all his measures. The nobility were but too much like the court; and, with the natural leaders at home against them, while a powerful French army is in the heart of the kingdom, and while other powerful armies are pouring in, in every direction, what are the people to do? If there had been a large German army at Paris, in 1791, the French revolution would never have taken place. Nevertheless, if there should be a pretty general spirit of resistance; it will cost much blood to subjugate the country; and certainly our ministers are doing right in sending off assistance to the revolvers. That can do *no harm*, and it may do good. It is, however, a curious turn, which the war has taken, at last. We are now aiding a people against their sovereign. Disguise it how we will, this is the fact. The king of Spain has ceded his sovereignty to Buonaparté. A sovereignty ceded is a sovereignty rightfully possessed; and, I should like to hear the sticklers for “the law of nations” attempt to show how it is that the emperor is not, at this moment, the rightful sovereign of Spain. Mind, I do not wish to hint a doubt as to our right to aid and abet the people of Spain against their sovereign; but, I say, that it is a curious turn which the war has taken at last. We are now at war, by the side of Democracy against Despotism; and this certainly was not the case at the outset of the war which began.

1793. I have often had occasion to say, that now, since the emperorship of Buonaparté took place, it is not *democracy*, but *despotism*, that we have to fear. Democratical societies might now, one would think, meet with the countenance of the government. What think you, my lord Castle-reagh, of a democratical society for raising money to assist the patriots in Spain? The thing would be quite natural, and yet I'll warrant, that the very mention of it will make some people's teeth chatter in their heads. — I have been much amused with suppositions as to what must have passed amongst the divers sets of office-holders in Spain, at the dissolution of the old government. How the placemen and pensioners must have stared at one another, when they saw the old king's act of abdication; for, they never could suppose, that Napoleon would continue to pay them. What an outcry there must have been amongst all those, who had so long lived in idleness upon the labour of the people! What confusion amongst the tax-gatherers! What wringing of hands and tearing of hair amongst the strumpets, who were kept upon the taxes! And, if there were in Spain, any old intriguing, battered, titled hags, the constant defenders of peculators of every description, how chap-fallen the old devils must have been! I think I see them now, the un-renewed paint sticking in the wrinkles, their wigs uncombed, and their teeth scattered upon the toilet, while ruffian French grenadiers are mounting the stairs, and upon the point of tossing them out as so many bundles of filth. How it must have amused the people to see the humble and mournful looks of thousands and thousands of saucy rascals, who, but a few days before, treated them with disdain, at the same time that they were living upon the fruit of their labour. All these people, and all the numerous swarms of lacquies and strumpets whom they kept to administer to their pleasures, must now labour or starve. They will all pass now for just what they were worth, and no more. They will not work, however; they will thieve, and then they will be hanged. — These gentry thought, doubtless, that they were secure in their enjoyments for life. They saw the misery of the people; they saw them writhe under the torment of being obliged to submit, in silence, to extortion and plunder; but, they said to themselves, "let them writhe; for they cannot destroy our authority, or suffer it to be destroyed by France, without exposing all property to destruction. For their own sakes, therefore, they will submit to be

"robbed and insulted by us. Come on, then? let us add to, instead of diminishing, the length of our spurs; for the greater the danger from without, the more perfect will be the submission within." They deceived themselves; and they have now found, that it was possible to ride with spurs so long as to leave the people *nothing to dread* from without. They had got the people's all, except there mere lives, and what could the French get more? The French could not carry away the land or the houses; if they killed the people they would have nobody to rule over; a *change* of property they might make, but still somebody must possess it; and, therefore, after all, it was only the few, and principally those who lived upon the labour of the people, who would experience any very serious suffering from the change. Nothing of this sort appears to have occurred to the bribing and corrupting gentlemen, nor to any of the bands of aumils and peculators, who seem, besides, to have quite forgotten, that revenge is not a very calculating passion, and that men, when pushed to extremity, care not if they do lose, and lose a good deal too, for the sake of seeing punishment inflicted upon those, by whom they have been long and deeply injured, especially if the injury be accompanied with insult, and the injurer, wrapped up in the impunity of office, laughs at the agonies of the injured. That the Spaniards will soon find themselves beset with new aumils and peculators, new bribers and corruptors, new robbers and insulters, I have little doubt. But, they will have seen the fall of their former enemies; and, it will, at any rate, be some time, some years, before the new ones will be able so completely to oppress them as they were oppressed before. That part of tyranny, which comes into every man's house and affairs, is a long while in growing to perfection. It creeps, by slow degrees, over a man, as the accursed ivy does over the oak. As it advances in the shoot, it gets stronger and stronger in the stem. Each new act of tyranny strengthens and confirms all that have been enacted before. But, when once the whole is loosened and torn down, though it may grow up again, that growth must be a work of time; and, in the interim, though in the midst of convulsions, men enjoy something like freedom. Though the bribers and robbers, in Spain, did not reason in this way, the people did. Instinct would teach them this. They knew, they felt, that they could not change for the worse. Their bare lives were all that they had left, and those they were naturally not

disposed to venture for the preservation of that which had reduced them to such a miserable state. To terrify a people with pictures of danger from without, and to rob and insult them under the security derived from that terror, will do for some time; but, it will not do for ever. It is not in the nature of the human mind to entertain terror for life. When it becomes familiar, it is no longer terror, and then, woe be unto those, by whom it has been excited, and who have thereon depended for impunity.

MR. ROSCOE AND MR. FOX.—In another part of this sheet, will be found, in a letter from a correspondent, a postscript to a new pamphlet, which, it appears, Mr. Roscoe has published relative to the conduct of Mr. Fox in the affair of the Passy Assassin. From this postscript, it is made clear (for I will not doubt the word of Mr. Roscoe respecting the documents and the information of Mr. Brooke), that the pretended assassin did really come from France, and was sent out of the country, in about three weeks afterwards. Mr. Roscoe now cries "calumny." But, as to myself, to whom he evidently alludes, I never said, that the invention was Mr. Fox's. I never said, that I believed it to be so. A correspondent of mine did say that he believed it; and, certainly, the thing was so incredible, as a real transaction, that any one was free to form his opinion respecting it. What I said, I still say: and, that is, that "Mr. Fox" must have seen through the trick; or, at "the very best, he was the dupe of Talleyrand." This was what I said; and I should not have gone too far in asserting, that, in not exposing the vile trick, Mr. Fox made himself a sort of accomplice in it. Mr. Roscoe makes no attempt to shew, that Mr. Fox ought to have considered the man as a real assassin. He says nothing to convince us that it was not a trick of Talleyrand; and he will please to recollect, that that was the main point for him to clear up. Mr. Fox could not have been in office more than a week when the assassin arrived. He was dispatched the moment the news of the change of ministry was received in France. It was evidently a dirty trick; and it was Mr. Fox's duty to expose it, instead of giving it countenance. Why was the man hurried out of the country? Why not have kept him here, till an account of the whole plot at Passy had been unravelled: till its existence had been proved? If Talleyrand could have sent over proofs of the existence of the plot, then the man might have been sent off; otherwise he ought to have been considered and treated as

a spy. Mr. Fox seems to have been afraid of obtaining proof of the trick; and Mr. Roscoe, even now, carefully abstains from saying any thing upon the conduct of Talleyrand, as to this matter, conscious apparently, that the less is said about it, the better. I did not wish to fix upon the memory of Mr. Fox the scandal of having been the inventor of such a paltry trick, but, it was my duty, in answering Mr. Roscoe, to expose the trick itself, and to take the shine off that eulogium which he thought proper to bestow upon the greatness of mind of the man, who was either an accessory to, or the dupe of, that trick.

MR. PALMER.—There is, I perceive, a committee formed, in the House of Lords, for investigating certain circumstances, relative to this gentleman's claim; and, from what has dropped, I am inclined to fear, that the decision of the House of Commons will be reversed. The spirit of "the great man now no more" is mighty still; and mighty it will be, until a material change take place. Of the nature of Mr. Palmer's claim, of the justice of it, enough was said in my former article upon the subject; and, indeed, there is nothing that can be said to procure him justice, if what has already been said be not sufficient. But, what is the most grating to one, is, to hear the sum due to this gentleman represented as enormous, and the paying of it as a waste of the public money, while not a word is said of the thousands and hundreds of thousands, which are annually paid out of the taxes to sinecure placemen and pensioners.—Lord Liverpool is Collector of the Customs with a monstrous salary; Lord Hawkesbury has four thousand pounds a year, as Warden of the Cinque Ports, while he has still more as Secretary of State; Lord Auckland has a large pension himself, another for his wife, and his son has many thousands of pounds a year, as one of the tellers of the Exchequer, his gains keeping pace with the increase of the taxes and the distresses of the people; Mr. Rose is in the receipt of immense sums annually from the taxes, and has taken care to have one of his places (worth four thousand a year at least) settled, in reversion, upon his son. But, the list would be endless. A committee was appointed, upon an amended motion of Lord Cochrane, to make out, and lay before parliament, a list of all the pensioners and sinecure place-holders. This list has not, I believe, been yet laid before the House. Two sessions have passed since it was moved for, and ordered. By the help of this list, we might afford the public some amusing information. If w

had this list before us, we might be able to make a striking contrast between the grants to others for doing nothing and this objection to the paying of Mr. Palmer for what he really earned, and which is as much his *due* as the wages of a journeyman are his due on a Saturday night.—Mr. Palmer was a man of too much merit and spirit to profit in such a concern, engaged with such people. He should have learnt to lick spittle, and have drilled himself to crawl upon his belly. This he could not do: well, then, he should have kept his invention to himself. What has he obtained? A life of vexation, from which he might have been free. He has not the *public* to blame. They would cheerfully pay him, and save the money by the reduction of useless expenses. If he chose to have dealings with the Pitts, that is no fault of the public. They would rather pay him than pay pensions to Lady Auckland and the like; but, if he chose to confide in "the great man now no more," they are not answerable for it.

N. B. I have received a long letter, containing an eulogium on Mr. Coke, of Norfolk, and, as I have no objection to an eulogium of that gentleman, I shall insert it in my next Number, if I have not room for it in this. If possible, it shall be inserted in this; but if the *indexes*, &c. which *must* come into this number, do not leave room for it, I beg the writer to be assured, that no further delay shall take place.

Botley, June 22, 1808.

MR. ROSCOE AND MR. FOX.

SIR,—As a constant reader of your journal and a friend to truth, I request your insertion of the POSTSCRIPT to a late pamphlet of Mr. Roscoe's, entitled, "*Remarks on the Proposals made to Great Britain for opening Negotiations for Peace in the Year 1807.*"—I confidently rely upon your candour for insertion of this, as I think it only just, that the false insinuation of your correspondent should be contradicted in the same journal which gave it birth.—I am, Sir,—AN ADMIRER OF MR. FOX.—*Newcastle upon Tyne, June, 8, 1808.*

POSTSCRIPT.

Perhaps there never was an instance of more gross and unfounded calumny than in a recent attempt to asperse the memory, and impeach the veracity of the late Mr. Fox, by insinuating that the proposal made to him respecting the assassin's nation of the French ruler, as related by him in his letter to M. Talleyrand, was a story fabricated by himself, for the purpose of bringing on a negotiation with France. The more

immediate friends of Mr. Fox have disdained to take any public notice of the false assertions, and scandalous imputations to which I allude; and I can scarcely suppose that any of my readers require further evidence, than what is contained in Mr. Fox's letter, of a fact, with regard to which his character and veracity are opposed to the malicious and wanton accusations which have been made against him. But that no possible doubt may hereafter remain as to this transaction, and for the entire refutation of these slanders, I think it incumbent upon me to state, from indisputable authority, that there exists evidence, in documents at the Alien Office, of the arrival at Gravesend, of the person named and described in Mr. Fox's letters; of his application from that place for an audience with Mr. Fox; of his private interview with that gentleman at his house in Arlington-street; of Mr. Fox's order, in the first instance, to send the Frenchman out of the kingdom, and of his subsequent revocation of that order, in consequence of which the intended assassin was detained in custody three weeks, and was then embarked at Harwich, on board a vessel bound for Husum. When to these particulars it is added, that the person who accompanied the Frenchman to the interview with Mr. Fox, and who acted under his directions in the measures taken for sending him out of the kingdom, was Mr. Brooke, who yet holds the same situation in the Alien Office, as he did under the administration of Mr. Fox, I trust it will be wholly unnecessary for me to state any thing further in vindication of that distinguished character, against so malignant and foul a charge.

MR. COKE OF NORFOLK.

SIR,—As I am a constant reader of your Register, I believe there are few subjects that escape my observation: certainly, none of those which contain your sentiments. Although I may differ from you in opinion relative to some of them, yet I cannot avoid expressing my thanks for the pleasure and information I have frequently derived from your labours, and what in my mind is of vastly more importance than individual interest, the concern you take in the welfare of the community demands still more forcibly those thanks; being like yourself only anxious to behold the prosperity of my native land. If it be remarked by those who never will coincide with you, so long as you continue to speak the truth, that your *personal* attacks are often too severe, nay,

what they term unpardonable, your friends, Sir, will do you the justice to declare, that no one more readily contradicts an assertion which has been founded either in misrepresentation, or from not being perfectly acquainted with him concerning whom you are speaking. That rank or fortune should prove no shield to the degrading acts of those who are placed in elevated situations, I perfectly agree with you, and that such a mirror as your Register exists to afford to public characters the opportunity of seeing their faults and their vices, I consider a most fortunate circumstance for the people. But, Sir, as you appear desirous of taking for your motto that most admirable sentence—"Nothing to extenuate nor set down aught in malice," I feel convinced you will be obliged to any of your readers who will point out those mistakes you unintentionally may have committed; or, even if you should still retain your opinion, who in many argument will differ from you in that opinion; leaving it to the public to correct or confirm the judgment of either.—On reading your Register of the 28th of May, I was greatly astonished at some remarks which were made on Mr. Coke of Norfolk, and if they were not positively addressed to him, his tenants, and to other gentlemen who have exerted every laudable endeavour to encourage industry, reward labour, and promote the general good of the kingdom, they were evidently written with the intention of being applied to them, and solely to them. I shall not, Sir, at this time proceed to state to you the advantages which I consider have arisen from the formation of agricultural societies composed of the most learned men we can boast, and of the best practical, liberal, and enlightened cultivators of land; but, it is my wish to mention some of the most prominent traits in the character of Mr. Coke; that any false impression which may have been made on the minds of that part of your readers who do not know Mr. Coke, may hear that which with perfect truth is advanced in his praise.—Thus, Sir, an opportunity will be afforded to you, and to them afterwards, to declare, whether or not they consider Mr. Coke to be deserving that public testimony of esteem the inhabitants of Norfolk have so long bestowed in electing him their representative; whether or not he may be truly said to reign in the hearts of his tenants and his friends; whether or not he has deserved, although he never received, those marks of distinction conferred on many; although they were conspicuous for their enmity to patriotism—a thorough contempt for the laws of the land

—disregarding the interests of the people, and only shewing a desire to enrich themselves at the expence of the country.—First, Sir, considering Mr. Coke as an Agriculturist, it will be necessary to recall the attention of your readers to the state of the county of Norfolk, previous to that gentleman's becoming the proprietor of the immense tracts of land he now possesses; and which, I believe, would have worn a very different aspect, had any other person inherited them. The residence of Mr. Coke but a short period before was a barren spot; the lands around scarcely to be termed cultivated; the greatest part of the western district conspicuous for its growth of rye; the race of sheep such as disgraced the breeders of that animal; the farmers' men who imbibed all the system of the preceding century, and neither emulation nor encouragement prevailed. Although, when Mr. Coke became the sole manager of his property, it may justly be said, speaking figuratively, that the foundation stone of the fabric was laid, yet it was left to him to rear and complete the noble structure. More enraptured with the solid comforts of domestic life, than the transitory joys obtained in courts and palaces, Mr. Coke devoted his time to two of the most laudable pursuits which can engage the attention of man—the increase of his own property, and the happiness of those by whom he was surrounded. While other distinguished characters were lavishing thousands and tens of thousands at the gaming table; on the turf; in empty parade; in disgusting masquerades and useless routes: he was inviting to his house and courting the society of men, the most reputed for their agricultural knowledge. He sought for the first breeders of stock of every description: he attended himself to the management and improvement of a flock of 4000 sheep; and the most ingenious manufacturers of their produce were ever welcome guests at his hospitable board.—Mr. Coke's invaluable Library, thrown open to all his friends, contained every publication deserving the notice of the farmer; and the superior information which from such various sources he had derived, was disseminated on every occasion, and that at no small expence, if the printing works on tillage were alone considered. One day in every week was given up by himself and his family to oblige those that chose to examine his gardens, his nurseries, his parks, his farms, his numerous breeds of cattle, his newly invented implements of every description; and he added to this gratification of the visitors, by permitting them to enter

every room in his princely abode. Three days were also annually appointed for *general inspection*, and for the sale or the letting of such stock, as on trial were found to be best adapted to the different soils of the kingdom; but more especially those in Norfolk, and to obtain this knowledge with the best mode of benefiting poor lands, *five thousand* pounds were every year devoted. The motto which Mr. Coke chose was "LIVE AND LET LIVE;" and, determining to render his tenants independent yeomen, he granted long leases, and on such terms as he knew must induce them, for *their own* as well as his sake, to enhance the value of his estates. He erected them houses fit for the residence of gentlemen, and all the external buildings were not to be surpassed for convenience. Vast sums were expended by Mr. Coke in the purchase of the most elegant and costly pieces of plate given to stimulate industry; and, while the farmer himself with honest pride displayed such well earned prizes, he had the additional satisfaction of knowing that his arable land was become more productive; that his breeds of cattle, particularly his flocks, increased in number and in quality; and that his servants were rewarded because they were patterns of industry and integrity. His wife also had equal pride in shewing that the management of the concerns *within* doors was equal to that *without*, and her maids received public gifts for their good conduct, and the extraordinary produce of the dairy; as well as the shepherds for their fostering care of the lambs and the ewes.—To the encouragement of Planting, Mr. Coke paid particular attention; especially to the growth of the oak for the use of the navy, where it could be raised; and in his own domain, amidst 800 acres of ornamental and profitable wood, is his mansion embosomed. With years of toil, and with a fortune which might have supported even princes, did Mr. Coke alter the face of a whole county. *One hundred thousand* acres of land were, by his exertions, brought into cultivation. The barley and turnip system was introduced, layers were regularly sown; and, in one of the largest districts, where before only rye was seen, astonishing breadths of the finest wheats were now annually grown. This large portion of the sustenance of human life, supported the increasing population. Heaths hitherto barren, groaned for the sickle and the scythe; farm houses, and stack yards full of corn every where appeared; in a once desolate country riches in abundance met the gladdened eye, and the grateful mind naturally reverted to him who had effected so much

good, and conferred happiness and wealth, not only on individuals, but whole families and generations.—But, even then, Mr. Coke saw that one great evil still remained, an evil more to be dreaded in Norfolk than any county in England, from the lightness of the soil; this was the poverty of much of the uplands, and most of the low meadows and marshes. If the turnip crop failed, (the Norfolk farmer's great resource) what were they to do under these circumstances? or, if substitutes were found, they must have been procured at a great expence. Mr. Coke had the mortification to find there were ninety thousand acres of land of this unprofitable description, and the value of great part of it entirely destroyed by the constant inundations of the sea. Therefore, he first selected and brought to his house from a great distance, one of the most able engineers, who was also possessed of vast geological knowledge (Mr. William Smith, mineralogist); and in a short time, considering the magnitude of the concern, he recovered *forty-five thousand* acres from the power of the German ocean, whose raging tides had hitherto been deemed irresistible to the efforts of human art: and this mighty undertaking was accomplished for the small sum of little more than *two thousand* pounds, and to effect which the lowest calculation delivered by those previously employed to estimate, and who were considered very capable to judge from their official situations, amounted to near *thirty-five thousand*: and thus, through the means of Mr. Coke, in this single instance, a saving to the county of more than *thirty thousand* pounds was obtained. The same gentleman (Mr. Smith) was employed to render the boggy, gravelly, and useless lands on Mr. Coke's estates, more productive; and, by drainage and irrigation, converting them into *water meadows*, they were made more profitable than even the oldest and the best pastures. Mr. Coke, for this truly spirited *example* (which was immediately adopted by many landed proprietors to a considerable extent) was presented by the Board of Agriculture with the gold medal. Mr. Smith, for his masterly style in conducting such works, was honoured by the Society of Arts with a silver medal; and, for his book on this subject also publicly received the thanks of their members. That such astonishing and incredible improvements might the more rapidly spread throughout the county, Mr. Coke, to induce his tenants and *all other* occupiers of lands to *unite* with him in such labours, annually gave them massive *vases* of plate, and every liberal encouragement

Large tracts of swampy lands, where the men walked up to their knees in water to mow off the rushes, were drained and fertilized even to the growing of corn. Some of a sterile and more boggy nature were made firm; and natural and artificial grasses enriched the soil: many which before would not bear a cow nor feed a sheep, yielded from two to three tons per acre, of most excellent food; exclusive of the large quantities of stock, maintained in the spring and the autumn; and off others, immense crops of tares and pulse were harvested, which had been dibbled on the surface. It is likewise in contemplation, on a most judicious plan, to propose to open a *navigation* through the interior of the county, that a free communication may exist between the two principal seaports; or, at least, that it may be carried through part of the distance, where it does not now extend; and, which may easily be effected in a manner most beneficial to the inhabitants. Thus, the labour of man and beast is much decreased; the produce of the land greatly increased; agricultural implements improved, beyond description; and a brilliant example has been shewn, worthy the imitation of *every* landlord. But, sir, when at the annual festivity of the sheep-shearing at Holkham, I beheld thousands of people witnessing a scene that is not known elsewhere, when I look around me, and discover the most scientific men in the empire, assembled to give and to *obtain* information; when I see Mr. Coke's tenants are gentlemen of enlightened minds and liberal education; fellow labourers in the same vineyard; fit associates for such dignified characters, as the dukes * of Bedford, lord Thames, lord Somerville, sir John Sinclair, Mr. Arthur Young, &c. &c.; when I behold foreigners of the *first rank* from various parts of the world, and hear them exclaim, as I have, that "we petty monarchs" of little states, could have formed no such "ideas;" when I see Mr. Coke at his table, surrounded by five hundred of such men as I have named, who look up to him with a fervor of esteem and degree of veneration, which kings may envy, but do not obtain.—Why, then, if this, Mr. Cobbett, is, what you call "ambition," would to God that every Englishman's bosom glowed with the same ambitious hopes; the same desire to be as much respected; and I should have no fear for England's safety! If such a mode of passing through life be called a proof of "little talents," happy, in my humble opinion, is he who possesses that

* I say dukes as I wish to speak in the plural.

little. If these men from whom this respect and love are obtained can be termed "knaves or fools," for expressing their estimation of such a patriot, why then, proud may they be on this occasion, to merit the title of either the one or the other.—On this subject, I could add a great deal more, but, less I could not well say. Relative to Mr. Coke's political conduct; has he not always been consistent? What was it during the American war? Did he not then receive the *thanks of the country*, for his patriotic proceedings? Pursue him through the whole career of his parliamentary duties, and say, where he has been inconsistent. Neither titles nor pomp nor power, could ever purchase his integrity; and the glittering useless baubles of state sycophancy have been neglected for the more estimable, and more lasting treasures of GENERAL admiration, and UNIVERSAL esteem. As a husband, a father, a master, a landlord, and a friend, it is needless for me to say any thing in Mr. Coke's favour. Point out to me such another man, considered in those various *public and private* views in which his character is to be regarded; and I will then admit, that the kingdom contains two persons, one of whom alone I believed to exist.—Having, Sir, merely fulfilled what I thought was my duty, (as a member of that society of which Mr. Coke was solicited to be the president), in stating my ideas, why I considered the attack on him UNMERITED, particularly by so public a writer, I trust you will excuse me for having engaged so much of your valuable time; but, *weak indeed* must be that cause which does not possess an advocate, and *truly degenerate* that fraternity, amongst whom not one appears to vindicate the dignified, consistent, and manly conduct of their patron.—THOMAS ROOPE.—*Lakenham Cottage, Norwich, June 9, 1808.*

TITHES.

SIR;—I am sorry to see that your late contests with the land-owners and farmers has led you to attempt the defence of the present mode of taking tithes. I think that even all your powers of argument will be unable to convince disinterested men, that they are not, under the present system, a great bar to improvements in agriculture, and render many of the clergy odious in the eyes of numbers, who, under other circumstances, would be friends to the established church; and I should suppose that the clergy would very readily agree to a *fair* commutation, except a few whose thirst for domination over their parishioners is stronger than their desire of being respected by them.—

That tithes are not the rightful property, by long custom, of those to whom they are due, few, if any, I believe will deny; but that they are not a greater hardship than a rent, when collected in kind, or an advanced money-payment demanded for them when the produce is increased by superior management, you are very far from proving. If rents were taken in kind, do you think agriculture would flourish as it does? ask those who have seen the Metayers' farms in France. In those parishes where the tithes are impropriate, the clergyman is far more likely to be beloved by his flock, but they are no less a bar to agricultural improvements. If the tithes were appropriated to the purposes for which they were originally given; namely, one part to the bishop, another to the repairing of churches, another for the support of the poor, and the remainder for the support of the clergyman, perhaps the "sect of cultivators" would not so loudly complain of their hardship, and we should not so often hear of country churches becoming so ruinous as to be dangerous to celebrate divine worship in, and that the parishioners are wholly unable to repair them, "being chiefly tenants at rack rent, and greatly burthened with poor!"—You ask, "for what should new enclosures be exempted from the payment of tithes, for some years at least?" For what? Because the owner or occupier *ought* to have the expense of enclosing fully repaid, before the tithe owner *ought* to touch the produce. In strict justice he ought never to have more than a tenth part of the profit which the land yielded in its natural state, and neither the church nor the poor could justly complain of being robbed. If a man encloses, and brings into cultivation the lands of another, he either has it rent free, or at a low one until it repays him, and if you had had any experience in inclosing, you would know it is not done, but at a very considerable expense, sometimes greater than lands even *tithe-free* ever repay. But it appears you are not acquainted with the *practice* of agriculture, or you would know that where manure is to be sold, and lands tithe free, and lands from which they are rigidly taken, are equally situated for receiving it, that far the greater part of it will be applied to the former, and thus "the church and the poor would be robbed." I will ask you, Sir, if you were a hard-working farmer, and could, at the expense of ninety-two pounds, and a good deal of toil and labour, procure as much dung, road-scrappings, waste earth, &c. as would make your farm produce a hundred pounds' worth

more of hay or corn than it would do without it, and when produced, the tithing man was to come and take a tenth of it, thus causing you to lose £2 instead of gaining £8: whether you would lay out your capital, or remain content with the "natural produce" of your farm? Your answer to this question will oblige A FRIEND TO LIBERAL-MINDED AGRICULTURISTS.—Norton, near Malton, June 9th, 1808.

P. S. The land-owners and farmers are certainly very much alarmed, lest *their* interests should suffer by stopping the distillation from corn, but I think you have clearly shewn the fallaciousness of their arguments; certainly, barley and oats are as high now as they can desire them to be: but, I suppose their opposition to it arose from the same liberality of sentiment which made "Pitt and "War" such a favourite toast at the farmers' market dinners, because we *fortunately* had some bad harvests during his administration, and the same cause makes *talem* now so strenuously argue, that we ought not to make peace so long as Buonaparte reigns; some of the less cunning acknowledge, that they think peace would lower the price of corn! They are a good deal like the electors of Honiton, whose patriotism you have sketched so naturally, and much resemble the "independent burgesses" of a place that I could name, who have made so much noise lately, about their *loyalty*, and who have so nobly proved their principles by extolling those who have given them a guinea and half-a-crown for a vote, and degrading those who only gave them half-a-guinea.

STIPENDIARY CURATES' BILL.

SIR,—However different the following sentiments, on the principle of the stipendiary curates' bill, now pending in parliament, may be from those which have been hitherto expressed by you, or your correspondents, I trust to your impartiality to allow of their appearance in your Register.—So far as the bill is expressive of a *wish* to ameliorate the condition of curates, it has my most unfeigned approbation. But, this approbation is *confined* to the *wish*; and it is mingled with the sincerest regret, that the *means* intended to accomplish that *wish*, are not only inadequate to their object, but that they are likely, also, to prove injurious to the public good, so far as the general condition and influence of the great body of the clergy are concerned.—I shall, in a few words, endeavour to explain these objections to the bill.—First the *means* intended to accomplish the *wish* of the bill, to improve the condition of curates, are inadequate to

the object proposed. They are not, indeed, inadequate to increase the salaries of some curates, though this they would not do, considering the very few livings comparatively that are of the value to which the bill is intended to apply, to nearly the extent supposed; but they are inadequate to improve the condition of curates, so as to enable them, as a body, to become better able to support that rank in society, which their profession entitles them to move in. For, did even the possibility exist, of increasing every curacy in the kingdom to the sum of £250 a year, which is much more than what the bill proposes, or than any bill can accomplish, we should, in a very short time, see, at least, as much distress among that class of clergy, intended to be relieved by the bill, as we do at this present time. Let us pause a moment, and consider what would be the operation of the means proposed? Would it not be to induce many more to enter into orders than now do, without private fortune, without connections, and without any view to future preferment, in prospect of the stipend of a curacy? Now the sum mentioned is perfectly inadequate to supply even a small family, in the present state of things, with the necessities of respectable subsistence; but it would be just enough to prevail with many to enter into the church, to engage afterwards in marriage, and to expose themselves to the hard and severe shifts, which every man of reflection must know to be his lot who has to maintain a family upon a life income of £250. Compared with the great body of the clergy, few now receive holy orders on the narrow view of the remuneration they are to receive for their services, whether they are fortunate enough to have preferment in view, or whether they are to take their chance in the vineyard of their Redeemer; but the majority take orders, resting on their own private means, chiefly, for future support, and influenced by the general respectability attaching to the church from the liberal policy whereby she has hitherto been disciplined. Let this policy be cramped, and, instead of that respectability, which now attaches to the church, through all the degrees of her ministers, and which is supported by private fortune and honorable connections, it would soon be discovered, that the measure of the bill would materially injure the condition of the inferior clergy, or, what is precisely the same thing, it would hold forth to the inexperienced a hope of subsistence, it would encourage them to enter into the church, and to expose themselves, in future life, to the miseries of those who build on a scanty annuity to supply the

calls of a liberal profession.—If there be any truth in these reflexions, then it will follow, that the means, intended to be resorted to, are likely to prove injurious to the public good, so far as concerns the general condition and influence of the great body of the clergy: Whatever tends to increase the visible distress of the clergy, will necessarily diminish their influence; and a division of the income of the church; that may operate to induce any to enter into it on a scantier pay than, in the present increased expences of living, would be adequate, will increase this distress, and ultimately restrain others of more liberal means from engaging in a profession which will be respected in proportion to the external respectability of those persons who are engaged in her services.—The church is to be considered the post of honor, and not of profit. Happily, it has, hitherto, for the most part, been so considered. With exceptions, we have no other concern than to lament them. Look to the body of the clergy. You will see many living in all the comforts, and elegancies of life, curates as well as incumbents, but very few, indeed, that are enabled to do so from their preferments. The truth is, that they did not enter into the church from the narrow views of mere subsistence; but on more noble and honourable views, on feelings of attachment to the sacred profession, on the love of a life of ease and leisure for liberal studies, and in the prospect of meeting with persons embarked in the same profession as themselves, respectable in family, and above dependence for subsistence on the pay of their services. The church, indeed, notwithstanding a few glittering preferments, which allure as so many prizes in her scanty wheel, is utterly unable to pay for the services she requires, even were her revenues equalized, by any equitable remuneration for expenses of education incurred, and for advantages which must be foregone in the clerical profession.—But, such has hitherto been the wisdom of her policy, that, what she is unable to accomplish by stipends, she has actually accomplished, by what has been called the Lottery of the Church, by engaging the services of most learned, and most respectable men.—If any one is prepared to say that she has not, then he and the writer of these reflections are at issue, and little good could follow from prolonging or multiplying them. But, in the sincere belief that they have been secured, the object of these cursory reflections is to submit a consideration on the impolicy of risking the future loss of such services, by adopting the measures of the bill.—I am, Sir, yours, &c
N. T.—7th June, 1808.

STIPENDIARY CURATES.

SIR,—The curates' act of the 36 George the third was, as to augmentation of stipend, analogous to the statute of Anne which made £50 per annum the maximum. The two acts intended no *punishment* for non-residence, and left much to the discretion and benignity of the bishops.—And, in order that we may more deliberately discuss the question of residence, let it be remembered, that the several ancient statutes, viz. the 9 Ed. 2. st. 1. c. 8; the 21st. Hen. 8 c. 13, and the 25 Henry 8, c. 16, exempted from legal penalty, certain persons there described: and what is the general principle of such exemptions? That certain situations of high dignity, great responsibility, well directed industry, and many of them requiring superior talents and attainments, not omitting the consideration of personal improvement in knowledge amidst the rage of excessive reformation, were legitimate pleas for non residence. When it serves a particular purpose, we are reminded that the ordinary was not and is not bound to pay attention to these exemptions, but I never heard that such a power was ever exerted, and heaven forbid it ever should. Let us now proceed to the legal decisions, which I shall give in substance, after premising that the word *wilful* is a word which gave more latitude to a judge and jury than they ever took. It must have had an intentionally strong meaning, but, except in cases of bad health, was little attended to. Those reasonable and honourable apologies which the calls of private business, and private affection furnish were never admitted, and the word *wilful* lost all its meaning. Nor did the evil end here. The courts decided that no one was statutorily resident who did not reside in the parsonage house, and so Dr. Ibbetson was cast who lived within a few yards of his own premises. It was taken for granted that no clergyman would keep his parsonage in repair who did not live in it. The use of parochial visitations is thus taken away. But *hospitality* is pleaded.—Are parsonage houses then to become honorary inns, and especially after the establishment of parish rates, and the occasional donations of every clergyman who is competent to make them? Let the following two cases be considered as very common. A. has a living of £60 or £70 per annum. He has also private property, or which amounts to the same thing, he purchases, and builds. Could he justify it to his family to lay out hundreds upon so small a life estate? For Gilbert's act would not allow him above £120 or 140. Neither has he a right to enlarge the premi-

ses beyond the size of the living itself. An incumbent within my own knowledge did justice to his living by rebuilding the parsonage, but *resided* in a house of his own. Another incumbent had family property and a family house in one of the most populous parishes in the kingdom. Let the inhabitants say what loss they or the church sustained, by his residing half a mile out of the town. This was so far from being the case, that they have expressed every degree of respect both before and after his decease.—The ignis fatuus of hospitality has brought on a determination that if an incumbent boards in his parsonage house, he is not resident under the statutes, as if single men could do no act of liberality, and as if there was no method of feeding the poor, but in the parsonage kitchen. It was also determined that nearness of residence would not suffice, unless in the respective parishes. Thus Mr. Van Mildert and Mr. Bland, were harassed, though officiating conscientiously, and residing in the vicinity of their parishes.—Such were the hardships which legal decisions had unfortunately added, and which certainly did not arise out of the statutes, but the interpretation of them. In old towns the parishes are so numerous that whoever resides in any part of these towns is sufficiently at hand for the duties required, especially if he have also an associate.—When the late residence bill passed, the clergy seemed in general to be satisfied, having had to combat with the rigour of the statutes, the still greater rigour of legal interpretations, and most of all with ill founded prejudice and clamour: and I venture to assert from a long acquaintance with several lay districts that the instances of unjustifiable non residence were never numerous nor flagrant. In some parts of the kingdom, there are small parishes and ill endowed, and if one clergyman hold two or three of them and serve them all, he may do his duty very conscientiously; of which I have known many irrefragable proofs. If the act of the 36 Geo. III, had considered these as perpetual curacies, till they were augmented to a value which would have rendered them benefices in truth, great advantage would have followed, patrons and others would have augmented some which stand in need of it, and any one of them might be possessed by an incumbent of a living without vacating that living by cession, and which can only be resumed at an enormous expence, an expence often exceeding a whole year's income of the new *pretended* benefice.—Mr. Perceval has thought proper to say that many of the excuses in the New Residence Act

ought to have been excluded. To the immaterial who his connexions are, I have not to say, I envy neither him nor those associates. The framers of the bill would not intentionally insert anything nugatory, and no candid well-judging person will think so. There is a class of men left to the kindness of the bishops, of men, I say, who if they do their duty, are pronounced by the general suffrage of mankind, to be the most useful members of the clerical profession; I mean, the instructors of youth. Hard-hearted, indeed, must that bishop be, who would refuse a letter of licence to such persons, especially if their benefices were inadequate to their reasonable support. With impropriations belonging to laymen and corporate bodies Mr. P. *dares not interfere*. The universities and *Sion college* are justly incensed against him. If his proposal could ever have been just, which every thinking man must deny, this is not the moment to make it, when ten per cent. is taken out of every income for the exigencies of the State. The curates' act made an encroachment by allowing an ordinary to licence a curate, without the consent of the incumbent, and by making those benefices which are not such in truth. That this was a proper construction of the stat. Geo. I. is at least doubtful, but if it were, the statute should have been repealed instead of confirmed. In one word, the present bill, reprobated as it was when brought forward in substance a few years ago, if passed into a law, will descend to posterity with abhorrence and execration, as dictated by a sanctionious casuistry and a mean desire of popularity, crammed down the throats of the senators, remaining in town by the overbearing influence and importunity of office.—It will easily be seen from whom the order of privy council on the subject of residence originated, and it will be worth while to copy the bishop of Worcester's letter to Mr. Fawkener, sent a little time before his death. No one can judge of the merits or demerits of cases in the gross, but the taste of the times will relish any thing in disparagement of the regular clergy, and the greatest calumniators are they who falsely call themselves evangelical.—I am, &c. L. M.

LOCAL MILITIA BILL.

To the Lords of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled.—The humble Petition of John Cartwright of Enfield in the County of Middlesex.

Sheweth—That the Local Militia bill now before your lordships appears to your peti-

tioner to be inconsistent with that constitution, on which depend his life, liberty, and property.—That if the said bill should become part of the general system of defence for Great Britain, it would, in the humble judgment of your petitioner, greatly add to the present public danger, by tending to inspire the nation with fallacious hopes of security, while the system of defence would in reality be extremely defective, both in physical means, and moral motive.—That the physical force required by the constitution for repelling invasion, extends to the whole of the posse comitatus, including all men from 15 to 60 years of age, independent of any such regular army as might by authority of parliament be at any time in existence.—That the moral motive for contributing by taxes to the utmost of men's ability, and for hazarding life in defence of the state, is that political liberty, or, in other words, that full and substantial representation in parliament, to which the people are by the constitution entitled: but of which they are deprived in a degree which is, and for a long course of years has been, matter of extreme grief, dissatisfaction, and complaint: creating even doubts whether a House of Commons so defectively constituted as the present, and of whose members a very large proportion are dependent on the crown for lucrative offices is any protection at all to the liberties of our country.—That your petitioner believes that if, in physical means and moral motive, the system of defence for Great Britain were made as perfect as the constitution requires, the impossibility of conquering an island, and the madness of invading it would then be apparent to the enemy.—That the present defectiveness of our system of defence, by feeding the enemy with the hope of ultimately conquering our country, is the true cause of his continuing the war; and that, were parliament to perfect that defence according to the constitution, we should of consequence, very shortly have peace.—And when your petitioner casts his eye towards Spain, he is convinced that neither peace nor alliance with the present ruler of France would, for a moment, give our country security, unless the people, free and armed, should ever be ready on the instant, effectually to repel the most formidable invasion, backed by a fleet even superior in number of ships to that of England, which, in the relative situation of the two countries he may shortly be expected to possess.—Your petitioner therefore humbly hopes the said Local Militia bill will not be allowed to pass into a law, but that your lordships in conjunction with the other House of Parliament and his Ma-

jesty will, 'ere it be too late, effectually provide for the safety of the realm against invasion, by restoring to life and action those energies of the constitution, civil and military, which are applicable to defence, and in which alone are found the physical means and moral motive, whereby, as your petitioner verily believes, our endangered country, when the whole continent shall be in the hands of Buonaparte, can be defended.—And your petitioners shall ever pray, &c. &c.—J. CARTWRIGHT.—Presented by Earl Stanhope, on Saturday the 18th of June, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE AND AMERICA.—*Letter of M. Champagny, to Gen. Armstrong, dated Paris, Jan. 15, 1808. (Concluded from page 992)*

It has not been enough for her to offend against the independence of her flag, nay, against that of their territory, and of their inhabitants, by attacking them even in their ports, by forcibly carrying away their crews: her decrees of the 11th November have made a fresh attack on their commerce, and on their navigation, as they have done on those of all other powers.—In the situation in which England has placed the continent, especially since her decrees of the 11th of Nov., his Majesty has no doubts of a declaration of war against her by the U. States. Whatever transient sacrifices war may occasion, they will not believe it consistent either with their interest or dignity to acknowledge the monstrous principle, and the anarchy which that government wishes to establish on the seas. If it be useful and honourable for all nations to cause the true maritime laws of nations to be re-established and to avenge the insults committed by England against every flag, it is indispensable for the U. States, who from the extent of their commerce have oftener to complain of those violations. War exists, then in fact, between England and the U.

States, and his Majesty considers it as declared, from the day on which England published her decrees. In that persuasion his Majesty, ready to consider the U. States as associated with the cause of all the powers, who have to defend themselves against England, has not taken any definitive measures towards the American vessels which may have been brought into our ports. He has ordered that they should remain sequestered, until a decision may be had thereon, according to the dispositions which shall have been expressed by the government of the U. States.

BRAZILS.—*Ordinance, addressed to the Count de Ponte.—Dated at Bahia, Jan. 29, 1808.*

Friend,—I, the Prince Regent, send you, as my well beloved, greeting: duly considering the report which you have made to me on the condition of my subjects, and my royal revenue, on account of the present critical state of public affairs in Europe, and being desirous to give on that important subject, a speedy decision, in order to stop the farther progress of evils of such magnitude, &c. I do herewith provisionally ordain, until a general system of regulations, respecting the matters in question shall have been arranged, as follows:—1. That at the custom houses in the Brazils, all kinds of goods, merchandize, and commodities, brought either on board of foreign ships, belonging to such powers as are considered to be on terms of amity and peace with my royal crown, or in vessels belonging to my subjects, shall be admitted, on payment of 24 per cent. import duty, consisting of 20 per cent. consolidated customs, and four per cent. additional duty already established; the collection of the said customs to be effected in the same manner as has hitherto been done at the custom-house. Wine, brandy, and sweet oil, shall pay double the duty that has hitherto been levied on the said articles.—2. That it shall be lawful, not only for my own subjects, but

2 K

DIRECTIONS TO THE BOOKBINDER.

It is to be observed, that this sheet, which is the last of Volume XIII, should *not be cut open* by the Reader, but should be left to the Bookbinder, who will perceive, that the first half-sheet, of which this page makes a part, comes at the *end*, and that the other half-sheet containing the Title Page and Table of Contents, is to be cut off, and placed at the *beginning* of the Volume.

also for those of the powers above-mentioned, to export to such ports as they shall deem expedient, for the benefit of trade and agriculture, which I feel anxious to promote, every species of colonial commodities and produce, with the exception of Brazil wood and other articles, the exportation of which is already prohibited, on payment of the same export duty as has hitherto been established in the respective provinces; all laws, royal edicts, and other ordinances, which hitherto prohibited in this state of the Brazils a mutual intercourse and maritime trade between my subjects and foreign nations, remaining until farther notice suspended and without force. All which you will cause to be carried into effect with that activity and zeal which I expect from you.

SWEDEN.—*Answer to the Danish Declaration of War.*—Dated, Stockholm, 21st March 1808.

The Court of Denmark had made an alliance with France, was prepared to receive French troops in its country, collected transport vessels in its ports, fitted out all its ships in the Road of Copenhagen, to cover a French expedition against Sweden, and then issues a declaration of war. Denmark accuses Sweden of being the cause of this rupture, because she did not make her compliments of condolence on the loss of the fleet; because she would not co-operate to avenge that humiliation, and especially because she sought aid from England against such an aggression.—The relations of the king with his neighbouring power, were those of a simple peace. There was neither alliance nor any convention whatever, which traced out for the two courts any common course for their political conduct; therefore, when Sweden, Russia, and Prussia, fought in conjunction against France; Denmark, under the shade of her neutrality, appeared the friend of all. The king witnessing this system, and convinced, by some explanations demanded in the course of the year 1805, of the impossibility of obtaining a change favourable to Sweden, could not entertain a hope that the naval force of Denmark could ever be useful to him; on the contrary, after the peace of Tilsit, he had every reason to fear, that by the suggestions of Russia and France, it might one day be turned against him. His majesty therefore thought it proper to observe a profound silence relative to the events which passed in his vicinity last autumn, leaving to England and fatality to justify them.—It is due to truth however to declare, that the court of London did not invite Sweden to take part in this expedition,

nor confided it to her till the moment of it^g being carried into execution; therefore not the least movement was made in Sweden on this occasion. The English fleet arrived and departed without entering into any port of Sweden, and the auxiliary troops embarked at Pomerania were restored, in virtue of a separate article in the convention concluded at London relative to this object on the 17th of June, 1807, when certainly there was as yet no reference to this expedition. The following is the article.—It is fully understood, that in case unforeseen circumstances should render impracticable the object of this convention, or that his Britannic majesty should find it necessary to withdraw the said troops (the German Legion) from Swedish Pomerania, the stipulation of this convention shall in no manner prevent his Britannic majesty from giving such orders as he may judge proper, with respect to the ulterior disposition of these troops, which are now placed under the orders of his Swedish majesty. The court of London has since fully justified this enterprize, and the experience of every day justifies it. Numerous French armies remained in Lower Saxony, and overawed the North. There were still nations to subjugate, ports to shut, and forces to direct against England. They were to penetrate at any rate and expense: they would have acted in any case, and under any pretence that might have offered. At present, it is the expedition against the Danish fleet which is the rallying word of the whole league.—What is remarkable is, that the Danish government, already beset by French troops, overpowered, impelled, and even paid by France, issues a declaration of war against Sweden, without daring even to name the power which forces it to act. It seeks, with embarrassment, grievances and reasons to appear to have had in this determination a will of its own. It cites the remonstrances of Sweden against the arrest of the Swedish mails, as vexatious; while in its severity against English correspondence, it would not suffer it to pass according to treaty, and declares that it is imperiously obliged to take these measures. It pretends to know the thoughts of the king, and imagines them hostile, though for some months it had concerted an aggression upon Sweden.—It pretends to reason on the interests of the country, though it has abandoned its own interests, and even its existence to a foreign influence; in fine, it reproaches Sweden with having provided for her defence by a subsidiary treaty, though itself is paid for an aggression, and then it pronounces, though indeed with a kind of

timidity, the word mercenary, which the government that pays it had probably cruelly dictated to it.—It is proper here to render to his Britannic majesty the most authentic and solemn testimony, that in all his transactions with Sweden he never demanded offensive measures, nor required any thing that was not perfectly compatible with its tranquillity and independence. The most recent and convincing proof of this is the promptitude with which his ministry acceded to the proposition of the king for the pacification of the Baltic, by a formal promise not to send thither any ships of war, on conditions useful and honourable to all the North. Let the Danish government read in this proposition the complete refutation of the complaints of which the manifesto against Sweden is composed, and in the moments when it shall return to itself, let it compare the state of things which the king has desired, with that which France and Russia wish. Let all the allies of France read in this consent of England, the difference between the connections which unite the two courts and those which enchain them, and let them pronounce on which side is to be found a due regard for particular interests, and a just moderation for the general good.—Denmark herself has been during a long time the object of this moderation, and did not cease to be so till she became absolutely dangerous. When the North was outraged by the devastation of Lower Saxony, by the oppression of the Hanseatic towns, what did she to avenge them? Sweden, England, Prussia, and Russia, made war for this object; but no one thought of forcing Denmark to take part in it. She was the ally of Russia then as well as at present; why did she not embrace her cause? What could she then alledge for her tranquillity which Sweden cannot now alledge? all this is explained by the single fact which she endeavours to conceal—that she is at present under the influence of the French government. Had England followed the principles of his enemy, she would not have waited the moment of her surrender to disarm her: she would have invaded her several years before; she would have guarded her; and all this with a view to the good of the North.—The ancient alliance with Russia is made a pretext for this aggression, though all the world knows that it was merely defensive; and that it remained suspended during the late wars with Russia, when, perhaps that power might have claimed it.—The court of Denmark, in order to justify its proceedings, hesitates not to make all kinds of assertions; dares to

defend the injustice of Russia, and betrays a premeditated plot; and all this it does to conceal the chief, nay only reason, which is—that Denmark is the ally of France. But injustice and falsehood find their end; honour and truth will triumph in their turn. His majesty, relying on the justice of his cause, hopes, with conscious pride of his reigning over a brave and loyal people, so often tried by danger, and always held up by the Almighty, that the same Providence will vouchsafe to bless his arms, and restore to his subjects a safe and honourable peace, to the confusion of his enemies.

ENGLAND.—*Order in Council respecting Property in Portugal.*—Dated 4th May, 1808.

His majesty, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that all Portuguese property now detained, and not already decreed to be restored, nor entitled to restitution under his majesty's order of the 6th of January last, shall be forthwith decreed to be restored upon claims given or to be given for the same, either by the Portuguese consul, or other person duly authorised by the Portuguese minister, resident at this court, or by the agents (duly authorised) of those owners and proprietors who are not resident in Portugal, or in other places subject to the influence and controul of France, and that the part of the property so restored belonging to persons not residing in Portugal, or in other places subject to the influence and controul of France, shall be for the use and benefit of the owners and proprietors thereof; and the part belonging jointly to persons resident in Portugal, and persons resident in the Brazils, or in any settlement belonging to the crown of Portugal, or in the United Kingdom, or in any country in amity with his majesty, shall be given up to such of the owners and proprietors thereof as are resident as last-mentioned, upon an engagement entered into, and security given by or on the behalf of the said part-owners and proprietors, to the satisfaction of the Portuguese minister, to account to the Prince Regent of Portugal for such part of the said joint property as shall belong to persons resident in Portugal, or in other places subject to the influence and controul of France; and the part belonging to persons resident in Portugal or in other places subject to the influence and controul of France, shall be at the future disposition of the Prince Regent of Portugal.—And it is further ordered, that the joint agents to whom the property has been or shall be delivered pursuant to the

said order of the 6th of January last, shall be, and they are hereby authorized and directed, after the said property shall have been decreed to be restored, to proceed to the sale of such property, or of such parts thereof, as the Portuguese minister resident at this court shall signify to them, in writing, the expediency of selling in the manner most beneficial for the parties interested therein, and to invest the proceeds of such parts as shall be sold in government securities, under the previous sanction, in writing, of the Portuguese minister, and to hold the same, together with the property not sold, at the disposal and subject to the future directions of the Prince Regent of Portugal, to be signified to them through his minister resident in London: And the the right hon. the lords commissioners of his majesty's Treasury, his majesty's principal secretaries of state, the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and the judge of the right court of admiralty, and judges of the courts of vice-Admiralty,* are to take the necessary measures herein as to them shall respectively appertain.

SICILY AND ENGLAND.—*Treaty of Alliance and Subsidy between his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the King of the two Sicilies.*—Signed at Palermo, 30th of March, 1808.

His majesty the king of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his majesty the king of the two Sicilies, being equally animated by a sincere desire of strengthening more and more the ties of friendship and good understanding which so happily subsist between them, have judged that nothing could contribute more efficaciously to that salutary end, than the conclusion of a treaty of alliance and subsidy:—For this purpose their said majesties have named their respective plenipotentiaries, viz. his Britannic majesty, the right hon. W. Drummond, one of his majesty's most hon. privy council, and his envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at the court of his said Sicilian majesty;—and his majesty the king of the two Sicilies, the right illustrious and right excellent Thomas de Semma, marquis of Circello, his gentleman of the chamber, field-marshal of his armies, knight of his royal order of St. Januarius, his councillor of state, secretary of state for the department of foreign affairs, and superintendant-general of the posts; who, after having communicated their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles:—Art. I. There shall be a continuance

of the sincere and constant friendship between his Britannic majesty and his majesty the king of the two Sicilies, their heirs and successors, which has always subsisted up to the present time.—Art. II. The two high contracting parties shall afford to each other during the present war with France, every succour and assistance in proportion to their respective forces, and shall prevent by common consent every thing that can cause them trouble or detriment.—Art. III. His majesty the king of the two Sicilies, engages to grant to the troops of his Britannic majesty, stationed in the fortresses of Sicily, and to all British ships of war, an exemption from all duties belonging to him, upon every thing of which the British squadrons in the Mediterranean, and the troops of that nation may stand in need, and which the country can furnish, in provisions, food, and in military and naval stores.—

Art. IV. His Sicilian majesty, being desirous of giving an additional proof of the sentiments by which he is animated, also engages to exempt from all duties belonging to him upon such provisions as may be requisite for the British ships of war at Malta, as well as all military stores which are to be found in the country, on condition, however, that each vessel or vessels of war be furnished with a requisition from the governor of the said island, which shall specify the articles, and the quantity required. Art. V. His Sicilian majesty further engages, in virtue of the present treaty, never to allow the enemies of Great Britain to bring into any of his ports during the present war, any British ships taken by the enemies of Great Britain. Art. VI. His Sicilian majesty also engages to open the ports of the two Sicilies during the present war, to British squadrons, as well as to all merchant and other ships belonging to British subjects, without any restriction whatever, referring to the third article, with respect to exemption from duties. Art. VII. His Britannic majesty engages in return, to defend during the present war the fortresses of Messina and Augusta, and to maintain there for that purpose, at his charge and expence, a body of troops which, in the present war, shall consist of ten thousand men, and to augment their number if the case shall require it. The disposition of which troops in the said fortresses, shall be in such manner and proportion as the commanding officer (to whom every requisite facility shall be given) shall judge expedient: and his Britannic majesty stipulates, that the said general officers shall have the power of exercising martial law in the above-mentioned garrisons, with

respect to their British troops, in the same manner, and according to the same rules, as are observed in other English garrisons.—Quarters for the said troops shall be provided in the above-mentioned fortresses by his Sicilian majesty. Art. VIII. His Britannic majesty further engages to pay his Sicilian majesty, during the continuance of the present war, an annual subsidy of three hundred thousand pounds sterling (to commence from the 10th of September 1805, when the British and Russian troops landed in the Neapolitan territory), payable at the rate of twenty-five thousand pounds sterling per month; which payment shall always be made one month in advance, computing from the date of the signature of the present treaty. His Sicilian majesty purposing to employ the said subsidies for the use of his marine and of his land forces, shall regulate the distribution of them in such proportion as these two services may require, for the defence of his states, and for operations against the common enemy, and an account shall be given every three months to the British government, of the manner in which his Sicilian majesty shall have employed the subsidies paid to him by Great Britain. Art. IX. The two high contracting parties desiring to strengthen more and more the ties which unite the two nations, and to extend their mutual relations, will employ themselves, as soon as possible, in concluding a treaty of commerce, the articles of which shall be equally advantageous to the subjects of both states. Art. X. His Sicilian majesty engages not to conclude with France a peace separate from England; and his Britannic majesty on his part also engages not to make a peace with France, without comprehending and saving in it the interests of his Sicilian majesty.—Art. XI. The present treaty of alliance and of subsidy shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties, and the ratification shall be exchanged in due form in London, within the space of four months, from the date of its signature, or sooner if possible.—In witness whereof, we the undersigned, furnished with full power from our respective sovereigns, have signed the present treaty, and have thereunto affixed the seal of our arms.—Done at Palermo, this 30th day of March, 1808.—W. DRUMMOND, (L. S.)—THOS. DE SOMMA, (L. S.)

SWEDEN.—*Report from Major General Baron Anekarward, touching the Transaction in the Island of Gothland.*

I received this moment by Assessor Dubbe, a report from admiral baron Cedersstrom, that your majesty's fleet, consisting of three sail of line, two frigates, two armed brigs, the yacht Fortuna, and several transports, dropped anchor, on the 14th inst. in Sandweek road, and that the same evening, the Swedish troops, infantry and artillery, were disembarked. On the following day, the 15th, arrived in Wesley, a Swedish flag of truce, with the annexed articles of capitulation, which were signed the 16th.—The Swedish van guard, composed of chasseurs, entered the town the 17th, as the Russian troops had already marched to Slito. The chief of brigade, lieutenant colonel baron Halwood, marched with the main body to Slito, on account of the Russians, having contrary to the capitulation, spiked several guns, spoiled a large quantity of gunpowder, and not paid the debts which they had bound themselves to discharge. The 18th, admiral baron Cederstrom, intended to weigh anchor and proceed to Slito, in order to prevail on admiral Bodisko to fulfil the terms of the capitulation.—Assessor Dubbes' report to me, is dated the 18th instant.—*Articles relative to the Evacuation of the Isle of Gothland.*—I. His imperial Russian majesty's troops are to evacuate the island within two days, and to deliver to his Swedish majesty's troops, all arms, ammunition, and artillery which they brought with them or took, in the island. They are to give their word of honour, that they will not serve before the expiration of a twelvemonth, against the king of Sweden or his allies.—II. All effects and magazines, of whatever name or description, which belong to the king of Sweden, and which have been consumed by the Russian troops, shall be paid for, and the value of all requisitions which may have been enforced, shall also be made good.—III. The Russian troops are to take with them all their effects and property, and to march to Slito; they are there to embark on board the same transports that brought them thither; they shall be furnished with a passport, in order that they may be able to return unmolested to Russian or Prussian harbours; and should they stand in need of provisions, they shall be supplied with them on making payment for the same. The 4-16th May, 1808.—RUDOLPH CEDERSTROM. BODISKO, Rear Adm. and Kn.

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